A treatise of the divine essence and attributes. By Thomas Iackson Doctor in Divinitie, chaplaine to his Majestie in ordinary, and vicar of S. Nicolas Church in the towne of Newcastle upon Tyne. The first part

About this Item

Title
A treatise of the divine essence and attributes. By Thomas Iackson Doctor in Divinitie, chaplaine to his Majestie in ordinary, and vicar of S. Nicolas Church in the towne of Newcastle upon Tyne. The first part
Author
Jackson, Thomas, 1579-1640.
Publication
London :: Printed by M[iles] F[lesher] for Iohn Clarke, and are to be sold at his shop under St. Peters Church in Cornhill,
1628 [i.e. 1629]
Rights/Permissions

To the extent possible under law, the Text Creation Partnership has waived all copyright and related or neighboring rights to this keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above, according to the terms of the CC0 1.0 Public Domain Dedication (http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/). This waiver does not extend to any page images or other supplementary files associated with this work, which may be protected by copyright or other license restrictions. Please go to http://www.textcreationpartnership.org/ for more information.

Subject terms
Apostles' Creed -- Commentaries.
Providence and government of God -- Early works to 1800.
God -- Attributes -- Early works to 1800.
Link to this Item
http://name.umdl.umich.edu/A04194.0001.001
Cite this Item
"A treatise of the divine essence and attributes. By Thomas Iackson Doctor in Divinitie, chaplaine to his Majestie in ordinary, and vicar of S. Nicolas Church in the towne of Newcastle upon Tyne. The first part." In the digital collection Early English Books Online. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A04194.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed May 16, 2025.

Pages

Page 3

CHAP. I.

How far we may seeke to expresse what by light of Na∣ture, or otherwayes, may be conceived concerning the incomprehensible Essence, or his Attributes.

FIrst, if every particular man, or bodie generable, have precedent causes of their beings; their whole generations must of necessity have some cause: o∣therwise all should not be of one kinde or nature. Now this progresse from effects unto their causes, or betwixt causes subordinate, cannot be infinite: but as all progressive motion supposeth some rest or stay, whence it proceedeth, so must this progresse, whereof I speake, take beginning from some cause, which hath no cause of its being. And this is that incomprehensible Essence, which wee seeke.

2 But whereunto shall wee liken him? Things compared alwayes agree in some one kind, or have (at least) a common measure. Is then this cause of causes contained in any predicamentall ranck of be∣ing? Or can our conceipt of any thing therein con∣tained, be truly fitted unto him? Or may his infi∣nite and incomprehensible nature be rightly moul∣ded within the circumference of mans shallow braine? One thing it is to represent the infinite Es∣sence, another to illustrate this truth, that he cannot be represented. Though nothing can exactly re∣semble him, yet some things there be which better notifie how farre he is beyond all resemblance or

Page 4

comparison, then others can doe. By variety of such resemblances as his works afford, may our ad∣miration of his incomprehensiblenesse bee raised higher and higher, and with our admiration thus raised, will our longing after his presence still be en∣larged. The nature of things finite and limited, no Philosopher can so exactly expresse, as Painters may their outward lineaments. But as some sensible objects, besides their proper shape or character, imprint a kinde of dislike or pleasance in creatures sensitive: so have our purest and most exact con∣ceipts intellectuall certaine symptomaticall impres∣sions annexed, which inwardly affect us; though we cannot outwardly so expresse them, as they may imprint the like affection in others. Hence it is that the more right resemblances we make to our selves of any thing, the greater will be the symptomati∣call impression of the latent truth; some part or shadow whereof appeareth in every thing, where∣to it can truly be compared. And though we can∣not in this life come to a cleare view of that nature, which we most desire to see; yet is it a worke wor∣thy our paines, to erect our thoughts, by varietie of resemblances (made with due observance of de∣corum) unto an horizon more ample then ordinary; in whose skirts or edges, wee may behold some scattered rayes of that glorious light, which is ut∣terly set unto men, whose thoughts soare not with∣out the circumference of this visible world; for all we see with ou bodily eyes, is but an hemisphere of midnight darknesse, to the habitation of Saints, and seat o blisse.

