A treatise of the divine essence and attributes. By Thomas Iackson Doctor in Divinitie, chaplaine to his Majestie in ordinary, and vicar of S. Nicolas Church in the towne of Newcastle upon Tyne. The first part

SECTION II. (Book 2)

Of Divine Providence in generall: and how contingency, and necessity in things created are subject unto it. (Book 2)

CHAP. 9.

Of the perpetuall dependance which all things crea∣ted have on the Almighty Creator, both for their beeing and their operations.

1 BVt will it suffice us to beleeve, that as Art hath its proper sub∣ject made or fitted by Nature; or as more perfect substances praesuppose an imperfect state in Nature: so this imperfect state of nature, or the subject on which naturall efficients do work, was made of nothing, without any coagency of Nature or Art, by the sole power of the Almighty Father? To beleeve all this, is but the first part of our beleefe of this Article of Creation. For better apprehending the intire object of our beleefe in this point, we are

to observe the difference betwixt the dependance, which Art hath on nature, or which workes artifi∣ciall have on the Artificer, or which more perfect naturall substances have on the imperfect substan∣ces, whereof they are made, or on their naturall efficients; and the dependance which both naturall Agents & Patients, & which efficient causes as wel artificiall as naturall, with their severall matters or subjects, have on the Almighty Creator and Ma∣ker of all things. First then nature or causes natu∣rall, after they have finished their proper works, and fitted them for Art to worke upon, do not co∣operate with the Artificer in fashioning them to his ends or purpose. The Artificer againe, after he hath finished his worke, doth not continually support, preserve or apply it to those uses, unto which it serves; but leaves this unto their care for whose convenience it was made. The Clocke-maker doth not tye himselfe to keep all the Clocks which he makes: nor doth he which undertakes to keepe them, binde himselfe to watch their motions perpetually, or to observe them as curiously as Physitians doe their sicke Patients. Againe, the most perfect works of nature, as vegetables and living things, depend upon their causes, whether materiall or efficient, (for the most part) onely in fieri, not in facto, whilest they are in making or in perfecting, not after they be made and perfected. The Lyonesse doth not perpetually nourish her whelps with her owne substance; nor doth the Raven continually provide for her young ones; or any o∣ther creatures more kinde than they, perpetually

support or direct their brood in their motions, but leave them to fend for themselves. If the Almigh∣tie Creator should doe no better by his most per∣fect Creatures, their returne to nothing, would be as speedy, as their production from it. All of them have a perpetuall and undispensable dependance upon his power, not onely whilst they are in ma∣king, but as great after they are made. And thus great and perpetuall it is, not in respect of their sub∣stances onely, but as truly in respect of their moti∣ons or operations. The imperfect masse or matter whereof bodies naturall are made, is not onely his sole worke, or effect of his Omnipotency; but that it is workable or fashionable unto any set forme, this likewise is an effect of his operative power; it could not be perpetually thus fashionable, but by his per∣petuall working. That the most perfect naturall Agent, should worke or dispose this matter to any set forme: this likewise is his worke. He doth not onely support both Agent and Patient in that being which he gave them, but doth perpetually coope∣rate with them in their motions; doth apply and direct their motions unto those ends and uses, whereto his wisdome hath ordained them.

2 Concerning the manner of that perpetuall dependance, which all finite Agents with their ef∣fects, have on the one Omnipotent and supreame illimited efficient, whether in respect of their ex∣istence or operation; the disputes in Schooles are intricate, and the questions perplexed. But the best is, the ingenuous Reader may quit them, if he will be but pleased to take unto himselfe, if not

an ocular demonstration, yet a visible representation of this truth, in that perpetuall dependance, which light diffused (whether through the celestiall bo∣dies, as the moone or starres, or through the ayre or other inferiour elementary bodies capable of en∣lightning) hath on the Fountaine of Light, to wit, the body of the Sunne: or which the light in rooms, otherwise dark, hath on the light of Fire or candles by night. So perpetuall, so essentiall is this depen∣dance which light, in bodies inlightned by others, hath on the bodies which enlighten them; that some* 1.1 good Philosophers, from observation of this dependance, have concluded, that [Lumen. non est inhaesive in corpore illuminato, sed in cor∣pore lucente▪] The lightsomnesse which appeares in these inferiour bodies, or in bodies not lucent in themselves, is not inherently or subjectively, in the borrowers, or bodies enlightned, but in the bodies which enlightens them. To prove this conclusion, they use this Antecedent, that light borrowed or participated, doth follow the motion of the body which bestowes or lends it; and this Antecedent they thinke sufficiently proved by sense. For if we hold a looking-glasse to a candle by night, the light which for the present appeares either in the whole glasse or in some part of it, will alter its place or seat according to the motion of the candle. If you move the candle higher or lower than it was, the light in the glasse will remove with it, from the highest place to the lowest, and from the lowest to the highest, as it shall please the mover to alter the aspect betwixt them, so will the light move from

one part of the roome to another, as the candle is re∣moved. And if you take the candle quite out of the roome, the light will follow it, and leave no∣thing but darknesse behind. The same observa∣tion holds as true in a Dyall, in which the light or shadow constantly followes the motion of the Sun. But to hold this conclusion, [That light borrowed from the Sunne or a Candle, should be inherently or subjectively in the Sunne or Candle] is more than true Philosophy will warrant; more than the unquestionable truth of the former experiment can logically inferre. For though light in bodies not lucent in themselves, bee not their owne, but borrowed; yet in that it is borrowed, it must bee truly in the borrower, not in the body which lends it. For every one which lends, is presumed to transfer the use of what hee lends unto him that borrowes: the borrower must have the posses∣sion of what is lent him, during the time of the loane. As for the former experiments, they may be retorted upon such as use their helpe for infer∣ring this pretended conclusion, [* 1.2 That light diffu∣sed is not inherently in the body enlightned, but in the body lucent, or enlightning.] For the muta∣tion of the seat of borrowed light, whether in a look∣ing-glasse held to a candle, or in a Sun-dyall, will be the very same, albeit the Candle or Dyall stand still in the same place; if so we move the Looking-glasse the same way from the Candle, or the Dyall the same way from the Sunne, by which the Sun did move from the Dyall, or the Candle was mo∣ved from the Looking-glasse. This conclusion is

most certaine, [That the motion of light, accor∣ding to the motion of the body which diffuseth it, doth no way inferre the light not to be inherently, (according to the inherency which it hath) in the body, through which it is diffused; but rather that this light, however inherent in the body enlight∣ned, hath a perpetuall indispensable dependance upon the light of the body which produceth it; a dependance on it, not onely in fieri, that is, whilest it is in production, which is in an instant; but a de∣pendance in facto, so long as it continues in the bo∣dy enlightned. And we cannot better conceive the manner, how a line should be made by the con∣tinued fluxe of a point, or a surface by the continued motion of a line; or how time should receive its continuation from the continued fluxe of an in∣stant, than by observing the manner how light being produced in an instant in the body, which borrowes it (the extremity of it being terminated to a mathematicall point or line) doth vary its place of residence in the same body, moving continually from one part to another, according to the degrees of motion, either of the body which gives the light, or of the body which is enlightned, one from the other. If either body could move or bee moved from the aspect of the other, in an instant, the light would remove from the body enlightned in the same instant. But moving as it doth, the motion of the light from one part of the same body or roome into another, is perpetuall; there is no in∣terruption in the motion so much as momentary, no interposition of darknesse so long as the motion

lasts. And yet it is not the same numericall light, which thus moveth in the bodie or roome enlight∣ned. There is a continuall production of light fully answerable to the continuall succession of the mo∣tion. The light, whilest in motion, continues no longer the same than the aspect betweene the bodie enlightning and enlightned continues the same. And it may be questioned, whether there be not a perpetuall production of new light, even whilest neyther the body enlightning nor enlightned re∣move one from the other, whilest both stand or rest upon their severall centers.

3 But what ever Philosophers may dispute one way or other concerning the proper subject of light diffused or participated, or concerning the identifie or multiplication of it in bodies not lucent in them∣selves, but enlightned: the dependance of borrowed or participated light upon the fountaine of light, whence it is borrowed, is the most perfect Em∣bleme, which the eye of man can behold, of that dependance which all things numerable that are, or can be, have on the incomprehensible Essence, or in∣exhaustible fountaine of Beeing. Whether light participated or diffused, have any true inherence or no in bodies enlightned, or whether it be present with them or in them, (ad modum spiritalium) af∣ter such a manner as spirits are in sublunary bodies, or with them; this is certaine, that light participa∣ted, is not deduced or drawne out of any matter praeexistent, or out of any positive qualitie inhe∣rent; it is produced out of darknes or want of light. And herein it is the true Embleme of created Enti∣ties,

w^ch were not made of any entities praeexistent, but of nothing. As light participated or diffused, hath no permanent root in bodies enlightned: So things created have not their root of beeing in any maetter praeexistent, nor hath the prime matter, of which things generated are made, any root prece∣dent out of which it groweth. Such being as it hath, it hath intirely by its perpetuall dependance upon beeing it selfe. The most excellent numerable bee∣ing that can be imagined, is more truely participa∣ted or borrowed from beeing it selfe, than the light of the Moone or Sarres, than the light in the ayre, water, or yce, is from the body of the Sunne. And albeit the formes or perfect bodies, which, by ope∣ration of efficients naturall, respectively result or are produced out of the matter, have a being di∣stinct from the matter, out of which they are made or produced: yet even these have the same imme∣diate dependency upon the incomprehensible Es∣sence or inexhaustible fountaine of Beeing, which the prime matter hath. As the resplendencie or ir∣radiation of coloured glasses, be they yellow, greene or azure, have the same immediate dependance upon the light of the Sunne, which the light diffu∣sed throughout the heavens, water, ayre, or pure glasses, hath; unlesse the Sun send forth his beames upon them, these colours have no resplendencie, they cannot affect the sense of sight. Nor can any created Agent (albeit endowed with qualities ope∣rative, more forcible and permanent, than any co∣loured glasses can bee) produce any reall effect, without the cooperation or coagencie of the in∣comprehensible

Essence, or inexhaustible fountaine of Beeing. As impossible it is, that any agent should move, or be moved, otherwise than by the vertue of his Almighty power, as that it should have beeing or existence (extra infinitum esse) without his infi∣nite Beeing or immensitie, or that the continuance of it in such being, should not be comprehended in his infinite and interminable duration, which wee call Eternitie. Againe, as light borrowed or diffu∣sed throughout this inferiour world, hath a beeing in its kinde distinct from that light, which is per∣manently seated in the fountaine of light, on which, notwithstanding, all borrowed light abso∣lutely depends as being eminently contained in it: so every numerable beeing, or part of this world, the Sunne, the Moone, the Starres, the Elements, mixt bodies, vegetables, man, and beast, have their proper kinde of Beeing distinct each from other, and distinct againe from the incomprehensible fountaine of beeing; on which notwithstanding all of them have more immediate, more essentiall de∣pendance, than either the lights, or different shapes in a glasse, have on the Sunne which gives the light, or on the bodies which they represent. And in this incomprehensible fountaine of beeing, all things not onely which are, but which possibly may bee, are more eminently contained, than the least-spar∣kles or portions of borrowed light, which appeare in broken glasses, are in the body of the Sunne.

4 In this point onely, or in this especially, is the production of light in this inferiour world by the Sunne, unlike the Creation of all things by the Al∣mighty

Father of lights, in that the Sunne produ∣ceth light or resplendency, without any free choice or intelligence, but by a necessitie of nature, that is, it so produceth light, as it hath no power not to produce it. So doth not the Almighty Father ey∣ther create the things that are, or preserve them in their estate of beeing, or cooperate with them in the production of such effects, as they in their seve∣rall kindes and rankes are truly said to produce. For albeit the Almighty Father, bee more immutable than the Sunne, yet is hee immutably free. For freedome of will, by which creatures rationall ex∣ceede all creatures meerly naturall, or capable of no better endowment then sense, being a true and reall branch of beeing, a perfection of the most per∣fect creatures, must be as truely and really, though in an eminent manner, contained in the Maker of all things, as any other branch of numerable beeing is. Now the object of this freedome of will in the Omnipotent Maker, is not onely the Creation or not creation of things that are or may bee; not the preservation or destruction of things created, or of the severall endowments or qualifications: but part of this object of divine freedome is the ena∣bling or inhibiting of all his creatures, to exercise those qualities or faculties which are to them most naturall, and in their kinde most powerfull. Albeit Nebuchadnezzar had power to make the flames of intēded persecution, much hotter than any ordina∣ry fire; though other Tyrants might have power to make the like againe, much hotter than hee did, or to environ Gods Saints with the fire of Hell; yet

if the Almighty Creator withdraw the influence of his power from such fire or flames, they can have no more power to burne or scorch his Ser∣vants, than they have to coole them; although we suppose their nature and qualities to be preserved still entire, by the same power, by which they were created. For as (but now) was said, the inhibition or enabling of naturall qualities or faculties to ex∣ercise their native force, is as truely the object of divine freedome, as the preservation or destruction of the Agents themselves, with their qualities or endowments is. For the same reason, the Sunne was no way wounded in his substance, nor hurt, nor tainted in its influence or other qualitie, when, by the divine power, which is immutably and perpe∣tually free, it was inhibited in its course or mo∣tion.

5 That the Almightie Creator neyther in our time, nor in the times long before us, hath laid any such restraint upon the Sunne, that it should not move, or upon the fire, that it should not burne, is not from any restraint which hee hath laid upon his power by his eternall decree; but from his immuta∣ble and eternall freedome. Wee may not say, that he cannot, for the times present or which are to come, lay the like inhibition upon the Sunne, upon the fire, or upon other celestiall or sublunarie bodies, for exercising the functions most naturall to them. That hee will not, at any time, lay the like restraint upon them, wee are not bound to beleeve, untill thus much be by his word revealed unto us. That God cannot at this time bring such a generall In∣undation

upon the earth as hee did in the dayes of Noah, we may not say or thinke: but that hee will not destroy the world by water, wee must beleeve, because wee have his solemne promise to this pur∣pose sealed unto us, by the signe of the Bow in the Cloud. But when the iniquitie of this present world shall come unto the same height and mea∣sure, which the old world had made up, wee be∣leeve hee will destroy it by fire. For other mutati∣ons in the course of nature, the condition or exi∣gence of times ensuing, may be such, as that they may be as strange and miraculous, as at any time heretofore they have beene. The not interposing of miracles in these our dayes, proceedes not from any Act passed by the Almightie to the contrary, nor from the unchangeablenesse of his eternall will; but from the condition or course, which his crea∣tures hold de facto, whose condition or estate is in it selfe, and by his Almighty will so to have it, so changeable and so improveable to different pur∣poses, that many events, which to our observation would be most strange, might upon speciall occa∣sions be produced, without any change or altera∣tion in his power, whose exercise ad extra, that is, in respect of effects producible in the creature, is im∣mutably free, untill hee promise to inhibit them, as hee hath done the generall Inundation. And al∣though hee be most immutable in all his promises or inhibitions: yet doth not every promise or in∣hibition which hee makes, induce an absolute im∣mutabilitie or necessitie of the things promised or inhibited. Their immutabilitie or necessitie is the

proper effect of his more solemne or peculiar pro∣mises. Nor are such inhibitions as he hath set un∣to the water absolutely necessary from Eternity, but grow necessary in revolution of time, by the changeable condition of the Creature. And albeit we can neither prescribe limits to his will, nor con∣ceive any reason of the mutations which fall out in the Creatures by his inhibition, by his permission, or by his positive enabling them to exercise their native functions; yet of the least mutation, that can fall out in the world, he knowes a cause or reason, nor doth he suffer any thing to be done, for which his immutable freedome in governing the world, hath not an eternall rule or reason infinitely more perfect, than the wisest man living can give any for his best Acts or undertakings. But suppose the Sun to have that freedome of power in the emission or not emission of his beames, which men have over their breath, or that dexterity in tempering or mo∣derating its light or influence, which skilfull Mu∣sitians have in modulating their voices: and the former representation of that power which God hath over all his creatures, and of their dependance on him in their beings and operations by the de∣pendance which light hath on the Sunne, would be more lively and full.

6 But the Psalmist hath made choice of that free power, which man hath over his animall fa∣culties, as over his breath or operation of his senses; as the fairest picture of Gods free power creative and providence over his Creatures. These wait all upon thee, that thou mightest give them their meat in

due seasons. That thou givest them, they gather: thou openest thine hand, they are filled with good. Thou hidest thy face, they are troubled: thou takest away their breath, they dye, and returne to their dust. Thou sendest forth thy spirit, they are created: and thou renewest the face of the earth. The glory of the Lord shall endure for ever: the Lord shall rejoyce in his workes. He looketh on the earth, and it trembleth: he toucheth the hils and they smoake. Psal. 104. vers. 27. &c. Yet even in these and the like emblemati∣call expressions of the Creators free power over his Creatures, or in the choisest that can bee taken or gathered out of the Propheticall descriptions, from the exercise of mens free and purest thoughts, there will still remaine this disparity: We cannot alter the objects of our intellectuall or abstract con∣templations, without some alteration or change of Acts. It is then the prerogative of the Almighty, freely to will things most contrary and different, without any diversity in his will. And this his free will not onely worketh greater varietie or change in the Creature, than the wits of all men in the world can conceive, but withall irresistibly deter∣mines the issue of every possible change, without any shadow of change or alteration in his thoughts or resolutions; which in him are not many, but more truly one infinity, than any one thought in us is one. This disparity betweene the Identity of his Eternall knowledge, and of his immutable freedome, and the manner of our understanding or intellectu∣all choice, I cannot yet better represent than by the * 1.3former disparity, betweene the circle and many

sided figures. Mans purest intellectuall thoughts or actuall choices, are in the contemplative part of the soule, as angles are in many sided figures, all as different each from other, as one angle is from a∣nother in a quadrangle, and every one is as distinct from the substance of the soule wherein they are, as angles in a quadrangle are from the sides or surface of it. But those which wee terme, or conceive as severall Acts or exercises of the Divine power, as the Act of creation, the act of preservation, the act of conseruation, the production of miracles, &c. are in the Almighty, not so much distinct one from another, or from his incomprehensible essence, as the Angles in a circle are from the sides or from the circumference, which notwithstanding is a to∣tangle, in which there is no sensible distinction be∣tweene sides and Angles, albeit both of them bee truly contained in the circumference, as all power and freedome of power is contained in the immu∣table, infinite and incomprehensible Essence.

CHAP. 10.

The usuall and daily operations of naturall causes with their severall events or successes, are as immediate∣ly ascribed to the Creator by the Prophets, as the first Creation of all things, with the reasons why they are so ascribed.

1 FRom the forementioned hun∣dred and fourth Psalme, which is no other than a sweet para∣phrase upon the sixe dayes work of Creation, and from the like propheticall emblazoning of Gods glory, which amounts from consideration of his workes; the intelligent Reader will informe himselfe, that the continuall rising and setting of the Sunne and Moone, their incessant diffusion of light through this visible World, the perpetuall ascent of springing waters into the hills, their con∣tinuall decursion from them into the Sea, the limi∣tation of the Seas ebbing and flowing, the daily growth of plants and vegetables, the motion of li∣ving things on the earth and in the waters, are as immediately and as intirely ascribed unto the ope∣rative power of the Creator, as their first Creation out of nothing was. Yet the reason of their ascri∣bing all this unto the immediate and sole power of God, will no way warrant the truth of their cri∣ticisme, who teach that neither the fire doth truly heat or burne, or the water really coole or moisten, or that no visible creature hath any reall operation

upon another, but that our assigning of their moti∣ons or operations, as true causes (in their kind) of the effects which we see daily produced, is but a solaecisme of vaine Philosophy, or of sciences fals∣ly so called; whereas the right resolution of this solaecisme into distinct and Christian phrase, is but this, God doth produce heat, cold, moisture, vegeta∣bles, and other living things, (ad praesentiam crea∣turarum) the Fire, Water, Sunne, Earth, &c. being but bare witnesses of the Creators power, which is ma∣nifested in them, or of its operation in their pre∣sence, by which operation alone, all those effects are produced, which the Philosophers ascribe un∣to the Creatures. And most true it is, that the Creator doth daily worke all those effects, which we attribute to naturall agents: yet doth hee not worke such effects onely in them, or where they are present, but he truly worketh by them and with them. And if the Omnipotent power be truly said to worke by and with natural meanes or causes, they must truly worke with him, in their kinde. When the Apostle saith, in him wee live and move, and have our beeing, this necessarily implies, that wee have a life in its kinde distinct from his life, a mo∣tive power different in its kinde from his power, a kinde of beeing likewise distinct from his infinite Essence, or from being-it-selfe. But in as much as the life of all things living, the motions of every thing that moveth, the being of every numerable thing, that is, hath such an absolute dependance as hath been declared upon his creative power; hence it is that the Prophets and Divine Philosophers,

ascribe all the visible effects or events, which time presents or place accompanieth, no lesse intirely to the Creator, than the first production of their vi∣sible and naturall causes. As for the former Cri∣tickes, in whose language, God onely worketh in his creatures, or (his creatures being present) they might with as good reason, affirme that the Sunne did not really move, but that God did move, the Sun being present; yet could he not move or create motion ad praesentiam Solis, unlesse the Sunne did truly move. The truth is, the Sunne doth move, or is moved by Gods presence in it, but he doth not move with it or by it. But with the Sunne or other Creatures, he truly worketh, as they truly worke with him. And, by this concession of some true power and property of working unto naturall A∣gents, more is ascribed to the Creator of all things, than can bee ascribed by the contrary opinion, which utterly denies al power or property of wor∣king to the Creatures. For he that denyes any ef∣fects to be truly wrought by them, cannot ascribe their abilities or operative force (which, in his o∣pinion, is none) unto their Creator. But* 1.4 Mo∣ses taugh the Israelites, that it was God which gave them power to gather substance. Nor were they more bound to praise God for the substance which they gathered, or for the Manna which by miracle

hee sent unto them, than for the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 which he gave them to gather the one or other.

