Against Ierome Osorius Byshopp of Siluane in Portingall and against his slaunderous inuectiues An aunswere apologeticall: for the necessary defence of the euangelicall doctrine and veritie. First taken in hand by M. Walter Haddon, then undertaken and continued by M. Iohn Foxe, and now Englished by Iames Bell.

¶The Argumentes of the aduersaries agaynst the foresayd Assertions propounded and confuted.

If our actions be first determined and decreed vpon:* 1.1 two inconueniences doe ensue vpon this Assertion .1. that the Freedome of mans will must vtterly perish .2. that men shal be constrayned by Necessitie, as if they were bounde in bondes. &c.

There are so many,* 1.2 & so manifest testimonies in the Scrip∣tures, concernyng the truth of Predestinatiō, and the foreknow∣ledge of thyngs to come, that they can by no meanes be denyed. As to the Obiection of inconueniēces, it is vntrue. For the Freé∣dome of mans will doth not so perish, but that men do alwayes chuse the thyng, that they will of their owne accorde and wil∣lyngly. Then also neither is any such Necessitie layed vpon any man, which by force of coaction may driue him to do that, which he would not. Moreouer although it rest not in our Freédome, that we may be chosen, or forsaken: it followeth not therfore, that we haue no Freédome to any other thynges. This is therfore a captious Argument, falsely concludyng, from the proposi∣tion Secundum quid, ad Simpliciter.* 1.3 As if a man would argue in this sort.

A fleshly man doth not conceaue the thynges that are of God.

Ergo, The force of mans witte doth conceaue nothyng at all in any matter whatsoeuer.

Osorius maketh Luther worse thē Diagoras:* 1.4 and Pighius maketh him worse then the Manichees. Pighius Argument is framed in this maner. The Manichees, bycause they would ascribe wickednes to God, did imagine two begynnynges: Luther ascribyng wickednes and mischieuousnes to God, maketh vs lyke vnto a Sawe, whom God doth draw, and driue forth and backe, whether him lysteth.

Manichee did appoynt two natures in man,* 1.5 thone good, the other euill: whereof that one could not sinne, this other coulde not do well. Luther doth neyther affirme two natures in man, neyther doth so condēne y^e same nature of man, wholy of it self:

but as it is corrupted after the fall, hee doth affirme, that of Necessitie and alwayes it doth resiste Gods Spirite, yea euen in the very Saincts thēselues, being euen from their very child∣dhoode enclined to euill. Then, that wicked men are as Sawes in the hand of God, not onely Luther, but Esay also doth con∣fesse. And agayne, whereas he sayth, that the remnaunt of flesh (euen in the holy ones) is like a wilde sauadge Tyger, euer re∣sistyng against the Spirite, and whereas also he doth cōuince y^e whole fleshly Iudgemēt of mā of faultynes naturall,* 1.6 he differeth herein nothyng at all. From Paule and Augustine, Augustine writyng vpon Iohn. Let no man flatter him selfe (sayth he) of him selfe he is a Sathan•• Let man therfore take away Sinne: that is his owne: and leaue righteousnes vnto God. &c.

* 1.7Osorius is not so blokishe as to make Luther equall with Diagoras, but much more wicked. And why so?

He adiudgeth is to be more tollerable to thinke there is no God at all, thē to conceaue that God is wicked and vnrighteous.

* 1.8But Luther doth conceaue him both wicked and vn∣righteous.

Ergo, &c.

Undoughtedly a very haynous fact, yea more then Diago∣ricall, If so be that any man either were euer so detestably abho∣minable, as to be able to conceaue any such thyng of God. But frō whence shall this mylde & charitable allegation of this most curteous Prelate appeare at the length vnto vs to be truly vou∣ched agaynst Luther? For sooth vnlesse I be deceaued, as the mā is not altogether blockish, he will coyne vs, this euident demon∣stration out of the bottome of his owne braynes.

* 1.9Whosoeuer doth impute the faulte to an other of the thyng he can not auoyde: doth vnrighteously.

Sinne is a thyng in man that can not be auoyded, as Lu∣ther doth say.

Ergo, God imputyng Sinne vnto man after Luthers do∣ctrine is vniust.

* 1.10The Maior proposition is true in those persons, which were not them selues the cause of y^e thyngs, whiche they could not a∣uoyde. But man now through his owne will hath throwen him

selfe into that Necessitie of Sinnyng, which he is not able to o∣uercome. Wherupon the fault of the trespasse that he commit∣teth, is iustly imputed vnto him selfe, nor can he nothwithstādyng chuse, but doe the thyng that is committed. And so by this rea∣son, the Maior is false. Moreouer as touching the Minor. Two thynges are to be considered in Sinne, as it is taken to be the punishment of Sinne, cleauyng fast vnto vs. The Acte and the Imputation: For although the Acte he not taken away altoge∣ther through the corruption of nature: Yet through Christ the Imputation of the Sinne is take away. Therfore if a man cā not be freé from Sinnyng. Let him obteyne a remedy for sinne in Christ, in whom Sinne, though be vnauoydable in this weake nature, yet can not be hurtfull at all, bycause it is not im∣puted: Whereupon Augustine very fitly.* 1.11 Sinne (sayth he) may be auoyded: not when the proude will is aduaunced, but when the humble and meeke will is holpen. And the same is holpen in them, which call earnestly by prayer, which do beleue, and which are cal∣led accordyng to Gods purpose.

He is in vayn cōmaūded to make choise,* 1.12 who hath no po¦wer to applye him self to the thing which he doth chuse. But we are commaunded to chuse both lyfe and death, aswell good as euill.

Ergo, We haue abilitie in vs to applye our selues aswell vnto life as vnto death, aswell vnto euill as vnto good.

These thynges are alledged, lyke as if there were any man y^t did vtterly driue away wil,* 1.13 or abilitie of freé choyse frō mē. We doe confesse that man hath a freé, not a coacted power to chuse good or euill. For we do chuse both, not through any coaction at all, but of our owne voluntary will, albeit our choyse is not all alike in both: for we make choyse of the thyngs that apperteine vnto Saluation after one sorte: and of the thinges that are wicked after an other sorte: For wicked thynges, and thynges that are not godly, euery man greédyly catcheth after, & of him self is greédyly carried thereunto: yet so neuerthelesse of him selfe, as of his owne nature he can not otherwise do: if he be not hoplē. But good & godly thyngs no man can chuse, through the naturall inclination of Freewill, vnlesse he be thereunto assi∣sted by the ayde of the holy Ghost. This therfore that is read in

the Scriptures:* 1.14 God left man to the power of his owne counsell: he set before mans face lyfe and death, good and euill, aduising him to chuse life. &c. Is a true saying, but with this restrainte al∣wayes annexed: that of hym selfe he was able to rush into all e∣uill, and beyng ayded by the holy Ghost, he might be able to doe well: on the other side: not beyng holpen, that he is neither of a∣bilitie to do any thyng acceptable to God well, nor could chuse by any meanes, but worke the thyng that was displeasaunt vn∣to God.

* 1.15If man be not the thyng, that he can not be, of his owne power and will, but be compelled of Necessitie to be that, which he ought not to be.

Ergo, This is not now to be imputed to man, nor yet see∣meth he to be in any fault for it.

The Aunswere is out of Augustine.* 1.16 Nay rather it is ther∣fore the fault of the man, that he is not without Sinne, bycause it came to passe by mans will onely, that he should come to such a Necessitie, which could not be counteruayled vp the onely will of man.

* 1.17If to Sinne be naturall not voluntary, then either is it not sinne now, or surely not to be imputed.

But if sinne be voluntary and not naturall nor of Neces∣sitie: then in respect that it is voluntary, it is auoydea∣ble by will, that it neede not cleaue vnto vs of very Necessitie.

* 1.18Augustine doth Aunswere: God created Nature at the first pure and sounde•• which may not be accused, as if it were the cause of Sinne. But afterwardes mans owne will did defile this good na∣ture, which beyng now corrupted conceaueth Sinne, which neither can be healed without the grace of God. Moreouer touchyng the thing that is done by will voluntaryly, it can not be denyed but that the same will may be chaunged: and so the will being chaunged, the thing also that was done voluntaryly may be altered. But whereas it is sayd, that will may be chaunged by will it selfe, this sauoreth surely of a wonderfull arrogancie.* 1.19 For asmuch as the flesh wil∣leth agaynst the Spirite, and the Spirite agaynst the flesh (as the Apostle him selfe witnesseth.) And these two are at warres agaynst eche other, so that ye may not doe the thynges

that ye would. Gallat. 5.

Either a man may be without Sinne,* 1.20 or he can not be without Sinne. If he can not, what reason is it, that Sinne that can not be but present, should be imputed? If he may be without Sinne, how is will then bounde by Necessitie, which might haue eschued the thyng that was committed?

And to this also Augustine maketh Aunswere: That a man may in deede be without Sinne if God do helpe him, we do not deny: but this reason proueth not, that there is any man without Sinne, that is not holpen, neither do we agree thereunto. But when a man may be without sinne, and by whom, that is the thyng that is in que∣stion. If thou wilt say in this present life, and in the body of this death, how then do we pray in this life, forgeue vs our sinnes? If mā can of him selfe be without Sinne. Ergo, Christ dyed in vayne. &c. But Osorius vnderproppeth his Freewill here, with this crooch in couplyng the grace of God with it, disputyng on this wise.

By the assistaunce of Gods Grace nature may subdue Sinne.* 1.21

The grace of God doth assiste them that be his owne.

Ergo, In the thynges apperteinyng to God all Necessi∣tie of Sinnyng is quyte excluded.

Least Osor. may not seéme to differre nothyng at all from the Pelagians:* 1.22 he doth vphold the cause of Freewill w^t an addition of Grace. And yet for all this, he doth not so catche y^e thyng y^t he ga∣peth for, but that a Necessitie of sinnyng shall alwayes be resi∣aunt, euen in y^e holy ones of God: Grace assistyng (sayth he) Na∣ture may exclude Sinne. If he meane the perfect assistaunce of grace, by the wh all infirmitie of nature is taken away, y^e Maior is true, but y^t Minor is false. For to confesse, as truth is, the ri∣ches of Gods graces to be wonderfull, and his blessyngs, which God powreth into his Elect to be magnificent, yet this Grace of God doth not make any man of such a singuler perfection in this world, but that the best of vs all many tymes offende in ma∣ny thynges: and do pray dayly, that our trespasses may be for∣geuen. The grace of God, in deéde doth helpe our infirmities, y^t they may be lessened and pardonable, but to be cleane cutte a∣way, y^t I do vtterly deny: it doth in deéde helpe out infirmities, yet leaueth it vs neuerthelesse in our infirmities, that he may al∣wayes

help vs. How plentifully the Grace of Christ was pow∣red vpon hys holy Apostles, no man is ignoraunt: which Grace notwithstanding did not make perfect their strength, to the full measure: but the same grace rather was made perfect, through their infirmitie In part (fayth S. Paule) we do know and in part we do perceaue,* 1.23 But when that is come which is perfect, then shall that which is vnperfect be abolished. For now we behold as by a glas in a darck ridle, but then shall we see face vnto face: nowe doe I know in part, but then shall I know as I am knowne.* 1.24 And therfore to aunswere at one word. If Osorius do meane that assistaunce of Gods Grace, which may make absolute and perfect obedience in this life: Augustine will immediately deny the same: who dis∣coursing vpon the first commaundement,* 1.25 whereby we are com∣maunded to loue God withall our hart, and our neighbour as our selfe. We shall fulfill that commaundement (sayth August.) when we shall see face to face: And immediately after: And ther∣fore the the man hath profited much in this lyfe, in that righteous∣nes which ought to be accomplished, who doth knowe by profiting, how farre he is distaunt from the full perfection of true righteous∣nesse. Lastly whereas it is argued from the power of Gods grace: that sufficeth not to exclude Necessitie of sinning, for it may come to passe through Grace, and the absolute power of God, that a man may not sinne at all, And that the fire may not burne also. And it might haue come to passe likewise, That the punishment of the whole corrupted masse in Adames loynes, should not haue bene deriued into the posterity, if it had so plea¦sed God. Yet are not all things done, that may be done: vnlesse the decreéd Will of God do ioyne together with his power. Not vnlike vnto this, is the very argument of Celestius the Pela∣gian agaynst Augustine.

* 1.26If God Will, it may come to passe that man may not sinne in wordes nor in thought.

But Gods will is that no man should sinne

Ergo, Nothing withstandeth but that man may not sinne in wordes nor in thought.

* 1.27The forme of this argumēt should rather haue bene framed on this wise. If God Will and do minister help withall, it may come to passe that man shall not sinne at all, but God willeth, &

helpeth withall that a man shall not sinne at all in worde nor in thought Ergo &c. I doe aunswere with Augustine, vnto the Minor. That it is true in deéde, that God willeth and helpeth agaynst the force of sinne: I doe adde ouer and besides, that no man is holpen but he that willeth, and worketh somewhat him∣selfe also. But two things are to be noted here: both who they be, that are holpē, & how God doth help them: Forsooth such as call vpon him, such as beleue in the Sonne, such as are called after the purpose of hys Will: and such as whose will is s••irred vppe to this end, to craue earnestly for assistaunce. Because whom he hath foreknowne, thē hath he also predestinate to be made like vn∣to the Image of the Sonnes of God. &c.* 1.28 Furthermore it must be cō∣sidered, by what meanes he doth helpe: not to the ende that no more dregges of sinne should from thenceforth cleaue fast in the flesh, but to the end that sinne should not raygne in y^e mortall bo∣dyes of them whom himselfe hath sanctified through Grace.

What thing so euer God will haue to be done, must of Necessitie be done.* 1.29

God will haue all men to be saued.

