Against Ierome Osorius Byshopp of Siluane in Portingall and against his slaunderous inuectiues An aunswere apologeticall: for the necessary defence of the euangelicall doctrine and veritie. First taken in hand by M. Walter Haddon, then undertaken and continued by M. Iohn Foxe, and now Englished by Iames Bell.

¶Of Predestination and Freewill.

LVther affirmeth that freewill is a thyng in name onely,* 1.1 or a Name without substaunce: That mā is the patiēt and not the agent: That he is drawen, and doth not purpose or Deli∣berate any thyng: That man is an instrument onely, and as it were a Sawe, or Axe whiche God doth frame and force whether he will, and whereun∣to him pleaseth: and that mā hath no power nor strēgth re∣serued him either to doe good, or to cōmit wickednesse: in so much that we are not able not onely not to do good or euill: but also not to thinke any thought by any meanes of our selues. Moreouer when I name Luther, I vnderstād al∣so withall Melancthon, Bucer, Caluin and the rest of your Iolly fellowes: whose opinions and writynges tend to this effect at the length. That no difference at all may seeme to be betwixt man, and any other toole or instrument.

In uery good tyme Syr, blessed bee this houre, wherein we are come now at the length to the most combersome and crabby treatie of Freéwill, which beyng heretofore so oft tost to an fro in common Schooles, in assemblies, and disputations of Deui∣nes, after so many combates & turmoyles, hath now at the last founde out a champion (hope I) through whose onely force and actiuitie beyng defended, and shrowded (as it were vnder the Target of Aiax) she shall be able to endure and withstād all the assaultes, and coūtermoyles of all heretiques whatsoeuer. For whereas heretofore this vnsearcheable gulfe hath encombred & entangled the wittes, and studies of so many notable Clerkes, Cardinalles, Byshops, and Priestes: the bottome and depth whereof could notwithstandyng neuer yet bee attayned vnto: I suppose the onely let thereof hitherto hath bene, for that our O∣sorius was not hatched as then, nor produced to be Proctour in this cause. But now sithence this vpstarte wrestler is skipt o∣uer the old barriers, and hath catcht the collers in hand, may a∣ny man doubt but that (the whole force of the Enemy beyng vt∣terly discomsited and compelled to fleé the field, the Maiestie of Freéwill hauyng bene long tyme wounded and weakened with greéuous maladie, yea and through feéblenesse euen yeldyng vp

the ghost) shall presently recouer health? stand vpon her feéte, and be strong? For this lusty gallaunt disdayneth to encounter as Bythus did sometyme with Bacchius or as Ecerinus with Pacidianus, or as Hercules agaynst two,* 1.2 or as Horarius a∣gaynst threé brethren at once, or with one man hand to hand onely: but of valiaunt courage, challengeth the field agaynst foure choise and tryed souldiours at one choppe together: to witte, Luther, Melancthon, Bucer, Caluine. Yea with them also agaynst the whole armye of Lutheranes. Agaynst whom neuerthelesse if Osorius durst haue cast his gloue, when they li∣ued amongest vs: or if they were present now to aunswere the challenge, and defende the cause, no doubt the iustie crakes of proude Iacke bragger would carry but a small coūtenaunce to moue the godly to be displeasaunt withall. But as to rake the dead out of their graues, and to pike quarell agaynst ghostes and spirites, is the common guise of euery rascall varlet: so to the discreét and well disposed hath it bene accompted most filthy and contemptuous: yea most to be abhorred in our Osorius at this present: who in all this his discourse of Freéwill alledgyng no one thyng agaynst them, but that whiche in their writynges and bookes is fully aunswered and satisfied: yet (as though they had made no aunswere at all) crawleth hee foreward neuerthe∣lesse, patchyng together his rotten and motheaten trumperie: wherein neither is any thyng of his owne inuētion, nor any new stuffe, but that he hath somewhat furbushed the old rusty Argu∣mentes of other raynebeaten souldiours, with a fresh glaze of raylyng and slaunderous tearmes, like the foolish Choughe at∣tiryng him selfe wholy with the feathers of other Fowles: and in this respect also more vyle and lothsome: That, where the o∣ther doe in their arguyng make a certeine shew of some reason vouched either out of Scriptures, or of Doctours wrongfully wrested: but he for the more part doth so frame his discourse, ra∣ther to the accusing of men, then to the discussing of the contro∣uersie: and doth so handle his matters,* 1.3 as one hauyng regarde rather to the persons agaynst whom hee quarelleth, then to the cause, which ought to haue bene discouered by him.

* 1.4The man is fully persuaded that Freewill ought to be main∣teyned by all meanes possible. But what the will or choyse of mā

is what thyng is freé, or not freé in the will of man: what is ne∣cessary, and what difference is betwixt freé, and necessary, and how many maner of wayes necessary to be taken, he doth neither discouer by definition, nor distinguishe by Argument, nor deuide by partition, nor doth declare what diuersitie and difference ought to be betwixt braunche and braunche. Many & sondry persons before him haue stoutely maynteined the quarell of Freewill, yea w^t no lesse courage, then they would haue done, if y^e state of their countrey had bene in hazard. In the same quarell long sithence, the Celestines and Pelagians kept a great sturre agaynst Augustin. Amōgest many others of late, yeares, wrate chiefly Roffensis and Eckius agaynst Luther. Cardinall Pi∣ghius hath stuffed vp tenne Inuectiues full agaynst Caluine. Likewise many others haue written agaynst Melancthon a∣gaynst Bucer and others. All which albeit preuayled very litle agaynst the truth, yet to the end they might the more easily de∣ceaue vnder a certeine visour of y^e truth, they did shuffle amōgest their owne writynges many sentences of the Scriptures, and many also of the most approued Doctours. After all these our Osorius intendyng to vphold Freewill beyng in great ieopar∣die to perish, what doth he? what bryngeth he? what vttereth he at length elles? but certeine simple croppes scattered here and there in the fieldes of holy Scriptures, which he hath gleaned together and wretchedly misordereth, to make his Assertions get some credite, yet nothyng auayleable to his purpose, God knoweth. In the meane whiles he citeth not one world so much out of the autenticke monumentes of the auncient Authours, nor out of Augustine: who was altogether busied in decydyng this controuersie, and by whom he ought chiefly haue bene gui∣ded in this cause: either bycause he hath practised other scien∣ces, and read nothyng of this writer: or els bycause he is wic∣ked and craftely dissembleth the thynges whiche he hath read. And yet all this notwithstandyng this our Portingall cham∣pion so carrion leaue in the knowledge of Scriptures, altoge∣ther disfournished of Doctours, persuadeth him selfe to be man good enough (if it may please the Muses) to beare y^e whole brūt of the battell in the behalfe of Freewill against freély Luther, Me∣lancthon, Bucer and Caluine, not with mayne strength onely,

but euen with a proude Portingall looke.

* 1.5But go to: bycause we will not protract any long tyme with the Reader, in wordes purposing to wrestle somewhat with O∣sorius herein. Let vs approche to the marke. And bycause the whole force of his communication seémeth to tend to this end, to accuse men rather then to open any matter worthy to be lear∣ned: and for as much he obserueth no order in teachyng, in accu∣sing, ne yet in disputyng: but beyng violently whirled and car∣ried (as it were) in some forcible whirlewinde of accusation raū∣geth the field without Iudgement and out of all aray, and after a certeine confused maner of talke doth wrappe vp, and mingle all thynges togethers as it were vnder one confused heape: we on the contrary part will to temper our aunswere, that (as neare as the matters will permit) we may dispose in some reasonable frame, the chief pillers and Arguments of his accusation, which him selfe hath set downe most disorderly. And therefore in my simple conceite the whole substaunce of all his accusation what∣soeuer, may bee gathered into foure or fiue principall places chiefly, whiche he seémeth to finde fault with all most in Luthers doctrine, as matters full of absurditie, and which he obiecta∣gayust Luther in this wise.

[unspec 1] First, that Luther affirmeth that there is no freé choyse, or freédome in the will of man.

[unspec 2] That all thyngs haue their begynnyng through absolute and vnanoydeable necessitie.

[unspec 3] That impossible thynges are commaunded by God.

[unspec 4] That men are damned, for the thynges which they commit not of their owne freé and voluntary motion, but compelled by fatall necessitie.

[unspec 5] That God is to be taken for the originall and Authour of all mischief and wickednesse.

For into these few places, as in a short Cataloge may be de∣uided all whatsoeuer is comprehended in this huge masse of O∣sorius Inuectiues. Which beyng in this wise placed, it remai∣neth, that we frame our aunswere to euery of them particular∣ly, as oportunitie and place shall offer them in the discourse, and so to purge and wash away (as much as in vs lyeth) all his cauillations & Sophisticall subtelties. For thus would I wish

theé to be persuaded (frendly Reader) that besides naturall scol∣dyng, and meére cauteles of wordes voyde of all substaunce of truth, there is els nothyng of all whatsoeuer he doth brabble in all this discourse, yea & that also stroakyng him selfe rather with vayne conceipt of his own opinion, then of any grounded know∣ledge or Iudgement at all.

And first as touchyng Freewill: In steéde of a proofe & testi∣monie of Luthers owne workes and yet the same also, neither doth he alledge whole as they be, nor fully: nor doth hee couple the first with the last: nor directeth to any certeine place of the Authour. But goe to. What maner of haynous crime is this (a Gods name) wherewith this Portingall Inquisitour doth charge Luther so greéuously & cruelly? Forsooth it is this: That he did dare mutter against Freewill, Saying that it was a thing in tittle onely: and whiles it followeth his owne nature, it doth nothyng but sinne deadly. And where is this written? In the volumes of Luther (I suppose) or els in Sybilles leaues. Seéke there Reader, or els where if thou wilt. For as our Re∣uerēd Maister Inquisitour assigneth no place to y^e Reader, so (I thinke) he neuer did read in Luther the thyng, whereat he cauil∣leth: nor thinketh that it concerneth his credite at all to vtter whatsoeuer him listeth, in what sense, w^t what phrase of speache, by what authoritie, or with what testimonies it bee bolstered so that somewhat bee suggested whereat hee may frame some qua∣rell. But proceéde on, and what followeth? Then afterwardes the same Luther correctyng him selfe, what sayth he farther? I haue erred (sayd hee) I spake vntruely: that Freewill is a thyng in name onely before the tyme of grace:* 1.6 but I should haue sayd simply. That Freewill is a fayned deuise or a tittle without all substaunce. Luther in his Assertions writ∣ten to Leo the tenth the 36. Article. Well and what is it at last, that this Maister Inquisitour will frame vnto vs out of this? Ergo,* 1.7 Luther is an heretique, who dispoyleth man of all his Freewill, and traueileth chiefly to this end, to affirme that mans mynde is alwayes holden captiue, his will fast bound, all power of workyng taken away, in so much that we can do neither good nor euill, nor cā thinke a thought so much by any meanes. And this doth not Luther teach onely: but

Melancthon also aboundauntly, yea much more plentyful∣ly Caluine doth debate the same. I not heare you Osorius & do aunswere, not I for Luther, but Luther shall aunswere ful∣ly for him selfe.

And first touchyng that whiche we terme mans choyse, whe∣ther ye conster it to be reason, or will: surely Luther did neuer deny. The same dare I boldly affirme in the behalfe of Melan∣cthon and Caluine also. Certes these men were neuer so rea∣sonably madde, as to despoyle man (whom they define to be en∣dued with reason) of reason and of will. For by no reason cā the operation of will be sequested from that part,* 1.8 where the vse of reason resteth. Howsoeuer nature was corrupted through the first originall of Sinne: yet remaineth neuerthelesse that thyng after a certeine sort within vs still, which we receaued of the treé of knowledge of good and euill:* 1.9 but thus must be noted chiefly in what wise it remayneth, not that it can auayle any way to salua∣tion, but that it hurteth rather thereunto. And therfore as con∣cernyng those naturall properties of will, Luther was neuer so foolishe, nor any of all the Lutheranes, as to exclude that will from nature by any meanes, which nature it selfe had engraffed into men. Let this therfore remayne vnshaken in this cōtrouer∣sie as touchyng the substaūce of Freewill, that the essenciall sub∣staūce therof vnited together with sensible reason doth alwayes cleaue inseparably to nature:* 1.10 which neither Luther deny, nor any of all the Lutheranes did euer deny. What is it then (will you say) that Luther did deny in Freewill? I will tell you: so that your vnderstandyng be able to conceaue it.

* 1.11It is out of all controuersie that Adam in his first creation, was endued with wonderfull and absolute freédome of will: to the vpholdyng of which freédome of will, the grace of God was not wantyng at that tyme, without the which he could not stand fast in that good will, wherein he was created though he would: now to haue a will to stand fast was not geuen him, but was left in the power of his Freewill, and so left, that if hee would haue stoode fast, hee had neuer bene euill, if he would not bene euill. And yet neither could he bee good through the force of his owne Freewill, without Gods speciall grace. But what did he? Be∣yng thus left in the power of his owne Freewill, when he neither

would stand fast, nor could fall without sinne: By Sinnyng (a∣busing his owne freédome) he brought to passe, that he both lost and cast away him selfe, and his freédome withall: and yet not in such wise, as that there remained in him neither sense, nor feé∣lyng, nor vse of will: but he so lost it, that, whereas he was be∣fore immortall and freé, now hath he both lost his freédome, and also his immortalitie and righteousnesse withall. Whereby it came to passe, that the wretched man (by losing that pure freé∣dome of good will, which he receaued in his first creation) pur∣chased to him selfe and all his posteritie most miserable and la∣mentable bondage. Now therfore beyng clogged and fastened to this state of bondage (as it were cloyed in claye) albeit after a certeine sorte we reteine still that power of vnderstandyng and appetite, whereby the mynde of her freé motiō is able to discerne betwixt sensible obiectes: yet can we neuer of our selues aspire agayne to that vprightenesse and immortalitie, which we haue lost: for beyng now fast yoaked, and sold vnder this yoake of ser∣uitude, we doe serue such a seruile thraldome in this fleshe, that we can turne our selues to no one side, through any force of freé∣dome, but we shall alwayes be the bondslaues of sinne & death, vnlesse the grace of Christ do helpe vs, and set vs at libertie.

Whereby you may easily perceaue (Osorius) what is the state and condition of Freewill:* 1.12 to witte: that in one sense it may be taken not altogether freé, and agayne in an other sense, not o∣therwise but freé. For if ye call backe the nature of mankynd to her first creation, and then will demaunde generally, whether there be no freé will in nature? I doe aunswere. That nature it selfe was created vpright at the first, & that God the good Crea∣tour endued it with Freewill: but that man him selfe became ene∣my to that freédome, & destroyed y^e same in nature vtterly. But if you will proceéde, & make a further question, & demaūde what kynde of will (after sinne entred once) was in man towardes na∣turall euill thyngs, and towardes deceitfull good thynges? I do aunswere that mās will (which they call Freewill) is altogether prone and enclined to wicked and euill thynges:* 1.13 And here you haue the bare title of Freewill. But if you demaunde how mās will is affectioned to good and godly thynges: Luther doth af∣firme that it is neither freé, nor effectuall of it selfe, or inclinable

thereunto & will boldly confesse y^t it is bond, seruile, & altogether captiuate, vnlesse it be hoipen. Not bycause mās will is vnable to will or to attēpt any thyng of it selfe: but bycause of her owne power it is not able to will well, or do to well, in those thyngs y^t apperteine vnto God.* 1.14 Where agayne you may seé the name of Freewill, but voyde of vse or substaunce. But as concernyng the proper qualitie or operatiō of freédome, albeit it reteine y^e name of Freewill in y^e Church in respect of the title: bycause it seémeth alwayes freé either to righteousnes, or free from sinne, yet ought it alwayes to be holden in such sorte freé, as not beyng alwayes good, yea rather neuer good in deéde, vnlesse it be gouerned by the goodnesse of the almightie God. Which thyng Augustine doth notably expresse saying.* 1.15 Freewill (sayth he) is nothing worth vn∣lesse God doe gouerne the same. And immediately after. To this effect is thy will, whiche is called free, apt and sufficient, that by doing ill, it becommeth a damnable bondmayde. &c. Harken Osorius. If it be a bondmayde, now is it not freé thē. If by doing ill it bee damnable (for that as Augustine reporteth of it selfe it can do nothyng but euill). Wherefore is Luther condemned for saying that Freewill doth sinne deadly, when it worketh what it cā of it selfe? &c. or what can your selfe Osorius discerne other then a title voyde of substaunce in that Freewill, wherein you cā finde nothing effectuall to the purpose, that is to say, to y^e worke of Saluation?

* 1.16For as much therefore as it so: what request is it that this accuser maketh? who contendeth so friuolously agaynst Luther for the Mooneshyne in the water, and for a title onely? whether is it bycause hee taketh away will from men, or freédome from will? As touchyng the substaunce of the matter, there is no qua∣rell agaynst Luther: The whole controuersie ariseth then about the forme and qualitie of will. Well then Luther doth not deny the will of man (as I do vnderstād) but the freédome of will one∣ly. Be it so Osorius: yet this may not suffice in the accuser, that he which is quilty shall make a simple denyall onely. But it be∣haueth to consider diligently in what sense, & with what wordes deny all is made, what libertie hee meaneth, & in what maner of persons, and in what thyngs that libertie may be knowen to be. For neither doth Luther so vtterly abandone from nature of mā

all freédome, as though there were no freédome at all, or as though it were so fait chayned with yron roapes, that it could moue it selfe to no vse. Albeit (I say) he do deny that will is freé, and confesse it to be a thyng of name and title onely: yet doth he not affirme this so to bee simply a title, as though man had no will at all, or as though it were neuer, or neuer was and neuer should be freé. And therefore in the same Article, he doth very learnedly annexe these wordes of restrainte. Post peccatum, After sinne, whiche wordes of Luther our Osorius doth very craftely dissemble and skippe ouer.* 1.17 Besides this also is added thereunto an exception of tyme, to witte, Ante iustitiam & gra∣tiam .i. Before righteousnesse and grace. By whiche playne wordes you might (as you are otherwise sharpewitted enough) haue easely discerned that Freewill is not so, simply, nor altoge∣ther taken away, neither from all men, nor out of all order of na∣ture: seyng as the state of Adam before sinne was most perfect in that integritie of Freewill: also seyng as after grace receaued Freewill is mighty in those persōs, which are made freé through Christ. As for the rest, who as yet stickyng fast cloyed in that old puddle of Sinne, are not yet come to bee regenerated by grace: in these persons if question be moued, what Freewill is in them, and of what efficacie in her owne nature:* 1.18 Luther doth aū∣swere truely, that it is a thyng of title onely, and that it sinneth deadly, when it worketh what it can of it selfe, though she ende∣uour the best that she can: meanyng hereby, that albeit Freewill continue to bee called Freewill after her first de••••••mination and state, yet that she hath vtterly lost the very substaunciall opera∣tion thereof, and so lost the same, that whatsoeuer enterprise it attempt, yet can it not auayle one iote so much to the very sub∣staunce of the matter, vntill the first nature beyng renewed by fayth, be fashioned a new, into a new creature. Well then, and what haynous matter at the length conteineth this sentēce that may prouoke you to barke so cruelly? or what haue you espied in this Freewill, that may auayle you or any other person to God∣ward? If there be any thyng, declare it I pray you: If there bee nothyng: wherein then hath Luther offended? who perceauyng, as truth is, that Freewill is altogether vneffectuall to profite vs, doth therfore make small accompt therof.

* 1.19But your Catholicke stomacke is somewhat queysie per∣happes at the sounde of that Hyperbole of Luther not vsually frequented in your Schooles, whereby he doth so embase Free∣will to be nothing els but a title, and a forged fantasie amongest naturall causes: As touchyng Luthers frequentyng of Hyper∣bolicall speaches: Admit I would somewhat yeld vnto you: yet sithence the Scripture it selfe doth not altogether vnacquaynte it selfe with such kynde of figures, reseruyng alwayes the truth of things: what waywardnesse is this of those men not to vouch∣safe in Luther to expresse certeine wordes with some sharpe ve∣hemencie of speach,* 1.20 whenas they them selues meanewhiles, ei∣ther for very blockyshnesse doe not marke, or for very malice do not reforme, not onely y^e most friuolous barrennes of words, but also the most outragious excesse of speaches, wherewith their whole doctrine swarmeth euery where? And what maruell is it then, if Luther inueighyng agaynst those so monstruous ou∣trages of doctrine, waxe somewhat whotte sometymes, after a certeine more vehement maner of speakyng? But if any man adiudge him worthy to be reprehended in that respect, I would fayne haue the same man required: if hee will not vouchsafe to Impute that his heate to y^e vehemēcie of Gods Spirite (which after the purpose of his good pleasure directeth his Instru∣mentes as him lysteth) that hee will yet at the least bethinke him selfe, of how great Importaunce the cause was wherein Luther trauayled at that tyme: & weighe aduisedly the manifold darke∣nesse, and errours of that season: and withall enter into a deépe consideration of the vnmeasurable iniuries of his aduersaries. Luther did then mainteyne the most iust quarell of Gods grace & mercy agaynst the innumerable droues of drousie Monckes, who hauyng ouerwhelmed the glorious Maiestie of the Grace of the Gospell,* 1.21 did of an incomparable shamelesse excessiue Im∣pudencie extoll aboue Moone and Starres, yea beyond all com∣passe of reason, the force of mans Freewill: in such wise that no∣thyng might beare palme besides mans merites onely, and the workes of Freewill (the mercy of God beyng vtterly banished and exiled) Or if they did at any tyme admitte Grace to be cape marchaunt (as it were) with Freewill, least they might seéme vt∣terly to exclude Grace: Yet did they so admitte her, as they dyd

the Article of Iustification. Wherein as they did with most vayne practize enforce this one point cōtinually: to witte: That fayth onely without workes could not Iustifie: euen so and in lyk•• maner in this question of Freewill, they would neédes haue this to bee graunted, that the Grace of God was not the onely foundresse of good workes, and of our Electiō, but a seruaūt ra∣ther, or at the most a companion of Freewill.

Whose vnmeasurable errour forced Martin Luther to that vehemet sharpnesse of speach,* 1.22 and not without good cause. And yet in all that his heate of wordes, what can any man (I pray you) finde, beyng not otherwise lead by corrupt affection, that is cōtrary to the naturall truth of thyngs? or that is not in all res∣pectes faithfully agreable w^t the very spirite & wordes of Gods Scriptures? Freewill is denyed to be of any value, not bycause it is of it selfe nothyng (if you respect the substaunce of it) but in respect of the operation therof, it is sayd to be altogether vneffe∣ctuall to that worke, whereunto it is supposed to be conducible: not much vnlike to that figuratiue phrase of speach, wherewith Paule doth esteéme of Circumcision, and Uncircumcision to be nothyng worth: wherewith Esay the Prophet doth tearme I∣dolles and Idollmakers to be nothyng: and wherewith Ieremy beholdyng the earth with open eyes, was sayd hee saw nought. Or as a man might say, that Osorius doth say nothyng at all, when as otherwise he is ouer lauishe of toung, if you regard his wordes and sillables: but nothyng at all to the purpose, if ye cō∣sider his Argumentes. Semblably Freewill is called a fay∣ned deuise amongest thynges, or a tittle without substaunce, from whence ariseth no preiudice to mās nature: onely the cor∣ruption of nature is discouered hereby.* 1.23 For it is vndoubted (as Augustine truly teacheth) that we do will, when we will: and that we doe worke, when we worke. But to be able to will, and to be able to worke bee bringeth to passe in vs, of whom it is sayd, God is hee that worketh in vs both to will, and to doe: geuing most effectuall power to our will: whiche sayd, I will bring to passe that you shall doe. Aud agayne in other place.* 1.24 Thinking (sayth he) we do beleue, thinking we doe speake, thinking we doe all whatsoeuer we doe. &c. Loe here you haue the tittle of Freewill. And forthwith in the same Chap. But to the attaining the way of righteousnesse and the

true worshipping of God, we are altogether of our selues insuffici∣ent: for all our sufficiencie herein proceedeth frō God. &c. Where you may easily conceaue the substaūce it selfe, which Augustine acknowledgeth to be none at all in Freewill, but affirmeth bold∣ly to cōsiste wholy in God. Albeit neither doth Luther him selfe (when he tearmeth Freewill to be a fantasie or deuise in thyngs) simply and barely affirme the same to be so: but annexeth there∣unto an addition: namely Post peccatum, & ante gratiam. That is to say. After Sinne, and before Grace. Whereby the godly Reader may vnderstand, that those persones are not noted here, whom either the Grace of Christ hath vouchsafed into Freé∣dome or whō, after Grace receaued, Christ will crowne in glo∣ry to come.

For there be certeine distinct differences of tymes, and per∣sons (if you know them not Osorius) whiche ought chiefly to be obserued:* 1.25 wherein if you be as yet vnskillfull, ye may repayre to your M. Lumbard, who will lead you to a descriptiō of Free∣will, deuidyng it into foure braunches as it were.

Wherof the first is: The same that was created ioyntly with mans nature at mans first creation, sounde and perfect.* 1.26 The se∣cond whiche after mans fall, was throwen downe in them that were not regenerated. The third, whiche is proper and pecu∣liar to the godly, after their conuersion vnto Grace. The last, which shalbe accomplished in those that shalbe glorified. As tou∣chyng the first and last whereof, the Deuines make no question at all (as I suppose) Agayne if you will assigne Freewill to the thyrd braunche, Luther will nothyng gaynsay you: whose dis∣putation concerneth those persons chiefly, who after Sinne, & before their conuersion beyng wounded with originall Sinne, haue not as yet recouered health in Christ Iesu, through the tri∣acle of better Grace. In which sort of people, if you be of opi∣nion that the state of Freewill ought by any meanes to be defen∣ded, I would fayne learne of you first, whether ye will inueste those persons with Freewill playnly, perfectly, whole, and not diminished, or otherwise? If you will attribute such a freédome vnto them: it remayneth then, that by way of definition ye ex∣pounde the difference betwixt the state, and condition of the first man before his fall, and this latter state and condition after his

fall. But if you will dismember it, and will graunt vnto them certeine vnperfect dregges thereof onely, neither will Luther vary much from you herein:* 1.27 so that ye will yeld some distinctiō thereunto, and vtter playnly and distinctly what kynde of liber∣tie you meane: in what thynges you settle it, and how it ought to be taken: what this word Freewill emporteth: and to what ac∣tions of mans lyfe it ought to be referred: and withall will vn∣lose those crabbed knottes of equiuocatiōs, wherewith ye seéke to entrappe the truth.

For whereas the actions of mans lyfe are not all of one sort or kynde: some wherof proceédyng from nature it selfe be natu∣rall, others altogether faultie and corrupt, others politique and apperteinyng to maners are morall, called good: Agayne some other spirituall, and consiste in the worshyppyng of God: It behoued you here to make manifest vnto vs, whiche of those actions you do meane. If you speake of the first kynde: certes euē vnto these, by y^e very law of cōmon nature it selfe, we are all fastened & boūde of necessitie, wherby we are bereft of y^e greatest part of our freédome. For what freédome can bee so mighty in mans wil as to preserue mā so, that he neuer neéde to sleépe, but be alwayes watchfull: that he neuer be sicke, but alwayes heal∣thy: neuer receaue sustenaūce, not to disgest the foode receaued,* 1.28 not to prouide for his houshold, not to be carefull for him selfe & his family, not to be busied abroad, not to rest at home, not to en∣ioy y^e commō ayre, not to lyue, not to dye, not to performe the o∣ther dueties apperteinyng to mans lyfe, whereunto we are for∣cibly drawen by course of nature, not so much by allurement of will, as by very constrainte of necessitie.* 1.29 I come now to the vse and handlyng of Ciuill trades and forreine disciplines, and to other dutiefull actions, and considerations of the same kynde which are dayly frequented in mans lyfe. In the whiche albeit Luther will confesse many thynges to be conteined that are sub∣iect vnto Freewill, yet will he not otherwise graunt thereunto, but that euen in the selfe same, y^e vnderstandyng mynde is many tymes deceaued, will defrauded, and freédome altogether ouer∣throwen. And yet doe we not for that cause vtterly extinguishe will or freédome, nor wrappe vp and entangle the mynde, nor spoyle reason of coūsell, nor dispossesse mā frō his aunciēt inhe∣ritaunce

of choyse or will: howsoeuer the cruell outrage of Sinne hath weakened, and wasted the sinewes and strength of nature, beyng well created at the first: yet remayneth neuerthe∣lesse that naturall power of the soule, not onely in those that are renewed in spirite, but in them also that are not regenerate, in respect of those actions especially, wherof I made mention be∣fore.* 1.30 But if the question be remoued to those actions, which do not belong to the naturall and common conuersation of life, but apperteine to the spirituall worshyppyng of God, and concerne the kyngdome of Christ: who can not here easily discerne that Freewill before it receaueth Grace, though it be garnished with neuer so gorgeous a tittle, hath besides a glorious tittle onely, nothyng els, whereby it may defende it selfe from seruile bon∣dage, or rayse it selfe vp to attaine the true freéedome of Salua∣tion. I doe not speake here of that freédome (Osorius) which is properly opposite to constrainte and compulsary violēce, wher∣of we vaunte all in vayne: nor of that naturall power of the rea∣sonable soule, whiche we seéke not to shake of: ne yet of mans will beyng regenerated, which we do not disable: finally nor yet of those actions wherewith this sensible lyfe is beautified, but I speake of those affections which are ascribed to the spirituall lyfe of the person that is regenerate in Christ.* 1.31 Whereupon ac∣cordyng to those fiue distinctions afore mentioned, as many se∣uerall kyndes of questions do arise: which for auoydyng confu∣sion, must be seuerally distinguished.

* 1.32First, if a question be moued of the freédome of nature being pure and sounde: as was before the fall of Adam: who doth not know that the state of that will was most pure and freé.* 1.33 And it is not to bee doubted, that mans Freewill was absolutely perfect in his first creation. But that man by sinne, lost the same freedome al∣together. August.

* 1.34Secundarely, if the question bee remoued ouer to the sub∣staunce, and to that part of man wherewith the mynde is en∣dued with vnderstandyng and appetite: as if this be the questiō, whether mans will which is called freé, were after the fall of A∣dam vtterly extinct, and of no substaunce? we do aunswere here with Ambrose,* 1.35 that the Iudgemēt of will was corrupted in deede, but not vtterly taken away. And agayne. The deuill did not spoyle

man of his will vtterly, but bereft him of the soundenesse and inte∣gritie of will. For although mans will and the vnderstandyng parte of his soule, was miserably corrupted through originall Sinne, yet was it not so altogether abolished, but that there re∣mayneth some freédome to doe: freé I call it in respect of those thynges, which are either naturally carryed to motion without Iudgement, as brute beastes: or whiche are forced by coaction agaynst nature, as stones. By this therefore that is spoken, it appeareth that will (wherewith we are naturally endued in res∣pect of the essentiall and naturall disposition thereof) doth al∣wayes remayne in mans nature, how corrupt soeuer it be: yea and remayneth in such wise, as hauyng alwayes a freé and vo∣luntary operation in naturall causes, without all forreine coac∣tion (vnlesse it be hindered) and a naturall sensibilitie also, and capacitie (as Iustine tearmeth it) in heauenly thynges,* 1.36 if it be holpē. And this is it that Augustines wordes seéme to emporte to my Iudgement, where speakyng in the defence of Freewill vseth these wordes.* 1.37 Beleeue (sayth hee) the holy Scriptures and that will is will, and the grace of God, without helpe whereof, man can neither turne vnto God, nor profite in God. Agayne in his se∣cōd Epistle to Valentin. The Catholicke faith doth neither deny Freewill applyable to good life or badd life, nor doth esteeme ther∣of so highly, as though it were of any value without the grace of God, either to turne frō euill to good, or to perseuer stedfast in good, or to attaine to euerlasting goodnes, whereas it feareth not now, left it may fainte and decay. &c. And agayne in an other place.* 1.38 I con∣fesse (sayth hee) that will is alwayes free in vs, but it is not alwayes good. But the maner how it is sayd to bee alwayes freé, must be learned of the same Augustine: It is either free from righteous∣nesse (sayth he) when it is the bondslaue of sinne and than is it euill: or it is free from Sinne, when it is handmayd to righteousnesse and then is it good. &c.

It appeareth therefore by this twofold freédome of Augu∣stine,* 1.39 that mans will is alwayes freé both in good thynges and in euill thynges. But we ought to conceaue of this freédome in this wise: not that she hath power of her owne strength to make choyse of good or euill, namely in spirituall matters, as our ad∣uersaries doe dreame: But accordyng to Augustines interpre∣tation,

whē will is naught, it is of her owne disposition naught: when it is good, then is it guided by grace not vnwillyngly, but voluntaryly, without compulsion:* 1.40 yet freé notwithstandyng al∣wayes, whether it be good or bad: bycause it is alwayes volunta∣ry & neuer constrained. And this much touchyng the propertie & naturall disposition of mās will, which who so will deny seemeth in my conceite to do euen all one, as if he should deny that man is a reasonable creature, for I seé no cause why reason may be more sequestred from man, then will ought to be seuered from reason. Which two thynges are so vnited together with a cer∣teine naturall affinitie, & are so mutually linked together with an inseparable knot in the reasonable soule, that Reason cā nei∣ther performe any exployte without will, nor will enterprise any thyng aduisedly without the guidyng of Reason. Therefore as Iudgement belongeth properly to Reason, so to will and to worke, apperteineth properly to will, whether it be to good, or to euil. The one wherof respecteth y^e substaūce of will, the other is peculiar to the disposition therof. But as this liuely Reason be∣ing enclosed within her certeine limittes & boūdes hath her pro∣per & peculiar obiectes, so that she is vnable to rayse it selfe be∣yond the cōpasse of naturall & vitall causes, vnles it be enlighte∣ned: euē so will, beyng straighted w^tin y^e same limittes & boūdes of naturall causes, hath no power at all in it selfe either to attēpt or to atchieue those spirituall good things, vnlesse it be holpen.

* 1.41For as much therefore as reason and will doe in their owne right exercize their actiuitie & dominiō in naturall thyngs one∣ly (as I said before) as it were in their lawfull prouinces, here∣of springeth the thyrd question. Whether there be any such freé∣dome in will, as to be able of it selfe to embrace or eschewe those thyngs, which are gouerned by the externall senses, and by rea∣son? Whereunto the aunswere is very easie:* 1.42 for it is not to bee doubted, but that the mynde and the wil (out of which two Free∣will is deriued) do yet still reteine some certein sparckes of freé∣dome, such as they be, euen in the forlorne nature: for the mynde after a certeine sorte is able to thinke, to purpose, to take coun∣sell, to Iudge, to allow or disallow:* 1.43 in like maner also will doth enioy her certeine freédome in those thynges, whereunto Sense and Reason do direct. For it as able to wil, or not to will, to chuse

or not to chuse, to desire, or to forsake, to stay his purpose or to chaunge it: to moue hether and thether: and after a certein ma∣ner to exercize it selfe in her kynde to externall discipline, that is to say: to worke externall honest actions agreable with the law of God, & to eschew the cōtrary. Which thyng besides that many other thynges doe approue to be true: as well the sundry examples of Ethnicke people, as also the whole politicall estate doth verifie. So is it true also, that the same is not performed without Gods guidyng: which thyng Nazienzen did notably aduertize and expresse in his Oratiō.* 1.44 I know (sayth hee) that the Goale is not attained by the quyuernes of the person, nor successe of battell by prowesse, nor conquest atchieued by fighting, nor yet safe and sure Roade alwayes at skilfull saylers commaundement, but it is the onely worke of God to geue victorie, and to cōduct the Shippe safety vnto the happie hauen. &c. But for as much as these actiōs are referred more properly to politique reason, then to Diuini∣tie, nor concerne Luthers discourse very much, it shalbe neéde∣lesse to bestow any great labour herein.

Fourthly, to approche somewhat neare to those thynges which are peculiar,* 1.45 and belong chiefly to the doctrine of Deui∣nes: and first of all if question be moued, whether mans Freewill do beare any stroake in actions meérely euil and corrupt, the do∣yng whereof doth defile man in the sight of God? our aunswere herein will forthwith be supplyed with y^e wordes of Augustine.* 1.46 God doth not helpe vs to committe Sinne (sayth he) but in that we fall from God commeth of our owne corruptiō. And this is our cor∣rupt will. And agayne, where he reciteth the Obiectiō of Iulian, writyng agaynst y^e two Epistles of y^e Pelagianes,* 1.47 Did the Free∣will of the first man perishe therefore (sayth Iulian) to the ende it should compell all his posteritie to Sinne in their flesh of very neces∣sitie? To whom Augustine maketh this aunswere: Which of vs dare say that mankinde was vtterly spoyled of Freewill by the sinne of the first man? freedome perished in deede through Sinne, but it was that freedome wherewith man was created in Paradise, free to enioy full righteousnes with immortalitie: for the which the na∣ture of man standeth in neede of Gods grace, according as the Lord him selfe doth testifie, saying: If the Sonne do deliuer you,* 1.48 thē shall you be free in deede: Free I meane, to liue well and vprightly: for

so farre is it of, that Freewill did so altogether perishe in Sinners, that by the same Freewill men do offende, especially they that take pleasure in Sinne, and which being delighted with the loue of Sinne, do with pleasure greedely folow their owne lust. And in y^e 3. Chap.* 1.49 We do not say, as they report that we say, that all men are constrai∣ned to fall into Sinne through the necessitie of their flesh, and as it were against their willes. But after they be growen to that rypenes of yeares, that they may discerne the inclinatiō of their own minde, and finde them selues fast holden in Sinne, through their owne con∣sent, and so suffer them selues to be carried headlong from Sinne to Sinne wilfully and wittingly. This will now whiche is free to euill thinges, wherein it taketh pleasure, is therefore not free to good things, bycause it is not made free. &c. Adde hereunto the wordes of the same Augustine to the same effect discoursing vpon the wordes of the Apostle.* 1.50 To doe euill thou hast Freewill, without the helpe of GOD, albeit that will is not free. For of whom so∣euer a man is holden bounde, to him is hee a bondslane. And a∣gayne in an other place, To fall (sayth hee) commeth of our sel∣ues and of our sluggishenesse: Moreouer writyng agaynst the same Pelagians.* 1.51 That person hath Freewill to do euill (sayth he) either whom Sathan allureth to take pleasure therein by couert or open suggestion: or who that persuadeth him selfe thereunto. Fi∣nally, if a mā might tarry still in alledgyng y^e testimony of Au∣gustine, what cā be clearer thē these wordes.* 1.52 Freewill being cap∣tiued hath no power to worke any thing but sinne, and is altogether vnable to worke righteousnesse, vnlesse God geue it free passage. Whereby you may perceaue how mās will is at one tyme both freé and captiue:* 1.53 to witte, freé to doe euill, in as much as pursu∣yng lust with voluntary delight, neédeth not any forreine coactiō to worke euill: whiche also Luther doth not deny: but in no res∣pect freé to do good, vnlesse it be set at libertie by Gods grace, & to speake Augustines words, vnlesse it be guided to euery good actiō of doyng, speakyng, & thinkyng. And where be these iolly fellowes now, which do so stoutely yeld to mans will equall freé∣dome to do good, or euill in this corruptiō of nature? and yet this might be graunted also after a sort, so that it be interpreted ac∣cordingly: for if they meane of will regenerated, it is tollerable enough, neither will Luther be agaynst it: all whose discourse of

Freewill tendeth not to any other will, then to that wherof men∣tion hath bene made out of Augustine, whiche beyng without grace, is altogether vneffectuall of her owne nature to doe any thyng but to Sinne.

