A treatise of the divine essence and attributes. By Thomas Iackson Doctor in Divinitie, chaplaine to his Majestie in ordinary, and vicar of S. Nicolas Church in the towne of Newcastle upon Tyne. The first part

CHAP. 13.

Contingency is absolutely possible, and part of the ob∣ject of Omnipotency, as formall a part as neces∣sity is.

1 IT is an unquestionable rule in the Art of Arts, that propositions, for their forme not incompatible, may from the necessity of their matter or sub∣ject, become equivalent to proposi∣tions directly contradictory; whose indispensable law or rule it is, that if the one be true, the other must needs be false, they admit of no meane be∣twixt them. Now there is no matter or subject in the world, which is so absolutely necessary, as the existence of the Divine Nature, or the internall operations of the Trinity. Whence it is, that be∣tweene

these two propositions [The generation of the Sonne, is necessary, the not generation of the Son is necessary.] there is no possible meane which can be capable of truth. The first is so absolutely ne∣cessary, and so necessarily true, that the latter is e∣ternally false. But such is not the case or conditi∣on of these two propositions following: [The Creation or Existence of the World is necessary: The not Creation or non existence of the World is necessa∣rie.] These are not contradictories for their form, nor equivalent to contradictories for their matter or subject, and therefore may admit a meane be∣tweene them. To say the creation or existence of the world was absolutely necessary, hath no truth in it: for it had a beginning of existence and being, and may have an end: and the other extreame or contrary [The not creation or non existence of the world is absolutely necessary,] hath lesse appearance of truth in it. It remaines then, that the two con∣tradictorie propositions to these false ones, must be true. The contradictory to the former is this: [The creation or existence of the world is not abso∣lutely necessarie.] The contradictory to the lat∣ter is this▪ [The not creation or non existence of the World is not absolutely necessary.] Now seeing the world is created, and yet it was not necessary that it should be created: both these propositions fol∣lowing (seeing either of them is a true meane be∣tweene the two former extreames or false ones,) are most true: [1 The creation of the world was possible, 2 The not creation of the world was possible.] And if as well the not creation, as the creation of

the world, was possible; wee may not deny that God did freely create it: seeing freedome pro∣perly taken, includes or is a possibility of doing or not doing. It was likewise free for the Almighty, to create or not to create Man or Angell. But his free purpose to create them after his owne Image be∣ing supposed: it was not meerly possible, but al∣together necessary that they should bee created good. In as much as he is goodnesse it selfe, it is not possible that evill should bee created by him, that he should be the Author of it. As is his being, so is his goodnesse, perpetually absolute, eternally necessary. But though Men and Angels were ne∣cessarily created good, yet their goodnesse in the beginning was mutable, not perpetually necessa∣rie. The question is, whether continuance in that goodnesse, wherein God created them, were tru∣ly possible in respect of Gods decree, unto such as have not so continued, or their non continuance necessary: Or whether, neither their continuance or non continuance were necessary, or both alike possible. To say that Adams continuance in good∣nesse was, in respect of Gods decree, necessary, is ••vidently convinced of falshood by his fall. So that the other part onely remaines questionable, whe∣ther Adams non continuance in the state of good∣nesse, were so absolutely decreed by God, that it was not possible for him to continue. For resolu∣tion of this point, we are to inquire, First, whe∣ther in respect of Gods power it were possible. Secondly, whether in respect of his goodnesse it were necessary or most congruent, to ordaine or

decree neither a necessitie of continuance, nor a necessitie of non continuance in goodnesse; but the meane betweene them, that is, an absolute possibilitie of continuance, and an absolute pos∣sibilitie of non continuance. That it was pos∣sible to decree such a mutuall possibilitie, may thus be proved.