Ergo, It is of Necessitie that all men shalbe saued.

I do aunswere vnto the Maior all things that God will haue done,* 1.30 must be done of Necessitie, so that God yelde hys helpe also together with hys will, that they may be brought to passe. Then I thus annswere to the Minor. That it is true that God would haue all men to be saued, with this addition annexed, All to witte: All that beleéue in the Sonne. For without the Media∣tor, he will haue no man saued. But now sithence it is not geuē to all men to haue fayth: nor that all men do repayre to Christ, for helpe. The fault hereof is their own vnbeleéuingnes, not the will of God. But some of Osorius pupills will vrge agayne.

Forasmuch as fayth is the gift of God,* 1.31 and hys will that all should be saued, is an vniuersall promise: and that the greatnes of his mercy is prepared ready, and set forth to all indifferently: why then is not geauen to all indifferently to haue fayth? is it because God will not geue it? but so should he seeme an vnrighteous distributour, and so should he offend in Iustice distributiue: Or is it because men will not embrace the kingdome of GOD? But this doth argue that

men may take holdfast of the gift of fayth, if they will. And how then is the power of Freewill suppressed?

* 1.32I do aunswere first out of the scriptures, then out of August. And they beleeued as many as were foreordeyned to lyfe euerla∣sting Actes 13.* 1.33 Augustine. Two thinges are to be holden to be re∣siaunt alwayes in God. That there is no vnrighteousnes with God: and likewise, it must be firmely beleued, that God hath mer∣cy on whom he will haue mercy, and on whō he will not haue mercy. thē he hardeneth. That is to say: on whom he listeth he will not take mercy: whereupon whether he geaue any thing, or require that is dew vnto hym: neyther he of whom he requireth it, can well com∣playne of hys vniust dealing: nor he to whom he geueth, ought to be ouer proud and boast of hys giftes: for the one neither rendereth a∣ny more then is due, and the other hath nothyng but that which he hath receaued,

* 1.34If God had commaunded vs to do the thinges that hym selfe saw were impossible for vs to do, he might seeme wor∣thely to be accused of vnrighteousnesse.

* 1.35This obiection were perhaps to some purpose, vnlesse the scriptures had prouided a Triacle for this malady : namely, Fayth, in hys Sonne: in whom when we do beleéue, endeuo∣ring in the meane whiles as much as lieth in vs, we do then ful∣fill the whole Law of workes: That is to say: we do attayne full & absolute righteousnes, as well as if we had fulfilled the whole, beyng endued wi••h righteousnes now, albeit not properly our owne, yet enioying hym notwithstanding whiche of God was made our righteousnesse, by Fayth: Whereupon Luther in hys booke of Christian liberty hath written very excellently.* 1.36 That which is impossible for theé to bring to passe in the whole works of the Law (sayth he) which are in number many, thou shalt ea∣sily accomplish with small labour. Namely, by Fayth. Because God the Father hath placed all thinges in Fayth, so that who∣soeuer is indued with this Fayth, may possesse all thinges: and he that is voyde of this Fayth, may possesse nothing at all. After this maner the promises of God doe geue that which the com∣maūdements do exact, & they do finish that, which the law com∣maūdeth: so that now he onely, & alone is he, that may cōmaūd, and he onely and alone is he, that may bryng to passe. &c.

To what end are ordinaūces to liue well prescribed?* 1.37 why are threatninges added to the stifnecked and rebellious, if men were not able to liue well? why is a freedome of choyse set out vnto vs, to enter into whether way we will, if we can not be able to holde the right way? who is so madde to com¦maund a blinde man to keepe the right path? or who will commaund that man that is so fast bound as beyng vnable to moue hys arme, but vnto the left side, to reache hym a a thing on the right side, whiche is not possible for hym to doe?

Augustine will aunswere.* 1.38 That which man is not able to at∣teine to by nature, vnto the same may he yet attayne by grace: he doth meane there, of liuyng commendably, not of liuyng perfectly: which was neuer as yet graunted to any one person in this life (no though he were aided by grace) but to Iesu Christ alone. But ye will demaund agayne, to what end then was the law published? and naturall choyse set out vnto vs, if that choyce be not free to make choyse of these thinges, that are set forth to our Election? I do aunswere. That this complaynt of Nature, might beé not altogether impertinent, if he that gaue the lawes had created the same Nature, such, as we haue at this present. But now whereas he did at the beginning create Nature, vp∣right, and vnspotted: God according to the selfe same Nature, did publishe hys law vnto men, whiche shoulde be holy and vn∣defiled. Neither could he do otherwise: whose commaundemēts if we be not able now in this corruption of Nature to accom∣plish with due obedience, there is no cause why the fault there∣of should be imputed to GOD (who can neyther will nor com∣maund any thing, but that which is most righteous) but we our selues, and our first parentes (Authors of this disobedience) and the Deuill the coūsellor are to be blamed therfore. God cā not be vnlike himselfe. If we become vnlike to our selues, whose fault is it? ours? or his? Furthermore touching the obiection of the blind, and the mā that was bound, hereunto I do aunswere: That the similitude is not in all respectes correspondent, for this cause. For if God had blynded man at the first, or had chay∣ned hym fast with such Roopes of Necessitie, and afterwardes had commaunded hym, whom he made blynde, to keepe the

right pathe, or him whom he had first bounde fast, to reach after∣wardes ouer to the right hand: this were perhappes not altoge∣ther from the purpose, that is cauilled: but now for as much as the cause of this blyndnes was procured by man him selfe, and not sent by God: he is not to be blamed that geueth necessary counsell (to speake as Augustine doth) but he that hath entan∣gled him selfe into such a Necessitie, out of the whiche he can by no meanes vntwyne him selfe agayne.

* 1.39A righteous and wise Law geuer doth neuer proclayme such Statutes, the performaunce whereof will exceede the abilitie and capacitie of his subiectes.

God is the most righteous and most wise Law geuer.

Ergo, God in publishyng his law did prescribe nothyng beyond the capacitie and abilitie of his owne Crea∣tures.

* 1.40I do aunswere vnto the Maior, two maner of wayes. First: That the same is true in deéde, in those lawes whiche were esta∣blished of the Lawgeuer, to this onely ende, that the subiectes should exactly performe the same. But albeit GOD did desire this thyng chiefly, that all men should precisely and throughly obserue his Ordinaunces, yet besides this consideration, there are many other endes and causes.* 1.41 1. That the Iudgement and wrath of God agaynst Sinne should be made manifest. 2. That we might be more easily brought to the acknowledgemēt of our Sinnes and weakenesse. 3. Thyrdly, that vnderstandyng our weakenes the more we feéle our selues more heauyly oppressed with this burden, the more sharpely we should be prouoked (as with the Schoolemaisters rodde) to fleé vnto Christ, who is the end of the law. 4. That by this Schoolyng, as it were, we may learne what way we ought to take, that if it be not geuen vs at the least to atteyne the full, and absolute obedience of the law, yet that begynnyng to be obedient, we may profitte as much as we may.

Secundaryly we do confesse, that the Maior is true in res∣pect of those lawes, for the due obseruation of the which, there is no cause to the cōtrary, either by the Lawgeuer, or in nature it selfe, but such as appeareth rather in the Subiectes: Whose onely fault, and disorderous licentiousnes procureth the breach

therof. As for example. If a Prince do sende foorth an Ambas∣sadour in all respectes whole, sounde, and well enstructed, to whom afterwardes he geueth in commaundement to put some matter in execution, which he might very easily bryng to passe vnlesse through his owne default, and disorder he made him selfe lame, halte, or vnable to execute the commaundement of his Prince. Now, if this Ambassadour for want of health, and strēgth become vnable to execute his Embassie, ought y^e Prince to be blamed for it? or the Ambassadour rather, who by his owne folly hath disabled him selfe? And that is it that Augustine doth seéme to emply in his booke De perfectione Iustit.* 1.42 Nay rather for this cause (sayth he) the man is blameworthy, that he can not per∣fittly doe his duetie, nor liue without Sinne: bycause by mans owne will it came to passe, that hee should be driuen to that Necessitie, which could not afterwardes be shaken of agayne by mās will alone.

Thyrdly here is to be noted, that there be foure maner of meanes or wayes to obserue the law. 1. Either by the force of our owne strength: and by this meanes the greatnesse of our strength is ouercome by the law. 2. Or by the helpe of some o∣ther: And so nothyng withstandeth, but that we may fulfill the commaundementes of the law. 3. Or by the operation of the ho∣ly Ghost in vs, to make vs to lyue godly. 4. Or by Imputation through fayth in the Mediatour, who freély forgeueth our im∣perfection, and iustifieth the Sinner and wicked also.

All sinne is voluntary.* 1.43

Ergo, No man sinneth of Necessitie.

Here must be a distinction added in these wordes Will and Necessitie.* 1.44 If Necessitie be taken in this place for coaction, then is the consequent true: but if it be taken for euery vnchaū∣geablenesse, which of it selfe can not be otherwise altered, then is the Argument faulty. Moreouer in the Antecedent. If the word Will be taken for a sounde Will & able enough of it selfe, such as was in y^e first creation of nature, the consequēt were not amisse, and was true in deéde in Adam. But if we take it for that Will, which is in vs now defiled, and full of corruption, the Argumēt concludeth no Necessitie at all, no more thē if a man should ar∣gue on this wise.

Euery man by nature is two footed.

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Ergo, Euery man may goe.

If Nature here be meant for sounde, the Argument is good: but if it haue relation to one sicke of the palsey, or to a maymed mā, or one that is bounde with roapes, beyng fallen in the hands of theéues: your selfe will deny the Argument. And why so? not bycause man is not two footed by nature (if ye regarde his first creation) but bycause this nature is woūded through the disobe∣dience of our first parētes, and maymed altogether: so that now either we haue no feét•• at all, or they be not sounde surely: or if they be hoale and soūde, they are not at libertie to treade on the groūde, but fast bounde by theéues, and are holden, captiuate vn∣der Sinne: so that either we be not able to go at all, or at least lesse able to treade the right tracke that we ought to doe, vnlesse the holy Samaritane come, and let lowse our bandes, namely: the assistyng Grace of Christ Iesu, of y^t which Augustine spea∣keth very notably.* 1.45 If we will mainteyne Freewill (sayth he) lot vs not gaynsay that, from whence will taketh her Freedome: for he that denyeth Grace, whereby it is made free, either to eschue euill or to do good, is willing to continue still in bondage. &c. And ther∣fore when we debate or dispute of Will: the question must not be referred to nature it selfe, but rather to the corruptiō of nature.

* 1.46There is no Necessitie of sinning where will hath a free∣dome to doe.

All men are endued with a Freewill to doe.

Ergo, There is no Necessitie of sinnyng in men.

* 1.47Where Freédome of Will is, there is no Necessitie of Sin∣nyng, this propositiō is false. For there is not such a repugnaū∣cie betwixt Will and Necessitie:* 1.48 whosoeuer sinneth freély, the same also sinneth voluntaryly. No man is enforced to Sinne, but is drawen to wickednesse by the enticementes of his owne will, and not by any foreine constrainte. Chrisostome:* 1.49 He that draweth, draweth him that is willing. Wherfore if our owne will do carry vs headlong to Sinne, let vs not Impute it to Neces∣sitie, but to lust.

And therfore to make a distinction of these thynges (Osori∣us) and that ye may be satisfied, if it be possible. Voluntary and Necessary are not opposite. For they may both light together at one tyme in Will. When Will enlightened by the inspiration

of the holy Ghost, doth earnestly couet after euerlastyng lyfe: this it doth of Necessitie in deéde, yet neither vnwillyngly, nor cōstrayned thereunto: for it cā not come to passe by any meanes, that will may be any tyme enforced to will that, whiche it will not. Nay rather Augustine is of this opinion, that it standeth as much agaynst the conueniencie of reason, for man to will the thyng that he will not, as if a mā would contend, that any thyng could be hoate without heate.

And yet that Necessitie in the meane tyme wherewith wic∣ked men are sayd to Sinne, is not so absolute, and vnauoydea∣ble, as that they can not chuse but continue in their wickednesse. For assoone as the holy Ghost,* 1.50 and the grace of Christ preuēteth them, that chayne of that Necessitie is forthwith broken in peéces. And therfore Augustine doth say, that it proceédeth of na∣ture to be able to haue fayth, hope and charitie, but to haue thē in deéde commeth vtterly of Grace. For that power and habili∣tie is not put in execution, vnlesse Grace be geuen from aboue. And thus farre forth Augustine did agreé with Pelagius, that to be able, commeth of nature: but Augustine addeth withall, that Pelagius would not agreé vnto. That to will well and to liue well, must be ascribed onely to grace.

Nothyng ought to be accompted for sinne, which doth not depende vpon the free choyse of man.* 1.51

This is true,* 1.52 if it be taken of that kynde of Sinne, that is called the punishment of sinne. For otherwise Originall sinne is neyther voluntary, nor vndertaken of any choyse.

If you be willing and be obedient,* 1.53 ye shall eate the fatte of the earth.

But if you will not, nor will be obedient, the sword shal deuour you, for the mouth of the Lord hath spoken it.

Ergo, It is in mans power both to will, and not to will.

Augustine.* 1.54 The whole law is full of such conditions. And these Commaundementes were geuen to suppresse the pryde of Arro∣gant persons by way of sufferaunce, vnder a colour, vntill the seede should come that was promised.* 1.55 That is to say. That men should be tyed to the commaundementes whiche otherwise presumed proudly before of their owne strength, In the accomplishing of the whiche man faynting, and made to quayle in hys owne conceipte, he shoulde

be forced to flee, to the deliuerer and Sauiour. And so being ter∣rified by the rigour of the Law, should by the same Lawe, as by a schoolemaister be conducted to fayth, and to grace. &c. This much Augustine.

