A modest reply to certaine answeres, which Mr. Gataker B.D. in his treatise of the nature, & vse of lotts, giveth to arguments in a dialogue concerning the vnlawfulnes of games consisting in chance And aunsweres to his reasons allowing lusorious lotts, as not evill in themselves. By Iames Balmford, minister of Iesus Christ.

A Reply to M. Gataker's answers to arguments conteined in a Dialogue against the vn∣lawfulnes of games consisting in chaunce.

* 1.1 WHatsoever di∣rectly, or of it sel∣fe, or in a speciall* 1.2 manner tendeth to the advauncing of God's Name is to be vsed religiously, & not to be v∣sed in sporte, as we may not pray, or sweare in sporte: But the vse of Lotts directly, or of it selfe, and in speciall manner tendeth to the ad∣vauncing of the name of God in attributing to his speciall Provi∣dence

in the whole, and immediate* 1.3 disposing of the Lot, & expecting the event. Therefore the vse of Lotts is not to be in sport.

* 1.4 The Assumption is not true, if it be understood vniversally. The proofe annexed I deny; Neither doe the places produced proove it. The former of them, concer∣ning ordinary Lotts, or Lotts in generall, was answered sufficiently before. The latter is an example of an extraordinary Lott, wherein was (indeed) an immediate, and speciall Providence. But extraor∣dinary examples make no generall rules Neither is it a good course of arguing to reason from the spe∣ciall, or a singular, to the generall, and vniversall: Much lesse from one extraordinary act or event, to all ordinary courses of the same kinde. Herein is the difference betweene the one, and the other

That the one could not but fall certainly, were it never so often cast, whereas the other, cast often in the same case, would not certai∣nely fall out still the same.

The assumption vnderstood v∣niversally* 1.5 is true, and the places quoted make good the proofe thereof, as shall be made manifest. First therefore let vs consider the* 1.6 supposed distinction betweene or∣dinary, and extraordinary Lottes Mr. Gataker speaketh of a distinc∣tion, but sheweth not wherein, (touching the Lottes themsel∣ves,) it doth consist. Indeed, tou∣ching themselves, (as they be Lottes,) there is no difference; For in an ordinary, as well as in an ex∣traordinary Lott, the things are by man, of purpose intentionally disposed vnto a variable event, & they are wholy disposed by God vnto this, or vnto that event,

which the vser of a Lott expecteth. If so, then it followeth, That the vse of all Lottes, (as they be Lottes) whether ordinary, or extraordina∣ry, directly, or of it selfe, & in spe∣ciall ma••ner, tendeth to the ad∣vauncing of the Name of God. How? The vse of Lottes attribu∣teth to Gods speciall Providence In the whole, and immediate dis∣posing of the Lott, & In expecting the event- Doth this scarce carry good sence? Is there then no diffe∣rence betweene an ordinary, and extraordinary Lott? The onely difference is the subiect-matter whe∣reabout the Lott is imployed. The subiect-matter of an ordinary Lott, is, by God's allowance, A Controversy to be ended: The subiect-matter of an extraordinary Lott is any other matter, where∣about a Lott is imployed by God's speciall direction; otherwise it is

vnlawfull, as be lusorious, and Divi∣natory Lotts. In regard of which difference onely, Mr. Gatakers Lo∣gique holdeth good, as thus. From the vse of a Lott about an other matter than ending a Controversy and that by God's speciall direc∣tion, it followeth not, that it is law∣full to vse a Lott about any other matter, than ending a Controver∣sy, as gaming, without God's spe∣ciall direction. But Mr. Gataker maketh an other difference to witt, An immediate, and speciall Provi∣dence in an extraordinary Lott, which is not in an ordinary Lott. He doth so; and therefore in his Logique, he cunningly ioyneth a supposed extraordinary Event to a supposed extraordinary Act, & declineth the proofe of an extra∣ordinary act, which rather he should have done, because mine argument standeth vpon the Vse

of Lottes. Neither doth he found∣ly proove an immediate, and spe∣ciall Providence, or extraordinary event, to be in an extraordinary, and not in an ordinary Lott. For, as it is a tempting of God to cast an extraordinary Lott the first time without God's speciall di∣rection, pag. 313. so it is a temp∣ting, yea, a greater tempting of God, when he hath given his iudg∣mentalready by the event of the Lott, to cast the Lott againe with∣out his speciall direction. How then can Mr. Gataker so confidently affirme, that an extraordinary Lot could not but fall certainly, were it never so oft cast? Indeed, The certaine event of an extraordina∣ry Lot may, in faith, be expected, because of Gods speciall direction. And why not so in an ordinary Lott? Seeing God adviseth vs, pag. ••35. to vse Lottes for the ending

of controversies. Prov. 18. 18. and assureth vs that the whole dispo∣sing of them is of him, Prov. 16. 33. But Mr. Gataker hath answered this place before. Let vs then consi∣der what he hath answered. Before he saith, pag. 144. Good Authours expound this place of singular, ex∣traordinary, and miraculous Lot∣tes onely. But (saith he) the wor∣des seeme to be more generall, and are, word for word, thus in the Originall, [The Lord is cast into the Lappe, but every iudgment, or disposing of it, is of God.] Doth not confu∣ting them, who holde onely extraordinary Lottes to be meant in this place, and transla∣ting the Text [Every iudgment] and expounding it, [Or disposing of it,] shew plainely that this place prooveth mine Assumption to be vniversally true? So that I much mervaile that he denieth

