Against Ierome Osorius Byshopp of Siluane in Portingall and against his slaunderous inuectiues An aunswere apologeticall: for the necessary defence of the euangelicall doctrine and veritie. First taken in hand by M. Walter Haddon, then undertaken and continued by M. Iohn Foxe, and now Englished by Iames Bell.

¶A Breuiate of all Luthers doctrine of Free∣will and Predestination gathered out of his bookes: And withall the contrary Argumentes of the ad∣uersaries and the solution of the same.

FIrst as cōcerning mās corrupt nature thus they teache. That man is so wholy and altogether de∣filed, that he is not able of him selfe, or of any part of him selfe, to atteyne vnto God. But they deny not but man may come to GOD, by the helpe of Grace.

2. That it is not in mās power to prepare him selfe to receaue grace, but all mās conuersion to be the gift of God, in the whole and of euery part.

3. That the Grace of God is not so offered, as that it resteth in our choyse afterwardes to take, or refuse.

4. That the grace of God is not so geuen, nor to thus endone∣ly, that by his aide onely it shold helpe our weakenes, as though there were otherwise somwhat within vs: but that the worke and benefite hereof is his owne: that our stoany hartes may be conuerted into fleshly hartes: that our wills be not bettered, but wholy renewed: That being regenerated in harts and myndes first, we may will that, which we ought to will.

5. That mākinde hauing lost that freedome, which he recea∣ued in his first creation, fell into miserable bondage: And they deny, that man being in this seruile estate, is endued with any free abilitie to do good, or euill, as that he may applie him selfe

to whether part him listeth. And here they expounde free∣dome to be that, which is opposite to bondage.

6. Touching the effectuall operation of Gods grace: thus they doe affirme: that our will is not so raysed vppe by the conduct therof, that it may be able of it selfe if it will: but that it is re∣newed and drawen, so that it must follow of necessitie, neither that it can be able otherwise, but to will.

7. They denie that in perseueraunce, man worketh together with God, as that of his owne power, it may obey the guiding of God: moreouer in rēdring reward, they denie that the latter grace is geuen to euery mā in steede of recōpence, as though by well vsing the first grace, man had deserued the last grace.

8. That mā cā do nothing at all, especially in the things which apperteine vnto God, but so much as God himself vousafeth to geue. And that God doth geue nothyng according to his good pleasure, but the same is altogether free, without all respect of any mans deseruinges. Finally that God doth geue nothing of set purpose; but that he pursueth his owne worke to an end, in a certeine perpetuall order and course.

9. That man doth not so worke together with God, as brin∣ging or adding any thing of his owne, but doth worke by mea∣sure onely in spirituall thinges, by how much he is forced by the cause agent. So doth the minde see, but being enlightened: Iudgement doth discerne, and chuse, but guided by the dire∣ction of the holy Ghost. The will is obedient, but being first re∣generated. The hart is willing: but being renewed, man doth endeuour, doth will and doth bring to passe, but accordyng to the measure that he hath receaued.

10. Moreouer where as it is declared, that man hath a will aswell in good thinges as in euill thinges, then if question be moued what kinde of thing will is of it selfe, they do aunswere with Augustine. That will is alwayes naturally euill, that of it selfe it can do nothing, but frowardly bende it selfe against

the Iustice of God: and that it is made good through grace one∣ly, and so made good, that it may then of necessitie loue and sol∣low righteousnes which it abhorred before.

11. They doe confesse with Augustine, that men when they sinne do neuer sinne, but of their owne accorde and by the pro∣per motion of will: and that they doe vaynely that do post ouer the fault therof to any others but to them selues.

12. Agayne when they are directed to good thinges by the Spirite of God, yet that their will is not excluded here: for as much as euen this is the very grace of God, namely, that their will is enclined to desire good.

13. That euen from the first creation, nature is so weakened, that sinne must cleane thereunto of very Necessitie. Whiche Necessitie neuerthelesse proceedeth not from God, nor from nature simplie, neither from any destinie, nor yet any forreine coaction, but from the corruption of nature, and from euery mans proper and peculiar inclination, and is to be ascribed thereunto: to which inclinatiō is annexed vnauoydeable Ne∣cessitie of sinning, as Augustine recordeth.

14. Luther Caluine, and the others, when they seeme to take away Freewill: the same is so to be construed, as that they doe not wholy take the same away, but in that sense onely, in the whiche that aduersaries doe establishe the same: That is to say, wherewith they do establish merite and preuētiō in Freewill.

15. Last of all whereas the whole difficultie of this contro∣uersie doth cōsist in three wordes chiefly, to witte: Will, Free∣dome and Necessitie.* 1.1 Our Deuines do distinguishe the same after this maner.

The will of God is takē ij. maner of wayes: sometymes for his secret counsell, wherwith all things are necessaryly carried to the end, whereunto God hath directed them before. And so do we say, that nothing is done besides this will: It is also some∣tyme taken for that, which God approueth, and maketh accep∣table

vnto him selfe: And in this sense, we do see many things done, now and then, cōtrary to his will discouered in the scrip∣tures. And therfore according to his will, God is sayd, that he willeth all men, to be saued, whereas yet not all, nay rather but a very few are saued.

* 1.216. Freedome also, which is peculiar to man, is discerned by two maner of wayes: either as it is set opposite to bondage: and this Freedome Luther doth vtterly deny, as he may well doe: or as it is set contrary to coaction, or fatall necessitie. And this Freedome Luther neuer gaynesayd: For as much as there is no will, which can endeuour any thing against her will, or the thing which she will not, or which will may sinne at any tyme except she will her selfe.

* 1.317. Likewise Necessitie is to be taken two maner of wayes, the one of certeintie, and vnchaungeablenesse: as hath bene declared before, which Osorius cā not deny. The other of vio∣lent coaction, which doth offer force vnto will: And the same is imputed to Luther falsely.

18. But now, that former Necessitie (which is called vnchaū∣geable) albeit it take her beginnyng from the cause of Gods Predestination: yet this Predestination doth not cast such a Necessitie vpon thinges, which may remoue Freewill, no more doth it take away the Iustice of God, wherewith he doth ren∣der to euery one according to his workes. These thinges beyng thus set downe, and duly considered, it shalbe an easie matter, not onely to withstand the cauillations and subtelties of Osori∣us, but to confounde the residue of the Sophisticall brables of all other aduersaries also, wherewith they practize busily enough (but all in vayne) to oppresse Luthers cause: weuyng their Cobbwebbes (as I may tearme them) for the more part after this maner hereafter following.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Will. Freedome. Necessitie.
• * 1.2

  Freedome taken two maner of wayes.
• * 1.3

  Necessitie taken two maner of wayes.