* 1.56Sinne is eyther of Will or of Necessitie: if it be of Neces∣sitie: then doth Osorius deny it to be sinne, if it be of Will: then may it be auoydeable.

Augustine maketh aunswere. That sinne is not of Nature simply, but of Nature corrupted, and of will depraued: where∣vpon ensueth vnauoydeable Necessitie to dwell in sinne vntill a Release be sealed, and deliuered from the Grace of GOD through Iesus Christ our Lord. And therefore that man may be acquited of this Necessitie, he is to be called vpon, vnto whom the Psalmist cryeth out. Set me at libertie O Lord from my Ne∣cessities.&c.

* 1.57God doth neyther forbid nor commaund any thing in vayne.

He shoulde prohibite in vayne, if the thynges that are contayned in the Lawe might not be eschued or ful∣filled by vs.

Ergo, We be of power to accomplishe or to eschew the things which God doth commaund or prohibite.

* 1.58Augustine doth aunswere. The whole Lawe which is compre∣hended in these two commaundementes, in not coueting, and in louing: To do good, and to eschew euill, doth com̄maund things that ought to be done in deede, and forbiddeth the contrary: nor so much because that we are of power and abilitie to accomplishe the same of our selues, but because when as man feeleth hys owne disa∣bilitie and weakenes to performe them, he shoulde not swell nor be pufft vppe with pryde, but beyng weryed and faynt in his trauaile, should seeke for relief at Christs handes: and so the law holding him in a couenable feare, should in stead of a schoolemaister leade to the loue of Christ.

* 1.59God doth commaund nothing but that which is in our power to performe.

God doth commaund spirituall thinges chiefly.

Ergo, Thinges that be most spirituall are in our power.

* 1.60The Maior were true, if the will were sound, or such as was

at the first, in the first man Adam, before the fall whiche was of power to enforce her selfe wholy to the keeping of the lawe, nowe sithence all the powers of the soule are weakened, and vn∣effectuall altogether to do any good, we must seek for abilitie y^t may satisfy the law in heauen, and not in our selues.

If man were not of power to be obedient,* 1.61 God shoulde enstruct and exhort in vayne.

In vayne I confesse: if he should vse none other meanes, but externall preceptes to lead to the true profiting in Godlines.* 1.62 But as now, sithence he maketh hys doctrine effectuall through the inspiration of the holy Ghost, it is farre of, that his dotrine should be fruitlesse.

God commaundeth nothing that is out of our power.* 1.63

True it is, if you meane of that power, not which is engraf∣fed in our naturall corruptiō, but that power wh God doth geue to hys holy ones peculiarly from aboue.

In the conuersione of a sinner God himselfe doth not by hys own will cōuert him alone,* 1.64 but doth allure and exhort hym, that he may cōuert hymself: for in much lenity & pati∣ent suffering, he doth not punish hym, but graūteth space & place of repentance. & prouokīg solliciting, & pricking him forward to repentaunce, vseth many occasions exhortati∣ons, and corrections. And therefore it is our part to be con∣uerted, and to tourne agayne, and hys office to receaue the sinner that retourneth, and to quicken him.

The collusion,* 1.65 and fallax of thys reason, is in the insuffici∣ent nombring of partes, or deriued from the cause insufficient: for albeit God do work all these in the conuersion of a sinner, yet doth he not vse these externall meanes onely, but ministreth also in the meane space the motione of the harte withall, and the in∣spiration of a secret renouation.

In the regeneration and conuersion of man euery of vs haue of our selues sufficiently to be obedient to the calling.* 1.66

It is in euery man I confesse: but not of euery man,* 1.67 but pro∣ceédeth frō an other, who calleth inwardly before that man doth outwardly obey.

The Tridentine Fathers doe obiect that man may refuse to geue hys consent, and to reiect grace when it is offred.* 1.68

* 1.69That is true in deede, and to true: Neyther doth any man Imagine that Grace is so thrust vppon man in hys conuersion, as though he shoulde be constrayned to receaue it, whether hee would or no: which neyther he can refuse, though he will. But this is the meaning hereof. That the holyghost with hys secret effectuall operation, doth so enlighten the hartes of hys elect y^t the Grace (which he graunteth of hys owne liberalitie) shalbe receaued, that the will cannot choose but receaue it, with an har∣ty desire and earnest willingnesse, yea most ioyfully and gladly. But if it happen that grace be forsaken, that proceadeth from the corruption of our own fleshe, and our naturall faultines na∣turally engraffed within vs.

* 1.70 Agayne, it is also in our power to geue our consent.

In vs in deede, but not of our selues as Augustine reporteth, who sayth that grace doth not finde good will in vs, but doth make them to be good. &c. And in an other place. Who ronneth to the Lord for Grace, but whose foot steppes are directed thereunto by the Lord? And therefore to craue the assistaunce of Grace is the very beginning of Grace.

God hath set before all men indifferently a ctrteine ge∣nerall grace and promise and a free desire of choyse,* 1.71 that all men may conceaue it that will.

* 1.72 We do not deny, that we haue altogether a generall grace of God, that calleth vs to eternall saluation. But this must be con∣fessed withall, that Grace to embrace the thinges whereunto we are called, is not graunted to all ingenerall without excep∣tion, but distributed by a certayne peculiar Election, and Pre∣destination of God to some: whereby it commeth to passe, that it is not in euery mans power y^e will, to refuse, or take hold fast of this grace, so generally offered, but in their power, vnto whom it is geuen, for to take or refuse Grace offered, is not in our own power. Otherwise what place were left for Gods Election, be∣fore the foundation of the world were layde? If our will were a a rule of hys Election, or the cause and beginning of our salua∣tion. And therefore this their cauillation, that God doth receaue them that will be receaued, and doth reiect them, that will not be receaued, is vntrue. It had bene more agreable with reason, to beginne rather at the Grace of God, then at our owne will, and

it had bene more conuenient, to haue sayd, that the Grace of God is graunted vs, to the end we may will those thinges, that he commaundeth vs: and that such as forsake it, are worthely re∣iected in deede: but in that, y^t they are forsaken cōmeth hereof, be∣cause they are not first holpen, that they may be able to receaue

If all the worke of our conuersione be in God onely,* 1.73 & that our endeuour auayle nothing thereunto, what remay∣neth then for vs but that we must become no better then stocks and stoanes.

There is none of vs that affirmeth that men do nothing to∣wardes their conuersion.* 1.74 This is it that we do affirme, that men when they be conuerted, do consent to the worde of God, do loue, do wish and earnestly desire to be saued. But yet we do call these the effectes, not the causes of mercy, who beyng now made the Uessells of mercy, could neuerthelesse not haue bene able of thē∣selues to bryng to passe that they should haue attayned the first & primitiue Election of God.

August. sayth that men are worthely cast away for sinne.

Ergo,* 1.75 On the contrary: if men are reiected for their sinnes why should they not aswell be predestinate for their good workes.

Augustine doth not meane here that reprobation that is cō∣trary to predestination,* 1.76 but vnder this reprobation, he doth vn∣derstand the last end & effect of Reprobation, namely damnatiō. And in this sence it is true y^t men are dāned for their sinnes, not forsaken: as they are neyther predestinate for their good works.

Luther and Caluine doth deny, that it is in mans power before grace receaued to seeke and desire it: But Augustine affirmeth the contrary.

Nay rather what is more common in Augustines mouth then these speaches?* 1.77 Couldest thou be conuerted vnlesse thou were called? Did not he that called thee back agayne, bring to passe that thou shouldest be cōuerted? And agayn do not presume vpō thy cō∣uersion, for vnlesse he had called the back agayne, thou couldest not haue bene conuerted. And in an other place. God doth not onely make willing of the vnwilling, but maketh also obedient of such as are stifnecked and stubborne.

The doctours of the popish faction, although deny not

that nature is very much corrupted in originall sinne,* 1.78 yet yeald they not thys much, that man can do nothyng els but sinne: Neyther that any thing els is taken away from Na∣ture, besides the supernaturall gift onely, whereby Nature might haue bene made more perfect, if it had not fallen. And therefore that Nature was beautified with those super∣naturall giftes, of the which she is now spoiled: the naturall power and abilitie of will, remayning in her force notwith∣standing.

This is most vntrue: whereas Nature and will it selfe, not by alteration of Substaunce,* 1.79 but by accesse of sinne and dispo∣sition, is so depraued and reuolted from God, so weakened and spoyled through it own operation, as y^t it may be not conuerted, but by the onely grace of God, hauing of her self no part in thys work, but as farre forth, as it is preuented by God: Whereup∣on Augustine doth witnes. That will doth not goe before, but is handmayd to well doyng: Wherefore the same Nature and sub∣staunce of will, remayneth still, not chaunged into a new shape by Gods creation, but defiled with the corruption and filthe of Nature. The same affections also do remayne that were before (in respect of their substaūce) but in respect of their disposition, they be so putrified and stincking, that nothing can be found in them now, that bringeth not with it some matter of filthines.

Who soeuer is holpen, he doth worke somewhat toge∣ther with hym that helpeth hym,* 1.80 and suffereth not him self to be applyed meerely passiuely.

Will beyng not renued is holpen of Grace.

Ergo, Freewill euen sithence the first creation seemeth to bring much to passe, and not to be altogether applyed passiuely.

In the Maior proposition should haue bene added, perse by it selfe.* 1.81 For what soeuer worketh by it selfe, hauing the help of an other, is not altogether plyed passiuely: but with this excep∣tion, the Minor must be denyed, for freedome of choyse, when as it selfe neuer preuenteth grace following her, but is altogether holpen of Grace goyng before, (according to the testimony of Augustine) what can it bryng to passe at all of it selfe? Or if it can do any thing at all by it selfe, that whiche it is able to doe,

it doth in morall good thinges: externall, and ciuill exercises: certes to deserue eternall lyfe, to purchase the fauour of God, Saluation, Iustification, and the euerlasting kingdome, Freé∣will is altogether vneffectuall: but is a meere sufferer onely, nor hath any thing, but that which it hath receaued, and is altoge∣ther vnprofitable: yea when it hath done all that it can possibly do. And this is it, that Luther seemeth to stand vpon.

Let hym be accursed that will say that God commaun∣deth thynges impossible.* 1.82

Melancton doth aunswere:* 1.83 what soeuer were the occasion of this saying, surely those wh vouch y^e same, & so busily vrge it, seéme voyde of vnderstanding in y^e causes why y^e law of God was geuen: worldly wisedome supposeth y^t lawes are published onely because they should be obserued. But the Lawe of y^e Lord was ordayned for this cause chiefly, y^t the Iudgement and wrath of God should be layd open agaynst sinne: y^t it should conuince vs of wickednes, and increase the horror therof, y^t wickednes might be restrayned from to much licensiousnes: that putting vs in re∣mēbraunce of our own weakenes & frayltie, it should in steed of a schoole master enstruct vs to Christ, as it is declared before.

And there was no lye found in their mouthes. Apoc. 14. to this August.* 1.84 maketh aunswere, aduertising vs how man may be in this sorte sayd to be true of hys worde through the grace and truth of God (who otherwise of hym selfe without all doubt is a lyer) As is that saying. You were sometymes darck∣nesse but now are ye light in the Lord: when he spake of darcknesse he added not in the Lord: but when he spake of light, he annexed by and by, in the Lord. But Osorius will vrge agaynst vs here: Ergo, Nature beyng holpen through grace (sayth he) may eschew all lying and sinning. To aunswere hereunto agayne out of Augustine, he that will speake so, let hym be well aduised, how he deale with the Lords prayer where we say Lord forgeue vs our Trespasses which we needed not to say, except I be not deceaued If our consents neuer yelded to false speaking, nor to the lust of the flesh. Neyther would the Apostle Iames haue sayd. We are tres∣passers all in many thinges,* 1.85 for that man doth not offend, but he whom flattering lust hath allured to consent contrary to the rule of righteousnes. Thus much Augustine.

* 1.86Out of the wordes of Ieremy. If I speake of any Nation that I may destroy them, and they do repent them &c. And if I say the word that I may plant them, and they tourn a∣way from me &c. vpon this the Romanistes do build as fol∣loweth. Euen as men behaue themselues, such shall the pot∣ters vessels be afterwardes. Ergo, it is false that the Luthe∣ranes teach, that the regard of worke doth fight agaynst Freedome and the power of God in chusing or refusing.

* 1.87 The Prophet doth treate here properly of the punishment & rewardes, which do follow mens workes at the last Iudgemēt, and not of the maner of eternall Electiō, which doth preceéde all our workes, either goyng before (as August. reporteth) which were none at all, or comming after, which were not as yet. If the aduersaries of Luther shall wrest these words of y^e Prophet to the cause of Electiō, as though Gods Electiō goyng before, did depend vpō mens workes that follow after, they do conclude vntruely. For as the Potter in fashionyng his earthē Uessells, hath no regard to y^e merite of the clay, euen so y^e purpose of God in the rule of his Electiō, is free frō all respect of workes. And therfore Paule doth resemble the same of the power of y^e Potter. But if they will trāslate the same to y^e punishments & rewardes of workes, in this respect we confesse they say true, euen as mē behaue thēselues, so shall they finde their Creator affectioned to∣wardes them: Yet in such sort neuertheles, that if any vertue or cōmendation be in y^e Uessell, that may moue to please: the same confesse, that it commeth not of it selfe, but of the free liberality of the Potter: on the contrary, if it haue any thing worthy of pu∣nishment, then to yelde that this proceedeth from themselues, and not from the Potter: For he made Nature at the beginning whole, sound, and vpright. Afterwardes came in vgly defor∣mitie wilfully and voluntarily defiled through originall sinne.

* 1.88 God hath no regard but to the poore and contrite in Spirite.