2 Ye•• is not this absolute and immediate de∣pendance, which every creature, as well or its be∣ing, as for its power or exercise of it, hath o•• the Almighty Creator, the intire ground or reason, why the effects which are (in their kinde) produ∣ced by the Creatures, are by the Prophets wholly ascribed unto power Almighty. For this depen∣dance, or the reason of ascribing all things to God which is grounded on it, being for the present ••∣questred; he hath a peculiar title to all the works or effects, (especially to all of greater and more pub∣lique consequence) which the Creatures produce, from his skill or wisedome in contriving the com∣bination of second causes, with their severall ope∣rations, for the assequution of their last or utmost end. Nor was the entitative goodnesse of every creature in his kinde, albeit considered in that per∣fection wherein God made it, the ground or rea∣son of that approbation which hee bestowed upon them, as they severally began to bee, or after hee had accomplished them all. God (saith Moses) saw all that he had made, and loe it was exceeding good. What goodnesse then was this, which hee thus commends? the goodnesse of order or of har∣mony betwixt them, as they were parts of this V∣niverse. This harmony, was the accomplishment of his severall workes, the ground of his praises, and the complete object of our beleefe of this Ar∣ticle of Creation. Hence saith the Apostle, Heb. 11 By faith we beleeve; What? Secula facta esse, nay

more then so 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that the worlds were harmonically made. It was a double over-sight in some good Divines, from one or both of these two principles, (Omne ens qu••••ens, est bonum,) What soever hath being is good, whatsoever is, was made by God, and all things which God made were good; to infer, that sinne or morall evill could have no positive entitie. For the greater the entitative goodnesse of any creature is, the greater measure of morall evill it alwayes includes, unlesse its entita∣tive goodnesse hold such harmony or correspon∣dency with the rest, as may helpe to make up or support that goodnesse of order, that is, that good∣nesse of coordination amongst themselves, or of that joint subordination unto their Creator, which he first framed and placed in this Vniverse, as it was his worke. Vnlesse sinne or morall evill had some positive entitie, or some positive degrees or mea∣sure, all sinnes should be equall, there could bee no different kinds of sinne, no numericall difference or degrees betwixt particular sinnes of the same kind. But of the nature of sinne or morall evill, and how compatible this evill is with goodnes entitative, more at large, by Gods assistance, in the Treatise of Ori∣ginall sinne, or the estate or condition of the sons of wrath, which estate every child of Adam by par∣ticipation of this first sinne doth inherit. The pe∣culiar title which the Almighty Creator by right of Creation, or by the combination or contri∣vance of naturall and intellectuall agents, hath to all the praises, which either the Souldier or* 1.5 States∣man, the Landlord, the Husbandman, or such as

live by Merchandizing daily rob him of, will come more fitly to be declared in some following Trea∣tises of Divine speciall providence.

3 If the Reader desire a briefe abstract or summe of what hath beene said of Gods power in crea∣ting the world, or of the reservation of this free power unto himselfe to alter, to innovate or a∣mend the estate wherein he hath hitherto preser∣ved it; I cannot exhibite this generall view more clearly or more succinctly than Iustin Martyr hath done in his answer to the fourth question of the Grecians. The question was thus proposed, [An Deus faciat, feceritve, facturusve sit: Et si facit, suaptene voluntare, an praeter voluntatem?] Whe∣ther God do make the things that are, whether hee hath made the things that have beene, whether hee will make other things which yet are not, or the things which are, after a better manner than as yet they have beene made: or if he be or hath beene a maker, or con∣tinue to make things better, whether he do all this out of his owne free will, or besides his will. His full an∣swer to this question is, Fecit Deus, & facit, & facturus est, suapte sponte & voluntate: nam creatu∣ram ipse condidit, quae antehac non fuerat, volens. Eam providentia sua in eo ut sit, conservat: quod quidem est, facit. Quam etiam instauraturus est, & in statum meliorem redacturus per restitutionem sive renovationem: quod est facturus est: ut repurget cam ab absurditate omni, ex rationalium ignavia contracta. Non quod per judicii considerationem & deliberationem posterius id quod melius sit, invenerit; sed quod longe antea & prius quam mundum condi∣dit,

constitutum habuerit ut faceret. Neque enim possibile est ut vel ad notionem vel ad potentiam, Deo posterius quidquam accedat, quod prius non habuerit. Volentem autem Deum mundum creasse, illud est do∣cumento, quod cum Deus potuerit plures efficere soles, non plures, sed unum duntaxat effecerit. Nam qui plures non potest condere soles, neque unum condere potest: & qui unum solem creare potuit, necessario quoque plures creare potuit. Quomodo igitur quos facere potuit plures soles, Deus non fecit, nisi certe quod plures soles facere noluit? Sin quos non fecit soles, voluntate non fecit: perspicuam utique fuerit, cum etiam quem fecit, voluntate fecisse. Et veluti sol, ita & reliquae creaturae partes omnes, quae vel ob∣noxiae vel non obnoxiae sunt corruptibilitati, ex vo∣luntate Dei & id quod sint, & id quod hujusmodi sint, habent.

CHAP. 11.

Containing the summe of what wee are to beleeve in this Article of Creation, and of the duties where∣to it binds us: with an introduction to the Article of His providence.

TO beleeve that God is the maker of Heaven and Earth, and of all things visible and invisible, in∣cludes in it an acknowledge∣ment not onely of the six dayes worke, but that he still makes all things that are, and shal make all things which here∣after shall be. So long as any thing which hath beene continues in beeing, so long as any thing which now is not, shall beginne or not cease to be, so long the Almighty continues a Maker. And in as much as some things which are made, or which hereafter shall be made, shall have no end, he con∣tinues an everlasting Maker. This title of Maker is none of his Eternall Attributes, but a denomina∣tion ascribed unto him from his workes which all had their beginning in time, or rather with time, or with duration finite or numerable. It is an ever∣lasting Attribute, for that properly is everlasting, which though it have beginning yet it hath no end. But albeit the acts or exercises of his will or power had a beginning with the world, (for they are al∣wayes in the creature or effect) yet his will and pur∣pose to make the world are eternall: So is the po∣wer by which he made it, so is the combination

of all these, to wit, his providence, by which hee orders and governes all things, coeternall to his es∣sence. All moderne controversies to my knowledge account it an heathenish solecism to say, God only did make or hath made the world and all things in it, he doth not now make them. For this were to deny the necessity of his everlasting worke in pre∣serving, supporting, and continuing all things in their proper being. And to deny this, would bee more than a solecisme of speech, a reall branch of infidelity. Is it then a lesse solecisme of speech to say, or a smaller portion of infidelity to thinke, that God only hath decreed before all times what shall fall out in time, but doth not now decree nor shall any thing hereafter be decreed by him? Question∣lesse, if his decree be coeternall to his power, the same with his will or purpose, if hee cease not to worke or will, he ceaseth not to worke or decree. He did decree to worke when he did not worke, or produce any effect ad extra, but hee never produ∣ced any effect or worke when hee did not decree. For he worketh all things by the Counsell of his will, not by the Counsell of his will as past and en∣ded, but by the Counsell of his will, which was, which is, and which is to come. And he decreeth all things for the times present after the selfe same manner that he decreed them from eternity, other∣wise his decree were not eternall, could have no re∣semblance of eternity. To infer that Gods decree is an act past, or that God doth not now decree, because he hath decreed al things before all worlds, is a solecisme or ignorance, to say no worse, of the

same nature, quality & scantling, as if you shold say, God was before the world was, therefore God is not since the world was, nor shall be after the end of this world. For the world could neither begin, continue, nor cease to be, but by his eternall and ir∣resistible decree, which neither hath beginning nor end, nor can admit any interposition of change. It is true, that if we consider the Deity in himselfe or his decree as it is in him, or the same with him, there is neither praeteritum nor futurum, no such difference in them as wee character or notifie by these termes past or to come: yet if wee consider God or his eternall Decree, as they include a refe∣rence of precedency to things temporall, past, or to come, or as times current have coexistence with him, wee may not deny that God was before all times, and did decree things to come, that he is in all times current, and doth decree the issue of times present or ensuing. Thus in all times, and in all places, the Almighty Father is present with us, pre∣sent in us, as our maker and preserver, present by his eternall providence to order and governe us. And the government of the world, specially of Men and Angels, is in true Divinity, the proper object of the Eternall Decree. And if God be thus with us, nothing can goe amisse with us, save only by our ignorance, by our misbeleefe or weake be∣leefe of this first Article.

2 The true, that is, the firme and sound beleefe of every morall or sacred truth, specially of such fundamental truths as are contained in this Article, alwayes include a correspondency in the beleever

unto the thing beleeved. And this corresponden∣cie must have its place, not in the braine or appre∣hensive faculty onely, but in the affection. The sympathy of affection unto the thing beleeved, re∣sults from the impression which the speculative forme or representation in the braine makes upon the heart, which is the seat of the affection. The meanes subordinate to the Spirit of God for ma∣king this impression, are two: A right explication or branching of the article or object to be belee∣ved: & a serious and frequent meditation upon the object rightly branched, or a taking not of the truth onely, but the consequences of it into deepe and setled consideration; or as we say, a laying of both to heart. The maine branches of this Article are three: First, that God is the maker of all men that are, not of Adam onely. Secondly, that he is the preserver of all. Thirdly, that he perpetually or∣dereth and governeth all things, even the thoughts of men, by the irresistible uncessant working of his Omnipotent decree or will. In our beleefe of the two first branches (bee it lesse or more, weake or strong) so it be uniforme, it is essentially included, that God is good to all, in that he hath given life and being unto all. Of this his goodnesse no man can want store of witnesses, so long as either he in∣joyes himselfe or the necessary supplyes of life. One speciall duty, whereunto the beleefe of this Article doth immediately bind all men, is expresly commended to us by our Saviour, Matth. 6. The generall neglect whereof is more than sufficient to condemne not the Heathens or Infidels onely, but

the greatest part of such as professe the Christian Faith, of infidelity: Take no thought for your life, what ye shall eate, or what ye shall drinke, nor yet for your body what you shall put on. Is not the life more than meat? and the body than rayment? It is a sin for him which beleeves that God hath given him that life and being which he hath, not to beleeve that God did give him both for his greater good, or that he will not increase his blessings upon him, so he doe not distrust his fatherly care and provi∣dence: A greater sinne it is to suspect or question, whether God have not a more fatherly care over all men, than he hath over other creatures. So our Saviour addes, Behold the fowles of the ayre: For they sow not, neither doe they reape, nor gather into barnes, yet your heavenly Father feedeth them. Are ye not much better then they? In that God hath gi∣ven man a better kind of life and being than the fowles of the ayre; this is an undoubted pledge unto all, that he hath prepared far better food for them than for birds and beasts, an everlasting food; so they do not distrust his providence. And as hee provideth better food for man than for beast, so hath he better rayment for them in store, than he hath for vegetables; so they will seeke it from him, and not be their owne carvers. Which of you by ta∣king thought can add one cubit unto his stature? And why take ye thought for rayment? Consider the Lillies of the field, how they grow; they toyle not, neither do they spin. And yet I say unto you that even Salomon in all his glory, was not arrayed like one of these: wher∣fore if God so cloath the grasse of the field, which to

day is and to morrow is cast into the Oven; shall hee not much more cloath you, O ye of little faith. That to distrust Gods providence or doubt of his love, of such love as is ready to bestow better rayment upon them than Salomon in all his royalty had, is a point of infidelity, is included in our Saviours infe∣rence or conclusion: Therefore take no thought, say∣ing, What shall we eate? or what shall we drinke? or wherewithall shall we be cloathed? For after all these things do the Gentiles seeke. For your heavenly Fa∣ther knoweth that ye have need of all these things. Is it then unlawfull to make any thing which the Gen∣tiles sought after, any part of our care? No, the Gentiles after their fashion, sought after God, who (as the Apostle saith) giveth to all life and breath and all things, even to the Gentiles, that they should seeke the Lord: if happely they might feele after him and finde him. Acts 17. 25, 27. The onely reason why they did not find him, was because they sought him amisse. And the reason why they sought him amiss was their ignorance of this truth which our Saviour and S. Paul hath taught, to wit, that God did give the very Gentiles themselves food and rayment, with other necessaries of life, even life it selfe, with all its contentments, to the end that they might seeke him and taste his good∣nesse. But they ran counter, and sought only after those things which were good not in themselves, but as they were pledges of his goodnesse. And the more eagerly they thus sought after these tem∣porall good things, the further they ran from the Fountaine of goodness, which alone must sweeten

the best things we can desire, and season our soules for the right entertainment or fruition of them.

3 Our speculative assent unto this Article, or approbation of this truth, whereof these Gentiles were ignorant, will rather aggravate than mitigate our Saviours censure of them; if we be as greedy seekers after the necessities of life, or as solicitous hunters after superfluities, as the Gentiles were. The distinctions or divisions of care, with annota∣tions what kinde of care, is by our Saviour forbid∣den, what allowed of, are easie to be found almost in every Writer, especially in the Expositors of that 6. chapter of Matthew. But whether through the default of hearers or of teachers, or respective∣ly of both: too much liberty is every where taken for employing the greatest part of mens times and indeavours in providing things of this life. Not∣withstanding all the prohibitions which have been given by our Saviour to the contrary: Covetous∣nesse and ambition, the two grand enemies of be∣leefe in God and his loving providence, have no where in any age thriven better, than amongst zea∣lous Christian professors in these later times. And which is most to be lamented, Scripture is secretly opposed to Scripture for justifying or countenan∣cing unchristian care of wordly matters. The war∣rant, which many take to themselves from the mistaken sense of one place in S.* 1.6 Paul, He that pro∣videth not for his family is worse then an Infidell, is used as a countermand to our Saviours prohibition. For the right limitation whereof, the onely caveat which I have to commend unto the Reader, is this,

As S. Paul, how mightily soever he debase workes, not ceremoniall onely, but morall, doth never de∣nie their use or necessity either for attaining to justification, or for making our Election sure, but onely seeks to strengthen our relyance upon Gods mercies in Christ by denyall of our selves, and of the best works w^ch we can do, whether before rege∣neration or after: so our Saviour, albeit he seeme universally to forbid all care of minding temporall contentments, yet in deed and reall meaning, for∣bids us onely to place any part of our hopes or con∣fidence in our owne endeavours. He doth not sim∣ply forbid all care of things temporall, but so farre onely as it is an hindrance to our care and watch∣fulnesse for trying and tasting the goodnesse of God, or as it weakens our relyance upon his father∣ly providence. If we be watchfull in prayer, and frequent in meditations upon Gods goodnesse al∣ready experienced, our care of heavenly things and estimate of Gods goodnesse will better teach every one of us in his severall calling, the right limitation of his domestique cares, than any generall rule which can be gathered from the nature, quality, or quantity of cares. For conclusion, he which for∣bids us to take care for the morrow, commands us to pray this day for to morrowes bread, that is, to pray every day for the good successe or blessings of the dayes following, with all attention and watchfulnesse.

4 Another fundamentall duty, and one of the most formall effects of faith, as it respects this Ar∣ticle, is that of the Preacher, Ecclesiastes the 12.

vers. 1. Remember now thy Creator in the dayes of thy youth. But why is this duty in particular prest upon youth? Because the prints of Gods creative power are then most fresh in our nature, and might transmit a fairer copy or truer estimate of the Crea∣tors goodnesse unto old age, than old age can take any: so young men by often reflecting upon the present comforts of health and strength, upon the activity of body, the quicknesse of sense and spirit, would ingrosse them deeply in their memories. Youth then is the fittest season for estimating the benefits of Creation, and old age the choicest time for surveying our unthankfulnesse to our Creator. If the former contentments of youth, with the comforts which accompany our best thoughts and actions, were truly calculated in our fresh and choicest daies, and rightly waighed upon their pro∣per center, our thankfulnesse would reciprocate upon the Fountaine from which they flow, and be returned to their doner in a measure equiponde∣rant to their waight upon our soules. And nothing but want of thankfulnesse in such as have tasted the ordinary benefits of Creation, can hinder the de∣scent of Gods choice of blessings in great abun∣dance. Would we but sequester that delight which we take in health and strength from our selves, and surrender it wholly into his hands that gave it, he is still ready to renew and better our present and former estate. Did we empty our hearts of pride, of selfe-delight, or complacency, by powring forth such joyfull thanks giving as the Psalmist doth, It is he that hath made us, and not wee our

selves: ••t is he that gives us all those good things wherein we joy, we did not receive them from our friends or parents, wee cannot take them to our selves: the same Lord, as the Psalmist elsewhere avoucheth, would give us our hearts desire, even fill our hearts with joy and gladnesse which shall never saile or decrease. This is his sole and proper gift, for though we could take unto our selves all the temporary contentments of transitory plea∣sures, which either our hearts could wish, or our inventions calculate, yet should wee not have our hearts desire, so long as we fixe our delight either in the things enjoyed, or in the enjoying of them, and not in the Lord which gave them unto us, and us power to enjoy them.

From thus delighting in the Lord, or from ren∣dring according to the benefits bestowed upon us, the generall withdrawments are but two. First, an over prizing of such externalls as procure or in∣crease our contentments. Secondly, an ouervalu∣ing the feare or dread of mens persons, or other externalls which seeme to menace disgrace, vexa∣tion, or torment unto us, if we should doe as in our calmest thoughts we often desire to doe. The sini∣ster sway of both temptations or withdrawments from the duties commended unto us, cannot be otherwise counterpoized than by taking the last branch of this Article into deepe and serious con∣sideration. The last branch was, that God doth nor onely make and preserve us, but doth withall perpetually order, direct, and governe both us and all the externalls which we love or feare, by his all-seeing,

ever-working Decree or Counsell. If our soules or senses have for once or twice beene over∣joyed with the possession of any externalls or in∣strumentall causes of contentment, let us call to minde, that as the Almighty Creator gives both us and them their being, so hee likewise stints and limits as well their operations, as our capacities to receive their impressions at his pleasure. The same externalls which formerly wrought our comfort or contentments, may procure our griefe and mi∣sery by too much or unseasonable familiarity with them, or fruition of them. If in feare or dread of evill menaced by man, or represented to us by fire, by sword, or other unruly instruments of wrath or vengeance, wee cannot hope that the Almighty Creator will by miracle abate their strength, or in∣hibit the exercise of their native qualities or dispo∣sitions, as he did in Daniel and the three childrens cases; yet unlesse our faith in the last branch of this Article faile, it will confirme us in this resolution, that he can and will so contrive the concurrence of hurtfull agents, as they shall become instruments of greater good to such as love him, and in tempta∣tions adhere unto him. The rule or Maxime is uni∣versally true: No agent or instrument, whether of temporall harme or comfort, whether of joy or griefe, can worke any other wayes or any further than he by his Eternall Decree or Providence hath appointed it for the present to worke. And in that promise made unto us by our Apostle, That hee will not suffer us to bee tempted above our strength; it is included that he will so restraine or abate the

force and efficacy of all second causes, as they shall not conquer our patience or quell the comfort of our unwounded conscience.

CHAP. 12.

Though nothing can fall out otherwise then God hath decreed: yet God hath decreed that many things may fall out otherwise than they doe.

1 MEn, otherwise of light and vaine behaviour, gaine oftentimes respect amongst the multitude by pretended descent from worthy Families, with whom their names have some alliance: so doe inconsiderate positions or conclusions dangerously erronious, many times get more esteeme among the Learned, than ordi∣nary truths doe, as being mistaken for the true and naturall off-springs of undoubted Maximes. There is no Christian, but thinkes himselfe bound upon his allegiance to submit his assent unto the former Principle, [It is impossible, that any thing should be, which God hath decreed not to be; or any thing which is, should otherwise bee, than God hath decreed it should be.] And many which make a conscience as well of their words as of their wayes, (herein per∣haps especially faulty, that they are too zealously

sollicitous not to speake amisse,) make no scruple of entertaining these and the like inferences follow∣ing, as naturally descending from the former Ma∣xime: [It is impossible ought should fall out other∣wise than it doth: all things in respect of God and his Omnipotent Decree, are necessary: Contingencie is but a solecisme of secular language, or if any thing may without offence be termed contingent, it must be reputed such, onely with reference to second causes.]

2 Howbeit such good men as doe thus write and speake, will give us leave (I know) to take it in the first place as granted, that God is wiser than we are, and knowes the nature of all things and their differences better than they or we doe. This being granted, we will in the second place suppose that Contingency is not a meere fictitious name of that which is not, as Tragelaphus; nor altogether Syno∣nymall to Necessity. The question about Contin∣gency, and of its difference from necessity, is not such as one in merriment once proposed in schools; An chimera calcitrans in vacuo terat calceos: The very names of Contingency and Necessity to ordi∣nary Latinists differ more than Ensis and Gladius, than Vestis and Indumentum, betwixt which per∣haps the ancient Latine Artificers or Nomencla∣tors knew some difference. Yet was it impossible for them to know any thing which God knew not, who out of all controversie knowes the true diffe∣rence betweene Contingency and Necessity, much better then we can doe. For both of them are En∣tities of his making, and serve as different Lawes to the diversity of his creatures, or their different

actions. All the reasons that can be drawne from the immutability of Gods Decree to the contrary, may with greater facility and strength of the same Decree be retorted than brought against us. For God immutably decrees mutability. Now who will say that things mutable, are in respect of Gods decree or knowledge immutable? The Heavens and other bodies moveable according to locall mo∣tion, are truly moveable in themselves, absolutely moveable, not immoveable in respect of Gods de∣cree or knowledge: for he knowes them to bee moveable, because he decreed them so to be; hee doth not know them to be immoveable because he decreed them not to be such, unlesse for a time by interposition of miracle. It implies lesse contra∣diction, to say, Deus immutabiliter decernit muta∣bilia, than to say (which hath beene accounted an ancient orthodoxall Maxime,) Stabilis dat cuncta movere. For Mobility is a branch of Mutability.

