The peace of Rome Proclaimed to all the world, by her famous Cardinall Bellarmine, and the no lesse famous casuist Nauarre. Whereof the one acknowledgeth, and numbers vp aboue three hundred differences of opinion, maintained in the popish church. The other confesses neere threescore differences amongst their owne doctors in one onely point of their religion. Gathered faithfully out of their writings in their own words, and diuided into foure bookes, and those into seuerall decads. Whereto is prefixed a serious disswasiue from poperie. By I.H.

DECAD. IIII.

First, Occam against the common opinion.

* 1.1ALthough Gul. Occam write, that the obiect of the will is any thing that hath being, whether it be good or euill; so that it can be set vpon euill, as it is euill: yet the

common opinion of Diuines is contrary, &c. and a∣mongst the rest of Saint Thomas in 1. part, q. 20. art. 1. &c. Bellarm. ibid. c. 12. p. 248.

Secondly, three rankes of Popish Diuines disagreeing.

ABout the obiect of freewill,* 1.2 there are three opi∣nions; The first of Pet. Lombard, Occam, Gabriel, who hold, that all things which are present, are ne∣cessary, and cannot be otherwise; and therefore that future actions alone are in the power of freewill.

The second of Gregorius Ariminensis (vpon 1. Sent. d. 39.) which thinkes, that the entring into an action, euen for the present, may be free, but that some continuance, is altogether necessary.

The third is more common in Schooles, and more true, which is declared and defended by Io. Sco∣tus, Capreolus, and Hersubcus: that freewill hath in his power, not onely future, but present actions, and not onely in their entrance, but continuance also. Bellar. ibid. cap. 13. pag. 251.

Thirdly, Scotus and Henric▪ against Thom▪ and Capreolus.

COncerning the first act of the will,* 1.3 whether it be simply free, as Scotus and Henricus hold, or whe∣ther it be wrought wholly by God alone, so as the will is but onely passiue, as Capreolus and Saint Tho∣mas (by Capreolus report) or whether thirdly, it be ef∣ficiently

of the will, but yet of God as the author of it: as following vpon that natural inclination, which God hath set in the will, as Caietane, Ferrariensis, and Saint Thomas. See Bellarmine same booke, cap. 14. pag. 256.

Fourthly, Petrus ab Aliaco against Saint Thomas and other Diuines.

* 1.4ONe Controuersie remains, whether by the light of reason alone, we can know that there is a God, and that he is one. Of our men Petrus ab Ali∣aco in 2. Sent. q. 3. writes, that we can know nothing at all of God, without a speciall helpe of grace: but almost all Diuines, and especially Saint Thomas, teach the contrary; who doubt not to call that o∣pinion erroneous. Bellarmine in his fourth booke of grace and freewill, c. 2. p. 277.

Fiftly, Durandus against all Diuines: some other namelesse against the rest.

* 1.5OF actions naturall, or ciuill, or manuall (with∣out consideration of any morall good or euill in them) whether they could be done of vs, by the onely power of nature, there haue beene two con∣trary errours: for some haue taught that man as well as other things, can doe his workes without a∣ny helpe of God, whether generall or speciall. So

Origen seemes to hold, as Saint Thomas noteth: so also the Pelagians, and amongst others Durandus vp∣on 2. Sent. dist. 1. quaest. 5. Others haue held in an other extreame, that God doth so immediately and properly worke all things, that the second causes do iust nothing; but in their presence God doth all. Saint Thomas reports this opinion, in quaest▪ de poten∣tia art. 7. The true and common opinion of Diuines is betweene both. Bellarmine the fourth booke, cap. 4. pag. 285.

Sixtly, Saint Thomas, Gregorie, Gabriel, Buridan, An∣dreas de Castro, Laurent. Valla, in three rankes against one another.