Ergo, The Grace of God is not promised to any but to such as are prepared thereunto before.

* 1.89 True it is, that none but humble in spirite are capable of Gods Grace: But from whence commeth this Iowlines, and humble reuerence towards God: truely not from the Nature of

our corrupted flesh (which is wont alwayes to be the Mother of pryde) but from the onely gift of the holy Ghost: Whereupon if any man vrge, that there ought to go some preparation in man before, apt to receaue the grace of God: neyther will the Luthe∣ranes deny this, but so, that they also confesse with Augustine that the same commeth to passe, not by the direction of our Freé∣will, but by reformation and renewing of the holy Ghost.

Forasmuch as the cause of all men is generall and the e∣state indifferent,* 1.90 as the Lutheranes do say.

Ergo, There is no cause not reason, why God in the choise of man should preferre some before othersome, and se∣perate some from othersome.

S. Paule rendereth this cause for vnreproueable I will haue mercy (sayth he) on whom I will haue mercy.* 1.91 Aunswering, as it were, to this same obiection, that thys commeth to passe, not because God findeth any cause in man, but for that he onely, re∣ceaueth hym of hys owne mercy.

I will not the death of a sinner,* 1.92 but rather that he be cō∣uerted in liue.

If this saying be referred to the secret will of Gods good pleasure: how is it then, that such will not be conuerted, nor fleé from Damnation, whom the almighty will of God both would haue to be saued, and can make able also to be saued? But if it be vnderstanded of hys reuealed will, which is called Volunt as Signi:* 1.93 what maruell is it if such will not be saued, but perish be∣sides the will of God, which are left to the power of their owne Freéwill, by the secret and vnsearcheable will of God?

What soeuer is voluntary may be auoyded.

* 1.94

Synne is voluntary.

Ergo, Sinne nay be auoyded.

This is aūswered before out of Aug. The Maior were true if it be vnderstāded of nature beyng soūde:* 1.95 but now nature is woū∣ded & defiled, either bycause it doth not seé, by reasō of her blynd∣nes, or bycause it doth not performe, by reasō of her weakenes.

God would not commaūde the thynges which he knew man could not do.

* 1.96

Augustine maketh aunswere.* 1.97 And who is ignoraunt here∣of? but he doth therfore commaunded some thynges, which we are

not able,* 1.98 bycause we may know, what we ought to craue at his hāds.

Where Nature and Necessitie beare rule, there is no iust crime in Sinnyng.

The Lutherans do teach that Sinne doth cleaue fast with in vs by nature, and that of very Necessitie.

Ergo. Accordyng to the Lutheranes doctrine there shal∣be no iust crime in Synnyng.

* 1.99 And hereunto aunswere is made before. In the Maior I do distinguish Nature and Necessitie. If it haue relation to Na∣ture that was sounde and Necessitie of coaction, true it is, that there is no accusation of iust crime of Sinne to be layed there. But if it meane Nature corrupt, and Necessitie of inuincible and vnchaungeable bondage, it is false, of which Necessitie Augustine speaketh. But now faultynesse punishable ensuyng did make a Necessitie of Freédome.* 1.100

There is no reason to make it Sinne, where is no power to be able to auoyde it.

I do aūswere that it was true in Adam, who cōmitted that, whiles nature was sounde,* 1.101 which he might haue eschued: but in vs not so: who in this corrupted and forsorne nature now, whe∣ther we may auoyde it, or not auoyde it, yet doth Sinne follow vs of Necessitie. For if will could eschue Sinne, yet can it not cleare it selfe from sinne of her selfe, and of her own abilitie, but onely through the assistaunce of helpyng grace: whereupon will deserueth no commendation, though it can cleare it selfe: but if it eschue not the sinne which it might eschue, so much the more doth it aggrauate the trespasse. And why commeth not forth a∣ny one such at the length, which can or dare boldly professe, that he hath euer eschued the sinne, that these Iacke braggers boast so much may be auoyded? on the contrary although will can not escape from Sinne, yet doth it not therfore cease to be Sinne, bycause it sucked this imbecillitie, not from nature (wherein it was created at the first) but from him, whiche might haue bene without Sinne, if he had would.

* 1.102

No mā lacketh the Grace of God, but he that will cow∣ardly faynte of hym selfe.

* 1.103 True it is: but to make mā not to be faynt harted in him self, it is neédefull that the grace of God be present first, without the

which all our good will is vneffectuall. Moreouer whoso beyng holpen with grace, doth begyn to will well, & to endeuour well is not now altogether a coward crauen: but he that is faynt har∣ted, is therfore faynte harted, bycause he was not assisted with the effectuall Grace of God.

God doth constrayne no man forcibly.* 1.104

I do graūt: but that they may be made willyng,* 1.105 he doth first of vnwilling, make them willyng, & draweth such as are stiffe∣necked, to become inclinable: creating new hartes within them, & renewyng a new Spirite within their bowels, to make them tractable, and willyng seruauntes for hym selfe.

But thou accordyng to the hardnesse of thy hart,* 1.106 doest procure to thy selfe vengeaunce.

The Apostle speaketh here of the externall blessing, or cal∣lyng of God: which he exercizeth indifferently, aswell towardes the good, as towardes the euill: and not of the spirituall Grace of Regeneration, wherewith he doth peculiarly seale, and esta∣blish his Elect vnto hym selfe.

The Grace of God is none otherwise effectuall,* 1.107 then as we be not sluggish or retchelesse to vse his helpe offe∣red vnto vs.

Ergo, It is in our power either to receaue the Grace of God offered vnto vs, or els not to receaue it.

I deny the Argument. For where the effectuall Grace of God is (which worketh in vs not onely by outward callyng,* 1.108 but also by the inward renewyng and earnest motion of the mynde, as Augustine writeth to Simplician) there can be no defect of will. And agayne, wheresoeuer is any want of will, there is not Gods effectuall Grace, which is comprehēded within these two partes outward callyng, and inward drawyng. So that the recea∣uyng of grace, is within vs in deéde, yet commeth not of our sel∣ues but of the grace of God. But the Refusall of Grace, is both in vs, and of vs: and yet in such wise, as that beyng left ouer to our owne weakenesse, we are not able to doe otherwise of our selues.

There is obiected out of Augustine Hypognosticon 3. booke.* 1.109 That we haue lost our freedome not to will: but to be able, and to performe.

* 1.110 First by y^t consent of y^e learned, it is certeine y^t this booke was neuer made by August. 2. the aduersaries do not interprete it a∣right. 3. let y^e premisses be ioyned w^t that which followeth. For he doth cōfesse, y^t there is a Freewill hauyng Iudgemēt of reason in deéde, not by wh it may be apt either to begyn, or to end any god∣ly action w^tout God, but onely in the actions of this present life. And forthwith followeth in the same August. When we speake of Freewill, we do not treate of one part of man onely, but of whole mā altogether. &c. Whereupō their errour is cōdēned, which do af∣firme y^t corruptiō is wholy includeth within y^e flesh: whereas by testimony of y^e same Aug. corruption hath defiled y^t inward pow∣ers of y^e soule likewise: whereupō he speaketh in y^e same place on this wise: Freewill beyng defiled, the whole mā is defiled: wherfore without helpe of the Grace of God, he is neither able to begin to do any thyng that may be acceptable vnto God, nor yet to performe it.

* 1.111The Scripture doth euery where describe the Freedome of will. Where it testifieth: that God will render to euery man accordyng to his deseruyng: whereas it cōteyneth or∣dinaunces and preceptes of good lyfe: where it exhorteth euery where to godlynes: forbyddeth to sinne: and threate∣neth punishment: Out of all whiche it is most assured, that the power of freewill is declared.

* 1.112 If the whole Scriptures treate altogether euery where of these, where be the premisses then? First as touchyng merites Augustine doth Aunswere: Woe be vnto the lyfe of man thought neuer so commendable, if God deale with vs after our deseruynges. As cōcernyng reward, he doth aunswere after the same maner: That reward is geuē in deede, to them that deserue it, but yet so as to deserue, is geuen first from the grace of God, and proceedeth not from mans Freewill, vnto whō reward is geuen afterwardes. That is to say, Grace for Grace as Augustine sayth. Moreouer as cō∣cernyng the preceptes and commaundementes: in deéde GOD doth commaunde vs to walke in them, but he doth promise that he will bryng to passe, that we may walke in thē: that is to say, that he will geue vs both a mynde, and feéte to walke withall.

* 1.113Where a Recompence is made, there is a consideration of merite.

* 1.114Nay rather the conclusion would haue bene more correspō∣dent

on this wise. Where Recompence doth follow, there doth consideration of obedience goe before. For of Obedience the Argument is good enough, but of Merite starke naught.

Where Recompence is, there is regarde had both of O∣bediēce and of Merite,* 1.115 out of the Maister of Sentēces. Wher∣upon they argue on this maner.

Hope doth not trust to the mercy of God onely, but to our Merites also.

And therfore to hope beyng voyde of Merites: is not to hope, but to presume, as they affirme.

This Treatize here toucheth Merites and Obediēce both.* 1.116 I aunswere vnto both. First of Obedience, the Assertion may be graunted. But that Obedience is ment here, that is made acceptable to God, and proceédeth not from the will, and abili∣tie of our Freéwill, but from the grace of GOD onely. But of Merite, if the worthynesse of the worke be regarded, we doe vt∣terly deny it: if they vnderstand of Obedience approued and acceptable in the sight of GOD, we doe not striue agaynst them, so that they will reknowledge this much agayne, that this Obedience of ours, how ready soeuer it be, doth not spryng from our owne abilitie, but that we ought to acknowledge it (as a gift receaued by the benefite of the heauenly Grace) to be his gift onely, and none others. Agaynst this Masterlyke sentence I will set downe the opinion of Basile. He that trusteth not in himselfe,* 1.117 neither looketh to be iustified by workes, that man hath the hope of Saluation reposed onely in the mercies of God. Augu∣stine, disputyng agaynst the Pelagians, which did say, that the same Recōpence which shalbe geuen in the ende, is a reward of good workes going before, doth aūswere: That this may be graū∣ted vnto them, if they likewise agayne would confesse, that those good workes were the gifts of God, and not the proper actiōs of mē: for those that are such, that is to say, proper vnto men, are euill: but yet are good giftes of God. &c. Whereupō in an other place. If thy merites (sayth he) come of thy selfe,* 1.118 they be euill, and for that cause are they not crowned: and therefore that they may be good, they must be the giftes of God. And agayne writyng to Sixtus. Be there no merites of righteous men? yeas truly: Bycause they be righteous men: but their merites brought not to passe, that they

were made righteous. For they be made righteous, when they be Iustified: but after the maner of the Apostles teachyng: Freely Iu∣stified through the Grace of Christ. And agayne writyng vpon the 94. Psalme.* 1.119 If GOD would deale accordyng to mens deser∣uynges, he should not finde any thyng, but that he might of very Iu∣stice vtterly condemne. &c.

But these sayinges, bycause they apperteyne to the Iudge∣ment of yeldyng Reward, do concerne our cause nothyng at all, who do not create now of the last Iudgement, but of the Grace of Election properly:* 1.120 Whiche grace whosoeuer will say is geuen accordyng to the proportion of deseruynges, Augustine doth call the same a most pernitious errour.

* 1.121It is Furthermore obiected that Augustine writyng vn∣to Prosper and Hyllary doth not onely in the very title of the booke ioyne Freewill with Grace, but also heapyng a nomber of Arguments together doth very earnestly ende∣uour to confirme, that man hath Freewill.

* 1.122I do confesse that Augustine in these bookes, as many tymes otherwise, doth by certeyne Argumentes framed out of holy Scriptures teache. Freewill, and withall ioyne it with Grace. But such Argumentes are they, as him selfe afterwardes con∣futeth. Moreouer consideration must be had in what wise he doth ioyne both these together, & how he doth part them a sūder agayne.* 1.123 They that doe fortifie Grace in such wise, as that mās Freewill may in no sense be admitted withall, doe not Iudge therof rightly. For mans will whether it be good, or whether it be euill, doth neuer cease to be after a certeyne sort Free: either Free to righteousnes, or Free to Sinne: which if it be good, she receaueth her goodnes of Grace: if it be euill, she sucketh that e∣uill of her selfe: and therfore sucketh it of her selfe, bycause it is seuered from Grace. Furthermore it must be cōsidered, in what sence Augustine doth construe Freewill: Surely if our aduersa∣ries doe interprete Freewill after this sence, as though it cōtey∣ned in her owne power, a Free election of chusing good, or euill: they swarue altogether from Augustines interpretatiō. Who by this vocable Freewill seémeth to signifie nothyng els, then that will onely, which worketh those thynges voluntaryly, that it worketh, whether they be good, or euill.

An other Obiection out of Augustine:* 1.124 Beleue the holy Scrip∣tures both that there is Freewill, and the grace of GOD, without whose helpe man can neither be conuerted to God, nor profite with God. Agayne out of his 2. Epistle to Valentine. The Catholicke fayth doth neuer deny Freewill either towards good life or towards euill life. Neither doth it attribute so much vnto it, as that it may be of any value without the grace of God, whether it be conuerted out of euill into good, or whether it continue profityng in good, or whether it attayne to the euerlasting good: whereas now it feareth not least it quayle and waxe faynte. &c.

What is meant els by these wordes of Augustine,* 1.125 but that vnder the name of Freewill,* 1.126 that will be vnderstanded in man, which is capable aswell of euill, as of good: and may be euill of it selfe, through corruption of Nature, but good onely by refor∣mation of Grace.

All actions that men take in hand do proceade frō God the first mouer and ruler,* 1.127 as from the first cause thereof accordyng to Luthers doctrine.

All sinnes are actions.