3 Every thing in respect of Gods decree or knowledge is altogether such as God hath decreed it should be.* 1.7 If then God hath decreed there should be contingency, as well as necessity; it is altogether as necessary that some events should be contingent as others necessary: and as truly contingent as the other is necessary in respect of Gods decree.* 1.8 Albeit to speake properly, the natures of contingency and necessity consist not in meere relation or respect. For in as much as both are immediate and re∣all effects of Divine Omnipotency; both must have absolute being, the being of neither is meerly re∣lative. Now if Contingency have a true and ab∣solute

being, it is neither constituted in the nature of contingency by any respect or relation to se∣cond causes, nor can any respect or relation to the first cause deprive it of that absolute nature, which the Omnipotent efficacy of the cause of cau∣ses hath irrevocably bestowed upon it. Briefly, if Contingency be any thing, it is that which it is by the Omnipotent Decree; and being such, it is alto∣gether as impossible that some effects should not be absolutely contingent, as that such effects as the Divine Decree hath appointed to bee necessary, should not be at all. Or if we would make impar∣tiall inquiry into the originall of all things, nothing without the precincts of the most glorious and ever blessed Trinity, is absolutely necessary.

4 By Contingency (lest haply we might be mis∣taken) we understand the possible meane betweene necessity of being and necessity of not being, or of being such, or of not being such; or betweene ne∣cessity of doing, and necessity of not doing, or ne∣cessity of being done, or necessity of being left un∣done. This meane betweene necessity of doing, and necessity of not doing, is that which in agents intellectuall, as in men and Angells wee call free∣dome of will or choice. Vnto which freedome, necessity is as contradictory, as irrationability is to the nature of man, and contingency as necessarily presupposed as life and sense are to reason. Adde reason to contingency, and we have the compleat definition of Free-will. In those cases wherein the Creator hath exempted man from restraint of ne∣cessity, his will is free. The divine will it selfe is

not free in those operations which are essentiall, though most delectable. God the Father is more delighted in the eternall generation of his Sonne: so is God the Father and the Sonne in the eternall procession of the Holy Ghost; than in the creati∣on, production, or preservation of all the creatures. Yet are not these or other internall operations of the blessed Trinity so free in respect of the divine nature, as is the production of the world. What∣soever God decrees he decrees it freely, that is, so as he might not decree it. Whatsoever he makes he makes it freely, that is, he so makes it, as that it was not necessary for him to make it.

CHAP. 13.

Contingency is absolutely possible, and part of the ob∣ject of Omnipotency, as formall a part as neces∣sity is.

1 IT is an unquestionable rule in the Art of Arts, that propositions, for their forme not incompatible, may from the necessity of their matter or sub∣ject, become equivalent to proposi∣tions directly contradictory; whose indispensable law or rule it is, that if the one be true, the other must needs be false, they admit of no meane be∣twixt them. Now there is no matter or subject in the world, which is so absolutely necessary, as the existence of the Divine Nature, or the internall operations of the Trinity. Whence it is, that be∣tweene

these two propositions [The generation of the Sonne, is necessary, the not generation of the Son is necessary.] there is no possible meane which can be capable of truth. The first is so absolutely ne∣cessary, and so necessarily true, that the latter is e∣ternally false. But such is not the case or conditi∣on of these two propositions following: [The Creation or Existence of the World is necessary: The not Creation or non existence of the World is necessa∣rie.] These are not contradictories for their form, nor equivalent to contradictories for their matter or subject, and therefore may admit a meane be∣tweene them. To say the creation or existence of the world was absolutely necessary, hath no truth in it: for it had a beginning of existence and being, and may have an end: and the other extreame or contrary [The not creation or non existence of the world is absolutely necessary,] hath lesse appearance of truth in it. It remaines then, that the two con∣tradictorie propositions to these false ones, must be true. The contradictory to the former is this: [The creation or existence of the world is not abso∣lutely necessarie.] The contradictory to the lat∣ter is this▪ [The not creation or non existence of the World is not absolutely necessary.] Now seeing the world is created, and yet it was not necessary that it should be created: both these propositions fol∣lowing (seeing either of them is a true meane be∣tweene the two former extreames or false ones,) are most true: [1 The creation of the world was possible, 2 The not creation of the world was possible.] And if as well the not creation, as the creation of

the world, was possible; wee may not deny that God did freely create it: seeing freedome pro∣perly taken, includes or is a possibility of doing or not doing. It was likewise free for the Almighty, to create or not to create Man or Angell. But his free purpose to create them after his owne Image be∣ing supposed: it was not meerly possible, but al∣together necessary that they should bee created good. In as much as he is goodnesse it selfe, it is not possible that evill should bee created by him, that he should be the Author of it. As is his being, so is his goodnesse, perpetually absolute, eternally necessary. But though Men and Angels were ne∣cessarily created good, yet their goodnesse in the beginning was mutable, not perpetually necessa∣rie. The question is, whether continuance in that goodnesse, wherein God created them, were tru∣ly possible in respect of Gods decree, unto such as have not so continued, or their non continuance necessary: Or whether, neither their continuance or non continuance were necessary, or both alike possible. To say that Adams continuance in good∣nesse was, in respect of Gods decree, necessary, is ••vidently convinced of falshood by his fall. So that the other part onely remaines questionable, whe∣ther Adams non continuance in the state of good∣nesse, were so absolutely decreed by God, that it was not possible for him to continue. For resolu∣tion of this point, we are to inquire, First, whe∣ther in respect of Gods power it were possible. Secondly, whether in respect of his goodnesse it were necessary or most congruent, to ordaine or

decree neither a necessitie of continuance, nor a necessitie of non continuance in goodnesse; but the meane betweene them, that is, an absolute possibilitie of continuance, and an absolute pos∣sibilitie of non continuance. That it was pos∣sible to decree such a mutuall possibilitie, may thus be proved.

2. Whatsoever implies no contradiction, is ab∣solutely possible, and fals within the object of om∣nipotencie. But this mixt possibilitie of continu∣ing or not continuing, being a meane betwixt the necessitie of Adams continuance, and the necessi∣tie of not continuance in the state of integritie, im∣plies no contradiction: Ergo, it was possible for God to decree it. That it implies no contradicti∣on in respect of the forme, is a point so cleare from the first principles of argumentation▪ that hee which vnderstands not this, is neither fit to dis∣pute, nor to be disputed with. But the same forme (notwithstanding) of contrarietie applied to the divine nature, the persons in Trinitie, or their in∣ternall operations, admits no meane. What is the reason? The nature and attributes of the Deitie are absolutely necessary and precedent to all divine decrees or effects of Gods power. And it im∣plies a contradiction, that any thing which is ab∣solutely necessarie, should admit any mixture of contingency, or of possibilitie of the contrary. But the nature, state, condition, or existence of man, are not proper obiects of the divine decree, yet proper effects of his power, and being such, they are not absolutely necessary; and not being neces∣sary

in themselves, they cannot incomber or involve propositions, for their forme, not necessarie with absolute necessitie. Whatsoever had a true possi∣bilitie of beeing before it was, may bee actually such as it was absolutely possible for it to be, or such as it might please the Almightie Creator (who is free in all his actions ad extra) to make it. It was possible for him to make mans goodnesse or his continuance in it, not to be necessary, but contin∣gent. He that made man of nothing, had nothing to resist or hinder him from squaring or framing his nature, to that abstract forme of truth which was in its selfe, or (as we say) objectively possible. For absolute Omnipotencie includes an abilitie to in∣grosse or fill meere logicall possibilities, with true and Physicall substances or qualities, as truely an∣swerable unto them, as naturall bodies are to bo∣dies mathematicall. But concerning Gods power to decree an absolute contingencie in the state, Condition, or Actions of men, there can bee no question amongst such as grant his Omnipotencie to be out of question. What could necessitate his will to lay a necessitie of sinning upon Adam, whose fall or first sinne, if it were necessary in re∣spect of Gods decree, the necessitie must needs proceed from Gods Omnipotent decree, without which nothing can haue any reall possibilitie or true title of beeing, much lesse a necessitie of bee∣ing. For Divine Omnipotencie is the first and sole Foundation of all Beeing, otherwise then by it; and from it nothing can come to passe either necessa∣rily or contingently.

3. Whatsoeuer is and hath not beene, must of necessitie have some cause of now beeing. And as is the event or effect, such must the causalty bee. If the one be necessarie or inevitable, it is impossi∣ble the other should bee contingent or meerely possible. Both, or neither, must bee necessarie. Man we suppose did once stand upright, his first sinne or fall, That action what soever it were, which brought him downe, the evils which thence en∣sued, are not meere nothing: Evill it selfe got some kinde of beeing by his negligence, which from the beginning it had not. Of all, or any of these, the question still revolves, whether they were necessary or not necessarie, but Contingent. If Contingent, we have no more to say, but Gods peace be on them, which so speake and thinke: If any reply, that they were necessarie, he must assigne a necessary cause of their beeing. For without some cause they could not be, and without a ne∣cessitating cause, there was no necessitie that they should bee. Was this supposed necessitie then from man or from God? from any second cause, or from the first cause of all things? if from man onely or from other second causes; then were they necessary not in respect of the first cause, but in respect of the second: that is, some second cause did make them necessarie, when as the first cause had left them free, or meerely possible; which to affirme is contrary to their positions, with whom we dispute, and in it selfe unconceiveable. For who can make that necessarie, which God hath made contingent or subject to change? What can

be said then? that God did make mans fall, his first sinne or appetite of the forbidden fruite, to bee ne∣cessarie, or necessitate his will in his sinister choy∣ces? This were all one, as to say, that God were the immediate and necessarie cause of sinne, of death, of all the evills that have befallen mankinde since Adam. For he is the sole immediate and ne∣cessarie cause of all things which hee so decrees as they cannot possibly fall out otherwise. For him to erre in decreeing, or for the execution of his decree to bee defeated, is impossible. In respect of his proper and adaequate object, and peremptorily intended effect, his will is a more irresistible, more powerfully necessitating cause, than any other cause whatsoever. Now if Gods will had beene, to leave no possibility for Adams perserverance, his fall had beene the compleat object of Gods decree con∣cerning our first estate, and by consequence Gods decree, or will had beene the first cause of sinnes first entrance into the world.

CHAP. 14.

The former conclusion proved by the consent of all the Ancients, whether Christians or Heathens which did dislike the errour of the Stoikes.

THE incommodious or inconsiderate speeches, which some of better note and antiquitie, have let fall, were (as I perswade my selfe) but symptomes of their provoked zeale, or eager de∣sire to salve those grosse absurdities, which they had rightly espied in others. But it is alwaies more easie to expugne an errour or salve a particular in∣convenience, then to provide, that no more shall follow upon the cure or medicine. Had those fa∣mous lamps of Gods Church, by whose light many grosse opinions have beene discried and re∣formed, seene the inconveniences, which follow upon their owne positions, as clearely, as many of their friends since have done: it would bee a foule slander in us to suspect, that they would not wil-willingly have altered their dialect, or taken advise for expressing their good meaning in tearmes more safe, more proper, and scholastique. If o∣therwise we abstract their speeches from that respect and reverence, which we owe unto their memorie, or that good opinion which best men have had of their sinceritie: I cannot see wherein the neces∣cesarie consequences of their opinions, as they are usually expressed, comes short of the Manichees

errors, or wherein they differ at all from the Stoicks. The Manichees held all evill, and mischiefe in the world to fall out by inevitable necessity: but this necessitie they derived from an evill Author, from a prime cause or Creator of evill onely, not of any thing that was good. And better it is (for it is more consonant to our Saviours advise) to ac∣knowledge the tree for evill, where the fruite is evill, then to justifie it for good, when the fruite is apparently and of necessitie naught. The perti∣nacie or stiffenesse in this common error, [Evils and mischiefe, or wicked actions fall out by necessi∣tie] being presupposed aequall; they adde lesse sinne or errour to it, which hence acknowledge a prime cause of evill, or a cause evill by fatall neces∣sitie; then those which hold evill to be necessary in respect of his Omnipotent decree, who is infinite∣ly good. In fine, the Manichees were grosse hae∣retiques in holding evill and mischiefe to fall out by inevitable necessitie; but this heresie once ad∣mitted, it was rather a consonancy of error, then a∣ny addition of new heresie, to admit two prime causes or Creators, the one of good, the other of evill. They durst not slander goodnesse with any crime, or for being the Author of any thing that was not good: nor were they disposed to flatter greatnesse, as if evill were no evill, because it pro∣ceeded from it.

2. That which the Ancients reprooved in the Stoicks opinion, as most injurious to God and all good men, was, that they held all things (and e∣vill things amongst the rest) to fall out by fate or

unavoydable necessitie. This foundation being once laied, the rootes of vertue must utterly perish, and that which we call vice should bee a meere name, or matter of nothing: there is no place left for just reward or punishment. Whether by fate the Stoicks meant the influence of starres, the course of nature, or the decree of GOD (who to them was all one with Nature;) all was one in re∣spect of the former inconveniences, which neces∣sarily followed from admission of an inevitable necessitie in humane actions, whence soever that be derived. To say, it comes from the first cause, or from the second, is meerly accidentall to the er∣ror or inconvenience so sharply & justly reproved by the primitive Church. In respect of a Trades∣mans commoditie, it is all one, whether he be pro∣hibited for setting up or trafiquing, by the compa∣nie of his own profession, or by some higher pow∣ers, so the prohibition or restraint be as large & pe∣remptorie, without hope of release: or if he bee restrained upon his allegiance by the Prince or privy counsell, his hopes of thriving will be much lesse, then if he were tied onely by the locall sta∣tutes of some pettie Corporation. Thus if the Stoick derived the necessitie of all things from the revolution of the Heavens, or from other second causes, as their supposed guides: the impossibili∣tie of doing otherwise then we doe, was, in every Christians conceipt, evidently much lesse, then if we derive this necessitie from the Omnipotent de∣cree. Now the danger or incenvenience of their opinion, did formally consist, in nursing a conceipt

in men, that it was impossible for them to doe o∣therwise then they doe, or to avoyd the evills and mischiefes into which they fall. And these dan∣gers or inconveniences, are so much greater in Christians then they were in the Stoicks; as the God which wee acknowledge is more Omnipo∣tent, then nature or the Stoicks god. For the more Omnipotent he is, the more impossible is it for a∣ny creature to avoid the necessitie which by his decree is layed upon him.

3. In respect of the former inconveniences, or of the opinion it selfe, it is meerely accidentall, whether this necessity bee layed upon us by coa∣ction, or willingly and cheerefully entertained by us; whether it proceed from Gods power or im∣pulsion, or from his wisdome: so our actions and their issues, bee, in respect of his Omnipotent power or will, alike unavoidable. If birds and fishes could speake, I suppose the one would as much complaine of those that in hard frost or snow, allure them with baites to come within the fall of the trappe, as the other would doe of Fish∣ers for driving them violently into their nets. If the birds once taken be used as hardly; their expo∣stulations would be so much more just, as their usage before their taking, was more kinde. To make a man willing to undoe himselfe, upon faire promises made, not with purpose to doe him good, but to circumvent him; is greater cruelty then can accompany open violence. Hee that wit∣tingly ministers poyson instead of Physick, is in all mens judgement, as true a Murderer, as hee that

kils with the sword, albeit the partie to whom it is ministred, having no reason to suspect any dan∣ger, doe willingly drinke it. And the lesse suspiti∣ous or more charitably affected hee is to his professed Physitian, the greater wrong he hath in being thus uncharitably dealt with. It would lit∣tle boote the malefactor in this kinde, to plead; Albeit I gave it him, hee might have chosen whe∣ther he would have drunke it, because I did not in∣force him with a drawen Dagger or other wea∣pon to be his owne executioner. In many cases, one may be the true cause of anothers death, and deserve death himselfe, although he be not any ne∣cessarie cause of his death, or plot his destruction without possibilitie of avoidance. But if our wil∣ling choyse of those waies which lead to death, be necessarie in respect of the Almighties decree, so that there be no possibilitie left, to escape it; hee is a more necessarie and more immediate cause of all their deaths that thus perish, then any man can be of his death whom he poisons. And if the case stood thus with any, their miserie were greater, by how much they did lesse suspect his goodnesse: However, most miserable, because most desperate. Reason and knowledge (the two ornaments of the humane nature) should be to them a curse. He that neither knowes nor doth his Masters will, shall be beaten; because it was possible for him to have known it: but w^th fewer stripes, because not know∣ing it, there was no possibility left for him to doe it. But he that knowes it, and doth it not, shall be beaten with many stripes, because the knowledge of his

will to punish sinners, and reward the righteous, did include a possibilitie to avoyd death, and to be made partaker of life. If otherwise, there bee no possibilitie left for him, that knowes Gods displea∣sure against sinne, to avoid the wayes of sinne (those are death;) his case before and after death, is much more miserable than his, whom God in just judge∣ment, hath deprived of knowledge. And the Prae∣server of men should be accounted much more fa∣vourable to stocks and truncks, than unto many men upon whom hee besto••es his best gifts in great plentie; if these be bestowed upon the Con∣ditions now mentioned, or be charged with re∣medilesse miserie.

4 But admitting their miserie to be fatall and inevitable by divine decree; is it not possible to acquit this decree, or the Author of it from being the Author of evill? did the Stoick condemne all Iudges of injustice that sentenced malefactors un∣to violent death, whereto by their opinion, all that suffered it, were inevitably destinated? Per∣haps the feare of censure in publique Courts, did make them silent in this point: But was not this care to keepe themselves harmelesse, or feare not to offend Magistrates, altogether fatall? Galen (〈◊〉〈◊〉 my remembrance) in his Stoicall discourse, quòd mores animi sequuntur temperamentum corporis, hath framed this answer to the question proposed: We doe not offend in killing Snakes or Toades or other like venemous creatures; albeit their natu∣rall temper or disposition be unaltrably harmefull unto men. And if nature or temper of bodie make

some of our owne stamp and ranke more noysome than these creatures are, unto their neighbours; to fit the one sort with the same measure of punish∣ment, which is due unto the other, is no injustice, no inequality. And* 1.9 Lipsius, a man not too much abhorrent from any opiniō, that was fashionable to his new stile, or might serve to set forth the point, which for the present he much affected; gives this briefe placet, in favour of the Stoicks opinion: (Fa∣tali culpae fatalis paena,) punishment is fatall to fa∣tall crimes. But this is principium petere, to take that for granted which is questioned. For, if the harmes which malefactors do and suffer, be truly fatall; the one is no true crime, the other is no just punish∣ment. To Galen I answer, that if we could by any skill in physick or complexions discerne some men to bee as naturally disposed to mischiefe all that come in their way, or by chance offend them; as are the Snake, the Sloworm, or other serpent, it would be the wisest way for such as love their lives, to rid the world of these fatally mischievous reasonable creatures, as fast as they met with them▪ or to ap∣point some certaine daies for hunting them, as wee do noysome beasts. But to examine their suspitious intentions, to question their actions, to arraign their persons, or put them upon a formall or legall tryall of their life, would be as ridiculous, as to produce witnesses against a Snake, to empannell a Iury upon a mad Dog, or to take bale for a Wolfes appearance, before a Butcher, in an assembly of Mastives.

5 The common notions of good and evill, & the ingraffed opinion of contingency in humane acti∣ons,

have taught the Lawgivers of every nation, to put notorious malefactors unto more exquisite tor∣tures, than we do harmfull creatures; either to en∣force them to utter, what no destiny nor complexi∣on makes them voluntarily confesse, or else to de∣terre others (that are as naturally disposed to evill, as they were) from doing the like. Scarce any male∣factor (unless he be poysoned with this opinion of absolute necessity) but will acknowledge that it was possible for him to have done otherwise thē he hath done; possible for him to have avoided the doome, which is passed upon him by man: which to have a∣voided had been absolutely impossible, if it were to be awarded upon him by Gods eternall decree, or (which is all one) if in respect of this decree, it had been necessary. As ignorance of the true God, and his saving truth, makes the former error more ex∣cusable in the Stoicks, than in such Christians as shal maintain it: so might impotency exempt that God which the Stoicks worshipped, (whether Nature, Fate, or some other distinct celestiall power) from those imputatiōs, unto which omnipotency makes the God of Christians lyable, if all things were by vertue of his decree absolutely necessary. It was a received opinion among many Heathens, that the gods themselves were subject unto Fate, & for this reason, when any thing fell out in their judgement amiss; Fates commonly did either intirely bear the blame, or the greatest part of it. And their gods (in∣deed) had deserved pity rather than blame, if they could do no better than they did, as being over∣mastered by Fates. But for a Christian to inveigh a∣gainst

Fates, is to accuse or deny his God. If Fates be nothing, hee hath no reason to complaine of them: if any thing they bee, they are of the true Gods making, who made all things, who cannot possibly be subject to any thing that he hath made. Nor can it stand with our allegiance to say when any disasters befall us, that our God could no other∣wise choose, that our mischances were the abso∣lutely necessary effects of his Omnipotent decree. One speciall cause of this error, and of some mens adherence to it, is a jealousie or zealous needlesse feare, lest they should grant God to be impotent, or not so omnipotent but that some things might take possession of beeing without his leave or no∣tice. The originall of this feare, is, want of di∣stinction, betweene chance or casualty, and such contingency as hath beene expressed.

6 Many reasons might be alledged sufficient to demonstrate the inevitable absurdities of this sup∣posed absolute necessity. But it is one labour to convince an error before indifferent hearers; ano∣ther to make men forsake the errours which have long possessed them: a third to win them unto a liking of the contrary truth. For effecting the two latter, no meanes can be so effectuall in respect of their disposition with whom we have to deale, as a plaine declaration, how ill this opinion of absolute necessity, how well this doctrine of mixt possibility or contingency consorts: first with their owne re∣solution of other difficulties in this very argu∣ment whereof wee treate: secondly, with the perpetuall voice of Gods Spirit, and his Mes∣sengers,

specially when they seeke ex professo, to perswade to good, and to disswade from evill.

CHAP. 15.

The principall conclusions, which are held by the fa∣vourers of absolute necessity, may be more clearly justified, and acquitted from all inconveniences, by admitting a mixt possibility or contingency in hu∣mane actions.