ONe of the maine Controuersies of this matter is,* 1.6 whether man haue freewill in naturall and ciuill actions, whereof are three opinions: First, of well neare all Catholikes, that not onely man is of freewill in the foresaid actions, but that this is eui∣dent, both in the light of nature and doctrine of faith, as Saint Thomas (aboue others (in quaest. 6. de malo) and Gregory, Gabriell, and others vpon 2. Sent. d. 25. The second of some Catholikes, which hold it certaine by the doctrine of faith, not by the light of reason, that man hath this freewill. So teach Io. Buri∣danus 3. Ethic. q. 1. Andr. de Castro, 1. Sent. d. 45. cyted by Ruardus, &c. The third opinion, or heresie ra∣ther, is of Laurentius Valla in his booke of free∣will, &c. and Bucer, who teach, that man hath

not freewill in any thing, in this state of his corrup∣ted nature; no not in things indifferent and ciuill. Bellarm. l. 4. c. 5. p. 289.

Seuenthly, Caietane, Durandus, and another sort vn-na∣med against each other, and Bellarm. against all.

* 1.7THE co-operation of Gods prouidence with mans freewill, Caietane thinks cannot be expres∣sed: Contrary, Durandus thinkes he hath sufficiently vnfolded it, when he teacheth, that there is no con∣course of Gods will with second causes; but that the natures and vertues of themselues are sufficient: and that God as he hath made them, so should pre∣serue them. But this opinion is false and contrary to Scriptures, Fathers, and reason. The third sort hold, that God by his concourse determines the acti∣on of mans will, and yet that it is absolutely free: and this for many causes I cannot allow. Bellarm. ibid. cap. 14. pag. 318.

Eightly, Greg. Ariminensis, Capreolus, Cassalius against Albert, Bonauenture, Scotus, Richard Durandus, &c

* 1.8SOme Diuines hold, that no morall truth can be knowne by man, in the state of his corrupted na∣ture, without the speciall aide of Gods spirit so teach Gregorius Ariminensis, Iohannes, Capreolus, Gaspar Cas∣salius. Contrarily, all Diuines almost thinke by the

meere power of nature, and by a generall ayde of God, some morall truth may be knowne. So Al∣bertus, S. Bonauenture, Scotus, Richardus, Durandus, Do∣minicus a Soto, S▪ Thomas, &c. This latter opinion seemes the truest, which we doe the rather defend, because it so much displeaseth our aduersaries, and Io. Caluin especially. Bellarm. 5. booke of grace and freewill, cap. 1. pag. 337.

Ninthly, Scotus, Durandus, Gabriel, Gregor. Ariminen∣sis, Capreolus, Marsilius, Alexander, Albert, Thomas Bonauent. opposite to each other.

ALl Catholikes agree,* 1.9 that no workes meritori∣ous of grace, can be done by the onely power of nature; and secondly, that all our workes before iu∣stification are no sinnes: within these bounds some dispute for freewill, perhaps more freely and lauish∣ly then were meete, as Scotus, Durandus, Gabriell, vpon 2 Sent. d. 28. Others againe giue lesse to it then they should, as Gregorius •• Ariminensis, Capreolus vpon 2. Sent d. 28. and Marsilius. We wil follow that, which the greater and grauer sort of Diuines teach, name∣ly, Alexander, Albertus, S. Thomas, S. Bonauenture, &c. Bellarm. l. 5. c. 4. p. 351.

Tenthly, two sorts of namelesse Doctors opposed.

PErhaps those authors which say,* 1.10 that without the helpe of God no tentation can be ouercome, and

those which hold, some may be vanquished with∣out it, may be reconciled; yet their opinion and speech is more agreeable to Scriptures and Fathers, which say, no tentation can be ouercome without Gods ayde. Bellarm. ibid. c. 7. p. 363.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Tametsi Gul. Occam in l. 3. Sent. q. 13.
• * 1.2

  Tres de hac re sententiae &c.
• * 1.3

  Tres enim The∣ologorum.
• * 1.4

  Vna solum con∣trouersia rema net.
• * 1.5

  Duo siquidem contrarij errores &c.
• * 1.6

  Tertia quaestio quae vna ex principalibus &c.
• * 1.7

  Concordiam istam liberi ar∣bitrij &c.
• * 1.8

  Quidam Theo∣gi, &c.
• * 1.9

  Conueniunt Theologi Catho∣lici, &c.
• * 1.10

  Fortasse concili∣ari possunt.