A modest reply to certaine answeres, which Mr. Gataker B.D. in his treatise of the nature, & vse of lotts, giveth to arguments in a dialogue concerning the vnlawfulnes of games consisting in chance And aunsweres to his reasons allowing lusorious lotts, as not evill in themselves. By Iames Balmford, minister of Iesus Christ.

An Answere to Reasons in∣ducing M. Gataker to allow lu∣sorious Lottes, as not evill in themselves, Lib. 6. § 4.

THIS Tenent seemeth to me more fearefull▪ then beseemeth a lear∣ned man, who, after the turning over a wō∣derfull n umber of bookes to com∣pile his Historicall, and Theologi∣call Treatise of the Nature, and Vse of Lotres, setteth downe his judgment. Allowing lusorious Lottes onely as not evill in themselves, whereas he affirmeth them to be lawfull in themselves, pag. 266. So that if theis games be vsed with

due observation of all his cautions, why is he fearefull to allow them as good in themselves? How then may a scrupulous man, who remem∣breth* 1.1 not onely his wicked wicked wayes, but his deedes also that are not good, build vpon such quagmiry grounds? Againe; Allowing theis games onely as not evill in themselves doth not manifest that Love of God, which (I doubt not) is in Mr. Gatakers heart. For whereas God is glorified by good workes,* 1.2 and theis games be too too com∣mon, and accompanied with many crying sinnes, whereby God is every where, and dayly much dis∣honoured, the Love of God would have constrained him, if doing* 1.3 truth, to haue brought theis games to the light, that thereby it might be made manifest, that they are wrought according to God. Last∣ly; By this Tenent he sheweth

not due Charity to his neighbour. For now it is enoug for Gamesters to pleade; A very learned man holdeth our Gaming to be not evill in it selfe. The∣refore they will not seeke, further to know, whither it be good in it selfe, forgetting that it is writen▪* 1.4 [The axe is putt to the roote of the trees, therefore every tree which bringeth not forth good fruite▪ is hewen downe, and cast into the fire.] Is not then hereby his neighbour's spirituall daunger oc∣casioned? But here (perhappes) it may be said, The first Reason, prooving that a Lott may be mat∣ter of Recreation, doth give me a checke: It is a checke? Then I will try if I cannot avoide the Mate. The Argument, collected with all faith∣fulnes, (as the rest, and his aun∣sweres be,) is this.

* 1.5 That which may be ordinarily vsed in other Civill affaires, be they

more or lesse weighty, may also be vsed for matter of recreation, and delight: But a Lott may be ordina∣rily vsed in other Civill affaires. Therefore I see not what should banish it out of our disportes, more than out of other (though serious yet) Civill affaires.

* 1.6 Is not this a fearefull conclusion like the Tenent? Why doth not Mr. Gataker conclude positively thus. Therefore a Lott may be v∣sed for matter of recreation, and delighte. He (forsooth) see's not. Can a blinde man goe stoutly on his way? But (blessed be God) Mr. Gataker seeth well, though not in this point. Bernardus non vidit omnia. For, if God had opened his eyes in this point, he might have seene plainely what should banish a Lott out of disportes, more than out of other Civill affaires. To witt, Be∣cause God alloweth a Lott to be v∣sed

in them, but not in theis; and It is praesumption, of sett purpose, to imploy God but as it may stand with his pleasure. Hereof more hereafter. In meane while, in fur∣ther aunswer to this argument I deny the Proposition thereof. For an Oath may be ordinarily v∣sed in other Civill matters, yet not for matter of Recreation: Whereof also more hereafter. Now I pro∣ceed to the 2. reason, which is sett downe in twoo shapes; The for∣mer is this.

* 1.7 That which best sorteth with the nature of a Lott, may a Lott most lawfully be vsed vnto: But the lightest matters best sort with the nature of a Lott: Therefore about things of that nature may a Lott most lawfully be vsed. The Pro∣position he prooveth thus. Great is the vncertainty of a Lott. The∣refore not fitt to be vsed in any

weighty affaire.

* 1.8 A Lott is sometimes taken for the instrument of purpose dispo∣sed vnto casualty, as [The Lott is cast* 1.9 into the lappe:] and sometime for the event, as, [Give a perfect Lott] Which, howsoever it be casuall in relation to the former, yet, falleth out certainely this, or that, by God's whole disposing the former, Prov. 16. 33. I therefore deny both the Proposition, and Assumption perswaded that Mr. Gataker would never have sett downe this suppo∣sed reason, if a Lott, in the former acception, had not drawne his religious eye from God as the onely disposer thereof to be a Lott in the latter acception. So that I mervaile much, that he findeth a Lott to be not fitt to be vsed in any weighty affaire. For why? Dividing the Land of promise, Numb. 26. 55. by Lott.