this place to prooue mine Assump∣tion, because it concerneth Lottes in generall. For if it doe so, then it prooveth that ordinary, as well as extraordinary Lottes tend to the advauncing of the Name of God. Againe pag. 145. Mr. Gataker taking the wordes, as they are v∣sually read in the Genevatranslation, and the King's edition, to witt, [The Lott is cast into the lappe, but the whole disposition, or disposing thereof is of the Lord,] graunteth that the whole event is of God. A graunt though true, yet turning the reader aside from seeing the whole truth. For the Text is, [The whole disposing of the Lott cast into the lappe.] If then the Lot cast into the lap, that is, of purpos•• disposed by man vnto a variable e∣vent, be wholy disposed by God, so, as the event be that, which plea∣seth him, then God doth not media∣tely dispose the Lot to this, or that

event, if not mediately, then imme∣mediately, because the whole dispo∣sing is of him. Doth not then this place make good mine Assump∣tion? But for all this Mr. Gataker will not have it so; For as he transla∣teth this place, he saith It impor∣teth thus much, [That there is a Providence in all things, even the least, and most casuall] and this he would confirme by theis my wor∣des, viz: [The disposing{is} of the chaunce is secret, that it might be chaunce indeed, & wholy of God, who directed all things.] Doe theis wordes iustifie Mr. Gatakers inter∣pretation of this place? Yes; For they say plainely, God directed all things, and, they say withall; The disposing of the chaunce (that is of the things purposedly disposed by a man vnto a variable event) vnto a certaine event, is secret, that it may be chaunce indeed, that

is, an event not by the will of man, but wholy of God. So that my wordes imply this argument. God directeth all things, Therefore much more, in our discerning, a Lot, the whole disposing whereof is of him. This is farre from saying that this place importeth onely, That there is a Providence in all things. Neither doth Mr. Gatakers translation inferre this imported interpretation. For this discre∣tion. [But] doth so oppose every iudgment, or disposing of it (as he expoundeth Iudgment) to a Lot cast into the lappe, as that Every disposing, is all one with The whole disposing. This place so troubleth Mr. Gataker that from it he would have no more gathered, than that the who∣le event (as of all things, so) of a Lot, is of the Lord. Yet so, as wor∣king by meanes in the most of them, and not implying and imme∣diate

Providence vniversally in them. I neede not examine the meanes, or immediate Providence of all the instances quoted in the margent For here it is impliedly graunted (for he faith not All, but the most of them) that in some things God worketh not by mea∣nes, and that there is an immedia∣te Providence Particularly, for he denieth such a Providence onely, as being universally. Howsoever it be in other things, I thinke it is ma∣nifest to all, that will see, that God, without meanes, and therefore immediately, doth wholy dispose the Lot cast into the lappe vnto this, or that event, what pleaseth him, whereas man disposeth the things onely vnto a variable event. As at cardes, man shuffleth them of purpose to dispose them vnto a variable event: But, by the imme∣diate Providence of God, they are

so shuffled, as that this, or that event followeth. Therefore (with Mr. Gataker favour) any reasonable man may iudge it not senselesse to say (which he doubteth of pa. 147.) that in childrens playes, at Even, and Odde, or at Heades, & Points, there is an immediate Providence, In in∣clining the will of the childe, and guiding his coniecture. Thus we see this place doth confirme mine assumption, and the proofe annex∣ed, Mr. Gatakers interpretation not∣withstanding. But he giveth 2. rea∣sons against an immediate provi∣dence in ordinary Lottes, which* 1.7 are also to be considered. The for∣mer is this. That which agreeth to a thing, as it is such, agreeth ne∣cessarily to ȧll things, that are such. Therefore if there be an imme∣diate Providence in a Lot, as it is casuall, then there is an immediate providence in all thinges, that are

casuall: But the latter is not true; ergo not the former, pag. 143. Why not the latter? if the is Positions be true. That which seemes Chaunce to us, is a certaine Word of God (saith Bernard, But Mr. Gatak. trans∣lateth* 1.8 it, Is as a word of God) ac∣quainting vs with his Will, pag. 17. and In casuall events there is no∣thing guiding them, but God's Pro∣vidence, pag. 22. But suppose that there is not an immediate Provi∣dence in all things, that be casuall, what is that to the purpose? For all things casuall are not such, with a Lott, wherein things are of purpo∣se disposed by man vnto an vncer∣taine event, which things, so dis∣posed by man, are wholy disposed by God vnto a certaine event, this or that; so it is not in all other things, that be casuall. Therefore all other casuall things, and Lotts are not such▪ Neither is it said an

immediate Providence is in a Lot, as it is casuall, but as the Lot being made casuall is wholy disposed by God to this, or that event. So that from Mr▪ Gatakers axiome this argu∣ment may be framed. An imme∣diate Providence, in an extraordi∣nary Lot, is acknowledged by Mr. Gataker as it is a Lot (say I) wholy disposed by God; Therefore an immediate Providence is in an or∣dinary Lot (as it is a Lot) wholy dis∣posed by God. For there is no difference betweene theis sorts of Lotts, (as they be Lotts) and so dis∣posed. For Mr. Gataker hath she∣wed that Prov. 16. 33. speaketh as well of one sort of Lotts, as of ano∣ther. The other argument is this▪ which is the kill-kow. If in every Lott there be necessarily an imme∣diate worke, and Providence of God, then is it in the naturall of man to make God worke imme∣diately

at his pleasure: But to say, that it is in man's power naturally to sett God on working, immedia∣tely, at his pleasure, is absurd. There is not therefore an imme∣diate worke, and Providence of God necessarily in every Lott. Mr. Gataker like an Oratour, seemeth desirous to draw his adversary into hatred by thei wordes [Necessarily, Naturall power, Sett God on wor∣king, At pleasure, To say, and Ab∣surd] Verba dum sint, surdo canit. But hoping better, I aunswering his Logique, deny the Assumption. For it is as much in man's naturall power to set God on worke imme∣diately, in an ordinary, as in an ex∣traordinary Lot. For both God, and man doe respectively as much in the one Lott, as in the other. But an extraordinary Lot is by the speciall direction of God: True; So is an ordinary Lott by God's

speciall advise to ende a contro∣versy. If then every Lot be a set∣ting of our glorious God on wor∣ke, there ought to be prayer, if not by wordes; yet in heart in the vse as well of ordinary, as extraordina∣ry Lotts. If so, then Lotts are not to be vsed in sport. Here then will I proceed to the defence of my second argument, which is this, pag. 150.

