Iustifying faith, or The faith by which the just do liue A treatise, containing a description of the nature, properties and conditions of Christian faith. With a discouerie of misperswasions, breeding presumption or hypocrisie, and meanes how faith may be planted in vnbeleeuers. By Thomas Iackson B. of Diuinitie and fellow of Corpus Christi Colledge in Oxford.

CHAP. IIII. What correspondencie, euidence, and certaintie hold in Assent or per∣swasions: what measure of either, in respect of what obiects, is ne∣cessarily required to the constitution of that Assent wherein Chri∣stian faith consists.

1. ASsents (as all agree) are most properly diffe∣renced by the diuers measures of their credibi∣lity, certainty, or perspicuity, whose growth in matters secular is alwaies equall. That the ob∣iects of our beliefe are all in themselues most certaine, were damnable to doubt. But whether vnto the na∣ture of that Assent, whose differences or properties we seeke, such exact certainty be so necessarily required, that without it we cānot truly be said to haue Christiā beleef, is somwhat dout∣full. Or if such certainty be so necessary, the doubt is greater, whether the euidence must, or if it must, how possibly in this life it can be thereto commensurable. But by apprehension or representation there can bee no beliefe or knowledge of any truth. And if we seeke all the differences or properties of appre∣hension or representation: what any of them besides such cleare∣nes or perspicuity, as satiates the passiue capacity of the appre∣hensiue faculty, should conferre vnto the certainty of know∣ledge, or assent thence resulting, is inexplicable. Euen the most d 1.1 acute amongst the Schoolemen, whiles they seeke to cleere this doubt, doe but faulter or tautologize; or finally confound the strength of adhaerence, which ariseth from the worth or a∣miablenesse of the obiect, with the certainty of perswasion or credence, which is the proper consequent of cleerenesse in ap∣prehension or representation.

2. If it be replied, that the certaintie of our beliefe depends vpon the authorities of the teacher, the doubt still prosecutes the solution. For, either must our apprehension of his skill and fidelity be cleere and euident, or else our perswasion of it re∣maines vncertaine, and our beliefe at the best but conditionally certaine: Notwithstanding it hath beene generally held in the schooles, that faith is no euident assent, because of obiects not euident or apparent, vnto which tenent we did thus farre in the beginning of this worke subscribe, that it was not directly eui∣dent: which opinion, whether it be true of all, or of some prin∣cipall obiects of our faith, or how farre of any, we are now fur∣ther to discusse.

3. The Romanist exacts a certaintie of Assent in the belie∣uer more exact then demonstratiue sciences affoord, and yet makes diuine reuelations not onely not euident, but ineuident and obscure, the method of faith euen a * 1.2 labyrinth of obscuri∣ties. And for ought I can perceiue, this obscurity in respect of euery Article is a like to all: euen whiles the Assent becomes most certaine and infallible. Yet questionlesse, whether the im∣mediate ground of our Assent be euidence of truth in the obiect or some inferiour degree of distinct apprehension approaching thereto: the growth of certainety in the perswasion is alwaies turbulent and preposterous, vnlesse the apprehension of truth in the obiect growe more and more perspicuous, and so come nearer and nearer to the nature of euidence properly so called. Euery degree of certainty we get in beliefe not thus grounded, is but a step to sorcery. For what is the Sorcerers fault, but that he belieues those things most firmly, of whose truth he can haue no distinct apprehensions, but some pretences of warrant from the authority of scriptures, or practices of holy men therein re∣corded? This grosse error in compounding faith of obscurity, and exact certainty, is one especiall roote of popery in graine, as els where I am to shew. And this certainty of perswasion which they thus enforce vpon themselues, without proportionall en∣crease of euidence or perspicuity apprehended in the obiect, hath the same proportion to liuely faith, that stubborne foole∣hardinesse vnto true valour. Few of Iesuiticall instruction but are as aduenturous, as most of Gods Saints haue beene, were

