Examen de ingenios. = The examination of mens vvits In whicch [sic], by discouering the varietie of natures, is shewed for what profession each one is apt, and how far he shall profit therein. By Iohn Huarte. Translated out of the Spanish tongue by M. Camillo Camili. Englished out of his Italian, by R.C. Esquire.

CHAP. III. (Book 3)

What part of the body ought to be well tempered, that a young man may haue habilitie.

MAns body hath so many varieties of parts and powers (applied ech to his end) that it shal not stray from our purpose, but rather growes a matter of necessitie, to know first, what member was ordained by nature for the principall instru∣ment, to the end man might be∣come wise and aduised. For it is a thing apparant, that we discourse not with our foot, nor walke on our head,

nor see with our nostrils, nor heare with our eies, but that euery of these parts hath his vse and particular dis∣position, for the worke which it is to accomplish.

Before Hippocrates and Plato came into the world, it held for a generall conceit amongst the naturall Philo∣sophers, that the heart was the principall part where the reasonable facultie made his residence, and the instru∣ment wherewith the soule wrought the workes of wise∣dome, of diligence, of memorie, and of vnderstanding. * 1.1 For which cause, the diuine scripture (applying it selfe to the ordinary speech of those times) in many places, cals the heart the soueraigne part of a man. But these two graue Philosophers comming into the world, gaue eui∣dence that this opinion was false, and prooued by many reasons and experiments, that the braine is the princi∣pall seat of the reasonable soule, and so they all gaue hands to this opinion, saue only Aristotle, who (with a purpose of crossing Plato in all points) turned to reuiue the former opinion, and with topicall places to make it probable: with which of these opinions the truth swai∣eth, time serueth not now to discusse. For there is none of these Philosophers that doubteth, but that the braine is the instrument ordained by nature, to the end that man might become wise and skilfull, it sufficeth only to declare with what conditions this part ought to be en∣dewed, so as we may affirme, that it is duly instrumen∣talized, and that a yong man in this behalfe may possesse a good wit and habilitie.

Foure conditions the braine ought to enjoy, to the end the reasonable soule may therewith commodiously performe the workes which appertaine to vnderstan∣ding and wisdome. The first, good composition; the se∣cond, that his parts be well vnited; the third, that the

heat exceed not the cold, nor the moist the drie; the fourth, that his substance be made of parts subtile and verie delicate.

In the good composition, are contained other foure things: the first is, good figure: the second, quantitie sufficient: the third, that in the braine the foure ven∣tricles be distinct and seuered, each duly bestowed in his seat and place; the fourth, that the capablenesse of these be neither greater nor lesse than is conuenient for their workings.

Galen collects the good figure of the braine, by an outward consideration, namely the forme and dispositi∣on of the head, which he sayth, ought to be such, as it should be, if taking a perfect round ball of wax, and pres∣sing it together somewhat on the sides, there will re∣maine (after that manner) the forehead and the nape with a little bunchinesse. Hence it followes that the man who hath his forehead very plaine, and his nodocke flat, hath not his braine so figured, as is requisit for wit and habilitie. The quantitie of the braine, which the soule needeth to discourse & consider, is a matter that breeds feare, for amongst all the brute beasts, there is none found to haue so much braine as a man, in sort, as if we ioine those of two the greatest oxen together, they will not equall that of one onely man, be he neuer so little. And that whereto behooues more consideration, is, that amongst brute beasts, those who approch neerest to mans wisedome and discretion (as the ape, the fox, and the dog,) haue a greater quantitie of braine than the o∣ther, though bigger bodied than they. For which cause, Galen said, that a little head in any man is euer faultie, be∣cause that it wanteth braine; notwithstanding, I auouch that if his hauing a great head, proceedeth from abun∣dance

of matter, and ill tempered, at such time as the same was shaped by nature, it is an euill token, for the same consists all of bones and flesh, and containes a smal quantitie of braine, as it befals in very big orenges, which opened, are found scarce of iuice, and hard of rinde. Nothing offends the reasonable soule so much, * 1.2 as to make his abode in a body surcharged with bones, fat, and flesh. For which cause Plato sayd, that wise mens heads are ordinarily weake, and vpon any occasion are easily annoied, and the reason is, for that nature made them of an emptie skull, with intention not to offend the wit, by compassing it with much matter. And this doctrine of Plato is so true, that albeit the stomacke a∣bides so far distant from the braine, yet the same workes it offence, when it is replenished with fat and flesh. For confirmation hereof, Galen alleageth a prouerbe which sayth, A grosse bellie makes a grosse vnderstanding, and that this proceeds from nothing else, than that the brain and the stomacke are vnited and chained together with cer∣taine sinewes, by way of which they interchangeably communicat their dammages. And contrariwise, when the stomacke is drie and shrunke, it affoords great aid to the wit, as we see in the hungerstarued, and such as are driuen to their shifts, on which doctrine (it may be) Per∣sius founded himself, when he said, That the belly is that which quickens vp the wit. But the thing most pertinent to be noted for this purpose, is, that if the other parts of the body be fat and fleshie, and therethrough a man growes ouer grosse, Aristotle sayes, It makes him to leese his wit. For which cause, I am of opinion, that if a man haue a great head, albeit the same proceed for that he is endued with a very able nature, and that he is furnished with a quantitie of well tempered matter, yet he shall