And hereof springeth at the length the whole substaunce of the fift questiō.* 1.54 Wherein the chief and speciall state of Luthers discourse consisteth: to witte, touchyng spirituall motions and actions: touchyng heauenly thynges and workes apperteinyng vnto God: touchyng spirituall righteousnesse: inward worshyp∣pyngs: fayth: repentaunce: conuersion: loue & new obediēce. &c. As if the question were demaunded now, not of the substaunce of reasonable will: whether after the fall, there remayne in man a power of vnderstanding, & appetite to those thynges, which nature hath made subiect to mans witte and capacitie? or whe∣ther man haue any freédome of will to corrupt affections? but rather that the question be after this maner,* 1.55 whether mās will after Sinne, do reteyne still that force and strength of freédome in those spirituall thyngs before rehearsed, as that it be effectu∣all of it selfe before Grace, or beyng holpen by Grace, could pre∣uayle so farreforth inspirituall thynges, as that through grace and the naturall force of Freewill workyng together, it might become sufficient cause of it selfe, to enterprise spirituall moti∣ons, and with all to put them also in practize? For all those thynges must be duely considered Osorius: If we will shew our selues vpright and hādsome disputers of Freewill: in debatyng of which question, if ye will permit our Cōfession to be coupled with the authoritie of the most sacred Scripture, we must of ne∣cessitie hold this rule fast, whiche teacheth: that albeit mans na∣ture is fallen from the integritie of that excellent and absolute freédome, yet it is not ouerthrowen into that miserable state of seruilitie, whiche is proper to brute beastes: neither that it is so altogether dispoyled of all the power of the first creation, as ha∣uyng no sparkes at all of her aūcient dignitie remaynyng. For the nymblenesse of the mynde deuiseth many thynges with vn∣derstādyng, digesteth with Reason,* 1.56 comprehēdeth with memo∣ry, debateth with aduise, gathereth in order with wisedome, in∣uenteth Artes, learneth Sciences, Recordeth thinges past, ob∣serueth thynges present, and prouideth for thynges to come.

Semblably will doth chuse,* 1.57 and refuse the thynges that seéme either agreable to reason, or profitable to the senses. So that by those qualities appeareth sufficiently (I suppose) the difference that is betwixt vs, and brute beastes, and vnsensible creatures. Which actions beyng naturally engraffed within vs, yea with∣out grace, albeit proceéde from the voluntary motion of the vn∣derstandyng mynde, yet bycause they extende no further, then to this present lyfe, and perishe together with this mortall body, serue but to small purpose: yea euen then chiefly, when we make our best accompt of them. Moreouer although they bee after a sort freé of their owne nature, yet stand they not alwayes in such an vnchaūgeable integritie, but that reason is many tymes de∣luded by great errours, will ouercharged with waywardnesse, & y^e power of the mynde suffereth many defectes. Almightie God many tymes by secrete operation communicatyng his handy∣worke to gether with these actiōs, doth apply the willes of men hether and thether, whereunto it pleaseth him: confoūdeth their deuises, aduaunceth their endeuours, not after the freé Imagi∣nation of men, but according to his own freé decreé and purpose. And this much hetherto concernyng those obiectes, and exter∣nall operatiōs onely, which concerne the common preseruation of this present lyfe, and which perish together with the same.

* 1.58But yet truely as concernyng either the enterprising, or ac∣complishyng of those spirituall motions and operations, for as much as they do farre exceéde the capacitie of mans nature, the Scripture doth vtterly deny that man (beyng not as yet rege∣nerated) is naturally endued with any force or abilitie of will sithence the first creatiō: but that all those giftes are vtterly lost through the greatnesse of Sinne, and that by this meanes 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 imbecillitie and weakenesse of nature, is by propaga∣tion discended vpon all men, and nature it selfe corrupted with miserable faultinesse, yea and not with faultynesse onely (that doth exclude vs from those euerlastyng good thynges) but be∣sides this also, that through this corruption of nature hath suc∣ceéded in steéde of that auncient integritie, a certeine rebellious contumacie, and filthy infection of Diabolicall seéde, which doth depriue vs of all heauēly knowledge, and carry vs headlong in∣to all maner of abhomination: whereupon y^e doctrine of Luther

is not vnfitly confirmed, wherew^t they do conclude with Augu∣stine most truly as agaynst the Romish Doctours, that Freewill is not onely weakened in vs, but vtterly extinct also, and so tho∣roughly defaced, that if we bee any tyme enlightened with any sparcle of Regeneration, the same ought wholy be ascribed to the grace of God, and not to Freewill, nor to any strēgth of ours, and (to speake the wordes of Augustine) neither wholy,* 1.59 ne yet of any part. For vpon this point chiefly dependeth the whole va∣riaunce betwixt vs and the Papistes touchyng Freewill.

These thyngs therfore beyng in thus sort discouered,* 1.60 which ought in deéde haue bene distinguished at the first, for the better demonstration of the manifold diuersitie of questiōs. I will now returne agayne to Luthers position, who doth professe that Freewill is a thyng of Title onely, and a Name or Title with∣out substaunce. Wherein if Osorius shall Iudge any worde to be misspoken and blameworthy in him, hee must then first aun∣swere me to this question. For as much as Freewill is not all a∣like in the persons that are regenerate, and in them that are not regenerate: and for as much as libertie also is to be construed in humane actions after one sort, but taken after a contrary cō∣struction in spirituall exercizes: hee must (I say) tell me which sorte of Freewill, or what maner of actions he doth treate of. If he meane that Freewill, which is now gouerned by the Spirite of God: Surely Luthers position maketh therof no mention at all. Or if he meane those naturall obiectes, whiche proceéde of common nature, or whiche are vsually frequented in the dayly practize of common conuersation, after the conduct of Morall reason, either in doyng right, or executyng wrong: So doth not Luthers position tende to these actions in any respect. But if the question bee after this maner: Of how much force and effi∣cacie the bare choyse of man may be of her owne naturall abili∣tie, either in enterprising or performyng those thynges,* 1.61 which doe obteine Gods grace for vs, or make an entrey for vs into heauen: then will Luther aunswere most truly: That there is scarse any substaunce at all in Freewill, auayleable to the pur∣chassing of the kyngdome of heauen, except a glorious visour of Title onely: no more substaunce veryly then is in a dead man, who besides the onely shape and denomination of a man, hath

nothyng in him whereby hee may receaue breath, and recouer life to the dead carcasse. For of what force is mans Freewill els towardes the thynges that apperteine vnto God, before it haue receaued grace, then as a dead man without lyfe? And for this cause the Scripture in many places, expressing our natures in their most liuely and natiue colours, calleth vs darkenesse, blinde to see: deafe to heare: vncircumcized of hart: wicked in the de∣uises and imaginatiōs of our conceites: stonie harted: cast awayes: enemies in respect of our fleshly thoughtes: Rebelles against the Spirite: vnprofitable Seruauntes: bondslaues: sold vnder Sinne: dead vnto iniquitie: vnexcusable: subiect to wrath. S. Paule des∣cribyng the callyng of Gods Elect in the first Chap. of his first Epistle to the Corinthes.* 1.62 And those thinges whiche were not (sayth hee) God hath called. &c. If Paule doe affirme that the thynges which are, were not so at the first, and that truely: How can Osorius Iustifie, that will was any thyng worthe in them which as yet were not? I will rehearse vnto you the saying of our Sauiour in the Gospell, where settyng vs forth to behold our selues, as it were in a glasse: Let the dead (quoth hee) burie their dead, Come thou and preach the kingdome of God. Tell vs here Osorius, in what sense did Christ call them dead, whose bo∣dies were not dead, if their life were endued with Freewill able to come vnto God in any respect, howsoeuer they seémed to be alyue in the Iudgement of men? But and if they had no lyfe in God, how then could Freewill be liuely, and forcible in the dead? Goe to: And how can the dead by any meanes restore him selfe to lyfe? May it please you to heare Augustine treatyng of the same matter.* 1.63 Man can not rise againe (sayth Augustine) of his owne accorde as hee fell voluntaryly: Let vs take holdfast of the right hand of God, which he reatcheth out vnto vs. &c.

So that I would wish you to consider with your selfe adui∣sedly, what thyng it is whiche we ought to receaue at Christes handes, without Freewill first: and what afterwardes of Free∣will, without Christ: for the which we ought to be thankefull to him for them both. For if accordyng to the testimony of Augu∣stine,* 1.64 There was none other cause of our destruction greater, then mans Freewill, by abuse wherof man lost both it, and him selfe: by what reason will you proue that to be sounde: which Augustine

affirmeth to bee vtterly lost? or how can you restore lyfe to that thyng, whereunto you are indebted for your owne death?* 1.65 Or what reliefe can you finde towardes the purchasing of eternall life from nature beyng so vtterly dispoyled? which euen then es∣pecially, when it stoode in most perfect integritie, could neither helpe you nor her selfe, nay rather whiche brought you and her selfe both to vtter destruction? The Lord cryeth out in a certein place by the mouth of his Prophet.* 1.66 O Israell thy perdition is of thy selfe: but in me onely is thine helpe. &c. If there bee no helpe els where, then in the Lord onely, vpon whō alone all helpe de∣pendeth, what is there left then in Freewill, that we miserable wretches may trust vnto? If you be ignoraunt therof (Maister Osorius) the Prophet will forthwith declare it vnto you: For∣sooth what els think•• you, but vtter destruction? For in as much as one man by one faulte onely, wherein he alone offended, did through his freédome of will (whenas yet it was most pure and sounde) throw headlong both him selfe, and all his ofspryng into so horrible thraldome, frō most absolute and most perfect Ma∣iestie of freédome: what other thynges will Osorius then gape after, out of this his Freewill, sithence nature is altogether defi∣led now, who hath made so often shypwracke of his freédome & of all his Freewill also, & standyng (as it were) in dispayred case, is enforced dayly to runne to the second table of Penitentiary Confession for relief, but vtter perditiō? vnlesse he take holdfast by fayth of that right hand of God, whereof S. Augustine doth make mētion before. Therfore let this great Proctour of Free∣will take good heéde, least whiles he accuse Luther to much, he cōmit a more execrable fact, & bewray him selfe a more deadly enemy to Gods grace, thē y^e other may seéme aduersary to Free∣will. For if this controuersie here debated touchyng the merite of Saluation tende to this end onely, to sifte out from whence the cause therof ariseth: to witte: whether from the onely grace of God? or whether from Freewill as a necessary and vnsepara∣ble coperterner therewith? truely, if it be true which the Prophe∣ticall Scripture doth most truely conclude,* 1.67 That all helpe consi∣steth onely in the Lord, and in our selues nothing but destruction. I can not seé, but that by how much soeuer it shall please Osorius to establishe Freewill, by so much shall hee disployle GOD of

his Grace and that most iniuriously.

But I heare the colorable pretence of Osorius, wherewith he practizeth to make his defence carry a certeine shewe of truth, paintyng it out with a deceauable foyle: so that hee may seéme neither to yeld all to the grace of God, accordyng to the Catho∣licke fayth, nor yet (after the errour of the Pelagians) leaue no∣thyng at all to the operation of Grace.* 1.68 For whereas the deuilish doctrine of the Pelagians (which taught that euery mā was en∣dued with sufficient freédome to doe good without the helpe of God) hath bene long sithence condemned for hereticall, accor∣dyng to the testimony of Augustine: This Gentleman fearyng to bee deémed a Pelagian, doth deuide his Assertion after such a sort, that he may neither seéme vtterly to exclude Grace altoge∣ther, nor yet so yeld ouer all to Grace, but that Freewill must of necessitie be copemate with Grace. But let vs heare Osorius vtteryng his owne wordes.

* 1.69Veryly we do cōfesse this to be true, that our thoughtes & our workes which we deuise & bring to passe vertuously and godly ought to be ascribed vnto God, through whose grace and fauour they are accomplished in vs. Behold god∣ly Reader, how this godly Prelate, of his Catholicke pietie, at∣tributeth some thyng to the Grace of God: whiche doth ascribe our godly sayinges, thoughtes, & deédes to the worke of God. And this much truly did neuer any of the Pelagians deny, but affirmed alwayes, that onely God must bee accompted the Au∣thour, not onely of our lyfe, of our beyng, yea of all the actiōs al∣so of our lyfe: but also that all our Freewill ought to be referred to him, beyng the Authour thereof. But this is not enough O∣sorius: for question is not demaunded here, whether God be the Authour of all good workes, which no man will deny. But the question is whether those thynges,* 1.70 which belong to the purcha∣sing of our conuersion and Saluation in the sight of God, do so proceéde from God the Authour therof, as that his onely Grace do worke y^e same altogether in vs: or whether Freewill also doth worke any thyng together with Grace. For herein consisteth the chief knot of all the controuersie. Which shalbe debated af∣terwardes more at large in place fit for it by Gods grace. In y^e meane space, let vs marke how Osorius goeth foreward.

For vnlesse God had restrayned me from rushyng wil∣fully into wickednesse: vnlesse Gods spirite had forewarned me with his coūsell, that I should not throw my selfe head∣long into euerlastyng calamitie: vnlesse he had strengthe∣ned me with his wholesome and strong protection, & made me able to worke the good worke that he cōmaunded me, I should neuer haue bene able either to thinke a good thought, or to doe a good deede: and all myne endeuour employed either to the purposing or accomplishyng my worke should haue bene vtterly vneffectuall. What neéde I aunswere much hereunto? Neither could Luther him selfe (if he were alyue) speake or professe any sentence more godlyly, if a man regard the wordes, and not the meanyng of the man. For what can be more truely or more substauntially spoken, thē that Freewill can worke nothyng but wickednesse, destruction, headlong ruine, and euerlasting wretchednes? nothyng but noy∣some thoughtes, vnlawfull Imaginations? finally nothing that is godly or good, except it be guided by the grace of God? which Grace doth restrayne from wickednesse, doth recouer from de∣struction, doth direct from wandring, doth reforme with whole∣some counsell, and bryng into the right way those that goe a∣stray. Truely if the matter go thus altogether, as the wordes emporte: That is to say: If the very founteine and perfection of all our actiōs, thoughtes, and deuises tendyng to godlynesse and poured abroad into our lyues, doe issue vnto vs from no where els, thē from the onely wellspryng of Gods grace: what other abilitie then shalbe left in wretched Freewill to worke a∣ny good worke (if Osorius he the man he would seéme to be) but an vnprofitable and naked name onely? But least peraduenture he may seéme to be hyred by the Lutheranes, to write so effectu∣ally in the defence of Grace, our Catholicke Byshop returneth agayne to the patronage of Freewill, endeuouryng to proue by his Diuinitie, that the worke of our conuersion doth not so alto∣gether depend vpon Grace onely, but that Freewill also must play his part withall. And why so?

Bycause (sayth hee) it is in our power not to consent to good counsell,* 1.71 to reiect it beyng offered, to refuse courte∣sie, and through wickednesse and outrage to treade vnder

foote profered grace. And who doth deny but that we may so do? Nay rather what els doth Freewill at all, whē it worketh af∣ter her owne nature, but by resistyng & refusall throw headlong into errour? (Luther him selfe witnessing y^e same?) But for more credite of the matter Augustine shall aunswere for Luther.* 1.72 In that we turne our selues away from God (sayth he) commeth of our selues, and this is euill will. But in that we turne vnto God, we can not, except he styrre vp and helpe vs thereunto. And this is good will. Thus much Augustin. We may therfore resiste (say you) and withstand the holy Commaundementes of God accordyng to the operation of our Freewill. In deéde there is nothyng more easie, neither neédeth any helpe hereunto. A∣gayne, We can geue our consent vnto, and embrase Gods Commaundementes also: Surely this is true, if the Grace of God doe guide vs: But if Gods grace doe not gouerne vs, we do then vtterly deny it, Augustine agreéyng with vs herein. To Sinne (sayth Augustine) we are not holpen by God:* 1.73 but to doe well or accomplish the Cōmaundementes of righteousnes through∣ly, we are not able except God helpe vs: And immediatly after. If we be turned from God,* 1.74 it proceedeth of our selues, and then we be wise accordyng to the flesh: God therefore doth ayde men beyng conuerted, and forsaketh them beyng reuolted, yea he doth not one∣ly helpe them beyng conuerted, but helpeth them also that they may be conuerted. Thus much Augustine. Go to, and what will O∣sorius Logicke conclude hereof at the length?* 1.75 Forsooth if euery man of his owne freé power be able to dissent from, and consent with the Grace of God, it appeareth then, that Freewill is not altogether vneffectuall. For to this effect I suppose will he di∣rect the force of his Argument. But I doe aunswere agayne with Augustine.* 1.76 That the same might be so construed and graun∣ted well enough, if it were not spoken by them, whose meanyng is apparaunt. For to admitte that man him selfe may will, and may condiscende, and yeld, and do somewhat in his conuersion, and spiri∣tuall workes: yet hath not man this power of his owne naturall strength neither in whole, nor in part: but he receaueth that strēgth of him, which worketh in man, both to will and to do.

* 1.77And therfore the reason that Osorius frameth here, of not re∣iectyng, and of condiscendyng: if hee meane of naturall giftes:

Augustine doth playnely declare, that this is the very errour of Pelagius. If he meane of the power of Grace, hee gaynsayeth Luther nothyng at all: who did neuer so dispoyle mans Free∣will of freedome, but that beyng manumysed and aduaunced by Gods grace, it was able to do much: and agayne he did neuer so vphold this freédome, but that man might of his owne proper strength refuse Grace, beyng at any tyme offred: (for neither Luther nor any other did euer dreame (I suppose) that Grace was so necessaryly throwen vpon mans will in his cōuersion, as that he should be enforced to reteine it beyng offered, whether he would or no, lyke as when a marke is emprinted into the fleshe by a who••e yron, or as stones that are violently whirled out of a Crossebow. But this is generally affirmed, that the holy Spi∣rite of God doth by his secret operation, worke such an effectu∣all influence in the myndes of the faythfull, that the grace which he offreth may bee receaued, not with vnwillyng will, but that will may with gladsome cheare delight to embrace it, with most earnestly bent affectiō. But if it happen to be reiected, the fault therof to spryng from out the corruption & malice of the flesh. If Osori. will not be satisfied yet, but will vrge still with this his Argumēt, that euery person accordyng to the proportion of his Freewill, may freély reteyne, or refuse the Grace of God, if he will. I will then aunswere briefly and resolutely, that the disceit of this suttle Sillogisme is framed of the Fallax:* 1.78 to witte: a Diuisis ad Coniuncta, as the Logicians do terme it. For albeit will (beyng seuered from Gods grace) be of it selfe freé to reiect Gods callyng: yet is it not after the same sort freé to obey Gods callyng, vnlesse it bee altogether vpholden by the ayde of Gods grace. Let vs now seé further the remnaunt of his disputation.

I do stand at the doore (sayth he) and knocke:* 1.79 hee doth not say, I do breake open the doores, or I do rende abroad the henges and doe violently rushe in: but I knocke onely: that is to say: I do admonish: I do foretell the daunger ensu∣yng: I doe foreshew hope of Saluation, I promise to geue ayde: and I allure vnto me, with fayre promises. In deéde Osorius hee standeth knockyng at the doore, and they to whom it is geuen do open vnto him, but vnlesse it be geuen vnto them they open not at all. Therefore in that hee doth knocke, this is

proper to the callyng: but in that an opē entrey is made, this is to be peculiarely ascribed to Election and Grace. So likewise he doth not heaue the doores of the hookes, nor rusheth in forci∣bly: and yet although hee presse not vpon with any foreine force, he worketh notwithstandyng a secret effectualnesse, and draweth them vnto him, whō he hath chosen, and entirely loueth, through inward operation of voluntary will.* 1.80 Neither is any mā good that will not be good (as Augustine reporteth) yet to haue a will to be good, must the grace of God needes be assistaunt: bycause it is not written in vayne: God is hee that worketh in vs, both to will and to do accordyng to his good pleasure, and the Lord doth first frame and fashion the will. &c. Therefore whereas it is sayd that God doth knocke at the gate of our will, I gladly yeld hereunto: but to say that he doth no more but knocke, this I do vtterly deny: In lyke maner whereas you say that hee admonisheth, that hee foretelleth daunger ensuyng: that he feédeth with hope: that he promiseth ayde, and that he allureth with reward, truely these are not vntruely spoken Osorius: But ye speake not all, nor as much as should be spoken. And therefore herein your haltyng bewrayeth it selfe playnely. For you are flowen into a Fallax, which the Logicians do tearme Ab insufficiente causarū enume∣ratione.* 1.81 True it is, that the grace of God doth knocke: doth fore¦warne, and doth allure: what? doth grace therfore nothyng els but knocke? forewarne? promise? and persuade? Doth it not also create within vs a cleane hart? doth hee not renew a new spi∣rite within our bowels? doth he not plucke out of our fleshe the stony hart, and engraffe in steéde therof a fleshly hart? Yea doth he not also alter all our whole nature? I meane all those inward naturall qualities: doth hee not make them plyable and (as it were) out of an old deformed lumpe, new fashion it into a new creature? doth he commaunde those thynges, which he willeth by admonishyng onely? by callyng, and persuadyng onely? doth not Gods Grace geue also that which he commaundeth? And where in the meanes whiles lurketh then the law that is writ∣ten within, in the hartes of the faythfull?

When we heare these wordes in the Gospel: No man commeth vnto the Sonne, but he whom the Father draweth: Tell vs a good felowshyp, doth he which draweth nothyng els but ad∣monish?

but call? but allure?* 1.82 What is he (sayth Augustine) that is drawen if he bee willyng? for the willing are lead, and none are drawen but the vnwilling. And yet no man commeth, but he that is willing: but to this willingnesse he doth draw vs by wonderfull meanes, who is skilfull to worke within, euen in the very hartes of men, not to make the vnwilling to haue fayth, but to frame the vn∣willing plyable to be willing. &c. If it be so that y^e heauēly Grace by inward operation do make men willyng, that before were not willyng: I would fayne learne now whether Grace do no∣thyng els,* 1.83 but knocke onely? Go to, and whiles Grace is a knoc∣kyng, who is it within that openeth? Freewill, I suppose: But now for as much as this Freewill is powred into all persons in∣differently by a generall influence, as much in one, as in an o∣ther, why doe not all alyke open to the heauenly Grace, when the Lord doth knocke? forsooth bycause they will not (you will say) yet doth the wheale runne neuerthelesse as rounde as it did before. For I demaunde agayne, why some seéme to be willyng whiles others are vnwilling? what els thinke you to be the cause hereof, but bycause God doth open their Freewill first, whiche do open vnto God, that they may be able to open, otherwise it could neuer opē vnto him. Whereby you may easely perceaue, that Freewill is not the porter to let in Grace, so much as the ve∣ry gate it selfe: and that it doth not els open, but as it is first o∣pened by his meanes whiche doth knocke, and that it applyeth not any way els, but as it is made plyable, and so made plyable, that it may seéme rather to be drawen, then to bee lead: neuer goyng before Grace, but followyng altogether, and to speake the wordes of Augustine,* 1.84 Neuer as a foregoer, but as an hand∣mayden of Grace onely in euery good worke. If you will deny this to be true, what Argument shall I better vse agaynst you then the wordes of your owne mouth? For what meaneth it els that you your selues of the Romish Sinagogue at the begynnyng of your Mattens, pray dayly to the Lord Domine labia mea a∣peries, Lord open thou our lyppes,* 1.85 if they open of them sel∣ues, and are not rather opened by him? And in what sorte doe you then desire the Lord to open your lyppes, that your mouth may shew forth his prayse, whom you affirme to do nothyng els but knocke onely? Why therfore doe ye not rather amende your

booke, that your prayer may bee agreable with your desire, and sing an other song on this wise: our Freewill shal opē our lippes O Lord, and our mouth shall chaunte forth thy prayse.

* 1.86What then (will you say) is it not in our owne power to moue our lyppes?* 1.87 Yes truly Osor. there is nothyng more easie then to moue them to contētion, to quarellyng, to lyeng, to blas∣phemous communication, to noysome talke, and vayne tittle tattle. But I will in no wise graunt that we are able to moue our lippes, or to open our hartes of our owne will, to shew forth the prayse of God. All which notwithstandyng tend not to this ende, as though Freewill did worke nothyng at all: yes it wor∣keth surely: but how it worketh and how it is wrought, bycause Osorius doth not declare sufficiently Augustine shall make playne vnto him.* 1.88 Not they that are carried of their owne motion but as many as are carried by the Spirite of God, they are the chil∣dren of God. Here will some man say vnto me. Then are we plyed, and do not plye our selues. I aūswere, yea rather thou doest both ap∣ply thy selfe and art applyed: And euen then doest thou plye well, if thou be plyed by Gods spirite, without whom thou canst doe no good thing: euen so also thou doest apply thy selfe of thine owne Freewill without the helpe of Gods Spirite, & thē doest thou euill. To this ende is thy will, which is called free, prone and effectuall, that by doing euill, it become a damnable handmayd. &c. Whiche wordes you must interprete to bee spoken of Augustine in this wise: not that will doth worke nothyng, but that it worketh no good thyng without Gods helpe. And that you may conceaue the same more effectually, harken what the same Augustine teacheth in his treatize De Gratia, & Lib. Arbit.* 1.89 It is vn∣doubtedly true (sayth hee) that we doe, when we doe: and that we will, whē we will: but he bringeth to passe in vs to will, and to do geuing to our will most effectuall abilitie, which hath sayd: I will make you that ye shall be able to do. Briefly to cōclude. It shalbe lawfull for me to speake the same and in such wise touchyng o∣penyng, whiche and in what wise Augustine spake of doyng, when the Lord doth knocke we do open with a Freewill in deéde, bycause when we do open, we do it freely and willingly: but that we may be able to do so, not we, but he doth open our harts first. Whereby you may perceaue to what end this our discourse ten∣deth,

not that Freewill hath no place,* 1.90 but that it be voyde of me∣rite, vnworthy of prayse, and to be takē for no part of any cause, not bycause we dispoyle her of all maner of motion, but we doe distinguish the maner of motion in such wise, that all the prayse of well doing be ascribed vnto him, vnto whom onely all is due, whatsoeuer we will or can, as Augustine reporteth: and that in this respect Freewill is endued with no actiuitie, whereupon it may vaunte her force:* 1.91 For so shall we liue more out of daunger (sayth he) if we yeld ouer all vnto God, and not commit part of our actions to him, and part to our selues. &c. And agayne in the xiij. Chapter of the same booke. I graunt in deede that we will and worke, but God worketh in vs both to will, and to worke, according to his good pleasure. Thus it behoueth vs to speake and beleue. This is godly: this is true, that by this meanes our Cōfession may be hū∣ble and lowly, and all attributed vnto God. &c.

But I heare what this arrogaunt hautynes of Frewill doth whisper agaynst this humble Confession.

If all this (sayth he) be the worke of God,* 1.92 and no power bee left in mans endeuour that may procure furthe∣raunce to our conuersion.

Ergo, sithence there is nothyng left in vs to doe, what are we thē, other then as good as stones & stockes.

Which Argument Osorius hath gathered (as hee sayth) not out of S. Paule, but out of Luthers braynsickenesse. I would haue marueiled if Osorius could haue gathered any Ar∣gument from any without some reproche, or could haue repro∣ched any man without a lye. But thus to doe is not to gather some thyng frō an other, but to lye rather: not to dispute by Ar∣guyng, but to play the part of a captious scoffer. But to let passe this dronken scoffe, as which neither furthereth his cause, nor empayreth Luthers estimation: we will turne our talke a∣gayne to y^e matter. Luther is here therfore cited for a drunc∣kard, who by blazing abroad Medusaes head doth enchaūt men into stones and flyntes. And why so? Forsooth bycause he doth deny, y^t we do aspire to y^e fauour of God of our own strēgth: but affirmeth that all whatsoeuer we do take in hād,* 1.93 or bryng to passe towardes y^e attaynement of saluation, we obteine the same wholy through the onely worke of Gods grace, which worketh

all in all in vs. Hereupon Osorius cryeth out forthwith, That will is fast tyed, boūde, and restrayned with euerlasting fet∣ters, so that men must of necessitie be chaunged into stones, rockes and stockes. So that it is much to bee feared, least by this Argument he turne Peter also into a stone, bycause Christ called him a Stone: & least he chaunge Christ him selfe Peters Maister also together with Peter into some stony substaunce, bycause Paule calleth him a Rocke, and bycause the Prophetes doe nominate him y^e Corner Stone. It is also to be feared, least he bewitche into stones all the whole aūcient race of the old Testa∣ment: of whō we heare the Prophetes speake in this wise.* 1.94 And I will take away from their fleshe their stony hart. &c. If the pro∣pheticall Scripture do accustome to resemble the properties of personages by some similitude of domme creatures, after an vsuall phrase of figuratiue speache: may it not likewise be law∣full for vs to expresse the hardnesse of mās nature, vnlesse we en∣chaūt mē forthwith into stones, stockes, & flyntes? I beseéch you. Or bycause we professe that Freewill is all together vneffectu∣all in those thynges, which apperteine vnto God, and to worke or vnderstād things, which passe beyond the reache of mās capa∣citie (vnlesse it be plyed by Gods Spirite) is there no force ther∣fore in Freewill to worke in other thynges?* 1.95 or to worke in those thynges, which belong vnto God beyng holpen and assisted by the grace of God? And will you so frame your Argument from the proposition Secundum quid, to conclude with that, which the Sophisters terme Simpliciter?

* 1.96Wherein though you be a Byshop, your fatherhoode seémeth to me to haue committed a double errour. First bycause you cō∣ceaue not the sense of those men sufficiently, whō you quarell a∣gainst: next bycause you deceaue your selfe in y^e selfe same Asser∣tiō which you do mainteine. For those men, which do call backe all the causes of actiōs frō Freewill, attributyng them to Gods grace onely, doe not conceaue of it after such sort, as though the mynde beyng endued with heauēly strēgth, whē it is made plya∣ble, doth not apply it selfe any thyng in the meane space.* 1.97 For euē as Gods secrete Grace through Iesus Christ our Lord, is not pow∣red into stones stockes or brute beastes (as Augustine doth truly record) but into him which was created in the Image of God): euē

so God doth not worke in this his owne Image, as hee worketh in a stone: or after the maner as huge heauy burdēs are drawen by mans pollicie: in the which abydeth no inward operation (as Aristotle sayth) which may auayle to motion:* 1.98 The matter goeth farre otherwise here: and the natures are farre vnlike. True it is that the heauenly grace doth draw vs in deéde, not through a∣ny force of externall coaction, as blockes & Images are drawen: but God leadeth and boweth, which way him listeth, euery per∣son inwardly by his owne will, or plyeth hee any man other∣wise then voluntaryly.

It is well then (say you) If will do nothyng but when she will,* 1.99 and if it will alwayes first before it do: how then shall will bee sayd to worke passiuely, whiche both willeth al∣wayes those thynges which it doth, and doth nothyng but that whiche it willeth?* 1.100 The Aunswere is easie: Will in deéde doth nothyng, but when it willeth: this is true. For otherwise it could be no will, vnlesse it did doe willyngly and voluntaryly. But yet neither doth will alwayes all those thynges whiche it willeth: And agayne to be able to will, it is alwayes made ply∣able first. By the one whereof may be vnderstanded the Instru∣ment or toole of action,* 1.101 by the other the cause of action. Wher∣fore whenas will is taken after this maner, that it yeld to the guiding of the workeman in y^e maner of a toole, by what meanes can it be called either freé, which serueth as bounde? or how can it be sayd to do, which in doyng doth alwayes suffer and is dri∣uē? And yet it doth not so alwayes suffer by doyng, that it neuer doth any thyng of it selfe: and agayne doth neuer so doe in those thynges which apperteine vnto God, but that it is made plya∣ble to doe. And therfore the maner how it doth, and how it suf∣fereth, must be aduisedly considered.* 1.102 For we doe confesse that both are true after a certeine sort, as Augustine testifieth in his booke De Correp. & gratia. Let thē not deceaue them selues ther∣fore (sayth he) which say. To what purpose are we taught and com∣maunded to eschue euill and to do good, if we can not doe it, but as God doth worke the same in vs,* 1.103 to will and to worke? Nay rather let them vnderstand, if they be the children of God, that they are made plyable by Gods Spirite, to doe the thynges that ought to be done, and when they haue done so, to yeld thankes to him, by whom

they were made to do so. For they are made plyable, bycause they should do something, not bycause they should do nothing. &c.

Which saying doth make euident vnto vs, that eche of these two are to be founde in Freewill, both that it is made to do, when it doth well, and agayne that it selfe also doth, when it is made to do.* 1.104 So that herein is no contrarietie at all, but that it may both demeane it selfe by suffering, and also by doing (and to aun∣swere for Luther with Luthers owne wordes) to witte, after di∣uers and seuerall sortes, and after the common phrase of speach in diuers and seuerall respectes. For in respect of the worke it selfe, whenas will occupyeth the place of an Instrument or toole, it both doth, & is made to do, euen as other tooles do in any mat∣ter whereunto they are applyed. But if you haue relation to the efficient cause or workeman, to whose vse it serueth in steéde of a toole: in this respect the will of man demeaneth it selfe altoge∣ther sufferyngly, as the which in respect of procuryng of Gods Grace (from whence issueth all motion of good will) it worketh nothyng at all, but simply obeyeth & suffereth. For in any good worke, what is mans will elles, then an instrument of the holy Ghost?* 1.105 voluntary in deéde, bycause it is moued whether soeuer it is moued of her owne accord, yet is it an instrument notwith∣standyng, bycause of thynges well done, it is neither the cause it selfe, nor any sparcke of the cause in respect of the worker, but a seruaunt rather, and a handmayde onely: whose seruice, the Spirite of God being the worker, doth apply to do these things which it pleaseth him to haue to be done in vs: for the accompli∣shyng wherof it ministreth no helpe at all, as of her selfe.

But the Papisticall generation can not disgest this by any meanes, to whom sufficeth not that Freewill shalbe taken as an instrument,* 1.106 or as it were a workeshoppe onely, vnlesse it beare as great a stroke or rather with Gods Spirite wor∣kyng together with it: nor doe they thinke it sufficient that the whole action of our Election and regeneration bee ascribed to the onely freé mercy of God, vnlesse we also as felow workemē, be coadiutours of this worke together with God. For euen the same doe Osorius wordes emporte manifestly, which folow in this wise.

* 1.107Do ye not therefore perceaue (sayth he) by Paules owne

wordes, that Freewill is approued by his authoritie, which Luther doth practise to ouerthrowe? For to what ende would he haue called vs fellow workers with God, if none of vs did further the worke that GOD worketh in vs? to what purpose would he haue admonished vs to worke our owne Saluation, if to do it were not in our owne power? We are together Gods labourers as Paule reporteth

. 1. Corinth. 3.* 1.108 Where I know that the word 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, doth signifie together labourers. But what is this at the length to the purpose? doe you not here playnly put the old Prouerbe in practize? to witte: I aske you for Garlicke, and you offer me Oynyones, I desire to borrow sickles, and you lyke a churlishe neighbour deny that you haue any Mattockes. How carefull the Apostles were in plantyng the doctrine of the Gospell we are not ignoraunt, nor do deny. And it is not to be doubted, that Gods prouidence vsed them as most choyse instrumentes to addresse, and husband his Uynearde, yea and that not without singular profite. But we make no enquiry here as now, how much mans industry did bryng to passe by the outward preachyng of the word, or whom it profited most: but the question is here touchyng the fruite of inward cōuersion, whether Freewill of her selfe do worke, or not worke any furtheraunce towardes the embracyng of fayth, to∣wardes repentaūce, towardes spirituall righteousnes, towards attainement of Saluation, and towardes the regeneration of lyfe: So that the state of the question be now, to witte: Whether mās mynde and will beyng of the selfe same nature (that it was when we were first borne) be endued with any actuall or effectu∣all power able to worke together,* 1.109 with Gods holy Spirite to∣wardes the begynnyng of our conuersion, and entryng into our godly consideration of good purposes, and actions of inward o∣bedience? Wherein many writers doe vary in Iudgement and opinion, yea that not a litle.

But Osorius propositiō alledged here of y^e Apostles toge∣ther workers maketh nothyng to the purpose,* 1.110 nor auayleth to y^e maintenaunce of Freewill a rushe. For to admit that the Apo∣stles were together workers with God: yet that those same together workemē should be hypred to worke in this Uyneard, and sent abroad into the Lordes haruest, proceéded not of their

owne voluntary motion or Freewill, but of the freé Election and callyng of God onely. Agayne this their Ministery (as farre forth as concerneth their own persons) euen then when they la∣boured most earnestly, was extended no further, then to the out∣ward preachyng & dispensation of the word: for as touchyng the inward conuersion of the hearers, & nourishment of their fayth, this was the onely worke of the holy Ghost, and not of the Apo∣stles: Paule did plante: Apollo did water. But what doth this helpe to Freewill, when as neither he that plāteth, nor he that wa∣tereth are any thing at all, but God onely who geueth the encrease. And what is the reason then, why they are sayd to bee nothyng? Is it bycause he that plāteth, and he that watereth, and he that ploweth doth nothyng at all? was Paule nothyng? or did he not worke at all? who beyng continually trauailyng is reported to haue laboured more then all y^e rest? or shall we say that y^e rest of y^e Apostles did nothyng, which did employ not their trauaile one∣ly, but shedd their bloud also in furtheryng y^e worke of the Gos∣pell? Yeas veryly, wonderfull much, if you respect the outward Ministery of Preachyng the word and their function. But we doe enquyre of the inward operation of conuersion, and the re∣newyng of the myndes, which is the onely worke of God, not of Freewill, nor of mans outward endeuour. Godly Preachers in deéde doe pearce into the eares of men with outward voyce, & set downe before them the wordes of fayth and truth: And yet thus to do, springeth not of their own Freewill, but from the freé callyng of God, whereby they are lead to do the same: but to be∣leue y^e doctrine inwardly, to become faithful hearers of y^e whole∣some word, is the onely worke of y^e holy Ghost, who by secret in∣spiration doth dispose y^e myndes, doth renew the hartes, doth in∣spire with fayth, finally of unwillyng doth make willyng: so that here is no place left now for Freewill to challēge, but y^t he onely possesse the whole, which onely worketh all in all: who thrustyng out workemen to preach the word, doth frameth the wills of the hearers that they may beleéue. Whereupō I do aūswere to that suttle Argument of Osorius briefly, and playnly in this wise.