Ergo, After the Lutheranes doctrine, all sinnes doe pro∣ceade from God as from the chief and first cause.

First in the Maior this word Actions must be distinguished.* 1.128 Some Actions are Naturall, some are Deuine, and Superna∣turall. Now if the Maior haue respect to these Actions,* 1.129 then is the Maior true, and the Minor to be denyed. For the Maior doth not meane properly these Actions which are not of nature, but agaynst nature: of which sort are sinnes, and the Actiōs of wic∣ked Spirites: or if it do meane those Actions, it may be denyed. There is besides the••e a thyrdkynde of Action, which is called a Freé and voluntary Action. I call it Freé for this cause, wher∣by will is willingby euill, without all coaction as August. wit∣nesseth. And these kyndes of Actions, which are proper and pe∣culiar to man, doe proceade from will, as from the nearest and most proper cause, although not altogether without the proui∣dence and ministery of God, which as it powreth it selfe abroad through out all maner of thyngs, by a certeine secret influence, beyond all reach of capacitie, euen so doth it encline, and make plyable the very wills of men, to whatsoeuer purposes it plea∣seth

him. Yet so notwithstādyng, as that no man is constrayned thereunto by this inclination. For neither is any man compel∣led to be euill agaynst his will, when he doth naughtyly, except he will him selfe. So that now it is neédelesse for any man to seéke for the cause of Sinne, without him selfe, as Caluine tru∣ly teacheth. But Osorius doth obiect here agayne.

* 1.130Whosoeuer doth entice and allure an other to wicked∣nesse, is as much in faulte, as he that is allured thereun∣unto: at the least is not voyde of blame.

God doth moue and prouoke mens wills to do haynous offences after the Lutheranes doctrine.

Ergo, God him selfe accordyng to the Lutheranes, as the first motioner and cause of euill, can not be cleare of faulte.

* 1.131The Maior is true there, where both he that doth allure & he that is allured, are lead both by one kynde of cōsent, are hol∣den both together vnder one selfe cōditiōs, & haue both regarde to one selfe ende in their doyng. But now all these thynges doe chaunce farre otherwise in God, then in men. For as God doth worke nothing, but that which is wrought w^t a maruelous pure, & sincere will (who cā will nothyng but that which is most good) euen so doth he attempt nothyng at any tyme, but that he may doe of his most Freé Iustice, nor is tyed to any conditions or lawes: Now where no law is, there neither is any Sinne at all. For Sinnes properly are defined, not so much by the bare acti∣ons, as by the conditions, lawes, and endes. At a word, to make this matter more discernable. God cōmaunded Abraham that he should kill his Sonne: if any other had cōmaunded the same, or if the Father had attempted to do the same, at any others cō∣maundement, he had ••urely sinned. But now sithe it was the Lordes Commaundement, neither was there any sinne in him that did commaunde, neither in him that did assent, no though he had slayne him in deéde. What ••hall we say of this? That the same Father of heauē and earth, when he gaue his onely begot∣ten sonne to be flayne, yea altogether vndeseruyng it (for this Tragedy was not played surely without his hand and secrete counsell) shall we therefore say that he sinned,* 1.132 bycause in this worke he willed the same that the murtherers dyd? For neither

was his cōsent absent, nor sene••ed frō their will which did Cru∣cifie the Sonne of God, ne yet his ordinaunce: yet was this ordinaūce of his cleare from sinne notwithstādyng, but their fu∣ry lacked not sinne. In deéde his consentyng will dyd will the same, that they willed: But not after the same sort, & for a farre other maner of end. For in them that dyd Crucifie Christ ap∣peareth a treble Argumēt, & playne demonstration of Sinne. First, bycause they brake the lawes, that were commaunded thē contrary to all equitie & right. Agayne for that they layed vio∣lent handes vpon the innocent, beyng enflamed with malice and despight: wherein also they did not respect any other end, but to embrue their madd murtheryng handes with innocent bloud, to establish thereby their arrogaunt ambitiō. All which were farre otherwise in God. For first, who euer limited any lawes for God which he might not breake? Wherfore beyng Freé from all law, he neither did any thyng here, nor at any tyme els can doe any thyng, that is not in all respectes, most lawfull for him to doe. And yet neither did the Father here so procure the death of his Sonne, but that y^e Sonne him selfe did volūtaryly of his own ac∣cord yeld therūto. Moreouer in this y^e fathers will was nothing amisse: in his ordinaunce nothyng malicious, in y^e end nothyng but most glorious, & for our saluation. For on y^e other side, in all this actiō was wōderfully vttered & expressed his most iust Iud∣gemēt agaynst sinne, his most excellēt piety towards his sonne, & his most tēder loue towardes mākinde: For in that he did most sharpely, and w^t seuerest Iustice punish our Sinnes in his owne sonne, he restored him to life & to a most ample kyngdome w^tall, & thereby prouided most fatherly for all our saluatiō generally.

We Read lykewise in the holy Scriptures. It is necessary that offences shall come, it is necessary that heresies be. &c. And it is not to be doughted, but that this Necessitie doth issue frō the ordinaunce of God. And what then? if these offences do chaunce altogether besides the ordinaunce of GOD how then doe they chaunce of Necessitie? Agayne if they happen by the ordinaūce of GOD, how shall we then defende the goodnesse of GOD? Forsooth euen by the same meanes, that I spake of before: For if he which dyd foreordeyne those offences were alyke af∣fectioned, and of the same mynde, nor dyd respect any other ende

then the persons themselues do from whom those offences doe aryse, there should nothing withstand, but that he should be in the self same fault: and in all respectes as blameworthy as they. But nowe sithe there is so great diuersitie betwixt them in the maner of doyng, and the respect of the end: hereby it commeth to passe, that in one selfe action: that which is committed by mē is a most haynous cryme: and in that which commeth of GOD appeareth most euidently a wonderfull commendation of Iu∣stice, and pyety. But here is yet a very great knott in thys bullrush: whereupon Osorius scrapeth agayne very busily.

* 1.133To cōfesse this to be true, that offences and heresies must aryse by men: yet forasmuch as their willes are not other∣wise ordered, but by the guyding and leading of Gods di∣rection: it can not be denyed, but that God hymselfe as (one that doth suggest some matter first) must be accomp∣ted for an Abettour or furtherer: for whosoeuer shall be the cause of any other cause or action, euē the same must needs be an accessary to the cryme that is committed.

* 1.134That offences, and other sondry inconueniences of this pre∣sent lyfe, do flow from out the corrupt affections of men, as out of their naturall source and sprynghead, is most true: And a∣gayne, that the willes of men, which way soeuer they bend them selues, are guyded, not without the permissiō and especiall pro∣uidence of God. This is also most true.

Furthermore that the very Will of God, and hys prouidence doe seéme to be in some cause, that offences and inconueniences do aryse, I doe confesse likewise, agreéing herein with August. Well: and what hereof? what if we graunt that God is after a certayne sorte the cause of euill? Ergo, Osorius doth conclude presently vpon the same, that God (as beyng the cause of euill) cannot be excused of blame. But if he do so, hee is at hand that will deny his argument. For it is not a good consequent which is deriued from the cause of offences and euilles, but onely in such offences and sinnes: which are not themselues the very pu∣nishment of sinnes, and reward of trespasse, & where the euills that are committed, be the vttermost effectes of the cause agent: Whereof neyther of them both may be imputed to God. For neyther doth Gods prouidence work in the corrupt affections of

men, as the principall cause vnto the last ende: moreouer ney∣ther are mens wills enclined, or hardened to wickednes, by the operation of God, but where God hath most iust cause so to do, aswell because God doth all thinges to make the excellency of hys power, and Maiesty to appeare more glorious, and to beé wondered at: as also because hee doth harden the hartes of no person, but to thend with sinne to punish the former sinnes, wic∣kednes, and mischieuous facts, that haue bene committed be∣fore, Yea and this also most rightfully. Whereupon August. sayth:* 1.135 this must be grounded and vnremoueable within your hartes. That there is no vnrighteousnes in God. And for thys cause when ye do reade in the holy scriptures, that men are seduced by God, or that their hartes are hardened, dought nothing at all, but that they haue committed before offence enough, for the which they ought worthely to suffer &c. If mans nature be of it selfe so va∣liaunt, as to defend it selfe sufficiently agaynst all stormes, and assaultes of sinne: wherefore then doth he suffer himselfe to beé caryed away, willingly and wittingly, out of the right way? why doth he not preuent all occasions, and temptations, as heé ought to do? why doth he not practize the same courage, that his owne reason inuiteth him vnto? If he cannot, why then (euen from the beginning, throwing ouer boorde the helme of Gods gouernement) did he take vpon hym to be pylote of hys owne course? why did he presume to be wise without God? why was he so arrogant, with so hauty and lofty a courage, to geue the at∣tempt vpon the tree of lyfe, and graspe of the fruit thereof? why being not contented with hys owne simplicitie chose he rather to raunge the field himselfe with the bridle in his teéth, thē to abide the managing of the Lord? who now if were able to gouern him selfe without Gods assistaunce, doth worthely breake hys neck if he fall ouer the rock. If he cannot guyde hys owne wayes, euē for this cause is he worthely forsaken, and spoyled, because him self cast of of God beyng hys Ryder, frō hys back: Whereupon this is a good consequent, and must be graunted of Necessitie: that eyther God is not the cause of euill, or if he be, yet that in this cause is nothing at all, but that whiche standeth most of all with equitie and Iustice: likewise that in man is nothing, but that whereof he may worthely condemne hym selfe.

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* 1.136The will of God doth worke together with mans will in sinne according to the Lutheranes.

It standeth therfore with as good reason, that the same should be imputed to the one, that is imputed to the other.

If the circumstaunces of them both were in all respects like, the consequent would be good:* 1.137 but the circumstances beyng al∣tered, the state of the conclusion is altered also. All the actions of mans life are gouerned by the disposition of the secret proui∣dence of God. This is very true. Mans will also doth endeuour withall together with the same. Here is therefore an operation, and working on both partes: God worketh, and man worketh: and both in one matter. But bicause God doth order things af∣ter farre other meanes, and respecting an other ende, then men doe, herein redowndeth vnto hym the highest commendation of power, Iustice, aud Bounty. Men are worthely blamed, as beyng the very causes of their own harmes. When Ioseph was solde by hys brethren: when Iudas betrayed the Lord: when Absa∣lon defiled hys fathers concubines. When Pharao witheld the peo∣ple of Israell: When Semei rayled vpon Dauid: When Antiochus waxed wrothe agaynst the Iewes long sithence: whenas Antichrist euen now gryndeth hys teeth agaynst the seély flock of Christ: when as Paule breathed out threatninges and slaughters: no man will deny but these were haynous & horrible factes: of all which notwithstanding no one wanted the singuler counsell of God, and hys especiall prouidence: whereupon it could not possible be otherwise, but that the thinges which he had determined before, should so come to passe in the ende. For neyther doth enter into mans thought any thing that God doth not will before, that mā shoulde will: neither doth mans will purpose any thinge, which is not both foreseéne, and foreordained of God. What thē? shall we therefore accuse God as Author of the wickednesse of the vngodly? because these thinges chaunce of Necessitie, which God hath purposed shall come to passe, and can by no meanes be altered? For so seemeth Osori. to conclude hys argument. But I argue agaynst hym in this wise, and with two reasons. First. If this preordinaunce of God, whereof I speake, do bryng such a Necessitie of externall coaction vppon men, as Osorius doth speake of, as that no man could sinne voluntaryly but cōpelled

thereunto by God: it might not seeme altogether perhaps from the purpose, to impute the fault thereof to God. But what is he now? or what mā hath euer bene so horribly wicked at any time? who in performing his treacherous deuises, can say that he was constrayned agaynst hys will to commit the facte, that he would not haue done, being neyther led thereunto of any motion of him selfe, nor blynded with any hys owne affections?

Moreouer although the will of God doth work together with mans will:* 1.138 or (as Augustine liked rather to speake) whether God do worke in the hartes of men to apply their willes wher∣vnto it pleaseth hym, eyther to godlines for hys good mercies sake, or to wickednes and vyce according to their owne deser∣uinges: or whether man be afflicted with any crosse of persequu∣tion, yet doth God bring all these to passe, according to his own iust Iudgement, sometimes open and manifest, but alwayes most righteous: for what sitteth more with iustice, thē to punish offenders? then to tame and suppresse the outragious pryde of rebellious Nature? But forasmuch as all the workes of GOD are directed chiefly as to one ende: from whence then may man take a more large occasion, to magnifie and extoll the Iustice of God, then out of hys owne works? And therefore though weé confesse, that it is one selfe work which is wrought by God, and by man, yet because in the selfe same worke God worketh by an other way, and to an other ende: Namely putting in vre the worke of hys Iustice: and because men do the workes of pryde, of Luste, of wrath, and of couetousnes: hereupon it commeth to passe, that sinne is worthely imputed vnto them: the will of God remayning alwayes righteous and good notwithstanding. For this rule is to be holden alwayes vnshaken: That all the works of God are wrought for the best. So the fall of our first parent Adam, the hardening of Pharaoes hart, the treasō of Iudas, the persequutiō of Paule, tended to as good purpose as the perse∣ueraunce of Noah in fayth: The humblenes of Dauid, Peters denyall of hys maister, and the conuersion of Paule. For what soeuer is wrought by God, doth alwayes tourne to the glorifi∣ing of hys power, and magnifieng hys Iustice: of hys Iustice, because by sinne he doth punish sinne: and that most righteously: of hys power, whē with hys mighty hand, and onstretched arme

he doth aduaunce and deliuer them for his wonderfull mercies, sake, and of hys free liberalitie it pleaseth hym to vouchsaue. But Osorius is a wylypye, and will not be destitute of a star∣ting hoale, but will seéke to escape through some chynk or mous∣hoole. And because he doth perceaue, that Gods power cānot be vtterly sequestred from the Actions of men, he like an olde try∣ed shifter, will collour the matter, and applye the workes of God which we haue rehearsed, to Gods foreknowledge. For this is the subtill distinction whereunto our aduersaryes flee for their defence.