Discovering Achan. Iohs. 14. Chusing of a king. 1. Sam. 10. 20. 81. and of an Apo∣stle Acts: 1. 26. were they not weigh∣ty affaires? Nay rather the premi∣ses considered, a Lott may more lawfully be vsed about weighty af∣faires. But indeed▪ whether the subiect matter be more or lesse weighty, a Lott may be vsed about it, provided it be with Gods allow∣ance. For want whereof both Di∣vinatory, and Lusorious Lotts be equally vnlawfull. The other shape of his reason, more particu∣larly (as he saith) for the present buisinesse is this.

* 1.10 A matter of mere indifferency, that is, such as a man may lawfully doe, or not doe, and it is not mate∣riall whether he doe, or omitt, such may a man lawfully putt to the ha∣zard of the vncertaine motion of the Creature, whether he shall doe it, or not doe it▪ But the vsing of

a Lott in game is but the putting of a matter of mere indifferency to the hazard of an vncertaine e∣vent. Therefore the putting of such matters to the hazard of a Lott, is not evill simply in it selfe.

* 1.11 What a trembling argument is this? In the Proposition he spea∣keth of a Lott in the former accep∣tion. In the Assumption, of a Lott in the latter acception. Indeed a man may be bolder with the Crea∣ture, so it be without relation to God, than with the Creatour him∣selfe. In the Proposition he affir∣meth lawfullnes but concludeth onely, as not evill simply in them∣selves. Indeed, the conclusion is to follow the worse part: But in this Argument the Assumption is particular, and the Conclusion is generall▪ What? Is Mr. Gataker af∣fraid to put (The vsing of a Lott in game) into the conclusion? is not

the Minor to be the Subiect, and the Maior to be the Praedicate of the Conclusion? I will not quaestion the Figure of this praetended argu∣ment if Sub: prae: prima: will serve the turne; and though I finde it in no Moode, yet will I answer the two fore-pieces thereof. The former is not true, except Mr. Gataker vnder∣stand a matter of mere indifferency controverted. For though such a matter may be the subiect matter of a Controversy, yet a matter controverted is the onely subiect matter of a Lott, otherwise it is no Lott, as Mr. Gataker truely writeth even in this case, pag. 167. If Mr. Ga∣taker so vnderstand, then there is some necessity of ending the con∣troyersy putt to the determina∣tion of a Lott, and consequently it is not then merely in the wiil of a man whether he shall doe it, or no doe it. In the other piece I obser∣ve,

that Mr. Gataker speaking of a Lot in the second acception, sup∣poseth it to be vncertaine. Which is begging the question, for the reason given in mine aunswere to his former shaped argument. Nei∣ther it is true that if in game, a con∣troversy (truly so termed) be deci∣ded by a Lot, a matter then of mere indifferency is put to hazard. But more hereof in my 3. reply. In meane while, consider whether this 2. shape be more particularly for the present businesse, so as to con∣clude the question, than the for∣mer; and Note, that in both theis shapes, onely Lightnes, and indiffe∣rency of matters putt to Lottery are pressed as causes most iustifying a Lot, yea so, as that in the confir∣mation of his former shaped argu∣ments proposition, he positively affirmeth that we shall finde a Lott not fitt to be vsed in a weighty af∣faire▪

If so, then Weightnesse, and Necessity of matters controverted make Lottery lesse lawfull, if not altogether vnlawfull. But thereof also more in that reply. I there∣fore proceed to his 3. reason pag. 131. Which is this.

* 1.12 If the vse of Lotts in game be of it selfe evill, then must it needs be a sinne either against Piety in the first table, or ag: Charity in the 2. But the vse of Lottes in game, is not of it selfe, a sinne against either Piety, or Charity. Therefore it must be iusti∣fied as agreeable to Gods Word. The Assumption is prooved thus▪ No man avoweth the vse of a Lot in game, (as it is a Lott) to be a∣gainst Charity: and A Lusorious Lot is not the prophaning of any thing hallowed, by any divine institution from the Word, to an holy Vse. Therefore not against Piety. In∣deed, if Lottes be holy, they may

in no case be made matter of sport.