1 THe most I have met withall, are afraid in plaine termes to main∣taine; That God did as immedi∣ately and as necessarily decree Adams fall or state of sinne, as his originall justice or state of in∣tegrity. For this were to make him as true, as pro∣per, and necessary a cause of sinne, and of all evill, as he is of goodnesse. To allay the harshnesse of some speeches, heretofore used, by those men whom they favour, they will grant no more then this: that God did decree to permit his fall. But the speech is improper and very ambiguous▪ and in what sense soever it may be taken, it must plead its warrant or right use, from our opinion; theirs can afford it none. Permission, to speake properly, is a vertuall part of the Decree it selfe; not the object whereto the decree is terminated. But to let this passe; we will take [Gods decree to per••it] to be all one, as if they had said Gods permissive decree. Did God then by his decree, permit Adam to sinne? if

he did, this decree was either just or unjust. What∣soever is by just decree permitted, is by the same decree sufficiently warranted. At least the punish∣ment, otherwise due unto it, is dispensed with. Such divorces as were unlawfull from the first in∣stitution of Matrimony in Paradise, were permitted to the Israelites for the hardnesse of their hearts by Moses, and for this reason, they were not pu∣nished by the judiciall Law. If it should please our Soveraigne to permit sickly Students to eate flesh in Lent, we would take his professed permission, for a sufficient dispensation with the penall Statutes in this case provided. God questionlesse would ne∣ver have punished Adam for eating an Apple, if by his eternall decrece he had* 1.10 permitted him to have eaten it. But their meaning haply is not, that God did allow or approve his eating of it, seeing he threatned it with death. But if, by his decree, he did not allow it, he did permit it onely in such a sense, as we may say the Lawes of our land, per∣mit men to be hanged because they keepe not men close prisoners, nor so tye their hands that they cannot steale, rob or kill, before they bee suspected or convicted of felonie, robbery, or murder. But▪ no tyrant did ever before hand forbid such a fact, under paine of death, without a supposed naturall possibility to avoid it. And just Lawes afford or∣dinary or civill meanes for satisfying nature in ne∣cessities, lest these (as they know no l••w) enforce men to use their naturall possibilities or faculties amisse. The lawes of this Land and others, which make theft matter of death, permit men the free

imployment of bodily faculties, to earne their bread, or (if they be impotent) to crave or accept the benevolence of others, lest they should perish for hunger, or be enforced to steale. If our lawes or Lawgivers, not permitting any of these meanes or the like, should punish the taking of a loafe of bread or cup of drinke, with death; they might be more truly said to enjoyne, then permit theft; to be more delighted with the bloud of the needy, than with preservation of publike peace; albeit they did not set other mens meat before thē, when they are hungred, nor lead their hands to take it. In like manner, he that saith, God did permit Adam to eate the forbidden fruit, and by eating to in∣curre death, doth necessarily imply, that God per∣mitted him the free use of his externall and inter∣nall faculties to satisfie his appetite, with some o∣ther meate. Now the free use of any faculty in∣cludes the concourse or cooperation of God, with∣out which it is impossible any creature should move. And this concourse was a part of his decree or will as it concerned this act. More plainly: He that permitted Adam to sinne, did more than per∣mit him to abstaine from sinne, or to persevere in obedience. If then God in permitting him onely to sinne, did afford meanes necessary for reducing this possibility of sinning into a sinfull act not al∣lowed; his more than permission of him to abstaine from sinne, his commandement to persevere in obedi∣ence, did not onely suppose a true possibility for him to abstaine and persevere, but include withall better meanes for reducing this possibility into act,

then were afforded for enabling him actually to sinne. These two contrary possibilities, and the se∣verall meanes for accomplishing them, must beare a proportion answerable to a meere permission without approbation, or to a prohibition, and to a peremptorie command of civill authoritie. Now every just Lawgiver affords better meanes and in∣couragement for accomplishing his commands or requests, then he doth for breaking or negle∣cting them.

2▪ For conclusion, when they say God, by his aeternall deree, did permit Adams fall, their mea∣ning rightly expressed, is no more then this; God did not decree that his perseverance should bee ne∣cessarie. For necessitie of perseverance excludes all possibility of falling. But if his fall had beene necessarie in respect of the aeternall decree, it had not onely beene permitted, but allowed and requi∣red. It remaines then that both were possible, neither necessary in respect of the divine decree. Or to untwist the knot a little further; God by his decree did permit and allow him a possibility to fall; but he did not allow the reduction of this possibility into act, that is, he gave it him, not to the end that he should fal, but that his perseverance might be more beneficiall. He did not onely per∣mit or allow him a possibitie of perseverance, but did command and require the reduction of this possibilitie into act.

3 This forme of wholsome doctrine admitted, will clearely enlighten the truth of another distin∣ction or resolution much used, but mightily ob∣scured,

or rather quite stifeled, by such as hold all things necessary in respect of the aeternall decree. The distinction is: God is the cause of every action, but he is not the cause of the obliquitie which accom∣panies sinfull actions, nor of sinne as it is sinne. This is their last Apologie for avoyding that imputati∣on of making God the author of sinne. Herein wee both agree; The coexistence of the all-wor∣king decree (or divine cooperation) is necessarily required to every action or effect. Every action includes a motion, and in him wee move, wee live, and have our beeing. But hee that will grant this cooperation or actuall coexistence of the all-wor∣king decree to be the necessarie cause of every acti∣on, unto which it is most necessarily required; must, upon the same tearmes, grant, God to bee not the necessarie onely, but the onely cause of all and every obliquitie, of all and every sinne, of all that hath beene, is, or can be blame-worthy in men or devills, from their creation to euerlasting. The demonstration of this inconvenience or absurdi∣ty, wherewith we charge the adverse opinion (but no maintainer of it) must be referred unto the dis∣cussions of the state of Innocency and the manner of sinnes entring into the world: we are now en∣gaged to extract a better meaning out of their other words, than they themselves expresse, or can truely be contained in them, untill they aban∣don the opinion of absolute necessity in humane actions, as they have reference to the aeternall decree.

Seeing it is agreed vpon, that God and man are

joynt agents in every sinfull action, or in effects essentially evill (such questionlesse was mans desire to be like God, or his lusting after the forbiden fruite:) The Probleme remaines, why both should not be aequall sharers in the sinne: or how it is possible justly to condemne men of iniquitie, without some imputation unto God, who is the principall agent in all actions. Shall wee bee partiall for him or seeke to excuse him by his greatnesse? Shall wee say hee cannot doe amisse, because he is su∣preame Lord over all, and may doe with his creatures what hee list? To such as count the donative of robbers a true boone or reall curtesie; to such as can magnifie their owne integrity, whereof they give no proofe, save onely as he did by negatives, (non hominem occidi,) I am no murtherer. The Poet hath shaped an answere, as fit as pertinent, (non pasces in cruce corvos,) Thou shalt not feede Ravens upon a Gibbet. To say God is the Au∣thor of sinne were hideous blasphemie: yet to say he is no tempter, no seducer of mankind to evill, is not to offer praise unto him. Let my spirit va∣nish with my breath, and my immortall soule re∣turne to nothing, rather then suffer her selfe to be overtaken with such a dead slumber, as can rest contented to set forth His Glory by bare negatives, or by not being the Author of sinne, who is most highly to be praised in all his works, whose good∣nesse is infinitely greater in concurring to sinfull actions, then the goodnesse of his best creatures in the accomplishment of their most syncere intentions.

4 The truth of this conclusion is necessarily grounded upon these assertions hereafter to bee discussed: That mans possibilitie or hopes of attai∣ning everlasting happinesse, was of necessitie to bee tempered with a possibilitie of sinning, or falling into miserie. To permit or allow man this possibility of sinning, & to bestow upon him the contrary possi∣bility of not sinning and hope of happines was one & the same branch of divine goodnesse. One & the selfe same branch of Gods goodnesse it was, to allow this possibilitie of sinning, and to afford his concourse for reducing of it into Act. For unlesse he had decreed to afford his concourse thereto, it had beene impossible for man actually to have sin∣ned. And if for man to sinne had beene made im∣possible by Gods decree: it had been alike impos∣sible for him to have done well or ill, or to become truly happy. Briefly, God in that hee decreed a mixture of contrary possibilities, decreed withall a concourse or cooperation sutable unto, and suf∣ficient for the actuall accomplishment of both. To the probleme propounded, the answere from these grounds, is easie: Albeit God and man bee joynt agents in every action or effect essentially evill, yet the whole sinne is wholy mans: because the nature of sinne consists either in mans using the possibility of sinne allowed of God for his good, to accomplish such acts, as God disallowes, or in not using the contrary possibilitie unto such acts, as he not onely alloweth and approveth, but re∣quireth and commandeth, such as he most boun∣tifully rewardeth, and unto whose accomplish∣ment,

hee affordeth, not his ordinarie concourse onely, but his speciall furtherance and assistance. In every sin of commission, we approve and make choice of those acts which his infinite goodnesse disalloweth. In every sinne of omission, we do not approve those acts, which he approveth: although perhaps it may be questioned, whether there can be any sinne of pure omission, or not mixt with commission; that is, any sinne wherein we doe not either like what God dislikes, or reject and con∣temne what he likes & cōmends unto us for good.

5 From these resolutions we may finde some truth in an usuall position; which, without this truth presupposed, is palpably false. Every action or effect, as it is an effect or action, or as it proceeds from God, is good. The best meaning whereof it is capable, must be this; Gods goodnesse is seene in every action, even in those which are most sinfull. To vouchsafe his cooperation to them, is a branch of his goodnesse, because man could not be happy without a possibility of deserving to be miserable. But humane actions or effects in their owne na∣ture, indefinitely considered, or in the abstract as they are actions, are neither morally good, nor mo∣rally bad. When it is said that every action, as an action, is good, this must be understood of transcen∣dentall goodnes only, of w^ch kind of goodnes mo∣ral evill or sin it selfe is partaker. If every action, as it is an actiō were morally good, it were impossible any action shold be morally evill. If we consider hu∣mane actions not indefinitely, or with this redupli∣cation, as they are actions, but descending unto par∣ticulars,

some are good, some are bad, and some (per∣haps) positively indifferent, but of this hereafter.

CHAP. 16.

The former contingency in humane actions or mu∣tuall possibility of obtaining reward or incurring punishment, proved by the infallible rule of faith, & by the tenour of Gods covenant with his people.

1 THough manifest deductiōs of ill sounding Consequences from their positiōs, which we refute, and more commodious explana∣tions of other tenents common to both, may somewhat move the Favourers of universall necessity to a dislike of their owne opinions, & in part incline them to the opposit truth: yet is it positive proofe of Scriptures that must strike the maine stroak, & fasten their as∣sents unto it. And God forbid they should bee so uncharitable, as to think, that we or any sonnes of the true Church, would be unwilling to put our selves upon this tryall. Scripture wee grant (and are ready upon as high and hard termes as they, to maintaine,) is the onely infallible rule of rectitude or obliquitie in opinions concerning God, or mans salvation. Yet are we not hereby bound to reject reason, and infallible rule of Art, as incompetent Iudges, what propositions in Scripture are equi∣pollent, which opposite, which subordinate: or what collections from undoubted sacred Maximes, are necessary or probable, or what conclusions are

altogether false and sophisticall. Nor ought they to suspect reason in others to bee unsanctified; be∣cause it is accompanied with rules of prophane sciences. For even these are the gifts of God, and are sanctified in every Christian, by the rule of faith. And in as much as both of us admit Scripture to be the onely rule of faith in it selfe most infal∣lible: both of us are tyed by infallible consequents of truth from this rule derived, to admit of this Maxime following;* 1.11 Gods threats and promises, his exhortations, admonitions, or protestations, whether immediately made by himselfe or by his Prophets, containe in them greater truth and syncerity then is in our admonitions, exhortations, and promises. His truth and syncerity in all his wayes are the rule or patterne, which we are to imitate, but which wee cannot hope to equalize.

2 Put the case then a religious, wise, and graci∣ous Prince, should exhort a young gentleman (that in rigour of Law had deserved death for some aemulous quarrell in the Court) to behave himselfe better hereafter, and he should be sure to find grea∣ter favour at his hands than any of his adversaries: no man would suspect any determination in the Prince, to take away his life for this offence, or any purpose to intrap him in some other. A minister of publique iustice in our memory told a Butcher, (whom he then sentenced to death for manslaugh∣ter,) that he might kill Calves, Oxen and Sheepe, but mankinde was no butchery ware; hee might not kill his honest neighbours. The solecisme was so uncouth, and so ill beseeming the seat of gravity

and of justice, that it moved laughter (though in a case to be lamented) throughout the assembly; and a young Student standing neare the barre, ad∣vised the poore condemned man to entreat a Li∣cence to kill Calves and Sheepe that Lent. The wisest of men may sometimes erre, sometimes place good words amisse, or give wholsome coun∣sell (such as this was, had it beene uttered in due time and place) out of season. But to spend good words of comfort and encouragement, upon such as thou hast certainly appointed to dye; to floute the children of destruction with faire promises of preeminence;* 1.12 That be farre from thee O Lord. Shall not the Iudge of all the earth doe that which is right and just: a thing welbeseeming the best and wisest Princes of the earth to imitate? Was then the sen∣tence of condenmation for Cains exile or utter de∣struction without possibility of revocation, when thou entreatedst him as a most loving Father;* 1.13 Why art thou worth? and why is thy countenance fallen? If thou doe well, shalt not thou bee accepted? and if thou doest not well, sinne lyeth at the doore: and unto thee shall be his desire, and thou shalt rule over him? Did that, which the Text saith, afterward came to passe, come to passe by inevitable necessity? And Cain talked with Abel his brother: and it came to passe when they were in the field, that Cain rose up a∣gainst Abel his brother and slue him. My adversaries (for I am not theirs) must be entreated to pardon me, if I be as resolute and peremptory for my opi∣nion hitherto delivered, as they are for any other. For reason and conscience ruled by Scripture per∣swades

me, it is possible for the Iudge of quick & dead to be unjust in his sentences, or unsyncere in his incouragement, as that Cains destruction should be in respect of his decree, altogether ne∣cessarie or impossible to have beene avoyded. When the Lord tooke first notice of his aemu∣lation and envie at his yonger brother; God would not banish him from his brothers presence, nor so tie his hands that he could not strike: But he used all the meanes that aequitie (in like case) re∣quires to move his heart, that way which it was very possible for it to bee moved. And unto this motion Cain had both Gods assistance and incou∣ragement, as readie as his generall conc••urse to conceave anger in his heart, or to lift up his hand against his brother.

3 The very tenor of Gods grand covenant with the sonnes of Abraham includes this twofold pos∣sibilitie, one of attaining his extraordinary graci∣ous favour by doing well, another of incurring miserable calamities by doing ill. If yee walke in my statutes, and keepe my commandements, and doe them; then will I give you raine in due season, and the land shall yeeld her increase, and the trees of the field shall yeeld their fruit. And your threshing shall reach to the vintage, and the vintage shall reach un∣to the sowing time: and yee shall eate your bread to the full, and dwell in your land safely &c. I am the Lord your God, which brought you forth out of the Land of Aegypt, that yee should not bee their bond∣men, and I have broken the bands of your yoke, and made you goe upright. Levit. 26. ver. 3. ad 14. But

if yee will not hearken unto mee, and will not doe all these commandements; And if yee shall despise my statutes, or if your soule abhorre my judgements, so that ye will not doe all my commandements, but that ye breake my covenant: I also will doe this un∣to you, I will even appoint over you terrour, consump∣tion and the burning ague, &c. Levit. 26. ver. 14, 15, 16, &c.

This tenor or condition was to continue one and the same throughout all generations. But some generations, as the event hath proved, were de facto partakers of the blessings promised; others have had their portion in the curses. Shall wee hence inferre, that prosperitie, was in respect of GODS decree or good pleasure altogether necessarie unto such as prospered, not so much as possible unto those that perished, or that their calamity was absolutely necessary? I would say ra∣ther, & I have Gods word, yea his heartie wishes, for my warrant, that the most prosperous times, which any of Abrahams or Davids posteritie en∣joyed, did come farre short of that measure of pro∣speritie, which by Gods aeternall decree, was pos∣sible to all, even to the whole stocke of Iacob throughout all their generations. O that my peo∣ple had hearkned unto me: and Israel had walked in my wayes! I should soone have subdued their ene∣mies, and turned my hand against their adversaries. The haters of the Lord should have submitted them∣selves unto him: but their time should have endu∣red for ever. Psal. 81. verse 13, 14, 15. But in what estate? fed with the finest of the wheate, and satified

with hony out of the Rocke. verse 16. Were these meere wishes of winde which vanished with the avouchers breath? did the Pslmist utter them out of tender affection to his people and country, without commission from his Maker? or was He lesse affected towards his people then this his mes∣senger, that his message wants the waight of ever∣lasting truth? To these and the like demands, of many bad answers, this is the best and most com∣mon: God would undoubtedly have made his pro∣mise good, and done aswell by Israell as here hee wish∣eth, if Israell could have turned to him or done what he requires. But that, say the same men, was in re∣pect of Gods decree or secret will, impossible. Whēce, seeing the condition neither was nor could be performed by Israel, God was not bound to be∣stow these blessings upon them, but free to reserve his store unto himselfe, or for some other people; which was profered (but upon conditions impos∣sible to bee performed) unto Israell. Might not churlish Naball have promised abundance of bread, of wine and flesh to Davids servants, upon like tearmes? May not cutthroate Vsurers assure bags of Gold to bedridden or decrepit limbs, up∣on condition they will fetch them from the toppe of high towers or sleep mountains? But what kind∣nesse, what synceritie could there be in such lavish profers, specially if the impotent wretches were by covenant excluded from al use of crutches? Yet is it more possible for a creeple to goe without his crutches, then for Israell to walke in the waies of God, without his aide or assistance. Necessitie

therefore constraines us to confesse the one of these two, Either that there was no more synceritie in the Almighties protestations, then in Nabals or the Vsurers supposed bountie, which they never meant to use, but upon performance of impossibi∣lities: Or else his promises, if they had any syncerity in them, did include his furtherance and assistance unto Israell for performing the condition requi∣red. Now unto whatsoever effect or event the furtherance or speciall assistance of Omnipotent power is, upon the truth and synceritie of divine promise, alwaies ready and assured, the same effect cannot truly be deemed impossible in respect of the aeternall decree. And whatsoever is not in respect of this decree impossible, the non existence of it, or the existence of the contrary effect, cannot, in re∣spect of the same decree, be necessarie. So then nei∣ther was Israels well-doing and prosperitie, nor their ill-doing and calamitie at any time absolute∣ly necessarie, in respect of Gods decree; both were possible, both contingent.

4 The truth of these collections from Gods word (or rather of these infallible consequences of his essentiall goodnesse, sincerity and truth) though necessarie and evident unto Artists, may from o∣ther positive authorities of the same word be rati∣fied à fortior to common sense. If Neither these good things which God sincerely purposeth and expressely promiseth, nor that evill which he seri∣ously and expressely threatens, bee necessary in re∣spect of his decree: much lesse can that good which is neither particularly promised or avouch∣ed;

or that evil which is not expressely threatned or foretold by his infallible messengers, be held neces∣sary in respect of his decree. Now, that the prospe∣rity which he expresly promiseth by such messen∣gers, is not so necessary, as to exclude all possibili∣tie of cōtrary Evill; nor the evill which he solemn∣ly denounceth so necessarie, as not to leave a true possibilitie for a contrary blessing: his Prophet hath given such a generall and evident assurance, not to Israell onely out to all the Nations of the earth; as we cānot deny, but that it was devised of purpose, by the Lord himselfe, as a post statute to prevent this strange misconstruction, which his people had then made, & which he then foresaw would after∣wards be enforced upon his decrees or lawes, by this praejud••cate opinion of absolute necessitie. At what instant I shall speake concerning a nation, and concerning a kingdome, to pluck up and to pull downe, and to destroy it; if that nation against whom I have pronounced, turne from their evill, I will repent of the evill that I thought to doe unto them. And at what in∣stant I shall speake concerning a nation, and concer∣ning a kingdome to build and to plant it; If it doe evill in my sight, that it obey not my voyce, then I will repent of the good wherewith I said I would be∣nefite them. Ier. 18. ver. 7, 8, 9, 10. And, if wee may gesse at the nature of the disease, by the medicine, and the manner of applying it; the house of Israell, was at this time almost desperately sicke of this errour which we refute. Or what need we frame conjectures from the qualitie of the medicine, when as the working of it hath made the Crisis

palpable and apparent. The pestilence is best knowne by the botch, or outbursting. What then was the issue of that Cordiall which the Prophet ministred unto them, being but the extraction of the former generalls? Thus saith the Lord; Be∣hold, I frame evill against you, and devise a device against you; returne yee now every one from his evill way, and make your wayes and your doings good. We have seene the application of the medicine, what was the operation? And they said, there is no hope, but wee will walke after our owne devises, and wee will every one doe the imagination of his evill heart. Ier. 18. ver. 11, 12. But did the Prophet take their answere verbatim, as they uttered it? No, God did not appoint him to keepe a Register of their words, but to make a comment upon the secret language of their hearts. They are suffici∣ently convicted to have said, wee will every one doe the imagination of his evill heart, in that the imaginations of their heart were evill, and they had resolved to retaine their wonted principles, and not to hearken unto the Prophets doctrine. The true and literall paraphrase of their replye, no interpreter extant hath so fully expressed, as the usuall language of some in our times briefly doth; What shall bee, will be: there is no hope the world will amend: if it bee Gods will to prosper the courses which are taken, all will be well: if not, his will however must be done. Thus we delude and put off our Maker with Ifs, and Ands: when as his will re∣vealed, aswell for private as publike good, so wee would addresse our selves to doe it, is plaine and

absolute. And it is impossible we should addresse our selves to doe it, vnlesse wee would hearken 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to such as teach it. To expect any other fruite, or use of this doctrine of absolute necessitie, then carnall securitie in time of peace and pro∣speritie, and than desperate wilfulnesse in distresse and adversitie, were a madnesse. And seeing this frenzie did still grow greater and greater, in the Iew, as the destruction of Ierusalem (whereof it was both times the principall cause and most fearefull prognostique) grew neerer: the Lord authorized another Prophet (after Ieremie) to in∣terpose his oath for the cure of it. They thought that death and destruction, when they approached, were armed with absolute necessitie, (derived from Gods decree) to punish them for their fathers sinnes: and in this conceipt many yeelded unto them, when they might easily haue conquered them. To discover the vanitie of this skale and to acquit his omnipotent decree from the suspected imposition of necessitie. As I live (saith the Lord God) yee shall not have occasion any more to use this Proverbe in Israel: The Fathers have eaten sowre grapes, and the Childrens teeth are set on edge. Be∣hold, all soules are mine, as the soule of the father, so also the soule of the son is mine: the soule that sinneth, it shall die. Ezek. 18. ver. 2, 3, 4. Have I any plasure at all that the wicked should die, saith the Lord God? And not that he should returne from his wayes and live? ver. 23. Cast away from you all your transgres¦sions, whereby yee have transgressed, and make you a new heart, and a new spirit: for why will yee dye, O

house of Israel? For, I have no pleasure in the death of him that dieth, saith the Lord God: wherefore turne your selves and live ye. vers. 31, 32. If the returning of this people, wherein God tooke pleasure, were not necessary, as the event hath proved (for, the most part of them did not returne) it must needs argue a spice of their frenzy, to think their death, wherein he tooke no pleasure, should be necessary. The onely orthodoxall resolution of this point then, must be this, [It was Gods good will and plea∣sure,] (the formall dictate, and absolute injunction of his eternall and irresistible decree,) that neither the life or death of such as perished should be ne∣cessary; but that both should be possible: albeit the choise of life had beene more pleasant to God, who had complained with griefe, Perditio tua ex te O Israel.

