The line of liberalitie dulie directinge the wel bestowing of benefites and reprehending the comonly vsed vice of ingratitude. Anno. 1569.

Chap. 31.

VErilie in my fansie thys Paradoxe or opinionatif Sentence of the Stoiques* 1.1 shoulde not be counted so straunge as it is, and scant woorthye of credit. Namelye. That he hath requited the plesour whyche he re∣ceiued, who hath ioyfullye accepted the∣same. For syth that all thynges are to be referred to the mynd alone, I thynke that he hath done enowgh who hath de∣clared hīself willing to requite it so nere as he could. And forasmuche as Pietie, faith, Iustice, and to be short eche vertew is parfect and absolute within and of it self, though a man vse no act of his hand to anye of them, euen so may anye man bée thankefull fullye and thoroughlye

in will alone. For so oft as the intent taketh suche successe and effect as a man before de••ised with himself, so often also may he be said to reape the hoped frute of his desier and trauaile. Who that ge∣ueth any benefit, what is his pretence at that time? Uerelie to benefit him to whō he geueth it, and that he should take ple∣sure in it. Then if it be so that he hath done that whyche he would doo, and that I haue parfite intelligence of his minde what it was, and that we haue reioyced mutuallye by exchange (as it were) he hath then that which he desi••ed himself. He dyd it not for this that he loked to ha∣ue the lyke againe at my handes: for thē it had not dese••ued the name of a benefit but rather were to be called an exchaun∣ge of marchaundise. I say. That certein∣lie he sailed wel and made a prosperouse v••age that chaunced safelie to fall into that hauen or port whyther at launching first forth he directed his course. That dart was sure cast with a skillfull hande

that hyt the marke at which it was cast. Who that doth anye benefit, doth it to that end that it should be thankfully ac∣cepted. Yf it be so receiued he hath that he would. But perhaps you will saye he loked to repe som other commoditie and gaine therby. Then certes might it not haue bene called a benefit.* 1.2 The proper∣tie wherof is not to loke to receiue anye thing again. If I hapned to receiue that which was geuē me with the same mind that it was geuen, I haue repaid asmuch as I receiued. In recompensing benefi∣tes and plesures receiued, I must regard mine owne fortune. Which if it be suche that I be not able to requite like for like it sufficeth that I owe a well meaninge mind, for that of his. How then? I will moreouer diligētlie obseru•• ••o get thad∣uauntage both of the time and thynges: and shall asfar as I may, shew miself de∣sirous to satisfie him at ful•• at whose hā∣des I haue had any plesour. But truly in mine opinion they scant merite the deno¦minacion

of benefits whiche a man may not séeme to requite with bare goodwill without any more, if his power will ex∣tend no Farther.

Notes

• * 1.1

  A para∣doxe of y^e stoiques.
• * 1.2

  It is not to be said a benefit for whi∣che y^e doer therof lo∣keth for profet or recōpense