A treatise containing the originall of vnbeliefe, misbeliefe, or misperswasions concerning the veritie, vnitie, and attributes of the Deitie with directions for rectifying our beliefe or knowledge in the fore-mentioned points. By Thomas Iackson Dr. in Divinitie, vicar of Saint Nicholas Church in the famous towne of New-castle vpon Tine, and late fellow of Corpus Christi Colledge in Oxford.

CHAP. XIII.

Of the office or service which the Phantasie performes vnto the actiue vnderstanding or contemplatiue fa∣cultie, for the right apprehension or discernement of truths specially vnsensible.

1. THe Aristotelian Maxime, Non intelligimus nisi speculando phantasmata, Wee doe not actually and distinctly vnderstand, but by speculation of Phantasmes; no Platonicke, I take it, would deny, but whether the Phantasmes rowse or start the latent notions, or rather be stirred or rowsed themselues by the necessary cōnexion w^ch the phantasie hath with the vnderstanding, thus seeking to expresse or figure its owne indefinite conceits, is que∣stioned

by some which deny all effluxions from ob∣iects sensible, or at least all permanent impressions of their formes, or images vpon the organs of sense. Whiles sensible obiects (for example, colours) are pre∣sent, they grant a resultance of such a forme or stampe of them in the eye, as the seale imprinteth in the wax, which notwithstanding straight way vanisheth with the removall of the obiect, onely the sensitiue facultie (in their Philosophy) being thus farre acquainted with them, can transforme it selfe at its pleasure into the same likenesse againe, as a cunning Actor can imi∣tate any mans motions, speech, or gesture, whom he hath heard or seene, and the more he converseth with him, the better will his imitation be. This manner of producing phantasmes I must confesse is most agree∣able to the vsuall manner of producing effects more reall, which haue no sensible forme or shape. Thus when one yeawnes, another yeawnes, and many moti∣ons begun in one, excite the like in others, not by im∣pressions of their formes, but by meere imitation. The bloud of many beasts will rise at the sight of red colours, whose formes or images cannot be imprin∣ted vpon it, because more red than they. But bloud, being like them, it is excited by their presence or re∣presentation made in the eye; and so may this forme, or representation it selfe be onely excited by the pre∣sence of the reall obiect. In like manner may the actu∣all motion or representation of the phantasme, excite the intellectuall notion answering to it. For, the in∣tellectuall facultie, being more actiue then sense, may from the vertuall similitude which it hath with all things, put on the actuall shape of any which shall be

represented, or suggested to it. The manner we may conceiue to be such as if the eye could represent any colour being once named, without the presence of a reall obiect. By this declaration we may conceiue how the phantasmes doe raise a conceit of an higher or different nature, then they formally represent. As red colours doe not onely produce their owne resem∣blance in the eye, but withall stir or moue the bloud; so attentiue inspection of sensible effects most exactly represented in the phantasie, may ingender a conceit of an invisible and latent cause, which we cannot di∣stinctly figure or expresse, and yet be more ravished with the consideration of it, then with the exactest re∣presentations possible of that which caused it. The manner of our delight in this case is wrought as it were by a secret sympathie or contract not apprehen∣ded, as shall herafter be declared. The like symptomati∣call conceits oftimes accompany the formall represen∣tations of meere sense; as sight of the Wolfe imprints with his bodily shape a terror in the silly Lambe, whereof there can be no distinct or formall represen∣tation. So with the shape or physiognomie of some men, a secret dislike doth often insinuate it selfe into our phantasies, of which we can giue no better reason than the Epigrammatist doth, though that no better than the Lambe perhaps could giue why he flies the Wolfe, could this silly creature speake:

Non amo te (Sabidi) nec possum dicere quare, Hoc tantum possum dicere, non amo te.

I loue thee nought, Sabidius, ne can I tell thee why. T'is all I wote, I loue thee not, ne can I loue thee, I.

2. It is questionable whether motion make any distinct impression, or representation vpon the senses, or affect them onely by concomitancie with obiects properly sensible, especially with the senses of sight and touch. Howsoever it be, apprehension of time we haue small or none, saue onely by motion; nor can we limit or bound the parts of the one but by designing some definite and constant parts of the other. He that neither dreames nor stirres whiles he sleepes by night, thinkes he is but newly lain downe when he awakes; whereas he that lies waking the same time, would thinke a short night longer than a summers day. How the yeare goes about we could not tell, but by the motions of the heavens; what a yeare is we can∣not better expresse, than by the Sunnes revolution from some point of the Zodiack to the same; nor what a day is but by its circumvolution in a part of the Ae∣quinoctiall, or other parallel circle. An houre likewise we define by the elevation of the Zodiack fifteene de∣grees aboue the Horizon. Thus the Philosopher de∣fineth time by motion numbred or distinguished into parts, which definition notwithstanding is not essen∣tiall but causall or connotatiue. For as place surmounts all magnitude or surface physicall (seeing the highest sphere is as properly in its place as any lower) so time is transcendent to all kind of motion, and hath a con∣ceit more abstract and metaphysicall, though not ea∣sie to be expressed without motion. Ioshua in pursuing the Amorites lost no time by the Sunnes standing still; nor should we Students gaine any, albeit the heavens should double their wonted pace, or the Starres ele∣vate themselues thirtie degrees in the space, a com∣mon-houre-glasse