CHAP. 17.

That Gods will is alwayes done, albeit many particu∣lars which God willeth, bee not done, and many done which he willeth should not be done.

1 AVt erit aut non erit, is a Prophe∣cie which will never bee out of date, impossible ever to bee im∣peached of falshood: an answer as universally true to all, as un∣sufficient to any question con∣cerning things to come. The truth of every dis∣junctive proposition, as Logicians teach, is fully salved, if any one member, though of never so ma∣ny, be true. Or if the disjunction or division be ar∣tificially formall, the actuall existence of one part or member, excludes the actuall existence of the other: so doth the absolute necessity of the one exclude all possibility of the others reduction into act. If I should wage any summe that it would ei∣ther raine all day to morrow, or be faire all day to morrow; no man of understanding would put me to prove, that it did both raine all the day, and hold up all the day. The proofe of either part, would be sufficient to evince the truth of my disjunctive assertion; that both should be actually true is im∣possible. Or if my adversary could substantially prove, either any intermission of raine or interrup∣tion of faire weather: His advantage against mee would bee as evident; because the proposition, which he was to make good against me, was but

disjunctive: so that of any two minutes in the whole day, if the one were rainy, and the other faire, my universall disjunctive must needs be false, and his apparantly true, because directly contradictory un∣to mine. That it should at one and the same time raine and not raine, is impossible, and comes not within the compasse of any contradictory conte∣station, it can be no object of lay or wager.

2 When wee say that God in many humane actions decrees a mixture or multiplicity of possibi∣lities; our meaning is, that the tenour of Gods e∣ternall & omnipotent word, from which all things derive as well the law and ma•••••••••• of their being; as their being it selfe: is in respect of the severall possible events decreed, not conjunctive or catego∣ricall, but disjunctive. And we hold it a sinne to thinke or say, that the onely wise Almighty Crea∣tor is not able to conceive or make propositions as truly disjunctive, as any of our making are, or not able to make as formall and contradictory oppositi∣on betweene their severall parts, as any humane wit can conceive. Thus much being granted, our intended inference is an everlasting truth. Gods decree or determinate proposition, concerning the supposed multiplicity of possibilities or manifold events, all alike possible; is alwaies exactly fulfil∣led, when any one of the events, whose possibilities are decreed, goes actuall existence. To reduce more of them then one into act at one and the same time, is, in many cases altogether impossible, and falls not within the object of Omnipotency. If the reducti∣on of any one of them, into actuall possession of its

owne being, were in respect of his decree, or by any other meanes, altogether necessary; his decree should necessarily; be broken, and his omnipotency might be overborne. For the necessity of ones be∣ing, takes away all possibilitie of being from the con∣tradictorie, which omnipotency (as is supposed) had bestowed upon it. Finally, Gods decree in re∣spect of all and every part of its proper object, is alike Omnipotent: and therefore it is as impossible for any necessity (by vertue or respect of what cause soever,) to incroach upon those events, the Law or manner of whose production God hath de∣creed to be contingent; as for Contingency to hin∣der the production of those events, the law or manner of whose production or existence, he hath decreed to be necessary. As impossible for neces∣sity to mingle with absolute contingency, from which God hath separated it; as for contingencie to be wedded to absolute necessity, whose mariage God hath forbidden by an everlasting decree.

3 The onely difficulty,* 1.14 wherewith these con∣clusions can (as I conceive) with probability bee charged, may be conceived thus: Admitting Gods decree concerning the house of Israels life or death, were (as evidently it was) disjunctive, and did es∣sentially include a possibility of life, and a possibi∣lity of death, in respect of all or most of their per∣sons, or of their publike state; Yet no man will de∣nie but that amongst the severall or opposite mem∣bers of this or the like decree, God wills one, more than another. For so he saith, That hee willed not the death, but the life of him that dyed. Now if that

which God willeth not, may come to passe; and that which he willeth may not come to passe; or if, of two possible events, that whose actuall being he willeth tenne thousand times more ardently, never get actuall being or existence (as being prevented by the actuall accomplishment of the contradicto∣rie or incompatible event which he lesse willeth,) How can his will, in this case bee fulfilled? and if his will be not fulfilled, his decree must needs bee broken; and if his decree may be broken, how is his will said to be irresistible? how do we beleeve him to be Omnipotent? Some perhaps would hence conclude, that if of two objects, which we suppose to bee alike truly possible, there bee no necessity, that that should come to passe, which GOD willeth most, or any probabilitie for that to come to passe, which he lesse willeth, or willeth not at all, but rather the contrary: Then there is a possi∣bilitie or rather a necessitie, that his will should not be alwaies fulfilled, that he might sometimes sit downe with a kinde of losse, and say with im∣potent man,* 1.15 I have failed of my purpose. The best preparation for fit and peaceable entertainment of the Orthodoxall solution to these difficulties, will be to declare the evident and necessary truth of that assertion, which they object unto us, as a dan∣gerous inconvenience able in their judgement to infer the last conclusion.

Truth fully and evidently declared will justifie it selfe against all gainsaiers. The assertion which we grant will necessarily follow from our former discursions, and comes now to justifie it selfe is

this; That such things as God no way willeth, oft∣times come to passe, when as their contradictories, which he wils most ardently, come not to passe.] The principall instance for justifying this truth, is the repentance and life of a sinner, which God hath sworne that he willeth; so doth hee not his death, if we will beleeve his oath. If any mans verdict shall scatter from mine, or others, which main∣taine this doctrine, I must call God and his consci∣ence to witnesse, whether he hath not left that un∣done, w^ch God wold have had him to do, & some∣times done, that which God would have had him not to doe? Let him that will answere negatively to this Interrogative, indite that confession which we daily make in our Liturgy of falshood or slaun∣der. Let him call for Iacobs Ladder downe from heaven, and require a guard of Angels to conduct him safely into Gods presence. For if hee have as truely and continually done Gods will here on Earth, as the Angels doe it in heaven; hee may justly challenge speedie admission into their socie∣tie. But if he can with safe conscience communi∣cate with us sinnefull men, in that confession; his exceptions against our assertion are but needlesse scrupulosities, altogether against reason? what∣soever they bee in respect of his conscience, yet to his exceptions wee are to frame a further ans∣were.

4 There is an absolute necessity, that Gods will should alwayes be fulfilled: but there is no such necessitie, that it should alwayes bee fulfilled by the parties to whom it is revealed or directed.

They are tyed indeed by necessitie of praecept, and at their perill, alwayes to doe it; but the Al∣mightie God, doth not referre the fulfilling or evacuation of it, to their fidelitie, choice or resolu∣tion: for so the certaintie or infallibilitie of execu∣ting his decree, should bee but commensurable to the fragility of our Nature; and that which some object unto us would fall directly upon themselves, to wit, That Gods will should depend upon mans will. As hee alwayes grants the re∣quests of the faithfull, or, as the Psalmist speakes, gives such as delight in him, their hearts desire, al∣beit he alwaies gives them not the particulars or materialls which they request or heartily de∣sire: so he knows how to fulfill his own will, or do his pleasure, albeit those particulars or materials, which he ardently wils and takes most pleasure in, be not alwayes done by us. And this answer might suffice unto a Reader not scrupulously curious. But sophisticall and captious objections require artifi∣ciall and formall solutions. The former objection may perhaps be framed more captiously thus. Of more particulars proposed to the choise of men, if that bee not alwayes done, which God willeth most, his will is not done at all. For as a lesser good whilest it stands in competition with a greater, is rather evill than good: so, that which is lesse wil∣led or desired, cannot be said to bee willed or de∣sired at all, in respect of that which is more desired, specially in the language of Gods Spirit, which expressely saith, that God will have mercy, and not sacrifice. Whence it will follow, that when sacri∣fice

was offered, without performance of duties of mercy, or obedience; Gods will was not done, but broken. It is Gods will likewise, that we should goe unto the house of mourning, rather then unto the house of mirth. The duties to be performed in the house of mourning are many: To mourne, to fast, to pray, with other branches of humiliation; all which God truly willeth, in different measure ac∣cording to the diversity of their nature, or the more or lesse intensive manner of their performance. The transgressions likewise usuall and frequent in the house of unhallowed mirth, are many and much different as well in quality as degree; all de∣tested of God as contrary to his most holy will, but more or less detested according to their nature, quality or degree, or other circumstance. Suppose a man, to whom choise of going into the house of mirth or mourning is solemnly proposed; the in∣conveniences of the one, and gracious acceptance of the other in Gods fight, seriously prest by Gods Minister; do vtterly reject the Preachers counsell, and adventure upon the most desperate evill that is practised in the house of mirth: shall wee say Gods will is in this case fulfilled? Yes, though the evils which he willeth not, were tenne thousand, and man did desperately resolve to doe the very worst and most contrary to his will; yet that which he willeth most, shall still be done: for it is his ab∣solute and peremptory will, that all the particu∣lars offered to mans choice, as well those which his Holinesse most abhorreth, as those which hee wil∣leth most, should bee truly possible for a man to

choose without impediment, that none should bee necessary. Now this liberty being left to man which way soever his will inclineth, Gods will shall be most infallibly fulfilled, in the selfe same mea∣sure, as if the very best had beene chosen by man; seeing it is his absolute will to grant him freedome (at his perill) to choose the very worst and refuse the best. And the perill is, that Gods will shall be done upon him according to the measure it was neglected by him. As this proposition [The Sun will either shine or not shine this day at twelve of the clocke] will be as true if the Sunne shine not, as if it shine: so Gods will being (as is supposed in this case) disjunctive, shall bee as truly fulfilled, albeit man doth that which he willeth not, as if he did that which he willed most. For his will (as was now said) may (according to the same measure) be fulfilled two wayes, either by us, or upon us; whe∣ther it be this way or that way fulfilled, it is all one to God, but much better for us to doe it, then to have it done upon us. And though it be possible for us not to doe it, yet not doing it there is no possi∣bility left, that it shall not be done upon us. In as much then as Gods will must of necessity be done, and no man can doe it by doing evill, (seeing it is set onely on that which is truly good;) the punish∣ment of such as continue to doe evill, is absolutely necessary, that is altogether as unavoydable, as if they had beene appointed to it from all eternities, or created to no other end, then that they might be punished. For the punishment of evill is good, and is for this reason a part of Gods will, or rather a

part of the object of his irresistible will or inviolable decree; yet may we not say that God* 1.16 simply wil∣leth evill, or delighteth in punitive justice, which he never willeth, but upon supposall of evill deserts in the Creature. As for the evill it selfe, which de∣serveth punishment, that, God is not said (in true Divinity) to will at all, either voluntate signi, or be∣neplaciti, either by his secret or revealed, or by his antecedent or consequent will. For nothing is evill, but that which swarveth from, or is contrary to the rule of goodnesse, and other rule of goodnes there is none, besides Gods goodnesse; nor doth he wil any thing that is not consonant to his good∣nesse; so is not any thing that is truly evill. They which otherwise teach, that God in any sort can will that which is morally evill, have mightily for∣got the rules of Logick: For if nothing be evill, but that which God would not have done, then nothing which God would have done, can be evill.

CHAP. 18.

Of the distinction of Gods will into Antecedent and Consequent. Of the explication and use of it.

1 GOds will being, as all confesse, in∣divisible, some there bee which hold all distinctions concerning it, no lesse unfitting, then the di∣vision of Christs seamlesse coate. Others mislike that distinction of his antecedent and consequent will, and yet are content to distinguish his will into revealed and se∣cret, or into voluntatem signi & beneplaciti. The use notwithstanding of the first distinction [of his antecedent and consequent will] is most ancient; warranted by the authority of Chrysostom, and well exemplified by Damascene. And of this distincti∣on I have made choise in other meditations, as most commodious (to my apprehension) for re∣solving many problemes arising out of Propheti∣call and Euangelicall passages, concerning the ful∣filling of Gods will in his threats or promises. The ingenuous Reader will not bee so uncharitable or injurious towards Chrysostom or Damascene, as to suspect, that either of them imagined two wills in God; unto which imputation, they are more just∣ly liable, which affect the distinction of Gods secret and revealed will, or of voluntatis signi & benepla∣citi. For every distinction of Gods will, must bee framed ex parte volitorum, non ex parte volentis, in

respect of the things willed, not in respect of him that willeth them. We must in charity and good manners permit Chrysostom and Damascene that li∣berty of speech which we take our selves. Now it is usuall with all of us, to attribute that verbo tenus unto the cause, w^ch really and properly belongs on∣ly unto the effect, or to denominate the intellectual faculty from the qualitie of the object to which it hath reference; as when we say the Sunne is hot, the understanding is practique, &c. The meaning of those two good Authors, whom we follow in the use of the distinction of Gods antecedent or conse∣quent will, was this, or the like: That God by one and the same indivisible will, might differently af∣fect or approve divers objects, according to the nature quality or degrees of goodnes contained in them. And certaine it is, that the immensity or greatnesse of our God, doth not make his power or will to bee unweildy. Though he be in power truly infinite, yet he alwayes worketh not according to the infinity of his power, but oft-times more gently and pla∣cidly, then the weakest or softest spirited of his rea∣sonable creatures can doe. Though his will like∣wise be alwayes irresistible, yet is it not alwayes so peremptorily set on this or that particular object willed by him, as mans will, for the most part, is. The variety of particular objects which hee truely willeth in different measure, is much greater than the wit of man can comprehend So is the liberty or variety of choise, which hee alloweth unto his creature, much greater then we can without grud∣ging, afford to such as have dependance on us.

Some things he willeth in the first place and di∣rectly; though not so peremptorily, but that things lesse willed by him, or contrary evills, which hee willeth not, may get the start or take place of them in humane choise. Other things he willeth in the second place, or by consequence, as in case, that which in the first place he willed, be (by abuse of mans free will) rejected. The former he is said to will by his antecedent will, because the object wil∣led by him, hath antecedence or preeminence in re∣spect of his beneplacitum or acceptance: the latter he is said to will by his consequent will, that is not in the first place or directly, but by consequent, as supposing those objects, which he better approved, to be neglected. Whatsoever is good in it selfe, and good withal for a reasonable creature to make choise of, that, God is said to will by his antece∣dent will, as the repentance of a sinner, and the joy∣full fruits which the sinner shall reape by his peni∣tencie. Whatsoever in it selfe is not evill, or con∣trary to the rule of goodnesse, but evill to the rea∣sonable creature, which must suffer it, as sicknesse, death, all kinde of torture or calamity, that God willeth onely by his consequent will. We may not deny but that he truly willeth the death of obsti∣nate sinners, yet this he willeth by his consequent will. Their obstinacy in sinne he willeth not at all, for if he did, he would not punish it: for punish∣ment is the necessary consequent of his will neg∣lected. Both these branches of one and the same will (which from the reference onely which they have unto their different objects, wee conceive to

bee two or divers) are subordinate to his abso∣lute and peremptorie will, which is, that man should have a libertie of doing, and not doing those things which in the first place he willed or liked better. But is not this libertie of man an im∣perfection?

2 An issue though a blemish to youth and live∣lihood, is ofttimes a good meane or principall cause of health to an unsound and crasie bodie. So possibility of declining to evill, albeit in it selfe an imperfection, and not possibly incident to aeter∣nall and immutable goodnesse, is no way contra∣ry to the participated actuall goodnesse of the rea∣sonable creature; whereof it is an essentiall or con∣stitutive part, at the least a necessarie ingredient or condition precedent to the constitution of it. And imperfection with reference to this end, may be the object of Gods antecedent will, or part of that which in the first place he willeth and princi∣pally intends. But inasmuch as actuall evill is for∣mally dissonant to actuall goodnesse; hee which is actually and infinitely good, cannot but hate or dislik actuall evill in whomsoever it is found, as much as he loveth the contrary good. Now pu∣nishment or malum poenae, being as necessarie a con∣sequent of Gods hate or dislike of sinne, as re∣ward or happinesse is of his loue to vertue and pietie: the reasonable creature by declining from vertue to vice, from good to bad, doth ipso facto and inevitably bring evill [malum poenae & damni] tribulation and anguish upon it selfe. By reward and punishment in this place, wee understand not

onely life and death everlasting (of whose refe∣rence to Gods aeternall decree, we shall in parti∣cular dispute hereafter, if Superiours shall so think fit:) but every temporall blessing or crosse, all prosperity or calamitie, specially publike & remar∣kable. Prosperitie we alwayes take to be a pledge of Gods love (though not alwaies of the Person, on whom it is bestowed, yet of some good quality in him or in some of his, serving for publique use or private imitation;) and is alwayes (in the begin∣ning at least) an effect of Gods antecedent will. Calamitie we take alwayes for a token of Gods dislike, though not alwaies of the person afflicted, yet either of somewhat in him to bee amended, or of somewhat formerly done by him, to bee by o∣thers avoided; and is an effect of Gods consequent will. For hee wils no evill at all, not malum poenae, but as it is either a punishment or correction for evill done, or good neglected, or as it is a mede∣cine to prevent the doing of evill, or neglect of goodnesse.

3 From the infinite varietie of possibilities au∣thorized by the aeternall decree, and their corre∣spondent consequences, which one time or other actually follow upon their reductions into Act, by the irresistible award of the same decree; wee may resolve many difficulties, and abandon sundry in∣conveniences, wherewith the Heathen in their vaine speculations, and many Christians in more grievous temptations, charge, either the truth or goodnesse of Gods Providence. The varietie of such possibilities, amounts, partly from the speci∣ficall

nature of the objects, made possible by the divine decree: partly from the severall degrees of good or evill contained in such objects, or in mens actions concerning them. The whole lati∣tude (if I may so speake) of Gods providence, as it concernes kingdomes, states or persons, consists in moderating and ordering the possible devoluti∣ons or alternations of the resonable creature from his antecedent will to his consequent. The alterna∣tions or devolutions themselves, may be number∣lesse, save onely to God; so may the degrees bee of mans dissonancie or consonancie to Gods ante∣cedent will, throughout the course of his life.

CHAP. 19.

Of the divers acceptions or importances of Fate, especially among the Heathen writers.

1 THE very name of Fate, will be I know, to many very offensive, unto whom I am unwilling to give the least offence. The use of it (I must confesse) is in some cases prohibited by S^t. Au∣stin, a man too modest, to vsurpe greater authori∣tie then he had; and oecumenicall authoritie in this point hee had none, or none so great as might impose silence upon all posteritie. Would to God such as are most forward to presse us with this Re∣verend fathers interlocutorie sentence once or twice perhaps vttered for not vsing the name;

could be perswaded to stand to his definitive sen∣tence often pronounced against the nature of the Errour, which the Heathens, against whom hee disputes, covered under this name. Vpon conditi∣on they would be pleased not to revive the nature of the errour, or bury their opinions that way ten∣ding; my heart and mouth should never give breath unto the name. The opinion which some rigid Stoicks had of Fate, is an haeresie not to bee named among the Heathen; so deepely tainted with the very dregs of heathenisme, that it is a wonder any Christian writer should come neere it; that any at least should take infection from it: especially seeing the Reverend and learned Fa∣thers of the primitive church, had provided so ma∣ny excellent preservatives against it. But albeit Fate, according to that sense or meaning, where in some heathens tooke it, was become a wicked Idol: yet seeing the word or name, whether in the ordinary use of Greeke or Latine writers, hath greater va∣rietie of significations or importances, then al∣most any other word in the world besides▪ to a∣bandon all, for one ill sense, or importance, seemes to me as rude and uncivill a part, as to roote out a whole clan or surname, because one of the same name and stocke had beene at deadly sohood with our family or had otherwise deserved death. Vpon diligent perusall of the best Philosophers, histori∣ans or Poets amongst the Heathens, of some hi∣storians and Moralists of best note amongst Chri∣stians; we may finde realities, or solid matter an∣swering to this word Fate, which cannot bee so

well expressed by any other terme or name, by any paraphrase more briefe than the true and proper definition of the matter or reality signified by it. Now if the matter defined, prove to bee no Idoll; the name certainly is indifferent, and of the defini∣tion there may be a good morall or historicall use. For finding out the true and proper definition or description of it, we are to explicate the divers ac∣ceptions or importances of the name.

2 Fatum à fando dictum, and sometimes imports no more then the dictate of nature, or the certaine course appointed to things naturall. Thus natu∣rall death, is by some accounted fatall. And Dido according to this importance, did not die by Fate, because shee prevented Lachesis by cutting the thred of her owne life, before this great Arbitresse of mortality had passed sentence upon her;

* 1.17 Sed quia nec fato, merita nec morte peribat.