* 1.13 Here I observe one of the faults which I found in the latter shape of the 2. reason to witt▪ The con∣clusion conteineth more than the premisses. For the Conclusion saith A Lot in game is agreeable to Gods Word, and then it must be [Good of it selfe,] which is more, than [Not evill of it selfe.] For that is good of it selfe, for doing whereof there is either praecept, or permission in Gods word, pag. 137. But to the Assumption, an d proofe thereof I answere, That the vse of a Lott in game is, (of it selfe), a sinne against Piety. For it profaneth a Lot hal∣lowed by divine institution from the Word, as shall be manifested hereafter. Yet here I thinke fitt breifely to shew 2. things. One is,* 1.14 That an Oath is hallowed to mak•• an holy vse of the testifying presence

of God, So a Lot is hallowed to make an holy vse of the determining presence of God. If Mr. Gataker deny a Lott to be holy, except it have a more remote holy vse, I say He may as well deny an Oath to be holy for that cause. More of* 1.15 this point in my 2. reply. The other is, That vse of a Lott is against Piety, which is (I say not, [Not forbidden] but) [Not warranted] by the Word. For it is without faith, therefore a* 1.16 sinne, yea Impiety. So disputeth Mr. Gataker against a Divinatory Lott, pag. 313. and so doe I against a Lusorions Lot. If then a lawfull Lott be holy, it is (saith Mr. Gataker) in no case to be made matter of sport. Nay, I may make yet more advantage. For I may say; That maintaining the vse thereof in ga∣ming, as it is a Lott, by practise, much more by writing, is against Charity, as well as against Piety. For

so [a weake brother is offended, and con∣••equently Christ sinned against] that brother being occasioned, by er∣rour of iudgment, to stumble. I have this reasoning from Mr. Gata∣ker himselfe, pag. 255. Now then with some comfort I proceed to the 4. argument, as Mr. Gataker cal∣leth it, pag. 134.

* 1.17 By vertue of Christian liberty, every Christian man hath a free vse of all Gods good creatures, to im∣ploy them vnto such purposes, as by any naturall power, they are inabled vnto: But in lusorious Lottes the Creature is vsed to no other ende or vse, but what it hath a naturall power vnto, and such as by the mutuall consent, and agree∣ment of those that vse it, it may be enabled to effect. Therefore it's no more to be exiled from a Chris∣tian man's recratiō, than any other creature whatsoever, that hath any

power to delight.

* 1.18 So generall & eager is the pur∣suite after Liberty in this licen∣tious age, that a godly, and charita∣ble Christian, (much more being a minister), ought to take great heede, that he occasion not any* 1.19 much lesse too too many, to make Liberty a cloake of Naughtinesse▪ But Mr. Gataker speaketh of Chris∣tian liberty, not of Licentiousnesse▪ Then let vs consider what he saith▪ For both the premisses of this ar∣gument are flatly to be denied▪ For sundry good Creatures have a naturall power to impoison; But Christian Liberty giveth vs not free vse thereof to impoison a•• pleasure. Neither is it true that any creature hath a naturall power to be a Lott, no more than a stone hath a naturall power to be carried vpward. For as a stone is carried vpward by a power; that is without

it: so all creatures are mooved, & applied to be Lotts by a power without them. God keepe me from teaching that Christian Li∣berty warranteth the vnlawfull vse of any Creature, what naturall power soever it hath to that vse. If any creature have any power to be a Lot, yet that power is not to be vsed vnto Lottery, but in cases (whereof gameing is none) where∣in God alloweth such vse thereof. To the inforcing of the conclusion by a supposed confirmation of the Assumption, I say, It is a beg∣ging of the question. For though a dog having a naturall power to hunt, be not exiled from recreatiō yet ought a Lot-creature to be, for reasons given, and to be given, or rather defended hereafter. Now then to a 5. argument A concessis, (as Mr. Gataker tearmeth it,) pag. 135.

* 1.20 Any thing in different is lawfull matter of recreation: But Lottery is a thing indiffertnt; Lottery the∣refore may be made lawfull matter of disport. The Proposition is con∣firmed by the wordes of M. Fennor. Christian (saith he) recreation is the exercise of some thing indifferent for the necessary refreshing of body, or minde. The Assumption is also proved by Mr. Fennor. Indifferent in nature is that, which is left free, so as we are not simply commaunded, or for∣bidden to vse it: But such is Lot∣tery (saith Mr. Gataker) Not sim∣ply commaunded. For Prov. 18. 18. is rather a permission than a praecept, or, Not so much a Commaundement as an advise commending that as a prudent course; Nor any where forbidden as evill in it selfe.

