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CHAP. I.
How far we may seeke to expresse what by light of Na∣ture, or otherwayes, may be conceived concerning the incomprehensible Essence, or his Attributes.
FIrst, if every particular man, or bodie generable, have precedent causes of their beings; their whole generations must of necessity have some cause: o∣therwise all should not be of one kinde or nature. Now this progresse from effects unto their causes, or betwixt causes subordinate, cannot be infinite: but as all progressive motion supposeth some rest or stay, whence it proceedeth, so must this progresse, whereof I speake, take beginning from some cause, which hath no cause of its being. And this is that incomprehensible Essence, which wee seeke.
2 But whereunto shall wee liken him? Things compared alwayes agree in some one kind, or have (at least) a common measure. Is then this cause of causes contained in any predicamentall ranck of be∣ing? Or can our conceipt of any thing therein con∣tained, be truly fitted unto him? Or may his infi∣nite and incomprehensible nature be rightly moul∣ded within the circumference of mans shallow braine? One thing it is to represent the infinite Es∣sence, another to illustrate this truth, that he cannot be represented. Though nothing can exactly re∣semble him, yet some things there be which better notifie how farre he is beyond all resemblance or