not be owner of so good a wit, as if the same held a mea∣ner size.

Aristotle is of a contrary opinion, whilest he enquires for what cause a man is the wisest of all liuing creatures; to which doubt he answers, That you shall find no crea∣ture which hath so little a head as man, respecting with∣all the greatnesse of his bodie: but herein he swarued from reason, for if he had opened some mans head, and viewed the quantitie of his braine, he should haue found, that two horses together had not so much braine as that one man. That which I haue gathered by expe∣rience is, that in little men it is best that the head incline somewhat to greatnesse; and in those who are big bo∣died, it prooues best that they be little: and the reason is, for that after this sort, there is found a measurable quantitie, with which the reasonable soule may wel per∣forme his working.

Besides this, there are needfull the foure ventricles in the brain, to the end the reasonable soule may discourse and Philosophize: one must be placed on the right side of the braine, the second on the left, the third in the middle of these, and the fourth in the part behind the braine. Whervnto these ventricles serue, and their large or narrow capablenesse for the reasonable soule, all shall be told by vs a little hereafter, when we shall intreat of the diuersities of mens wits.

But it sufficeth not, that the braine possesse good fi∣gure, sufficient quantitie, and the number of ventricles, by vs forementioned, with their capablenesse, great or little, but it behooues also that his parts holds a certaine kind of continuednesse, and that they be not diuided. For which cause, we haue seene in hurts of the head, that some men haue lost their memorie, some their vnder∣standing,

and others their imagination: and put case, that after they haue recouered their health, the braine re-vnited it selfe againe, yet this notwithstanding, the naturall vnion was not made, which the braine before possessed.

The third condition of the fourth principall, was, that the braine should be tempered with measurable heat, and without excesse of the other qualities, which disposition, we sayd heretofore that it is called good na∣ture; for it is that which principally makes a man able, and the contrarie vnable.

But the fourth, (namely that the braine haue his sub∣stance or composition of subtle and delicate parts) Galen sayth, is the most important of all the rest. For when he would giue a token of the good disposition of the brain, he affirmeth, that a subtile wit, sheweth that the braine is framed of subtile and very delicat parts, and if the vnder∣standing be dull, it giues euidence of a grosse substance, but he makes no mention of the temperature. These conditions the braine ought to be endewed withall, to the end the reasonable soule may therethrough shape his reasons and syllogismes. But here encounters vs a difficultie very great, and this is, that if we open the head of any beast, we shall find his braine composed with the same forme and manner, as a mans, without that any of the fore-reported conditions will be failing. Whence we gather that the brute beasts haue also the vse of Pru∣dence and reason, by means of the composition of their braine, or else that our reasonable soule serues not it selfe of this member, for the vse of his operations; which may not be auouched. To this doubt, Galen answereth in this manner: Amongst the kinds of beasts, it is doub∣ted, whether that which is termed vnreasonable, be alto∣gether

void of reason, or not. For albeit the same want that which consists in voice (which is named speech) yet that which is conceiued in the soule, and termed dis∣course, of this it may be, that all sorts of beasts are parta∣kers, albeit the same is bestowed more sparingly vpon some, and more largely on other some. But verely, how far man in the way of reason outgoeth all the rest, there is none who maketh question. By these words, Galen giues vs to vnderstand (albeit with some fearfulnesse) that brute beasts do partake reason, one more, and ano∣ther lesse, and in their mind do frame some syllogisines and discourses, though they cannot vtter them by way of speech. And then the difference betweene them and man consisteth in being more reasonable, and in vsing Prudence with greater perfection.

The same Galen prooues also by many reasons and experiments, that Asses (being of all brute beasts the bluntest) do ariue with their wit to the most curious and nice points, which were deuised by Plato and Ari∣stotle, and there on he collects saying. I am therefore so far from praysing the antient Philosophers, in that they haue found out some ample matter and of rare inuenti∣on, (as when they say, We must hold that there is selfe, and diuers: one, and not one: not only in number, but also in kind:) as I dare boldly affirme, that euen the ve∣ry Asses (who notwithstanding seeme most blockish of all beasts) haue this from nature.