Whosoeuer worketh together with an other, worketh actiuely and not passiuely onely.* 1.111

The Ministers of the Gospell are together, workemen

with God.

Ergo, The Preachers of the worde, when they worke with God, do not suffer passiuely onely.

I aunswere,* 1.112 that in the Maior proposition should haue bene added these wordes Per fe, & inys que ngit: That is to say: Of him selfe, & in the things wherein he worketh. For y^e thyng that of his owne power worketh together with an others helpe, doth somewhat in deéde in those thynges, whiche it doth, and is not wrought onely. That is true. And for the same purpose the Minor proposition must bee denyed: for the Freewill of Gods Ministers doth neither worke in Preachyng the word Per se, of it selfe, except it be holpen by Gods Spirite: nor doth proceéde any further euen when it is holpen, thē to the outward action of preachyng. But as concernyng the inward fruite of preachyng, (namely nourishment of fayth, and the operatiō of conuersion) all this action proceédeth from the holy Ghost, and not frō Free∣will. And this seémeth to bee the very meanyng of Luther,* 1.113 to witte, hauyng respect to those thynges onely, wherein Freewill can not challenge to be any meane of effectuall operation, either in workyng, or in together workyng, nor can make any title of clayme therein, nor prescribe to bee any partener with the holy Ghost in the worke.

It remayneth that we arme our selues agaynst the other sut∣teltie of Osorius,* 1.114 which he coyneth out of the Apostles wordes.

S. Paule writyng to the Phillipians, doth counsell them in a certein place to worke euery of them their own saluation with feare and tremblyng.

I doe heare it, and I awayte what this choppelogicke will stampe out hereof.

Ergo (sayth Osorius) we are able to worke our Salua∣tion of our owne Freewill.

I doe aunswere.* 1.115 The antecedent is true, but the consequent most false, and altogether sauoryng of Pelagius errour, nor a∣greable with the antecedent. For this word working, which the Apostle vseth, doth not signifie any such thyng as may vphold the force of Freewill, or declare it to be the efficiēt cause of Sal∣uation, as though it did depend vpō the dignitie of our workes: but is onely a word of exhortation, to comfort them to goe fore∣ward

diligently, and to perseuer carefully in the course of Salua∣tion, where they were now settled.* 1.116 And withall teacheth them fur∣ther how they ought to perseuer with feare (sayth he) and trē∣blyng, to witte, exhortyng them to take vnto them the feare of God in humblenesse of mynde, which might hold them alwayes conuersaunt in good workes, whiles they made hast to attaine the goale of Saluatiō. Finally that no man might cauill & say, that this vertue of perseueraūce did farre surmoūt their weake∣nes, he addeth forthwith, callyng them backe as it were to a bet∣ter hope through cōfidence of greater helpe: For it is God (sayth he) which worketh in you both to will and to worke accordyng to his good pleasure. &c. If God do worke in vs (Osorius) both to will and to worke, what is it then that Freewill can will or doe? Fur∣thermore if life euerlasting be the gift of God, not for the workes sake whiche we haue done, how shall Saluation be obteined by good workes? wherefore you trippe twise in your Argument. First, whereas you place Saluation in good workes. Then, whereas you deriue good workes out of mans Freewill, as from the sprynghead therof. For thus ye conclude. If it were not in our own power (to witte in our Freewill) which both are false and most friuolous.* 1.117

And yet after all these manifest trackes of Pelagius playne footesteppes, not vnlike that craftie varlet Syrus in Terence, whiche cleareth him selfe to his Maister, as vnacquainted with the Mariage of his sonne: euen so least he should seéme to be de∣filed with some spotte of Pelagius errour, addeth immediately: What?* 1.118 Are we such as will consent with Pelagius? Did we say at any tyme that we were able to worke any godly or prayse worthy worke through our own strength and indu∣stry? If you will abide by your wordes Osor. you haue so said in deéde. For he y^t doth auow, that it is in our own power to worke our saluation: what doth hee meane els by these wordes, but that we be able of our owne strēgth to worke somewhat worthy cōmendatiō? But whether he agreé herein w^t Pelagius or no, let y^e indifferēt Reader Iudge as seémeth him best. But I pray you sir, by what meanes do you affirme y^t to be in our owne handes, which you deny agayne to be in our owne power? Or how cā ye defend them both, but you must neédes make a lye in y^e one? or

what slipper deuise will you vse here to couer your lye withall? You say that Saluatiō is not obteined by our own strength; but through Gods grace workyng within vs. And why then chaufe you so maliciously agaynst Luther, Melancthon, Bucer and Caluine, which affirme the same that you do? But a litle earst ye confessed the thyng, which ye do now deny. Be stedfast therfore, and set downe your mynde whereunto you will stand, that we may know once where we may finde you. If you af∣firme that all consisteth in our owne handes, then do you not a∣greé with Pelagius, but you go farre beyond him: If you ascribe all to the grace of God, what neédeth any more scoldyng? But you will deuide your meanyng perhappes, and will allowe to Gods grace such a parte of the worke, that Freewill also may occupy some part with all.* 1.119 Yet doe ye not vntwyne this meashe notwithstandyng. For if you will so cut asunder this shippe, which can by no meanes bee vnioynted, and will yeld ouer the forepart therof to mās guidyng, & the powpe to Gods tuition: surely S. Paule will gayne say you euery way, which yeldeth y^e whole interest of both, aswell the former as the hinder partes to God, whether Osori. will or no: Declaryng That it is God that worketh in vs both to will, and to bryng to passe all thyngs accordyng to his good pleasure. But you will finde out some meane thyng paraduenture betwixt both, whiche you may attribute to Free∣will. But euen here agayne you shall be driuen backe, whereas you may heare Paule pronounce That it is God that geueth the increase, so that now not onely the originall of good will, but the encrease also of well doyng, the accomplishyng, proceédyng and successes also flow from out the holy Ghost, and not from man.

If it be so thē (will you say) that Gods grace doth worke all in all in vs,* 1.120 to what purpose serueth the Freewill that is naturally engraffed within vs? or beyng holpen by grace, how is it sayd to doe any thyng, if you shall thinke that it ought not to be accōpted in any respect a partener in wor∣kyng a good worke? For aūswere wherof,* 1.121 I would wishe you to harkē not to the wordes that I speake, but vnto Augustine. It is most true Osori. that whatsoeuer good worke is wrought by vs, the prayse thereof ought to redounde wholy not to our Freewill, but to Gods grace, which performeth all whatsoeuer

is performed by vs godly, and worthy prayse. For that is it that the wordes of Augustine emporte, that true and humble con∣fession doth require in vs. That is to say. That we referre all vnto God. And yet this grace of God doth not so worke all that whiche is proper to it selfe, by her selfe onely, as workyng in vs without our Freewill. And agayne it neither worketh so toge∣ther with our Freewill, that any portion of prayse or rewarde should bee ascribed to Freewill, for any of all whatsoeuer is due vnto God. And therefore where as Augustine in his booke De gratia & libero arbit•• both affirme,* 1.122 that neither grace without Freewill, nor Freewill without grace is sufficient: We do confesse both to be true: for either of them worketh with the other I cō∣fesse it: but yet after a certeine seuerall sort. For the Grace of God worketh, when it helpeth mans Freewill, yet it worketh in such wise, as that it is neuer wrought by an other: it doth so helpe Freewill as beyng neuer holpen by Freewill. Furthermore it doth so helpe, but that it is alwayes freé not to helpe, if it will: In fine whēas Gods grace doth worke most effectually by hel∣pyng mās will,* 1.123 yet worketh it not so with mās Freewill, as stā∣dyng in neéde of the helpe of Freewill by any meanes, but rather vsing y^e seruice therof. But the state of Freewill is farre other∣wise: For Freewill worketh together with Gods spirite, not as commaundyng his seruice at any tyme, but alwayes wantyng his assistaunce. In the one wherof you perceaue the efficacie of the cause that worketh, in the other the seruice onely of the In∣strument.* 1.124 Moreouer when will doth worke most effectually (Gods grace directyng it) yea and freély, bycause it worketh vo∣luntaryly, yet doth it neuer attempt any good thyng of her selfe, without the directiō of grace, neither by any meanes otherwise, then as it is holpen, but neuer helpeth grace by which it is both wrought and holpen. Yea and then also when it is wrought it so worketh, that it can not chuse but worke of very necessitie. E∣uen as Seruauntes in respect of their birth are freé, but beyng commaūded by their Maisters (whom they be bounde vnto) they must obey whether will they nill they, of very Necessitie. In like maner fareth it with mens Freewilles, albeit they stand in such plight as that they be alwayes carried with freé motiō, that is to say, with voluntary motion to the thynges whatsoeuer they do,

yet is it so farre of to be able enough of their owne power to pro∣secute their purposed imaginations as they would wishe them selues, that many tymes they are withdrawen agaynst their willes,* 1.125 from executyng the mischief whiche they conceaued. A∣gayne to do good deédes, they are so the Seruauntes of grace, that when they are drawen, they can not chuse but obey of ve∣ry necessitie.

What neéde examples in matter most apparaūt?* 1.126 How oftē and how many doe we finde, that purpose many thynges in their myndes, which notwithstandyng come to a farre other maner of end then they were deuised for, beyng quite ouerthrowen by the onely countermaunde of almightie God. As appeareth in Ba∣laam, and the brothers of Ioseph: of whom the first was bar∣red from speakyng that which he determined: the other from ex∣ecutyng their deuises by the wonderfull prouidence of God. It would be to much to recite all the exāples mētioned in the scrip∣tures to this effect as Pharao, Sennacherib, Hamman, Anti∣ochus, Herode, the Pharisees, Iulian and innumerable others of the same sorte: whose Freewill beyng wonderfully interrupted euen amiddes their chiefest practizes, was neither able to do a∣ny good thyng well, nor yet accomplishe the euill that they had i∣magined accordyng to their determinate purpose. It shall suf∣fice to produce one or two examples, whereby it may make both euidētly appeare, how that it neither resteth in the choyse of mā to proceéde in euill doyng after his owne will, nor to leaue of frō doyng well beyng drawen by Gods Spirite. Saule breathyng forth as yet slaughter & threatenynges, whenas he persequuted the Christiās with wholy bent affection of Freewill,* 1.127 what cruel∣tie would he haue executed, if he could haue brought to passe the deuise, which he had throughly determined in mynde? And why could hee not doe it? But bycause there is no freédome in mans Freewill of it selfe, euen in workyng wickednesse, but such as be∣yng hindered many tymes, & alwayes bonde, must be enforced to acknowledge her owne weakenesse on euery side.

Let vs couple with Paule the Apostle Peter:* 1.128 that we may learne in thē both, how that we are not able of our selues either to frame our lyues altogether to wickednesse, or to direct the same sometyme to godlynesse. And first touchyng Saules wic∣ked

will in his most wicked enterprises, how litle it auayled hath bene declared already. Let vs now behold Peters fayth, not by what meanes he receaued it at the first, but let vs seé what his fleshly will was able to doe, to the vttermost of his power, ei∣ther in refusing fayth when it was geuen him, or in forsakyng it when he was holpen. Upō which matter let vs geaue care to the testimonie of Augustine:* 1.129 When it was sayd vnto Peter (sayth hee) Peter I haue prayed for thee, that thy fayth may not fainte: Darest thou presume to say that `Peters fayth should haue fayled though Peter him selfe would haue wished it to haue fayled, consi∣dering that Christ prayed that Peters faith might not fayle, as though Peter would haue willed any thing elles, then as Christ had prayed for him, that hee should will? Whereupon appeareth that Peters faith did not depend so much vpon his owne will, is vpon the prayer of Christ: who did both helpe his faith, and direct his will: And bycause his will was directed of the Lord, therfore could not the prayer made for him be vneffectuall. And therfore when hee prayed, that his faith might not fayle, what prayed hee for els, but that he might bee endued with a most free, most valiaunt, vnuan∣quishable, and most perdurable will in the faith? Thus much Au∣gustine.* 1.130 And therfore Ieremie the Prophet cryeng out vnto the Lord most worthely: I know O Lord (sayth he) that the way of mā is not in him selfe, neither is it in man to walke and to direct his owne steppes. Whiche wordes me seémeth that Luther did note not altogether vndiscretely, whose wordes if I would here set downe, I can not seé which part therof Osorius would be able to confute. For in this sorte doth Luther argue:* 1.131 If mans way & mans steppes be not at his owne disposition, how shall the way of the Lord, & the pathes of the Lord be at mans direction? And hereupon deriuyng an Argument a Comparatis, as they tearme it in Schooles, addeth forthwith, how then is mā able to dispose him selfe to good, whenas he is not able of him selfe to make his wayes euill? For otherwise if he be able, how then did the Pro∣phet say, that he knew that mans way was not in him selfe? or how is it that in y^e 16. of his booke of Prouerbes y^e wise Kyng beyng enspired with y^e same Spirite confesseth, that he knew as he te∣stified?* 1.132 The hart of man (sayth he) purposeth his way, but the Lord doth direct his steppes. Albeit this is not spoken to this end, as

though we did affirme that mās will is no wayes freé towardes wicked thynges:* 1.133 for who knoweth not how frayle and prone the disposition of mās will is alwayes to catch hold of euill? though from doyng therof, it be many tymes hindered. The compari∣son tendeth to this ende onely, that if mans Freewill beyng hin∣dered, and bonde, seéme many tymes lesse freé to put in executiō euill thynges: how much lesse freédome thinke you doth it enioy towardes the thynges that further vnto godlynesse? for as much therfore as this appeareth to bee most true by the euident testi∣monies of the Scriptures, and experimented by the continuall course of mens actions and conuersations: Let vs heare what Osorius doth obiect agaynst Haddon.

But I say thus that all good men,* 1.134 all godly men, all men most endued with heauenly giftes doe testifie, that in this sentence of thine lurketh haynous wickednesse: vnshame∣fast impudencie: detestable maddnesse and most execrable treacherie. Unlesse your so manifold lyes hetherto dispersed abroad, and as it were clouted together in one lumpe, vnlesse your shamelesse face Osorius, and that your impudent vsage in lyeng and blaunching, your monstruous vanitie (the lyke wher∣of can scarse possibly be founde in any writer, surely more mon∣strous in no man) had long sithence disabled all the substaunce and credite of your talke, in the Iudgemēt of all good and god∣ly men: you might happely haue founde some one, which would haue soothed this your cōmunicatiō. But now hauyng vttered scarse one true Sentence throughout all this worke of yours, with what countenaunce, and with what face dare ye speake in this wise? But I say this. &c. And what doth this famous speaker tell vs at y^e length? I do say this that in this sentēce of Luther, Melancthon and Caluine lurketh haynous wicked∣nesse, vnshamefast impudencie: detestable maddnesse and most execrable outrage. Goe foreward then, and tell vs first without a lye (if you can) I pray you, what they haue vttered in their wordes.* 1.135 Forsooth bycause they stand stiffely herein that mans mynde is alwayes holden captiue, his will fast chayned, dispoyled of all abilitie to doe, in so much that we can neither doe good nor euill, no nor thinke any good thought by any meanes. Finally this is the effect of their

opinion, that there is no difference betwixt vs and any o∣ther toole or instrument. &c. Truely I should haue maruei∣led much Osorius, if that lyeng spirite in your mouth, if your wicked lippes & deceitfull toung could haue vttered any thyng vnto vs without a lye, or haue made a lȳe without raylyng. Yea Syr? Is the winde in that doore? who that assigneth freé and vo∣luntary power to doe good,* 1.136 not in our owne will, but in Gods grace: who that ascribeth all our actions (especially these which be godly) to the direction and disposition of God: who that af∣firmeth that our will is neither freé of it selfe without Gods Grace, and that it doth nothyng els but sinne deadly, when it worketh after disposition of her owne nature: doth he so dis∣poyle man naked altogether of all will, as though it could doe nothyng at all? or purpose nothyng at all? or as though he made no difference betwixt man and any other instrument or toole? who that endeuoureth to proue manifestly by the Scriptures this thyng chiefly, that all the thoughtes of mans hart, and all his senses alwayes are prone, and inclined at all tymes to wic∣kednesse, doth hee seéme to affirme that man is voyde of all feé∣lyng of thought? Tell a good fellowshyppe, the man that doth that which is in his owne power, or the man doyng that whiche is in his owne power, doth nothyng els but sinne: doth this man now nothyng at all, whiles he sinneth? or whiles he imagineth mischief, doth he imagine nothyng at all? And how then, I pray you, doth Luther spoyle men of their will? or how is hee re∣ported, to bynde mans will fast in euerlastyng chaynes, in such wise, as that it can not onely not doe, but also not thinke any good or euill?

* 1.137But Luther doth deny that it resteth in mans Freewill to make his wayes euill. And what inconuenience is there in this sentence, if the meanyng therof be taken in the right sense, as it ought to be?* 1.138 Truely if our wayes either good or badd were sim∣ply and absolutely at our owne disposition: how is it that the Scripture teacheth that mans steppes are directed? or how is it that the Prophet doth deny mans way to be his owne? or how read we in the holy Prouerbes, That when mā hath prepared his hart most, yet it is the Lord that gouerneth the toung? How often doe we finde the old Prouerbe to proue true, that man doth purpose

one way and God doth dispose an other way? How rife are the examples of some persons which with halter in hand, and knife ready bent to dispatch them selues of their wretched liues, or whiche haue practized to drowne them selues, haue not accom∣plished the wicked fact, that they deuised euen then, when they were most willyng thereto? Surely Gods diuine prouidence doth wonderfully dally with mans thoughtes and imaginati∣ons, deludyng, ouerthrowyng, makyng frustrate transposing beyond all expectation of man, the thynges which we haue most firmely determined. And what freédome is this at the length, whiche is alwayes constrained to serue at an others appointe∣ment? the strongest force wherof beyng many tymes hindered, must alwayes depende vpon the permission and commaunde∣ment of the hygher power? whiche thyng Augustine doth very well declare.* 1.139 All willes are subiect (sayth he) to the will of God, bycause they haue no power, but such as hee graunteth. The cause therfore that maketh this, and is not made, is God, other causes doe both make and are made, as are all created Spirites, but chiefly such as are endued with reason. And agayne.* 1.140 Our willes are so farre a∣ble, by how much God would haue them to bee able and foreknew it. And therfore in what soeuer abilitie they stand they are vndoub∣tedly able, and what soeuer they shall doe, they shall surely do, by∣cause he did foreknown that they should be able, and should do, whose foreknowledge can not be deceaued. &c.* 1.141 And agayne in an other place. Neither is it to be doubted, that mens willes can not resiste the will of God, but that he must needes doe what God will, for as much as he doth dispose the willes also as him listeth, and when him listeth. Therefore to will, and to nill, is so in the power of him that willeth and nylleth, that it neither goeth beyond Gods power, nor hindereth his will, but is many tymes hindered by the power of God, and alwayes ouermaistered. &c.

But that is somewhat more hard which is obiected out of the same Article, that will is so fast bounde, that we cā thinke no euill thought by any meanes. For so doth Osorius cite the place. Wherein he doth first cast a myste before the Rea∣ders eyes, and then deale iniuriously with Luther. For he doth neither faythfully, nor fully rehearse the wordes of his Article. He is also no lesse iniurious to Melancthon and Caluine, whō

he alledgeth as partakers of the same opinion. Albeit I know right well, that they doe not varie from Luthers meanyng, yet did they alwayes of very purpose refrayne from this kynde of speache. Where did Melancthon euer write, that all thynges are performed by vnaduoydeable necessitie? Where did Cal∣uine say, that Freewill was but a deuise in thynges? Who euer heard Bucer say, that man was not of power to thinke euill? not bycause they varied from him in meanyng and Iudgement, but they chose rather to quallifie, with some more plausible kynde of stile, that which seémed to be propoūded by him somewhat more roughly. But to returne agayne to Luthers wordes: I doe re∣knowledge herein not your new furnished cauill Osorius: but the auncient rusty canker of many others agaynst Luther, as of Leo, Roffensis, Eckius, Iohānes Coclaeus, Albertus Phigius, Iohn Dreidon, Alphansus de Castro, Andrew Vega, Peter Canisius, and such like: which do neither read Luthers writyng with Iudgement, neither consider his meanyng, nor cōferre the first with the last: but catch here and there a worde halfe gelded for hast: and out of these beyng sinisterly construed, if they finde any one thyng more then other fitte to be quarelled withall, that they snatch vp, that they vrge stiffely, and are alwayes rakyng their nayles vpon that scabbe (as the Prouerbe sayth). And by∣cause amongest all other his Assertions, they can picke out no one sentence more odious in the Iudgement of the simple peo∣ple: it is a wōder to seé, what a coyle they keépe here, and how vi∣perously they gnaw and turmoyle this one Sentence, wherein he sayd, That mans will hauyng lost her freédome, is now of no force at all, not so much as to thinke an euill thought. And in this respect surely, I can not but marueile much to seé the vndis∣creéte disorder of some, but chiefly the singuler shamelessenes of Osorius. For albeit Luther in so many his Commentaries, Sermons, Bookes, and Aunsweres doth vrge this one pointe alwayes, and euery where trauaile earnestly to proue, that mās Freewill (beyng voyde of Grace) auayleth to nothyng but to cō∣mitte sinne: yet doth Osorius so frame all his writyng agaynst Luther: as though Luther did teach that mans Freewill could not so much as thinke an euill thought.

And frō whence doth he pike this quarell? out of the wordes

of Luthers Article before mentioned, I suppose: But for as much as Luther doth in the selfe same Article openly professe,* 1.142 that Freewill of her owne nature auayleth to nothyng but to Sinne, and that all the imaginations of the hart do (of a cer∣teine naturall inclination) rushe headlong into euill: in what sense can y^t mā be sayd not to be able to thinke an euill thought, whiche is alwayes occupied in imaginyng euill? But I beleue he will presse vpon vs with Luthers owne wordes, wherewith he affirmeth that no mā of him selfe is of power to thinke a good thought, or an euill thought, &c. Well, let vs heare what conclu∣sion this Logician will coyne out of these wordes.

Mans minde whether it thinke well or euill,* 1.143 doth nei∣ther of them both of her owne power.

Ergo, Mans mynde of it selfe cā neither thinke a good nor an euill thought.

I do here appeale to your Logicke Osorius. What kynde of Argumēt is this? by what rule make you this cōsequent? what? bycause the substaunce of the matter doth depend vpon the first causes properly, will you thereupō conclude, that the secōd cau∣ses do therfore nothing at all? Or bycause the freédome of doyng is restreined to the first and principall cause, to witte, to the one∣ly Maiestie of God, that therefore mans will is no cause at all, bycause it is not freé? and y^t therfore it cā thinke no ill thought by any meanes, bycause it doth it not of her owne strength and li∣bertie, as though to do a thyng properly? & a thyng to be done of her owne proper power, were all one to say? So then by this reason the Iewes, which crucified the Lord of glory, shalbe sayd to do nothyng, bycause all the outrage whatsoeuer they kept, was determined before, by Gods vnsearcheable coūsell. In like maner Pharao in withholdyng the people of Israell, and Na∣buchadonasor in spoylyng them, may be sayd to do nothyng, bycause the hart of the one was hardened by the Lord, and by∣cause the other leadyng his armye into Egypt, was constray∣ned to chaunge his will in his iourney, and bende his force a∣gaynst Ierusalem. Likewise neither the Shippe whiles she sayleth, nor the Pylote within the Shippe, do any thyng at all, bycause their course whether it bee fortunate or vnfortunate, is not alwayes directed after their owne will, but as the wyndes &

the tydes do driue them. For what doth Luthers disputation of Freewill enforce els, but that he may referre all the order of do∣yng to Gods freé disposition onely? Neither doth hee dispoyle mā of will altogether, which doth onely disable will of freédome: Neither is it a good consequent to say, bycause mans will is de∣nyed to be freé, therfore that man is altogether destitute of will, bycause it is not freé, but alwayes captiuate, bounde, & an hand∣mayde, as the which in euill thyngs is either alwayes seruaunt to Sinne, or in good thynges handmayde to grace, euen as an Instrument or toole is alwayes at the bestowing of him that wor∣keth withall.* 1.144 For what should let but Luther may as well call Freewill, by the name of a toole, as Esay doth name the wicked by the name of Sawes in the band of the Lord? and as well as in many places of Ezechiell those hartes are called stoany hartes which the Lord doth promise to soften and mollifie with his grace?* 1.145

* 1.146And yet I will not much trouble Osorius herein. For whe∣ther will be freé vnto euill, or be seruaunt vnto euill: it maketh litle to the present purpose, nor will stād Osorius much in steéde. This is vndoubtedly true, that mans naturall strength (bee it freé, or be it bond) is more thē strong enough to all wickednesse. So were all these stormes raysed agaynst Luther neédelesse al∣so, consideryng that he doth so frankely oftentymes, and in ma∣ny places professe in playne wordes, that mans mynde is al∣wayes prone, and inclined to all euill cogitations: consideryng also that he doth confesse euery where, that to thinke euill is as properly naturall to mans will, as that of it selfe it neither can, nor doth acquainte it selfe with any thyng elles, but with euill thoughtes. And I thinke it is not so neédefull to stand much vp∣on the name of freédome, especially sithence we doe agreé vpon the truth of the matter. And it may happen that Osorius is de∣ceaued in doubtfull cōstruction of the word, or rather deceaueth others therewith: takyng the same in an other sense thē Luther vnderstode it.* 1.147 For whereas some thynges are sayd to bee freé of necessitie in respect of outward coaction, some freé of necessitie in respect of bōdage: Will may right well be called freé after the first maner of necessitie: as the which is neuer cōstrained to will vnwillyngly that which it willeth, be it good, or badd: For com∣pulsary will (as Augustine sayth) is no will. Accordyng to the lat∣ter

maner of necessitie, man hath neuer power ouer his owne will so, but that (whiche way soeuer it is carried) it alwayes o∣beyeth his commaūdement of whom it is carried, albeit it doth alwayes serue both voluntaryly, and willyngly. Whereupon S. Paule discoursing vpon the euill whiche hee would not, but did it neuerthelesse, sayth, that he did it not: but imputed the do∣ing therof to Sinne dwellyng within him, and to the law of his members, the force wherof being greater then his own strēgth, did drawe him into bondage, though hee stroue agaynst it. And surely that is the bondage that Luther did meane accordyng to Paules saying,* 1.148 when writyng of bond will on this wise: Mans will (sayth he) is after this sort common to vse, as is a horse or a beast: if God do ride vpō it, then it willeth & goeth whyther God will haue it: if the Deuill sit vpon it, then it willeth and goeth whyther the Deuill will haue it: nor is it in his owne choyse to runne to either of those riders, or to get either of them: but the riders do contend for the hauyng and keépyng of him. &c. If O∣sorius do seé any meane betwixt these two riders, I would fayne haue him shew it. He will say perhappes, that betwixt these two there is a meane in will, whereby will is able to apply it selfe to this, or to that; Augustine doth make aunswere,* 1.149 that the very begynnyng of this applyeng, if it be towardes good, ariseth not with∣out Gods good will and grace: if it be towardes euill: then it sprin∣geth not but out of euill:: Euen as Bernarde doth teach that the whole begynnyng must be ascribed to Grace.

In fine: to shutte vp the matter in fewe wordes,* 1.150 as concer∣nyng Luthers proposition, wherein he denyeth that Freewill is of power to do good, or euill of it selfe. Two thynges seéme wor∣thy to be noted here. The one concernyng the power of doyng, the other concernyng the freédome of power: If we enquire of the power of will, how effectuall it may be to good or euill of her owne naturall force: neither Luther nor any other will deny, the propertie of will to bee otherwise, but that it may will the thynges that it willeth: neither that the force of will is so alto∣gether blotted out, but that it may apply when it is applyed ei∣ther to good, or to euill: and that it doth so farre forth not apply, by how much it is either destitute of Grace, or ayded by Grace, after none other sorte, then as the horse doth beare his rider hee

trauerseth in his ryng, and runneth his race, he sweateth vnder his rider, he trauaileth his grounde, is very nymble, chaufeth & champeth vpon the bridle, commeth a loft, porketh out with his heéles behinde, he runneth rounde in his carryer backward and foreward, and performeth all other qualities and properties of his kynde, which are subiect to his senses. All which motions if you respect the naturall qualitie and force of the horse, seéme to be not altogether out of his owne power: But if ye respect the libertie of motiō, the actiuitie therof will appeare to consiste not so much in the naturall power of the beast which is ruled, as in the power of the ryder, which doth mannage him. Euē so ought we to Iudge of mans will, whose naturall inclination if you re∣gard, and what it may doe of her owne strēgth: who will deny, y^t the property of will is to will, but to be able to will, is proper to habilitie? For of will it proceédeth, that we will, but of habilitie it cōmeth, that we performe. So with our will we will, with our mynde we conceaue: and with our habilitie we doe performe. And, as Augustine sayth,* 1.151 thinking we do beleeue, thinking we doe speake, and thinking we doe whatsoeuer we doe. And in an other place the same Augustine doth confesse: that nature may be of power not onely to do euill, but also to haue fayth, hope, and charitie, yet to haue all these, hee doth affirme to come of Grace altogether.* 1.152 Wherfore we agreé well enough together as touchyng y^e habili∣tie of will. But to let passe this treatie of habilitie: if question be moued touching freédome of will, bycause hereupō hangeth all our cōtrouersie (for neither do we enquire here, what y^e property of will is: or what will cā do properly? but what euery man may do,* 1.153 or not do in all thyngs, by the freédome of his owne proper will) Luther doth aūswere forthwith, that the name of freédome seémeth to be a name of more maiestie, thē that it ought, or may agreé cōueniently to any thyng properly, but to y^e onely Maiestie of God, or to him, whō the holy Ghost hath made freé by grace.

* 1.154But y^e great Proctours of Freewill are wont to obiect, that in some sense this is true in deéde: That there is no power abso∣lutely & fully freé, but the onely omnipotēt power of Gods Ma∣iestie: yet neuertheles as we call Angels immortall, men holy, wise, and good (though we doe acknowledge God onely to bee truly immortall, onely wise, and onely good) so nothyng withstā∣deth,

but we may call men after their certeine maner freé. I do Aūswere.* 1.155 Angels in deéde are called immortall, and that truly: bycause they obteined that state of their creatour at the first: be∣sides that also, they neuer lost that state of immortalitie where∣in they were placed, although some fell frō the blessednes of im∣mortalitie. But as for our freédome, the condition & state therof is of a farre other condition and kynde. For albeit mā in the be∣ginnyng was created in the freé estate of will through y^e benefite of his creatour, which he might haue reteigned still without any contradiction if he would: yet did hee loase the same freédome, and Paradise withall, by his own default: so that he turned that blessed estate, into miserie: and his freédome, into bondage: that beyng out of Paradise now, by how much we are sequestred frō all felicitie, euen so farre seéme we to be cut of from all freédome, without the Grace of the Redeémer. For shyppe wracke beyng once made of vniuersall blessednesse, I can seé none other reme∣dy, but that freédome must be drowned withall. Therefore the selfe same thyng whiche doth open Paradise, beyng shut fast a∣gaynst vs, must of necessitie restore freédome agayne: which can not by any meanes be brought to passe through force of nature, or through any power of our owne: It consisteth onely in the Grace of the Redeémer. As our Redeémer him selfe witnesseth in S. Iohns Gospell.* 1.156 If the Sonne shall make you free, then shall you be free in deede. Notyng vnto vs this one thyng chiefly, by those wordes, the state of our bondage to be such, as except it be renewed with Grace of the Redeémer, that in all this nature of ours is nothyng freé. Moreouer as concernyng the vsuall ma∣ner of speach: that men are called good, holy, and wise:* 1.157 I know that men haue bene accustomed to bee tearmed so. But what is this to the purpose? The question here is not, by what name mē are called, but of what value euery thyng is in the sight of God. And yet do I not doubt at all, but y^t many men may bee in their kinde good, holy, and wise, & euen so to be esteémed well enough. But howsoeuer this holynesse, godlynesse, and wisedome of mē seémeth in mans Iudgement, yet is nothyng whatsoeuer it be, if it proceéde not from the grace of God. (For what hast thou, that thou hast not receaued?) After the same sorte do I aunswere touchyng freédome, whiche beyng once lost through Freewill,

must of necessitie sticke fast cloyed in y^e puddle of thraldome, vn∣lesse it be renewed agayne by Gods grace.* 1.158 Whereupō August, very aptly, Freedome (sayth he) without grace, is no freedome but co••tumacle. And as in this place August, denyeth that to be li∣berty, which is seuered frō grace, so in an other place he will not graunt that to bee named will, except it be conuersaunt in good things.* 1.159 Will (sayth he) is not will: but in good thyngs, for in euill & wicked thinges, it is properly called Luste, & not will. Wherfore if there be neither freédome, where Gods grace is not present: nor will, where wickednesse is practized: by what meanes then will Osorius mainteyne, that Freewill is in euill thinges, whenas in that respect, there is neither freédome, nor will? There is also in the same August. & in the same his Epistle to Hillary, that may well be gathered and framed into an Argument on this wise.

The lyfe of libertie is the perfect soundenesse of will.* 1.160

But in doyng euill mans will is not sounde.

Ergo, In doyng euill mans will is not freé.

For euen so are we taught vp Augustines wordes.

The lyfe of libertie (sayth he) is the soundenesse of will, and by so much euery man is more free, by how much his will is most sound.

Albeit I will not striue much about the contention of tear∣mes. If any mā be minded to name the choyse of will applyable towardes good or euill, to be voluntary, rather then freé, he shall not erre much in my Iudgement. Neither will I be offended, if a man do say (as Augustine doth) that mās will is freé towardes euill thinges, so that he hold the meanyng of Augustine, as well as the wordes. For I am of this mynde, that when Augustine doth name mans Freewill, & couple it to grace: he calleth it freé in this respect,* 1.161 bycause beyng freé frō all forcible constrainte, it bēdeth it selfe through voluntary motiō that way, whereunto it is directed, be it to goodnes through Grace, or to euill, through naturall lust. And in this sense, accordyng to August. meanyng, y^e Confessiō of Auspurgh doth expoūde mās will to be freé: that is to say: yeldyng of his owne accord. The selfe same do Bucer, and Melancthou also: & this also doth Caluine not deny: who doth neither striue much about this tearme of freédome,* 1.162 & doth learnedly also professe, that the originall cause of euill, is not to be sought elles where, then in euery mans owne will. But as

concernyng Luther: for that he doth vpon some occasion some∣tyme expresse his minde in writing somewhat roughly, wherein afterwards he discouereth his meanyng in a more mylde phrase of speach: it was not seémely in my conceite to racke out those thynges onely whiche might breéde offence, cloakyng meane whiles those thynges fraudulently, which do wipe away all mis∣likyng. He doth set downe in his Assertion thus: That it is not in mans freé power to thinke a good or euill thought. Agayne in the same Assertion the same Luther doth not deny, that all mans imaginations of their owne inclination are carried to all kynde of naughtynesse: & that Freewill can do nothyng of it selfe but Sinne. On this wise with lyke heate of disputation rather, then of any errour he calleth Freewill sometyme a fayned or de∣uised tearme, not to bee founde in deéde any where, makyng all thynges to be gouerned by vnauoydeable necessitie. Which ve∣hemencie of speach many men do cast in his teéth reprochful∣ly now and then.* 1.163 And yet in other places agayne exp••undyng him selfe, he doth graūt without all Hyperbolicall speéche, that in inferiour causes Freewill can do somewhat, and withall doth franckely affirme, that it can do all thynges beyng assisted with Grace. And why is hee not holden excused as well for this, as snatcht at for the other? why doe the aduersaries shut fast their eyes, and blindfold them selues willyngly at matter well spokē, and neuer looke abroad, but when they liste to carpe and cauill.

Was there euer any so circūspect a writer, whose latter di∣ligence & more attentiue heédefulnes might not alwayes amend some ouersight escaped at the first? either in Exposition, or Iud∣gement of thynges? The more that Solon the Sage grewe in yeares, the more he increased in knowledge: and may it not bee lawfull for vs to encrease vnderstādyng with our age likewise? Surely August. could not excuse the errours of his youth, nei∣ther shamed he to confesse in his age, the ouersight that escaped his penne in youth vnaduisedly, & not onely to reforme them by ouerlickyng them, (as the Beare licketh her whelpes) but also to reuoke them openly, with an open, graue, and grayheaded retractation: and to pray Pardon of his errours franckly: nor doth in vayne permitte those bookes to be preiudiciall vnto him, whiche hee wrate beyng a young man,* 1.164 saying very modestly of

him selfe that hee began then to write like a learner, but not a•• grounded in Iudgement. Neither was such perfection to be re∣quired in Luther: who albeit vttered somewhat at the first in wordes, otherwise then common custome of Schooles were ac∣quainted with, it had bene the partes of graue Deuines, not to prye narrowly into y^e vnaccustomed phrase of wordes so much, as to sift out the substaunce of the doctrine, how agreably it ac∣corded with the Scriptures in truth, and sinceritie. And if the matter would admitte some other interpretation, yet ought As∣sertiō haue bene compared with Assertion, and place with place: Finally consideration ought to haue bene had of the entent and meanyng of the writer: then also of the first originall, & scope of his doctrine, whereunto it tended, and what it emported. And if ye would examine vprightly the opinions and assertions of mē, accordyng the true touchstone of Gods truth, and not sinisterly for eiudge them: whether opinion I pray you seémeth in your cō∣ceite most sounde, of those which doe aduaunce the Maiestie of Gods grace? or of those whiche doe enhaunce the weakenesse of mans nature? of those which doe make mens merites, & workes, the effectes of Saluatiō? or of those which do ascribe it to Gods freé imputation, through Iesu Christ? of them which doe deter∣mine that righteousnesse commeth by fayth? or of them which say it is obteyned by the workes of the law? of those whiche spoyle Freewill of all matter to glory vpon?* 1.165 or of them which do call mē backe to a true, and humble acknowledgement of them selues? of those whiche razing out the euerlastyng and vnchaungeable decreé of Gods Predestination, doe committe the successes of thynges to happe hazard, and blynd chaunce, and to freé affectiō of mans will? or of them whiche settyng aside all chaunceable euentes of fortune, and all power of mans will, doe referre all things to the assured gouernaunce of Gods infallible foreknow∣ledge, guidyng all thyngs after his own pleasure, in most stayed and stable order? And yet doth not Luther so roote out all Free∣will altogether, and all chaunceablenesse of fortune, but that he doth admitte the vse of them in some respect: to witte in respect of inferiour causes, although in respect of hygher causes, & in those thynges whiche concerne saluation or damnation, he be∣leueth surely, that no force of Freewill, ne yet any chaunceable∣nesse

of fortune doe preuayle any thyng at all.