And according to this importance it is used by the Prince of Romane Historians in the sixt booke of his Annals; Per idem tempus Lucius Piso Pontifex (rarum in tanta claritudine) fato obijt. About the same time L. Piso High Priest died a naturall death (being 80. yeares of age;) a matter rare in those times, in a man of so great birth and place. Some∣times againe Death it selfe, howsoever it come up∣on men, is termed Fate or Destiny; perhaps be∣cause the comming of it is by course of nature cer∣taine, albeit the time and manner of it, be unknown or incomprehensible. So another Roman Poet

saith, The parthians poysoned arrowes carryed Fates upon their points, able to let in Death at the least breach of skin, Fatum{que} in sanguine summo est. It may be Virgil held naturall death to be fatall, be∣cause it cannot be avoided, being otherwise of our opinion, that Dido might have lived longer, or that it was not absolutely necessary from the houre of her birth, that she should live so many yeares and no* 1.18 more. For so some of the wisest amongst the Heathens held death to be fatall, that is, simply necessary unto all; albeit to dye at this or that set houre, were in their opinion contingent, or at least supposed a Contingency before it became necessary. Of this opinion wasa 1.19 Pythagoras and his followers. And so it seemes wasb 1.20 Iu∣stine Martyr. But Lucan, we know, was somewhat al∣lyed unto the Stoicks, and out of his private conceit that the set time or manner of every mans death, was no lesse necessary then death it selfe, he might, not inconse∣quently terme violent or sudden death, Fatall. And

Tacitus, who seemes to be doubtfull, whether all things fell out by Fate or Necessity or no, ascribes violent and undeserved death, as well as naturall, unto Fate. For, speaking of Agricola his untime∣ly death, (as we would terme it) he saith, Constans & libens fatum accepit: He constantly and willing∣ly entertained his Fate. Martials conceit con∣cerning Death and Fates, is not much different from Lucans, or this last cited place of Tacitus, though not altogether the same.

Nullo fata loco possis excludere: cum mors Venerit, in medio Tybure Sardinia est. From Fates no place is priviledg'd: but when Death is their doome, The pestilent Sardinia, in Tyber findeth roome.

And as Death, in his opinion, could not bee re∣pelled where Fates had granted his admission; so neither could it be obtruded, or admitted, without the leave or approbation of Fates, if the authority of the Father of Poets be authentique.

* 1.21 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

Vexe not thy soule, for none can send me to my grave, before, My day be come, since all mens lives runne on a fatall score Which none may passe, none not make up; 'tis not mans power or will Can change the period which is set as well to th' good, as th'ill.

Virgil was somewhat of a better minde in this point than Homer was, or they are, which can thus liberally dispose of their friends bodies or bones.

Similis si cura fuisset,* 1.22 Tum quoque fas nobis Teucros armare fuisset. Nec pater omnipotens Troiam, nec fata vetabant Stare, decem{que} alios Priamum superesse per annos. Had like care beene, nor mighty love, nor Fates did fore-ordaine Or Troy to fall, or Priamus not tenne yeares more to raigne.

3 That no man can dye before his Day come, is an opinion in whose truth some are so confi∣dent, as they will not stick to bequeath the bones of their dearest friends unto the divell, if they should dye otherwise. And it is certaine, all things have their appointed time, yet may wee not hence collect that no man can live longer or dye sooner than he doth, or that the number of his dayes can∣not possibly bee diminished or encreased: But

of this argument see* 1.23 Iustin Martyr, or the Author of the questions and explications, which have for a long time gone under his name. In all these or the like acceptions of Fate, and the very common conceipt which this name suggests, there is an im∣portance of necessitie. And according to the se∣verall degrees of necessitie, Fates good or bad (for so they divided them for their qualitie) were sub∣divided into (majora & minora) into lesser and greater fates. (Fata minora) lesser fates, were held alterable by enchantment or other curious pra∣ctises, taught by Sathan, as imitations of those sa∣cred rites or solemnities, which God had orday∣ned for averting imminent plagues. (Fata majo∣ra) chiefe or supreame fates were so unalterable, so in∣flexible, that their great god Iupiter could not com∣mand them, but was to doe whatsoever was de∣signed by them 〈◊〉〈◊〉 done. Whence as Lactan∣tius wittily 〈…〉〈…〉 they could not rightly en∣style him Maxi•••••• because hee was lesse then this kinde of Fate•••• in this heathenish division not∣withstanding, there was a true glimpse of a Chri¦stian truth, hereafter 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ••••sewere to be discussed. Subordinate to this division of Fates, were the

opinions of the Caldean and Aegyptian Astrolo∣gers concerning the power or efficacie of the hea∣vens, over sublunary bodies. The* 1.24 Caldeans were impious not in practise only but in opinion, in that they held the operation of the heavens to be unal∣terable and unpreventable by the wit, industry or skill of man: all which such as follow Ptolomie the Aegyptian, expressely deny, & bring good reasons for their deniall. If their practises to foretell things to come, bee no worse than their opinions concerning the manner how they come to passe; it would bee no great sinne to be their Schollers.

4 There is no Christian but will grant his God to be greater then Heathenish Fate, and his Law to be above all controll of any other Law or pow∣er whatsoever. And yet by the doctrine of many Divines, the Almighty Lawgiver is made aeternal∣ly subject to his owne decrees. Their meaning is taken by many to be in effect this: That albeit God be Omnipotent, yet it is true of him,

Post semel emissum volat irrevocabile verbum.

That he had past his Omnipotent word, concer∣ning the ordering and managing of all things to come, before it could be taken or accepted by a∣ny creature: and that by his word thus past once for all for ever, such irrevocable doome had passed upon some of his best creatures before their nonage, (in their non existence;) as they would not have accepted life or being it selfe, when they first entred vpon possession of it, if they had knowne up∣on

what hard conditions it had beene tendred. Or, were it yet left free for them to disclaime those covenants or conditions of life and beeing, where∣unto they never gave their consent; The greatest part of divine goodnesse which they could hope to be partakers of, were to be released from the right of creatures, and to returne againe to nothing. Briefly, by making God supreame Lord of such hard weirds or sinister Fates, as are by these men inevitably awarded to absolute reprobates; they doe not adde so much unto his greatnesse, as they derogate from his goodnesse, in respect of the hea∣then gods. For, unto such of the heathens, as gran∣ted Fates a negative voice in some cases against the good purposes of their gods; it was some comfort to thinke, that their gods wished them well, and did entreate them, as great personages or cour∣teous gentlemen do their sutors, whom for the pre∣sent they cannot pleasure, as being overborn by the opposite faction. But alas, what can it boot poor im∣potent man, to beleeve his Maker was not from ae∣ternitie subject to Fates, or any other law; if by his owne Lawes, or decrees, he hath bound them be∣fore the world had beginning, (without all hope or possibility of release) to harder conditions of Life, then the heathens imagined could bee injoyned by Fates. For it is probable, that such of the heathen as were most peremptorie for the absolute neces∣sitie of fatall events, did thinke bad Fates had spit their poyson, when this life was ended. They did not suspect the miseries inflicted by them, to be for time so everlasting, or for their qualitie so

unsufferable, as wee Christians beleeve the tor∣ments of the life to come shall bee to all that are ordained for the day of wrath. But bee the tor∣ments for their qualitie more exquisite than the Heathens could conceive any; was it absolutely necessary for the Almightie from aeternitie to ap∣point them? If so it were, there was a fatall neces∣sitie praecedent to the Almightie decree. But if his decree hath brought this absolute necessitie upon men; the execution of this decree by in∣strumentall or second causes, differs nothing save onely in excesse of rigour and severitie, from the most rigid stoicall Fate.

CHAP. 20.

Of the affinitie or allyance which Fates had to ne∣cessitie, to Fortune or chance in the opinion of Hea∣then writers.

BVT that we may finde out, which wee most desire, some mittigati∣on or tolerable reconciliation of the most harsh opinions, whe∣ther maintained by heathens or Christians in this argument: it is a common notion received by all, that every fatall event is necessarie; but very few of the heathen, were of opinion, that all ne∣cessarie events were fatall. Albeit by way of such a Poeticall licence in substituting the speciall for the generall, as he used that said,

Hunc ego si potui tantum sperare dolorem.

Fate is sometimes taken for necessity without restriction. It was not usuall with ancient Hea∣thens, nor is it with such as to this day use to ascribe many events to Fates, to terme the rising, or set∣ting of the Sunne, the ebbing and flowing of the Sea, or other like effects of hourely observation (necessary by the common course of nature) fatall. In the literall construction of many good Writers, Fate and Fortune, are, if not Synonimall in their for∣mall,* 1.25 prime, or direct signifi∣cations, yet coincident in their importances or conno∣tations. Their titles, to the selfe same events or effects, were ofttimes undistinguish∣able, by such as ascribe too much to the one or to the o∣ther. Ausonius, but for verse sake, might as well have said, Dum vult fortuna, as,

Dum fata volunt, bina venena juvant. When such successe the fates shall will, One poyson shall another kill. Or Iuvenal as well, Si fata velint, as, Si fortuna volet, fies de Rhetore consul: Si volet haec eadem, fies de consule Rhetor. Of Rhetorician whom she will, Dame Fortune Consull makes: And when she will, to meaner state, her Favorite downe she takes.

Others held Fortune to be a branch of Fate, or an instrument for executing what was by Fates designed.

Quid referam Cannas? admota{que} moenibus arma? Varronem{que} pigrum, magnum quod vivere posset Post{que} tuos Thrasimnene lacus? Fabium{que} morantem Accepisse jugum victas Carthaginis arces? Spectatum Hannibalem nostris cecidisse catenis? Exilium{que} Rogi furtiva morte duisse? Adde etiam Italicas vires, Romam{que} suismet Pugnantem membris, adjice & civilia bella: Et Cimbrum in Mario, Marium{que} in carcere victum: Quod consul totiens exul{que} ex exule consul: Et jacuit Libicis compar jactura ruinis At{que} crepidinibus cepit Carthaginis orbem:* 1.26 Hoc nisi fata darent, nunquam fortuna tulisset.

The resultance of this long Oration, is no more than this: Fortune was but the messenger to bring all those welcome, or unwelcome presents to the Romane State, which Fate did bestow upon it. Of this argument see more in the 27. Chapter of this Booke, parag. 2, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14.

2 In Tacitus his language Fate and Fortune have sometimes the same reference or importance. Occulta lege fati, & ostentis ac responsis destinatum Vespasiano liberis{que} ejus imperium post fortunam cre∣didimus: After his good fortune we surely beleeved, that the Empire was by the secret course of fate, by signes and Oracles destinated to Vespasian and his sonne. Tacit. 1. histor. cap. 10. Yet is not this dif∣ference

betwixt Fate and Fortune constantly ob∣served by these two Writers themselves, much less observed at all by others: with Cominaeus, Ma∣chiavel, and other later Historians or Politicians, Fortune and Fate, are used promiscuously. The properties or attributes of Fate, are, in ordinary con∣struction the same, or equivalent to those of For∣tune. The titles of Fate were anciently these, or the like, unavoydable, insuperable, inflexible, ineluc∣table. And it is a conceit or prenotion, that to this day runnes in many Christians mindes, that no∣thing can be against a chance: Where Fortune failes, nothing prevailes. This difference notwithstan∣ding betwixt them, might bee observed in many Writers (or in their language, which have cause, in their owne apprehensions to like well or com∣plaine of them.) That the ordinary successe of others labours or consultations, are for the most part ascri∣bed by envy or aemulation unto Fortune: whereas Fates are usually charged with the calamities or disasters, which befall themselves or such as rely upon their counsells. Most men are by nature prone to excuse themselves in their worst actions, si non à toto, yet à tanto, by accusing Fortune; and can be well content to exonerate their galled con∣sciences, of inward griefe, by venting bitter com∣plaints, or receiving plausible informations from others, against Fates. Attonitis etiam victoribus, qui vocem preces{que} adhibere non ausi, lacrymis ac si∣lentio veniam poscebant, donec Cerealis mulceret ani∣mos, fato acta dictitans, quae militum ducum{que} dis∣cordia, vel fraude hostium evenissent. Tacitus lib. 4.

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Histor. num. 72. Even the Conquerors were asto∣nished at the sight, who not daring to speake, begged their pardon with silence and teares, till such time as Cerealis with comfortable words revived their spi∣rits; affirming that those things, which indeed came to passe through the mutinousnesse of the souldiers, or the dissention of the Leaders, or the malice of the Ene∣mies, were but fatall mischances which could not bee escaped.

3 Some againe derive Fate and Fortune from one and the same fountaine, and distinguish them onely by excesse of strength, as the same streame in Winter differs from it selfe in drouth of Sum∣mer.* 1.27 Advertendum vero illud, quandocunque illa coelestium causarum ratio ita digeritur, ut artem ex∣culcatam exsuperet, dici à platonicis fatum: ubi ve∣ro sic, ut vincere inertem desidiosum{que} evaleat rur∣sum à solerti strenuo{que} vinci, Fortunam. Vtrobi{que} vero divinam statuunt providentiam, quae ad finem agat sibi soli notum quae universa modis contemperet occultioribus. Lection. Antiquar. lib. 10. cap. 20 The Platonicks, which derive most humane events or successe from the order or disposition of cele∣stiall causes, call this disposition, Fate; when it is so strong, that no endeavours or skill of man can prevaile against it: but when the strength of it is of such a middle size, as may prevaile against sloath∣full and carelesse men, but may bee vanquished by the vigilant and industrious, they call the same disposition Fortune. In both cases they admit a Divine Providence, which worketh to ends knowne onely to it selfe.

4 For this affinity betweene Fortune, Chance and Fate in best Writers, it will bee expedient to touch at the seat of Chance or Fortune in our way, and to declare what is meant by these termes; and whether such events as we say fall out by Fortune or Chance, have any alliance with necessity. In this discussion, I hope wee shall arive at that point, whereat the favourers of absolute necessity, and the favourers of other opinions concerning Fate and Fortune, more fluctuant, will bee content to cast anchor. Fortune (saith* 1.28 Plutarch) is a part of Chance, as free-will or choise is of contingency. Every casuall event is contingent, but every con∣tingent effect is not casuall or a chance: 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, quasi 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. The very name of Chance in Greek (saith Aristotle) implies as much as to be to no end or purpose: yet this etymology (under correction) was no part of the Ancients meaning, which gave the Greek name 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, to such events as we terme casuall, unlesse [〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 frustra] be referred onely (as perhaps Aristotle intended) to the efficient cause. After a manner of speech not much unlike to this,

the Schoolemen say that is gratis dictum (as wee would say freely spoken) not for which a man takes no fee, but for which he hath no just ground or rea∣son. And that in phrase of Scripture is said to bee done gratis or frustra, which is done without just motives or provocation, not that which is done or attempted to no end or purpose. Oderunt me fru∣stra, and Oderunt me gratis, They hated me without a cause, or They hated me vainly, are in some trans∣lations equivalent. The word in the originall an∣swers to both. In analogy to this kinde of speech, those events were said to fall out by chance, or to be 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which in the opinion of such as gave this name, had no efficient cause, or at least none discernable, but were supposed to move themselves or to take possession of such short beeing as they had, without the assignement of any superiour po∣wer, or of any constant or setled cause; intruding themselves into the course of nature, like unbid∣den guests, sometimes as unwelcome as frost in summer, sometimes as welcome as warme weather to such as want fire in winter.

5 Fortune hath her authority placed onely in reasonable actions or* 1.29 deliberations, yet not in

all these, but onely in such events as fall out ei∣ther so farre beyond or contrary to mens intenti∣ons, that they may be rather wondred at, then ex∣pected. If husbandmen should digge their Vine∣yards with purpose to finde Gold, the fruitefull vintage thereon following (though no part of their intentions) could not so properly b••e ascribed to Fortune, as if a husbandman, intending onely to dig his Vineyard in hope of a plentifull vintage, should finde store of Gold.

6 The meaning of Plato, of Aristotle and Plu∣tarch may bee better perceived by fit instance, then by large scholastique commentaries upon their severall definitions of Fortune. Valerius Maximus (and to my remembrance, Plutarch) hath a memorable storie of one Iason Phereus, that was cured of an impostume in a fray or Duell. The blow of an enemy was the cause of this mans health, but by a rare and unusuall accident, quite contrary to his intention that gave it; and altoge∣ther beyond his expectation that received it. His purpose was only to maintaine his reputation or revenge his wrongs, either to wound or to be wounded, without any hope or thought of curing his disease, the danger wherof was not fully disco∣vered, til it was past. But a more perfect Idaea or ex∣emplarie forme of fortune good or bad, then any historian relates, the greeke Epigrammatist hath pictured for our contemplation. The matter of the Epigram was in English thus: A silly poore wretch, being deprived of all meanes to live, re∣solves to deprive himselfe of breath; but, whilest

he sought a place convenient for acting this despe∣rate purpose, finding store of gold which another had hid; he returned home againe leaving his hal∣ter in the place, which was worse taken by him that hid the gold, then meant by him that left it: for he hanged himselfe in it for griefe of his losse.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. A poore wretch finding gold, for ioy, left's halter in its steed: Which he that left the gold, for griefe, did make his fatall threed.

To finde Gold was no part of that poore mans hopes, whom despaire of like meanes to live by, had made desirous of death: the other had as lit∣tle minde to dispatch himselfe, when he came to visit the supposed stay and comfort of his life where∣in his soule had solaced her selfe with the foole in the Gospell.

CHAP. 21.

Of the proper subject and nature of Fate.

1 THE most usefull issue which these or the like cases afford is this, whe∣ther the event specified in them bee meerely casuall, contingent, or (in some sort) necessarie. One and the same determination, will as well befit the like quaestion, concerning such events as are properly tearmed Fatall, whose proper subject, nature and definition, we are more particularly to inquire after. The first quaere, which few meddle withall, would bee this: Whether fatall events participate more of contingencie, then of necessitie. But setting aside all comparison, it sufficeth us that they truely participate of both; but in diffe∣rent degrees or measures according to the diversi∣tie of times. Contingencie is alwayes as neces∣sarily praesupposed to the production of events fa∣tall, as necessitie is included in them. And as the proper forme or essence of Fates consists not in e∣very sort of necessitie, but in some peculiar branch thereof; so neither is every Contingent subject a fit matter for receiving that forme or branch of necessitie, wherein the nature of Fate consists, and which giues denomination and be∣ing to events fatall. I have heard many unthrifts, upon the loosing of a faire game at Tables, curse the Dice or cry vengeance upon ill luck; but I ne∣ver heard any Gamester frame such inditements

either in verse or prose, against Fates, as were usuall amongst the heathens, whose language in other cases, is with our unthrifts most familiar. Such pettie adventures as Cardes and Dice, are as met all too base to be instampt with the inscription of Fate: whose proper subject in publike affaires, is matter either of tragedie or of triumph: in pri∣vate matter either of extraordinarie and unusuall prosperitie or of calamitie.

Most of Gods creatures are the subject of con∣tingency; mankind onely or humane societie, is the the proper sphaere, without whose circumference, neither fortune or fatall events doe wander. Yet is not every part of man subject to fate, though man according to every part bee subject to that contingencie, which is praesupposed to Fates. * 1.30Iustin Martyr; though a professed enemy to Stoi∣call

Fates, and a most valiant champion, a chiefe leader to all the rest which have defended the Christian truth against that sect, being most potent in the infancie of Christianitie; was not so nice, as either to deny us the right use of the name Fate, or the nature of the thing thereby signified. This, saith he is immutable Fate, that such as doe well, shall be rewarded, and such as doe ill shall bee punished. Quid aliud est fatum, saith Minucius Feli•••• quàm quod de unoquoque nostrum Deus fatus est, qui cum possit praescire materiam▪ pro meritis & qualitatibus singulorum, etiam fata determinavit. Both of them follow their Master S^t. Paul, that God will render to every man according to his workes: unto them that are contentious, and disobey the truth, and obey un∣righteousnesse, shall bee indignation and wrath. Tri∣bulation and anguish shall bee upon the soule of every man, that doth evill, of the Iew first, and also of the Graecian. But to every man that doth good, shall bee glorie, and honour, and peace, to the Iew first, and also to the Graecian. For there is no respect of persons with God. Rom. 2. verse 8, 9, 10, 11. It is a point cleare from the authoritie of Minucius Felix and Iustin Martyr, and from the grounds of Christi∣anitie it selfe, that the reasonable soule is not subject to Fate,* 1.31 taken (in the Stoicall sense) for

absolute necessitie, whencesoever such necessitie be derived. For as Iustin Martyr strongly con∣cludes, if the soule of man were by the necessitie of the Divine decree, either violently driven or placidly drawne to good or evill, there could bee no vice or vertue, or God should bee as truely the onely author of all vice, sinne, and wickednesse, as he is of vertue and godlinesse; or as S^t. Austin infe••••••••, hee could not justly punish any besides himselfe, who is altogether incapable of punish∣ment, but more uncapable of deserving it, or of doing evill. That freedome of choyse or Contin∣gencie, which these good Writers, with all the auncients suppose as granted, by the divine decree, to the humane soule, is the proper subject or im∣mediate matter whereto Fate is limited. The na∣ture or essence of Fate, in their doctrine consists in the infallible doome or sentence, past by the Divine providence upon mens actions according to their nature or qualitie. The actions or choyses them∣selves are truely and properly contingent, not Fa∣tall, the events or issues of them are Fatall, not contingent. And in this sense did most of the* 1.32 hea∣thens, in their sober moodes use the name of

Fates. So Virgil ascribes the want of anb 1.33 heire male by the untimely death of the first borne and the illc 1.34 successe of warre unseasonably undertaken, or begun (as a man would say) in an ill time, unto the Fates, or Weirds allot∣ted by the gods. The fained cō∣plaint or speech which hee puts in Latinus his mouth disswa∣ding * 1.35Turnus & his people from going to war, is a true picture of Moses his expostulation with the Israe∣lites, which had gone out to warre contra••y to Gods Com∣mandement, and found that successe by experience, which Latinus fore-warnes Turnus of: Yee answered, and said un∣to mee, we have sinned against the Lord, wee will goe up and fight, according to all that the Lord our God com∣manded us. And when yee had girded on every man his weapons of war, ye were readie to go up every man into the Hill. And the Lord said unto me, say unto them, Goe not up, neither fight, for I am not among you: lest yee be smitten before your enemies.