* 1.9 We are not to tempt the Al∣mighty* 1.10 by a vaine desire of mani∣festing his power, and speciall Providence: But by vsing Lotts in sport we tempt the Almighty, vai∣nely desiring the manifestation of his speciall Providence in his immediate disposing; Therefore we may not vse Lotts in sport▪ The Assumption (saith Mr. Gata∣ker) they seeme to proove on this wise. To call God to sitt in iudgment, where there is no

necessity so to doe, for the deter∣mining of trifles, is to tempt, nay to mocke God: But by the vse of Lotts in sport, God is called to sitt in iudgment, whe∣re is no necessity, for the deter∣mining of trifles. By the vse of Lotts in sport therefore, we doe tempt, and dishonour God. This argument Mr. Gataker hath from Dan••eus that learned man of reverend memory. To proo∣ve the Assumption whereof, he alleadgeth theis wordes out of my Dialogue. A Lot in the na∣ture thereof doth as necessari∣ly suppose the Providence, and determining presence of God, as an Oath, in the nature there∣of, doth suppose the testifying presence of God, yea so, that, as in an Oath, so in a Lot, prayer is expressed, or to be vn∣derstood.

* 1.11 The Assumption of the maine Argument is not true, but onely in extraordinary Lottes, vsed not with out speciall direction. Yea rather, if a Lot be such as is here said, it is not lawful to vse Lottes in any case whatsoever. Because thereby we require a worke of God's im∣mediate Power, and Providence, and so tempt God. And to speake as the truth is. By this course, and force of this discourse, the onely lawfull vse of a Lot is condemned, & an vnlawfull vse of it is allowed in the roome of it. Againe: An Oath, and a Lot are not alike. The comparison therefore laide be∣tweene them will not holde. For neither is the right of ought in an ordinary Lot, put to the speciall providence, and imediate worke of God, as the truth of the thing testified is in an Oath, put to his Testimony: Neither is there in

every Lot any such solemne invo∣cation of God, as there is in an Oath ever, either expressed, or im∣plied. For the definition of each thing conteineth the whole nature of the thing defined. Now a Lot may be defined without mention of Prayer, as appeareth in the de∣finition thereof in the Dialogue: But so cannot an Oath. There∣fore Prayer is not of the essence of a Lot. Neither doe the places, 1. Sam. 14. 41. Acts 1. 24. (whereof the former was a faithlesse prayer) proove it. They proove onely, that prayer was sometimes vsed before an extraordinary Lot, for an immediate Providence to direct the event of it. Which is not law∣full in ordinary Lotts. For in set∣ting forth tithes, Levit. 27. 32. it was not lawfull to pray God to give a right Lot. In election of offices sacred, or civill prayer

ought to be vsed, yet it followeth not therefore, that Prayer is part of the choise, or that therefore the Election, in the nature thereof, doth necessarily suppose a speciall providence, and determining pre∣sence of God. Lastly, A Lott is not in it selfe an holy thing alwayes, and necessarily, as hath beene shewed, nor indeed was ever any so save extraordinarily. Therefore there is difference betweene Lotts and Oathes. Indeed, Whosoever shall contemne an extraordinary Lot, he shall abuse an holy thing, and Gods Name.

* 1.12 To this long answer I might make a short reply. For whereas Mr. Gatakers maine ground is this. There is no immediate providence of God in an ordinary, as is in an extraordinrry Lot, and therevpon he buildeth theis answeres, The∣refore there is no tempting of God

by vsing Lotts in sport: Therefore no prayer expressed, or to be vn∣derstood is required in ordinary Lotts: and Therefore an ordinary Lot is not an holy thing in it selfe; I might, (referring my selfe to the defence of my former argument,) breifely reply, and say. There is an immediate providence in an or∣dinary Lot. Therefore God is tempted by vsing Lotts in sporte: Therefore Prayer expressed, or to be vnderstood, is required of them who vse an ordinary Lot: and Therefore an ordinary Lot is an holy thing: But something more in replying, will have more savour in reading. Therefore I first mervaile that M. G. forgetteth himselfe in concluding. That all Lotts be vnlawfull, if there be an immediate providence in all Lotts. What? Were extraordinary Lotts vnlawfull too? Nay; He

vnderstandeth an exception of them because they were com∣maunded by God. So I say, ordi∣nary Lotts were advised by God to end controversies. Therefore vsing them, in that case, is no temp∣ting of God. I mervaile also, why Mr. Gataker should so confidently affirme, that, by this course, that is, by maintaining an immediate Pro∣vidence in all Lotts, an vnlawfull vse of a Lott is allowed in the roo∣me of the onely lawfull vse. But I referre the discussing thereof to the defence of my 3. argument▪ Againe, It is to be observed, that he sett's downe a comparison be∣tweene an Oath, and a Lott, which I sett not downe, whereby the minde of the reader may be trou∣bled▪ For I say not, As the Truth of a thing is, by an Oath, put to Gods Testimony: so in an ordina∣ry Lot the R••ght of a thing is put