* 1.139They say that no prouidence of God that may enduce a∣ny Necessitie, doth go before to cause men to sinne. Onely that God did foreknow that they would so do, & that they were such in deed: not for that God did foreknow, that they would be such: but rather that he did therefore foreknowe that they should be such through their own inclination.

Where the Aduersaryes make mencion of the foreknowe∣ledge of God,* 1.140 they doe not altogether lye in this poynte. For it is most true, that the Maiestye of God doth behold (as it were) with present view all thinges that are, haue bene, and shalbe, as though they were present in hys eye: but herein they go amisse, where they practize to establish the foreknowledge and permissi∣on of God so firmely, that they would haue hys vnchaungeable prouidence seuered from the same: which cannot possibly be by any meanes: for what may a man thinke, if God doe foreknow and permitte wickednes to raigne, which he is not able to turne away, where is then hys power? if he be able and will not, where is then his mercy? what father is so hard harted, that seéing his childe ready to receaue some harme, will not call him from y^e pe∣rill if he may? But say they, he that doth wickedly, & he also that doth consent thereunto, are both in one predicament. Therfore as it is an absurde thing not to confesse God to be omnipotent, or that any thing is done that he cannot do: so is that as false also to say, that any thing w^t God will not, is permitted w^tout hys knowledge, and agaynst hys will. For howe shall we con∣ceaue that God doth permitte any thing to be done, but because hys will is, that it shall so be done? whereupon we may frame an argument agaynst those persones, who reiecting the neces∣sary

doctrine of predestination, flee onely to Gods Permission on this wise.

If God do permitte sinne, that doth he eyther with hys will or agaynst hys will.

But he doth not permitte it agaynst hys will (for there can nothing be done agaynst the will of God.)* 1.141

Then followeth it, that God doth willingly permitte sinne, and will not stay nor hinder it.

Which beyng graunted, their obiection hath a dubble error. First, because they take away sinne altogether from the will of God, casting the same wholy bpon hys Permission: Next, be∣cause they do feare least Gods Iustice should be blemished: be∣yng of this opinion: To witte: if God do worke in the hartes of the wicked, when they do sinne, Then must it be taken for con∣fessed, that the cause of sinne shalbe forthwith imputed to God: and withall that men shall hereof take iust occasion to excuse thē selues: Both which are easily confuted. For first of all, whereas it is sayd, that GOD worketh in the hartes of men, to encline their willes whereunto it pleaseth hym, eyther when he doth thrust vpō men outward calamities, as straunge diseases, cruell Warres, flames of fire. &c. or where he bryngeth vpon men in∣ward griefes by the seruice of Sathan exequutioner of hys wrathe: as famine of hys holy word, ignoraunce, blindenes of vnderstanding, hardnes of hart, as appeareth euidently by the Scriptures. I pray you what meane you by that whiche you reade in the 9. of Iudges?* 1.142 God did send hys euill spirite betwixt Abimilech and the people of Sychem &c. When you reade in Moyses, I will harden the hart of Pharao adding a cause to the same wherefore he would do it:* 1.143 And agayn when you heare that the Lord did harden the hart of Syhon King of Hesbon. When you read in Esay the Prophet.* 1.144 Blunt the hartes of this people, & stopp their eares. And agayne, why doest thou make vs wander from thy wayes O Lord? What is this in the 3. of the kings the 22. chap?* 1.145 Behold the Lord hath geuen the Spirite of lyeng, into the mouthes of all the Prophets. &c. and in Iob. 12.* 1.146 The Lord doth take away the hartes from them that rule ouer the people of the earth, and he maketh them to goe astray. &c. of the same sence are the wordes of the Prophet Ezechiell. If the Prophet be seduced and speake a

word. I the Lord haue seduced that Prophet. And in Amos,* 1.147 If there shalbe any euill in the Citie, that the Lord hath not done. And agayne in the 2. to the Thessalonians the 2. chapter.* 1.148 God shall send vpon them strong illusione to beleue lyes &c. These and innu∣merable like vnto these who so shall heare euery where in the scriptures, can he dought hereof, that the sinnes of the wicked are not hidden vtterly from the decreed will of God? or that any thing is done in any of all these by Gods Permission so, as hys effectuall prouidence doth not worke also withall?

Now as concerning the inconuenience, as though it were of Necessitie, y^t Gods Iustice shold be therfore called in questiō: and that it would by that meanes come to passe, that wicked mē would hereof take occasion to excuse themselues, as though they should not offend through their own default, but by the compul∣sary constraynt of Gods will: if so be those thinges be so taken according to y^e very purporte of the bare letter wherwith God is sayd to deliuer ouer into a Reprobate minde, to make blynde, to har∣den the hartes &c. then is this also eche way as false. Neyther doth the conclusion of hys argument thus shuffled vp hang to∣gether.

* 1.149All thinges that God hath foreordayned shall come to passe, do chaunce through absolute Necessiitie.

God did foreordayne that sinne should come to passe.

Ergo, When sinnes do come to passe, they are to be impu∣ted aswell vnto man, as beyng an instrument, as vnto God hymself, as beyng the Authour.

* 1.150Nay rather the conclusion ought to haue bene framed on this wise. Ergo, God hath ordayned that sinnes should be, which for the same cause cannot but be of very Necessitie. And so in deede is the conclusion right, and to be graunted also. For it is without all controuersie, that sinnes cannot come without the ordinaunce of Gods will: which ordinaunce neuertheles hauing iust cause of defence, ought to be acquited of all vnrighteousnes. And to shew that it hath iust causes of defence, Three reasons may be rendered.* 1.151

First. This seely earthly worme had skarse yet thrust hys nose out of the dyrte, whenas he would needes make hymselfe equall w^t God hys creator farre aboue y^e reach and cōpasse of his

creation, presuming to attayne the knowledge of good and euil: then came it to passe by the most iuste iudgement of God, not by hys Permission but by hys prouidence also, that Freewill be∣yng as then throughly furnished with vnderstanding, and rea∣son (but destitute of Grace) could not gouerne it selfe, but must needes both agaynst hys owne knowledge, and conscience stum¦ble, and fall downe withall. And no meruayle. For assoone as God had withdrawne hys light, right spirite, and helping hand (whereupon issued lacke of well doyng, blindenes and hardnes of hart) it could not otherwise be, but that (the grace of God be∣ing withdrawne & all abillitie to do well beyng taken away) this proud presumptuous Uermine must fall to the ground, both of very Iustice and of very Necessitye, whereof the one is ascri∣bed to God, and not to man, this other not to God but to man, and to hys owne Freewill: And hereupon aryseth that absolute and vnauoydeable Necessitie whereof we treat so much, and withall the most iust defence of Gods Iustice.

Then besides this Freewill, there is yet an other reason,* 1.152 that will playnly acquite the iust prouidence of God from fault, though it worke in the sinnes of men together with men them∣selues. As when he bryngeth vppon man eyther diseases of the body, or blindnes of vnderstanding for sinnes already commit∣ted, punishing sinne: as it were, by sinne Euen so Pharao, that had vsed horrible tyranny before in drowning y^e suckling babes of the Hebrues, was himselfe afterwardes most iustly hard har∣ted by God, and at the last miserably drowned in the read Sea. Euen so likewise Esay,* 1.153 and the other Prophetes did prophesye, that the Iewes should be blinded for the wickednes whiche they had committed.* 1.154 By the like Iudgement, of God came it to passe that which was spoken of the Gentiles.* 1.155 As they would not geue themselues to know God, God did deliuer them ouer to the lustes of their owne hartes. &c. And in an other place writing to the Thes. For this cause (sayth he) God will send vpon thē strong illusion to beleue lyes &c.

Besides these most iust causes spoken of before,* 1.156 there is yet a thyrd, no lesse rightfull, and iust: which although be somewhat darke vnto vs, yet seémeth not so darke to the vnderstādyng, and knowledge of S. Paule, where Gods Deuine prouidence doth

wonderfully order and dispose his workes: to witte, by his Iud∣gemēt hidden in deéde, but alwayes iust, leadyng and directyng all thynges to that ende, whereby he may make his Iustice, or his power discernable to mankynde. And to this end at a word, do all the counsells of God, and all the effectes of the same tende and be directed, whether he do fashion the vessels of his wrath to destruction, or prepare the vessels of his mercy to Glory: or whe∣ther he be mercyfull to whom he will, or whether he do harden the hartes of whom it pleaseth hym, or whensoeuer it pleaseth him so to do, or when he doth styrre vppe the myndes and en∣deuoures of men, where unto him lysteth, by the seruice of Sa∣than, minister of his wrath, or whether he do comfort, and make glad the hartes of his chosen, by the operatiō of the holy Ghost. And yet is there no cause in the meane whiles, why any man should complayne that the thynges are done iniuriously which are done by Gods secrete Iudgement: or that God ought to be blamed in any of all these, whenas whatsoeuer is done by him, we beleue assuredly, is done either to expresse his power, or to make his glory discernable, or to commend his Iustice, or els to discouer the wonderfull riches of his mercy.

Wherfore when Luther doth affirme, that with GOD all thynges are done by an absolute Necessitie, whether they come by destiny, chaunce, or any fortune at all, why should not it be as lawfull for him to speake so, as for Osorius to speake in the lyke phrase and in lyke titles of words. That God is of Necessitie y^e best, the most iust, and the most wisest? But I heare the sounde of an Argument from the Popish Diatriba.

* 1.157

They say that they abridge not God of his power, no nor that they can do it, neither would at any tyme other∣wise then as him selfe hath abridged it. Although there be nothyng, but that the omnipotency of God can bryng to passe, yet would he haue nothyng lawfull for him selfe to do, that might be contrary to his Iustice. And bycause it is an horrible matter that any man should be damned with∣out euill deseruynges, and that it is not reason that good workes should be defrauded of their due reward: therfore it must needes follow accordyng to the rule of Iustice, that God should chuse thē whom he would haue to be saued, for

the good workes, whiche he did forsee to be in them, and condemne the other lykewise for their euill doynges. For otherwise if he doe not regarde the workes, then were not his Iustice constaunt and permanent.

This Obiection must be ouertaken after this maner.* 1.158 It is one thyng to treate of Gods Election, and an other thyng to treate of his Iudgement. As concernyng the Iudgement of God, it is euident, that no man is damned, vnlesse he haue de∣serued it for his wickednesse: and that no man is saued, vnlesse some matter be founde in him, whereunto his saluation may be imputed. It is farre otherwise in Election, and Predestina∣tion, which is accomplished accordyng to Gods Freé determi∣nation and coūsell, without all respect of workes, either goyng before, or commyng after. Or els how can that saying of the A∣postle be true, Not of workes, but of him that calleth? &c. meanyng thereby the Free Election of GOD? Whereupon let vs heare Augustine very aptly discoursing in his booke De Praede∣stin. & Grat. It is sayd:* 1.159 not of workes but of him that calleth: The elder shall serue the younger. He doth not say of workes done before: but when the Apostle spake generally, not of workes: here he would that men should vnderstand it, both of workes done and already past, and workes not as yet done, that is to say, workes past which were none at all, and workes to be done, which as yet were not done. &c. Workes therfore haue both their tyme and their place: Certes in Electiō they haue neither tyme, nor place: Neither is any thyng here of any value, but the onely will of God, which neither dependeth vpon fayth, nor vpon workes, nor vpō the promises: but workes, fayth, and the promises, and whatsoeuer els doe all depend vppon it. For neither are our deédes vnto him a rule, to direct his Election by: but our deédes are directed by his Election, as the effectes do consequētly de∣pend vpon the causes: and not the causes vpō the effectes: Nei∣ther doth God worke vnrighteously in the meane tyme in this, if he take mercy on whō he will take mercy, or if he harden whō he will harden: And why so? For sooth bycause he is indebted to no man. For sithence we are all in generall euen from our mo∣thers wombes, ouerwhelmed & drowned in this puddle of ori∣ginall sinne: he may, accordyng to his good pleasure, haue mer∣cy

on whom it pleaseth him, and againe passe ouer whom soeuer hym lysteth and leaue them to them selues, that is to say, not take mercy vppon them. Whereupon all men may easily per∣ceaue, aswell the Reprobates, what it is whereof they may iust∣ly accuse thē selues: as also they that are chosen, how much they are indebted to God for his great and exceédyng mercy.

* 1.160Euen as if one man kill an other with a sworde, no man doth therfore accuse the sword, but he rather is knowen to be in faulte, which did abuse the sword to murther: with as good reason, for asmuch as men are nothyng els but as in∣strumentes of wickednesse onely in Gods hand, they that yeld of Necessitie are not so much in fault, as he rather de∣serueth to be blamed that caused them to do wickedly.

* 1.161If so be that men, whom God hath created after his owne I∣mage, were such kynde of Instrumentes, whiche lyke vnto a sword, or sawe, were driuen not of them selues, and without any motion or consent of their owne: or if God were such a Royster or hackster that would delight in the slaughter of men, the simi∣litude were not altogether to be mislyked. Now to graunt vn∣to them, that the wills of men are directed, and are subiect to a stronger power, then they are able to resiste, yet do they not suf∣fer onely as Instruments, brutish and senselesse, doing nothyng them selues in the meane whiles. Men are drawen in deéde, but with their owne wills: as Augustine maketh mention. Neither is any man euill, but he that will him selfe. And if man will be of his owne accord euill, who ought to be blamed therfore but him selfe? For where shall we say that sinne is, but where a will is founde to committe Sinne? But Osorius ceaseth not as yet frō his chatteryng.