* 1.21 Mr. Fennor's booke, from whence theis allegations be drawne, and from whence I learned that

Lottes may not be vsed in sport, doth proove that lusorious Lottes are forbidden, and therefore not indifferent. What helpe then hath Mr. Gataker from Mr. Fenners grauntes? and his owne proofes helpe him as little. For it is graun∣ted, that if Lottery be either commaunded, or forbidden, it is not indifferent, to passe by the former, onely observing that Mr, Gataker doth not absolutely deny it to be commaunded, Prov. 18. 18. I come to the other. I might here referre the Reader to my Dialogue, and to my Re∣ply, by which it will appeare evi∣dently, that a Lusorious Lott is forbidden, and therefore not in∣different. But to speake a little more (generally) of things not in∣different, because forbidden, I say, That is forbidden as well which is forbidd••̄ by iust cōsequence, as that

which is expresly forbidden: As that is permitted as well which is per∣mitted by iust consequence as that which is expressely permitted. Mr. Gataker affirmeth, the latter, pa▪ 137. and will not (I dare fay) deny the former. Againe, The Word of God is so perfect, that whatsoe∣ver it neither commaundeth, nor permitteth expressely, or by iust consequence, that is verily forbid∣den. For all things especially such as have relation to God, ought to have some warrant from the word. If Mr. Gataker putt me to proove this, I dare vndertake to proove it demonstratively. But I presume he will not. For, in the last men∣tioned page, he describeth that to be indifferent, which is (at least) per∣mitted by the Word. If a thing be not so much as permitted, it can∣not be lawfull, and therefore not in̄different. Here I wish he would

remember what he writeth pag. 95. Speaking of this word [Indifferent,] ••s it is opposed to good, or evill, & ••he wing how some say, that to be ••ndifferent which is neither good, ••or evill, he determineth the point ••hus. Neverthelesse most true it is, That ••o particular morall action, or No action ••f the reasonable Creature proceeding ••rom reason, can possibly be so indifferent, ••ut it must of necessity be either confor∣••able to the rules of Gods holy Word, or ••isconformable therevnto. So that I ••onder, why Mr. G. should say ••ere, Lottery in game is not any ••here forbidden as evill in it selfe. ••s it not evill, if forbidden, except •• be otherwise evill of it selfe? ••hat is good of it selfe which is ••ither commaunded, or permitted, ••ag, 137. Therefore that is evill of •• selfe which is forbidden. It grei∣••eth my soule to see what a wide ••ore to lusorious Lottery this

doctrine will make. For now Lot∣mongers will choppe Logicke, and say, What if a lusorious Lotte be forbidden by iust consequence, ye•• they are not forbidden as evill in themselves, and therefore they are indifferent. Now to come to Mr. Gatakers last reason, which, like an Oratour, he amplifieth to leave a deepe impression behinde. Bu•• let it be well considered, as in i•• selfe, so whether it proove that th•• vse of Lottes in game is not agaia•••• Gods worde, but hath sufficient warrant from it, as he pretendeth in his introduction, pag. 136. It is this.

* 1.22 Where the Wisdome of God, hath not determined the subiect matter, the manner, and other Cir∣cumstances of a thing lawfull in it selfe, there all such are lawfull, a•• the Word doth not forbid, and a•• no Circumstance that a man shall

make choice of, shall be against the generall rules of the word concer∣ning the same: But a Lott is a thing lawfull in it selfe, and the subiect∣matter, manner, & other Circum∣stances thereof are not determined by Gods Word, nor against the ge∣nerall rules. Therefore a Lott in game is not prohibited, nor is a∣gainst the generall rules of Gods Word otherwise. The Proposition he confirmeth. First, touching a thing lawfull in it selfe, by shewing* 1.23 that act to be lawfull in it selfe, which in Gods word, is either com∣maunded, or permitted expresse∣ly, or by iust consequence. Secondly, touching the manner &c. by proo∣ving* 1.24 the rest of the Proposition; which he indeavoureth to perfor∣me. (1.) By the Authority of Calvin. (2.) By Luke: 9. 50. (3.) By a glosse (4.) By shewing that the circumstance of time for free will

offerings being not determined, they might have beene offered at at any time, and Sacrifices might have beene in any place before a certaine place was determined* 1.25 Thirdly, touching both the doing o•• every act, & the doing of it in this or that manner, by shewing that i•• naturall reason will not, of it selfe affoard sufficient direction, the•• must warrant be had out of God••* 1.26 Word, because, Whatsoever is not o Faith is sinne. Which Word is give•• vs in morall matters to supply th•• defect of it caused by our first pa∣rents their fall. Neither doth th•• Word abridge vs of the helpe, an•• vse of naturall reason for directio•• in such actions. The Assumptio•• is thus prooved. Recreation, i•• generall, is warranted from th•• Word as permitted, and inioined▪ if not expressely, yet by iust conse∣quence. For the matter or man∣ner,