This selfe same meant Aristotle, when he enquired the cause, Why man amongst all liuing creatures is wi∣sest: and in another place he turnes to doubt, For what cause man is the most vniust of all liuing creatures: in which he giues vs to vnderstand the selfe same which Galen sayd, That the difference which is found between

man and brute beast, is the selfe same which is found be∣tweene a foole and a wise man; which is nought else than in respect of the more and the lesse. This (truly) is not to be doubted, that brute beasts enioy memorie and imagination, and another power which resembles vn∣derstanding, as the Ape is very like a man, and that his soule takes vse of the composition of the braine, it is a matter apparant: which being good, and such as is be∣hooffull, performes his workes very wel, and with much prudence, and if the braine be ill instrumentalized, it ex∣ecutes the same vntowardly. For which cause we see that there be asses, which in their knowledge are pro∣perly such: and others againe are found so quicke con∣ceipted and malicious, that they passe the propertie of their kind. And amongst horses are found many iadish∣nesses, and good qualities, and some there are more trainable than the rest: all which growes from hauing their braine well or ill instrumentalized. The reason and solution of this doubt, shall be placed in the chapter which followeth, for there we returne to reason anew of this matter.

There are in the body some other parts, from whose temperature, as well the wit as the braine depend; of which we will reason in the last chapter of this worke. But besides these and the braine, there is found in the body another substance, whose seruice the reasonable soule vseth in his operations, and so requireth the three last qualities which we haue assigned to the braine, that is, quantitie sufficient, delicate substance, and good tem∣perature. These are the vitall spirits, and arteriall blood, which go wandring through the whole body, and re∣maine euermore vnited to the imagination, following his contemplation. The office of this spirituall substance

is, to stir vp the powers of man, and to giue them force and vigour that they may be able to worke. This shall euidently be knowne to be their manner, if we take con∣sideration of the motions, of the imaginations, and of that which after succeeds in working. For if a man begin to imagine vpon any iniurie that hath bene profered him, the blood of the arteries runs sodainly to the heart, and stirs vp the wrathfull part, and giues the same heat and forces for reuenge.

If a man stand contemplating any faire woman, or stay in giuing & receiuing by that imaginatiō touching the venerious act, these vitall spirits run foorthwith to the genitall members, and raise them to the perfor∣mance. The like befals when we remember any delicat and sauourie meat, which once called to mind, they straight abandon the rest of the body, and flie to the sto∣macke and replenish the mouth with water. And this their motion is so swift, that if a woman with child long for any meat whatsoeuer, and still retaine the same in her imagination, we see by experience, that she looseth her burthen if speedily it be not yeelded vnto her. The naturall reason of this, is, because these vitall spirits, be∣fore the woman conceiued this longing, made abode in the bellie, helping her there to retaine the creature, and through this new imagination of eating, they hie to the stomacke to raise the appetite, and in this space, if the belly haue no strong retentiue, it cannot sustaine the same, and so by this means she leeseth her burthen.

Galen vnderstanding this condition of the vitall spi∣rits, counsaileth Phisitions that they giue not sicke folke to eat, when their humors are raw and vpon digestion, for when they first feele the meat in the stomacke, they straightwaies abandon the worke about which before

they were occupied, and come thervnto to helpe it. The like benefit and ayd, the braine receiues of these vitall spirits, when the reasonable soule is about to contem∣plat, vnderstand, imagine, or performe actions of me∣morie, without which it cannot worke. And like as the grosse substance of the braine and his euill temperature brings the wit to confusion: so the vitall spirits, and the arteriall blood (not being delicat and of good tempera∣ture) hinder in a man his discourse and vse of reason. Wherefore Plato sayd, That the supplenesse and good temperature of the heart, makes the wit sharpe and quicke-sighted. Hauing prooued before that the braine and not the heart, is the principall seat of the reasonable soule. And the reason is, because these vitall spirits are engendred in the heart, and partake of that substance and that temperature, which rested in that which for∣med them. Of this arteriall blood, Aristotle meant when he sayd, That those men are well compounded who haue their blood hot, delicat, and pure; for they are also of good bodily forces, and of a wit well dispo∣sed. These vitall spirits are by the Phisitions termed Na∣ture, for they are the principall instrument with which the reasonable soule performeth his workes, and of these also may that sentence be verefied, Nature makes able.

Notes

• * 1.1

  And therefore the heart and the things seated therabouts haue great feeling, but for all that are not partakers of knowledge: but of all these things the braine is causer.
• * 1.2

  There are two sorts of fat men, the one full of flesh, bones, and blood: the other replenished with fat, and these are very wittie.