the causes they manage as good, their motiues to vndertake them as euidently warrantable, or their intensions as sincerely sound. But the Iesuite or his Catechist, nursing a conceit of obscurity in the obiect of beliefe to ground a title vnto merite, (* 1.3 for what reward were it worth to belieue an euident truth?) out of the stubbornenesse of his forced perswasions, or violent certainty meeting with this vaile of darkenesse, wherewith he purposely hoodwinks himselfe, runnes vpon any mischiefe his Superiors shall designe him vnto, as stoutly and boldly as blind Bayard rusheth into the battell: which way hee should goe he sees not, he cares not, saue onely as his Rider spurs him, or rather as the diuell driues him; destitute of cleere ayme by the word of God, he desperately flies like an instrument of battery, whither his liuing rule of faith shall leuell him, though it be to ruinate the state wherein hee was borne, or ouerthrow that Church which gaue him Christendome.

4. But a great deale more easie it is to discerne the grossenes of error come to full growth, then to discouer the first roote whence it springs, or assigne the originall breach betwixt it and truth, commonly vnited in the same trunke, like the two oppo∣site branches of Pithagoras letter. As much as in reason can be re∣quired of vs will be to guesse or giue aime (as our custome is) grosso modo, leauing the exact designation of that Mathematicall point, or angle, wherein truth and error in this present busines are first diuided, vnto more accurate eye-sights. Seeing Euidence, besides cleerenes or perspicuity (directly and formally included in it prime and natiue signification) collaterally drawes with it a conceit of such plenary comprehension of the obiect knowne, as fully satiates our desire of its knowledge: (for euident wee hardly accompt that knowledge which leaues the apprehensiue faculty capable of further or better information then it already hath from the particulars which we desire to know) In the first place it may be questioned, whether that apprehension we haue in this life of obiects supernaturall, though neuer comming to such full growth as may deserue the title of euidence, may not ground a greater certainty thē that we haue of things les certain or credible in themselues, yet euidently apprehended, or rather exactly comprehended, according to the ful measure of that cer∣tainty or credibility they haue. For, if certainty of Assent a∣mount proportionably to the degrees of credibilitie inherent in

the obiect, distinctly apprehended by vs; that Assent, whose e∣uidence is defectiue or imperfect in respect of its proper obiect (containing as is supposed almost innumerable degrees of Vera¦city, Certainty, or Credibilitie) may be more certa ne, then the most exact and euident knowledge that can bee had of other matters, the full measure of whose internall certainty, or veraci∣ty, containes fewer degrees then wee did apprehend in the for∣mer. Of this assertion there could be no doubt, were the appre∣hension of seuerall degrees in both, a like cleere and distinct: whence, of such as hold the euidence of our Assent vnto reuela∣tions diuine, to be lesse then that wee giue to humane sciences, many perhaps meane no more then this, that the apprehension we haue of them in this life is for euidence very imperfect, in respect of that which may bee had of them in the life to come: whereas the euidence of some scientificall principles or conclu∣sions (mathematicall especially) is already as great as it possi∣bly can be. •• Thus some opinions seeming contrary, may per∣chance bee reconciled with this distinction: our assent to the truth of reuelations diuine is lesse, then that we giue to conclu∣sions in humane sciences, if we compare either euidence, as it is found in vs, with the capacity of its proper obiect; yet altoge∣ther as great, if we compare the seuerall qualities, or degrees of euidences onely betwixt themselues. As 8 while it is compared with 7 is a greater number, because consisting of more vnities; & yet the Octonary number applied to nine, is lesse then the Sep∣tenary applied to seauen materiall numerables. Or, to illustrate our purpose by a comparison more familiar and proper; If a man should see the sun at mid day in a cloud, and the moone in her strength, or the beames of the one in at his chamber win∣dow, & the body of the other directly in its sphere: his sight of the Sunne would be as euident as of the Moone; although the Moone hee could not possibly apprehend more euidently or more directly, while his apprehension of the Sunne, in respect of what it might be, is both waies very imperfect. But thus, if we make an equall comparison, the certainty likewise of our Assent vnto supernaturall obiects, should in a correspondent sense bee said lesse or greater then the certainty we haue of humane scien∣ces, because the obiects of the one cannot possibly bee better knowne then they are, when as the knowledge of the o∣ther