For as much as this is the chief grounde of Luthers doc∣trine,* 1.166 what els may the well affectioned & indifferent Reader (I pray you) cōceaue of this his Assertiō, then that which may mag∣nifie the glory of God? extoll his omnipotencie? may establishe the sauetie of the faythfull, dependyng vpon the freé promise of God through fayth, & not vpō the worthynes of merites through Freewill? may terrifie the wicked with a wholesome feare of God? may restrayne them frō outrage: may comfort vs agaynst death with lyfe y^t is in God: agaynst miserie, with grace: against infirmitie with strength: & agaynst destruction with Gods mer∣cy? may rayse vp the godly to loue and embrace their God? The fruite of all which thyngs as the godly Reader may easily reape by this doctrine, let vs seé now on the other side, what poyson O∣sorius doth sucke out of the fame, as one that seéth nothyng in this Assertiō,* 1.167 but horrible wickednes (as he fayth) shamelesse arrogācie, detestable maddnes, execrable outrage. And now would I fayne heare how he will confirme this proude affirma∣tiue so vehemētly vttered. For (sayth he) this beyng graunted, I doe say, that lawes are abolished: decrees put to silence: sciences rooted out, learnyng extinguished, peace and trā∣quillitie disturbed, and vtter confusion made of all, right and wrong without all order. If Osorius require this at our handes, that whatsoeuer his lauishe tounge shall rashly roaue at large, be coyned for an vnreproueable oracle, thē is this matter soone at an end. But that world is gone long sithēce Osor. wher∣in this Pythagoricall Prouerbe 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, was takē for a law.* 1.168 We thinke it not now enough to harken to all that a man will speake, but to cōsider what, & vpon what groūde a mā speaketh. Well: & what say you vnto vs at the lēgth Osorius? That lawes will decay, statutes be put to silence, sciences rooted out, learnyng extinguished, trāquillitie disturbed, and right and wrong confounded together. Certes you haue heard of this man here many hygh and absurde speaches (gentle Reader) but heare yet much more absurditie.* 1.169 I say furthermore that here∣upon doth follow, that mā is spoyled of sense, bereft of ad∣uise, and depriued of reason, and driuen to that passe, as no difference may seeme to be betwixt him & a stone throwen

out of a mans hād. And yet haue you not heard all. Osori. crau∣leth forward still, & is come now (as it seémeth) into some mayne playne, where he purposeth to make vs a course of his harysh e∣loquence. I say also: that the holy cōmaundements of God, his preceptes & statutes, his exhortatiōs and threatnyngs, rewardes promised for well doyng, and punishmēt threate∣ned for malefactours, were all in vayne prescribed to the posterity by Gods word. O Heauē, O Earth, O Sea of Her∣cules. But is there any more yet? tush all these be but trifles yet. For ouer and besides this ensueth so haynous a fact, more horri∣ble then toung can speake, or hart cā thinke, so vnspeakeably fil∣thy, & so monstruously straūge, that all the rest beyng layd toge∣ther, may in respect of this, be accompted scarse worth the spea∣kyng. And what is it a Gods name?* 1.170 Forsooth that Luther or Melancthon, Bucer or Caluine, or whosoeuer were the first foūder of this doctrine, besides that he doth thereby turne all states and cōmon weales quite vpsidowne, he breaketh yet further into such vnmeasurable impiety, as that he doth imagine God him selfe (the most holy of holy ones) & our most deare Father (to whō no iniquitie can by any meanes be imputed) to be the author of all wickednes and cruelty. We haue heard a tedious Catalogue of haynous absurdities, which (as he sayth) must needes ensue vpō Luthers doctrine: And if it be not true. He requireth vs to make him a lyar, as that either Luther neuer spake so: or els to teach him that Luthers doctrine may well be mainteined. As though there were any such pitthe in all this your rayling (M. Osorius) that might not easily be confuted; or any such weakenes in Luther, that might not much more easily be defended? yea & so defended as that neither he may seeme to haue taught the doctrine of Ne∣cessitie, without good cōsideratiō, nor you able to deface y^e same without great perill of cōmittyng horrible sacriledge? I speake now of Necessitie, not that Necessitie, that is called violēt coa∣ctiō, but of that which is named of vndoubted assuraūce, & abso∣lute infallibilitie: not that Necessitie which the schoolemen call Consequēti••, but which is called Consequētia, or ex Hypothesi.* 1.171 For Necessitie is neither takē after one onely significatiō amongest y^e Deuines, nor yet amōgest y^e Logiciās & Philosophers, wher∣of

of (I suppose) you be nothyng ignoraunt, at the least you ought not be ignoraunt therof surely. Therefore they that haue em∣ployed their studyes somewhat more carefully about y^e scannyng of this matter, haue defined Necessary after this maner:* 1.172 to be such a thyng, as can not bee altered, a certeine settled and firme vnmoueablenes, which can not be chaūged by any meanes from that whiche it is. Of this Necessary, Aristotle hath se•• downe two principall begynnynges: the one internall, the other exter∣nall. Then also distinction is made of this Necessitie,* 1.173 which is moued force of the internall cause, and inward proprietie of Nature: So that some thynges may be called simply, and ab∣solutely necessary: as God: and those thynges whiche beyng chaunged do emply contradiction: as if a man would say: that foure were not an euen nomber, that foure and threé, were not seuen in nomber: And this is called Geometricall Necessitie, which will not admitte any chaunge by course of nature. There is an other Necessitie; called Naturall Necessitie. Which al∣beit bee of her selfe the begynnyng of her owne motion, yet it consisteth not in so simple and absolute an estate, but followeth onely the vsuall course of her owne nature: And after this ma∣ner•• fier is sayd to bourne of Necessitie: The Sunne is con∣tinually carried about in his course of Necessitie: whiche can not chuse, but doe as they doe, accordyng to the proprietie of their naturall disposition: yet doe they not follow their naturall inclination so absolutely, and vnauoydeably, but that God may hinder, and alter their dispositiō, or make them cease from their naturall operation. Such a kynde of Necessitie to Sinne, we say that man is clogged withall sith the fall of Adam, if the ho∣ly Ghost and Grace be absent: For of them selues they can not but sinne, albeit there is no let in their nature, but that they may bee holpen or chaunged, and otherwise altered: as we seé come to passe in those that are regenerate in Christ. That Necessitie therefore whereby wicked men are sayd to bee lead to sinne, is not so absolute, and vnaduoydable, that they can not chuse but sinne: for assoone as the holy Ghost, and the Grace of Christ com∣meth, this Necessitie is vtterly cut of. And thus much of that internall Necessitie.

But the Necessitie that spryngeth from externall causes is

also deuided two maner of wayes. Whereof the one is violent,* 1.174 and is called Compulsary Necessitie: As when a thyng is for∣ced to moue, or to styrre agaynst her own nature. And this Ne∣cessitie can by no meanes fall into mans will: for it is impossi∣ble that will shall will any thyng vnwillyngly. The other is sta∣ble and infallible, or of the Hypothesis, or by reason of the Consequence, which Logicians do take to be in Sensu composito, & not in Senfu `Diuiso. Now this Necessitie, called of the Con∣sequēce, is on this wise. As when a thyng may be true by occasiō of the Necessary couplyng together of one proposicion with an other, though the thyng that is concluded for true, bee not Ne∣cessary of it selfe. And in this respect, we do affirme that all our actions are done of Necessitie, not by the force of the inwarde cause or els their owne nature, that is to say, if they be conside∣red apart, & referred to their next cause, to witte, vnto will. E∣uen so will beyng considered apart, in her owne nature from the externe begynnyng, to witte, Gods prouidence and foreknow∣ledge, it is sayd to be freé in his certeine kynde, so that it is en∣dued with a certeine facilitie to encline it selfe, to whether part it will, although it bee not able of her selfe to moue and en∣cline at all but vnto that part, which God did foreknow. Whereby you perceaue Osor. in what sense this Neces∣sitie, which we do affirme is not alwayes absolutely tyed to our actions, as farreforth as they doe pro∣ceéde from our owne will, but through the cou∣plyng & conioynyng of Gods Predestina∣tion with our workes. Which thing to be euen so, the Deuines did seéme to signifie `Per Sensum Com∣positum and Necessita∣tem Consequentiae.

¶ A Description of Freewill, and the thynges apperteinyng thereunto after the rules of Diuinitie, taken out of August. P. Lombard an•• others.

Fiue thyngs chiefly to bee cōside∣red in Free∣will.

• 1. What Free∣will is
  • ...Will.

    Is a thyng properly perteinyug to reason, whereby man doth lis∣cerne good frō euill, what is to be desired, or what to be eschewed.

  • ...Free.

    Freedome is a thyng properly perteinyng to will: whereby of voluntary appetite without fo∣reine coaction it may either will good or euill, but to will good cōmeth of Grace, which maketh to will and to doe.

    ¶ The des••••••ption of Freewill talen out of Arg••na 〈◊〉〈◊〉. l••b. 2. Dist. 24.

    Freewill is an ••••••initie of rea••on and will, whereby good is chosen through the assistaūce of Grace, or euill, if Grace b•• absent, or thus.

    Freewill is a facuine of the Soule which can will good or euill, discernyng them both.

• ...
  2. In what thyngs Freewill doth consiste.
  • In God first and chiefly.

    Whose wi••l is of it selfe simply and absolutely most 〈◊〉〈◊〉 frō all bōdage of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 and all infec∣cion of sinne, for God can ••ot of his own nature sinne: not bycause any force restrayneth him, but bycause of his own nature he cā not so will, so that God is both holy of necessitie, and yet this necessitie 〈…〉〈…〉 Freewill from God in whō all ••ccessitie ioyned with all free∣dome is reliaunt.

  • In blessed Angels.

    Whose state and condition is this, that their will is made stedfast and vnchaungeable in all goodnes, not of them selues, but through Grace.

  • In mans nature, and that foure maners of wayes according to the fourefold diuision of mans state.
• 3. In what respect it is called mans Freewill.

  Not in respect of things present, nor thyngs past, bycause present thyngs and thyngs past be of this qualitie, that beyng done they cā not be vndone, nor thynges pa••. can be reuoked.

  But is called Freewill in res∣pect of thyngs to come. And these be the thynges that our Lombar∣dines do affirme are in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 pow∣er, but vntruely, for mās habilitie (to confesse truth) is directed by gods euerlasting decree neither is it in mās habilitie to order chaū∣ceable thynges at his pleasure.

  • 1. In the state of innocen∣cie.

    Whose freedome was once such which could both sinne & not sinne. And in this sense the auncient wri∣ters must be vnderstanded as often as they speake of mans Freewill, that is to say, of the Freedome of mans nature.

  • 2. In the state of blessed∣nesse.

    or of his heauenly coūtrey, as schole∣men terme it, where man shalbe en∣dued with a freedome that can not Sinne by any meanes.

  • 3. In the state of life after sinne, & before re¦genera∣tion by Grace.

    In which state man hath no Freewill to do any thyng, but to Sinne dead∣ly as Lombard sayth? and of this state meaneth Luther writyng of bonde will.

  • 4. In the state of life after sinne, & after re∣genera∣tion by Grace.

    In whiche state man hath freedome not to Sinne except veniall Sin••e as sayth Lombard. But although Au∣gustine and Luther doe yeld an habi∣litie not to Sinne after a certeine sorte: Yet in respect of actuall Sinne they doe not except man either from veniall or deadly Sinne. Bycause was neuer any man yet found (Christ onely excepte) endued with such 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of Grace that had not in all his ly••e Synned, yea and that deadly.

• ...

• ...
  4. Of what thynges Free∣will taketh his denomination.
  • 1. From necessi∣tie or coaction whiche is called the Freedome of nature.

    This Freedome the scholemen do attribute to mē in all states. But this necessitie must bee distin∣guished & pro∣portioned by his principall cau∣ses, whereof

    Some be called internall. As be the thynges whiche are mo∣ued of their own nature and of inwarde ope∣ration: And those.

    Are either simply and abso∣lutely necessary as God and his holynesse, and as those thynges which b••yng chaū∣ged emply contradiction, whereof the one partie m••st needes bee true the other needes false: as foure is not an equall nōber, foure & three are not sen•• in nō∣ber: and this is called Geo∣metricall Necessitie which alteration nature do••h not admitte and this Necessi∣tie perteyneth nothyng to Luthers Disputation of Freewill.

    Or be no•• simply and abso∣lutely necessary, but after the common course of na∣ture, as ••••er doth burne of Necessitie. The Sinne is alwayes moued and other such lyke, beyng naturall thynges, whiche yet are not of such Necessitie, but may bee ••indered by God and so cease from opera∣tion.

    Some haue ex∣ternall begyn∣nynges: and of these there is two maner of Necessities.

    Either violent. Whiche is called the Necessitie of ex∣ternall coaction: as wh•••• thynges are constreyned to moue or to do contrary to their nature, as stones and heauie thyngs, as the schole men call Necessitie in re∣spect of the consequence not of the consequence or it Sensu Diuiso and not in Sensu Composito and frō this Necessitie the freedome of mans will is vtterly exēp∣ted.

    Or stable and infallible by reason of the consequence not of the consequent or in Sensu Composito not in Sen∣su Diuiso. This Necessitie of the consequence not of the consequent is to be vn∣derstanded, when a thyng may bee true in respect of the necessary aff••••tie of proposition from proposi∣tion, although the thyng concluded be not necessary of it selfe: or true in Sensu Composito, which otherwise is false in Sensu Diuiso, or false in Sensu Composito, which otherwise is true in Sensu Diuiso, as if a man say, that white may bee blacke by distinction of contrary tymes it may bee true, but ioynyng the tymes and in Sensu Compo∣sito, it can not be true.

  • 2. From sinne or from bondage of sinne, whiche is called freedome of Grace. And this freedome is attributed to them onely, which are made free by Grace. Where∣in if they meane of the imputa∣tion of Sinne, it is true: but if they meane of actuall Sinne, it is false.
  • 3. From miserie, which is called the freedome of Glory, and this freedome had free will in the state of innocēcie once, and shall haue the same much more perfect hereafter in the state of glory.
• 5. How much Freewill is em∣payred in man through sinne.

  It is woūded in her naturall qua¦lities, to witte, in Reason, in vn∣derstādyng, in memory, witte. &c. Dispoyled altogether in thynges as bee heauenly, and appertey∣nyng to God.

  And this much well agreeth with the doctrine of Luther.

  Lombard. Lib. 2. Dist. 25.

Sithence we haue now layd this foundation for our better furniture to be able to make aunswere: We will now addresse our selues to our aduersaries Argumentes. Wherein although he obserue no course, nor forme of cōmon Disputatiō, let vs yet helpe his lame Logicke as well as we may. And first of all, tou∣chyng y^e ouerthrow of Lawes (wherewith bycause it lyketh Mai∣ster Osorius to vrge this point chiefly before the rest) let vs geue our attentiue eares to his wordes, and marke well how cun∣nyngly he argueth.* 1.175 But I say (sayth he) that by this doctrine of Luther (whereby he doth teach that things are directed to their end by Necessitie) that Lawes are subuerted, De∣crees put to silence: and right and wrong confoūded toge∣ther. And why doth he not adde this much more also? that whole common weales are ouerthrowen? Well go to. I do heare very well what you say Osorius. But I haue not heard yet any sub∣staunciall Argumēt, whereby you proue this that you say to be true. Certes there be at this present within Christendome ma∣ny Natiōs, many Prouinces, many Kyngdomes, many Duke∣domes, many Cities and common weales that fauour Luthers doctrine: Wherein I appeale to your owne conscience (speake it if you can) haue you euer heard amongest all these (I say not of any one commō wealth or Citie) but of any one litle Uillage, or Ciuill familie, that hath bene any one iote defrauded of the benefite of their Lawes, or become lesse prouident for the cōmon quyet of their countrey, by followyng Luthers doctrine? Al∣though we haue not yet receaued frō Spayne and Portingall into our common wealth your bloudy lawes of Inquisition, em∣brued with Chriscian bloud, and do suppose also that no discrete common wealth will euer receaue them: Yet through Gods in∣estimable prouidence we bee not destitute of politique Lawes, nor of honest sciences, nor of vigilaunt Counsellours. Wherein albeit our grosse capacities may seéme vnworthy to bee compa∣red to the fine and pregnaunt wittes of Portingall: yet howsoe∣uer they seéme, we are by their direction sufficiently enough in∣structed to discerne betwixt the limittes of right & wrong, & not to confounde thē: neither haue we euer confounded thē as farre as I know: what maner of hotchpot you make of them in Por∣tingall I know not. For as much therefore as common experi∣ence

teachyng the contrary, doth most manifestly conuince you of open lyeng, with what face dare you so boldly affirme? that through this doctrine of Luther, Lawes are subuerted, Coun∣sels put to silence, and confusion and disorder of right and wrong to haue entred in? Whereof you neuer saw any proofe, ne yet can tell a dreame so much of any attempt practized in a∣ny common wealth. And therfore I marueile what kynde of le∣sing you will coyne at length to make this cauillation of yours to carry some shew of truth. I suppose veryly that (beyng disfur∣nished of proofe and recordes, and founde an open lyer in matter so euident) you will shrowde your selfe vnder some close couert of Pelagius. To witte. That where the vse of the law consisteth of two pointes principally, that is to say, in aduancyng vertue, and in punishyng vyce: hereupon Osorius will frame an Argu∣ment after this maner and forme.

Lawes are ordeined in vayne, vnlesse there be habilitie to performe them.* 1.176

But there is no habilitie to performe by the doctrine of Necessitie which Luther do threache.

Ergo, Lawes are ordeined in vayne by Luthers doctrine of Necessitie.

I do aunswere the Maior proposition were true,* 1.177 if this bon∣dage or Necessitie, which doth preiudice habilitie, were natu∣rall, and not of it owne faultynesse, that is to say: If we had bene created without this habilitie by nature, and had not throwen our selues into this inextricable Laberinthe of yelding, through our owne default. But as now hauyng heaped vpon our selues this Necessitie of sinnyng voluntaryly by our owne purchase, and hauyng made Necessitie (as Augustine sayth) of a penall offence: for good cause therefore lawes are of Necessitie establi∣shed, which may by some lawfull meane reduce vs to nature, or at least reteyne vs in some couenable order of lyfe:* 1.178 not ouerpas∣sing this also withall: that where the Maior treateth of the obe∣dience of mans lawes, in the Minor that Necessitie (which Lu∣ther doth teach) ought not be referred to mās lawes nor the di∣scipline of externall lyfe, but to the obediēce of Gods law onely.

Moreouer, for that I haue promised to helpe to vnderproppe Osorius Logicke, which is of it selfe very ruinous, and ready

to fall to the grounde. I will not refuse to frame by some order and forme, the remnaunt of his allegations into Argumentes, that the Reader may more easily be instructed, what aunswere to make to euery of them particularely.

* 1.179The freedome of mans will beyng takē away, the force of lawes preceptes and rules of good lyfe and all or∣dinaunces of Ciuill discipline and statutes do cease.

The Necessitie which Luther teacheth doth abolish all freedome of mans will.

Ergo, This doctrine of Necessitie being allowed. Lawes decay, good statutes and ordinaūces, and all ende∣uour of good and godly lyfe is extinguished.

* 1.180First in your Maior proposition this word Freedome must be distinguished: namely to be taken either as opposite to coac∣tiō, or opposite to bondage: if in the Maior you vnderstād of co∣acted freédome, then is the Maior true. For whosoeuer taketh away freédome from man, doth also dispoyle him of will. But if you vnderst̄ad of bonde freédome, then euen by this meanes is your Maior cleane false.

* 1.181Next we deny your Minor with Augustine, wherein also this word Necessitie must be distinguished. Whiche beyng de∣uided into two partes, the one whiche is called Cōpul••ary Ne∣cessitie, the other whiche is sayd to be of the Consequence, or ex Hypothesi, wherof the first ••euer any of our Writers dyd de∣ny, the other can none of all your Doctours deny: whiche con∣sistyng of the foreknowledge of God,* 1.182 by a certeine vnmoueable coniunction of causes, and byndyng Necessitie to thyngs fore-ordeined by God, doth vtterly abolish fortune and chaunce: but doth not take away will, nor withstandeth the freédome therof: as there is no contradiction, but one selfe thyng may be called both Uoluntary, and Necessary also. For freédome of will is not taken away through Necessitie, but through coaction. As for example, when we say that God liueth euerlastyngly, and orde∣reth all thynges vprightly: we doe confesse that both these are peculiar to Gods nature of Necessitie, and not by any forreine coactiō. After this maner in the booke of Exod. Whereas Pha∣rao did endeuour to stay the children of Israell from departyng out of Egypt, we must neédes confesse, that he did it of Necessi∣tie,

in respect of Gods secret appointemēt: & in deéde he neither could will, nor do otherwise:* 1.183 But in respect of his owne inclina∣tion, which was the very peculiar & nearest cause y^t moued him to stay thē••o Necessitie of coactiō forced his will to this vnwil∣lingly, but that which he did, he did uolūtaryly: and with no lesse earnest willingnes of mynde did he bring to passe y^e thing which his greédy affection had willed before. Although a man may be constrayned to do somethyng many tymes agaynst his will yet can he not be framed by any meanes to will a thyng y^t he would not. For the will which willeth not, is not now called will, but vnwillyngnesse: nay rather nothyng at all. And for the same ve∣ry cause, bycause there is no such thyng at all in the course of na∣ture, nor to be founde any where, therfore hath it no denomina∣tion nor vsuall name of speache, whereby it may be expressed in Latine: of the same sorte also are the other Argumentes tou∣chyng Artes and Sciences, whereof he cauilleth so much after this maner.

If all thynges that happen bee referred to the power of God and are done of Necessitie according to Luthers doctrine,* 1.184 which byndeth all the actions of men to Ne∣cessitie.

It would hereupon follow that all Sciences should be o∣uerthrowen, all endeuour of mā vtterly frustrate, nor any industry of mē (were it neuer so skilfull employed in husbandry, to byeng and sellyng, to traffique, to prouision for the familie, to Surgery and Phisicke, or any other actions of mans lyfe whatsoeuer) shall pro∣fite nor be auayleable.

I do aunswere this to bee most true,* 1.185 that the operation of all thynges ought to be referred to the will and prouidence of God, as to the chief and principall cause: by whiche prouidence all thynges are ordered of very Necessitie. But this Necessitie ta∣keth not away habilitie to endeuour from men, but causeth one∣ly that mens actions are not chaunceable. For albeit the thyngs that God willed, doe necessaryly come to passe: yet doth mans will neuertheles yeld her diligent endeuour, which will the pro∣uidence of God doth not take away, but gouerneth. In deéde mās will doth worke, yea and freély worketh: that is to say: wor∣keth

voluntaryly, not coactly: yet it worketh so, as if God helpe, it worketh well, if God doe not helpe, it worketh ill. And yet whether it worke well, or ill, it alwayes worketh of Necessitie: neither doth will employ her habilitie any io••e lesse beyng go∣uerned by God, but rather is encouraged to worke so much the more earnestly, bycause the thynges come to passe necessaryly, whatsoeuer Gods will hath foreordeined to bee done by the in∣dustry of man.

Certes this saying of Luther is vndoubtedly true, that no∣thyng happeneth in all the actions of mans lyfe, either well, or euill, either without Gods knowledge, or without his will, or els without his direction. And yet bycause the successes of those thynges are vncerteine vnto vs, therefore followyng the rule of our will and reason, and withall obeyeng the will of God (who cōmaundeth vs to do our endeuour) we do apply all our diligēce earnestly to worke, cōmending in the meane whiles both our sel∣ues, & the successe of our trauaile to the tuitiō of almighty God: at whose especiall commaundement all thynges come to their end necessaryly, & obey his direction of very Necessitie. Wher∣by you perceaue that our endeuours and trauailes doe nothyng lesse decrease or waxe more dull to worke, bycause they are fore∣knowen, and directed by God: but our will is by so much more encouraged to worke, bycause we will obey Gods will, who cō∣maundeth to worke. And therefore that Sophisme of yours is altogether Sophisticall & deceauable, not much vnlike to that, whiche we read in Origine in his second booke agaynst Celsus: where the Sophister, to dissuade the sicke body from counsell of Phisicke,* 1.186 frameth this Argumēt. If thou be Predestinate (sayth hee) to recouer health, thou shalt surely be hoale whether thou take Phisicke, or no: but if thou be Predestinate to dye, the Phi∣sition shall both loase his labour, and thou cast away thy money to no purpose. Whom the sicke person perceauyng to be to∣wardes Mariadge, with the lyke Sophisme (driuyng out as it were one nayle with an other) aunswereth after this maner. If it be thy destiny to haue issue of thy body, thou shalt haue one, whether thou marry a wife, or not marry a wife: but if thou be predestinate to be childlesse, thou shalt surely be childies, though thou marry a wife neuer so much. The deceite of this So∣phisme

lurketh herein. Bycause our endeuours,* 1.187 and Imagina∣tions ought not to depend vpō an vncerteine certeintie, whiche may be applyable to good or euill indifferently, or vpon chaun∣geable aduenture (the successe wherof we know not) but must be ordered by a direct assured rule of reason. For albeit on the one side it may so come to passe, that he that marryeth a wife shall haue no children: yet on the other part, for as much as it is im∣possible to haue children without copulation of man and womā: therfore that ought to be yelded vnto, that seémed consonaunt to reason, not that which y^e Argument concluded videl. therfore he must not marry a wife. In lyke maner fareth it with the other Argument concernyng the Phisition. Although it may so come to passe that no Phisicke may helpe me, yet bycause it is most a∣greable to reason that vnlesse Phisicke be ministred, health will not bee recouered, I will follow herein the most approued rule of reason, and will not wilfully throw my selfe by an vncerteine Necessitie of destiny, into that whiche seémeth impossible, or at least lesse agreable to reason. Wherfore as these assumptions be false, thou shalt in vayne marry a wife, & thou shalt vse Phi∣sicke in vayne: in lyke maner I aunswere that Osorius Argu∣ment is Sophisticall, where hee argueth that our endeuours are applyed in vayne, & that we do trauaile in vayne. Well: to go foreward to the other triflyng toyes of this Sophister.

An other Argument touchyng rewardes and punishmentes.

For as much as vertue and vyce doe proceede from out the free choyse of will,* 1.188 it can not be, but that he which doth bereaue will of her freedome, must also dispoyle the lyfe of man of due reward for vertue, and punish∣ment for vyce.

Luther, by byndyng all thynges to Necessitie, doth be∣reaue will of her freedome.

Ergo, by Luthers doctrine it doth come to passe, that nei∣ther punishment shalbe executed vpon malefactours, nor vertue aduaunced with condigne reward.

The very same Argument did Pelagius long ••ithence vse a∣gaynst August. though not in the selfe same wordes, yet all one in effect. I aunswere the partes therof. And first concernyng

freédome of will mentioned in the Maior, how it ought to be di∣stinguished, hath bene declared before already. Then if in the Minor you respect that kynde of Necessitie, whiche forceth vs to yeld whether we will or no, your Minor is false. As touchyng reward for vertue, and punishment for vyce: Celestius the Pe∣lagian vrged agaynst Augustine in the same wise.* 1.189 Man is not to be blamed (sayth he) for committing the Sinne, which he can by no meanes auoyde. Augustine maketh aunswere:* 1.190 Nay ra∣ther (sayth he) man is therefore faultie, in that hee is not without sinne: bycause by mās Freewill onely it came to passe, that he should fall into that Necessitie of Sinnyng, which Necessitie by his owne will he can not withstād. Whereby you perceaue Osor. that Ne∣cessitie of sinnyng is neither vtterly abolished frō mās nature, & that malefactours are duely punished notwithstādyng for their offences. By what reason may this be iustified (will you say) sithence the Iudgement of our choyse (whereby we fall into Sinne) is not freé, but subiect to thraldome. Be it as you say, but thorough whose default this seruitude came first is already declared. Agayne whether offence be committed through frée or seruile choyse of will, it maketh litle to the purpose for the qual∣lyfieng of the punishment, so that it appeare to the Iudge, that the fact was committed of willfull and corrupt lust and affectiō. But you will say agayne.

If the offence be voluntary.

* 1.191Ergo, the doing therof consisteth in our owne power.

For what soeuer is voluntary, seemeth to be within the compasse of our habilitie. I aunswere.* 1.192 To will, we haue in deéde naturally in vs: but to will well we haue not: So that ha∣bilitie to will is of our selues,* 1.193 to witte: We are able to will, but to will well is not in the power of will: for this soundenesse of will, Adā lost (when he had receaued it) through his own abuse.

* 1.194As touchyng rewardes. I Aunswere. Albeit our deédes de∣serue not to be rewarded, yet doth God righteously reward thē whenas he doth crowne his owne giftes in vs. Neither doth it follow hereupon, bycause God doth reward good workes in vs, that therfore those good workes are our own, as proceédyng frō vs through our owne strength, & habilitie. But bycause he hath vouchsaued to make those giftes to be ours, & bycause he pow∣reth

those good giftes into vs, therefore worthely are those good giftes rewarded as his owne. And yet neither is this reward geuē as due to desert, in respect of the worthynes of the worke: but of his gracious liberalitie, which he hath bountyfully pow∣red vpon vs vndeserued before, to make vs obedient vnto him.

Briefly, if this Aunswere, though of it selfe very playne and manifest, shall seéme but of small credite with you, I will bryng you Augustine for an umpyer betwixt vs sufficient enough (I trust) who beyng long agoe assayled with the same Obiections by the Pelagians, shall for the better maintenaunce of his owne credite, fully aūswere these cauillations of those heretiques like vnto your selfe. For the Pelagiās did obiect agaynst him in this sort. If it be true, that all thynges frō the begynnyng are deter∣mined to their end by Gods foreordinaunce & decreé,* 1.195 & that mēs willes are directed by God: to what purpose are lawes made? & punishment ordeined for malefactours? why are men rebuked, reproued, reprehended, & accused? for what do we that we haue not receaued? what maruell is it if we be disobediēt to God, whē as he that commaūdeth to obey, hath not geuen will to obey?

Euen as Augustine hath aunswered this Obiection long si∣thence, so let Osorius cōtent him selfe to be aūswered in as few wordes:* 1.196 For correcting of vyce (sayth he) punishment is ministred for two causes. First bycause no man is euill, but by his owne de∣fault, for the euill that he worketh, is euill voluntaryly and of his owne accorde. And although it ought not to be doubted that mās will ought to be subiect to Gods will, whom mā can not let to worke what him best liketh, for as much as when him listeth, he frameth mans will to worke after his will, yet here is no cause to the contra∣ry, but that man should receaue due punishement for the offences, which him selfe committeth willfully, seyng that he is the worker of his owne Sinne, for no man Sinneth agaynst his will. The other cause why transgressours are worthely punished, is bycause the tres∣passours either are regenerate, and such beyng cleansed before, and fallyng agayne to their former filthe, of their owne accorde, can not pleade for defence that they neuer receaued grace: as men who through their own Freewill, haue made frustrate the Grace of God once receaued, by their owne wickednesse: But if they be not rege∣nerate, yet is that damnable originall sinne worthely punished: that

will through anguish of punishment may conceaue desire to be rege∣nerate, if at least the man that is so chastized be the child of pro∣mise. That God by outward vsing this meane of scourge vexation and chastizement may by secret inspiration fashion and frame the will to obedience. &c.

And thus much hetherto cōcernyng lawes and ordinaūces, for rewardyng vertue and punishyng vyce in Ciuill gouerne∣ment. There followeth now an other absurditie, to witte, where he sayth, that by Luthers doctrine man is altogether dispoyled of vnderstandyng; depriued of Iudgement, bereft of reason, and driuē to that extremitie, as to be no better then a naturall stoane throwen out of a mans hand.

Osorius Argument.

* 1.197Whosoeuer do attribute the orderyng of all thynges to absolute Necessitie, exemptyng freedome from will, doe spoyle men of their vnderstandyng, depriue them of Iudgement and bereue them of reason, and do trāf∣forme them into brute beastes and stoanes.

Luthers doctrine doth bynde mens actions and willes to Necessitie.

Ergo, Luthers doctrine doth dispoyle mē of their senses and turneth them into stoanes.

* 1.198I deny the Maior of this Argument. In the Minor I distin∣guish this word Necessitie. Lastly the Argument is altogether vicious: and that for two causes. Either bycause Osorius thin∣keth:* 1.199 That no Necessitie at all byndeth thynges to be directed by the eternall prouidence and ordinaunce of God: or els he sup∣poseth this Necessitie to he such, as must neédes exclude all freé∣dome of will. Both which are false. And first touchyng Necessi∣tie. Luther & other aūcient writers do learnedly affirme:* 1.200 That the actions of mans lyfe are not subiect to fortune: but herein they do acknowledge the prouidence of God, which they assigne to be the onely and principall gouernesse and guide of mās lyfe, as which directeth mās purposes, boweth and bendeth his will, and ordereth all the enterprises thereof. Moreouer they teach the same prouidence to be such, as whiche is not whirled about through blynd and sudden motions (wherein no place is left to

the happenynges of fortune) nor such a prouidence as must neédes depend vpon inferiour causes,* 1.201 or vpon a necessary cou∣plyng together of causes (wherein destiny is excluded) nor such a prouidence as is vnaduisedly & vncerteinly tossed to & fro, ac∣cordyng to the wandryng chaunces of fortune (wherein fortune & chaunce is taken away) but such a prouidence, as consisteth in a certeine assured stedfast & permanent order,* 1.202 workyng so in the meane whiles by inferiour and mixte causes neuerthelesse, not as though it were tyed to those causes with any such necessary bonde of couplyng, that it may not possibly doe otherwise by her owne absolute and most freé motione, neither as though those causes could not possibly doe otherwise, but must of Necessitie follow the direction of the same prouidence, whereunto they be subiect. Whereby it commeth to passe, that Freewill beyng oc∣cupyed in these meane causes,* 1.203 neither ceaseth to be altogether freé (as being forced by no forreine constraint, but guided by her owne accord:) nor yet remayneth so absolutely freé, but that it is constrayned whether she wil or no, to yeld to y^e direction of Gods prouidence, voluntaryly notwithstandyng & not coactly. Wher∣upon amongest the learned this Necessitie is called Necessitas immutabilitatis aut certitud••nis:* 1.204 whiche though doe not vrge thynges with violent coaction, yet for as much as nothyng is in al the creation of nature of so small substance, as can be with∣out the cōpasse of Gods knowledge,* 1.205 therfore albeit many things seéme accordyng to our capacities to be done by chaunce, yet in respect of Gods prouidence (if wee duely consider the origi∣nall and principall cause of thynges that are done) wee shall finde nothing done, but which could not but be done, of very Ne∣cessitie. I make hast to the other absurdities: to witte: to Oso∣rius his most friuolous brabblynges. For in this sorte he craw∣leth from mans lawes and ciuill gouernement, to Gods lawes, arguyng as it were in this sort.

If will be nothing auayleable to good lyfe, nor of it selfe can do nothyng but Sinne: then are Gods lawes com∣maunded in vayne: in vayne also are exhortatiōs and aduertisementes ministred: in vayne are blessinges and cursinges set downe in the Scriptures.* 1.206

But no man wil say that these are cōmaūded in the Scrip∣tures

in vayne.

Ergo, this doctrine of Luther is false & execrable, whereby he leaueth none other habilitie to Freewill, but onely to sinne, & whereby he bindeth all things to necessity.

* 1.207This Maior must bee denyed, beyng nothyng els but a most manifest cauillation: to witte: tendyng to this effect, as though God commaunded vs to doe nothyng, but that we might of our owne selues performe: whereunto Augustine aunswereth in this wise. O man in the commaundemēt learne what thou oughtest to doe, in the punishment learne thy weakenesse through thyne owne default: In the prayer learne from whence thou mayest obteyne. &c. By the law of commaundyng, and forebyddyng therefore accordyng to Augustine, we come to the knowledge of our Sinne and infirmitie, not of our owne strength & power, yet is not the law therfore cōmaunded in vayne. For to vs that aske in the Sonnes name, and acknowledge our infirmitie, is Grace promised: which worketh in vs both to will, and to doe: accor∣dyng as the same Augustine doth recorde in the same place: Let vs remember that hee doth say: make vnto your selues a new hart and n••w Spirite, who hath sayd. I will geue you a new hart, and I will geue you a new Spirite. How is it then that he that sayth make vnto your selues a new hart, fayth also, I will geue you a new hart? Why doth he commaunde if him selfe will geue? Why doth he geue, if mā be the worker? but bycause he geueth the thyng that he com∣maundeth, and helpeth him whom hee hath commaunded that hee may do it? For through grace it commeth to passe, that man is en∣dued with a good will, which was before of an euill will. &c. Ther∣fore by this Argument of Augustine appeareth that this word of admonition, exhortation, or of rebukyng vsed in the Scriptu∣res is as it were a certeine meane, or instrument which the holy Ghost doth vse in conuertyng the will of such, as are not yet re∣generate: and in beautifying the first issues of his good giftes in such as are regenerate, that they may grow to a more rype∣nesse through Repentaunce, through Fayth, and through Pray∣er. And by what wrest of Logicke doth Osorius gather habili∣tie of Freewill out of the holy ordinaūces, seyng Augustine doth in so many places so directly gayne say him, but especially in his 2. booke agaynst the two Epistles of Pelagius,* 1.208 writyng in this

wise. I can see nothyng in the whole Scriptures, geuen by God in commaūdement to man, to proue that man hath Freewill, that may not bee founde either to bee geuen of Gods liberalitie: or required to set forth the assistaunce of his grace. This much Augustine.