or the thinges wherewith we may recreate our selves, there is nothing determined. Therefore any meanes that are not against the generall rules Of comelines, and decency, Rom. 13. 13. 1. Cor. 14. 40. Of conveniency, and expediency, 1. Cor. 6. 12. and 10. 23. Rom. 14. 21. Of Religion, and Piety, 1. Cor. 10. 31. Colos. 3. 17. and the like, are by the Word of God allowed.

* 1.27 I might, as did Alexander, loose Gordian's knott with one choppe, and say, The vse of Lottes in game is forbidden in the Word, referring my selfe to what I have, and shall write. But for better satisfaction, I will answere more particularly, not doubting, but that the Prover∣be may (now) proove true, viz: In many wordes there cannot want iniqui∣ty.* 1.28 First, I observe fearefull shifting,* 1.29 and then vnsound arguing. The former thus appeareth, He suppo∣seth

the thing must be lawfull in it selfe, and disputeth onely about the subiect-matter, &c. Againe, In the introduction he saith. Th'vse of Lottes in game is not against God's Word, but hath sufficient warrant from it, which may imply this position. [That is against the Word, which hath not sufficient warrant from it.] But in the Pro∣position of the maine argument his ground is; [Such things are law∣full, which the Word doth not for∣bid.] Fower of his confirmations, and his Assumption are to that effect, or rather defect, and his conclusion is answereable: Is not this a fearefull shifting course of reasoning? Now let vs consider his vnsound ar∣guing. Touching the Proposition of his maine argument, I mervaile why Mr. Gataker avouching such subiect-matter &c. to be lawfull as are not forbidden, limiteth this

assertion with theis wordes (Of a thing lawfull in it selfe) As if such a thing may warrant our retchles∣nesse in, and about the subiect-mat∣ter &c. As if God doth not, accor∣ding to the olde saying, [Loue Ad∣verbes] An Oath is a thing lawfull in it selfe; Are not we therefore to make conscience, that the subiect-matter, &c. be agreable to the Word of God? But I mervaile much more at this gronnd. [Such things are lawfull, as the Word doth not forbid.] I set it downe thus, becau∣se the confirmations tend to make this good, and so conclude. All things not prohibited are permit∣ted, and therefore the subiect-matter, &c. of a thing lawfull in it selfe. I mervaile (I say) the more because Mr. Gataker confirmeth a thing or act it selfe to be lawfull in it selfe, if it be in the Word, either commaunded, or permitted ex∣pressely,

or by iust consequence. Which I acknowledge to be so cleare a truth, that (me think's) Mr. Gataker cannot, but, in propor∣tion of reason, if he beleive the Word to be perfect vnto every* 1.30 good worke, holde All thinges to be vnlawfull, which are not lawfull one of theis two wayes, and the ra∣ther because he peremptorily af∣firmeth, pag. 95. All particular morall actions, be they never so iūdifferent, to be either conforma∣ble, or disconformable to Gods Word, and, by particular actions, he meaneth actions clothed with circumstances, pag. 94. O that Mr. Gataker would holde to this doctri∣ne!* 1.31 Then should he thereby pro∣voke all, who make consciences of their wayes, and doe truth (that is▪ doe good workes sincerily) to come to the light, that their deedes might be made manifest, that they are wrought ac∣cording

to God. On the contrary; If he bring not disciples to the Law, and* 1.32 Testimony, by doctrine according to the Word, but writhe from it, by teaching that to be lawfull which is not forbidden, as therein his light faileth, so there by he shall make men carelesse to seeke for their warrant, and wilfull to seeke af∣ter their owne heart, and eyes after which* 1.33 they goe a whoring. Well, let vs exa∣mine his confirmations. First, Mr. Calvins* 1.34 testimony in English is this. [When the Scripture delivereth generall rules of a lawfull vse, the vse is to be limi∣ted according to them.] From hence Mr. Gataker concludeth that a man hath a sufficient warrant for any circumstance he shall make choise of, that is not against those rules. Mr. Calvin speaketh of an Vse, and of an Vse doe we dispute, Mr. Gata∣ker concludeth a Circumstance: Mr. Calvin saith, According, Mr. Gata∣ker