* 1.162They that doe affirme that God hath seuered out of all the vniuersall masse of mākynde some whō he would prepare to euerlastyng glory, and some others whom he would appoint to euerlastyng destruction, not for any other cause, but bycause it so pleaseth him: doe plucke Gods prouidence vppe by the rootes.

The Lutheranes do alledge none other reason of Gods Predestination besides his will onely.

Ergo, The Lutheranes do foredoe and plucke the proui∣dence

of Cod vppe by the rootes.

I beseéche you Osorius,* 1.163 if as yet you haue not cast away all feélyng of an honest and sober Deuine vtterly, returne to your selfe at the length. In deéde say you so? Do they foredoe Gods prouidence which say it is so, for none other cause but by∣cause it pleaseth him? &c. What kynde of Argument doe I heare from you? Cā God be pleased to do any thyng that is not most correspōdent to reason? or cā any Reason be of all partes so absolutely perfect, that can disagreé frō the chief and principall patterne of his will? or do you seéme a reasonable man that doe talke so fondly? But I beseéche you Syr. For as much as the will of God, whether soeuer it bende and encline it selfe, is no∣thyng els but a most perfect Reason of it selfe, and of all partes most absolute, and without blemishe: and for as much also as Reason it selfe is nothyng els then the very rule of Gods will: nay rather for as much as the will of God is the very essence,* 1.164 & substaūce of God: what kynde of couplyng do ye desire to be had betwixt Reason, and the will of God? Who in deéde can will no∣thyng but that whiche is perfect, sithe that nothyng is perfect but that which he willeth. And whereupō then riseth this hauty crest of yours? that can not be satisfied w^t the bare will of God, beyng expressed in his playne word? Neither seémeth it sufficiēt in your Iudgement that God should chuse any to saluation, vn∣lesse his secret counsell herein may be made discernable by the deépe reach of your owne reason? and that he should render an accoumpt and reason of his decreéd will herein vnto your Mai∣stershyppe? Albeit I doe not deny this to be true, that the pro∣founde wisedome of the Deuine Godhead, can not be sundered from the knittyng together of his Reason, and counsell: that is to say, from it selfe: Yet out of what Schoole suckt you such Di∣uinitie, O singuler Piller of the Romishe route? so earnestly to require and to sift out the counsell and Reason of the Creatour, euen in the very vnsearcheable wisedome of him that created you? I suppose ye were thus schooled in your sacred confessions. Surely you neuer learned it out of holy Scriptures. If you neuer noted what aunswere the Lord made to Moyses in the Scriptures, marke now somewhat more attentiuely: I will haue mercy (sayth he) on whom I haue mercy, and I will take compassion

on whom I will take compassion. &c. Here you may seé a singuler Mercy of God in takyng compassion: whereof you nor seé, nor heare any other rendred in the whole Scriptures, besides the onely will of God. I will haue Mercy: (saith he) will you know y^e causes, and the persons? the doth not say, bycause I perceaue thē to be worthy of my benignitie, whose foreseéne workes doe de∣light me now, before I take Mercy: but I do therfore take Mer∣cy, bycause I will take Mercy: and I will take compassion, on him of whom it pleaseth me to haue Mercy. And therfore S. Paule addyng a very fitte conclusion. Ergo (sayth he) God will haue mercy on whom he will haue mercy, and will harden whom he will harden. With these wordes bridlyng our nyce curiositie, as it were, and withall geuyng vs to vnderstand, that it is enough for vs to know, that so is y^e will of y^e Lord, although there be no manifest demonstration made vnto vs of the cause, wherfore he would so do.* 1.165 For of what soeuer it shall please the Lord to bryng to passe, albeit we can not atteyne the Reason, yet ought we to grounde our selues vpon this, for sufficient and lawfull Reason, bycause the Lord hath brought it so to passe: we ought also to learne of Christ this lesson. Bycause it hath so pleased thy good will O Father: For as much as it is not lawfull for any creature to presume to enquire any reason beyond the will of God.

* 1.166Right well therfore, and very profoundly doth Augustine geue vs this lesson, It is not meete (sayth he) to search for the cau¦ses of Gods vnsearcheable will, it is not lawfull to know it, for that the will of God is the principall and highest cause of all thinges that are: and therefore if when it is asked, why the Lord did it, it is to be aūswered, bycause he so willed it: if thou go further in asking why he willed it, thou askest some greater and higher thyng then the will of God is. Which can not possibly be founde out. And agayne the same Augustine in an other place writyng of Predestinatiō and grace, God (sayth he) taketh mercy on whō he will haue mercy and of whom be will not haue mercy he will not take mercy. He geueth to whom him listeth, and requireth that whiche is due vnto him, of whom he will. Here agayne ye heare the Will of God named, yea and that alone: wherewith if you be not yet satisfied, bycause it is named alone, harken what is immediately annexed by y^e same Augustine, for thus it followeth. He that shall continue to say

God is vnrighteous, let him harken vnto the Apostle. O man what art thou that contendest with God? man with God: earth with the Potter. &c. Doth he herein not note you excellently (Osorius) and (as it were) poynt at you with the finger? as, that no man could possibly haue noted any matter more notably? Paule the Apostle doth render no causes at all of Gods Election, but his will onely: Augustine dare enquire after none. All the whole Scripture is throughly satisfied with his will onely: Onely, Osorius can not be satisfied, nor thinketh it lawfull enough for God to doe that him lyketh best, vnlesse with sutteltie of Reaso∣nyng as it were with cutted Sophismes, and Sillogismes, mā mainteyne Argument with his GOD, earth with the Potter. Which thing how horrible it is, learne at the least out of Esay y^e Prophet:* 1.167 Woe (sayth he) vnto him that will contend with his ma∣ker, a brittle pottesharde of the outcast potteshardes of the earth: shall the clay say vnto the Potter, why doest thou make me thus? did thy handes fayle thee in thy worke. &c. As though there were any of the Creatures of God that doth vnderstand the mynde of the Lord: or were euer counsellours vnto him: or as though it were not permitted him to will as him lysteth: or as though what soeuer pleaseth him, were not lawfull for him to do, vnlesse he did geue vs a reason, and orderly render vnto vs the causes that moued him thereunto? And what if he will not discouer it Osorius? Yea and what if he ought not? what if when him ly∣steth to display it most manifestly, your balde mazer, and the blockyshnes of your nymble capacitie can not be able to pearce into the vnsearcheable depth of his glory? wisedome? and coun∣sell? Ieremy the Prophet beyng commaunded to go downe into the house of the Potter, and there to behold throughly y^e worke∣manshyppe of the runnyng wheéle, and the hand of the craftes∣man: when he saw the Uessell that was newly made, and was by and by broken agayne: neither doth he require a reason thereof of the workeman, nor yet doth the Lord beyng the workeman rēder any reason vnto him: onely he declareth his power in ma∣kyng new, and renewyng agayne of that which was broken, in these wordes.* 1.168 Am not I of power to do vnto you, as this Potter doth to his claye, O house of Israell? sayth the Lord. Behold as the clay in the hand of the Potter, so are you in my hand, O ye house of

Israell. And will Osor. dare be so bold (beyng a fashioned lumpe of the Potters wheéle, neither reuerencyng the Maiestie of his maker, nor contented with his onely will) to require a reason of his creation, besides the lawfull will of the Creator? and will he not permit it to be sufficient for God to doe in his owne wor∣kes, what it pleaseth him best?

For what do these wordes of Osorius emporte els?* 1.169 Where beyng squeymish at Luthers speache: He doth Iudge them not worthy to be heard in any wise, whiche will affirme that God doth chuse whom he will vnto Saluation, out of the whole masse of mankynde: for none other cause but by∣cause it so pleaseth hym. Pag. 163. First where hath Luther any such Assertion? Why do ye not set it downe good Syr? and admit that he hath: what is it, that your carpyng cauillation cā gnaw at here, if you interprete it aright? For although Luther seéme in your goodly conceipt to be more then a thousand tymes madd (whom ye can neuer name without some gall of raylyng speache) yet was he neuer hetherto so foolish, as to haue a will to spoyle the most wise workes of God of Reason, and counsell in any wise. There is with God a most perfect, stable, & vnchaun∣geable knowledge of all the workes of his owne handes, but such a knowledge, as doth altogether surmount the greatest reach of our nymblest capacities, and seémeth rather to be wōde∣red at, then to be searched out by vs. Surely it is farre be∣yond the Reason that you make vnto vs. For deliberately no∣tyng with my selfe, and entring into a very deépe viewe and con∣sideration of the thynges, which are spoken of Election, of pur∣pose of Gods prouidēce (for this word Predestination as scarse fine enough for a Ciceronian you abhorte, neither dare ye so much as once to name in all your bookes) hereūto all your drifts seéme to tende, that ye suppose that Gods Iustice can by no meanes be defended, in makyng a differēce betwixt them whom he reserueth to be saued, & those whom he adiudgeth to be dam∣ned, but by foreknowledge of those workes, which God doth be∣hold shall be in them. As though Osorius would seéme to argue with God with such an Argument as this is.

* 1.170There must be alwayes with God a stable assured and vpright reason in euery choyse to be made.

There can be none other iust cause of Reason of Gods Election and Reprobation,* 1.171 but in respect of the merite that must follow.

Ergo, To the attainyng the grace of Election some pre∣paration of merite must needes go before.

First I do aunswere out of Augustine:* 1.172 that it is a most pe∣stilent errour, to say, that the Grace of God is distributed accor∣dyng to merites; & this is one of the errours of Pelagius. Then as touchyng the Maior. There is in deéde with God a perfect, sounde, & vnchaungeable Reason of all his workes: But by what reason be ordereth his workes, may not be subiect to the Iudgement of the claye (as Augustine sayth) but of the Potter. Now I come to the Minor. Which we do vtterly deny: for where you make a definition of Gods prouidence (in chusing or refusing whom he will) to be none other then such as dependeth vpon the fore∣knowledge of workes: this is altogether most brutishe and vn∣reasonable. For albeit that preuēting for eknowledge of things (which out Deuines doe call foreknowledge) is vnseparably knitte together to the will of him, that doth Predestinate: yet do we not graunt the same to be the cause of Predestination. For first as concernyng the cause efficient, for as much as the will of God is the very substaunce of God, aboue the which there cā be nothyng more highe: there can be no efficient cause thereof ren∣dered, either before it, in limitation of tyme: or aboue it in Ma∣iestie: but the materiall and finall cause therof may (after a sort) be assigned. The materiall cause about the which it doth exer∣cise her force, is mākynde, and those thynges which God doth geue vnto men by Predestination, namely: Vocation, Faith, Iu∣stification, Glorification: The finall cause is two maner of wayes: either that which forceth him to doyng, by the preuen∣tyng will and reason of the first Agent: or els that which is pro∣duced out of action. And bycause there may be many endes of one thyng, it may be, that there is one end of Predestination, an other end of him that is Predestinated, and an other of him that doth Predestinate: As for exāple: As Saluation and life euer∣lastyng is the end of Predestination: the end of him that is Pre∣destinated, is to beleue and to lyue well: and the end of him that doth Predestinate, is his owne glory, and the manifestation of

his Iustice, power and mercy. As we do reade in Salomons Prouerbes.* 1.173 God doth make all thinges for himselfe, and the wic∣ked man also for the euill day. And therfore if it be asked, whether God do predestinate for the workes sake?* 1.174 it may be aunswered with S. Paule, that the holy ones are predestinated not for their good workes, but to do good workes: so that now the respect of workes be vnderstanded, not to be the cause efficient of prede∣stination: but the effect rather. For thus we heare the Apostle speake,* 1.175 Euen as God hath chosen vs in hys sonne frō eternitie that we should become holy to the prayse of hys glory. &c. not because we were, or should be holy (sayth he) but that we should become holy, to the prayse of hys glory, &c. So that no reason of Election may appeare, but that which is to be sought for in the freé libera∣litie of hym, that doth make the Election, neyther that any o∣ther last end may be conceaued, but the prayse of the manifesta∣tion of hys heauenly grace. So that as without God there is no cause efficient, which may enforce predestination, so (if weé seeke for the very beginninges of eternall predestination) we shall perceaue that S. Paule doth reduce them, to iiij, princi∣pall heades chiefly.* 1.176 1. to hys power, Where he sayth, hath not the Potter power. &c. 2. to hys purpose or hys good pleasure. For so we reade in the Epistle to the Ephesianes, where he vseth both these wordes: because he hath predestinated vs (sayth he) accor∣ding to the good pleasure of hys will. &c. And immediately after whē we were predestinated (sayth he) according to hys purpose &c. 3. to hys will. Rom. 10.* 1.177 he will haue mercy on whom he will haue mercy and will harden. &c. 4. to hys mercy or loue: Where he sayth Rom. 10. It is neyther of hym that willeth nor of him that runneth but of God that taketh mercy.

Last of all if you demaund further for some reason of Gods Election, who shall more liuely expresse the same vnto you: then the Apostle Paule writing to the Romaynes on this wise.* 1.178 If God (sayth he) willing on the one side to shew his wrath, and to make his power knowne, did with much lenity beare with the Vesselles of wrath prepared to destructiō, and on the other side to make knowen the riches of hys glory towardes the Vessells of mearcy, which he hath prepared to glory, &c. Unlesse you haue ceased long sithence to be a reasonable man (Osorius) what more perfect reason can

be made vnto you? or more manifest of Gods workmanship then this, that is here set downe in Paule? Whereby you may playn∣ly perceaue, that all these councells and workes of God (which we do see) were begonne, and atchieued, not for any fayth fore∣seene before, nor for any foreknowne good works, but to mag∣nifie, and make discernable hys power, and the prayse of hys grace. And yet is not this vntrue, that the fayth of the holy ones was foreseene, and the works of the vngodly were foreknowne, long before they were: but yet these do follow as effectes, and do not preuent, nor make predestination, nor do certifie a reason, or playne demonstracion of Gods prouidence, but are thēselues established rather, by the reason of Gods prouidence: For to hym that will enquire amongest all the workes of God, what is it, that his most hyest and vnsearcheable will hath respect vnto chiefly? for what reason: for what cause? and to what end all these were instituted, in the same order and maner, as we do beholde them? the matter may by this reason, be made notorious vnto hym: to make manifest (sayth he) the power of hys wrathe, and to make knowne the riches of hys mercy. But I will pursue the other reasons, wherewith they do vrge vpon vs.