is in running. Or though both clockes and houre-glasses moved twice as swiftly, as now they doe, time would be the same, but so could not the distinction or apprehension of it be to vs, vn∣lesse we knew in what proportion their swiftnesse en∣creased; certaine withall that they had an equall and constant course. If vpon their variation or vnconstan∣cie we should haue recourse vnto the motions of our owne soules or bodies, or keepe a perpetuall account of time (as for a space Musicians doe) with our hands; these would deceiue vs. The same motions or bodily agitations seeme much longer to men well nigh wea∣ried, than to such as are lustie or fresh. Solitarinesse without corporall imployment seemes long and tedi∣ous to illiterate soules, so doth vaine iangling or toy∣ings reall or verball to minds bent for contemplation, because in this latter case, men are enforced to take too deepe notice of externall motions; in the former, of their owne vnsetled cogitations or working phan∣tasies. All sicknesses, paines, or eager expectations, whether of release from evills, or of accomplishing ve∣hement desires or hopes, doe double or treble the length of time in our conceit according to the ex∣cesse of paines or pleasure felt or expected. The rea∣son is because the notice of every severall motion is more deepe and pearcing, and the motions are in a manner multiplied. In sicknesse there is a conflict be∣twixt nature and the offensiue humour, both which haue their severall swayes or motions. In expectation likewise the soule is moued two wayes, and being thus affected the difference betwixt our conceit of times length, and theirs that passe the time in sport

and merriment, is much what such as is betweene their progresses or mensurations which runne the same race for length, the one directly and by a streight plaine way in summer, the other by way of indenture, or in winter, or in a deepe soyle. All these argue time to haue a nature of its owne distinct from motion more abstract and immateriall. And if we consider it onely indefinitely or vnder the generall conceit of space contradistinct to distance locall, the conceit of it is as familiar & obvious as of any thing sensible, but ve∣ry hard to define what it is distinctly, as S. Augustine who hath sifted this point as accurately as any Philo∣sopher could doe, well obserues.

3. a 1.1What is there either more familiar or better knowne in ordinary discourse than time? And surely we vnderstand our selues when we mention it, wee doe not mistake others when wee heare them talke of it. What then is time? If no man aske me this Question, I can tell. But if any man shall vrge me to expresse the nature of it, I am at a stand. He finally concludes, That time future or to come can∣not properly be said long, because it is not. But our expec∣tation of it (who haue soules, whose soules likewise haue their true and proper duration) is long. Time past likewise is not properly long, but our memory of that which is past, and now is not, continues still and is long * 1.2.

As we could not measure or account motions, vnlesse our soules had some internall motions, or numerable designements, nor conceiue of time without an imbred sense of our owne duration or extension of our exi∣stence: So neither could we vnderstand any thing without vs, vnlesse we had some vertuall similitude of them within vs, as homogeneall and commensu∣rable to their formes or essences, as our internall du∣ration is to the duration of externalls. As much as in this whole discourse we doe, he did suppose which said Homo est mensura rerum omnium, Man is the mea∣sure of all things. Howbeit to the distinct expression of these internall similitudes, or latent measures of all things the correspondency of Phantasmes either bor∣rowed from sense, or framed by imitation of sensibles, wherwith our soules haue beene acquainted, is alway necessary. For this reason in this life we cannot ap∣prehend, at least not comprehend, things vnsensible and immateriall in such manner as we doe matters sensible, especially visible. But to recompence this de∣fect, the reasonable soule is more affected with the tacite indefinite suggestions, or internall notions of some things vnsēsible indistinctly notified, than with any sensitiue representations. And no marvaile, seing the similitude betwixt her and them, is more immedi∣ate and exact, their sympathie (though secret) more internall, their kindred proper and intire. With sensi∣tiue obiects she hath onely alliance or affinity by mat∣ching with corporall organs, without whose media∣tion no bodily or materiall natures finde any accesse vnto her, nor can she be delighted with their presence, vnlesse shee see them, or distinctly view their proper