concludeth, Not against. Is* 1.35 this sound arguing? Is the 2. con∣firmation from Luke: 9. 50. much better? The wordes set downe by Mr. Gataker be theis. [He that is not against me, is with me.] This place (forsooth) is a rule holding in the subiect-matter, &c. neither determined, nor forbidden. As theis wordes, [He that is not with me, is against me, Math. 12. 30.] is a rule in the subiect-matter, &c. deter∣mined. Both a like in conceipt. And why may not M. Gatakers? con∣ceipt be the same touching thin∣ges, or actions? But let vs see, whe∣ther the conceipt be not a be-mis∣ted Phantasy. In the former place Christ his wordes are occasioned ••y his Disciples their forbidding one who cast out Divels in Christ his name. Forbid him not (said Christ) for, He, that is not against me, is with me. In the latter place

Christ spake those wordes vpon occasion of the Pharises their oppo∣sition. So that consider the two sentences with their occasions to∣gither, this, indeed, is the summe. All men are either with, or against Christ. For there be no Neutralles. So that those two sentences are like theis. He that is not a goate, is a sheepe, and He that is not a sheepe is a goate. But Mr. Gataker's argument is this. All men who are not against Christ, are with him. Therefore Circumstances not de∣termined, nor forbidden, are law∣full. Is this sound arguing? The third confirmation is from a Glosse.* 1.36 Here I remember an olde saying [A cursed glosse corrupt's the Text.] Now lett vs see whether Mr. Gata∣ker have any blessing by this glosse, the wordes whereof in English, be theis. [All things are permitted by Law, which are not found prohibited.] Note,

that it speake's of things. There∣fore it make's as well for actions, as for circumstances▪ Is this Divi∣nity? But what Law? If the Civill Law, what is that to the point? Ex∣cept Mr. Gataker can proove, the Civill Law to be a perfect rule to vs; and whatsoever it permitteth is allowed of God. Howsoever, (I say) this course of fetching proo∣fes from any other Law, than God's Law, is fitter for a Papist, who hol∣deth Vnwritten verities (so called) to be a supplement to the Scriptu∣res, thereby to authorize traditions of men, than for one, that feareth* 1.37 God to walke in his wayes. Is then this glossing sound arguing? Hath* 1.38 the fourth confirmation more vali∣dity in it than the rest? The for∣mer 3. proofes speake not directly of Circmmstances according to the proposition, (so doth Mr. Ga∣taker dispute Adidem) here he doth▪

here then Iinquire, If the Circum∣stances of Time, and Place be at the pleasure of him that v••eth a thing lawfull in it selfe, doth it fol∣low therevpon, that the subiect-matter, and manner be so too? If God allow any thing to be done, of necessity there must be a time, and place, when and where it may be done, Even when, and where there is iust occasion of the Act▪ It is to be obscrved, that, as here, so, in the Proposition it selfe Mr. Gataker slideth from the sub∣iect-matter, and manner, to cir∣cumstances onely. Is not this fainting? Let vs now proceed to that, which Mr. Gataker wri∣teth, touching both the doing of every act, and the doing of it in this, and that manner. Neither of which needeth warrant from the Word if naturall reason, of it selfe, afford sufficient directiō▪ Good Lord!

What fearefull shifting from the Word is here? But why doth he ioyne the doing it selfe of an Act. with the manner thereof? I'le tell you, even to make a way to his As∣sumption. For, if he sticke close to that which he teacheth in ime∣diate wordes, to witt, that an act it selse is lawfull in it selfe, if, in the Word, it be, either commaunded; or permitted expressely, or by iust consequence, he foreseeth, that it will be answered to the fore-part of his assumption, that every Lott is not lawfull in it selfe. Therefore he would trouble the Reader's head with a supposed direction therein of naturall reason, and that sufficient, (I say) Supposed; For he sheweth no direction therein of naturall reason either sufficient, or insufficient. But let vs with feare, and trembling, consider Mr. Gataker his most straunge position

to witt, [Neither the doing of any act, nor the manner of doing needeth warrant from the Word, if naturall Reason of it selfe, affoard sufficient direction.] Let vs consider it (I say) together with his reason. For (saith he) the Word is given vs in morall matters, to supply the defect of naturall rea∣son caused by our first parents their fall. Is it our best way then to seeke sufficient direction, in morall matters, from naturall rea∣son, before wc consult with God in his Word? For the said direction is the 2. time vrged thus. I say where natnrall reason doth not, of it selfe, afford sufficient direction, and neede not a man know, that he hath warrant srom God's Word if, in his perswasion, he have suffi∣cient direction from naturall Rea∣son? Doth the Max••me of Gods Spirit quoted here, by Mr. Gataker* 1.39 to witt, [What is not of Faith is sinne]