to Gods immediate Providence. This is that I say, As an Oath, in the nature thereof, suppo••eth the testi∣fying presence of God: so a Lot, in the nature thereof, supposeth the determining presence of God. My reason is, Ending a controversy (I say not, Deciding a Right, for, before dividing the land of Promi∣se by Lot, no tribe, or family could chalenge more Right to one por∣tion, than to another) Ending (I say) a Controversy is, by a Lot re∣ferred to God's determining the same by his whole, or immediate disposing the vncertaine Lot) to a certaine event. It is also to be ob∣served that in the 2. comparison betweene an Oath, and a Lot, tou∣ching Prayer, he saith, Neither is there in every Lot any such so∣lemne invocation. Therefore in some Lot, that is, an extraordinary Lot, because of an immediate Pro∣vidence

to direct the event of it. For the same cause (say I) is prayer to be expressed, or vnder∣stood in the vse of an ordinary Lot too. But (saith Mr. Gataker) Prayer is of the essence of an Oath, and not of a Lott. I have said nothing to the contrary; So that he might have spared his definition of a Lot: But because he taketh a definition (such as it is) out of my Dialogue, I will say somewhat thereto. The Definition (so called) is from Lyrd, viz. To vse Lotts is by a variable event of some sensible thing to determine some doubtfull, or vncertaine matter. How is this matter to be determined indeed? Even by God's whole, or immediate disposing the Lot. Hath God the principall hand in the determination? and Is not then Prayer to be expressed, or vnderstood in a Lot, that is, in the managing by the vsers thereof?

Now then let vs consider the pla∣ces produced to proove it. The former (saith Mr. Gataker) was faithlesse, I say so too, Because that Lot was without any warrant. This (notwithstanding Prayer in this, and the other place) doth shew that God's people beleiving that God doth signifie his iudgment by the whole, or immediate disposing of that Lot, did therefore thinke themselves bound to pray. But both theis Lotts were extraordi∣nary, wherein was an immediate providence of God. Therefore they might well beleive they should pray. True; So all Chris∣tians may, yea and must be∣leive they ought to pray in the vsing ordinary Lotts, because of God's immediate Provi∣dence exercised therein. Nay▪ It was vnlawfull in setting out Tithe. If so▪ Not because

it was an ordinary Lot (If a Lot) but because the Lord expresly said Of all that goeth vnder the rodde the tenth shall be holy. The instance of elec∣tion of offices is besides the pur∣pose- For it is not argued thus. Because Gods people prayed when they vsed a Lot, therefore there is an immediate Providence of God in a Lot: But thus. There is an im∣mediate Providence of God in a Lot, therefore Gods people prayed when they vsed a Lot. If then there be an immediate Providen∣ce of God in a Lot, and in regard thereof, Prayer is to be expressed, or vnderstood in lawfull vse of a Lot, then Praying and Playing, (though they rime well together, yet) runne not well together in the lawfull vse of a Lot. Nay rather it followeth from both That a Lot is not to be vsed but in a case of necessity more, or lesse; and The∣refore

stra••nge (I will not say absurd) is Mr. Gataker his Posi∣tion, pag. 111. to witt, The lesse weighty the matter is wherein a Lot vsed, the lawfuller the Lot is. Except it be prooved, That the lesse weighty the m••tter is, the greater is the necessity of ending the controversy by a Lot. The said Position is more strange because he graunteth, pag. 95. That Prayer specially applyed to the Lot may, (in some case,) be conceived, where the matter is more weighty, and the event of some conse∣quence, as in the choise of a Magistrate. But concerning this also more shall be said in my next Reply. Lastly; It serves my turne that Mr. Gataker ac∣knowledgeth that God's Name, and an Holy thing is abu∣sod whensoever an extraordinary

Lot it contemned, because an im∣mediate Providence of God is therein. For the same cause an or∣dinary Lot is the Name of God and an Holy thing, and the••efore not to be abufed in sport. But Mr. Ga∣taker hath shewen before that a Lot is not, in it selfe, an holy thing. In∣deed; He would have shewen in his 3▪ reason inducing him to allow lusorious Lotts▪ as not evill in themselves, that a Lot is not holy either in it selfe, or by divine insti∣tution. Wherevnto I have already answered somewhat. But having learned more (occasionally) by his further dispute, I will now, for some more satisfaction, answere somewhat more. A Lot (saith Mr▪ Gataker, pag. 132. and 133.) is not holy, either in it selfe, because a Casualty hath no holinesse in it selfe; For then all Casualties should be holy: or By divine institution i••

the Word, sanctifying it to som•• holy vse. I answere breifely. Is an extraordinary Lot the Name of God, an Holy thing in it selfe, be∣cause of God's immediate Provi∣dence therein, and not an ordina∣ry Lot in respect of the same Pro∣vidence? If it be, Then, though all casualties be not holy in themsel∣ves, yet all lawfull Lotts be holy in themselves. So that as ••he Bush that burnt, and wasted not, was holy, when God manifested him∣selfe to Moses in it, pag. 156, so a Lot is holy, because of God's speciall Presence therein. Herein they differ. The Bush was holy but for a time, because God was present in it but for a time: Whereas a Lot is holy from time to time, so oft as it is lawfully vsed, because of God's speciall presence therein from ••ime to time, Therefore Hows••e∣••er sport might have beene made with the Bush the speciall presēce of God be∣••ng remooved, yet ought sport never be mad••

with a Lot, because God's speciall presence is ever therein. Againe; I neede not proove that an ordi∣nary Lot to ende controversies is by divine institution in the word, seeing Mr. Gataker graunteth that God in Prov. 18. 18. adviseth vs to vse it to that ende. But it is not sanctified to an holy vse. I have shewed otherwise. But what then? Is not a Lot therefore alwayes holy in it selfe, as Mr. Gataker saith in this passage? Were all extraor∣dinary Lotts sanctified to holy vses? Yet Mr. Gataker deemeth them all holy in themselves, be∣cause of God's immediate Provi∣dence in them. Why may not I, for the same cause, thinke the same of all ordinary Lotts? And the ra∣ther, because Mr. Gataker saith, pag. ••27.▪ Marriage, being Gods Ordi∣naunce, is holy in it selfe: But (as he acknowledgeth, pag. 1.) a Lot is