So I spake unto you, and you would not heare, but re∣belled against the Commandement of the Lord your God, and went presumptuously up into the Hill. And the Amorites which dwelt in that mountaine, came out against you, and chased you as Bees doe, and de∣stroyed you in Seir, even unto Hormah. And yee re∣turned and wept before the Lord; but the Lord would not hearken unto your voyce, nor give eare unto you. Deuter. 1. vers. 41, 42, 43, 44, 45.

Plagues or punishments are properly then ter∣med fatall, when GOD will not repent or change the Doome threatned; when his eyes are shut un∣to mens teares, and his eares unto their prayers. But of all the heathens which I have read, this point is most divinely discussed by* 1.36 Hierocles in his commentary upon Pythagoras golden verses. If Calamitie (saith he) be the award of divine power, Pythagoras might better have called it Divine will, than Divine misfortune. If it bee not the award of Divine power, it had beene enough to have called it misfortune; a Divine misfortune it cannot bee. Out of these straights he winds himselfe with this

acute distinction, Inasmuch as Calamitie or ven∣geance is the award of Divine power, it is in this re∣spect rightly called Divine. But with reference to this or that particular man, it is a misfortune. His meaning (as he elsewhere illustrates himselfe) is this: The Divine power (as every just iudge) doth onely intend to punish evill, suppose Adulterie, Mur∣der, Incest, &c. But that this or that man should commit these or the like evils, which necessarily draw calamitie upon themselves, this is contingent. Now the necessarie award of a contingent evill, is by the Pythagoreans, sometimes termed Fate, sometimes Divine misfortune.

2. Not to interpose ought one way or other praejudiciall to the different opinions concer∣ning freewill, as it hath reference to merit, election or predestination (for all which points wee have allotted a peculiar place in this long worke:) we hold it for the present as a part of our Creede or fundamentall point of Christianitie; That man in in respect of some objects, hath a true freedome of choyse or Contingencie, and is enabled by his Creator to make varietie of antecedents in thought, word or deede. But the* 1.37 antecedents being once made by man, though not without divine coope∣ration; God alone allots the consequents, without any concurrence or suffrage in man. To repaire to Gods house or loyter at home, or in worse pla∣ces on the Lords day, is left free unto us by the di∣vine decree: but what good or evill, spirituall or temporall, shall befall us upon our better or worse choise, is intirely and meerely in the hands of God.

wee have no power or freedome to resist the doome or sentence which God hath appointed to our resolutions, be they good or bad. As unto evill or goodnesse indefinitely taken, some measure of reward or punishment is, in the language of Iustin Martyr and other of the Auncients, truely fatall: so every* 1.38 possible degree of good or evill, whe∣ther meerly moral, or spirituall, hath successe from aeternitie fitted to it quoad pondus, in measure more exact then the cunningest Arithmetician can de∣vise. Gods Iustice holds one scale, his mercy and bountie the other; their severall awards are most exact, most infallible and irresistible; yet alternant. Punishment or chastisement for offences past is necessarie, yet not absolutely necessarie to any mans person in this or that degree; because the aeternall decree hath left him a possibilitie not to offend in this or that kinde, or not to offend in such a degree; or in case hee so offended, to seeke for pardon. Nor shall wee, by this assertion bee enforced to imagine any new act or determinati∣on in God, either for daily awarding different successe, or the same successe in different measure, according to the diversitie or contingency of hu∣mane choise, which may varie, every moment. For the infinite, incomprehensible and all comprising essence, as is* 1.39 before observed, is fitnesse it selfe, an vnchangeable rule aeternally fitting every altera∣tion possible to the creature, without any altera∣tion

in it selfe. A rule it is, which needes no ap∣plication to the event, the event by getting exi∣stence or actuall beeing is actually applied unto it. The just measure and qualitie of that successe, which is by the Idea of equitie, bountie, or mercie al∣lotted to every event, is no lesse essentially contai∣ned in goodnesse it selfe, then the event it selfe or its beeing, is in infinite essence, or in Essence it selfe.

3 The immediate and proper subject of Fate, is Freedome of choise or contingencie in humane actions; the genus proximum, is the certaintie of Divine retribution according to the nature and qualitie of the choyse wee make. Yet are not re∣wards or retributions, but retributions extraordi∣nary and remarkeable, aswell for their manner of execution as for their matter or qualitie, properly termed Fatall. Of sinister Fates, there is no con∣tingent subject, which can exhibit a more exact picture or modell, for the manner how they come to passe, then a game at Chesse or Tables. Many games at both, which at the beginning, or untill the middle of time spent, in them, are very faire and more then tenne to one; after some few over∣sights, or ill dice, become desperate and irrecove∣rable, by any skill that can be vsed: so events pro∣perly fatall, become at length unpreventable, irre∣sistible; but such they were not from the begin∣ning of time, or from their infancie or first at∣tempts, on whom they fall. Such disasterous or dismall events, for which the Heathens usually in∣dited Fates, were commonly remarkable checks given, they know not by whom, to humane poli∣cies

or cunning contrivances. They were, as the unexpected winning of an after-game, upon some great stake or wager. Good or dexterous Fates, were the unexpected issues of mens contrivances, for their owne or associates good Fortunes. The manner of accomplishing such fates or Fortunes, is like a game wonne by a bungler, against a skilfull player, by extraordinarie dice, or by the suggesti∣on of some by-stander, more skilfull then both. This kinde of Fate or strange Fortune, of which most of the Heathen knew not well what to make, wee may define, To be the incomprehensible dispo∣sition, or irresistible combination of second causes, conspiring for the infallible execution of Gods will, maugre all plots or conspiracies of men to defeate the events, which hee had purposed. Sinister or disasterous Fates were the infallible execution of his consequent will. Good fates or fortune, were the infallible effects of his antecedent will; both were sometimes strangely & remarkeably accom∣plished against cunning and potent oppositions, not so much for the parties sakes whom they be∣fell, as for others. Many disasters have befallen some men, though deservedly for their owne sins, yet withall for the admonishing of others, to pre∣vent the like. Hence it is that the Heathen Poets observation [Multi committunt eadem diverso eri∣mina Fato] though in many cases most true, is no way prejudiciall to the unchangeable rules of the All-seeing Providence, which is alwayes full of equitie, whose justice is still allayed with mercy.

CHAP. 22.

The opposite opinions of the Stoicks and Epicures. In what sense it is true, that all things are necessarie in respect of Gods decree.

1 THE Stoicks did well in contra∣dicting the Epicures, which held fortune and Chance to rule all things, or at least to bee in themselves somethings, not meere denominations of such events as had no certaine or constant cause, appre∣hensible by man. The Originall of their Errour, was, their desire to be extreamely contrary to the Epicureans in a matter contingent, or rather in contingencie it selfe: for that is the common sub∣ject of Fortune, chance or fate. Fortune and chance they deny to be any thing, with no other purpose, it seemes, then that they may make Fate to bee all things. They were Orthodoxall in acknowledg∣ing an infallible unerring providence, but they ••r∣red againe as much in not acknowledging this in∣fallible providence, oft-times to hold the meane betweene Chance or Fortune, and absolute ne∣cessitie; or not to order and moderate contingen∣cie it selfe. From the same originall, some have thought it to be the most safe and compendious course for rooting out errour and superstition, to overthrow the a••tecedent, when their commissi∣on directs them onely to deny or refute the conse∣quence. As not a few, no lesse affraid (and the feare

it selfe is just) to grant merit of workes, then the Stoicks were to admit of Chance, have taken away all contingency in humane actions, save onely with reference to second causes. Wherein they seeme to invert that rule of Tyrannicall policie: He is a foole that kills the Father, and leaves his braits behind to revenge his blood. These take away the harmelesse Parents for the faultie issues sake, seeking to destroy true and Orthodoxall an∣tecedents for the incommodious consequences which others have falsely fathered upon them. The reclaiming of men from this one Errour is my present and scope.

2 For the better effecting whereof, we will sub∣scribe at length unto their general Maxime, [That all things are necessary in respect of Gods decree,] up∣on condition they wil not extend it beyond its na∣turall and proper subject, or not take decree in the Stoicall, but in a civill sense. Now hee that saith [All things are necessary in respect of Gods de∣cree,] cannot in civill construction bee conceived to meane any more then thus; All things which God hath decreed are necessary. The question then is, whether every thing that is, may truly bee said to be the object, or part of the object of Gods decree. To which question our answer must be ne∣gative. For those things onely are properly said to be decreed, which are enacted and appointed for better ordering and moderating such things as either by nature, custome, or ill example, are apt to grow worse, or may be amended by good educa∣tion, wholesome advice or discipline. Every de∣cree

of man supposeth the subject or party whom it immediately concernes, to be capable of perswa∣sion to good or evill, to be alterable in his inclina∣tions, through feare of punishment, or hope of re∣ward. Magistrates or Corporations take order that mad men or dogs should doe no harme; yet are not these creatures the proper subject of their de∣crees or sanctions. They do not tie Mastives by penall laws not to bite, they do not bind mad men to good behaviour: but they i••joyn men of reason and understanding to muzzle M••stives lest they bite; to keepe mad men or franticks, close, lest they should doe mischiefe by going abroad. Now the Divine decree concerning the ordering of man, is the rule or patterne of all humane decrees, and therefore supposeth somewhat in man, which makes him more capable of the divine sanction, than reasonlesse or inanimate creatures are. This capacity of the reasonable creature or man, consists in freedome of choise or contingency, in his acti∣ons or resolutions. The donation of this freedome upon man, is an act of Gods free bounty, and is pre∣supposed as the proper subject to the divine decree, or to all acts or awards of divine justice or mercy. The proper and formall object of the same decree, is, the moderation of this contingency or freedome of man, by awarding the issues or consequences, in mercy, justice, or bounty, exactly proportioned to the nature and manner of his choise and resolu∣tion. For illustrating the truth of our intended con∣clusion, let us take the Epigrammatists* 1.40 relation, or that idaea of Chance or Fortune, which hee hath

pictured, for a true story. It was not necessary in respect of the divine decree, that the one should be so extreame poore, or the other so miserably rich, as to come within the compasse of that snare, wher∣in the latter was taken. The meanes by which the one came to that depth of poverty or melancholly passions, wherewith hee had almost beene stifled, and the other to that height of covetousnesse, from which he fell headlong into despaire, were contin∣gent. Neither were driven into such excesse of passion or distemper by irresistible necessity. But taking them as now they have made themselves; that the one should be led unto temptation, the o∣ther into it; fell not out by chance, but by the espe∣ciall disposition of the Divine providence. The great Tempter intended mischiefe to the one, but failed, God having yet a blessing in store for him. To the other, perhaps he intended not this parti∣cular harme, untill opportunity did offer it. So that the inriching of the one by a chance rare and unusuall, in respect of man, was necessary in respect of Gods decree of mercy and fatherly providence; the delivering of the other unto Sathan, was like∣wise necessary, in respect of Gods justice.

3 Now if such events, as to the apprehension of meere naturall men come by chance, be necessary in respect of the divine decree: disasters by common consent reputed fatall, must by efficacy of the same decree be divorced from contingency, with which formerly they had connexion. For though For∣tune, as well as Fate, be a branch or particle of the proper object of the divine decree; yet as they have

reference to man, this difference may in the last place be observed betwixt then: Those things fall out by meere chance or fortune, whose procurati∣on or prevention hath not beene thought of at all by man, or but sleightly, before they happen: Those by fate, which have beene often and seri∣ously thought of, but either farre exceed all expec∣tation, or frustrate sollicitous care or forecast. Oft∣times the unexpected accomplishment of one mans expectation defeates the industrious hopes or anxious contrivance of another, and such events are in a twofold sense termed fatall.

Heu stirpem invisam, ac fatis contraria nostris Fata Phrygum. Both Phrygian race, and Phrygian fate, As contrary to ours, we hate.

4 All events properly fatall include a kinde of canvas betweene man and man, nation and nation, or betweene divine providence and humane poli∣cie, or betwixt the soule of man and wicked spirits licensed by divine providence to sollicite, tempt, or assault her.

CHAP. 23.

Of the degrees of necessity, and of the originall of in∣evitable or absolute necessity.

1 VVEre the maine question hitherto disputed, thus proposed, Whe∣ther all things were only so farre necessary, so farre contingent, as it pleased the Omnipotent to ap∣point: or whether the successe or issue of humane intentions or contrivances, were so far avoydable or unavoydable, as he hath made them by his decree: I should have Infidels only for mine adversaries: Christians, I am perswaded, will move no questions about his power or ability, but only about his will or pleasure, for determining all things. And who can deny that Gods Law or co∣venant for effecting some things, is more strict and peremptory, then for effecting others. The Pro∣phet supposed his covenant for day and night to bee more certaine and invariable, than his cove∣nant for the former and latter raine. And yet the Law which he hath appointed for the most glori∣ous creatures in the Firmament, is not like the law of the Medes and Persians. It was dispensed with∣all all at Iosuahs suit, and may againe be dispensed with at his pleasure. The motion of the Sun and Moone, is not perpetually necessary in respect of his de∣cree. The seasons of seed time, harvest, and the disposition of these lower Regions (in which For∣tune

may seeme to have placed her wheele, and Chance erected his tottering throane) may become certaine and constant to such as constantly observe his holy Covenants: If you walke in my statutes, then will I give you rain in due season. Levit. 26. 4. &c Such was the wisedome of the Lawes given unto this people, that by observing them, they might have changed the disposition of the Ayre, altered the influence of the Heavens, and have had domi∣nion over the Starres.

2 Constancy of assent or adherēce unto these fun∣damental truths of religion, wold fasten our minds unto a point of inestimable use (as wel forreforming or curing maladies of State▪ as of private life) of∣ten in this Treatise intimated, but not fully decla∣red. The point is this; maine events which at this instant are meerely contingent, and may easily bee prevented by diversity of practices, not onely pos∣sible but acceptable by the divine appointment, may in succession or revolution of time, become more necessary, and at length truly fatall, alto∣gether unavoydable. Absolutely necessary from all eternities, nothing can truly be reputed, besides the Deity, and the internall operations of the ever blessed Trinity. Many things which from the be∣ginning of time had but the first degrees of possibi∣lity, (their contraries or incompatible opposi••es being in the highest degree of probability,) have by the continued sinister sway of mans thoughts and practices, beene drawne from meere possibili∣ties to be more then probable, and unto the first de∣gree of necessity: yet at the first not absolutely or

irresistibly necessary. Some meanes there may be, though but a few left of many, and those not easie to be put in practice, for preventing them. The e∣vents of greater consequences which stood thus, were with the Heathens accounted Fata minora: For Fates (as we said before) admit the selfe same division or degrees that necessity doth. The same events by omission of practices appointed by the divine decree for their prevention, become altoge∣ther irresistible and absolutely necessary in respect of any meanes possible for averting them: yet not absolutely necessary from eternitie, but absolutely necessary only from that point of time, wherein the eternall decree or providence did cut off all contrary possibilities, which before were concur∣rent with the possibility of their being. And events thus utterly bestript of all contingency, or al possi∣bility of being recalled or avoyded, were by the Heathens ascribed [Fato majori] to greater Fates. The symptomes or characters of events becomming thus irresistibly & absolutely necessary, come* 1.41 else∣where (by Gods assistance) to be deciphered. Here it sufficeth to advertise the Reader, that as divers things besides, so necessitie may be enstyled abso∣lute many waies, but two especially. Some things are said to be absolutely necessarie, that is, altoge∣ther inevitable, albeit this necessitie or inevitable∣nesse did accrue from some occasions or set points of time lately past. As many diseases, in their na∣ture curable, and easie to have beene cured by ordi∣narie medicines (if they had beene administred in time,) do, by some few daies ill diet, by carelesse

attendance, or casuall relapse, become altogether incurable, by any after-care or helpe of physick. Other events there be, which were absolutely ne∣cessarie in respect of all times: their exhibition or production could not by any policie of man have beene prevented. So our Saviours death was abso∣lutely necessary from the beginning of the World, but whether absolutely necessary from eternity, or absolutely necessary, without supposall of Adams fall (which was not necessary) shall not here be di∣sputed. Certaine it is, that nothing decreed by God, can be so absolutely necessary as the Divine Nature, or blessed Trinity is. Many errors have found opportunity to mingle themselves with di∣vine truth for want of a commodious distinction or explication of this indistinct and confused terme Absolute: the anatomy of it were worth the paines of the Learned. Evident it is, that some things which are not to day, may to morrow be, in their kind, absolute.

3 We truly say, that the summe of mony wher∣in one man stands bound unto another, is absolute∣ly due from the time of the forfaiture, or non-per∣formance of the condition: that is, there is no plea left in Law, no course or meanes of Iustice to a∣voyd the payment of it. Yet was not the same sum absolutely due from the first date of the bond; the performance of the Condition in due time had prevented the losse, which negligence or breach of promise hath now made necessary and irrecoverable. Moneys lent upon no other consideration, but up∣on meere good will, to be repayd whensoever the

party lending shall demand them; are absolutely due, from the date of the recognizance, and for that which is absolutely due, there is a necessitie of payment or satisfaction.

4. Some disasterous events become, by divine providence, irresistibly necessarie long before they be actually accomplished, or inflicted: such was the destruction of Pharaoh, of Senacherib, the deso∣lation of Iudah and Ierusalem by Titus. Others be∣come fatally irresistible within some few dayes or houres before they happen, other not till the very moment wherein they are awarded either for some grievous sinne then committed, or for some remar∣kable document of Gods justice. Some againe are for a long time totally irresistible and unpreventa∣ble; others resistible quoad* 1.42 tantum, though not quoad totum, that is, part of the evils might be pre∣vented, though not the whole. All that we have said concerning the alteration of possibilities, or contingencies, or change of events contingent in∣to necessary, may easily be conceived, without any surmise of alteration in the Omnipotent, or in his everlasting decree. The least degree of possibility or contingency, is as necessarily derived from* 1.43 his absolute irresistible will, as necessity it selfe in the highest degree. It is impossible for possibility to

have any right to actuall being without his speciall appointment. To think that Fate, Chance, or For∣tune, should nestle in some certaine periods of time, or be brought forth by revolutiōs of the heavens, is altogether heathenish. But neither doth Scripture insinuate, nor can reason justly suspect any danger in avouching, that the Almighty suffers that con∣tingency or multiplicity of possibilities betweene good and evill, or the severall degrees of evill, wherewith hee hath endued the reasonable crea∣ture, to explicate or contract it selfe in every mo∣ment of time. And according to the nature of the free motions of man, the irresistible decree brings 〈◊〉〈◊〉 such events or issues, as were truly possible from eternity, but become necessary by revolutions, not of the heavens, but of mans hart and thoughts; publike plague or calamities become necessary, or inevitable by these meanes onely. We must ever remember that God hath not so decreed all things before they come, or the manner how they shall come, as that he doth not yet decree them. For he continually decrees as well necessity as contingency, and brings forth effects as well contingent as neces∣sary, from this present houre; both being some∣times meerly possible. The truth of this our last assertion, may be demonstrated from our former principle: If one part of a disjunctive proposition be denied or faile, the other may be necessarily inferred, though neither bee absolutely and determinately necessary, but become such by consequence, or up∣on supposition of the others failing. Many things which in respect of our present purpose or resolu∣tion

are free or contingent, may within a short while after become altogether necessary and una∣voydable, without any alteration or change in us. Suppose a Iudge should be tied by oath to execute justice upon a malefactor within eight dayes; there is no necessity that he should performe his vow the first, second, third or fourth day. The execution or not execution of Iustice, is during the first seven daies, free and contingent, without any breach or violation of oath: but omitting the opportunities, which the first seven dayes have offered, the exe∣cution of Iustice upon the eighth day, is as necessa∣rie, as his honesty or fidelity; as necessary, as if hee had beene tied by oath to execute it upon that day alone. The parts of indefinite time, or of the mat∣ter promised or threatned by man, may be farre more than this instance implies. So that the per∣formance of those duties or promises, which for a long time was free and arbitrarie, and might have beene performed in different measure, becomes at length absolutely necessary, and necessary to such a determinate degree. The parts of Gods disjun∣ctive decree, and the degrees as well of every mat∣ter decreed by him, as of the time allotted for the execution of it, may be numberlesse in respect of us. And man by not entertaining the opportuni∣ties, which by severall times have beene allotted him, for reducing his possibilities of doing Gods antecedent will into act, may forfeit the very pos∣sibilities themselves for ever, or for a long time. And by continuance of such neglect of many parts or kindes of successe, all truly possible, in respect of

the eternal decree; that only shall in the end be∣come necessary, which he least desires, which his soule shall most de••est. In respect of some future events not as yet become necessary, the eternall de∣cree leaves fewer branches of contrary contingen∣cies or possibilities, in respect of others more. Their multitude may expire or revive every mo∣ment, according to the diversity of mens waies, on which Gods will is alwaies done by means infinite, at least to man incomprehensible.