intimate. That whatsoever is done by sufficient direction from natu∣rall reason, is of Faith? Became naturall reason onely defective, and not corrupted also by our* 1.40 first Parents their fall? O God have mercy vpon vs! For I see that the Wisedome of the Flesh is En∣mity against thee; For it is not fub∣iect to thy Law, neither, indeed, can be. But why doe I vexe my soule with this fearefull doctrine, seeing Mr. Gatakers heart fainteth in the prosecution thereof? For, at last, he cometh to say. Neither doth the Word abridge vs of the helpe, and vse of naturall reason for direction in such actions. Here is some more authority (to witt, Of not abridging vs of the helpe, &c.) given to the Word. For it doth imply, that the Word might abridge vs, &c. Therefore ou•• most warrantable way is to be well

informed, when, and how farre, the Word doth give vs leave to vse the direction of naturall reason in mo∣rall matters. If this be so, then the former strange doctrine is contra∣dicted, and I neede not make any answer to the scriptures quoted in the margent. So then I pro∣ceed to the Assumption of the maine argument. In the former part whereof, it is to be denied (as was saide before) that every Lot is a thing lawfull in it selfe. For as a Divinatory, by him, cap. 11. so a Lu∣sorious Lott by me, and others, is de∣nied to be a thing lawfull in it selfe. More clearily to answer the other part. It is to be observed, that, in this large, argument it cannot be gathered w••ath M. G. meaneth by Subiect-matter. So the minde of the Reader may be troubled with wordes, which ought not to be. But* 1.41 by that which he writeth, pag. 230. I

vnderstand he meaneth the Matter whereabout the Lottery is im∣ployed. If so, I affirme that the fubiect matter of a Lott is deter∣mined by God, namely, A Contro∣versy to be ended thereby; and therefore I also affirme lusorius buisinesse (to vse Mr. Gataker owne word pag. 130.) to be a subiect-matter of a Lott, no lesse against the generall rules of the Word, than was the finding out of Ionas, in Mr. Gatakers iudgment, pag. 278. If then a Lusorious Lott be not a thing lawfull in it selfe, & If Luso∣rious buisinesse be a subiect-mat∣ter of a Lott, that is against the ge∣nerall rules, then how can the man∣ner, and other circumstances, though neither determined, nor forbidden, be sufficient warrant for the vse of a Lusorious Lott? Now then, Let vs try the force of the Assumption's confirmation. It

is true that Recreation in generall, indefinitely vnderstood, is warran∣ted by God's Word. But I beleive Mr. Gataker will not affirme all re∣creations taken vp by men, to be so warranted. Yes (saith Mr. Gata∣ker) we may recreate our selves with any thing, that is not against the generales rules, because, tou∣ching things, wherewith we may recreate, there is nothing deter∣mined.

Of this evasion [Not against] I neede not speake at this instant. But touching things not deter∣mined, so much inculcated, I aske whether things must be determined particularly, or by name; or else, if not so for∣bidden, they are lawfull. If so, why doth Mr. Gataker (spea∣king of divers particulars,) as of a key, and a booke, of a paire of sheares, and a ••ive, and such like

so earnestly aske, Are they any where found revealed in the Word of God? Where he is of another minde, than here, arguing thus. Not found there commaunded, or permitted; therefore vnlawfull. If it be said, Not so found there, to finde out a theife. I then say; Nei∣ther are Lottes so found there for Recreation. But if by Not determi∣ned be meant, Thinges wherewith we recreare are not determined in the Word either expressly, or by iust consequence, then, whosoever saith so, if he be wise, will adde [So farre as I doe remember, and know.] For who can remember all the senten∣ces of holy Scriptures, and know all iust consequences, that may be made from them? If he thus adde then his Negation is of no validity, but he himselfe is too bolde in de∣nying, vpon presumption, that ano∣ther remembreth, and knoweth no

more than he. At last let vs reli∣giously consider the generall rules so often spoken of, and we shall finde, that Mr. Gataker should have done well not to have pleased Li∣bertines by pleading Not against, but to have given the Word due ho∣nour by saying with Mr. Calvin. [The vse of things is to be limited according to the generall rules.] For theis rules require Decency, Ex∣pediency, and Piety, and therefore they are not obeyed by the vse of things not vndecent, not inexpedient, and not impious. For it is to be no∣ted that in 1. Cor. 6. 12. and 12. 23. Paul saith not, all things are lawfull, but some things are inexpedient, but in both places thus. [All things are lawfull, but all are not expedient.] Let vs consider theis rules yet so∣mewhat more nearely to the point. Touching the first. The wordes of the Apostle, 1. Cor. 14. 40. be theis.