Gods Ordinaunce; Therefore, from his graunt, a Lot is holy in it selfe. If then a Lot be holy in it selfe I conclude with Mr. Gataker, pag. 133. It may in no case, with no caution, be made matter of sport. Now then I proceed to my 3. argument, which is this, pag. 166.

* 1.13 Whatsoever God hath sanctified to a proper end is not to be perver∣ted to a worse end: But God hath sanctified Lotts to a proper end, viz: To end Controversies▪ There∣fore man is not to pervert them to a worse, viz: To play, and by play∣ing to get away another mans mo∣ney, which, without controversy is his owne. The Assumption is am∣plified by the like vse of an Oath.

* 1.14 This Argumēt is faulty. But may be mended thus. That which God hath sanctified to some proper vse is not to be applied to any other, especial∣a worse. But God hath sauctifyed

Lotts to this propre vse, to witt, the deciding of Controversies in matters of weight; A Lott there∣fore may not be applied to any other vse, much lesse to a worse. But to aunswere the argument. The Proposition is graunted, if, [To Sanctisie] be vnderstood in a larger sense, as meates are said to be sanctisied, by God's word, for man's food, and The vnbeleiving mate sanctified to the maried be∣leever, and if thereby be also vn∣derstood the sanctification, and ap∣probation of the whole kinde. To the Assumption, and amplification thereof, it is answered. That place, Prov. 18. 18. doth not inioyne tho vse of a Lot; Nor restraineth it to the ending of strife, Much lesse to the ending of great quarrells one∣ly, For, ending strife is but one vse amongst many, Ioshua, 7. 14. Ionas 1. 7. 1. Sam. 14. 42. Levit. 16. 8; 9. So

••ebr. 6. 16. doth not she w that en∣ding a Controversy is the onely lawfull vse of an Oath. For there be other vses of it, As, to give assu∣rance of the performance of Co∣venants, and promises. For, what controversy was there betweene Ionathan, and David to be ended by* 1.15 Oath when they sware either to other?

* 1.16 I would thanke Mr. Gataker for mending mine argument, though there be not any great neede, if he had not put into his Assumption theis wordes [In matters of weight] for his owne purpose, as shall ap∣peare, But to the matter. In mine vnderstanding, and meaning, the Proposition doth sufficiently ex∣presse all that which mooveth Mr. Gataker to graunt it. Well, Then let vs consider his opposition made to the Assumption, and the am∣plification thereof. Doth Mr. Gata∣ker

imply a Lot not be sanctified, because (as he saith now peremp∣torily) it is not inioyned? What! Is Recreation (in generall) inioy∣ned by precpt, if not directly, yet (at least) by iust consequence, as Mr. Gataker in his allowance of luso∣rious Lotts, saith is graunteth by all, pag. 138? and is not so vsefull an Ordinance, as is a Lot, to end Con∣troversies, inioyned by precept ei∣ther directly, or by iust consequen∣ce? Doth God more carefully provide for recreation, than for peace amongst his people? But Mr. Gataker is not so peremptory in an other place, pag. 135. where he saith. The vse of Lotts is not simply com∣maunded, For. Prov. 18. 18. is Ra∣ther a permission than a precept, & Not so much a commaundement as an advise, & counsaile. I will come to an issue. If it will please M. G. to set downe his iust consequence

to proove Recreation inioyned by precept, I will vndertake to sett downe as iust a consequence to proove, that a Lot to end a Contro∣versy is likewise inioyned by pre∣cept. In meane while I cannot be perswaded that our God of peace,* 1.17 who commaundeth vs to seeke pea∣ce, and follow after it, and hath or∣deined a Lot, wherein he is special∣ly present by his immediate provi∣dence, to end controversies, which otherwise cannot be ended conve∣niently, doth leave vs at liberty in that case, to vse, or not to vse a Lot. But suppose the vse of a Lot be not (thus) inioyned, yet doth not Gods counsel (which me thinkes is a cōman∣demēt though it be said of mans con∣sell that it is no commaundement) sanctify it to be vsed to end con∣troversies. This (I thinke) will not be denied: But it is denied That the vse of a Lot is restrained to end

controversies, much lesse great quarrelles onely, and sundry in∣stances are given of vsing Lotts to other endes than to end contro∣versies. But all those Lotts were extraordinary. Therefore, where∣as in the beginning of this answere where he would finde fault with mine argvment, he saith, That the vse of Lotts in play is ever to de∣cide some question, or controver∣sy, though a light one (it is like) yet a question, or controversy truely so tearmed, otherwise it were no Lot. If he meane a Lot in gene∣rall, then (with his favour) he for∣getteth himselfe in saying Lotts, by him quoted were not to end con∣troversies: If he speake of a Lot in play, as being an ordinary Lot, then he faileth in iudgment, In denying that the vse of ordinary Lotts (whereof is the question) is restrai∣ned to end controversies, and The