shapes or figures. Discourses of colours doe little de∣light a blind man, although his other senses be exact; he that is deafe is as incompetent a judge of soundes, albeit indued with perfect sight and accurate know∣ledge of all colours. In respect onely of these or other proper obiects of sense, that common Maxime in the proprietie of speech, is true; Nihil est in intellectu, quod non prius erat in sensu, that is, There can be no pro∣per intellectuall cōceit of things sensible, vnlesse they be first formally represented to sense and distinctly perceiued by it. Fully equivalent to this Maxime thus limited (whe∣ther for vse or extent) is that other Maxime; Deficien∣te sensu deficit eiusdem sensus scientia; For him that is blind or deafe from his natiuitie, to be either a skilfull pain∣ter or musician, it is impossible. Howsoever, as well for attaining such knowledge of things immateriall as in this life we haue, or for rightly conceiuing of things sensible, the phantasie serues as a glasse to the vnder∣standing, and the motion or agitation of phantasmes, as a Nomenclator to the inherent notions, whose notice or expression we seeke, whose apprehension till we light on phantasmes fitting, is but such as we haue of matters which we well know we haue forgotten, but cannot distinctly call to minde. Yet, if other shall guesse or name divers persons or places (suppose the names of men or Cities, were the matters we had for∣gotten and would call to minde) we can easily dis∣cerne whether they misse or hit, when they goe neere, or wide of that we seeke, because in hitting or com∣ming neere they start either the former distinct repre∣sentation we had of it, or some especiall circumstance that drawes it nearer to the second birth, or new ap∣prehension.

After the same manner doth the intel∣lectuall ingraffed notion, before it be distinctly appre∣hended, either mislike the suggestion of sundry phan∣tasmes, as apt rather to smoother or obscure than to manifest or expresse it, or like of others as comming neere it, or being some necessary adiunct of it: but fi∣nally approues onely such as haue exact correspon∣dency with it, or cleerely represent it to it selfe or the intellectiue facultie wherein it resides or moues. Hence perhaps may that maine question of questions be assoyled, How wee become certainly perswaded of any truth: this certaintie can never be wrought but by a repercussion of the ingraffed notion vpon it selfe. Thus in all contemplations fully evident & certaine, we feele a gratefull penetration betweene the obiect knowne, and the facultie knowing, and as it were a fastning of the truth found, vnto that part of the soule, whence the desire of it sprung. The soule it selfe by this penetration becomes so fully satisfied, that the inclination which before wrought outwardly, seeking where to rest, delights now rather to retire inwardly and enioy it selfe. Our manner of examining the cer∣tainty of truth supposed to be found out is by a kinde of Arietation, a tryall which floating conceits or phan∣tasmes not perpendicularly setled vpon the intellectu∣all notion cannot abide. And without convenient and setled phantasmes the intellectuall intentions glaunce away without reflection or repercussion, and conse∣quently without all sense or notice of the Idaeall rules or notions whence they flow as lines from their center. Some glimerings they may leaue of their indefinite truth, none of their goodnesse, as the Sunne-beames

leaue some light or impression of light in the middle or vpper region of the aire, none of heat vntill it meet with some solid bodie to reflect them.

Notes

• a 1.1

  Quid autem familiarius, & notius in loquēdo com∣memoramus, quàm tēpus? Et intelligi∣mus vtique cum id loqui∣mur, intelli∣gimus etiam cum alio lo∣quente id au∣dimus. Quid ergo est tem∣pus? Si nemo ex me quae∣rat, scio, si quaerenti explicare velim, nescio. Lib. Confess 11. cap. 14. Sed quomedo minuitur, aut consumitur futurum, quod nondum est? aut quomodo crescit praeteritum, quodiam non est? nisi quia in animo, qui illud agit, tria sunt. Nam expectat, & attendit, & meminit; vt id quod ex∣pectat, per id quod attendit, transeat in id quod meminerit. Quis igitur negat futura nondū esse? sed tamen iam est in animo expectatio futurorū Et quis negat praeterita iam non ess••? sed tamen adhuc est in animo memoria praeteritorum. Et quis negatpresens tempus carere spatio, qu••a in pūcto praterit? sed tamen perdurat attentio, per quam pergat ••besse quod aderit. Nonigit•••• lon∣gum tempus futurū quod non est; sed longū futurū, long a expectatio futuri est. Ne{que} 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ••••m∣pus prateritum, quodnon est, sed longum prateritum, longa memoria prateriti est
• * 1.2

  Vide Ploti∣num Eunead. 3. lib. 7.