Briefly to knitte vp the matter in a word or two: if you will know to what end, commaundementes, couenaunts and exhor∣tations are deliuered by God. Learne this out of S. Paule, if Augustine cānot satisfie you. That is to say: Bycause after y^e knowledge of good & euill is once receaued, we are therfore vn∣der the law of Necessitie, & bycause also we are vnder y^e law,* 1.209 whether we be able, or not able to performe: the law speaketh vnto vs of Necessitie, that if we be able to performe them, we should ly••e by them: and that if we despise them euery mouth should be stopped, and all the world be culpable before God. And withall that such as are not yet regenerate in Christ, vnderstan∣dyng how much is cōmaunded beyond their habilitie & power, may fleé to prayer, and seéke for the Mediatour, and call vpon him for assistaunce of Grace: on the other side, such as the holy Ghost hath endued with more bountyfull giftes of his gracious liberalitie, may w^t more earnest bent affection, yeld them selues thankefull to God, who hath geuen them strength to be able to walke in his wayes. Whereby it is come to passe,* 1.210 that neither the Necessitie of the commaundement is made frustrate by our imbecillitie, nor mans endeuour any thyng weakened by the Necessitie of infallible certeintie, nor yet freédome or will disa∣bled by Gods prouidence, all which you do most falsely reporte to ensue vpon the doctrine of Luther. I come now at y^e last, to that great and most haynous matter, the very chief and well-spryng of all the other absurdities. To witte: Wherein Luther maketh God to be the Authour of all mischief, and chargeth him with vnrighteous dealyng, in this Argumēt for sooth. For where as Luther doth attribute the successes of all things,* 1.211 be they good be they euill to God as to y^e chief and principall originall, and doth conclude all thynges vnder the absolute Necessitie of pro∣uidence, hereupon the aduersary doth gather threé moustruous inconueniences.

The first, that by this meanes men haue not freédome vpon [unspec 1] their owne willes.

[unspec 2] The second, that men are not Authours of their owne sinne.

[unspec 3] The thyrd, that God doth execute his Iudgementes vpon men vniustly for the Sinnes, whereof they be not the Authours, but God. Whereupon Simme Suttle argueth from destructi∣on of the consequent on this wise.

Osorius Argument.

God doth not take away freedome from mans will, nor is Authour of euill: but euery man is Authour of his owne euill. Neither is God iniurious to any man, in ex∣ecutyng his punishment vpon him for his offence.

* 1.212Ergo, Luthers doctrine is wicked and haynous, whiche teacheth absolute Necessitie of doyng good or euill by the foreknowlede of God, and whereby he imagi∣neth God to be the Authour of wickednesse.

* 1.213There are extant in the Scriptures many famous and no∣table testimonies touchyng the truth of Gods Praedestination, and foreknowledge of thynges to come: which neither Osorius nor all Portingall are able to gaynsay.* 1.214 Whereupon Necessitie of al the actions which we do, must neédes ensue, in respect of the Hypothesis, as Schoolemē tearme it. But as touchyng his glo∣rious assumption of the haynous inconueniences concurraunt withall: that is most false. For first neither doth the freédome of mans will perish so, but that men may alwayes willyngly, & voluntaryly chuse that, whiche they will. Neither is any man charged with such Necessitie, as the force of cōstraint may com∣pell him to doe that, whiche he would not:* 1.215 And it may come to passe, as is mentioned before, that the thinges which be Neces∣sary vpō the Hypothesis, beyng done without the same Hypothe∣sis, may seéme to be chaūceable, and not Necessary. And by what meanes then is will bereft of freédome? vnlesse paraduenture, bycause God (seyng mans wil inclinable to all wickednesse) doth not restrayne it when he may, for this cause he may be sayd to take away freédome from will. But this withstandeth our dis∣putation of Necessitie nothyng at all. For although this freé∣dome be holpen to good, yet remayneth the same neuerthelesse freé to wickednesse, in the sense spoken of before. But he might haue holpen (you say.) In deéde nothyng was more easie. For

what cā not his omnipotēcie bryng to passe w^tout any difficultie? but what then, I pray you? Ergo, God is vnrighteous bycause whē he could geue grace he would not: Truth in deéde, if god did owe this grace to any mā of duety: but by what law will you auerre that God was boūde to geue this grace of duetie? First, God did at the first creatiō endue the whole nature of mankynd with Freewill: So also if he did suffer mankynd aftewardes to be directed by the same Freewill, I pray you what vnrighteous∣nesse was there in him hitherto as yet? But ye will say, that this Freewill is spoiled, and vneffectuall to worke spirituall good thynges: through whose default I pray you? through Gods default? or mans default? If it were mās default: for what cause then is God accused, as either vniust for not geuyng assitaūce, or cruell, for punishyng the Sinne, which euery of vs doe com∣mitte of no coaction, but of our owne voluntary will?

But besides this he chargeth GOD to be the originall cause of all mischief.* 1.216 If that be true, then must this needes follow, whiche were execrable to be spoken: that wicked mē are vnrighteously damned, as whom him selfe had cre∣ated to the end they should be damned, and so doth punish them for the offences, whereof him selfe was Authour, and procurer at the first. For this is Osorius obiection.* 1.217 For reme∣dy whereof, I perceaue that I had neéde to goe circumspectly to worke: least God be disabled in any thyng that is due to his omnipotencie, or that more be ascribed to his power, then is a∣greable with his Iustice. Moreouer as there want not testimo∣nies in the Scriptures, which in vtter apparaunce may seéme very well inclinable to either part: so I thinke it not amysse, to vse herein some ayde for the better discouerie thereof: Besides this must be had no small consideration of the simple and vnlet∣tered multitude, who once hearyng God to bee named the Au∣thour of wickednesse, and not vnderstandyng the matter aright, will forthwith interprete thereof, as though it might bee law∣full for them forthwith to rush into all disorder whatsoeuer, & that they are vniustly punished, if they doe the euill which God doth both will and cause to be done. Whiche kynde of people I wishe to be aduertized, when they heare the direction and orde∣ryng of all thynges good or euill to be ascribed vnto God,* 1.218 that

they Imagine not these wordes to be so spoken, as though God were willyng to haue iniquitie committed: That is to say, as though GOD were either delighted with wickednesse, or as though wicked men when they do wickedly, did therein accom∣plishe Gods will simply and absolutely.* 1.219 And yet neither may this be denyed in any wise, y^t of the generall masse of all the cre∣ation, any one thyng cā be without the cōpasse of Gods Deuine foreknowledge, or done without his will: albeit we must neédes confesse with Augustine that many thyngs are done agaynst his will. Now therefore encombred (as it were) betwixt these two whirlepooles, how shall we say that he doth either will Sinne, which he doth forbyd and punish? or that he doth not will sinne, whenas nothyng can be done, God not beyng wittyng and wil∣lyng thereunto?

* 1.220Surely as touchyng Sinne, God ought not to be named the Authour of Sinne properly: Neither (as Ambrose truely writeth) can iniquitie issue from thence, whence floweth all righte∣ousnesse. And yet can not God be excluded from the direction & rule of Sinne altogether, vnlesse we may thinke that some¦thyng may chaūce in mans lyfe, which the almighty eye of God either seéth not, or that his will willeth not.* 1.221 If he do not seé it, where is then his eternall foreknowledge? if the thynges which he seéth, be done without his knowledge and will, where is his euerlastyng omnipotencie, which worketh all in all? and where∣with he is sayd to doe all thinges that he will in heauē and in earth? What shall we say then?* 1.222 If God will not haue Sinne, why is sinne committed, & so wōderfully ouerflowyng? If he will haue sinne, how may it be defēded that he is righteous? for after this sorte reasoneth Osorius, as though the righteousness of God could not be excusable, if God may be supposed either to will Sinne, or to be any cause or procurour of Sinne.

Albeit this drift of Osori. whereby he cōcludeth y^t God wil∣leth not sinne, bycause hee is righteous, may be in some respect yelded vnto:* 1.223 so y^t, it haue relation to y^e same will of God, which hath discouered it selfe vnto vs in his expresse law, which will y^e Schoolemen tearme Voluntatē sigui, or if he argue on this wise.

God is righteous.

Ergo, He is not a Sinner.

God is righteousnesse it selfe.

Ergo, He can not sinne.

This Argument would hold well enough.

But this other Argument can not be good, to say:* 1.224

God is righteous and the founteine of all righteousnes.

Ergo, God can not will Sinne in any others without pre∣iudice to his owne righteousnesse.

As though God could not will Sinne in some respect not sinnefully, with that most secrete and vnsearcheable will, where∣with he order••in, and sweetely disposeth all thynges in heauen and in earth, not empayring in the meane space any ioate of his own righteousnes at all?* 1.225 Nay rather what if euen for the selfe same cause, bycause he is righteous, some kynde of actions do some∣tymes burst out, whiche beyng committed of men, in respect of mans nature are Sinne: but in respect of God, are not Sinne, but punishementes of Sinne, powred fromout his most iust Iudgement? for it is not the least office of Iustice to punish sinne by sinne: nor is it by and by necessary to Iudge alyke of the cau∣ses them selues, whenas one selfe same action doth proceéde frō diuerse causes: vnlesse the causes be altogether correspondent in action. When the Magistrate doth execute the offendour, he is both the cause of his death, and doth willyngly cause him to be executed: not bycause he delighteth in his death, but enduced onely by necessitie of doyng Iustice, he doth in that respect both rightfully, and necessaryly minister Iustice. But if a priuate mā, or a Russiā should willyngly put a mā to death, he should be deémed a murtherer. When the parent doth chastize his vnthrif∣tie child with the rodde, he doth the same rightfully, yea if he dyd it not, he should Sinne. But if the brother should beate his bro∣ther, or the seruaunt his felow seruaunt, the same could not but be culpable. Wherfore in all maner of actions regarde must be had, not onely what is done, but how it is done:* 1.226 so must the ende and causes also bee considered, whiche being in nomber many tymes many, & diuers, & not all of one nature, do neuerthelesse concurre. For it may be (as it doth oftentimes come to passe) y^t in causes beyng cōcurraūt in one actiō may be great diuersitie. So that one selfe same cause may be in one kynde of actiō wic∣ked, and in another actiō, meére righteousnesse. It may so come

to passe that a man at a tyme may committe robbery, or fall into some other haynous wickednesse: where if you seéke for the ve∣ry cause of executyng that action, you may rightly impute it to the frayltie of mans nature: If you seéke the procuryng cause that draue him to consent, no doubt it was his wicked thought, and corrupt mynde, which is altogether replenished with sinne: neither is it to be doubted but that Sinne is engendred out of the corrupt will of mā, without the which (as Anselme doth wit∣nesse) no wicked action is committed.* 1.227 Whereby appeareth at the length, that because no vncleannesse can be founde in the will of God, therfore his most sacred nature can by no meanes be defi∣led with Sinne. But if you be desirous to learne from whence this corruption and euillnesse of the mynde, & imaginatiō doth proceéde, Caluine him selfe whom you accuse very greéuously, shall aunswere you in his owne behalfe.* 1.228 This corruption of mynde (sayth he) commeth partly by the procurement of Sa∣than, partly by the frayltie of nature, which man did defile by his owne voluntary fall. Whereupon, he sayth, when the cause of e∣uill is sought for, we ought not to seéke it els where, then in our selues: but the whole blame therof we must lay vpon our selues.

* 1.229You will say then, and how then will these wordes of Caluine agree with Luthers doctrine? seing Luther maketh God the Authour both of good and euill, and Caluine ma∣keth man the cause of euill? Nay rather by what meanes can you forge vnto vs such a crafty deuise of iarryng, in so vniforme an agreement of Iudgemēt, betwixt Luther and Caluine? Cal∣uine supposeth that the cause of euill ought not to be sought for els where, then in man. Luther teacheth that no righteousnesse ought to be sought for els where then in God onely. And where be these felowes now, which either go about to make man excu∣sable, or God culpable of vnrighteousnes by any meanes? for to this effect tēdeth the whole force of Osor. brablyng agaynst Lu∣ther: as though God could not will sinne by any meanes, but that the glory of his Iustice should by and by be blemished. And bycause mans will imaginyng or doyng wickedly at any tyme, can not imagine or do euill without Sinne, therefore Osorius dreameth forthwith that it fareth in lyke maner in Gods will, which is most vntrue. For nothyng withstandeth at all, but that

many causes of semblable affections may concurre oftentymes,* 1.230 all which nothwithstandyng may not altogether powre out sem∣blable force of operatiō, after one and semblable sorte. And ther∣fore this is no good Argument.

God accordyng to his secrete vnsearcheable will, doth some¦tymes encline the willes of men to committe horrible mis∣chiefes, and after a certeine maner willeth Sinne.

Ergo, God may be iustly accused of vnrighteousnes & iniquity.

Which Argument applyed in the behalfe of mans nature, might seéme to be of some validitie perhappes in the opinion of men. But to transpose the same from men to God, It can not holde. And why so? bycause there is great difference betwixt thynges wherof God is the Authour, and thynges wherof man is the doer. For euen Sinnes them selues and wickednesse, as they come frō God are scourges, yea and that most righteous, and whatsoeuer is decreéd either by his couered, or discouered will, it is in this respect both holy and righteous, bycause the will of God ought alwayes to be accompted for the very foun∣datiō of all righteousness. Upon which matter let vs heare what Augustine speaketh in his thyrd booke De Trinitate, euen his owne wordes. The will of God is the chief and principall cause of all kindes of actions and motions.* 1.231 For there is nothyng done whiche proceedeth not frō that vnsearcheable and intelligible wisedome of the most mightie Emperour, accordyng to his Iustice vnspeakeable, for where doth not the almightie wisedome of the highest worke as it willeth? which reacheth from one ende of the world to an other mightely, and ordereth all thynges sweetely, and doth not these thynges onely, which beyng in dayly practise, and by reason of com∣mon vse are not much marked or marueiled at, but thynges also passing all vnderstandyng and capacitie, and whiche for the rare∣nesse of vse, and straungenesse of successe, seeme marueilous: as are Ecclipses of the Sunne and Moone, earthquakes, mōsters, and vgly deformed vnnaturall shapes of creatures & such like: Of the which no one thyng commeth to passe, without the will of God, though it seeme to be otherwise in the Iudgement of many persons. And ther∣fore it seemed good to the phātasticall Philosophers to ascribe such vnkindely operations to other causes beyng not able to discerne the true cause thereof, which in power surmounteth all other causes, to

witte,* 1.232 the will of God: wherefore besides the will of God, there is none other principall cause of health, sickenesse, reward, punishment of blessinges and recompences. This is therfore the onely chief and principall cause, from out the which do flow all thyngs whatsoeuer: and is it selfe without beginnyng, but endureth without endyng.

Let vs now gather the Argumēts of Augustine into a short abridgement. If the will of God be the souereigne and princi∣pall cause of all motiōs: what remayneth but that Osorius must either deny that Sinnes are motions: or yeld vnto this of ne∣cessitie, that the same motions are not done without the will of God: which will neuerthelesse must be adiudged cleare from all reproche. Moreouer if the same motions, which are on our be∣halfe Sinnefull, be punishementes for Sinne: What should lette, why that euē the selfe same sinnes should not seéme to pro∣ceéde after a certeine maner frō God, without any preiudice of his Iustice at all? none otherwise truely, then when as God is accompted the creatour of monsters, Ecclipses of the Sunne & Moone, vnpassable darkenes, vntymely byrthes, and yet not∣withstandyng no ioate of his maiesty and integritie empayred.

* 1.233But we are vrged here with an Obiection out of the Scrip∣tures, where it is sayd, that God is not a God that willeth iniqui∣tie. Aunswere. As though Luther did not perceaue this saying of the Prophet well enough? or that he were so impudent at any tyme, as that he would cōtrary to the Prophet deny that sinnes raunge immoderately agaynst Gods will? We rehearsed a litle earst out of Augustine: that somewhat may be done agaynst the will of God, which neuerthelesse cā not happen without his will:* 1.234 In the one part wherof, the vnsearcheable wisedome of his De∣uine counsell is playnly discernable: in the other y^e thyng that is naturally wicked & displeasaūt in Gods eyes: So that y^e thing, which is of it selfe & in respect of it selfe naturally euill, may be∣come good in respect of Gods ordinaūce, & in respect of the end whereunto it is directed by God. The worke of our redēption from sinne and death, is a good worke of Gods mercy. But man should neuer haue stoode in neéde of this redēptiō, vnlesse death & sinne had happened. Therfore death and sinne could not execute their malice, w^tout the foreknowledge & ordinaunce of God. So also no lesse notable is the worke of Gods Iustice in executyng

his iust wrath agaynst Sinners: which seueritie of Iustice had neuerthelesse neuer expressed his wonderfull brightnesse: if sinne had neuer bene committed.

But here I suppose Osorius will not deny that men rushe headlong into wickednesse and Sinne, if not by Gods proui∣dence, yet by his sufferaūce at the least. For it may be, that ma∣ny thynges may happen by a mans permission, in the which he that did permit them may be blamelesse notwithstandyng.

I heare you well & aunswere to the same, that it is not alto∣gether nothyng that Osorius doth alledge in deéde, and yet this allegation of his comprehendeth not all. For first I demaunde what if Osorius beyng a Bishop do suffer Gods flocke commit∣ted to his charge to starue by defraudyng thē the necessary foode of the word, whom of duety he ought to cherish with all diligēce and care? What if the Shepheard doe willyngly suffer y^e mag∣gotte to pester the sheépe? or what if the Maister should suffer the seruaunt to perish, whose perplexitie he might haue releued by puttyng his hand to in tyme? may not we iustly accuse Osorius of fraude for not feédyng? or can Osorius acquit him selfe by a∣ny slipper deuise of negligence in this behalfe? If in cōmon cō∣uersation of lyfe, the man that will not repell iniury when he may, be adiudged in euery respect as blameworthy as if he offe∣reth the iniury him selfe, by what meanes can God (whō you say doth permit sinnes to be done) either deémed be excusable in res∣pect of this sufferaunce onely? or how can you charge vs as ac∣cusing him of iniustice? bycause we say that he doth not onely permit, but also will sinne after a certeine maner. Which thyng Augustine doth very well declare. If we suffer (sayth August.)* 1.235 such as are vnder our correctiō to doe wickedly in our sight, we must needes be adiudged accessaries to their wickednesse. But God doth permitte Sinne to raunge without measure euen before his eyes, wherein if he where not willyng, surely he would not suffer it in any wise, and yet is be righteous notwithstandyng. &c. Wherfore your allegation of bare Sufferaunce doth neither helpe your cause, nor disaduantageth ours any thyng at all.

But go to: let vs somewhat yeld to this word of yours Suf∣feraunce, whereupō ye stād so stoughtely: yet will ye not deny, but that this Sufferaunce of God, is either coupled together

with his will, or altogether sundered frō it: If ye confesse y^e will and Sufferaunce be ioyned together: how can God be sayd then either to suffer the thyng whiche he willeth not, or to will the thyng, wherof him selfe is not after a certeine maner the cause: but if you sunder will from Sufferaunce, so that Gods Suffe∣raunce be made opposite to his will: That is to say, contrary to the determinate coūsell of God, in bringyng any thyng to passe: Surely this way your bare Sufferaūce will not be sufferable, but foolishe, false, and ridiculous. For neither can any thyng be done without Gods Sufferaunce, but must be done by his will: and agayne nothyng soundeth more agaynst the conuenience of reason, that any thyng may be done with his will, otherwise thē as him selfe hath decreéd it to be done. But if so be that ye set Gods Sufferaunce opposite to his will, namely to that will, wherewith he vouch safeth and accepteth any thyng, veryly it may so be, that some one thyng may be executed by Gods Suf∣feraunce, yet altogether agaynst his will: so that we forget not in the meane space, that this Sufferaunce is not idle & fruite∣lesse, but altogether effectuall: not much vnlike the orderly pro∣ceédynges in Iudgementes, whenas the Iudge deliuereth ouer the trespassour to be executed: it is cōmonly seéne that the Suf∣feraunce of the Iudge, doth worke more in the execution of the offendour, thē the acte of the executioner, & yet the Iudge is not altogether exempt from beyng the cause of his death, though he be cleare of all blame in that respect. And therfore to make you conceaue our meanyng more effectually Osorius, you may vn∣derstand by the premisses:* 1.236 That the will of God, is to be taken two maner of wayes, either for that vnsearcheable will, not ma∣nifested vnto vs, wherewith thynges may happen accordyng to to the determined decreé of his purposed coūsell, whereunto all thynges are directed: And in this sense or signification we doe affirme that God doth will all thynges that are done, and that nothyng at all is done in heauen or in earth, that he would not haue to be done. Or els how should he be called Omnipotent, if the successes of thyngs be other, then as he hath decreéd them? Secundarely the will of God may be takē for that, which by ex∣presse word and commaundement he hath reuealed vnto vs, and which beyng done he accompteth acceptable in his sight. And

in this sense. The faythfull and godly onely do execute the will of God, euen that will, wherewith he can not will nor allow any∣thyng, but pure & good. After this maner is that will fully dis∣closed, and ensealed vnto vs in his Scriptures, wherewith God is sayd to be a God that doth not will Sinne.

Accordyng to that former will which is hidden from vs, and is neuertheles alwayes iust, and discouered vnto vs but in part by his word, as there is nothing done without his prouidence & foreknowledge: so in this sense we do affirme, that he willeth no∣thyng at all, but that, which is of all partes most pure, and most righteous, be it neuer so secrete. For euen as it is hidden frō the knowledge of all men, what shall come to passe, by the purposed appointement of God: so shall nothyng come to passe, but that which he hath decreéd vpon before: neither should any thyng at all be done, if he were altogether vnwillyng thereunto. Finally to conclude in few wordes, all whatsoeuer concerneth this pre∣sent discourse.* 1.237 God can not be sayd to be properly, & truely the very cause of sinne, accordyng to that will, which he would haue to be reuealed vnto vs in his Scriptures: And yet if the cōcur∣raūce of causes must be deriued from the first originall, surely God ought not be excluded altogether from the orderyng & ap∣pointmēt of sinne. Frō whence if we respect the meane & second causes, it is vndoubted true, that mākynde doth perish through his owne default. For no man liuyng sinneth vnwillyngly. But if we tourne our eyes to the first agent, & principall cause, by y^e which all inferiour causes haue their mouyng. Then is this al∣lso true, that all second and subordinate causes are subiect to the eternall prouidence and will of GOD.* 1.238 And therefore both these may be true. That mans destructiō commeth through his owne default. And yet that therein the prouidence of God bea∣reth the sway, without any preiudice at all to his Iustice.* 1.239

But this prouidence notwithstandyng is altogether vn∣slayned: for albeit Gods euerlastyng purpose be sayd to be the cause of our sinnesiull actions, yet are those Sinnes in respect of Gods acceptaunce, meare righteousnesse. For GOD in most vpright disposed order doth by Sinne punish Sinne. And therfore with those Sinnes (in that they are scourges of Gods Iustice) God doth worthely execute his iust Iudgement agaynst

mē, which although his pleasure be to vse otherwise accordyng to his vnsearcheable counsell, either to execute his Iudgement vpō the reprobate, or to manifest his mercy towardes his elect, neither is he iniurious to y^e one in exactyng y^t which is due: nei∣ther culpable in y^e other sorte in forgeuyng that, which he might haue exacted. These two thyngs therfore especially be to be be∣leued to be inseparable in God (though mās capacitie cā scarse∣ly atteine hereunto) the first. That there is no wickednes with God. Secondly. That God hath mercy of whom it pleaseth him to haue mercy, and doth harden their hartes, whō he willeth to be hardened.* 1.240

Now that we haue spoken sufficiētly in the defence of Gods Iustice, and acquited it cleare from all quarellsome accusation: to retourne agayne to our former question.* 1.241 If Osorius doe de∣maunde now, if God bee the cause of Sinne? Bycause I will protract no tyme: I aunswere in two wordes. That in seuerall and sundry respectes, it is both the cause, & not the cause. Now let vs seé, how this will hang together.

First, I call him the cause, not bycause he distilleth new poy∣son into man, as water or other liquour is powred into empty caskes from somewhere els: for that neédeth not: for euery man ouerfloweth more then enough already with faultynes naturall, though no new flames of corruption be kyndeled a fresh: but by∣cause hee forsaketh our old nature, or bycause he withholdeth him selfe from renewyng vs with grace: Bycause nature beyng not holpen waxeth dayly worse and worse of it selfe, without measure, and without end: Whereupon Augustine debatyng of mans induration, speaketh not vnfitly on this wise.* 1.242 But as touchyng that whiche followeth: Hee doth harden whom hee will. Here the force of mans capacitie is ouerwhelmed with the straungenesse of the word. But it must not be so taken as though God did beginne to harden mās hart, which was not infected before. For what is hardnesse els then resistaunce of Gods commaundementes? which who so thinketh to be the worke of God, bycause of this say∣ing: He doth harden whom hee will, let him beholde the first beginnyng of mans corruption, and marke well the commaundemēt of God: the disobedience whereof made the hart to offende, and let him truely confesse, that whatsoeuer punishement befalleth him si∣thence that first corruption, bee suffreth it righteously and deser∣uedly.

For God is sayd to harden his hart whom hee will not molli∣fie: so is hee sayd also to reiect him, whom hee will not call, and to blynd them, whom he will not enlighten. For whom hee hath Pre∣destinate them hath he called. &c.* 1.243

2. Moreouer after this withdrawyng of Grace, this also fol∣loweth thereupon. That God doth righteously minister occa∣siō of sinnyng in the wicked and reprobate, and maruelously en∣clineth the hartes of men, not onely to good, but also to euill: If we may beleue the testimony of Augustine. Who in his booke De Libero Arbit. & Grat. alledgyng certeine testimonies out of the Apostle.* 1.244 Where it is sayd that God gaue them vp to vyle affections. Rom. 1. And agayne, hee deliuered them vp vnto a reprobate mynde.* 1.245 And in an other place. Therfore God doth send them strong delusion that they should beleeue lyes. By these and such lyke testimonies of Sacred Scriptures appeareth sufficiently, that God doth worke in the hartes of men, to bende encline and bow their willes, whereunto him listeth either to good, accordyng to the riches of his mercy, or to wickednesse, accordyng to their owne de∣sertes: to witte, by his Iudgemēt sometymes reuealed in deede, and sometymes secret: but the same alwayes most righteous. For this must be holdē for certeine, and vnshaken in our myndes. That there is no iniquitie with God. And for this cause when ye read in holy writte that mē are deceaued or amazed, or hardened in hart, doubt hereof nothyng at all, but that their sinnefull deseruyngs were such before, as that they did well deserue the punishment that followeth. &c. The premisses considered, and for as much as God doth vse the peruersenes of men (will they nill they) to these purposes & endes, whereunto he hath decreéd them, may any mā be doubt∣full hereof, but that God ought not by any meanes be excluded from the disposing of sinnes?

3. Besides this also, whereas the holy Ghost misdoubteth not to speake in the Scriptures, after this vsuall phrase of speach, to witte.* 1.246 That God doth harden mens hartes: doth deliuer vp in∣to reprobate myndes: doth dazell with blyndnesse: doth make eares deafe: doth lead into error: and such like. How shall we say, that sinnes doe happen now without God? Albeit neither doe we say that God is therefore properly and simply the cause of wicked∣nesse, whenas we are of our selues more then enough the true & 〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

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naturall cause of wickednesse. Be it therfore that the will of mā is the cause of sinne: but seyng this will must of Necessitie be subiect to the will of God, and be directed by the same: surely it may not be lawfull to exclude God from the direction and dis∣position of sinnes. If Osorius shall thinke him selfe not yet ful∣ly satisfied w^t this aūswere, he may be resolued agayne if he will with this. That the whole cause of sinne is resiaunt in man him selfe, and in his corrupt will: but the cause wherfore sinne doth become sinne, must be ascribed to Gods good ordinaunce: in the one wherof is sinne, and the punishment for sinne, as Augustine maketh mention. Out of the other affections be ordeyned, y^t such affectio••s as be, may be wicked: which affections notwithstan∣dyng are not in the guidyng cause it selfe, but are by hym gui∣ded to some good purpose & end: of which doctrine let vs heare what August. doth him selfe testifie & professe.* 1.247 It is out of all con∣trouersie (sayth he) That God doth well euen in suffering all things whatsoeuer: yea euen in the thynges that be wickedly done: for euē those he suffereth to be done not without his most iust Iudgement: now whatsoeuer is iust, the same is good surely: Therfore albeit the thynges that are wicked in this respect that they are wicked be not good: yet that not onely good, be, but euill also, is neuertheles good. For if it were not good that wickednes should be, surely the almigh∣tie goodnes it selfe would by no meanes permitte it to be done, who without doubt can as easely not permit the thynges that he will not, as he cā easily do the things that be done. If we do not firmely beleue this, the groūdworke of our faith (wherein we do cōfesse that we do beleue in God the Father almighty) is in great hassard. For God is not called omnipotēt for any other cause in very deede, but bycause he is able to do what he will, the operatiō of whose Deuine will the will of no creature cā hinder or preiudice by any meanes at all. &c. This much Augustine. And bycause I will not be tedious, I argue vpon Augustines wordes in this wise.

* 1.248Euery good thyng doth proceede from God as from the Au∣thour and guider therof. But it is good that wickednesse be. Ergo, God is the Author and directer that wickednesse com∣meth to passe.

But here some Iulian of Pelagius sect & with him our Por∣tingall

Prelate Osorius will brawle and cauill: That those deédes of wickednesse are committed through the sufferaunce of God forsakyng them, and not by his omnipotent power wor∣kyng in thē: meanyng hereby I am sure: That God doth permit wicked thynges to be done in deéde, but by his power forceth no man to doe wickedly.* 1.249 Agaynst such persones Augustine doth mightly oppose hym selfe euen to their teéche, prouyng those thynges to be done by Gods power, rather then by his Suffe∣raūce, and for more credite voucheth a place of S. Paule. Who knittyng those two together: to witte, Sufferaunce and Power, writeth after this maner: What and if God willyng to shewe his wrath, and to make his power knowen, did suffer with long patience the vessels of his wrath prepared to destruction? &c. Rom. 9. Af∣terwardes produceth many examples & reasons taken out here and there of the Propheticall Scriptures, to make good his Assertion Achab was Deliued ouer to geue credite to the lyeng mouthes of the false Prophetes. First, in that he beleéued a lye, you perceaue that he sinned.* 1.250 Moreouer in that he was geuen o∣uer not without cause, you conceaue the punishment of sinne. I demaund of you now, by whom hee was geuen ouer? you will aunswere of Sathan: neither will I deny it, though it seéme ra∣ther that he was deceaued by him, then deliuered ouer. But goe to. Who did send Sathan? but he which sayd, Go forth and doe so, vnlesse Osorius do suppose that to send forth, and to suffer, be all one, which besides him no man els will say, I suppose.

By like Iudgement of God, Roboam is sayd to be driuen to harken to sinister Counsell, bycause he should refuse the counsell of the Elders. And from whēce came this I pray you but from him of whom it is written in holy writte?* 1.251 For it was the ordinance of the Lord, that he might performe his saying, which he speake by the mouth of his Prophet. 1. Kynges. 15.12.

The lyke must iudged of Amasias, who had not fallen into that perill if he had harckened to Ioas the kyng of Israell, now what shall we alleadge to be the cause why he did not harken to the good counsell of Ioas? Here will Osorius runne backe a∣gaine after his wounted maner, to Freewill, or to Sathan y^e mo∣uyng cause.* 1.252 And this is true in deéde in respect of the second and instrumentall causes. But Gods sacred Oracles beyng ac∣customed

to searche out the souereigne and principall cause of thyngs, do rayse them selues higher, and do aunswere, that this was wrought by God him selfe, who dyd not onely suffer hym, but of his determinate counsell directed him also thereunto, by∣cause hee would auenge him selfe of the kyng, for his abhomi∣nable Idolatry.

* 1.253When Dauid caused the people to be nombred, I know that Sathan is sayd to prouoke hym thereunto, as we read in the Chronicles. But let vs marke what the Scripture speaketh els where. And the wrath of the Lord being kindeled agaynst Israell, he stirred vp Dauid to nomber his people.* 1.254 2.Sam. 24. And nothyng withstandeth truely, but that both may bee true. Neither is it agaynst cōueniēcie of reason (as Augustine truly witnesseth) that one selfe wickednesse may be a punishement, & scourge of sinne vpō the wicked, by the malicious practize of the Deuill, & by Gods iust Iudgemēt also, seyng it skilleth not whe∣ther God bryng it to passe by his own power, or by the seruice of Sathan. Esay the Prophet cryeth out in his Prophecie.* 1.255 O Lord why hast thou made vs to erre from thy wayes? and hardened our hartes from thy feare? And in Ezechiell GOD speaketh by the mouth of his Prophet.* 1.256 And if the Prophet bee deceaued I the Lord haue deceaued him.

Let vs consider Iob hym selfe the most singular paterne of perfect patiēce,* 1.257 whom beyng turmoyled with infinite engynes of Sathans Temptatiōs all men will confesse to be plagued by the horrible malice of Sathan. True it is, will you say: and with Gods sufferaūce withall. Be it so. But I demaunde further, who made y^e first motiō of Iob, whē God sayd on this wise? Hast thou considered my seruaunt Iob? And wherefore did God make this motion first. But that it may appeare that the Enemy is not permitted onely, but made a Minister also to make triall of mans patience? Furthermore after that he was robbed & spoy∣led of all his goodes and Cattels, and throwen into extreme po∣uertie, I would fayne learne who stale those goodes from hym? That dyd the Caldeans & Sabees will Osorius say, I am sure: which is true in deéde. Yet Iob doth not so acknowledge it: But liftyng hym selfe vp higher, and entryng into a more deépe con∣sideration of that souereigne prouidēce, which ordereth and dis∣poseth

the seruice of all the workes of his creation at his owne pleasure, professeth earnestly, that none els dispoyled him of his goodes, but he that gaue them.* 1.258 The Lord gaue (sayth he) and the Lord hath taken, blessed be the name of the Lord. &c.

But that wōderfull force and vnmeasurable power of Gods wisedome, and prouidence, disposing all thynges accordyng to his euerlastyng purpose, & with outstretched cōpasse spreadyng it selfe farre, & wyde, abroad throughout all degreées & successes of thynges,* 1.259 is not discouered vnto vs by any one thyng more notably discernable, thē in the death of his sonne Iesus Christ: in that most innocent Passion of all other, y^e most innocent death (I say) of our Sauiour Iesu Christ: In y^e whiche as there were many causes goyng before, and the same also not a litle diffe∣ryng eche from other, yet amongest them all was there none, but was not onely ioyned with Gods sufferaunce, but was long before also foreordeyned by his will, decreéd by his wisedome, yea & ordered almost by his owne hand. For otherwise, in what sense is he called The Lambe slayne frō the beginning of the world, whenas they were not yet created that should kill him? and when as yet were no sinnes committed by mankynde, whiche might procure Gods wrath. If God from the furthest end of eternitie, in his euerlastyng foreappointed wisedome and determination, had decreéd vpō nothyng that should cause those thyngs to come to passe afterwardes, through vnauoydeable Necessitie?

Out of those matters heretofore debated and argued, two thyngs may you note, Osorius, wherof the one concerneth Lu∣thers doctrine, and is true: the other toucheth your suggestions and is false. For as to the first (wherein Luther doth discourse vpon Necessitie, agaynst the mainteynours of chaūce and for∣tune) cā no more be denyed by you: then Gods prouidence in go∣uernement of the present tyme, and foreknowledge of thynges to come can be any wayes deceaueable. On the other side, where as you do w^t so gorgeous colours & glorious titles blaze forth the beautie of mans Freewill, ioynyng in league herein with the old Philosophers, auncient Maisters of ignoraunce, and especi∣ally Cicero, bendyng your whole force to ouerthrowe the doc∣trine of necessitie, what els doth your whole practize herein? thē the same which August. did long sithence worthely reprehēd in

Cicero? To witte: Whiles you striue so much to make vs free, you practize nothyng els but to make vs horrible blasphemours, and withall endeuour to vndermyne the vnpenetrable Castell of Gods foreknowledge. For who is able to foretell thynges to come, which he neuer knew? or preuente the assured certeintie of successes of thyngs, without the vtter subuersion of the infallible prouidence of Gods foreknowledge? Wherfore I would wishe you to be well ad∣uised Osorius, least whiles you thinke to molest Luther with your outragious barkyng, for affirmyng an infallible. Necessitie flowyng from aboue, from out the founteine of Deuine opera∣tion in direction of thyngs: ye fall your selfe headlong at the last in this cōbersome,* 1.260 gulfe to be adiudged not 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, but playnly 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: and beyng not able to endure the doctrine of Necessitie, ye entangle your selfe vnto such an inextricable maze of impietie, as that ye shalbe thought to practise the abādonyng of the vndeceueable certeintie of Gods most Sacred Scriptu∣res out of heauen, after the example of that your fine Cicero, whiles ye affect Cicero to much in the nymblenesse of your stile. For what els can be gathered out of that detestable discourse of Cicero?* 1.261 (as August. calleth it) or out of this execrable opiniō of Osor? (if he will be y^e man he seémes for). How can those things be auoyded, which God doth know shall come to passe most assu∣redly? but that Necessitie must be graunted by the doctrine of prouidence: or Necessitie beyng excluded, Gods prouidence al∣so be rent asunder withall? For after this maner doth Cicero dispute in his bookes De natura Deorum.* 1.262 If thynges to come (saith he) be foreknowen, then it must neédes followe that euery thyng must proceéde in his due order: but for as much as no∣thyng is done without some cause, therfore must a due order and knittyng together of causes be graunted of Necessitie. Where∣upō must neédes ensue, y^t all thynges y^t are done, are performed by vnauoydeable Necessitie: If this be graunted (sayth he) all Ciuill societie is rooted out, Lawes are established in vayne: correction, praysing, dispraysing, good counsell are ministred in vayne, neither anye ordinaunce deuised for the aduauncement of vertue, and punishement of vyce serueth to any purpose at all.* 1.263 Now bycause these haynous and daungerous absurdities are not tollerable in any weale publique. Therfore (sayth Augustine) this

man will not yeld, that there should be any foreknowledge of thyngs to come. So that by this meanes he forceth the Reader into these inconueniences to chuse one of these two: either that mans will is of some force, or els that thynges must be determined vpon before of Necessitie: beyng of opinion that they can not be both at one tyme together, but that if the one be allowed, the other must needes be abolished. If we leane vnto Gods foreknowledge and prouidēce, then must Freewill haue no place, on the other side if we mainteyne Freewill, then foreknowledge of thyngs to come, must be banished. So y^e whiles Cicero, beyng otherwise a man of wōderful expe∣rience (as August. sayth) endeuoureth to make vs freé, doth bring vs w^tin y^e cōpasse of sacrilege as horrible robbers of Gods foreknowledge: and beyng ignoraunt him selfe how to vnite this freédome and foreknowledge together, rather suffreth God to be despoyled of his wisedome, then men to be left destitute of Freewill: which errour Augustine doth worthely reproue in him.* 1.264 For it is not therfore a good consequent, bycause the well orderyng & dispositiō of all causes is in the hands of God, that mans Freewill therfore is made fruitelesse altogether: for that our willes them selues being the very causes of humaine actions, are not exempt frō that well disposed order of causes, which is alwayes vnchaungeable with God, and directed by his prouidence. And therfore he that with his wisedome doth cōprehend the causes of al thyngs, the same also in the very causes them selues; could not be ignoraunt of our willes, which he did foreknow should be the causes of al our doyngs.