4 The incarnation of our blessed Saviour, was in the opinion of some of the Ancients, absolutely necessary before the creation of mankind, & should in time infallibly have been accomplished for con∣firming or augmenting that happy estate wherein Adam was created; if so he had continued sted∣fast in it untill the time appointed by God for his change or translation. But however the Schooles may determine or wave this question (I must con∣fesse, neither very usefull nor in this place much ne∣cessary) there was no necessity questionlesse, that the second Adam should become a bloudy sacrifice for our sinnes, unlesse the first Adam had sinned: but after he, by his actuall transgression, had utter∣ly cut off that possibility of perseverance, which the eternall decree had bestowed upon him, the humi∣liation and bitter passion of the Sonne of God, be∣came as necessary in respect of Gods mercy and bounty towards man, and of his infinite justice which (notwithstanding his infinite mercy) was to be fully satisfied, as his incarnation. After Cain had despised Gods 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and had slaine his bro∣ther

Abel, it was necessary the Messias should proceed from Seth; yet not then so necessary, that he should be the sonne of Abraham, as the Son of Seth. Others lineally descended from Seth, might have forfeited their reall possibilities, or ordinary hopes of attaining unto this glorie. At the least, when God first made his promise to the Woman and her seed, the birth of Abraham was not in re∣spect of the eternall decree so necessary, as Christs birth was. It was possible to have written Terah as childlesse as Iechoniah, after his mariage with A∣brahams mother. But after the same God had pas∣sed that promise unto Abraham and confirmed it by solemne oath, In thy seed shall al•• the nations of the earth be blessed: It was thenceforth altogether as necessary, that our Redeemer should be the seed of Abraham, as of the Woman: Yet not then so ne∣cessary, that he should bee the sonne of Iudah, or that Iudah should have a sonne called Iesse, or that Iesse should have a son called David, a man after Gods owne heart. That glory, which long after Gods oath to Abraham, befell the Tribe of Iudah, was (for ought we know or can object unto the contrary) a part of that dignity; whose possibility was once really possessed by Reuben, though utter∣ly forfeited by his misdemeanour. But after Iacob had prophesied, that the Scepter should not depart from Iudah, till Shilo come, or rather after the Lord had sworne not to faile David in bestowing the prerogative promised to Iudah upon his seed, the necessity becomes as great, that our High Priest, after the Order of Melchisedeck, should bee the

sonne of David as the son of Man, or seed of A∣braham. Now if we can perswade our selves, that God either speakes or sweares as he truly intends, or that mortall man may certainly know where to have him, or what to trust to: wee must beleeve and acknowledge those events concerning which he hath sworne not to repent, to be farre more ne∣cessary in respect of the irresistible decree, from the first interposition of such oath; then those ordi∣nary blessings or cursings, which hee seriously threat••eth or promiseth, but disjunctively, & with expresse reservation of their repentance whom he threatneth, or of their defection whom he incoura∣geth by his promises: yet such was his covenant of life and death with his people, such was his de∣cree concerning the prosperity or calamity of Da∣vids temporall Kingdome; as the* 1.44 Prophets com∣ments upon the promise made to* 1.45 David expresly testifie. By these and the like oracles fully exem∣plified in the alternation of Ierusalem and Iudahs contrary fates, or successe; we may discerne the course of that eternall providence, by whose irre∣sistible unerring disposition, all other States or Kingdomes have the certaine periods of their pro∣sperity or calamity assigned, and by which Princes and greatest statesmen stand or fall.

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Notes

• * 1.1

  Vide Za∣barel. de Lumine.
• * 1.2

  Vide An∣ton. Scar∣milion. de coloribus.
• * 1.3

  See the first part of the Divine Essence & Attributes, chap. 21. pag. 229, 230. &c.
• * 1.4

  Who fed thee in the wilderness with Man∣na, which thy fathers 〈◊〉〈◊〉 not, that hee might humble thee, and that he might prove thee, to doe thee good at thy latter end: Lest thou say in thine heart, My power and the might of my hand hath 〈…〉〈…〉 is wealth. But thou shalt remember the Lord thy God, for it is Hee 〈…〉〈…〉 power to get wealth, that he may establish his covenant, which hee 〈…〉〈…〉, as it is this day. DEVT. 8. vers. 16, 17, 18.
• * 1.5

  Vide Sal∣vi••num lib. 7. num. 227.
• * 1.6

  1 Tim. 5▪ 8
• * 1.7

  In what good sense all things may be said necessary in respect of Gods decree.
• * 1.8

  See chap. 22. parag. 2.
• * 1.9

  In Dialo∣gistam.
• * 1.10

  Quàm lon••è quaeso est à juben∣te ••ermit∣tens? Qui en••m, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 nos ista ••ma∣la) perferre, et prohibere potest ne perferamus, probat abs{que} 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ••ebe∣•••• ••••ferre, & quaecun∣q•• pati∣••••ur. susti∣n••••e Salvi∣••n. lib. 8. in initio pa. 260.
• * 1.11

  Vid. Suf∣frag. Britan∣norum in Concil. Dordr. the∣si 3. de An∣tecedaneis ad Conver∣sionem. Vide etiam D. Wardum Concione de Gratia di∣scriminante pag. 5, 6, 7. editionis 2.
• * 1.12

  Gen. 18. 15▪
• * 1.13

  Gen. 4▪ 6, 7, 8.
• * 1.14

  Objection
• * 1.15

  Answer.
• * 1.16

  Et vere clamor & grandis cla∣mor est, quando pie∣tas Dei, pec∣catorum clamoribus vincitur, ut peccantes punire coga∣tur. Osten∣dit ergo Do∣min{us}, quam invitus pu∣niat etiam gravissimos peccatores, dicens, quod clamor Se∣domorum ad se ascen∣derit. hoc est dicere: Miseritor∣dia quidem mea mihi suadet ut parcam, sed tamen peccatorum clamor cogit ut puniam. Salvianus lib. 1.
• * 1.17

  Virgil. 4. Aeneid. vid. Rodiginum lib. 21. cap. 4▪ pag. 972.
• * 1.18

  See Cha. 23. §. 2.
• a 1.19

  That Death it selfe is fatall, Pythago∣ras supposeth in those verses; Iura colas non ore tenus; sed rebus & ipsis: Nec pravis mentem suescas rationibus uti: Sed mortem fato subituros noveris omnes: Divitias quando{que} dari; quando{que} perire.

  That disasterous or untimely death was not fatall but preventable, he supposeth in the verses following, for he calleth all Ca∣lamities Divina Infortunia. See Hierocles upon both places. See his Annotations upon the latter. Chap. 21. of this Booke. Parag. 2.
• b 1.20

  Quaest. 32. Si Deus mortalem naturam nostram fecit, cur Deum mortem non fecisse dicis? Explicatio. Non si quid est mortale naturâ, id omnino mori necesse est. Argumente sunt Enoch & Elias, qui cum naturâ mortales sint, in immortalitate etiam manent superiores excelsiores{que} effecti quàm ad quos elogium illud pertineat, Terra es, & in terram revertêris. Verum est igitur, naturam nostram à Deo factam esse mortalem, mortémque invectam esse in mundum hominis inobedientiâ. Si enim Deus ut naturam fecit mortalem, sic etiam mortem fecis∣set, non inobedientia mortem induxisset: ac si Deus inobedientiam non fecit, ne mor∣tem quidem fecit.
• * 1.21

  Homer. Iliad. 2. non procul à fine.
• * 1.22

  Virgil. Ae∣neid. lib. 8.
• * 1.23

  Quaestio. 33. Si ho∣minum na∣tura ut mortalis, proprium ac suum finem agnoscit, tempus au∣tem unus∣cujus{que} non est certi cujusdam termini; quod qui∣dem fotum vocant ij qui à religi∣one nostra abhorrent: quomodo Ezechiae addita sunt tempora? Quod enim additum est, in praefinito determina∣to{que} numero certè sumi∣tur. Vnde igitur in merientibus incertum interminatum{que} tempus docetur? Explicatio. Non esse uniuscujusque tempus certum ac definitum, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 divi•••• scripturae verbis docetur, Si in campo invenerit homo puellam desponsatam, eique vi••llata dormierit: vitum quidem interficite, puellam autem ne interficite. Mores e••••m corrupit homo proximi sui, eum{que} puls••ns non crat qui juvaret, atque ita haecres 〈◊〉〈◊〉. Et puella clamavit, nec suit qui ei auxilium ••••••ret. Non autem divina scriptura violatum therum coactae morti comparasset, simor•• certa desi∣nita{que} fuisset. Quod enim apud Deum definitum est, id nec viola••i, nec transiri potest. Quod si ita est, profecto definitae Ezechiae vitae tempora vitae non sunt addita, sed annis ejus qui indefinite occupaverant, quorum sinis morbo lethali eveniebat, nisi Deus morbam ejus cu∣rasset, eumque ad vitam revocavisset. Iustin. Martyr. explicat. pag. 29.
• * 1.24

  Vide Bel∣lantium.
• * 1.25

  At vos, O superi, & divum tu maxime rector Iuppiter, Arcadij quaeso miserescite regis: ••t patrias audite preces, si n••mina vestra Incolumem Pallanta mihi, si fata reservant: Si visurus eam vivo, & venturus in unum, Vitam oro: patior quemvis durare laborem. Sin aliquē infandū casum Fortuna minaris, Nunc, ô nunc, liceat crudelem abrumpere vitā. Virgil. Aeneid. lib. 8.
• * 1.26

  Manil lib. 4 cap. 4.
• * 1.27

  Caelius Ro∣digin. lecti∣on, antiq. lib. 10. c. 20.
• * 1.28

  Casus au∣tem latius patet quam Fortuna: quando & eam com∣plectitur, & multa alia quae alias aliter accidere suapte na∣turâ pos∣sunt. Ipsum nomen hoc indicat. Est enim 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 Grae∣cis quod ultrò & à se fit: intelligitur{que} casus, quum quod alterius causa sierisolet, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 propter illam caus••m, quale frigus sub caniculae ortum esse videtur non enim frustra, ne{que} denique sicut quod est in nostra potestate, pars est contingentis: sic fortuna pars est casus. Vtque casus contingenti, ita i••s quae in nostra sunt potestate, fortuna accidit: non omni∣bus tamen, sed in quibus consilium delectus{que} adhibentur, uti diximus. Proinde casus com∣munis est animatorum & animae expertium: fortuna hominis est propria, ejus qui jam a∣gere possit. Idque hinc constat, quòd fortunatum esse & foelicem esse pro eodem habentur, & foelicitas est quaedam agendi dexteritas: haec autem solius est perfecti hominis. Quae ergo fato comprehenduntur, haec sunt▪ contingen••, possibile, delectus, in nostra situm potesta∣te, fortuna casus, iis{que}, adjuncta, de quibus est etiam fortassis, & perinde: quae omnia conti∣nentur quidem fato, nullum autem eorum fatale est. Plutarch. de fato. pag. 418, 419. Faium iamen sub provi ••e••lia comprebendit.
• * 1.28.1

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉
• * 1.29

  Plato for∣tunam cau∣sam in pro∣positis con∣stitutis{que} per accidentiam & consequutionem. Aristoteles, causam per accidens in ijs quae ex animi appetentia propter quid fiunt, obscuram illam quidem & instabilem. Diff••rre autem à fortuna spontaneum temer arium{que} casum. Quod enim à fortuna, idem à temeritate quoque fieri: hoc{que} geren∣dis in rebus esse. Quod autem temerarium spontaneum{que} sit, non continu•• idem à fortuna fieri, id{que} citra omnem rerum administrationem usu venire. Porò fortunam rationalium esse; spontis autem casum, tum rationalium, tum rationis expertium animantium, tum inanimatorum corporum. Epicurus, causam non sibi constantem, personis, temporibus, mo∣dis: Anaxagoxas & Stoici, indeprehensam humano captui causam. Siquidem evento∣rum quaedam è necessitate, quaedam è fato, quaedam ex libero & constituto, quaedam è for∣tuna, nonnulla è suae spontis casu. Plutarch. de placitis & decretis Philosoph. lib. 1. p. 213.
• * 1.30

  Si fato fi∣eret, ut esset aut impro∣bus, aut bo∣nus; profe∣ctò contra∣ria in cum cadere nun∣quam pos¦sent, nec sae∣pissime mu∣taretu••; quin nec alii quidem pro∣bi essent, a∣lii malitalio∣qui fatum causam ma∣lorum esse, contraria{que} sibi facere sentiremus, aut illud quod ante dictum est, videri verum esse, nihil esse virtutem nec vitium sed opi∣nione solum bona, & mala judicari: quae, ut vera ratio docet, maxima est & impieta•• & injusti••ia. Verum fatum hoc immutabile esse dicimus, iis qui praeclaras bonas{que} res cligunt, ac sibi proponunt, digna praemia, item{que} iis qui contraria, digna praemia constituens. Non enim ut alia, veluti a••bores & quadr••pedia, quae nihil voluntate & judicio facere possunt, sic hominem Deus condidit. Ne{que} enim praemio ac laude dignus esset, si per se, & à se, bo∣num non deligeret, sed bonus ••actus esset: nec si malus esset, jure supplicio afficeretur, cum non à se talis esset, sed aliud nihil esse posset, nisi quod factus fuisset. Iustin. Martyr. Apo∣log 2 pro Christ pag. 32. Itaque Deus non est sic mundum deletu••us & eversurus ut nulli sint jam futari improbi angeli, daemones, & homines, propter Christianorum semen & genus quod ipsum causam rerum esse intelligit. Nam nisi hoc esset, ne vobis quidem haec jam à malis geniis fieri ullo modo possent, sed ignis judicij delapsus omnia dissiparet & in∣cenderet, quemadmodum etiam cl••vies superioribus seculis nemini pepercit, nisi uni illi qui à nobis Nochus appellatur, à vobis Deucalion, ejus{que} familiae, ex quo rursus tam multi nati sunt quorum partim improbi, partim boni fuerunt. Sic enim conflagrationem fore cens••mus, non, ut Stoicis placet, omnium rerum inter ipsas mutatione, quod turpissimum videtur: nec fato homines facere aut pati quicquam co••ū quae fiunt & evenium, judic••mus, sed voluntate ac judicie unumquen{que} bene agere aut peccare: malorū{que} geniorū operā bonos, veluti Socratē ejus{que} similes exagitari & in vincula conjici: Sar ••anapatū aut••̄, Epicurū ac fimiles in rerū abundantia & gloria beatae vitae compotes videri: quod cum non intellexissent Stoici, fati necessitate fieri omnia censuerunt. Iustin Mart. Apol. 1. pro Christ. pag. 8.
• * 1.31

  Rodigi∣nus lecti∣on. Anti∣quar. lib. 10 cap. 20. Caeterum quo planius fati ratio pernosca∣tur, ita om∣nino colli∣gendum, si∣cuti animi rationalis summus creator est Deus, at{que} idem guber∣nator, ita et corporis ge∣niter est mundus, ac moderator, vnde con∣sequitur il∣lud, uti ani∣mus velut Dei filius ab Deo, tanquam à patre, providentiae legibus clementer agatur, & suaviter. Corpus verò ut mundi membrum à mundano corpore fati viribus, velut particula quaedam ab mole tota impetu quodam ••ra••atur violento: unde fit, uti in mentem nulla pror sum sati vis queat assultare, nisi quatenus corpori ipsa se fatalibus obnoxio legibus, ad∣dixerit. propterca semper ferè divinus Plato ab corporis amore, ac externorum cura ad ani∣mi & Dei cultum praecipit defugiendum, quando non alia ratione declinari mala queunt.
• * 1.32

  Ne{que} enim si non esset providētia, ordo ille in mundo exi∣steret, quod fatum possit aliquis ap∣pellare: nec si ista dees∣sent, ulla esset mulcta ullum{que} adversus sceleratos judicium: immo nec bonorum praemium, nec cōmen∣datio. At vero, Provi∣dentiā at{que} ordine ex∣istentibus, omnes opor∣tebat qui jam nascun∣tur eadem bona Sor∣tiri; si nihil à seipsis ad inaequalitatem contulissent. Hierocles in Carm. Pythag. pag. 127. And again pag. 136. Tot tanta{que} adeo ex versibus istis possumus baurire prae••epta quae ad virtut•• institutionem primam conferunt. Videntur enim & Providentia, & Fati, liberatis{que} animi verissimimas rationes complecti; quibus molestiam illam, quae in eorum, quae c••rnuntur, dissimilitudine versatur, oratio examinavit; inque omnibus malorum caussam Deum nequaquam existere demonstravit. That Fates may stand with freedome of Election in man, Tacitus ob∣serves out of the ancient Heathens. Sed mihi haec, ac ••alia audienti, in incerto judicium est, fatone res mortalium & necessitate immutabili, an forte voluantur. quippe sapientis∣simos veterum, qui{que} sectam eorum aemulantur, diversos reperies: ac multis insitam opinio∣nem, non initia nostri, non finem, non denique homines diis{que} curae. Ideo creberrima & ••ri∣stia in bo∣nos, laeta a∣pud deterio∣res esse; contra alii, fatum quidem congruere rebus putant sed non è vagis stellis, verum apud principia & nexus naturalium causarum, ac tamen electionem vitae nobis relinquunt: quam ubi elegeris, certum imminentium ordinem. ne{que} mala vel bona, quae vulgus putet: multos qui conflictari adversis videantur, beatos: ac pleros{que} quamquam magnas per 〈◊〉〈◊〉, miserrimos: si illi gravem fortunam constanter tollerent, hi prospera inc••nsulte utantur. Caeterum plurimis mortalium non eximi, quo primo cujusque ortu ventura destinentur: sed quaedam secus quàm dicta sint ca∣dere, fallacijs ignara dicentium, ita corrumpi fidem artis, cujus clara documenta, & antiqua aetas & nostra tulerit. Quippe à filio ••jusdem Trasulli, praedictum Neronis imperium in tempore memorabitur, ne nunc incepto longiù•• abierim. Cornel. Tacit. lib. 6. Annal. num. 22.
• b 1.33

  Aeneid. 7. Filius huic, fato divum, prolésque vir••lis Nulla fuit; primá{que} oriens erepta juventa est.
• c 1.34

  Virgil. Aeneid. 7. Vndique collecti coeunt, Mattémque fatigant. Illicet infandum cuncti contra omnia bellum, Contra fata Deum, perverso numine poscunt. Certatim regis circunstant tecta Latini. Ille, velut pelagi rupes immota, resistit. Vt pelagi rupes, magno veniente fragore, Quae sese, multis circum lat••antibus undis, Mole tenet; scopuli ne quicquā, & spumea circū Saxa fremunt, later ique ill••••a refunditur alga.
• * 1.35

  Verū ubi nulla datur caecū exuperare potestas Consilium, & saevae nutu Iunonis eunt res: Multa deos aurásque pater testatus inanes, Frāgin••ur heu fatis, in quit, fer••múr{que} procell••. Ipsi has sacrilego pendetis sanguine poenas, O miseri, te Turne nefas, te triste manebit Suppliciam: votisque Deos venerabere seris.
• * 1.36

  Si quidem per se alteri quidem di∣vitias; alte∣ri autem pauperta∣tem, divi∣num judi∣cium tribu∣it: Divinam voluntatem nominari istud opor∣tuit, non in∣fortunium. Sin autem nih••l hujusmodi nominibus imperat; sed fortuito & temere accidit, ut felix iste sit, sicuti dicunt; ille autem infelix: Infortunium vocare tantummodo istud oportuit; non Divinum Infortunium. Sin porro Deus arbiter unicuique tribuit, quod meritis con∣venit; neque in caussa est, ut tales ipsi simus; sed eo fine tantum justitiam possidet, ut ex praescripto ipsius, gestis paria referat: non immerito conjunctis nominibus judicij decreta Divina Infortunia nuncupat: sive, (quia Divinum sit judicium, atque intelligens) praepo∣nendum putarit quod Divinitatem atque scientiam demonstret: sive etiam (quod sponte malitiam idipsum amplectatur, de quo agitur, unde etiam calamitatibus istis dignum est) Infortuniorum nomen adjecerit, tanquam non ex professo certum hominem vel supplicio, vel praemio afficere Deus statuat; sed eum semper, qui i••••o se, atque illo modo gesserit; cujus rei caussa non sit extra nos investiganda. Itaque voluntatis nostrae, divini{que} judicij nexum Infortunium parere; nihil{que} aliud totum hoc Divinum existere Infortunium, quam Dei adversus peccata calculum. Hieroc in aurea Pythag. carmina pag. 111.
• * 1.37

  See chap. 28. §. 1.
• * 1.38

  Nos ita ju∣dicandū hu∣manū gen••à Christo dici∣m••, ut tamē etiā nūc om∣nia Deum, prout ratio∣nabileputat, regere ac di∣spensare cre∣damus: & i∣ta in futuro judicio ju∣dicaturum affirmemus, ut tamen semper eti∣am in hoc seculo judi∣cesse docea∣mus. Dum enim semper gubernat Deus, & semper judi∣cat: quia gubernatio ipsa est ju∣dicium. Sal∣vian. lib. 1. And again: ••deo etiam sanctos ho∣mines casti∣gatos quōdā judicio Dei legimus, ut judicandos nos, Deo judice, etiam presenti seculo nosceremus; quia sicut Deus est semper, sic justitia Dei semper: sicut omnipotentia Domini indeficiens, sic censura indemutabilis: sicut Deus jure perpetuus, sic justitia perseverans. Salvian. lib. 2.
• * 1.39

  In the Treatise of the Divine Essence. Part. 1.
• * 1.40

  See Cha. 20.
• * 1.41

  In the Treatise of Prodigies & of their usefull ob∣servation.
• * 1.42

  See Cha. 24. parag. 9. & 10.
• * 1.43

  Nos cala∣mitatum nostrarum authores s••∣mus. Deus enim pius est & miseri∣cors, & qui, ut scriptum est, neminem velit perire vel laedere. Nos•• ergo adversum nos omnia facimus. Nihil itaque, nihil est in nobis crudelius nobis. Nos inquam, nos etiam Deo nolente cruciamus. Sed videlicet adversum meips••im dicere arbitror, qui cum superius dixerim, ob peccata nostra nos puniri à Deo, nunc dicam nos puntri à nobis ipsis. Vtrum{que} verum est; Deo quippe punimur, sed ipsi facimus ut punia∣mur. Cum autem punire nos ipsi facimus, cui dubium est quin ipsi nos nostris criminibus puniomus: quia quicunque dat causam qua puniatur, ipsese punit, secundum illud; Funi∣bus peccatorum suorum unusquisque constrin gitur. Salvianus lib. 8.
• * 1.44

  Ier 18. ••. &c.
• * 1.45

  2 Sam. 7. 12. &c. See the next chap∣ter of this Book pa∣rag. 2.