A treatise of the divine essence and attributes. By Thomas Iackson Doctor in Divinitie, chaplaine to his Majestie in ordinary, and vicar of S. Nicolas Church in the towne of Newcastle upon Tyne. The first part

CHAP. 18.

Of the distinction of Gods will into Antecedent and Consequent. Of the explication and use of it.

1 GOds will being, as all confesse, in∣divisible, some there bee which hold all distinctions concerning it, no lesse unfitting, then the di∣vision of Christs seamlesse coate. Others mislike that distinction of his antecedent and consequent will, and yet are content to distinguish his will into revealed and se∣cret, or into voluntatem signi & beneplaciti. The use notwithstanding of the first distinction [of his antecedent and consequent will] is most ancient; warranted by the authority of Chrysostom, and well exemplified by Damascene. And of this distincti∣on I have made choise in other meditations, as most commodious (to my apprehension) for re∣solving many problemes arising out of Propheti∣call and Euangelicall passages, concerning the ful∣filling of Gods will in his threats or promises. The ingenuous Reader will not bee so uncharitable or injurious towards Chrysostom or Damascene, as to suspect, that either of them imagined two wills in God; unto which imputation, they are more just∣ly liable, which affect the distinction of Gods secret and revealed will, or of voluntatis signi & benepla∣citi. For every distinction of Gods will, must bee framed ex parte volitorum, non ex parte volentis, in

respect of the things willed, not in respect of him that willeth them. We must in charity and good manners permit Chrysostom and Damascene that li∣berty of speech which we take our selves. Now it is usuall with all of us, to attribute that verbo tenus unto the cause, w^ch really and properly belongs on∣ly unto the effect, or to denominate the intellectual faculty from the qualitie of the object to which it hath reference; as when we say the Sunne is hot, the understanding is practique, &c. The meaning of those two good Authors, whom we follow in the use of the distinction of Gods antecedent or conse∣quent will, was this, or the like: That God by one and the same indivisible will, might differently af∣fect or approve divers objects, according to the nature quality or degrees of goodnes contained in them. And certaine it is, that the immensity or greatnesse of our God, doth not make his power or will to bee unweildy. Though he be in power truly infinite, yet he alwayes worketh not according to the infinity of his power, but oft-times more gently and pla∣cidly, then the weakest or softest spirited of his rea∣sonable creatures can doe. Though his will like∣wise be alwayes irresistible, yet is it not alwayes so peremptorily set on this or that particular object willed by him, as mans will, for the most part, is. The variety of particular objects which hee truely willeth in different measure, is much greater than the wit of man can comprehend So is the liberty or variety of choise, which hee alloweth unto his creature, much greater then we can without grud∣ging, afford to such as have dependance on us.

Some things he willeth in the first place and di∣rectly; though not so peremptorily, but that things lesse willed by him, or contrary evills, which hee willeth not, may get the start or take place of them in humane choise. Other things he willeth in the second place, or by consequence, as in case, that which in the first place he willed, be (by abuse of mans free will) rejected. The former he is said to will by his antecedent will, because the object wil∣led by him, hath antecedence or preeminence in re∣spect of his beneplacitum or acceptance: the latter he is said to will by his consequent will, that is not in the first place or directly, but by consequent, as supposing those objects, which he better approved, to be neglected. Whatsoever is good in it selfe, and good withal for a reasonable creature to make choise of, that, God is said to will by his antece∣dent will, as the repentance of a sinner, and the joy∣full fruits which the sinner shall reape by his peni∣tencie. Whatsoever in it selfe is not evill, or con∣trary to the rule of goodnesse, but evill to the rea∣sonable creature, which must suffer it, as sicknesse, death, all kinde of torture or calamity, that God willeth onely by his consequent will. We may not deny but that he truly willeth the death of obsti∣nate sinners, yet this he willeth by his consequent will. Their obstinacy in sinne he willeth not at all, for if he did, he would not punish it: for punish∣ment is the necessary consequent of his will neg∣lected. Both these branches of one and the same will (which from the reference onely which they have unto their different objects, wee conceive to

bee two or divers) are subordinate to his abso∣lute and peremptorie will, which is, that man should have a libertie of doing, and not doing those things which in the first place he willed or liked better. But is not this libertie of man an im∣perfection?

2 An issue though a blemish to youth and live∣lihood, is ofttimes a good meane or principall cause of health to an unsound and crasie bodie. So possibility of declining to evill, albeit in it selfe an imperfection, and not possibly incident to aeter∣nall and immutable goodnesse, is no way contra∣ry to the participated actuall goodnesse of the rea∣sonable creature; whereof it is an essentiall or con∣stitutive part, at the least a necessarie ingredient or condition precedent to the constitution of it. And imperfection with reference to this end, may be the object of Gods antecedent will, or part of that which in the first place he willeth and princi∣pally intends. But inasmuch as actuall evill is for∣mally dissonant to actuall goodnesse; hee which is actually and infinitely good, cannot but hate or dislik actuall evill in whomsoever it is found, as much as he loveth the contrary good. Now pu∣nishment or malum poenae, being as necessarie a con∣sequent of Gods hate or dislike of sinne, as re∣ward or happinesse is of his loue to vertue and pietie: the reasonable creature by declining from vertue to vice, from good to bad, doth ipso facto and inevitably bring evill [malum poenae & damni] tribulation and anguish upon it selfe. By reward and punishment in this place, wee understand not

onely life and death everlasting (of whose refe∣rence to Gods aeternall decree, we shall in parti∣cular dispute hereafter, if Superiours shall so think fit:) but every temporall blessing or crosse, all prosperity or calamitie, specially publike & remar∣kable. Prosperitie we alwayes take to be a pledge of Gods love (though not alwaies of the Person, on whom it is bestowed, yet of some good quality in him or in some of his, serving for publique use or private imitation;) and is alwayes (in the begin∣ning at least) an effect of Gods antecedent will. Calamitie we take alwayes for a token of Gods dislike, though not alwaies of the person afflicted, yet either of somewhat in him to bee amended, or of somewhat formerly done by him, to bee by o∣thers avoided; and is an effect of Gods consequent will. For hee wils no evill at all, not malum poenae, but as it is either a punishment or correction for evill done, or good neglected, or as it is a mede∣cine to prevent the doing of evill, or neglect of goodnesse.

3 From the infinite varietie of possibilities au∣thorized by the aeternall decree, and their corre∣spondent consequences, which one time or other actually follow upon their reductions into Act, by the irresistible award of the same decree; wee may resolve many difficulties, and abandon sundry in∣conveniences, wherewith the Heathen in their vaine speculations, and many Christians in more grievous temptations, charge, either the truth or goodnesse of Gods Providence. The varietie of such possibilities, amounts, partly from the speci∣ficall

nature of the objects, made possible by the divine decree: partly from the severall degrees of good or evill contained in such objects, or in mens actions concerning them. The whole lati∣tude (if I may so speake) of Gods providence, as it concernes kingdomes, states or persons, consists in moderating and ordering the possible devoluti∣ons or alternations of the resonable creature from his antecedent will to his consequent. The alterna∣tions or devolutions themselves, may be number∣lesse, save onely to God; so may the degrees bee of mans dissonancie or consonancie to Gods ante∣cedent will, throughout the course of his life.