[Let all things be done honestly, and by order] In which is no intimation, that all things are in themselves lawfull to be done, which are done honestly, & by order, but a charge that all things, be they in themselves ne∣ver so lawfull, be done honestly, & by order. Those drinke offerings to Bacchus, commonly called Healthes (per Antiphrasin,) are solemnized so∣metimes with standing, sometimes with kneeling, alwayes with put∣ting of hatts, and some speech more or lesse, are they accepta∣ble to God, because they are thus orderly carried? If not, Then be Lotts, and the vsers of them in gaming never so orderly disposed, yet are they not therefore iusti∣fied.* 1.42 Touching the second rule. It is true, That all things must be ex∣pedient, that is, edify, 1. Cor. 10. 23. Therefore they sinne who stum∣ble, or offend a brother, that is, oc∣casion

him to fall or be made wea∣ke, Rom. 14. 13. 21. But Lu••orious Lotts occasion thousands to fall into sinne, & to be weake in goodnesse. Therefore they doe not edifie, and therefore are not expedient. Con∣cerning the 3. rule. Let all things to be* 1.43 done to Gods glory, 1. Cor. 10. 31. Is this to Gods glory, to vse his name in any other case than wherein God is well pleased his name should be v∣sed, & thē to take that name in vai∣ne? Is tempting of God any glory to God? But playing with a Lottis to vse God's name in an other case, than wherein God is well pleased his Name should be vsed, and then also to take that Name in vaine, & it is a greivous tempting of God as shall be prooved. Therefore play∣ing with a Lots is not to God's glo∣ry, & by consequence not agreable to Religion, and Piety. Though it be sufficiently prooved that Lusori∣ous

Lotts are directly aga in••t tw•• of the generall Rules, and not war∣ranted by the third, so that Mr. Ga∣taker hath not bete red his cause by appealing to them, yet it is to be observed, that all the rules re∣quire, Things, and Actions to be ac∣cording to them, But Mr. Gataker by onely speaking of them, would iustify circumstances, and meanes of playing with Lotts if (forsooth) they be not against them. Thus having evidently shewed Reasons inducing (not drawing) Mr. Ga∣taker to allow Lusorious Lotts to be both fearefull, as theis evasive speeches. [Not evill in themselves.] [Not prohibited.] [Not determined.] &, [Not against the generall rules,] doe import, & otherwise vnsound, I wil now (with God's helpe I hope) re∣ply vpon M. G. answers to mine ar∣guments against playing with Lots, conteined in my Dialogue.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Ezek. 36 31.
• * 1.2

  Math. ••. 16.
• * 1.3

  Iohn. 5. 21.
• * 1.4

  Math. 3. 10.
• * 1.5

  M. G. 1.
• * 1.6

  I. B. 1.
• * 1.7

  M. G. 2.
• * 1.8

  I. B. 2▪
• * 1.9

  Prou. 16 3••. 1. Sam. 14. 41▪
• * 1.10

  M. G.
• * 1.11

  I. B▪
• * 1.12

  M. G. 3.
• * 1.13

  I. B. 3.
• * 1.14

  1.
• * 1.15

  2.
• * 1.16

  Rom. 14 23.
• * 1.17

  M. G. 4.
• * 1.18

  I. B. 4.
• * 1.19

  1. Pet. 2. 16.
• * 1.20

  M. G. S.
• * 1.21

  I. B. S.
• * 1.22

  M. G. 6.
• * 1.23

  1.
• * 1.24

  2.
• * 1.25

  3.
• * 1.26

  Rom. 14. 23.
• * 1.27

  I. B. ••.
• * 1.28

  Pro. 10. 19.
• * 1.29

  1.
• * 1.30

  Psal. 19. ••. 2. Tim. 3. 15. 16. 17.
• * 1.31

  Iohn. 3. 21.
• * 1.32

  Is a. 8. 20.
• * 1.33

  Num. 25 39.
• * 1.34

  1.
• * 1.35

  ••.
• * 1.36

  3.
• * 1.37

  Deut. 10 12.
• * 1.38

  4.
• * 1.39

  Rom. 14 23.
• * 1.40

  Rom. 8. 7.
• * 1.41

  Acts. 15 24.
• * 1.42

  2.
• * 1.43

  3▪