is not halfe so greate in this life, as it shall bee, for the Apostle (who knew many diuine mysteries, more e∣uidently then we doe ought) saith of himselfe as well as others, we know but in part. Yet notwithstanding, this halfe knowledge of the one, may be more great and certain then the whol know∣ledge of the other; if wee compare them onely betwixt them∣selues, not with the internall capacity of their proper obiects, considered as credible or intelligible. Or if our apprehension of as much as we know in the one, be not so cleere as it is in the o∣ther, it may further be questioned, whether the excessiue multi∣tude of parts apprehended in it, though not so cleerly, or the variety of motiues procuring our assent, though not so euident; may not, all taken together, be as forcible to support as great certainty as ariseth from euidence in humane sciences fully ap∣prehēded, more intensiue in it selfe, vet extensiuely not so great, as not being grounded vpon so many motiu•••• or degrees of in∣ternall certainty or veracity in the obiect. Thus many pillars, though all somwhat declining, may beare as great weight, as fewer exactly perpendicular; or many lights seuerally taken, not splendent in the highest degree, may better illuminate a large roome, then one or two intensiuely much brighter.

5. Lastly, it were worth a sacred Critiques paines to ob∣serue, whether this error that giues certainty the start so farre of euidence, did not spring from a confusion of that certainty which is in the obiect, with the certainty that may be in the sub¦iect. It is true indeed, our Assent must bee conformable to the obiect; and therefore as is the one, so should the other bee most exactly certaine: but, whether such exact certainty as may bee had in humane sciences, be not only necessary by way of duty or precept, or as the marke whereat all must aime though fewe in this life can hit, but euen vnto the being of a Christian; or whether an earnest desire of encreasing our knowledge in mat∣ters diuine, ioyned with an vnfained vniforme practise of such duties▪ as faith prescribes, be not sufficient at least to h 1.4 many, al∣beit the certainty of their belief be not in it selfe so great as their knowledge in some other matters, may in charity, and for the

comfort of weake consciences be doubted. Most certainely per∣swaded euen the weakest alwaies must bee, vpon the highest termes of absolute nesessity, not to relinquish the profession of Christianity, not to despaire of good successe, not to be daun∣ted in religious courses, for all the arguments the diuell, the world and flesh can oppose against them. But hereto wee stand in our owne consciences most strictly bound, albeit the certainty of our assent vnto diuine matters be lesse then demon∣stratiue or scientificall; seeing as well the danger that may ac∣crew by renouncing, as the hopes wee conceiue by continuing our profession are infinitely greater, then any we can possibly imagine, should arise from embracing contrary suggestions. It may well seeme so farre sufficient as not to argue any nullity of Christian faith, if our Assent, vpon examination or triall, proue more certaine then any conclusions can be brought against it, which can neuer be demonstratiue, nor if well sifted, probable; and yet retayning▪ firme adherence to the truths contained in the Apostles Creede, and an vndaunted resolution, to follow the prescripts of Gods word, (notwithstanding all the blasts of temptatiōs, or storms of persecutiōs the wicked spirits or their agents can raise against vs) we may be truly said to hold fast the Faith, albeit our apprehension of the particular truths it tea∣cheth, be not so euident, nor the grounds of our adherence to them, (to speake properly) so certain as they are vnto some Ma∣thematical conclusions. For what necessity is there faith should be more certaine then such sciences, as are more prest to doe her the best seruice they can, then any way to oppugne her?