2. Whatsoever implies no contradiction, is ab∣solutely possible, and fals within the object of om∣nipotencie. But this mixt possibilitie of continu∣ing or not continuing, being a meane betwixt the necessitie of Adams continuance, and the necessi∣tie of not continuance in the state of integritie, im∣plies no contradiction: Ergo, it was possible for God to decree it. That it implies no contradicti∣on in respect of the forme, is a point so cleare from the first principles of argumentation▪ that hee which vnderstands not this, is neither fit to dis∣pute, nor to be disputed with. But the same forme (notwithstanding) of contrarietie applied to the divine nature, the persons in Trinitie, or their in∣ternall operations, admits no meane. What is the reason? The nature and attributes of the Deitie are absolutely necessary and precedent to all divine decrees or effects of Gods power. And it im∣plies a contradiction, that any thing which is ab∣solutely necessarie, should admit any mixture of contingency, or of possibilitie of the contrary. But the nature, state, condition, or existence of man, are not proper obiects of the divine decree, yet proper effects of his power, and being such, they are not absolutely necessary; and not being neces∣sary

in themselves, they cannot incomber or involve propositions, for their forme, not necessarie with absolute necessitie. Whatsoever had a true possi∣bilitie of beeing before it was, may bee actually such as it was absolutely possible for it to be, or such as it might please the Almightie Creator (who is free in all his actions ad extra) to make it. It was possible for him to make mans goodnesse or his continuance in it, not to be necessary, but contin∣gent. He that made man of nothing, had nothing to resist or hinder him from squaring or framing his nature, to that abstract forme of truth which was in its selfe, or (as we say) objectively possible. For absolute Omnipotencie includes an abilitie to in∣grosse or fill meere logicall possibilities, with true and Physicall substances or qualities, as truely an∣swerable unto them, as naturall bodies are to bo∣dies mathematicall. But concerning Gods power to decree an absolute contingencie in the state, Condition, or Actions of men, there can bee no question amongst such as grant his Omnipotencie to be out of question. What could necessitate his will to lay a necessitie of sinning upon Adam, whose fall or first sinne, if it were necessary in re∣spect of Gods decree, the necessitie must needs proceed from Gods Omnipotent decree, without which nothing can haue any reall possibilitie or true title of beeing, much lesse a necessitie of bee∣ing. For Divine Omnipotencie is the first and sole Foundation of all Beeing, otherwise then by it; and from it nothing can come to passe either necessa∣rily or contingently.

3. Whatsoeuer is and hath not beene, must of necessitie have some cause of now beeing. And as is the event or effect, such must the causalty bee. If the one be necessarie or inevitable, it is impossi∣ble the other should bee contingent or meerely possible. Both, or neither, must bee necessarie. Man we suppose did once stand upright, his first sinne or fall, That action what soever it were, which brought him downe, the evils which thence en∣sued, are not meere nothing: Evill it selfe got some kinde of beeing by his negligence, which from the beginning it had not. Of all, or any of these, the question still revolves, whether they were necessary or not necessarie, but Contingent. If Contingent, we have no more to say, but Gods peace be on them, which so speake and thinke: If any reply, that they were necessarie, he must assigne a necessary cause of their beeing. For without some cause they could not be, and without a ne∣cessitating cause, there was no necessitie that they should bee. Was this supposed necessitie then from man or from God? from any second cause, or from the first cause of all things? if from man onely or from other second causes; then were they necessary not in respect of the first cause, but in respect of the second: that is, some second cause did make them necessarie, when as the first cause had left them free, or meerely possible; which to affirme is contrary to their positions, with whom we dispute, and in it selfe unconceiveable. For who can make that necessarie, which God hath made contingent or subject to change? What can

be said then? that God did make mans fall, his first sinne or appetite of the forbidden fruite, to bee ne∣cessarie, or necessitate his will in his sinister choy∣ces? This were all one, as to say, that God were the immediate and necessarie cause of sinne, of death, of all the evills that have befallen mankinde since Adam. For he is the sole immediate and ne∣cessarie cause of all things which hee so decrees as they cannot possibly fall out otherwise. For him to erre in decreeing, or for the execution of his decree to bee defeated, is impossible. In respect of his proper and adaequate object, and peremptorily intended effect, his will is a more irresistible, more powerfully necessitating cause, than any other cause whatsoever. Now if Gods will had beene, to leave no possibility for Adams perserverance, his fall had beene the compleat object of Gods decree con∣cerning our first estate, and by consequence Gods decree, or will had beene the first cause of sinnes first entrance into the world.