problems) as an appendix to this worke finished: he that is desirous of information in this kinde, may finde rules not alto∣gether impertinent to this effect, in such as write of the triall of spirits, or mysticall Theologie.
12. Here some happily will demaund, whether this Assent we treate of, being of things past, present and to come, or of things partly seene, and partly vnseene, bee properly termed faith in respect of all, or some of these onely? For ought I haue obserued in Scripture, or from the common vse of speech, the name of faith is giuen to it especially in respect of things past or to come, which are vnseen: but this I dispute not. It sufficeth that the habit of inherent grace, whereby wee formally assent vnto all the obiects of Christian faith, (whether they include a relation vnto times present, past, or to come) is one & the same, and may in part be defined, an Assent vnto supernaturall truths reuealed in Scriptures, firme in respect of all, directly euident on∣ly in respect of some. Or if any will exclude euidence from the definition, because not incident to those obiects, with refe∣rence to which this habit originally takes his name, let him say it is a firme infallible Assent vnto supernaturall truths already past or hereafter to he manifested, grounded vpon an experimentall euidence of others present, or vpon a true knowledge of scriptures diuine truth, or such points as they teach, indefinitely considered, without peculiar reference to this or that time.
13. From these discussions about the imperfect euidence or certainety of some, the inexhaustible capacity of all, and the incomprehensiblenesse of the two finall ob••ects of Christian faith, life and death euerlasting, the one distinctly apprehended in its pledge or assurance, the other in its presignifications; it may appeare, the most natiue property of this Assent thus far differenced, is admiration & horror. Admiration is properly of things rare and excellent, knowne in part, but not comprehen∣ded, so as the more we know, the more wee desire to know of them. This affection it was which first brought forth philoso∣phy, according to the dunsticall prouerbe, propter admiraricaepe∣runt homines philosophari: and as an excellent Philosopher tels vs, mindes naturally disposed to admire things strange, secret o•• vncouth, are the fittest for this study. Belike, want of this dispo∣sition