Go to now. Let vs compare with this blynd Philosophy of Cicero, the Diuinitie of Osorius in all respectes as bussard-lyke. For as Cicero doth vphold the freédome of mans will, by the ouerthrow of Gods prouidence and predestination, and con∣trarywise by the ouerthrow of mans Freewill, doth gather and establish the certeintie of Gods prouidence, supposing that they can not stand both together: In lyke maner our Osorius ima∣ginyng with him selfe such a perpetuall and vnappeasable dis∣agreément betwixt Necessitie in orderyng of causes, and mans Freewill, that by no meanes they may argreé together: what doth he meane els, thē pursuyng the platteforme that Cicero before him had builded in the couplyng of causes, but to come to this issue at the length, either to establish the doctrine of Necessitie

with Luther? or agreéyng with Cicero, vtterly to roote out the foreknowledge and prouidēce of God?* 1.265 for if to chuse be the pro∣pertie of will, then are not all thynges done of Necessitie, accor∣dyng to Osorius opinion. Agayne, if not of Necessitie, then is there no perpetuall orderyng of causes, after Ciceroes suppo∣sitiō. If there be no perpetuall order of causes, neither is there any perpetuall order of thynges, by the foreknowledge of God, which can not come to passe, but by the operation of causes pre∣cedent.* 1.266 If the perpetuall orderyng of thynges, be not in the fore∣knowledge of God, thē all thyngs atteyne not y^e successes, wher∣unto they were ordeyned. Agayne if thyngs atteyne not the suc∣cesses, whereunto they were ordeyned, then is there in God no foreknowledge of thynges to come. Let vs cōpare now the first of this suttle Sophisme with the last.

* 1.267The choise of mans will is free.

Ergo, There is in God no foreknowledge of thynges to come.

Let Osorius aduise him selfe well, what aunswere he make to this Argument. If he hold of Ciceroes opinion, what remay∣neth but hee must neédes condemne vs of Sacrilege as Cicero doth, whiles he endeuoureth to make vs freé? But I know hee wil not hold with this in any case: and in very deéde, Ciceroes Argument ought not to be allowed, for that he doth not discende directly in this Argument frō proper causes, to proper effectes. For whereas Freewill is mainteyned in the one propositiō, this is no cause wherefore it should be denyed that thynges are done by Necessitie. As also this is not a good consequent lykewise, bycause Necessitie is taught to consiste in an vnchaūgeable or∣deryng of causes, and in Gods foreknowledge, that therfore no∣thyng remayneth effectual in our Freewill.* 1.268 And why so? bycause agreéyng herein with Augustine, we doe confesse both, to witte: Aswell that God doth know all thynges before they be done: and that for this cause y^e thynges foreknowen are done of Necessitie.* 1.269 And that we also do willyngly worke whatsoeuer we know, and feéle to be done by vs, not without our owne consentes.

But you will Reply. That Luther contrary to Augustines doctrine both leaue mans lyfe altogether destitute of Freewill, tyeng all our actions fast bounde in the chaynes of vnauoydea∣ble

Necessitie. I do aunswere. As Luther doth not defend eue∣ry absolute and vnaduoydeable Necessitie,* 1.270 but that whiche we spake of before, of the consequence: No more doth he take away all freédome from will, neither from all men: but that freédome onely, which is set contrary and opposite to spirituall bondage: no nor yet doth he exempt all men from that freédome, but such onely, as are not regenerate with better Grace in Christ Iesu. For whosoeuer will inueste such persons with freédome, is an vtter enemy to Grace.

And no lesse false also is all that whatsoeuer this coūterfaite Deuine doth now groūde him selfe vpon, and hath more then an hundred tymes vrged touchyng this opinion of Necessitie. For in this wise he brauleth agaynst Luther and Caluine.

If the thyngs that we doe, are done of meere Necessitie, and decreed vpon from the furthest end of eternitie.

Surely whatsoeuer wickednesse we do committe, as not lead by our owne voluntary motion, but drawen by perpetuall constraynte, is not to bee adiudged for Sinne.

Which triflyng Sophisme we haue vtterly crusht in peéces before, by the authoritie of Augustine. Neither came euer into the myndes of Luther, or Caluine to mainteyne any such Ne∣cessitie, which by any cōpulsary externall coaction should enforce will to committe wickednesse vnwillyngly. For no man sinneth, but he that sinneth voluntaryly. Albeit none of our actions are destitute of a certeyne perpetuall directiō of the almighty Lord and Gouernour, yea though neither the sinnes them selues can not altogether escape the prouident will and foreknowledge of God: Yet is not the peruerse frowardnesse of the wicked any thyng the lesse excusable, but that they ought to receaue cōdigne punishment accordyng to their wicked deseruynges: for whoso∣euer hath voluntaryly offended, deserueth to be punished. And therfore herein Osorius friuolous Diuinitie, doth not a litle be∣wray her nakednesse: that whereas debatyng about the matter of sinne, he seémeth not to haue learned this lesson yet out of Au∣gustine, that sinne & the punishmēt of sinne is all one.* 1.271 And ther∣fore mainteynyng one lye by an other, doth conclude as wise∣ly: that it is not agreable to equitie (sithence men are Instru∣mentes

onely, & God the worker of all thyngs) that they should be condemned as malefactours which are onely Instrumentes, with as good reason as if the sworde wherewith a man is slayne should be adiudged faultie, & not the persō that slue the man with the sword:* 1.272 Whiche I my selfe would not deny to be agaynst all reason, if y^t matter were as Osor. would applye it. But who did euer speake or dreame, that men were Instru¦ments onely in doyng wickednesse? and that God is the Authour and worker of all mischief? These be y^e wordes of Osorius, not Luthers nor Caluines.

* 1.273That wicked men are Sawes & Instrumentes many tymes in the handes of God for the punishement of sinne, this not Lu∣ther onely. but Esay also, doth boldly confesse. Go to. And will you therfore cōclude that men are nothyng els, but instruments, and tooles onely? very wisely I warraunt you: deriuyng your Argument from the propositiō Exponent, to the Exclusiue: nay rather maliciously wrestyng and peruertyng all thynges from the truth, to slaunderous cauillyng. August. doth sundry tymes witnesse that mens willes are subiect to Gods will, and are not able to withstand it.* 1.274 For as much as the willes them selues (sayth he) God doth fashion as him liketh, and when him lysteth, and that our willes are no further auayleable, then as God both willed, and foresawe then to bee auayleable.* 1.275 Whereby you seé, that Gods al∣mighty power doth worke in our willes, as in a workeshoppe: & whē he purposeth to do any thyng, that then he doth neither trās∣pose our willes otherwise, or to other purposes then by y^e seruice of our owne willes. And yet doth it not therfore follow, y^e mens willes are nothyng els then Iustrumentes, and tooles onely of Gods handyworke, as y^e thyng that of it selfe doth nothyng but as it is carryed, and whirled about, hither & thither without any his own proper motiō, through the operation of the agent cause onely. Truly Augustine sayth very well.* 1.276 We doe not worke by wishinges onely (sayth he) least hereupon cauillation arise that our will is effectuall to procure to lyue well. Bycause GOD doth not worke our saluation in vs, as in vnsensible stoanes, or in thynges which by nature were created voyde of reason & will. &c. In deéde God doth worke in the willes and harts of men, and yet not rol∣lyng or tossyng them as stoanes, or driuyng & whirlyng them as

thynges without lyfe, as though in enterprising and attemp∣tyng of thynges, the myndes and willes of men were carryed a∣bout by any forrein constraint and Deuine coaction, without a∣ny voluntary motion of the intelligible mynde. And therfore O∣sorius doth hereof friuolously, and falsely forge his cankred ca∣uillation, and maliciously practizeth to procure this doctrine of Luther? to be maligned: As though we did deuise man to be lyke vnto a stoane, or imagined God to be the onely Au∣thour and worker of mischief,* 1.277 bycause we do teach that mens willes are subiect to Gods wil, as it were secundary causes.

Certes if that •• August. writeth begraūted for truth: That Gods will is the cause of thynges that are done.* 1.278 Why should the same be lesse alowable in Luther, or not as false in eche respect in Aug. since they both speake one selfe sentence & be of one iudge∣ment therein. Neither is it therfore a good consequent that O∣sor. doth phantasie: The onely will of God to be so the cause of sinne, as though mans will did nothyng reproueable for sinnyng, or punishable for deseruyng. For to this end tendeth the whole cutted conclusion of all Osorius brabblynges. But if you haue no skill to know the nature of a distinctiō as yet, you must be taught, that it is one thyng to permitte a sinne volunta∣r••ly, an other thyng to committe a sinne voluntaryly. Wherof the first is proper to God, the other is peculiar to men: the first may be done without all offence, the other can bee done by no meanes without wickednesse. Whereas GOD is sayd to will sinne after a certeyne maner, the same is sayd to be done accor∣dyng to that will (which they call Gods good pleasure) neither e∣uill, nor without the truth of the Scriptures. And yet it follow∣eth not hereupon necessaryly, that God is the onely and proper cause of sinne:* 1.279 No: for this is accompted the onely cause, which excludeth all other causes besides it selfe: So is that cause cal∣led the proper cause, which doth respect onely one end, yea and that also the last end, in respect wherof it is accompted to be the proper cause. Whereas therfore sinne is y^e last end not of Gods will, but of mans peruersenesse, we do affirme that it is not done in deéde without Gods will, but that man is the proper cause therof, and not God. For if the causes of thynges must be pro∣portioned by their endes, surely sinne is not y^e last end of Gods

will, in respect that it is euill, but in respect that it is y^e scourge & plague of sinne, and to speake Paules own wordes:* 1.280 The shew∣yng forth of Gods righteousnesse, and the feare of God, then which ende nothyng can be more better or more holy. And where is now that iniquitie, and cruelty of God, Osorius, which by mis∣construyng Luther wickedly & maliciously, your fruitlesse Lo∣gicke taketh no fruite of, but which your deuilishe Spirite and slaunderous cursed fury doth corrupt. But that I may not seéme to stand to much vpon refutyng this toye, lettyng slippe many thynges here in the meane whiles, whiche make nothyng to the purpose, nor conteyne any other thyng almost in them but vayne hautynesse of speache, Tragicall exclamations, maddnesse, feé∣uers, frensies, spittyngs, reproches, horrible cōtumelies, wher∣with this vnmanerly Deuine hath most filthely defiled whole pa∣pers, I will come to those places, which carry a certeyne shew of lesse scoldyng and more Scripture. After this maner the ver∣mine crawleth foreward.

* 1.281But that ye may perceaue how illfauouredly your Do∣ctours haue interpreted those testimonyes of Paule, which you haue heaped vp together, I thinke it expedient to dis∣close the meaning of Paule. And that this may be done more orderly, it behoueth to note diligently to what ende Paule gathered all those reasons together.

It is well truly. This cruell scourgemottō weried throughly w^t whippyng poore Luther miserably, & vnmercifully buffetyng him, doth now at the length hyde his rod vnder his gowne & be∣ginneth to creépe to high desk, & will teach somewhat (and God will) out of y^e Scriptures, so that we shall neede nothyng now, but a Camell to daunce, whiles this Assehead minstrell striketh vppe his drumme. And therfore harken in any wise you blinde buzardly Lutherans, you caluish Caluinistes, & you foolish Bu∣cerans, sith you be so blockish by nature, that of your selues you can cōceaue nothing of the Apostles doctrine ye may now at the last (I warrant you) learne of this Portingall Thales the pure and sincere Interpretation of Paules discourse, touching the Predestination of the Gentiles, and the reiection of the Iewes, whereof he debateth in all those his three Chapters. 9.10.11. The vnderstanding whereof, because neyther Luther himselfe,

nor any of all the rest of Luthers Schoole were able to con∣ceaue: it is good reason that we not onely attentiuely harken vnto, but also without controlement beleue this new pyked car∣uer, not of sentences onely, but a planer of wordes also, whiles he do lay open before our eyes y^e very naturall meanyng of that place, to be sensibly felt, euen to the vttermost tittle thereof.

And for as much as there be two thinges chiefly hand∣led by Paule in these three chapters.* 1.282 First, wherein he reioy∣seth with the Gentiles for that their calling and most pros∣perous knowledge of the light of the Gospell. Secōdarily, wherein he lamenteth the lamentable fall of the Iewes, & their most sorowfull blindenes, and taking occasiō hereup∣on, doth forth with enter into a discourse of fayth, and the infallible certeintye of Gods promises. For whereas that blessednes was promised to the posterity of Abraham, here might some scrupule haue troubled his minde, as there wan∣ted not of the Iewes some that pyked hereout matter to cauill vpon, as though God had broken the promise that he once had made, as one that hauing obliged hymselfe be∣fore with so many couenauntes, and promises to this gene∣ration, did now contrary to his othe cast them of and des∣pise them. S. Paule valiauntly impugning the disorderous reproches and cauillations of these with sondry forcible reasons, doth fortifie this his defence with iiij. Argumētes chiefly. First, that this promise of the blessing was made in deede to Abraham, and Israell, and to their posteritie: but this promise in as much as is spiritually to be taken, did not so restrayne it selfe onely to that externall Family alone af∣ter the kinred of the fleshe, as that it noted not vnder the same fellowshyppe and kinred of Israell, the Gentiles also, such especially as were endued with like sincerity of fayth. He addeth furthermore,* 1.283 that albeit the same promise did concerne those Gentiles chiefly, which ioyned themselues to Christ, yet the same was not so wholy translated to the Gentiles (the Iewes beyng forsakē) but that a great portiō of these also (remnaunts as it were of that lamētable ship∣wracke) beyng preserued: should be partakers of the same promise and blessednes together with the Gentiles.

* 1.284In the third place that it came to passe through their own villany & vnbelief, & not of any inconstancie on Gods behalfe, that this promise of God did so much fayle them but that they did exclude themselues rather from the be∣nefite of Gods promise.

* 1.285Lastly that neyther this reiection shoulde continue so for euer, but that it should once come to passe (as the Apo∣stle prophecieth) that the fulnes of the Gentiles beyng ac∣complished, the whole nation of the Israelites recouering at the length the former grace of their auncient promise, shoulde be restored agayne to the benefite of their former blessing.

Uerily I do confesse, that this interpretation of Osorius is not altogether amisse: wherein I seé nothing yet false, or newly deuised: moreouer nothing spoken of here, that hath not long si∣thence bene spoken, yea and with a farre more playne lightsom∣nesse by our expositors:* 1.286 for we beyng long agoe sufficienly en∣structed in Paules schoole, haue vnderstood well inough without Osorius schooling, y^e that promise was peculiar to the seede of Israell, beyng the children of promise, and not to the Children after y^e flesh: Moreouer neither are we ignorant hereof, that that blindenes happened not to all Israell but in part onely, not of a∣ny inconstancy on Gods behalfe, but that they fell themselues from true righteousnes, by their owne default, as people follo∣wing the righteousnesse whiche came not by fayth, but flat∣tering themselues in obseruing the workes of the lawe. Fur∣thermore that whiche Thapostle doth prophecie shall come to passe concerning the restoring agayne of that whole nation at the length: as we all hartily wish for, so no man (I suppose) is so blockishe, but doth vnderstand sufficiently, all whatsoeuer Paule hath spoken of this matter by his owne writing, though Osorius did neuer interprete it.

* 1.287And agayne touching the examples of Isaac and Iacob set downe by Paule, whom Gods election would, should be preferred before their brethren, though elder in birth in the deuision of the Fathers patrimonye? We are neither igno∣raunt, nor forgetfull thereof: whereupon we do nothing disagreé frō Osorius in conceauing the same thing vnder the types and

figures of those persons, and doe professe in as many wordes, that neyther the prerogatiue of kinred, nor workes, nor yet the lawe, but that Gods election, calling, and grace doth make the true Israelites. Forasmuch therefore as our expositours in all these poynts of doctrine, haue nothing at all hitherto swarued from the truth of Paules doctrine, or your interpretation, what corrupt exposition is that at the length of these our Interpre∣tours, wherewith you are so much offended? forsooth, (say you) because they doe not sufficiently enough conceaue the very ende, whereunto Paule did referre those argumentes. Goe to then. sith you prouoke vs hereunto. Let vs first seé what argu∣mentes those be of Paule: then to what ende they be applied: Because the Iewes did challenge to thēselues a title of righte∣ousnes through the obseruaunce of the law, which neuerthelesse they did not obserue in very deéde, partely (because swelling w^e pryde for the Nobilitie of their race,) they did promise vnto thē¦selues a certaine peculiar election with God before all other na∣tions) Paule entending to treate very sharply agaynst the inso∣lent arrogancie of them, doth argue agaynst thē with most forci∣ble argumentes, taken out of holy Scriptures, namely. That the substance of Gods election neither did hang vpon the works of the Law, neyther vpon the roialtie of race, not yet vpon aun∣cient of parentage, but did depend vpon the onely freemercy of Gods compassion and Fayth of the Gospell. And to make the same appeare more euidently, he putteth foorth vnto them the example of Isaac and Ismaell,* 1.288 whereof the one though by byrth were yonger, yet obtained through grace to be the first, and was thereby aduaunced to the dignity of inheritaunce, where as they both were generall issues of one, and the same father Abraham, though they had not both one mother. And to auoyde y^e daūger of scrupule, that might ensue, by reason of the two mothers, hee doth yet confirme the same with a more notable exāple. Name∣ly the example of the two brothers that were twinnes Iacob and Esau who issuing of one Father, of one mother, and one birth, and before they had done any thing good, or euill, God did tran∣slate the honour of birthright and blessing to y^e yonger, to beare rule ouer the elder. And whereof came this? but from the freé gift of election, whereas before there was nothing in the In∣fantes

(beyng not yet borne,) that might eyther deserue to beé aduaunced, or to be reiected. If you respect the worthines of their workes, what had the seély infantes done before they were borne? but if this whole matter did depend vpon the determina∣tion of Gods vnsearcheable counsell, what rewarde here doe mens workes deserue? namely whereas God spake to Moyses in playnest maner of speach.* 1.289 I will haue mercy on him on whō I will shew mercy, and will haue cōpassion on him on whom I haue compassion. Whereunto agreéth the testimony of Paule immediately vttered by the same spirite, It is not of him that willeth nor in him that runneth, but in GOD that sheweth mercy. Againe alledging the example of Pharao, with sembla∣ble reason cōfirmeth the same by the example of Gods seuerity,* 1.290 that he debated before of his freémercy.

And this is the very order of the argument in Paules dis∣course, which neyther Osorius himselfe will deny. But it must be diligently considered, to what ende Paule applyed those rea∣sons: for herein consisteth the whole pithe of our controuersie. And whereas Luther, Caluine, Martyr, and their companions bee of opinion, that Paule vndertooke this Disputation for this end•• that by settyng downe examples of Gods liberalitie,* 1.291 and seueritie, he might make manifest that the onely freé mercy, and eternall Election of God, accordyng to the purpose of his good pleasure, did make the true Israelites, without any helpe or res∣pect of workes or endeuours•• Osori. doth very stoughtly with∣stand these felowes, not denyeng meane whiles Gods Election nor Gods callyng, ne yet his Grace, as hee sayth: but will not graunt this notwithstandyng, that the Election of the faythfull consisteth in the freémercy of GOD, without speciall respect of workes. For this is the whole force of this Prelates Diuinitie, Let vs heare his owne wordes, as they be.

* 1.292This therfore (sayth he) do we gather out of this place of Paule, that neither dignitie of parentage, nor worke, nor yet the law, doth make true Israelites, but Gods Election, his callyng and his Grace. But let vs see, whether this so no∣table mercy of God powred vpon vs without all our deser∣uynges, is geauen vs without any respect of workes? No: it is not? &c.

First bycause I do not sufficiently conceaue Osorius, what you meane by this that you say, mercy powred vpō vs with out desertes, & yet not geauen without respect of workes. I would haue you open your meanyng more distinctly. If God do powre out vpō his faythfull mercy, without merites, as you say, what other choyse then doe ye want in those that are elect, then the very same, which cōsisteth of Gods meére mercy & good will onely, without merites? But this you thinke not in any wise sufferable nor to be vttered: for this reason as I suppose.

If Gods Election should consiste of mercy onely,* 1.293 with∣out any choyse of such as are chosen: Gods Iudgement might be adiudged to be chaunceable and vnaduised.

Let vs ioyne hereunto the Minor.

But fortune and vnaduisednesse are not to be imputed to Gods Iudgement.* 1.294

For we heare out of Paule. Not by workes, but of him that calleth who sayth that the elder shall serue the younger.

Let vs now conclude a Gods name.

Ergo, Gods electiō standeth not by his mercy onely,* 1.295 with out some choyse, that is say: without some especiall & discrete regarde of some one thyng in the person that is elected, which was not to bee founde in the person that was reiected.

For in this maner doth Osorius both define and conclude.

After sūdry ridiculous vayne glorious speaches of his Rhe∣thoricall brauery, and vnprofitable scoldyng, least he might not seéme to be a Rhetoriciā onely, or a leane Logiciā: he hath now pyked somewhat out of the Rules of Sophistry, wherein he be∣haueth hym selfe neuerthelesse none otherwise, then an Owle a∣mōgest Nightingales. For the very principall & speciall pointe of that Arte, hee either atteyneth not aright, or toucheth surely very coldly. Which may be easily and playnly perceaued Oso∣rius by this your owne forme of arguyng. And I call it playn∣ly your owne, bycause no creature cā more nearely resemble his Sire: wherein you do neither define rightly, nor deuide order∣ly, no lesse foolishly heapyng together false thynges, in steéde of true thynges in your maner of arguyng: proceédyng from the effectes to causes: and as Crabbes crawle backeward, so do you

for the more part set the carte before the Hoarse. First,* 1.296 Wheras you say that this word Electiō doth signifie some speciall re∣gard, whereby some thyng may be iudged to be in the per∣sons that are Elect, that wanted in the reprobate. If you de∣fine Election in this wise, surely we can not allow of it. For al∣though no man ought to dought, but that God accordyng to his incomprehēsible wisedome, euen from the begynnyng, was not ignoraunt of the contrary dispositious of all and euery thyng, & the differences betwixt the faithfull and the reprobate: yet is not Election opened sufficiētly hetherto as yet accordyng to the na∣ture of the word. These be the effectes of Gods foreknowledge, and doe follow Election, but make not Election: For euen as fire doth not therfore warme, bycause it should be whote, but by∣cause it is whote: and as a wheéle doth not therfore runne roūde, that it may be rounde, but bycause it is rounde. As August.* 1.297 ma∣keth mention: euen so the faythfull were not therfore chosen, by∣cause they were lyke to lyue vertuously: but they were chosen in Christ, bycause they should lyue vertuously, beyng thereunto predestinate by God, not for the worthynes of their workes (that were for seéne should be in them before as Osorius doth dreame) but accordyng to the good pleasure of his will: If we list to geue credite more to Paule,* 1.298 then to Osorius: So hath hee chosen vs (sayth Paule) in Christ before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy (not bycause we were holy) and vnblameable. &c. What can be more playne then this? And yet doth hee not stay there, nor so expresse the last maner of Election. Whereupon he addeth forthwith:* 1.299 Accordyng to the good pleasure of his will, to the prayse of the glory of his grace. If Gods Election stād accordyng to the purpose of the freé will of God, by what meanes will O∣sorius iustifie, that Election cōmeth accordyng to his foreknow∣ledge of workes to come? As though Gods Election and fore∣knowledge did depende vpon our Actions,* 1.300 and not rather our actions vpon his Election and foreknowledge?

* 1.301Therfore Osorius doth deale falsely, whereas he defineth the purpose of God to be a Iudgemēt preordinated before, whereby God doth ordeyne some vnto glory, and others some vnto destruction, accordyng to the choyse of those thynges, which he doth see will come to passe. First, in that

he calleth it by the name of Iudgemēt, I seé no reason at all, why he should so do:* 1.302 for as much as Iudgement is properly execu∣ted in sinnes before committed: but Purpose concerneth thyngs to come & preuenteth them. Agayne if we must speake after the proper phrase of speache, whatsoeuer is done by Iudgement, must neédes be cōfessed to be righteously done & according to de∣serte, not accordyng to Grace. But whereas y^e Election & Pre∣destinatiō of God (which I think Osor. would gladly expresse by this word, Purpose, for this word Predestinatiō, he dare scarse meddle withall, as not worthy the finesse of a Ciceronian) pro∣ceédeth from grace and not from workes, by what meanes may any sentence be geuen vpon workes y^t were neuer done? or how will Osorius say, that Election commeth by Iudgement geuen vpon workes, which Paule affirmeth to be ascribed to Grace, & freé mercy onely? all merite of workes beyng excluded.

Hee sayth that in the euerlasting counsell of God,* 1.303 all things which are, which haue bene, and which shalbe, are all as if they were presently in the sight of God, so that in exe¦cuting his iudgement, he needeth not to regard the thinges thēselues. I do confesse, y^t all thinges whatsoeuer are, be open and present to the foresight of God: as if they were presently and openly done, but what will Osorius conclude hereof vnto vs? forsooth he doth conclude hereupon, that God hath already determined, according to the diuersitie of mens actions fore∣seéne by him before: after this manner. To witte.* 1.304 That whome God doth foresee will cōtemptuously despise his benefites, those he hath excluded from Paradise: contrariwise whom God doth foreknow will behaue themselues in this lyfe du∣tifully, and vertuously, those he hath mercifully chosen to e∣uerlasting lyfe as worthy of his mercy. To impugne this craf∣ty cauillacion, I perceaue I shalbe pestered, not with Osorius alone: but with Pelagius, and with the whole troupe of the Pe∣lagians, for this hereticall schoole chattereth not vpon anye one matter more, then in maynteining this one heresie. But Paule alone shall suffice at this present to refell all the rable of them: The force of the Argument tendeth to this ende at the last.* 1.305

The wonderfull quicksited mynd of God, did throughly perceaue euen from the beginning, what manner of lyfe

euery person would leade, as well as if the view thereof had bene layed presently open before him.

Ergo, Gods purpose was applyed according to the pro∣portion of euery mans workes and life forseene of God before, to choose the good to saluation, and to iudge the wicked to damnation.

* 1.306This argument is altogether wicked, and tending altoge∣ther to Pelagianisme. And the conclusion meerely opposite to the doctrine of S. Paule. For if the difference of eternall electi∣on, & reiection, do depend vpon workes foreseéne before: Then doth the Apostle Paule lye,* 1.307 who affirmeth that election is of Grace, not of Workes: Rom. 11. and agayne in the 9. Chapter of the same Epistle.* 1.308 That the purpose of God might remayne accor∣ding to election, not of workes: but of him that calleth. What? and shameth not Osorius to affirme, that which the Apostle doth de∣ny? If it were expedient for me to ruffle Rhetorically agayne, with a Rhetoriciane. You seé Osorius, howe great and howe champaine a plaine lyeth open for me to triumph vpon you, and such crauēs as you are with lyke force, & in farre more weighty matter. What tragicall exclamations, could I bray out here? what quartaine feuers, what outrages, frensies, madnes, dron∣kennes? impieties? impudencies? yea what whole Cartloades full of raylinges and reproches frequented by you, and pretely pyked out of your Cicero, could I now throw back agayne into your teeth? and spitt euen into your owne face? But away with these madd outragies of rayling, and this cāckred botch of cur∣sed speakyng, worthy to bee rooted out, not of mens maners onely, but to be razed out of y^e writinges & bookes also of christi∣ans: the contagious custome wherof being frequented by you, to the noysome example of the worlde. I do verily thinke vnseeme∣ly for the dignity whereunto you are aduaunced, neyther would I wish any man to enure himself vnto the like, after your exam∣ple, namely in the debating of so sacred a cause, where the con∣trouersie tendeth not to the reuēgement of iniury, but to the dis∣couery of the truth: where skirmishe must be mayntayned, and conquest purchased by prowesse of knowledge, and Gods sacred scriptures, and not by outrage of rayling: And therefore to re∣turne our treatise to y^e right tracke of y^e Scriptures, leauing all

bypathes aside, the Apostle doth deny that election springeth out of workes: What aunswere you to y^e Apostle Osorius? you will vouch that old rotten ragge, worne out to the hard stumps by your schoolemen, to witte, that the workes that were fore∣seene: are the cause of predestination, not those whiche are done but which are to be done,* 1.309 for so doe the schoolemen ex∣pound, and distinguishe it: but this will be proued many wayes both friuolous, and false by sundry reasons.

First if this be true which you did earst confesse, and whiche Pighius doth euery where inculcate, that of all thinges whatso∣euer, nothing is to come, or past, but is as it were present in the sight of God: Agayn if there be no diuersitie of times with God, because his knowledge comprehendeth (as you say) all thinges past, present, and to come, as though they were present in view: how can hys election, or reiection spring out of workes then, that are yet to be done?* 1.310 If they bee present: in what sence call you them to be done in after tyme? but if they be to come, and to bee done in after tyme: how call you them present? or how doe these thinges agree together, that there is nothing to come in respect of the foreknowledge of God, and yet that election must be beleued to issue frō out the foreknowledge of works to come?

2. Agayne, in what respect soeuer these workes are taken,* 1.311 whether in respect of God or of men (which your schoolemen do distinguishe into works done, and works to be done) they vaun∣tage thē selues nothyng by this distinction, but that y^e question will continue as intricate, as at the first. For whereas all good workes, which either men worke, or shall worke, do proceéde frō God: the question reboundeth backe agayne frō whence it came first: to witte: Why God accordyng to the same purpose, should geue good workes more to one, then to an other? if the perfor∣maunce hereof did arise of foreseéne workes, and not rather of the determined will of him that calleth, whiche is not limited by any conditions of workyng.

3. Whereas the Scripture doth manifestly declare,* 1.312 that we are created & elected to good workes: it appeareth ther∣fore that good workes are the effectes of Predestination.

But the effectes cānot be the cause of that, wherof they were the effectes.

Ergo, workes can not be the cause of Predestination.

But if they alledge that not workes, but the foreknowledge of workes, in the purpose of God, be the cause, out of the which the Grace of Election ensueth, and is gouerned: surely neither can this be agreable to reason. For God did also foreknow the euill will of the reprobate (as there is nothyng in the world, that his vnsearcheable purpose did not foreknow) euen aswell, as he foreknew before the glory of the elect that should come: yet did he not therfore chuse vnto glory some, bycause he foreknew thē, nor did chuse all thynges, which he did foreknow: but whatsoe∣uer his Electiō had predestinated, it is out of all doubt, that the same were all foreknowen.

* 1.3134. Agayne the foreseéne pety workes (which they make to be the cause of Election) are either our owne, or properly apper∣teynyng to God. If they be Gods, and not ours: where then is the freédome of our choyse? any merites of works: But if they be ours, that is to say, in the direction of our owne willes: then is that false, that Paule teacheth. God it is, that worketh in vs both to will and to worke, declaryng hereby: that we are vnable to will, or to attemp any thyng that good is, without Gods assi∣staunce.

* 1.3146. The fift reason is this, whatsoeuer is the cause of y^e cause, is worthely adiudged the cause of the effect. If the foreseéne workes of y^e faythfull be the cause of Predestination, certes they must neédes be the cause of Iustification also: whiche is directly opposite and aduersary to the doctrine of Paule, and the Grace of Christ.

* 1.3156. Workes as they issue from vs, are thynges vncerteine: But Gods Election is a thyng alwayes certeyne, and perma∣nent: Now by what reasō will Osorius proue then that thyngs beyng of their own nature certeine & vnchangeable, shall depēd vpon thynges transitory and variable. Not but foreknowledge (sayth he) of thynges that are foreseene, doth stand in a cer∣teine permanēt and vnremoueable assuraunce. Neither do I deny this. And therefore when the foreknowledge of God hath established thyngs in such a Necessary & vnaduoydeable assu∣raunce, whiche will be chaunged by no alteration, what should moue him to gnaw so greédely vpon Luther for teachyng such

a Necessitie of our workes?

7. When as God did regarde the people of the old Testament as a Damsell naked, polluted, and adulteresse. &c.* 1.316 Agayne in the new Testamēt,* 1.317 where we are heare the vyle things & things despised in this world, and thyngs which are not to be had in estimation with God. Moreouer whereas accordyng to the testimony of August.* 1.318 Gods Electiō is said to haue ouerpassed many Philosophers notable for their vertue. & famous for the cōmendable cōuersation of life, doth not the thyng it self declare sufficiently? y^t the whole exploite of our saluation is accōplished, not of any desert of our workes that were foreseéne, but of his onely bountyfull benignitie, and most acceptable freé mercy?

8. Moreouer, what shall be sayd of Infantes,* 1.319 who are taken out of this worlde assoone as they are Baptised? what shall we thinke of the theéfe hangyng on the Crosse? and others the lyke? who hauyng lyued most abhominably, were yet receaued into the kyngdome of Christ by holy repentaunce onely thorough fayth, whenas they had done no good worke at all, were either a∣ny workes to come foreseéne in these persons? which were none at all, shall we Iudge, that they wanted Electiō, bycause they wanted workes foreseéne before?

2. Furthermore,* 1.320 whereas this seémeth to be y^e onely scope of Paules Epistle, to extoll and aduaunce the freé mercy of God, by all meanes possible, surely this scope is vtterly ouerthrowen and rooted out, if the whole action of freé Election must be deci∣ded by merites of workes foreseéne before. Whiche matter mo∣ued Augustine so much, that to preferre knowledge of workes,* 1.321 yea of foreknowledge of fayth either, before the Grace of Elec∣tion, he adiudged matter of all other most intollerable.

10. Lastly,* 1.322 bycause Osorius doth so scornefully loathe our 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 innouations (as her termeth them) as newfan∣gled deuises of rascallike abiects, to make it euidēt that we are not altogether destitute of antiquitie, to iustifie our Assertions to be true, we will ioyne with vs herein the Iudgement of Au∣gustine, who excludeth foreseéne workes altogether from the worke of Gods Electiō. For these are his wordes most expresse∣ly set downe.* 1.323 And least peraduenture the faythfull should bee thought to be Elect (sayth he) before the foundation of the world,

for their workes that were foreseene, he proceedeth & addeth ther∣to. But if Electiō come by Grace, then cōmeth it not now of workes: Or els Grace now is not Grace at all. &c. What say you moreouer to this?* 1.324 that in an other place hee doth vtterly deny that choyse was made of the younger to beare rule ouer the Elder, through the very foreknowledge of any workes at all. &c.

Which matters being thus set in order, what remayneth? but that we encounter with our aduersaries argumentes, wher∣with they endeuour to reuiue the auncient heresie of Pelagius, and hale it out of hell agayne. For as those olde heretiques dyd teach, that mans will was so farforth freé, as y^t euery man was elected for the merite of their workes foreseéne before by God: none otherwise do these our new Pelagians iarre vpon the same string, or not very much vnlike, treading the track of their fore∣runners the Archheretiques, referring all thinges in lyke sort to workes foreseéne before, least something maye seéme to bee found altogether without recompence in the behalfe of our most bountifull and souereigne God. And amongest these notable Champions, rusheth out this couragious ringleader Osorius, and geueth a proud onset agaynst the kingdome of Grace, and hath so disposed the whole force of hys battery, that the maiestie of Freewill may not by any meanes bee endamaged, trustyng chiefly to this Target of proofe before mentioned, arguyng on this wise.

* 1.325If election did consist of freemercy onely (sayth he) with∣out respect or choyse of any the thinges that God did foresee, he might be worthely accused of vnaduised and rashe dealyng.

But now whereas God accordyng to his vnpenetrable counsell doth determine all thinges aduisedly in a cer∣tayne well disposed order.

Ergo, Gods Election doth not consiste of his mercy one∣ly, without respect or choyse of workes which he fore∣saw would be done by the faythfull.

* 1.326To aunswere these thinges brieflye. If Osorius senselesse iudgement were not throughly ouerwhelmed: with heddinesse, and rashenes, he would not skatter abroad such black and thick

cloudes (to vse Augustines wordes) and such crafty cautels of confused disputations: We doe know and confesse (Osorius) that God doth neuer any thyng at all aduētures, nor vnaduised∣ly. Yet doth not that rashe imagination therefore followe, whiche you haue as rashely conceaued in that blynde denne of your intoxicate braynes, to witte that workes foreseene before, are the cause of Election. Moreouer Gods Election is neyther therefore decreéd vpon without cause, nor yet therefore guyded by blynde chaunce, though it hang not vpon the choyse of works afterwardes to be done. But Osor. beyng a very naturall Phi∣losopher, and very Ethicall seémeth to haue sucked this geare rather from Aristotle, thē out of Christes Testament,* 1.327 who tea∣cheth in his 3. booke of Ethickes that Election (which he calleth vnderstandyng Appetite) is euer occupyed about good or euill: And because in humaine actiōs, where choyse is made betwixt two, or moe thinges, preéminence is graunted to one of thē, ac∣cording to the difference of good and euill: like as in cōmon mu∣sters, the Souldier that is most valiaunt: in Maioralities and Baylywicks, the richest Citizen: in choyse of wyues, the most beautifull, in schooles of learning, the most expert in sciences, are vsually more esteémed and preferred formost: the same sur∣myseth our Osorius to be betide with the Election of God, and hys sacred decrees. But here a distinction ought to haue bene made betwixt Gods choyse, and mans choyse: and the causes thereof likewise ought to be distinguished. And therefore in this place especially Osorius doth notably bewray his singuler ig∣noraunce, disputing of those thinges: whiche lyke an vnskilfull Sophister he can neyther rightly deuide, nor duely define.