instances which he giveth being extraordinary Lotts, are not to the point. Besides: The subiect-mat∣ter of an extraordinary Lot being by God's speciall direction, if it be lawfull, there may (happily) be no present controversy. Whereas, the subiect-matter of an ordinary Lot, being something questioned betweene man, & man, there may be a great controversy. I say, May be, For if it be well observed, in an ordinary Lot there is not alwayes a present controversy to be deter∣mined: But alwayes some question to be decided to prevent a con∣troversy. As may appeare by Mr. Gatakers owne wordes, partly here, where he saith [That there must be some question, or controversy, or else it is no Lot,] but more evident∣ly, where he saith: That the Lot v∣sed by the souldiers about Christ his garments, which he truly calleth

a serious divisory Lot, was to pre∣vent all contention, and strife, pag. 176. & 177. Such was the Lot also which was vsed about dividing, the Land of Promise, about which was no present controversy. For God, who would have no controversies, whould have also such things re∣mooved which may cause, or iustly occasion controversies. Therefore Christ expounding the commaun∣dement.* 1.18 Thou shallt not kill, for∣biddeth wordes of provocation. About which ordinary Lot, God, who knoweth how ordinary or common, controversies, and the occasions thereof be, giveth direc∣tion in Prov. 18. 18. That which is said of an ordinary Lot may iustly be also said of an Oath, that the vse of it is sanctified to end controver∣sies by present determination, or prevention. For, as it is true, that Heb. 6. 16. implieth, that Gods Oath

to man is more inviolable, than an Oath from man to man, whereof onely, M. G. taketh knowledge, so it* 1.19 is true, that Heb. 6. 16. intimateth, That, as an Oath, for confirmation, is amongst men an end of all strife▪ so Gods Oath for confirmation of his promise to Abraham, was to put the matter out of doubt, question▪ or controversy▪ Else, theis wordes ▪An end of all strife] were to no purpo∣se. But that they were to the purpo∣se by me vnderstood, appeareth in the 2▪ uext vers. where it is written. That God bound himselfe by Oath as to shew the stablenesse of his Counsell, so that the heires of promise might have strong cousolation. So that Gods Oath to A∣braham tooke away doubting, ques∣tioning, & all strife that might be, not onely in Abrahās minde, but also in the mindes of the heires of promise. Therefore an Oath doth not onely end presēt cōtroversies, according to

M. G. vnderstanding, but confirming a promise▪ or covenant doth also ende a strife, though there be none present, when the Oath is given, to wit, by Prevention. Now let vs somewhat consider Mr. Gatakers pur∣pose in putting into the Assump∣tion, theis wordes▪ [In matters of weight.▪ Forsooth, By denying the the same, to make way for light matters, and consequently for playing with Lottes. Because (as he saith, pag. 130.) they best agree with the nature of Lotts, that is, with vncertaine hazard. Surely, If Mr. Gataker had acknowledged God's speciall presence by his im∣mediate Providence in a Lot, as being a Lot ordained by God, to end controversies, he would not have so written, but deemed weighty matters best agreeing with the nature of a Lot. It is true that a matter of lesse weight in it

selfe may be the subiect-matter of a controversy, as a controversy may be among men, as well meane, as might, yin their state, as Mr. Gata∣ker here saith pa. 137. For by migh∣ty men (as in Gen. 6. 4. so) in Prov. 18. 18. are meant Men strong in their affections, so as the contro∣verfy cannot be well ended with∣out a Lot, whether the subiect-matter of the Controversy be of more, or lesse weight in it selfe; so as there is a necessity that one or both parties be satisfied. For other∣wise there may be a great quarrell about a matter of lesse weight. Neither doe I say, that onely great quarrells are to be ended, or pre∣vented by a Lot, as Mr. Gataker de∣nieth not, but some may. For (as he saith truly, pag. 173.) God spea∣keth in Prov. 18. 18. of contentions in generall. Here then we may enter into further consideration

of that which Mr. Gataker writeth, pag. 135. to wit. That, by the force of our discourse against playing with a Lot, the onely lawfull vse is condemned••, and an vnlawfull vse is allowed in the roome thereof. What is that Onely lawfull vse of a Lot? I can finde none other than The putting of that to a Lot which he calleth (pag. 130.) A matter of mere indifferency, that is, Such as is not materiall, whether a man doe, or omitt: How∣soever there may be a lawfull vse of a Lot about such a matter ques∣tioned to determine, or prevent a Controversy, yet I wonder that Mr. Gataker deemeth it that onely lawfull. Doth not he graunt, pag. 91. That Prayer specially applyed to a Lot may be conceived in weighty matters, as in the choise of a Magistrate, which is not a matter of mere indifferency, that is, such

as is not materiall whether it be done or omitted. Did God spe∣cially appoint Lotts to be vsed a∣bout onely matters of weight? and must man so farre swerve from Gods example as to strive onely about matters of such indifferen∣cy, and then to putt onely such, controverted, to the determina∣tion of a Lot? So that I doubt not but that with found iudgment, and a cleare conscience not accusing me of not duely respecting the speciall Providence, of God by his immediate disposing of a Lot, I may affirme. That the more weigh∣ty the subiect-matter of a contro∣versy is, the more iustifiable is the Controversy: and Be that matter of more or lesse weight, the grea∣ter the necessity of ending a Con∣troversy is, the more iustifiable is the vse of a Lot. Is not then play∣ing with a Lot an irreligious abu∣sing

of Gods Ordinance? But (faith Mr. Gataker glad of any thing to pleade for playing with a Lot.) The vse of a Lot in play is ever to decide some question, or contro∣versy truely so tearmed. If so, Then he might have called it a serious Lot, according to his doctrine, the lightnesse of the subiect-matter controverted, notwithstanding. But whereabout is that supposed Controversy? Mr. Gataker in his written answere to my Dialogue, before mentioned, sayth. The Controversy tendeth to Victory, which till it be decided, there is a Controversy though a light one, yet a Controversy, truely so tear∣med. But is that truely or worthi∣ly to be called A Victory, which falleth out by hap-hazard (accor∣ding to M. Gatakers esteeming a Lot) without any desert? But (say I) Is it not a tempting of God to put

him, by his immediate Providence in disposing the Lot, to humour (I say not, honour) some of the vaine glorious fooles with suppo∣sed Victory, who make a preten∣ded controversy there-about, whereas (before they intended to play with a Lot) there was none in∣deed? Is this a Controversy truly so tearmed? I need say no more, and therefore proceed to the last argumēt (whereof, but part is mine) It is this, pag. 173.