If thou wilt conuert vnto me,* 1.179 I will conuert thee, and if thou be retourned, and will make thy self to be retourned, thou shalt stand before my face: If thou wilt make separati∣on of that which is precious, from that which is vile, thou shalt be euen as myne own mouth. Be ye tourned and I will heale you: I will retourne and not turne away my face from you.

The office of the holyghost is of two sortes:* 1.180 the outward calling by preaching. And the Inward operation of the minde, whereof the first is layd open for all men indifferently: the other concerneth none, but the chosen properly. Moreouer for asmuch as repentaunce is a spirituall resurrection frō death: I cannot see how the same may be within the compasse of mans power, more then for a man that hath bene dead, can be able to restore hymself to lyfe agayne.

If God do vouchsafe to empart hys liberalitie to some without all respect of preparation,* 1.181 he shal be iniurious and cruell to the others, whō he passeth ouer in the meane time.

* 1.182God doth witnes of hymselfe, that he alone is he that is able do discerne and Iudge betwixt men, when as otherwise we are all like eche other in all thinges: but after what maner GOD doth discerne & make the difference, the scriptures doe declare. Not in respect of mans preparation, but according to the good pleasure of hys will: for so we reade Ephes.* 1.183 That God hath pre∣destinate vs all according to the purpose of hys will. &c.

* 1.184If God should not worke in respect of the workes fore∣seene before, he should seeme vnrighteous in hys election.

* 1.185S. Paule doth propose these same obiections to himself, and withall maketh an aunswere to the quarrelling cauiller O man what art thou that doest aunswere with God? adding thereunto the similitude of the Clay and the Potter. And yet GOD hath much more power ouer men, then the Potter hath ouer the clay. If the Potter be at his owne libertie to fashion the Uessels, as he will himselfe: shall it not be as lawfull for God to shewe forth hys power vpon hys owne creatures? but that he must be enfor∣ced to follow mens merites, and that our deedes now must be vnto hym a rule of Election.

* 1.186Roboam was sayd to be reiected for this cause: because he did not encline hys hart to seeke God.

Ergo, It is in mans power to make the harte apte to re∣ceaue grace.

* 1.187The hardnes and peruersenes of the hart, wherewith we are made prone and propense to wickednes, vprofitable and vnable to do good, is a generall disease of all mankinde, vntill the new regeneration of the holyghost do minister a new remedy for y^e same. Which remedy if it come once, Grace is to be than∣ked for it onely: If it do not come, let euery man impute it to his owne frowardnes, and to hys naturall disease, and not vnto God, who did create mans nature whole, and sound at the be∣ginning. Briefly, to aunswere at a worde: This aunswere shall suffice to all those threatninges and exhortations, which our ad∣uersaryes do pyke out of the bookes of sacred scriptures euery where, and do obiect agaynst vs.

I may seeme perhapps to haue bene ouerlong, and tedious in heaping together, and confuting the obiections of our ad∣uersaries.

It remaineth now, that I make aunswere to certeine slaunders and lyes of these persones, who being vnable to bring any thing to passe with sound argumentes, and good matter, do attempt y^e ouerthrow thereof, with crooked conueyaunce, & with false & slaūderous cauillations: wherein as many others do tur∣moyle themselues very much, so doth this our porting all ouer greedely busye hymselfe, more then all the rest.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Argument.
• * 1.2

  Aunswere.
• * 1.3

  A fallax se∣cundū quid ad simplicit,
• * 1.4

  An other obiection of the aduer∣saries.
• * 1.5

  Aunswere.
• * 1.6

  Aug. in Io∣han. Tomi. 49.
• * 1.7

  Osor. obiect
• * 1.8

  Osorius. pag 163.
• * 1.9

  Osorius ar∣gument lea∣ding to in∣conueni∣ence.
• * 1.10

  Aunswere.
• * 1.11

  Augustine de perfect. iusticia.
• * 1.12

  Argument.
• * 1.13

  Answere.
• * 1.14

  Deut. 30.
• * 1.15

  An other obiection of the Aduer.
• * 1.16

  Aunswere. August. de perfect. Iu∣sticiae.
• * 1.17

  An other obiection of the Aduer.
• * 1.18

  August. de perfect Iu∣sticiae.
• * 1.19

  Gal. 5.
• * 1.20

  An other obiection.
• * 1.21

  Osorius ar∣gument.
• * 1.22

  Aunswere.
• * 1.23

  2. Cor. 12.
• * 1.24

  1. Cor. 13.
• * 1.25

  Aug. de spi∣ritu. & ••itte∣••a. Cap. 36.
• * 1.26

  The Argu∣ment of Ce∣lestine the Pelag. a∣gaynst Au∣gustine.
• * 1.27

  The Aun∣swere out of Augustine.
• * 1.28

  Rom. 8.
• * 1.29

  An other Argument.
• * 1.30

  Aunswere.
• * 1.31

  Osori. Ob∣iection pag. 159.
• * 1.32

  Aunswere.
• * 1.33

  Actes. 13. August. in his booke of Questiōs to Simplici. the second Quest.
• * 1.34

  An Obie∣ction.
• * 1.35

  Aunswere.
• * 1.36

  Luther in his Chri∣stian liber∣tie.
• * 1.37

  The Argu∣ment. Ex Diatreba.
• * 1.38

  Aunswere out of Au∣gustine.
• * 1.39

  Obiection out of Pi∣ghius and others.
• * 1.40

  Aunswere.
• * 1.41

  The vse & end of the law.
• * 1.42

  August. de perfect. Iu∣stit.
• * 1.43

  Obiection.
• * 1.44

  Aunswere.
• * 1.45

  August. in his 107. E∣pistle vnto Vitalis.
• * 1.46

  The Papi∣stes Argu∣ment.
• * 1.47

  Aunswere.
• * 1.48

  Will and Necessitie are not cō∣traries.
• * 1.49

  Chrisost. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.50

  Voluntary and Neces∣sary how they agree and are cō∣trary eche to others.
• * 1.51

  Obiection.
• * 1.52

  Aunswere.
• * 1.53

  An Argu∣ment out of Esay.
• * 1.54

  August. de perfect. Iu∣stit.
• * 1.55

  Aunswere.
• * 1.56

  Osori. Ar∣gument.
• * 1.57

  An argu∣ment for Freewill.
• * 1.58

  Aunswere.
• * 1.59

  An other Argument.
• * 1.60

  Aunswere.
• * 1.61

  Out of O∣sorius and Pighius.
• * 1.62

  Aunswere.
• * 1.63

  Obiect. Aunswere.
• * 1.64

  Osorius reason,
• * 1.65

  Aunswere.
• * 1.66

  An other obiection of Osorius.
• * 1.67

  Aunswere.
• * 1.68

  An argu∣ment of the Tridentine councell.
• * 1.69

  Aunswere
• * 1.70

  Aunswere out of Aug. de corrept. & gratia.
• * 1.71

  Obiect.
• * 1.72

  Aunswere.
• * 1.73

  Obiect.
• * 1.74

  Aunswere.
• * 1.75

  An obiectiō out of Aug, wordes.
• * 1.76

  Aunswere.
• * 1.77

  Aunswere.
• * 1.78

  The Iudge∣ment of the Aduersaries touching o∣riginall sinne.
• * 1.79

  Aunswere.
• * 1.80

  Obiect.
• * 1.81

  Aunswere.
• * 1.82

  Out of Ie∣rome.
• * 1.83

  Melanch∣tones aun∣swere.
• * 1.84

  Obiect. out of the Apoc. August. de perfectio Iusticiae.
• * 1.85

  1. Iaco. 3.
• * 1.86

  Obiect. out of Ieremy. Cap. 18.
• * 1.87

  Aunswere.
• * 1.88

  An obiect. out of Esay. Cap. 17.
• * 1.89

  Aunswere.
• * 1.90

  Obiect.
• * 1.91

  Aunswere.
• * 1.92

  Out of E∣zech. cap. 18.
• * 1.93

  Voluntas Signi,
• * 1.94

  Argument.
• * 1.95

  Aunswere.
• * 1.96

  Obiect.
• * 1.97

  Aunswere.
• * 1.98

  August. de grat. &. Lib. arbit.
• * 1.99

  Aunswere.
• * 1.100

  An other argument of the same sort.
• * 1.101

  Aunswere.
• * 1.102

  Osori. ob∣iection.
• * 1.103

  Aunswere.
• * 1.104

  Obiection.
• * 1.105

  Aunswere.
• * 1.106

  Osori. Ob∣iect. out of S. Paule. Aunswere.
• * 1.107

  An other out of Oso∣rius.
• * 1.108

  Aunswere.
• * 1.109

  Obiect. out of August.
• * 1.110

  Aunswere.
• * 1.111

  The Obie∣ction of O∣sori. and o∣thers.
• * 1.112

  Aunswere.
• * 1.113

  Obiect. a∣gaynst Free Election.
• * 1.114

  Aunswere.
• * 1.115

  Out of the Maister of Sentences Lib. 3.
• * 1.116

  Aunswere.
• * 1.117

  Basil. vpon the .32. Psalme. Aug. in his Epistle to Sixtus.
• * 1.118

  August. de Grat. & Li∣bero Arbit. Aug. in his Epistle to Sixtus. 105.
• * 1.119

  Aug. vpon the .94. Psalme.
• * 1.120

  August. de bono perse∣uer. Cap. 17
• * 1.121

  Obiect. out of August.
• * 1.122

  Aunswere.
• * 1.123

  Will is al∣wayes Free either to righteous∣nes or to Sinne.
• * 1.124

  Out of Au∣gust. in his 1. and•• 2. E∣pistle to Valentine. How farre forth will is free after August.
• * 1.125

  Aunswere.
• * 1.126

  Mans will capable of good and euill.
• * 1.127

  Agaynst Gods pro∣uidence and Predest. out of O∣sorius.
• * 1.128

  Aunswere.
• * 1.129

  Three ma∣ner of Ac∣tions.
• * 1.130

  Out of O∣sorius.
• * 1.131

  Aunswere.
• * 1.132

  In the death of Christ our Sauiour how the fathers will did consent and how it did not cō∣sent.
• * 1.133

  Againe out of Osorius.
• * 1.134

  Aunswere.
• * 1.135

  Aug. de lib. arb et gra. Cap. 2••.
• * 1.136

  An other obiection of the aduer∣saries a∣gaynst the Lutherans.
• * 1.137

  Aunswere
• * 1.138

  Aug. de grat. & lib. arb. Cap. 21.
• * 1.139

  How the aduersaries do dally with Gods prouidence.
• * 1.140

  Aunswere.
• * 1.141

  Argument. Sufferaunce.
• * 1.142

  Iudges. 9.
• * 1.143

  Deuter. 2.
• * 1.144

  Esay. 6.63.
• * 1.145

  3. Kings. 22.
• * 1.146

  Iob. 12.
• * 1.147

  Amos. 3.
• * 1.148

  2. Thessa. 2.
• * 1.149

  A conclusiō ill fauored∣ly inferred.
• * 1.150

  Aunswere
• * 1.151

  Three rea∣sons may be rendered why sinnes do come by the iust iudgement of God.
• * 1.152

  The second reason.
• * 1.153

  Esay. 6.
• * 1.154

  Ezechiel.
• * 1.155

  Rome. 1.
• * 1.156

  The 3. reasō
• * 1.157

  An obiect. out of the Diatriba & others a∣gaynst Lu∣ther.
• * 1.158

  Aunswere.
• * 1.159

  August. de Praedest. & Grat. Cap. ••
• * 1.160

  Obiect. of Osori. pag. 163.
• * 1.161

  Aunswere.
• * 1.162

  Argum. O∣sor. pag. 163.
• * 1.163

  Aunswere.
• * 1.164

  Aug. in his 11. booke of Confesi. Cap. 11.
• * 1.165

  Aug. vpon Genesis a∣gaynst Ma∣nichaeus. Lib. 1. Cap. 2.
• * 1.166

  August. de Praedest & Grat. Lib. 6
• * 1.167

  Esay. 45.
• * 1.168

  Ierem. 18.
• * 1.169

  Osorius wordes. pag 163.
• * 1.170

  An Argu. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Oso∣rius, Pighi.
• * 1.171

  Hosius. Bar tho. Came∣rar, and o∣thers.
• * 1.172

  Aunswere.
• * 1.173

  Prouer. 16.
• * 1.174

  Not for good wor∣kes. To good workes.
• * 1.175

  Ephes. 1.
• * 1.176

  Rom. ••. Fou••e prin∣cipall heads of Predesti∣nation. Ephes. 1.
• * 1.177

  Rom. 10.
• * 1.178

  Rom. 9.
• * 1.179

  Out of Ie∣remy. Cap. 15.
• * 1.180

  Aunswer.
• * 1.181

  The reason of the pa∣pistes.
• * 1.182

  Aunswere.
• * 1.183

  Ephes. 1.
• * 1.184

  Obiect.
• * 1.185

  Aunswere.
• * 1.186

  Obiection.
• * 1.187

  Aunswere.