But here perhaps some question will be moued:* 1.328 whereas God and nature do nothing without cause: what other cause els could there be here, if God did not make choyse of the faythfull, and of the Reprobates accordyng to the proportion of their workes foreseéne before. But this reason can no man discusse better then Paule himselfe: who after many his blasphemous persecutiōs of Christ, obtayning mercy at the length, and yeal∣ding y^e reason of this great mercy, doth franckly confesse that it was the onely clemency of God, & not any workes foreseéne in him before: to the end, that he might be a president to others of

Gods mercy stretched out towardes them which would beleéue. To be short: if the naturall cause must be throughly searched out: which are the very foundacion of Gods predestinat••on: the Apostle Paule doth knit them vp altogether into iiij chiefe pla∣ces,* 1.329 first GODS POWER: hath not the potter power of the clay. 2. GODS PVRPOSE or GODS GOOD PLEA∣SVRE, for he doth vse both these speaches. 3. GODS WILL.* 1.330 He will haue mercy on whom he will haue mercy, and will harden whom he listeth. 4. GODS MERCY OR LOVE. It is not of hym that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but in God that sheweth mercy. Rom. 9. So y^t you seé playnely that here is no mention made of works at all, but that there be other much more weigh∣tie causes which will deliuer God cleare of all Rashnesse and vn∣aduizednes, though foreseéne workes haue neuer anye place in the counsell of God.

* 1.331I come now to the other argumentes of Osor. For after this sort doth this lumpish logician cauill agaynst Haddon that beautifull blossome of Bucer out of the 2. of Tim. 2.

* 1.332If any man purge himselfe from these he shall be a vessel of honor vnto the Lorde, that is to say, predestinated vnto honour, and sanctified.* 1.333

Euery man is of power of his own Freewill to purge him selfe.

Ergo, Euery man is of power of his owne Freewill to be predestinate, and made a vessell to honour.

The Maior must be vnderstanded, that Paule treated not of the cause of predestination,* 1.334 but of the execution and effect of predestination. Neyther doth the wordes of the Apostle tend to this end, to expresse the cause of predestination but to admonish vs by the effecte of predestination, how weé ought to esteéme of the worthines and vnworthiness of persons in the congregation according to y^e saying of Christ: by the fruites you shall know them &c. Then the Minor is false, for that which they inferre vpon these wordes of Paule, as though it were in the power of our owne will, to make our selues vessels of honour, is not well concluded: for it lyeth not in the will of y^e doer, but of the caller, not in the clay, but in the potter, who is of power to fashion the ••lay, whereunto him listeth: into a vessell of honor or of dishonor.

Furthermore neyther is our abilitie to be decyded by any hypo∣theticall proposition, no more then if a man would conclude vp on thys hipotheticall proposition.* 1.335

If you doe this or that, or if you beleeue you shall bee saued.

Ergo, to do this or that, or to beleue, we are of our selues sufficient inough.

And why then doth the Scriptures vse thys phrase of speech that men purge themselues: if we haue no power of our own selues to purge our selues? forsooth because God doth worke in men, not as in stockes and stoanes, whiche are not mo∣ued of any their own feéling or will. Whē God worketh in men, he doth so temper their mindes and willes whom himself doth regenerate, that they willingly vndertake whatsoeuer they are commaunded. After this mauner therefore are they sayde to to purge themselues by this very will, not whiche is proper and peculiar to their owne nature, but whiche is poured into them by grace. And by this meanes at the length, such as are rege∣nerate, are made afterwardes Gods together workemen: and of their own accord leade a vertuous and holy life. Finally God in his Scriptures commaundeth to purge our selues, when notwithstanding it is he alone that purgeth. So doth he com∣maund the people of Israell by the mouth of his Prophet Mo∣ses to sanctifie themselues,* 1.336 whereas hee witnesseth of himselfe in an other place that it was he that doth sanctifie the people.* 1.337 So also, hee commaundeth vs to beleéue:* 1.338 when as notwithstanding Fayth is the gift of God, and not our owne, nor is the cause of our predestination but the effect.

But let vs proceéde farther to your challenge Osor. wh chal∣lenge you haue vndertakē to iustifie out of y^e depth of Diuinitie:* 1.339 namely that there is nothing in gods eternall electiō but is accōplished vpon certeine conditions of reason and iudge∣ment. And yee suppose that the reason of Election, is not to be sought els where, but from the foreseene workes of the faythfull and reprobate. And that if wee graunt not this, that then ye think that our assertion of predestination cannot be iustified, but that many thinges will ensue there∣upon not onely erroneously false, but also absurde to bee

spoken, & incredible to be beleued. First, because Gods iu∣stice cannot be acquired of iust reproche of parcialitie, nor his mercy (which is retched to all mē indifferently) cleared of vnrighteous dealing. You crye out afterwardes that it is both agaynst right & reason that he should saue a very few in number, and condēne an innumerable company besides to destruction. Moreouer euen in this choyse it selfe, when cōsideration is had, why he should chuse these, and why he should reiect the others, the thyng it selfe doth seeme not to bee cleare of speciall acceptyng of persons, nor of a cer∣teyne extreme crueltie. &c. All which w^t others y^e lyke sithence be but weake sproughtes, budding out of the sauadge woodbyne of the aduersary, & not issues of the true stocke, will be so much the more easily cut of with the Razour and Axe of the truth, and vtterly rooted out with the vnuanquishable force of Gods scrip∣ture.* 1.340 Therfore first: Let vs heare what discourse he maketh of Gods Iustice and mercy against the Lutheranes. For where∣as Luther and all good men of Luthers opinion do professe, that the regarde of merites is directly cōtrary to Gods libertie and power, as touchyng his Election and Predestination. Osorius on the cōtrary part doth enforce all his might possible to proue, that it is not so, vsing these Argumentes especially.

* 1.341Whereas we were all wrapped vp in one brake of perdi∣tion, so that beyng ones defiled with sinne we became all most worthy of euerlastyng destruction, for our naturall ha∣tred agaynst Gods law, engraffed fast within the nature of our bodies subiect to the outrage of lust: God in whō nei∣ther any rashnes not vnrighteousnes can fall, beyng a most iust Iudge towardes all men indifferently, could not of his vnuariable equitie, with singular clemēcy so embrace some, as he must hate others: vnlesse there were some cause or rea∣son to enduce him to extēde his mercy to some, and to ex∣ecute Iudgement agaynst other. But God now doth per∣ceaue the whole cause therof, to consiste in the maner of li∣uing, and workes: not the workes which were already done, but which God foresawe should be done. For what is there that the wisedome of God, in his infinite knowledge doth not comprehende euen as it were present, though the same

be to be done in the vttermost minute of ages? And by this reason, it may be, that God (accordyng to the seuerall con∣ditions of men) did of his clemency, elect them to eternall life, whō he foresawe would be obedient to his Cōmaūde∣mentes: And on the other side did exclude them from the fruitiō of his kyngdome, which he foresaw would vnthank∣fully despise his heauenly benefites. And by this meanes (sayth he) Gods Iustice may right well be defended, all the defence whereof standeth vpon mercy, which otherwise cā not by any meanes deliuered from due reproch.

What a mockery is this?* 1.342 as though if God should follow his owne libertie and will in y^e order of Predestination, without all workes foreseéne before, his Iustice could not stand inuiola∣ble, nor garded safe enough from all slaunder or suspition of vn∣righteousnesse. I demaunde then: what if God out of this huge lumpe hadd chosen no one man at all (whiche he might lawfully haue done if him lysted) what if he had duely Iudged to deser∣ued damnation the whole masse of mankynde, which did altoge∣ther deserue his indignation & wrath? (to speake Augustines wordes) could any man cōdemne him of iniustice.* 1.343 Goe to. May not he that oweth nothyng to any man, of his owne meére libe∣ralitie lawfully exempt vndeserued out of this corrupted & loste masse whō him listeth? or haue mercy on whō he will haue mer∣cy? could not hee indurate and reiect whom he would without respect of meritorious workes followyng, whenas there was matter more then enough ministred by their former desertes, to condemne all to destruction? As for example. Admitte that a mā haue two debtours, whereof the one is indebted vnto him in an exceédyng great summe of money, the other oweth not so much by a great deale: and the bountyfull creditour vouchsafe to for∣geue the greater summe to that first: I pray you, is there any iust cause here, for the other to grudge agaynst the creditour? If he doe, shall not his mouth be forthwith stopped with that aun∣swere of Christ in the Gospell?* 1.344 Is it not lawfull for me to doe as I will with myne owne? is thyne eye euill, bycause I am good? The ve∣ry same doth that place of Paule seéme in my simple capacitie to emply, where treatyng of the Election of the yoūger, and re∣fusall of the elder, and of hardenyng Pharaos hart withall, he

doth annexe immediatly vnto the same, what shall we say then? is God vnrighteous?* 1.345 makyng this Obiection agaynst him selfe as vnder the person of Osorius after this maner.

* 1.346If God did not worke after the proportion of foreseene workes and deseruynges.

Ergo, God may seeme to be vnrighteous in his Election, and should offend against Iustice distributiue.

* 1.347This Argument the Apostle doth forthwith deny, saying: God forbyd, and withall rendreth a reason of his illation nega∣tiue, namely that both propositions bee Iustifiable in God. Both, that God is not vnrighteous. And also that God accordyng to the equitie of his Freewill, doth take mercy on whom he will haue mercye, not in respecte of anye mans deseruynges, but of his owne freé bountyfulnesse, benignitie and mercy. And ther¦fore for the better establishyng of this his defence, he doth forth∣with cite the same wordes that were spoken to Moyses. I will haue compassion on whom I haue compassion, and I will shew mercy to whom I do shew mercy. So that hereby you seé (good Syr) that to the worke of Election and Predestinatiō, the Apostle iudgeth Gods will onelye (though there were no cause els) matter suf∣ficient, to acquite his Iustice freé from all flaunder and reproch: that in my Iudgement now, the defence of Gods Iustice, which you haue placed in Gods mercy, seémeth more aptly applyed to his will.* 1.348 For as he can will nothyng but y^t which is most righ∣teous, so nothyng is truly righteous in deéde, but that whiche proceédeth from the will of GOD. So that now it shall not be neédefull at all to be inquisitiue (accordyng to the coūsell of Au∣gustine) after any other principall causes besides Gods good will,* 1.349 consideryng that no hygher cause can be founde of greater importaunce.

* 1.350But what can be so well spoken, but that some will be founde somewhat scrupulous without cause? & will not in most brightest Sunneshyne seé w^tout a candle? Therfore this cauillyng colco∣uerthwart creépeth yet foreward. If it be true (sayth hee) that Gods Election is directed by his will onely, in allowyng or makyng hardharted whom he will, & that no man cā resist his will: It seemeth then that Pharao and others who of in∣durate contumacy of mynde are wicked, whereas in that

their wickednesse they do execute the will God: that they are not the cause of their owne wickednesse, nor that they can chuse but do the wickednesse, whereunto they are vio∣lently thrust necessitie: If it be so: what iust quarell can God haue then agaynst those (whom him selfe hath made to be stiffenecked). wherefore he should condemne thē? To be short. The substaunce of the Obiection is for the most part knitte vp in this Argument.

If God do harden mens hartes: then should not Pharao be the cause of his owne Sinne,* 1.351 consideryng no man can resist the will of God.

Or to reduce this consequent into a Sillogisme.

No mā hath iust cause to blame him,* 1.352 whom him selfe en∣forceth to offende.

God doth iustly finde fault with sinners.* 1.353

Ergo, God doth compell no mā to sinne, nor doth make them endurate.* 1.354

I do Aunswere.* 1.355 First, euen by the self same Obiections, wh the Apostle vnder the person of the Cauiller did oppose agaynst him selfe: Is there any vnrighteousnesse with God? why doth he yet complayne of man? who is able to resiste his will? It may appeare most euidētly, that Paule was fully resolued there, that as well Election, as reiection, did depend altogether vpon the very will of God, without all mans deseruynges: For otherwise there had bene no place to make this Obiection. For if they onely should be chosen that did deserue, and they likewise should be onely cast away which did not deserue: what reasonable man might mur∣mure at this? when Gods Iustice rewardyng euery man accor∣dyng to his deseruynges, did now leaue no cause to moue man to be offended, nor gaue any stumblyng blocke to the Apostle, to enter in this kynde of Obiection.

But let vs now draw neare to the aunswere of the Apostle it selfe,* 1.356 which seémeth to me to be two maner of wayes. The one in respect of the person: whereby he stoppeth y^e mouth of the mur∣murer. O man, what art thou that pleadest against God? The other in respect of the thyng, whereby he doth expresse the very cause it selfe, perswadyng it by a certeine similitude of the Potter and the clay. For as the Potter in makyng his vessels doth not re∣gard

any desert on the clayes behalfe Euen to Gods purpose in the gouernement of his Election is at libertie, and freé from all respect of workes, and is directed by the onely will of the ma∣ker. And for this cause Paule doth make this comparison be∣twixt this Election of Grace,* 1.357 and the power of the Potter: Doth the thyng formed (sayth Paule) say to him that formed it, why hast thou made me thus? hath not the Potter power ouer the claye to make of the same lumpe one vessell to honour and an other to dis∣honour? And yet GOD hath much more power ouer men then the Potter ouer y^e clay. In deéde y^e Potter hath power to fashion his vessels as him listeth. If God were not able to doe the lyke with his creatures, then were the Potter of more power then God. For the Potter is able to fashion his vessels, yea to breake them and fashion them a new after his own will: And shall God then be bounde to our merites and regulate his Election by the measure of our deseruynges? Take this Argument if it may please you.

* 1.358The power that the Potter hath ouer his vessels, the same pow∣er hath God ouer men.

The Potter is of power to make vesseles to honour, or to disho∣nour, as him listeth, nor is bounde to any worthynesse of the Claye.

Ergo, God is of power to dispose his creatures after the boun¦tie of mercy, or measure of his Iustice as him listeth without all regard of deserte in his Creatures.

* 1.359To this Argument the aduersaries make this aunswere, that they do not take away power from God, and that they are not able so to do, neyther did euer meane anye such thinge, but that onely power, which he putt of from himselfe. And albeit there is nothing that his omnipotēt power cānot bring to passe, yet would he neuerthelesse be no more able, then was be seéming to his Iustice. And because it is horrible to condemne anye man without deserte, by the same reason it standeth not with equitie, to defraude good workes of their due rewarde. And therefore it behoueth Gods Iustice to yelde this of Necessitie, that whom God would haue to be saued, the same he should haue chosen for their good workes foreseéne before, and the Reprobates hee should destroy, for their wickednesse: for otherwise if heé had no

consideration of workes, his Iustice could not be constant, and vnchaungeable. And therefore this Trifler doth conclude vpon the premisses. That the Lutheranes assertion is false, that in the worke of Election and Reiection choyse or respecte of workes, is meerely opposite and cōtrary to the libertie and power of God. &c.* 1.360 But this obiectiō is to be encountred with∣all on this wise. That it is one thing to treate of Election, and an other thing to treate of Gods iudgement. As concerning Gods iudgement it is true, that no man is damned vnlesse heé haue deserued it through wickednes of sinne: and that no man is saued, vnlesse same cause be found in him, which may be impu∣ted vnto him for saluation. But it is not so in Election, and Pre∣destination, which is accomplished by Gods Freewill, without all respecte eyther of former workes, or workes to come after∣wardes. Or els what meaneth the Apostle by speaking of gods freé Election when he sayth Not of works but of him that calleth:* 1.361 Whereupon let vs heare what Augustine wryteth. Saying this, not of Workes (sayth hee) but of him that calleth was spoken, tou∣ching that the Elder shalbe in subiection to the Yonger. For he doth not say of works past: but when he spake generally of workes, in that place hys meaning was as well of workes already done, as of workes that were to be done: to witte workes past: which were none at all and workes to come whiche as yet were not. &c. Workes there∣fore haue both their place and tyme,* 1.362 but in Election they haue neyther place nor tyme, neither is there any thyng effectuall in Election, besides the onely will of God, which neither hangeth vpon Fayth, nor vpon Workes, ne yet vppon promises: but Workes, Fayth, promises, yea and all other thinges whatsoe∣uer do depend vpon Election. Neyther is Gods Election pro∣portioned after the qualitie or quantitie of our workes, but our workes rather directed by his Electiō, none otherwise, then as y^e effectes do depēd vpon y^e cause, & not contrariwise y^e cause vp∣on the effectes. And yet in the meane tyme, God is not vnrigh∣teous. Neither doth GOD therfore offend in Iustice distribu∣tiue, if he haue mercy on whom hee will haue mercy: or if hee doe harden whom he will harden. And why so? because hee oweth no∣thing to any man, for whereas all men are borne by nature the children of wrath altogether, why might not God according to

the purpose of hys will haue mercy on whom he will haue mer∣cy? and agayne cast them awaye, whom him listed? leauing them to their naturall filthe and corruption, to witte: not hauing any compassion vpon them? Wherby all men may throughly per¦ceaue, as well the reprobate, what the cause is that they are rightfully condēned, as the elect also, how much they be indeb∣ted to God for this his so vnmeasurable mearcye.

These matters beyng so cleare your foolish consequent then (whereby you wrestle so much for y^e vpholding of works against y^e Election of Grace,* 1.363 as though if God did not work Electiō for the merite sake of the workes foreseéne, that then his Iustice could not possible beé acquited, nor defēded frōiust accusation of slaunder) is vtterly fonde, faynte, and not worth a rush: for if it were true, then is not Election of Grace: but of workes: yea Paule spake foolishlishly also, saying: that the remnant are sa∣ued according to the Election of Grace, and according to the pur∣pose of the Grace of God,* 1.364 and so should he haue spoken more aptly in thys wise, that the remnaunt were saued according to the E∣lection of workes. And how then shall God be sayd to haue mer∣cy on whom he will haue mercye? and so harden whom hee will harden?* 1.365 if that he will nothing, but that whiche is due of verye right, nor doth receaue any to mercy, vnlesse it appeared that he rewarded them both according to their workes forseéne. But what kinde of duety can that be called, which is freely geuen? or what kinde of mercy is it, whiche is not poured foorth vpon any, but such as do deserue it? If it be of Grace (sayth the Apostle) now is it not then of workes, or els were Grace no more Grace.* 1.366 Whereunto Augustine doth further annexe. Not of workes done already (sayth he) but where the Apostle vseth this generall phrase of speech.* 1.367 Not of works there he doth meane this to be spokē both of workes past, and workes to come &c. Whereof let Osorius beé well aduised lest whiles he immagine in hys mynde vnder the colour of purging Gods Iustice of due reproche, to escape the iutte of a moulehill, he breake hys neck ouer a Rock by putting Gods mercy out of doores: for what place will there be left for mercy? or what office will Osorius assigne vnto her? If Gods Iustice doe measure all thinges by lyne and leuell of hys fore∣knowledge of things to come? For Osorius in this disputation,

of Election,* 1.368 and of the purpose of God, calling backe all things to the foreknowledge of thinges which God doth perceaue will came to passe, Osorius doth not in wordes onely professe, but with the whole bent of his skill practize y^t ouerthrowe of Grace. Goe to. And what be those goodly workes (good Syr) whiche God doth foreseé shal come? If they be good and righteous, what is more agreable to equitie, then that the workes which be good should be worthely embraced and accompted prayse worthye? But if they be euill: that then also they should euen of very right be forsaken? And what shall become of Mercye in the meane space? but that shee sitt mute in a corner with her handes in her bosome, & like a dumbe stocke play mumme budget in Osorius Stage of merites.

But here forthwith will Osorius rayse vp hys Bristles, and merueile it is but that we shall heare him belching out agayne in most beastly braying noyse, Feuers quartanes, tertians, fu∣ries, woodnes, frensies, helhoundes, botches, shamelessnes, and what soeuer outragies els he hath suckt out of the olde tragicall deuises.* 1.369 What (will he say) haue I euer spoken or imagined any thing of Gods mercy otherwise then becommeth me? what kynde of foolehardinesse is this? what vnmeasurable and disorderous kynde of liyeng? Doe I thrust the grace of God out of doores? with what face dare you a••ow this vp∣on me? where? when? in what place? in what phrase of wordes? to whom? in whose presence? in whose hearing? in what booke can ye approue that I euer vttered any such thing? who haue alwayes most reuerently esteemed of the Grace of God, and do yelde euery where so much to Gods mercy, that I haue affirmed that in Gods mercye onely the whole protection of Gods Iustice doth consiste whiche if were not otherwise fortified with the ayde of mercy, could neuer be free from reproche: And how is it that I am so so∣denly accompted a changeling fugitiue, a traytor to Gods grace and a cutthroate of mercy.

I doe heare you well (good Syr) surely these bee smoothe wordes that you speake. But may I be so bolde (by your leaue) as to cyte your owne wordes before the Inquisition, and to rack the same after the maner of an Inquisitour, to seé, whether ye

approue the same man in deéde, which you so boldly pronoūce to be in wordes: you say that ye diminish not so much as the value of a myte of Gods grace, and that you doe not so exclude Gods mercy out of doores: but that ye rather cōclude all things vnder her, as vnder the most especiall: and onely fortresse of all other. Goe to then. Let vs take a taste both of your selfe and your do∣ctrine. And forasmuch as there be iiij. thinges, in the whiche all our saluation and doctrine is chiefly conteyned.* 1.370 Namely E∣lection, Vocation, Iustification, & the Glory of immortali∣tie: forasmuch also as the whole purporte of the sacred Scrip∣tures and the generall profession of Christian doctrine do con∣sent in this one thing, aboue all others: that the whole hope and confidence of our Saluation consisteth in no one thing els, but in the onely mercy of God promised vnto vs: in all these now would I fayne learne how much Osorius wisedome doth yeald vnto mercy whiles he ascribeth so much to Gods Iustice.

* 1.371First as touching Election and Predestination: if workes foreknowne do beare the whole sway here, and that Gods Elec∣tion falleth vppon no man, but whose whole course of lyfe be∣ing knowne before, hath made not vnworthy of this honorable dignitie of Election, what place I pray you then, is left here for mercy? seéing this whole worke of Election seémeth to be a∣scribed to Iustice rather? For as Iustice vouchsaffeth none but the good, and such as deserue it, euen so Grace and mercy doe relieue none for the more part, but abiectes, outcastes, & such as are altogether vnworthy therof.

* 1.372Moreouer as concernyng Vocatiō, and Cōuersiō: if the ha∣bilitie of mans Freewill be such (accordyng to this new Maister Doctour) that it may not onely worke together with God, but may also as well preuent the grace of God, by some good motiō, as follow it: and that Grace is none otherwise either offred vn∣to vs, vnlesse we put forth our willes thereunto before, or that it is not otherwise effectuall in vs, but whiles we stand fast to our tacklyng, and hold fast the helpe, offred vnto vs, yea and en∣crease it with our owne strength: and that no man is holpen of GOD, but who that both willyng, hopyng, and prayeng, doth make him selfe apte thereunto: truly, whosoeuer teach this doc∣trine, let them set neuer so glorious a face towardes the bla∣zyng

of mercy in wordes, yet in very deéde they be nothyng els but very Rebelles to Gods Grace: or at the least manglers and spoylers of the best part and power of Gods Grace, whiles they attribute part to grace, and part to Nature.

The same is also to be adiudged of the worke of Iustifica∣tion from the whiche though you seème not to exclude the Free∣mercy of God altogether,* 1.373 yet doe you gelde the most forrible partes therof surely, and yeld them ouer to workes flowyng frō out the foūteyne of Freewill: wherein also you make such a myn∣gle mangle, that ye will neither graunt onely fayth in the worke of Iustification, nor onely Grace on the worke of Election by any meanes.

Lastly, what shall we say of the reward of Glory?* 1.374 for if our workes, beyng wayed in the righteous ballaunces of Gods Iudgement, shall procure vs lyfe or death (as Osorius writeth. Pag. 145.) Agayne if the righteousnesse onely, which consisteth of well doyng, doth purchase Gods fauour to mankynde. Pag. 142. What soppe I pray you shalbe left for mercy here to deale withall? or what shall remayne at all wherein the Grace of God may be exercized?

If these be not your owne wordes Osorius deny them,* 1.375 if you dare: but if they be: with what artificiall Argumēt will you per∣suade vs not to accōpt you for an enemy of Gods grace, whiles ye sight so much vnder the banner of his Iustice? Yet will not I be so captious a cōptoller of your wordes, as to call you by the name of an enemy of Grace: though in very deéde I dare scarse∣ly thinke you, to be in any respect a sownde frende thereunto: he∣therto veryly as yet haue you declared your selfe no better. And the same euen your owne writings do more then sufficiently de∣nounce agaynst you: in y^t which it is a wonder to seé, how lauish & prodigall you be in the aduauncyng of the prayses of Iustice, for the amplyfieng whereof you can scarse finde any end: but in the meane tyme towardes the commendation of Mercy so spa∣ryng a niggard, and hardelaced, that ye seéme either not to con∣ceaue of the wonderfully Maiestie therof sufficiētly, or els very vngratefully not to be acquainted therewith: sauyng that ye be∣gyn now at the lēgth, to preach somewhat of the excellency ther∣of also,* 1.376 takyng occasion of these wordes of Paule: What shall we

say then? Is there vnrighteousnesse with God? God forbid: for he sayth to Moyses. I will haue mercy on him, to whom I do shew mer∣cy, and I will haue compassion on him, on whom I haue compassion. In y^t which place (say you) Paule doth render a Reason,* 1.377 Wher∣fore no man cā by any meanes accuse God of vnrighteous∣nesse: And doe annexe hereunto a conclusion agreable enough to your defence. For the defence of Iustice (say you) cōsisteth wholy in mercy. And agayne. But the mercy of God doth acquite his Iustice free from all reproche. Whiche reason of yours Osori. although perhaps might be allowed in some res∣pect: yet doth it not exactly and substauncially enough discusse y^e naturall meanyng of the Apostle, nor sufficiently aūswere the A∣postles question. Which will euidently and playnly appeare ei∣ther by the Apostle him selfe, or by Augustine the Expositour of the Apostle: if we will first note before, the marke, and state of the question diligently and truely.

The scope wherof Augustine affirmeth to be this. That the Apostle may lay open before vs, that the Grace of fayth ought to be preferred before workes, not to the end he might seéme to abolish workes, but to shew that workes do not goe before, but follow grace:* 1.378 and to make the same more apparaunt, he alled∣geth amongest others, the example of Iacob, & Esau: Who be∣yng not as yet borne into the world, hauyng done nothyng wor∣thy either to be fauored or to be hated, but that equabilitie of e∣state had made eche of them equall with the other, and betwixt whō was no difference of natures, or deseruyngs, which might procure aduaūcement of the one, before the other: Finally when∣as by orderly course of byrthe, and right of first byrthe, the elder might haue challenged the prerogatiue of honour before the younger:* 1.379 Almighty God vsing here his vnsearcheable Electiō, did make this difference betwixt them (whereas was no diffe∣rence of workes or merites) as that for sakyng Esau, (who by no merite after the rule of Iustice had deserued to bee reiected) he gaue the preheminēce to the younger: turnyng the common or∣der of nature vpsidowne, as it were, that whereas the younger are wont to be subiect to the elder, now, contrary to kynde, the elder should become seruaunt to the younger. Whereupon whē the Apostle sawe, what scrupule might arise in the imagination

of the hearer or Reader therof: he putteth a question vnder the person of one y^t might argue agaynst it: whether God had done any thyng herein agaynst equitie and right? or any thyng that he could not iustifie accordyng to Iustice distributiue? whereun∣to him selfe aunsweryng immediately, doth with wonderfull vehemency detest that slaunderous cauill, and withall acquiteth God freé from all accusation and suspition of vnrighteousnes, & this not w^tout lawfull authoritie of the Scripture, What (sayth he) do we not read spokē vnto Moyses on this wise? I will haue mer∣cy on whō I do take mercy, and I will haue cōpassion on whō I haue compassion? Besides this also, addyng forthwith the example of Pharao, he doth conclude at the length on this wise. Therfore he hath mercy, on whom he will, and whom he will he hardeneth.

But if our captious accuser will yet persiste in his obstina∣cie, as though it sufficed not for God to do what it pleased him: he doth cōfute him with a most manifest Argument of lyke com∣parison on this wise. The Potter fashionyng his vesselles either vnto honour, or to dishonour, or to what purpose seémeth him best, doth not offend at all. And shall it be lesse lawfull or God, to shew his power vpon his owne creatures, then for the Potter vpon his Chalke or Clay? Therfore whether God be willyng to haue mercy, or to indurate any man, he doth nothyng herein, but that which is most lawfull and most agreable with equitie.

You perceaue therfore Gods Iustice sufficiently enough de∣sended I suppose: which in all his workes ought by good right be mightly defēded. But how it is defēded, is now to be seéen. O∣sorius vrgeth stoughtly that Gods Iustice standeth not other∣wise to be defended but onely in respect of his Mercy:* 1.380 which al∣beit might be graunted after a sorte, yet is not altogether sim∣ply and absolutely true, and the reason therof is pyked out of O∣sorius credite rather, then out of any Argument of S. Paule. Whereas Paule seémeth to referre all this whole defence of Iu∣stice not to mercy, but to onely will of God, Saying God taketh mercy on whom he will, and hardeneth whom he will. Albeit I will not in the meane whiles deny, but that the Election of the fayth∣full doth consist vpon mercy alone, yet surely the defense of Ele∣ction is not vpholden, but through the will of God onely. Like∣wise also albeit the castyng away of the Reprobates do proceéde

from the onely Iustice of God, yet will no man say, that the de∣fence of this reiection consisteth in Mercy, but in the onely will of God. And therfore it is the onely will of God, which doth de∣fende Mercy in Election, and Iustice in reiection. For other∣wise how could this come to passe, that the onely Mercy of God should defēd his Iustice either in the Reprobate? (in whō scarse one sparckle of Mercy is discernable) or els in the Predestina∣tion of the faithfull, wherein appeareth no execution of Iustice? therfore what is it then, that may defend Iustice in these, & Mer∣cy in those other, but onely the purpose of Gods will onely? wherof S. Paule maketh mention: God taketh mercy (sayth he) on whom he taketh mercy, and hardeneth whom he will harden. As who neither reiecteth of Mercy, nor yet taketh cōpassion of Iu∣stice: but executeth both, accordyng to the absolute good pleasure of his will.

* 1.381Let vs make this more manifest by exāples. Whenas God is sayd to hate Esau, & to loue Iacob, beyng not yet borne: both which had done as yet nothyng worthy to be loued, or to be ha∣ted: what kynde of mercy can you shew in the hatred of that one, whiche may defende his Iustice? or what kynde of Iustice in the loue of the other, which Mercy (as you say) may deliuer cleare from all reproche? It followeth hereupon therefore, that the whole defence of Iustice consisteth not in mercy alone, but that the onely will of God rather doth acquite, not onely the mercy of God, but his Iustice also withall, frō all accusatiō of vnrigh∣teous dealyng.

* 1.382Be the same spoken likewise touchyng the hardenyng of the hart of Pharao. Which beyng decreéd vpon in the secrete coun∣sell of God, long before any droppe of mercy was extended vn∣to him: how then doe you referre y^e Iustice of his induration, to Mercy onely? But you will say:

God did call Pharao to fayth and obedience:* 1.383 but when as he did despite that so great bountie, and lyke a wilde Colte would licentiously raunge out of all order, it was agreable not onely with Gods seue∣ritie, but with his mercy also to scourge him with most iuste plagues accordyng to his deserte, that so by his exāple, o∣thersmight be reclaymed to do their duety.

I do know y^e sū∣dry singular Presidentes of Gods clemency and callyng were

ministred vnto him in deéde, but as all those tokens of Mercye be outward meanes,* 1.384 which God vseth in the outward calling of men, so the same do appertayne to calling onely, and touch E∣lection and Reiection nothing at all: nor do in this respect ex∣presse any defence of his Iustice: for to admit that the hardning of Pharao, and the casting away of Esau did happen most righ∣teously: yet this Iustice is not therefore defended agaynst the quarelling aduersary, because they did abuse the lemty of God afterwardes: And why so? because they were first reiected from God, before any Mercy (which they did abuse) was powred out vpō thē. And these things thus alleadged by me, doo not tend to this end, as though I were of opinion, that this Iustice of their reiectiō were boyd of all defēce: for it hath her certeine peculiar & most iust defence:* 1.385 but not that wherof Osorius doth dreame. If we seéke for the right defence of Gods Iustice: what can beé more Iust the Gods will? which apperteining to God, as hys owne properly, and effectually (as the Deuines do tearme it) can do nothing of her owne nature, but that which standeth with equitie and Iustice, neither standeth in neéde of an other defence. For what soeuer God doth decreé vpon, though it be neuer so farre hidde from our vnderstanding, yet is it of it self defensible and absolutely perfect enough. And therfore S. Paule seéketh no place of refuge els where agaynst the most terrible assaults of the aduersary, then the will of God: which he accompteth the strongest & surest fort of defence. Where he sayth,

God taketh mercy on whom he hath mercye, and will ha••den whom he will.

* 1.386He doth not say he doth harden that person on whom he taketh no mercy: but he doth harden whom he will. And agayne he that hath predestinated vs through Iesus Christ according to the pur∣pose of his will: He sayth not of his Iustice. Ephes. 1. hauīg in deéd no one thing of greater maiestie to alleadge for, hys defence a∣gaynst the aduersary, then the onely will of God, & wherewith a∣lone the Aduersary might be throughly satisfied.

But Osorius will take exception,* 1.387 and say that this will ought to be vpright and agreable to it selfe. Who is eyther ignoraunt hereof? or who can deny thys? But I demaund like∣wise of Osorius: whereas weé confesse that this will is moste righteous, and lawfull, whether in Reiection, Mercy, do suffi∣ciently

acquite this Iustice of Gods will, agaynst the quarel∣ling Cauiller? or Gods will rather. As for example. If a vayne babling Sophister or some capciouse busibody do demaund of you what the cause should be that Esau was forsaken without all desert of euill fact committed? and why also Paraoes hart was hardened, before that Moses was sent vnto him? why the eares of the Iewes were stopped that they might not heare, before the Prophet opened his mouth vnto them? All which thinges considering you cannot deny were wrought by Gods most righ∣teous Iustice, by what meanes will you defēd his Iustice here∣in? you will say perhaps, that God did therefore forsake, and cast them off, because he forknew by their wickednes that would ensue, what they should work in after tyme. But he will tell you here: that this proceéded not here of Mercye, but of Iustice wh doth rēder to euery man according to his desert: so that now the defence of Iustice may not seeme to depend vpon mercy by this meanes,* 1.388 but vpon Iustice it selfe? Not so (say you) but I do af∣firme that the defence of Iustice hangeth wholy vpō mercy which will acquite it cleare from all Reproche. I do see what you do affirme, but I do not seé yet how this will stop the mouth of the cauiller: for in this wise will this wrangler replye (if so be that God were pleased with Iacob, of his owne meere mercy, how could it be then that he should be displeased with Esau, by meane of the same mercy? for it hys wickednes that was yet to come, were layd vnto his charge, then did this reiection now be∣long to hys Iustice, not to his mercy? but if the same hys offen∣ces not yet done were pardoned through mercy: by what meanes then is he sayd to be reiected?

Certes how this manner of defence delighteth you Osorius, I know not: sure I am that S. Paule tooke a farre other manner of course, treating of Induration and reiection, alleadging none other argument in the defence of Gods Iustice against the Aduersary, then the onely decreé of Gods deuyne will: what art thou o man (sayth he) that doest contend agaynst God? Doest thou not heare the Lord himselfe declaring the reason of his Election in the propheticall scriptures? I will haue mercy on whom I haue mercy. And to make the same more euident S. Paule debateth the matter after this manner. Therefore (sayth he) God doth take

mercy on whom he taketh mercy, & doth hardē whom he will hardē: As though he might say, God in choosing or refusing hys own creatures, is tyed to no Necessitie, neyther is there any law to y^e contrary, but y^t he may according to his good pleasure, do ther∣in what himself liketh & lusteth. If he dochoose thee, y^u hast great cause to be thākfull vnto him for it, If he cast theé of, y^u hast no iust cause to quarrell w^t hym therfore: for he doth y^t no wrong. Thy God he is, & thy potter, what art y^u to cōtend w^t him? a weake man w^t thy most mighty God: a lump of clay with y^e potter: for this is the effect of your Argumēt.* 1.389 Surely God willeth nothing that he willeth without most iust and righteous reason: but in such sort, that this very will cannot seeme to proceede from any els where, or otherwise be defended in the order of pre¦destination, but of works foreseene, and of the foreknowne well vsing of good giftes, as the schoolemen do say.

Which saying how false and friuolous it is, shalbe declared both out of Augustine, and more notably out of S. Paule,* 1.390 for these are the wordes of Augustine discoursing vpon Esau, If so be (sayth Augustine) that God did therefore predestinate Esau to become vassall to his younger brother. because he did foreknowe that he would worke wickednes, then did he also predestinate Ia∣cob to become Lord of his elder brother because he did foreknow taht his works would proue good. And therfore the saying of the A∣postles is false. Not of works &c. And imediatly after enterlacing many other thinges betweene. If you will once graunt (quoth he) that a man may be chosen or refused, for the thing that as yet was not in him, but because God did foresee what would be in him, it fol¦loweth hereupon that he might haue been chosen for the worthines of his workes which God foresaw would be in him, though as yet he had done nothing, and this saying, that they were not yet borne, will not preuayle thee at all, where it was spoken, And the elder shall serue the younger: to declare hereby that it was sayde, Not of workes because as yet he had wrought nothing at all. &c. But to let passe August. Let vs heare what Paule himselfe speaketh. Who debating very largely vpon this poynt of Predestination, doth amongst other at the last breake out into this speach, tou∣ching the same.* 1.391 If God willing on the one side to shewe his wrath, and to make his power knowen hath with great sufferaunce and le∣nity

borne with the vessels of wrath prepared to destruction, and on the other side do make knowne the riches of his glory towardes the vessels of mercy, which he hath prepared to glory. &c. Let vs more exactly ponder the wordes of the Apostle,* 1.392 where he sayth, that God was willing, therein you heare first that God doth will, and withall, the cause and reason why he willeth, ye perceiue expre∣sly set downe afterwardes. But he is sayd to will wrath, y^t is to say, willing to shew the seueritie of his Iustice: Where I pray you? or towardes whom? what? towardes all creatures indifferent∣ly? Certes this might he haue done according to his Iustice: but this would he not do for his mercy sake. Towards whom thē? Towardes the vessells of wrath prepared vnto destruction. Where you heare the name of a Vessell, you doe withall conceaue a Potter, bycause no vessells are made without the Potter. More∣ouer where this worde Prepared is annexed, thereby forthwith commeth to remembraunce the will of the Potter not the will of the thyng fashioned. For it standeth not in the power of the port it selfe, to fashion and forme it selfe after it owne will, but the fa∣shioning therof resteth in the will and purpose of the Potter. For if any sense or feélyng at all were in earthen vessells, would any vessell fashion it selfe into a vessell of dishonour? if it had power to fashion it selfe by any meanes into a vessell of houour? where∣upon it followeth consequently, that the order and disposition of fashionyng, resteth wholy in the will of the Potter, and not in the will of the vessell.