That, which there is neither precept for, nor practise of, in Gods* 1.20 word, generall, or speciall, expres∣sed or implied, that there is no warrant for in the word: But such is the vse of Lotts in game. For we reade in Scripture that Lotts were vsed, but in serious matters one∣ly, both by Iewes, and Gentiles; Nei∣ther is there any warrant in the Word for the ludicrous vse of

them, by precept, or practise, ge∣nerall, or speciall, expressed, or im∣plied, There is no warrant there∣fore for lusorious Lotts in Gods word.

* 1.21 The Proposition is vnsound. For an argument holdeth (indeed) from the Negative in matters of Faith, but not in matters of Fact. Mnch lesse may a man reason from a matter of Fact, to a matter of Right negatively. For many things are of ordinary vse, whereof there is no mention at all in Gods Word, which yet all generally allow, as* 1.22 sugar for sweetning, &c. Secondly; An action may have warrant suffi∣ciently by permission, without pre∣cept, or practise. For where God hath not limited the vse of any creature, or Ordinance, there he hath left the vse of it free: Where he hath not determined the Cir∣cumstances of any action, there,

what he hath not prohibited, that he hath permitted. For this cause,* 1.23 in the point of Gods worship, the argument holdeth from the Nega∣tive, for the substance of it. Be∣cause God hath determined it: But in civil affaires, it will not holde from the Negative to disallow ought, because God hath not de∣termined them.

* 1.24 Mr. Gataker in his booke sheweth many instances of Lotts vsed both by Iewes, and Gentiles, and all in se∣rious matters. Which intimateth to me, that they, by the light not onely of the Word, but of nature too, discerned, that Lotts are to be vsed onely in serious matters. O let vs take heed how we put out so great light. But let vs consider his answere, which is onely to the Pro∣position, though I have already confuted many principall parts thereof. In my Dialogue to shew

that the Spirit sometime reasoneth from a matter of Fact to a matter of right, negatively, I quote theis Scriptures, Iohn 8. 39. 40. 1. Cor. 11. 16. The wordes of the former be theis, Yee goe about to kill me, a man that hath tolde you the truth; This did not Abraham. The argument is this Abraham did not kill any that tolde him the truth, Therefore yee ought not goe about to kill me, if yee would be sonnes of Abraham. This is Christ his Logicke, where∣with I dare finde no fault: Neither doth Mr. Gataker. For he saith no∣thing to it, because the Printer put∣teth for vers. 40. the 48. vers. whe∣rewith Mr. Gataker maketh pastime, but I will let passe time now to take further knowledge of it. Of the other quotation the wordes be theis. We have no such custome, nor the Churches of God. The consequent implied is. Therefore nomen ought

not to pray vncovered. Herevnto Mr. Gataker answereth indeed, but so, that he doth not deny that Paul argueth negatively from a matter of Fact to a matter of Right. Which is all that I intended by the quota∣tion, and not, to imagine this argu∣ment. The Churches of God, and faithfull men doe not vse Lotts in gaming▪ Therefore such gaming is vnlawfull. So that I neede not herein reply vpon Mr. Gataker, I onely wonder that he saith. The vse of Lotts in games hath beene common in the Churches of God. What! In the publicke Assemblies? as was the fault of women their heads vncovered in the Church at Corinth? But Mr. Gataker in this answer speaketh of things merely naturall, or civill, as sweetning with sugar, &c. I will not now in∣deavour to proove that in the Word there is matter of iust conse∣quence

either generall, or implied (which is a part of the proposition) to allow as well sweetning with sugar, &c. as Recreation in gene∣rall, and therefore they may be lawfull though they be not men∣tioned in the Word. But suppose M. Gatakers axiome holdeth in them, what is that to Lotts, wherein is the Name of God by his immedia∣te providence, and the vse whereof is limited to ende serious contro∣versies? In regard whereof doubt I not but an argument concerning the vse of them, may holde from the Negative in matter of Fact, as well as in matter of Faith, or of the point of Gods worship for the sub∣stance of it. For I presume that as Abraham would not, if he had had occasion, as he did not, kill a man that tolde him the truth: so that all who feared God, and knew the nature, and vse of a Lot, would not,

as they did not, vse a Lot in game. Secondly. Why may not there be for* 1.25 a thing permitted, some precept in the Word, generall, or implied? The permission of any thing must be in the Word, either expresse or by iust consequence, and then the thing so permitted is indifferent. But Mr. Gataker reconsileth theis two axiomes [Every action is indiffe∣rent,] & [No action is indifferent,] thus, Every naked and bare action sim∣ply conceived, is indifferent: But, No action cladde with his particu∣lar circumstances, is indifferent, pag. 94. So that, he concludeth it to be most true, That no particu∣lar morall action, or No action of the reasonable creature, procee∣ding from reason, can possibly be so indifferent, but it must of neces∣sity, be either conformable to the rules of Gods holy word, or dis∣conformable therevnto, pag. 95.