6. Or if from the excesse of certainty, or fertility of con∣sequences euidently flowing from vndoubted principles; these hand maids should pleade for equall interest with their mistris in our soules: to quell their insolencies enough it were, that besides the infinite reward, which wee haue reasons many and great (though none absolutly euidēt or demōstratiuely certain) to expect in the life to comithe ioy & comfort euery Christian, in this life, may sensibly reape from the constant embracements of trueths taught, or practise of duties enioyned by the rule of faith, is much greater then al the delight we can imagine should elsewhere grow. Nor doth lesse certainety, or euidence of diuine

truths in particular, any way preiudice, but rather aduantage our firme Assent or adherence to them, as long as their contem∣plation or practice euidently affoords ioy and comfort, more sincere and sweet then the most exact, most certaine, and euident knowledge that can be had of other subiects; especially if this comfort they yeeld receiue daily increase, as euery Christian by stedfast continuance in religious exercises may vndoubtedly perceiue. For, as I said before, the strength of our adherence, or Assent, ariseth more properly from the excessiue worth of the obiect apprehended, then from the euidence of apprehension. Thus by the diuine prouidence it comes about, that euery Christian may ••itly take vp the Apostles speech, but in another sense then he meant it, When I am weake [in faith] then I am* 1.5 strong. For though his Assent vnto the articles of this Creed se∣uerally considered, be much lesse euident and certaine, then vn∣to many other matters; yet if the fruites of it be euidently grea∣ter for the quantity, and incomparably more pleasant for the quality, the greater interest will their loue and admiration here∣by gaine in his soule. And who knowes, whether he that made the heart of man, best knowing how prone it is to be pu••t vp with pride, and ready vpon suddaine change of it wonted diet, (the beggarly rudiments of this world) to surfet with fulnesse of knowledge, though of heauenly mysteries, doth not, with pur∣pose to alay their sweetnesse, onely season the streame or current of our desires, whilest weake and sickely, with some light tincture of his graces; seldome infuling the water of the well of life into the fountain of our corrupt affections, otherwise then by drops, whose soft instillations, (during the time of our infancy in CHRIST,) bring forth such transient apprehensions, or imper∣fect tastes, as rather breed a longing after the like againe, then a∣ny waies enable vs to discerne aright the nature and quality of what is past; that so the loue of these euerlasting truths, neuer comprehensible in this life, thus secretly kindling by degrees in∣sensible in our soules, might at length breake forth into a flame, much more ardent and durable, then if our apprehension at first acquaintance with them, had been as euident, & certaine, as our first Parents had of them in Paradise, or Lucifer before his fall.

7. Thus granting euidence and certainty to liue and die to∣gether like Hippocrates twinnes, o•• rather the latter to follow the

former as closely as Iacob did Esau out of the wombe; we may conclude, that as well the euidence, as certainty of that Assent wherein Christian faith consists, is in some respects lesse, in o∣thers* 1.6 as great as can be found in any science. Both, in many (at least) rightly enioying the name of Christians, are directly much lesse, whiles we compare particulars with particulars; as beliefe of seu••rall Articles with Assent to demonstratiue con∣clusions. The certainty notwithstanding, of this generall reso∣lution [That all diuine truths proposed in Scriptures, are most vndoubtedly to be embraced, though with opposition to all o∣ther professions,] is as great as can be found in any scientificall conclusion, because manifestly grounded vpon euidence, as great as can be required in the vndoubted maxims, or common principles of exact sciences. For vnto breasts inspired with such inward comfort in this life, as may nurse hope of ••oies vnspeak∣able in the life to come; or vnto consciences so wounded with the sting of sinne, as thence to conceiue fearefull expectation of horrible torments after death: the wisdome of this choise [most firmely and constantly to adhere vnto all diuine truthes whatsoeuer, speculatiue or practique, particular or generall, (though apprehended directly in themselues neither as euident nor certaine, but in some high degree of probability) rather then to endanger the hopes of life, or increase feares of death e∣••erlasting, either by open renouncing their profession, or vn∣constant wauering betweene the practices they prescribe, and the contrary which the world followes,] is most cl••••re and eui∣dent. In the iudgement of such as will not be partiall for sensu∣ality, against the euident testimony of meere naturall reason, the reiection of the former choice vpon such experience of vn∣couth ioies and terrours, includes more degrees of extreame folly and desperate madnesse, then can be imagined of certain∣ty in any science, or of prudence in any other morall consulta∣tion. No heathen Philosopher, though vnwilling, because wan∣ting all such experience, to renounce his profession, but would haue condemned him as more brutish then any beast, that hauing such, would doubt to continue the former resolu∣tion. Now this firmenesse or constancie of adherence vnto diuine truthes in particular, thus grounded vpon an eui∣dent