Page 5

3 The rule of decorum in all resemblances of things amiable or glorious is, that as well the sim∣ple termes of comparison be sightly and handsome, as the proportion betweene them exact. Supposing the ods of valorous strength betweene Aiax and or∣dinary Trojanes, to have beene as great, as Homer would have us beleeve it was; the manner of this Champions retreat, being overcharged with the multitude of his Enemies, could not more exqui∣sitely be resembled, than by a company of children, driving an hungry hard-skinned Asse with bats or staves out of a corne-field or meadow. The Asse cannot, by such weaklings, be driven so hard, but he will feed as he goes; nor could Aiax be charged so fiercely by his impotent foes, but that he fought still as he fled. The proportion is approved, as most exact, by a* 1.1 teacher of Poetry that was his Arts Master, who not∣withstanding, with the same breath disallows the invention, as no way applyable unto Turnus, at least in the courtly censure of those times wherein Virgil wrote. Be the congruity betweene the termes never so exquisite or pleasant; the Asse notwithstanding is no amiable creature, nor can wisedome or valour, for his many base properties willingly brook comparison with him in any. More

Page 6

fitly (as this Author thinketh) might Turnus his heroicall spirit have beene paralleld by a Lion, which though unable to sustaine the fierce pursuit of many hunters, yet cannot be enforced to any o∣ther march, then Passant gardant.

4 But wee must allow the Poet (whose chiefe art is to please his Readers appetite with pleasant sauces, more then with solid meates,) to bee more dainty and curious in this kinde, than it is requisite the School-divine or Philosopher should be: albeit neither of them need much to feare, lest their dis∣courses be too comely, so solidity of truth bee the ground of their comelinesse. No courtly Poet is more observant of the former rule of decorum in their comparisons, than the holy Prophets are. Thus hath the Lord spoken unto mee (saith Esaias, cap. 31. vers. 4.) Like as the Lion, and the young Lion roring on his prey, when a multitude of shepheards is called forth against him, hee will not bee afraid of their voice, nor abase himselfe for the noise of them: so shall the Lord of hosts come downe to fight for mount Sion, and for the hill thereof. Saint* 1.2 Austin hath noted three sorts of errors in setting forth the divine nature: of which, two go upon false grounds, the other is altogether groundlesse. Some (saith he) there be that seeke to measure things spirituall by the best knowledge which they have gotten (by

Page 7

sence or art) of things bodily. Others doe fit the Deity with the nature and properties of the hu∣mane soule, and from this false ground frame many deceiptfull and crooked rules, whilest they endea∣vour to draw the picture or image of the immu∣table Essence. A third sort there be, which by too much straining to transcend every mutable crea∣ture, patch up such conceipts, as cannot possibly hang together, either upon created or increated na∣tures, and these rove further from the truth then doe the former. As (to use his instance) He which thinkes God to be bright or yellow, is much de∣ceived; yet his errour wants not a cloke, in as much as these colours have some being (from God) in bodies. His errour againe is as great, that thinkes God sometimes forgets, and sometimes cals things forgotten to minde; yet this vicissitude of memo∣rie and oblivion, hath place in the humane soule, which in many things is like the Creator. But hee which makes the Divine nature so powerfull, as to produce or beget it selfe, quite misseth not the marke onely, but the Butt, and shoots (as it were) out of the field: for nothing possible can possibly give it selfe being or existence.

5 But though in no wise wee may avouch such grosse impossibilities of him, to whom nothing is impossible; yet must we often use fictions or suppo∣sitions of things scarce possible, to last so long till we have moulded conceipts of the Essence and At∣tributes incomprehensible, more lively and sem∣blable, then can be taken either from the humane soule alone, or from bodies naturall. To main∣taine

Page 8

it as a Philosophical truth, that God is the soule of this universe, is an impious errour* 1.3 before con∣demned, as a grand seminary of Idolatry. Yet by imagining the humane soule to be as really existent in every place, whereto the cogitations of it can reach, as it is in our bodies, or rather to exercise the same motive power over the greatest bodily substance in this world, that it doth over our fin∣gers, able to weild the Heavens or Elements with as great facility and speed, as we doe our thoughts or breath: We may, by this fiction, gaine a more true modell or shadow of Gods infinite efficacy, then any one created substance can furnish us with∣all. But whilest we thus, by imagination, transfuse our conceipts of the best life and motion, which we know, into this great Sphere, which we see, or (which sute better to the immutable and infinite essence) into bodies abstract or mathematicall: we must make such a compound as Tacitus would have made of two noble Romanes: Demptis utriusque vitiis solae virtutes misceantur: The imperfections of both being sifted from them, their perfections onely must be ingredients in this compound. Yet may we not thinke, that the divine nature, which we seeke to expresse by them, consists of perfections infinite, so united or compounded. We must yet use a fur∣ther extraction of our conceits, ere wee apply them to his incomprehensible nature.

Notes

Do you have questions about this content? Need to report a problem? Please contact us.