A treatise of the divine essence and attributes. By Thomas Iackson Doctor in Divinitie, chaplaine to his Majestie in ordinary, and vicar of S. Nicolas Church in the towne of Newcastle upon Tyne. The first part

CHAP. 22.

The opposite opinions of the Stoicks and Epicures. In what sense it is true, that all things are necessarie in respect of Gods decree.

1 THE Stoicks did well in contra∣dicting the Epicures, which held fortune and Chance to rule all things, or at least to bee in themselves somethings, not meere denominations of such events as had no certaine or constant cause, appre∣hensible by man. The Originall of their Errour, was, their desire to be extreamely contrary to the Epicureans in a matter contingent, or rather in contingencie it selfe: for that is the common sub∣ject of Fortune, chance or fate. Fortune and chance they deny to be any thing, with no other purpose, it seemes, then that they may make Fate to bee all things. They were Orthodoxall in acknowledg∣ing an infallible unerring providence, but they ••r∣red againe as much in not acknowledging this in∣fallible providence, oft-times to hold the meane betweene Chance or Fortune, and absolute ne∣cessitie; or not to order and moderate contingen∣cie it selfe. From the same originall, some have thought it to be the most safe and compendious course for rooting out errour and superstition, to overthrow the a••tecedent, when their commissi∣on directs them onely to deny or refute the conse∣quence. As not a few, no lesse affraid (and the feare

it selfe is just) to grant merit of workes, then the Stoicks were to admit of Chance, have taken away all contingency in humane actions, save onely with reference to second causes. Wherein they seeme to invert that rule of Tyrannicall policie: He is a foole that kills the Father, and leaves his braits behind to revenge his blood. These take away the harmelesse Parents for the faultie issues sake, seeking to destroy true and Orthodoxall an∣tecedents for the incommodious consequences which others have falsely fathered upon them. The reclaiming of men from this one Errour is my present and scope.

2 For the better effecting whereof, we will sub∣scribe at length unto their general Maxime, [That all things are necessary in respect of Gods decree,] up∣on condition they wil not extend it beyond its na∣turall and proper subject, or not take decree in the Stoicall, but in a civill sense. Now hee that saith [All things are necessary in respect of Gods de∣cree,] cannot in civill construction bee conceived to meane any more then thus; All things which God hath decreed are necessary. The question then is, whether every thing that is, may truly bee said to be the object, or part of the object of Gods decree. To which question our answer must be ne∣gative. For those things onely are properly said to be decreed, which are enacted and appointed for better ordering and moderating such things as either by nature, custome, or ill example, are apt to grow worse, or may be amended by good educa∣tion, wholesome advice or discipline. Every de∣cree

of man supposeth the subject or party whom it immediately concernes, to be capable of perswa∣sion to good or evill, to be alterable in his inclina∣tions, through feare of punishment, or hope of re∣ward. Magistrates or Corporations take order that mad men or dogs should doe no harme; yet are not these creatures the proper subject of their de∣crees or sanctions. They do not tie Mastives by penall laws not to bite, they do not bind mad men to good behaviour: but they i••joyn men of reason and understanding to muzzle M••stives lest they bite; to keepe mad men or franticks, close, lest they should doe mischiefe by going abroad. Now the Divine decree concerning the ordering of man, is the rule or patterne of all humane decrees, and therefore supposeth somewhat in man, which makes him more capable of the divine sanction, than reasonlesse or inanimate creatures are. This capacity of the reasonable creature or man, consists in freedome of choise or contingency, in his acti∣ons or resolutions. The donation of this freedome upon man, is an act of Gods free bounty, and is pre∣supposed as the proper subject to the divine decree, or to all acts or awards of divine justice or mercy. The proper and formall object of the same decree, is, the moderation of this contingency or freedome of man, by awarding the issues or consequences, in mercy, justice, or bounty, exactly proportioned to the nature and manner of his choise and resolu∣tion. For illustrating the truth of our intended con∣clusion, let us take the Epigrammatists* 1.1 relation, or that idaea of Chance or Fortune, which hee hath

pictured, for a true story. It was not necessary in respect of the divine decree, that the one should be so extreame poore, or the other so miserably rich, as to come within the compasse of that snare, wher∣in the latter was taken. The meanes by which the one came to that depth of poverty or melancholly passions, wherewith hee had almost beene stifled, and the other to that height of covetousnesse, from which he fell headlong into despaire, were contin∣gent. Neither were driven into such excesse of passion or distemper by irresistible necessity. But taking them as now they have made themselves; that the one should be led unto temptation, the o∣ther into it; fell not out by chance, but by the espe∣ciall disposition of the Divine providence. The great Tempter intended mischiefe to the one, but failed, God having yet a blessing in store for him. To the other, perhaps he intended not this parti∣cular harme, untill opportunity did offer it. So that the inriching of the one by a chance rare and unusuall, in respect of man, was necessary in respect of Gods decree of mercy and fatherly providence; the delivering of the other unto Sathan, was like∣wise necessary, in respect of Gods justice.

3 Now if such events, as to the apprehension of meere naturall men come by chance, be necessary in respect of the divine decree: disasters by common consent reputed fatall, must by efficacy of the same decree be divorced from contingency, with which formerly they had connexion. For though For∣tune, as well as Fate, be a branch or particle of the proper object of the divine decree; yet as they have

reference to man, this difference may in the last place be observed betwixt then: Those things fall out by meere chance or fortune, whose procurati∣on or prevention hath not beene thought of at all by man, or but sleightly, before they happen: Those by fate, which have beene often and seri∣ously thought of, but either farre exceed all expec∣tation, or frustrate sollicitous care or forecast. Oft∣times the unexpected accomplishment of one mans expectation defeates the industrious hopes or anxious contrivance of another, and such events are in a twofold sense termed fatall.

Heu stirpem invisam, ac fatis contraria nostris Fata Phrygum. Both Phrygian race, and Phrygian fate, As contrary to ours, we hate.

4 All events properly fatall include a kinde of canvas betweene man and man, nation and nation, or betweene divine providence and humane poli∣cie, or betwixt the soule of man and wicked spirits licensed by divine providence to sollicite, tempt, or assault her.

Notes

• * 1.1

  See Cha. 20.