and certaine appehension of true wisdome in the former generall choice, may serue as the first difference of that Assent, which is necessary to the being, or constitution of a true Chri∣stian, which primarily distinguisheth him from an Hypocrite or worldling Whether more be not required to full assurance of our actuall state in grace, and fauour of the sonnes of God, is hereafter to be discussed.

Notes

• d 1.1

  Ad probationem∣cum assumitur quod n••llus tene∣tur ••••••mius adhae∣rere conclusioni, quâm sit certitude no ti••ae propter qeam ill••••dhere∣re••••ista posset con∣cedi cum aliqua conditione, sci••. si ill•• teneatur adhae∣rere conclusioni praecise propter certitudinem no∣••••••iae: vbi autem non subest dicta conditio, propositio est simpliciter ne∣ganda: in proposi∣to autem non sub∣est quoniam non praecise propter certitudinem ali∣quam notitiae (pro∣priè loquendo) si••e conclusionis, siue princi••iorum, te∣neatur Catholicus adhaerere ••alibus Quini••••ò quic quid Chi••roponatur per Scripturam vel Ecclesiam, fore cre∣dendam, nulla alia notitia habita credere tene••ur. Ad c••••••imat••on••m, cum dititur nullus credidit nisiquia illud sibi constat; si loquatur de constantia notitiae ••••ls••m est•• si de constantia adhaesionis, tunr etiam potest negari: quia aequiualet isti; Nullus credit aliquod nisi quia credit illud: quae in sua proprietate non est vera. Greg. Arim. in 1. Sent. dist. 1. quaest 1. Act c. 4. The like imperfect solution ••alentian hath where he dispureth this que∣stion against the same author Fran. de Mat. and Petir Abaylard or P••ripat: which held faith to be as∣sensus euidens.
• * 1.2

  So Valentian tearmes it whose words are cited in the appendix to the third book
• * 1.3

  To this purpose they abuse a say∣ing of Gregory•• Fides non habet 〈…〉〈…〉, cu•• hu∣mana r•••••• praebet experimentum: Which notwith∣standing he men•• of the incompre∣hensibility, no•• of the persp••cuity of obiects belieued. ••is words at full are these. Diuina operatio si ratione aprehendatut non est admirabil••••net ••ides habet mer•••••• &c. Greg. hem, 16. in Euang. But of his opini∣on in this point we shall haue fit∣ter occasion when wee come to speake of merits.
• h 1.4

  Aquinas and his followers g••••n•••• at ve••••••a∣••es ••id••i sunt e••••∣den••er ••r••dib••••es. It y ••redio••••••y they meane ••o 〈◊〉〈◊〉 then pro∣bability as it is opposed to cer∣tain••••, their doc∣trine is dāgerous: for ••o th••y make articles o•• faith to be euidently vncertaine. But if they take credi∣••••••••ty, as it is common or in∣diff••••••n•• •••• pro∣ba••••••••ty and ••er∣tai••••▪ ••▪ ••ropositi∣ons of faith may be (as we maintaine) euidently certaine vnto some, th••ugh but euidently probable vn∣to others in their particularities.
• * 1.5

  ^• 2. Cor. 12. v. 1.
• * 1.6

  This I take it is ••••o more then what the learned Hook••r, in a Ser∣mon vpon the Prophet H••ba∣k•••••• doubtfull c••••tation (pa 3) hath expres••d: onely wee make that which hee ca••s certainty of adheren•••• to haue ••••••dence for i••s ground, not of particulars, but of the generall choice here men∣tioned H•• e•••• we ag••••••, that this certainty of ••dherence vnto particulars arri∣••eth from their worth o•• conse∣quence?