Theis things, especially theis wor∣des (Rules of Gods Word, conside∣red,) I may say, that howsoever a naked indifferent thing be by per∣mission, yet a clothed indifferent thing, if lawfull, is by precept, or rule, as well as Mr. Gataker saith, Re∣creation in generall, is both by permission, and by precept, if not expresly, yet by iust consequence pag. 138. Doth then Mr. Gataker make permission a iust exception against the Proposition? Touching his proofe that Permission is a suf∣ficient* 1.26 warrant: I first would know what ordinance of God that is, which hath not some limited, or appointed vse thereof. I am sure, and have shewed, that Gods ordi∣nance* 1.27 touching a Lot, hath. Secondly, I greive to observe what a gappe Mr. Gataker hath, by this doctrine, opened to Licentiousnesse. What! may man disposed to finne, imploy

any creature, whose vfe God hath not limited, to what vse he will? No; For here is to be vnderstood that exception which is expressed in the next part of the reason tou∣ching circumstances, viz [Any vse, but that which is prohibited] How∣soever I could demurre the revpon, especially if an expresse prohibi∣tion be vnderstood, yet herein I will be silent having enough graun∣ted me. For the vse of Lotts in game is prohibited by iust conse∣quences, as I have demonstrated. For the better vnderstanding of the 2. part of the reason, (hasting to an end) I onely desire an answere to this question. Is any vse of a Lot lawfull where the circumstan∣ces of Time, Place, and Persons be not determined? If Mr. Gataker except an extraordinary vse, I may as well except the lusorious vse of Lotts, In answere to the exemplification

of this reason, graunting that an argument holdeth from the Nega∣tive for the substance of Gods Worshippe, I yet make this Quaere. Whether, onely because God hath determined it? For in those places of Ieremy, God doth blame his peo∣ple onely for vsing a worship [which he commaunded not], wit∣hout any intimation that he pres∣cribed his owne worship. To the same purpose writeth Paul to the Colossians against traditions of men, and will-worship, not for Mr. Gata∣kers cause, but because in so wors∣hipping they held not the Head, ver. 19. which is Christ, King of his Church teaching, and governing the same in all things. But in Deut. Mr. Gatakers cause is implied. It is true, that there God forbiddeth his people to inquire how other na∣tions served their Gods, and sen∣deth them to his word to observe

the same, without putting anything to, or taking out from the same. Surely, I should not gather from hence Mr. Gatakers cause, as being the onely cause; Because I feare it would incourage Papists in their superstitious rites, and ceremonies called Circumstances, though, in∣deed, parts of the substance of Gods outward worship. For they are to ready to take holde thereof and say God hath determined no∣thing touching theis supposed Cir∣cumstances, & they are not against the word of God, therefore they are permitted, and so warranted. But I should gather from that, and the other places (I thinke directly, and not auckwardly) this conclu∣sion. Because all things in, & vnto the service of God ought to be precisely according to Gods Will revealed in his word, therefore whatsoever is not commaunded

ought not to be. And the rather (God being jealous) because of th•• meaning of the fringes vpon the* 1.28 Israëlites their garments, to witt, Tha•• yee may remember all the Commaunde▪ments of the Lord, and doe them, and that yee seeke not after your owne heart, nor, af∣ter your owne eyes, after which yee goe •• whoring. To the last I answere. That a Lot is no more a Civill af∣faire, than is an Oath, though it, (as is an Oath,) be vsed in Civill affai∣res. And lastly, I affirme againe, that God hath determined the vse of a Lot to determine contro∣versies, so as, without Gods speciall appointment, (which is not now to be expected,) it cannot be lawfully vsed to any other purpose; There∣fore an argument from the Nega∣tive will holde by Mr. Gatakers rule, to disallow the vse of any other Lot, as well lusorious, as divinato∣ry. Thus having answered Mr. Ga∣takers

reasons inducing him to allow Lusorious Lotts as not evill in themselves, and remooved Mr. Ga∣takers answeres to mine arguments, I may more confidently holde mine opinion, which Mr. Dudley Fen∣nor (of reverend memory) his godly treatise of Recreations hath taught me▪ to witt, That Tables, and Cardes, as well as Dice, and all other games consisting in cha••nce, (wherein there is vse of a Lot) are vtterly vnl••wfull.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Dialog.
• * 1.2

  Mal. 6. 7 Exo. 20. 7. Isa. 29. 13. Ier. 4. 2. Prov. 16 33.
• * 1.3

  Acts. 1. 14. 26.
• * 1.4

  Aunsw. pa. 149.
• * 1.5

  Reply 1.
• * 1.6

  1.
• * 1.7

  1.
• * 1.8

  Sermo quidam
• * 1.9

  Dialog.
• * 1.10

  Psal. 78. 18. ••9. Isa. 7. 12 Math. 4. 6. 7.
• * 1.11

  Aunsw.
• * 1.12

  Reply 2.
• * 1.13

  Dialog. Mat. 21. 12. 13. Numb. 26. 5••. Prov. 18. 18. Heb: 6▪ 16.
• * 1.14

  Auns••.
• * 1.15

  1. Sam. 20. 16. 17. 42.
• * 1.16

  Reply ••.
• * 1.17

  Psal. 34▪ 14.
• * 1.18

  Math. 5. 21. 22.
• * 1.19

  pa, 17••.
• * 1.20

  Dial. 4▪
• * 1.21

  Aunsw.
• * 1.22

  2.
• * 1.23

  Ier. 7. 31 & 19. 5. Col. 2. 22 23. Deu. 12 30. 31. 32
• * 1.24

  Reply 4.
• * 1.25

  2.
• * 1.26

  1.
• * 1.27

  ••.
• * 1.28

  Exo. 20. 5. Num. 15 39.