Now therfore as concernyng the will of the Potter, left any mā shall thinke that his will is vnaduised, nor directed by equi∣tie and reason: The Apostle doth forthwith set downe the cause, therewith the mouth of the slaunderous backbyter may be stop∣ped. To shew (sayth he) the riches of his glory towardes the vessels of mercy which he hath prepared vnto glory. &c. He doth not say: bycause God foresaw the good workes of the godly, and the euill doynges of the wicked, that these were therfore ordeyned to dā∣nation, those other chosen to saluation: but hee sayth, that those are prepared to destruction, whom he would haue to be vessells of wrath, & the others to glory. And yet this notw^tstandyng nei∣ther vnaduisedly, nor contrary to equitie. Wherein if any man be desirous to know y^e reason, or the Iustice of God in his prede∣stination,

let him heare Augustine herein. The whole masse of mankinde was subiect (sayth he) to one state of perdition rightly de∣seruyng the scourge of Gods Iustice:* 1.393 which whether be executed, or pardoned, proceedeth not of any vnrighteousnesse in God. Now it pleased Gods good will of his mercy to make a choyse of some of these, and to relinquish other accordyng to his Iustice. If you re∣quire a reason hereof, the Apostle doth not hyde it from you: To make knowen (sayth he) the riches of his glory towardes the vesselles of mercy, which he hath prepared vnto Glory. &c. Wherein the principall and first cause of doyng, is ioyned toge∣ther with the last end therof. In the meane space many meanes are enterlaced betwixt these two. For euen as the will of God doth not otherwise preferre his elect to the honour of glory, but as it were through many tribulations, so neither doth he exe∣cute the seueritie of his Iudgement agaynst the Reprobate by & by,* 1.394 but by long sufferaūce, much lenitie and tolleration of their wickednesse. But as the afflictions of the elect is not the cause of their saluation, so neither the lenitie and long sufferaunce of the wicked, is the principall cause that moueth God to exercize the seueritie of his Iustice agaynst them. And therfore are they called Vessells: the one sorte vessells of wrath, the other vessels of mercy prepared either to destruction, or to saluatiō first, and before either God did with patience endure the wickednesse of the one, or with tribulations exercize the Fayth of the other.

To conclude therfore in few wordes briefly: I come agayne to the Argument that was proposed, which albeit he choppeth together without all order of teachyng: yet in my conceite, a mā may briefly reduce it into this forme. For out of these wordes of Paule, wherewith God is sayd to haue borne with the vessels of wrath in much lenitie, Osorius doth gather his cutted Sil∣logisine with a wonderfull dexteritie of witte.

Gods deuine Iustice did scourge none,* 1.395 but such as with much lenitie he did beare withall first.

Neither are any destitute of Gods mercy, but such as for∣sake it beyng offred. [unspec 1]

Finally saluation and the mercy of GOD is extended [unspec 2] vnto all persones, but vnto such as will not them selues be saued. [unspec 3]

[unspec 1] The defence of Iustice consisteth wholy in mercy.

[unspec 2] And onely mercy doth acquite Gods Iustice from all re∣proche.

[unspec 3] Neither doth any man perishe but beyng condēned for his owne treachery and wickednesse.

* 1.396To aūswere in one word. If this suttle Sophister do meane heare of Iudgement, or of execution of condemnation, I will graunt him his whole consequence. For who did euer deny this, but that God doth exercise his lenitie towardes the most abho∣minable rascalles, yea long and very much, & in much patience doth allure them to repentaūce? and agayne y^t no man is dam∣ned but who that perisheth through his own default, without all vnrighteousnesse in God? But if he meane of the cause of Prede∣stination: We deny his antecedent. For whereas that most sa∣cred purpose of the Deuine Predestination, and Reprobation, doth issue and spryng from out the onely will of God, beyng in deéde most vnsearcheable, yet most righteous: And whereas al∣so men are first fashioned in the same will, as in Gods worke∣shop, to be either vesselles of wrath, or vesselles of mercy, before that any lenitie or mercy doe appeare to be extended towardes any of them from God, by what meanes then will Osorius af∣firme That the defence of Iustice cōsisteth wholy in mercy, and that there be no vesselles of wrath, but such as will not be vesselles of mercy?* 1.397 Or how will he charge Luther w^t accu∣sing God of vnrighteousnesse? who by all meanes possible doth continually enforce with August. that there is nothyng in God, but that is most righteous, though it appeare vnto our capaci∣ties neuer so much past all findyng out. Nay rather why should not Osorius bee duly reproched for this matter? whose whole bent enforceth nothyng ells, but that Gods Iustice can by no meanes ells be defended, but by the workes of men knowen be∣fore? which how voyde is of all truth, we haue already declared, both out of S. Paule, and out of Augustine, sufficiētly enough, as I suppose: That in the meane tyme I slippe not ouer by the way that other saying of Paule, where makyng mention of veselles, he doth not say, y^t they were fitte or meéte vesselles, but vesselles formed not ready or apt vesselles, but vesselles prepared

and fashioned either to dishonour or to honour. Whereby you may perceaue that this whole action cōsisteth not in any y^e workemā∣shyp of the Potter, nor in the good or euill vsage of Gods gifts, but onely, and wholy, in the secret purpose & will of the maker.

But Osorius doth deny this that God did fashiō any ves∣selles vnto destructiō.* 1.398 How shall we know this to be true? For∣sooth by the wordes of the Apostle. For hee doth not say the vesselles which God him selfe did forme vnto destruction, as he spake a litle afterwardes of the vessels of mercy which he prepared vnto Glory. Goe to. And what mystery I pray you pyke you out of this? Forsooth, that ye may vnderstand that godly mē are predestinated to glory through the will and mercy of God, and that wicked mē euery one through his owne voluntary default are throwen out into condem∣nation. &c. I heare you Osorius. And I do aūswere, that this is true in deéde that you Reply, that no man perisheth at all, but who so perisheth by his owne procurement and default. But what is this to y^e purpose? Sithēce Paule in this place doth not treate of the executiō of punishment, but raysing him selfe farre hygher, debateth vpon the very cause & end of Predestination & Reprobatiō. Now as concernyng the execution of condēnation & condemnatiō it selfe, if we search for the cause therof. Sure∣ly the same is neither one nor alone: but in sundry and diuerse respectes. If you require the inward cause, and whiche in deéde is peculiarely to bee assigned in man: it is Sinne: If you re∣quire the outward cause, in respect that it is the punishment of Sinne, the cause of the destruction of Sinne, is Gods Iustice. You will say then, what? will you make GOD the cause of destruction and condemnation? Yea surely good Syr, in that sense that I spake before. For why not as well, as when the murtherer his hanged, if you respect the outward cause of his death, ye will not deny, but the Iudge was cause therof, but if ye behold the inward cause, he that is executed (being guilty of his owne fact) can charge no man with his death but him selfe.* 1.399 But you will say, although the Iudge doe punishe the malefa∣ctor, yet did he neuer so forme the malefactour to the end he should be hanged. And no maruell. For he doth occupy the place of a Iudge onely, who hath no other authoritie at all a∣gaynst

any such person, vnlesse he haue committed some offence worthy of Iudgement, for he is but a Iudge, he is not a Crea∣tour. But the matter fareth farre otherwise in the most sacred Maiestie of God,* 1.400 who hath absolute and full power ouer his creatures, not onely to punishe, after they haue committed of∣fence, in the nature of a Iudge: but also to determine vpon his creatures, before any their deseruynges, what him pleaseth in the nature of a Creatour, to frame them to dishonour, or to call them to honour as him lysteth. Therfore as he is a Iudge, he doth punish Sinners in deéde: but as he is a Creatour, he doth fashion his Creatures according to his will, euen as the Potter doth fashion his Pottes. And to this effect tend those wordes of Paule If God willing to shew forth hys wrath, and to make knowne hys power towardes the vessels of wrath. &c.* 1.401 But you will say GOD hath not fashioned vessels of wrath: nor hath for∣med any person vnto destruction. Why then let vs likewise imagine that y^e Potter doth not make some Uessels to dishonor, but all to honor rather. But sithence that all Uessels are not fra∣med by the handes of the Crastesman to beauty and dignitie, but some applyed, and made to serue for more base and vyle v∣ses, according to the testimony of Paule•• By what meanes then will the similitude alleadged be aptly applyed to God, to witte, if that God may not do towardes hys Creatures the same that the Potter doth to hys Vessels? But now will you heare this Argu∣ment finely contriued with a merueilous nimblenes of witte?

* 1.402Paule doth not say: the Vessels which he fashioned vn∣to destruction, as he doth in the same place speake of the Vessels of mercy, which he did prepare vnto glory.

Ergo, It may be vnderstanded thereby, that wicked men are not throwne into destruction by Gods will, but for their owne wickednes.

* 1.403As though both might not be graunted together namely: y^t wicked men are throwen into destructiō by Gods will, & yet ne∣uertheles not without their owne desert? But the name of God (say you) is not expressed in this place. And why so? because the Apostle speaking of the vessels of wrathe, doth say that they were fashioned vnto destructiō, but doth not say, that God did fashion thē vnto destruction. Surely here is a very

niece pointe of descāt: Go to, Admit this also that gods name is not expressed, yet haue ye not taught vs y^t it is not vnderstanded here. No, (say you) for so much as nothing could more varie from the minde of the Apostle,* 1.404 nor be more repugnaunt to the most milde nature of God, then to conceaue, that God should hymselfe frame vessels vnto dishonor, seyng that no man runneth headlong into ruine: but through hys owne voluntary blindenes. And who did euer deny this? yet doth this nothing more exclude the will of God, from fashioning his ves∣sels as him listeth: As on the other side neither doth the will of God receaue vnto mercy those, that haue offended: so that no∣thing withstādeth now, why the vessels of wrath should be lesse deémed to be fashioned vnto destruction, by the will of God, and withall that themselues also do procure to themselues their own destruction, But why did not Paule (say you) set downe thys matter in expresse wordes? which God himselfe did forme vnto destruction: whiche he would surely haue done, if he had thought that God had bene the Authour of destruction. Truely I will aske you a question in as few wordes Osorius, why the Apostle did choose rather to say, (Vessels Fashioned to destructiō) then leauing out the word Fashioned, to say Vessels of destruction? for this would haue accorded farre fitter with your exposition, if so be that he thought that the Vessels did pe∣rish without the will of God. Agayne, why did he call them Ves∣sels, and not? creatures rather? why did he annexe this supply, to witte, Wrath? finally why did he bring in God himself willing to shew forth hys wrath agaynst the Vessels of wrath? but that you should vnderstand that all those circumstances are to be redu∣ced to the most sacred will of God, euen as to the working hand of the Potter. For first as I sayd before when you heare this word Vessels thereby you vnderstād the Potter: Secōdly when you heare this word Fashioned,* 1.405 therein the hand of the Artifi∣cer is cōceaued: Thirdly when you heare Fashioned vnto destru∣ction therin appeareth the certeinty of Gods will in his Prede∣stination. Whereas the Vessels do perish, it is their own fault, but where it is sayd that they are Fashioned thereunto, this sure∣ly is not proper to the Vesselles, but doth note a certayne o∣ther hygher cause, and a more playne, demonstration of the cre∣ator

for Vessels are not wont to bee Fashioned of any, but of the craftesman, as I suppose: what man is so madde to say that Vessels made, are made of themselues? namely to their owne dishonor, and not formed thereunto by the workman rather: and I maruell greatly that Osorius hauing any sense or feéling in him at all, cannot quickly conceaue the meaning of the Apostle, eyther by the comparyng of the text together, or by the maner and order of speéch: namely sith the matter it selfe doth so di∣sclose so many manifest reasons to discusse the doubtfull signifi∣cation of the wordes.

* 1.406First, you will not deny but that this will of God, wherewith he had decreéd both to shew hys wrath (that is to say the seueri∣ty of his Iustice) and his mercy also, was euen from the begin∣ning. This will then beyng once determined vpon by God, could neyther by any meanes be made of none effect, nor againe by any meanes made discernable, vnles it were poured out vp∣on some matter,* 1.407 whereupon it might worke. And euen here doth that wonderfull Electiō of God display it selfe at the first, wherewith (before the foundations of the world were layd) he had predestinated them whom he would should be saued, and re∣iected thē whō he would haue dāned. Next vnto this Election, immediately ensued the Creation:* 1.408 wherewith the almighty Creator with a most singuler excellency, and exquisit work∣manship did forme all vessels out of one selfe lump of Clay, and yet not those all ingenerall appoynted to one ende. For some vessels he made to serue to shew forth hys mercy,* 1.409 some other to shew forth his Iustice. These things being thus established, im∣mediately after Creation ensueth Vocation or Callyng: & the same two maner of wayes: accordyng to hys purpose, and not according to his purpose:* 1.410 wherof the one is lynked with Grace making acceptable: the other is voyde of Grace: though not al∣together, yet destitute of effectuall Grace. And hereupon doe issue Blindenesse, Rebellion, Hardenesse of hart, Infidelitie, Breache of the Law, Execution of Iustice, not by force of any coaction, but by reason of the sequele or consequent. For y^e grace of God once denying assistance, what soeuer remayneth in man is nought els, but the seéde of the Serpent, or some vncurable Fistula, wherewith man is deadly poysoned. Agayne out of the

other Vocatiō, which is according to purpose, springeth Fayth a will to obey, forgeuenes of Sinne, Iustification:* 1.411 and such like inestimable treasures: not ensealed into vs by nature, but frāck∣ly geuen vs from aboue. Now out of that Infidelitie, and exe∣cution of Iustice, ariseth the destruction of the Reprobate: of the which Paule treateth here, which is not without the speciall will of God, Or els in what sense doth he say, God was willing to shew his wrath? and yet not without their most due deseruing nei¦ther: as on the other side Saluation and Glorification do spring of Fayth & Iustification, for asmuch as in them, the cōmendatiō of his Iustice, in y^e other, y^e dignite of hys mercy doth shew forth their bright beames to y^e inestimable glory of gods maiesty,* 1.412 who is the chief and principall ende and foundation of all workes.

Wherefore forasmuch as God was willing to shew both, as well hys wrath, as also hys mercy: and this hys will could by no meanes be accōplished, vnlesse there were some vpō whom, both hys wrathe, and hys mercy might make hys power on eche part discernable: hereupon then is no small stoare of proofe mi∣nistred, wherby may be perceaued, from whence aswell the de∣struction of the reprobate, as the Saluation of the elect doth proceéde. And first of all your selfe do not deny, that godly per∣sons are predestinated vnto glory through the onely bountiful∣nes of God. I demaunde now whether thys selfe same mercy of God haue predestinated to glory all creatures generally, or not all? I attend your aunswere. If you will say all without excep∣tion, where then are the vessels of wrath? what shalbe come of this saying. God willing to shew hys wrath vpon the Vessels ordey∣ned to destruction? Finally what shalbe thought of that saying of Christ? Many are called but few are chosen. If so be that all are receaued by a generall Electiō: how can this Election be made frustrate and vneffectuall? or what kinde of Reiection can there be then? But if you will not say all, it followeth then, that there must bee some Uessells of reiection of Necessitie, as well as of mercy: to witte: by like agreablenesse of contraries. Or els how shall a man vnderstand that some vessels are Predestinate to Glory? vnlesse by the same Argument ye confesse that some vessels were also reiected to dishonor, which beyng agreé vpon I demaund further, of the reprobation of them that are forsa∣ken,

whether do ye think that the same proceéded from the secret purpose of God: or of themselues? if from thē selues? how shall thys appeare? for asmuch as Election, and Reprobation also, are not seperated by any distinction of the Creator, or distaunce of tyme, and were both together before the foundacions of the world were layed: as appeareth most manifestly by the exam∣ples of Iacob and Esau, and sundry other semblable examples.

* 1.413But Osorius will coyne vs here some straunge Oracle, to witte. That GOD dyd create the nature of the vessels in deede, but not the very vessels of wrath, as whiche tooke their originall from Sinne and infidelity, and not from God the Creatour. And who did euer deny this to be true? Goe to. What monster doe these great bellyed hilles Calue out at the length? Forsooth a very wonderfull conclusion.

God did not create wickednesse.

Ergo, He did not not forme the vessels of wrath.

But that this creéppled curtoll of Osorius may stād vpright: vpō his legges let vs helpe here Osor. haltyng Logicke once a∣gayne. For in this wise shall it be able to craule vpon his feéte.

* 1.414Onely wickednesse brought to passe that they become vessels of wrath.

God did not create wickednesse.

Ergo, GOD doth not create vessels of wrath, but euery one maketh him selfe a vessell of wrath thorough hys owne wicked will, by cause he would not be made the vessell of Mercy.

* 1.415First, the Maior is not to be graunted simply and absolute∣ly. For if this must be yelded vnto for a truth, that onely wic∣kednesse doth make the vessels of wrath, why should not this al∣so be taken for matter confessed, vpon equall relation of contra∣ries? to witte, that vertue onely doth make the vessels of mercy, and withall that it consisteth in the habilitie and power of euery good body, that will not be a vessell of dishonour, to become a ves∣sell of honour.

Moreouer where it is sayd that wickednesse doth make the vessels of wrath, is not agreable with the truth. Dauid did com∣mitt agaynst his owne soule not one wickednesse alone: no more was Saule beyng a persecutour cleare of his proper wickednes

also, yet the same Dauid (notwithstādyng his wickednesse) was a vessell of Election.* 1.416 Be the same spoken of Mary Magdalene, of the theéfe: finally of many of Gods Elect, whose horriblenes of Sinne did not make thē vessels of wrath notwithstandyng.

Besides this also, if it be true that Osorius speaketh: That wicked men do not make them selues vessels of wrath, but through their owne will and wickednesse. Tell vs a good fel∣loshyp, what offence hadd Esau committed beyng the vessell of wrath, not by any action of lyfe, but beyng borne euen so by na∣ture? Be the lyke spoken of Ismaell: Cain the māquelier became worthely abhominable in the sight of God, by the murther of his owne brother: but before this murther committed, and before a∣ny priuy grudge conceaued, what had he done when in his first oblation, both him selfe and his oblatiō was reiected? Iudas Is∣cariotes had not yet betrayed his Maister, whenas he was both the vessell of wrath, and called also the Sonne of perditiō. The Phariseés had not yet vttered any tokē of hatred agaynst Christ, when they were called of Iohn Baptist y^e generation of Uipers. What shall I say of Pharao?* 1.417 Whose destruction if we behold, euen worthely and deseruedly layed vpon him by the Lord, who may dought it that his owne Rebellion deserued that he should be rightfully punished? but if we respect the secrete former de∣termination of the Deuine reiection, and induratiō which was before in the secret mynde of God. It is out of all question, that the same induration proceéded not of the rebelliō of Pharao, but that his Rebellion sprang out of his induration rather, as suc∣ceédyng thereupon.

Wherfore if we interpret of the wrath of GOD to be a pu∣nishment of Gods seuere Iustice,* 1.418 we deny not, but that the same falleth vpon none, saue such as through their owne wickednesse haue deseruedly procured their owne destructiō. And this wrath of God in deéde as it is alwayes righteous, so doth it alwayes follow, but neuer go before the vngodlynes, which is either pe∣culiar to euery person, or is parcell of the inheritable infection of the first father Adam. But if vnder this vocable Wrathe, that will and decreé of the highest God be noted, wherewith those are secluded from Election, whiche are called the vessels of wrath. Then is Osorius raungyng Fable both false & absurde, where∣with

he would seéme to persuade, that it is a very easie thyng to be chaunged from wooden and earthly vessels, into ves∣sels of siluer and gold, if we will our selues, and that it is in euery mans owne power to be made a vessell of wrath or a vessell of mercy as him listeth. As though Gods will were of no force at all to determine vpon matters, but as it is regulated by mans will. And as though it were also as necessary then to be made a vessell of mercy, whenas mā is not willing to be made a vessell of wrath. But such a vessell doth neuer display his light∣somnesse in the house of God, as I thinke (Osori.) But to what purpose then belongeth that saying of Paul.* 1.419 It is neither of him that willeth nor of him that runneth, but of God that taketh mer∣cy: If Gods euerlastyng decreé be of no more force in these mat∣ters to determine vpon any certeintie, but such as must be gui∣ded by the raungyng rule of mans will: which is as much as ac∣cordyng to the old sayd law Quite agaynst the heare. Albeit I will not deny in y^e meane tyme, that we are not able to discerne truly betwixt the vessels of wrath, and the vessels of mercy, but by good or euill workes, that we seé to be in them. Yea it cōmeth hereby many tymes to passe, that such as sometymes seémed in their owne conceites to be them selues the vessels of wrath, be∣yng afterwardes endued with better Grace, doe in processe of of tyme feéle the contrary. But this hangeth not now vpon the cobbwebbe of mans will, but dependeth wholy vpon Gods Ele∣ction: which beyng alwayes agreable and stable in it selfe, is ne∣uer chaūged, how variable soeuer the motiōs of men are. Ther∣fore if this be the very meanyng of Osorius wordes, his Iudge∣ment is commendable enough. But it is one thyng to be adiud∣ged somewhat in the opinion of men, Osorius, & an other thyng to be directed by the vnsearcheable counsell of God.

* 1.420What then will some man say. Did God create his cre∣tures to the end to destroy them? did he create his creature to wrath & destructiō? Is it credible that his will is to har∣den the hartes of any to wickednesse, whose will is to haue all saued? or that he who hath predestinate his creatures to glory, can cast thē into destruction? And can it be possible that he, who doth testifie of him self in the Scriptures, which will not the death of a Sinner, but rather that he liue and

be conuerted, shall now alter his nature and will not the lyfe, but the destruction of a Sinner? whenas also all things are good that God hath created, can he hate the worke of his owne handes? yea not onely after he hath created it, but also before hee hath made it? I am not ignoraunt Osorius of these and such lyke your not absurdities, but cauilles rather, which you are wont to thrust vpon vs now and then.

To the which to make a playne and distinct aūswere. First,* 1.421 the nature of causes it selfe must bee considered. Then must a playne distinction of Gods will be opened. For when question is made of Gods will, the Scripture doth not speake therof al∣wayes after one maner & phrase of speach, nor expresse the same euery where after one onely signification. Sometymes this name of will is taken in a most large and ample signification,* 1.422 for that which Gods decreé hath determined shall come to passe in all matters. As in that place of Paule. God doth take mercy on whom he will haue mercy, and doth indurate whom he will. &c. And agayne.* 1.423 God did what soeuer he would doe in heauen and in earth. And in an other place. Bycause it seemeth so good in thyne eyes O Father. Luke. 10.* 1.424 And this will, seruyng in eche respect to as many purposes, as the foreknowledge and essence of God,* 1.425 doth both go before all other meane and secondary causes in or∣der of tyme, and of it owne power also doth dispose all thynges (good Syr) not as though it would enforce them, agaynst their willes, by any outward coaction, but doth so dispose and order thyngs w^t a certeine secrett power, as y^t through their voluntary and seruiceable yeldyng, they atteyne at the last to the same pur∣pose, whereunto the will of God did first & chiefly foreordeyne and direct them. Whereby it commeth to passe, that though the will of God of it selfe make no persons euill properly, yet that wicked persons notwithstandyng shall accōplish the will of God,* 1.426 if not accordyng to the euent and successe properly and absolute∣ly, yet by accidentall meanes. So that on this wise, albeit the destruction of the wicked proceéde from the voluntary corruptiō of man, not from Gods will as from the nearest cause, yet do not those wicked persons fulfill their wickednes without Gods will. For in as much as it is a due scourge and punishment of sinne, man is not punished therewith without Gods will. Agayne by

this word will is signified sometymes that, wherewith God (by his expresse word) doth notifie him selfe to be delighted, to be well pleased, and which is acceptable in his sight. Of whiche sort are all thynges whiche be naturally good and commendable. In which significatiō, God is sayd not to will wickednes, nor to will the death of a sinner:* 1.427 And of this will speaketh the Apostle. This is the will of God, your sanctification. And this will the faythfull onely do performe properly and simply.

We haue spokē now of will, we must now create somewhat of y^e order of causes.* 1.428 Wherein this is to be noted aboue all other. To witte that y^e first causes haue alwayes relatiō to the vttmost endes, & the meane & concurraūt endes, & effectes to the meane & middle causes. Forasmuch therfore as the will of god y^t is to say the decreé of God is the originall of all causes, we must then seeke out, what the last end is which may be answerable to this will:* 1.429 now y^e same is sufficiently discouered by Paul If God (sayth he) willing on the one side to shew hys wrath and to make his power knowne, do with much sufferaunce and lenyty beare with the Ves∣sels of wrathe prepared vnto destruction: and on the other side to make knowne the richesse of hys glory: towardes the vessels of mer∣cy, which he hath prepared to glory. &c. By which wordes who doth not easely perceaue that the last,* 1.430 and principall ende of Gods workmanship doth consist in this, not that wicked men should perish, but that the Larges of hys heauenly mercy should more mightely increase in the saluation of hys faythfull. Now because this could not be brought to passe by any other meanes, vnlesse there were some on the contrary part, vpon whome the seueritie of Gods Iustice might be exequuted: it seémed good therefore to the Almighty Creator of all the creation in this vn∣speakeable Workshop of the whole world) to dispose his vessels to seuerall vses, not all vnto honor, nor yet all vnto dishonor, but some he made seruiceable instrumentes of hys Iustice, other some meéte instruments of hys mercy: not y^t he created his crea∣tures to this effect, as to the finall and vtmost end of hys pur∣pose, that they should perish: but because he had so determined with himselfe in his secret counsell before the foundations of the world, not to haue mercy vpon all, therefore it could not other∣therwise be, but that such as should be forsaken of him, beyng

forsaken and yelded ouer to themselues, should fall away of ve∣ry necessitie. For Gods grace withdrawing assistaunce, mans imbecillity must withall neédes fall to the ground: and Nature being nowe ouerthrowne, Gods Iustice coulde not but execute his office, & punish greuously of very necessitie. And hereof cō∣meth the destruction of the reprobates & persecutors of hys peo∣ple:* 1.431 y^e efficient cause wherof cōsisteth truely in euery of their own corruption,* 1.432 but the cause deficient in the will of God.

And therefore we ought not to Iudge alyke of the causes of Election and Damnation. For although these be certayne brā∣ches of predestination, and concurre altogether in one kynde one originall and one end, yet do they differ notwithstanding in the maner. The fountayne & original of them both is the decreé of God and the ende is the glory of God. And yet is not Election to lyfe euerlasting of the same sort that reprobation to destructi∣on is.* 1.433 For hee hath chosen by making, hee doth reiect not by doyng somewhat, but rather by forsaking. And in the saluation of y^t Godly, y^t whol cause is so wholy shut vp in God, as y^t besides him no person nor cause can come betwixt, that may challenge any interest in the title of Election and Saluacion. But y^t mat∣ter goeth otherwise in the destruction of the reprobate, for albeit such as perishe are not damned at all without the will of God: yet besides this will also, y^t obstinate rebellion of mans will thru∣steth it self in, wherby they do worthely procure to thē selues de∣serued Damnation. For God doth neyther so cast of those whom he doth cast away, as one that did enforce them to commit filthi∣nes, but forsaketh euery such one and yeldeth him ouer to hys owne guiding. Now Freewill beyng nothing els but fraylty, and feéble weakenes it selfe vnable to defend the brickle inclina∣tion of nature, agaynst the monsturous assaultes of vnsatiable lust, yeldeth it selfe coward captiue to euery storme of suttle Tē∣tation. By meanes whereof if commeth to passe, that mans life beyng left voyde of the help of God, as a ship destitute of a Py∣lot, tossed to and fro with outragious wyndes and waues of the Sea, which of her self she cannot withstand,* 1.434 doth easily driue it self vpon the Rocke of damnation and rendes in peéces, hauing none other guyde but it self. But the estate of the Electe is after an other sorte, for whom GOD hath chosen those:

doth he not yeald ouer to their owne conduct, but stirreth them forward with the force of hys secret good will, and doth drawe thē vnto hym self, & doth so draw them, y^t beyng called they must neédes obay: moreouer he doth so call thē, that heé doth forwith Iustifie them y^t are called, and doth so Iustifie them with his freé and bountifull mercy, that he doth at y^t length glorifie thē whom he hath Iustified. In all wh Action of Saluation Gods Grace doth so accomplish all, and euery part thereof, as that nothing at all is left for mans will to glory vpon, but very much paraduen∣ture y^t may ouerthrow it.* 1.435 Wherupō the Apostle very aptly sayth, that it is neither of him that willeth nor of him that runneth but of God that taketh mercy, On the contrary part I meane in the ship∣wrack of damnation, mans wayward peruersnes beyng left vn∣to it self, doth therin throughly play all her partes so, y^t there is nothing now, wherew^t it may iustly accuse God: neyther is there any man condemned, but he that through hys own default doth purchase to himself damnation. In which damnation too things offer themselues in the meane tyme to be considered:* 1.436 not onely what he suffereth which hath deserued to be punished, but what he hath deserued which suffereth, and how righteouslye hee suf∣fereth: in the one whereof mans offence is declared, in the other Gods Iustice is discernable. The first whereof the deuines do call, the euill of the offence, thother the euill of the punishment: Paule calleth it the reward of Sinne, therefore whereas a man doth commit euill,* 1.437 and is punished for that euill, let hym thank hymself for it: But whereas he is righteously punished: herein let him not murmure against God as though he were the Author of euill: for that which is righteously done, can not be vnorderly done: Although the punishment seéme euill to him that suffereth y^t he would not suffer, yet he is himself the Author of that punishment, bicause he did that, which he ought not to haue done. Moreouer neyther is that thing forthwith euill in the sight of God, that appeareth euill to mans iudgement: these thinges therefore are to be wayed by the circumstances of the ende. For euen as the cloudy ouerspreading of the darckened night, doth not diminish any part of y^e cleare day light, but rather beautifie the lightsome clearenes of the bright sunneshine, euen so where the persequutors of the Church do dash sometyme on a Rock, &

are drowned,* 1.438 although it be euil to thē that perish properly, and of it own nature: yet in that they dash on the Rock and perish, in respecte of Gods ordinaunce, and in respect of the end where∣vnto all thinges are directed, it is not euill in the sight of God, but tourneth to good rather, and to the setting forth and beautifi∣ing of hys glory. So Augustine not vnfitly: It is good (sayth heé) that euills be, neyther is there any inconuenience in this that Euills may not happen without Gods will, which yet are performed contra∣ry to his will. That is to say, agaynst that rule and ordinaunce which hymselfe doth allow and commaund.

To conclude. Albeit the Saluation of the elect, and the de∣struction of the reprobate doe proceéde both from one originall, namely,* 1.439 from the secret counsell of almighty God: yet this same decreé neuerthelesse doth not expresse it selfe after one maner at all tymes, if you haue regarde to the maner of the operatiō. For the cause of Saluation of such as are saued, is so wholy shutte vppe in the closett of Gods mercy, that God onely and alone is the whole and onely efficient cause therof, so that the same cā by no meanes be ascribed to any other. But y^e damnation of the re∣probate, albeit can not escape the knowledge of the secrete pur∣pose of God, (bycause no one thyng be it of neuer so small value can be done without his will) yet if we seéke the true and efficient cause therof, whereunto may it be more properly imputed, then to Sinne? and to the Deuill the father of Sinne? But for as much as: God doth compell no man to committe wickednesse, but rather yeldeth them ouer whom he forsaketh to their owne lustes, hereupon doth it consequētly follow, that the first seédes of originall corruptiō (beyng destitute of the grace of God) suc∣kyng vppe more deadly poyson of ragyng lust by the contagi∣ous motions of it owne naturall will,* 1.440 cleane contrary to Gods will, is become by that meanes the cause and procurour of his owne destruction. The cause deficient wherof (as I vouched be∣fore out of Augustine) is onely in God:* 1.441 but the cause efficient cō∣sisteth no where els then in man onely.

These premisses considered and duely examined, I returne to the Question that was proposed.

Whether God by his bare decree did create his Creatu∣res to destruction,* 1.442 and made them vessels of wrath?

Whether we will not graunt that the promise of God was vniuersall?

Whether we may imagine such a will in GOD, as will not haue all to be saued and come to the knowledge of the truth?

I doe aunswere.* 1.443 Gods promise is without all controuersie generall, and is extended generally to all mankynde, yet with this Prouiso, All, whosoeuer do beleue or shall beleue in the sonne of God.

And there is no dought, but that his will doth agreably con∣discende with his promise at all tymes, and in eche respect very readyly bent,* 1.444 inclinable, and fauourable towardes the saluation of all ingenerall: so y^t those All be vnderstād with the same Pro∣uiso, to witte, all that are engraffed in Christ Iesu by fayth: A∣gayne, as vnder the name of this vniuersall subiect All (to speake with Augustine) not euery particuler of all the genera∣lities, but the generalities of euery particuler is comprehēded,* 1.445 (for els as All haue not the true fayth: so neither is the promise made vnto thē all,* 1.446 who do not beleue in the Sonne, nor is there any will in God to saue them, but to cast them of rather.

* 1.447But as concerning Creation, if the end therof besought for. I doe aunswere, that God did create man vnto righteousnesse. For we were created to good workes, accordyng to the testimonie of Paule: That we should walke in them. But man abusing the freédome of his owne will, contrary to the will of God, to witte contrary to the rule of righteousnesse, fallyng quite away from righteousnesse into vnrighteousnesse, did at the length through the same vnrighteousnesse throwe him selfe headlong downe into vnrecouerable destructiō. What them? Shall we say y^t these thyngs chaunced w^tout Gods knowledge? & agaynst his will? or els w^t his wil, or not regardyng y^e same. For one of these we must graunt of very necessitie. If we say, agaynst his will, we shall ouerthrow his omnipotēcie: if, without his knowledge, we shall then empayre the excellency of his wisedome: If you say that he regardeth it not: I beseéche you what difference wilbe betwixt you, and that filthy pigge Epicure: It remaineth then: That we boldly pronoūce, y^t this work was atchieued, God not only wil∣lyng it, but foreknowyng, & withall permittyng it so to be done.

Which beyng agreéd vpon: there remaineth further to be enqui∣red, whether this will and sufferaūce of God were idle & fruite∣lesse or effectuall? but to assigne vnto God an idle and fruitlesse foreknowledge (as the Epicures do) we are altogether forbiddē by the Scriptures. Then if we graunt, that this is accōplished through the effectuall and determinate decreé and will of God, and withall that no man is able to withstand his will: what shall we conclude then? That the Reprobate are altogether excusa∣ble, bycause the fault to their reprobation resteth wholy in God? This saying in deéde thus spoken might seéme to be somewhat paraduenture, if so be that God had not made man perfect, whē he created him at the first, and had not enioyned him a law and rule of righteousnesse, and had not strengthened him w^t a sound freédome of will, adding thereunto further a certeine seuere cau∣tion of wholesome counsell, and a fatherly forewarnyng of the daunger that would ensue. But now when as our first father Adam fell, we were all ouerwhelmed together within the selfe same downefall, in such wise that we were neither able to shake of from our shoulders that law of Iustice, wherewith we were yoaked: nor accomplish the perfection therof, were the freédome of our will neuer so mightie. And therfore he that doth offende, hath no cause whereof hee ought to quarell with God:* 1.448 but hath matter of contagion enough, and more then enough to quarell a∣gaynst his owne lustes, Adam and the Deuill: Whereupon we conclude at the length, that the thynges which apperteine to de∣struction of mankynde can neither escape the knowledge & coun∣sell of God, and yet the prouidence of GOD to be neuerthelesse voyde altogether of blame and reproche.

But the Osorianes will deny that this ought to be at∣tributed to Predestination or Gods decree,* 1.449 but to hys suf∣feraunce onely. Certes this is not to be doughted, but that God doth permit and suffer the thinges which he hath decreéd: But they do winne nothing by thys distinction: seéing that they fall back into the same quauemire out of the which they can by no meanes cleare themselues. First whereas God vseth his suf∣feraunce, it is out of all question, that he doth the same witting∣ly and warily: furthermore whereas he had comprehended all those thinges: by hys vnsearcheable wysedome, and foresaw the

euentes thereof: we must neédes confesse that he was able of hys omnipotent power to forbid all what soeuer he were not willing should be done, if it had bene his good pleasure so to haue done: now my question is, why he would not? what? because he regar∣ded it not? but this swinish blockishnes of Epicure ought ney∣ther be admitted into any Christian cogitation: neyther can any such retchlesnes agreé with the gracious mercifulnes of God: what then? was not God sufficiently able? who shall let hym? doth there lack in him then any meanes to helpe? to thinke so, were heathnish infidelity. But some man will say: Seéing that the fall of Adam might haue bene stayed by an onely becke of Gods countenaunce, if it were not his pleasure so to do, why yet at the least would he not make stay of that welspring of Sinne in Adam?* 1.450 so that the same might not haue raunged to any fur∣ther infection of the posteritie. Finally why doth he dayly geue so great scope to Sathan, whom, he may so easily restrayne? The premisses considered, what remayneth? but that of Neces∣sity we yeld, that he did will y^e thinges which he foreknew would come to passe, as not restrayning the proceéding thereof, beyng otherwise of ability enough to stopp & ouerthrow it quite if heé would: Or els how shall Paules saying be true, He taketh mer∣cy on whom he will haue mercy, & he doth harden whom he will, if we make this an infallible rule that these thinges are suffered contrary to Gods will, or not performed by his will? forasmuch as he doth all what soeuer him listeth both in heauen & in earth.

Moreouer, whereas he is called by the predestinate counsell of God the Lamb slayne before the foundations of the world were layde, and before the fall of Adam: by what meanes (I pray you) could a playstere be prepared before the wounde made, but that through the same prouidence it was decreéd, y^t a wound should be made of Necessity?

* 1.451But loe a new onset agayn vpon vs: If this be true, then must it needes follow: that both God is the Author of Sinne, and withall that men were created by him to destruction also. I do aunswere to both the obiections. First that God is not the Author of Sinne, but the Author of his own creature: out of which creature sprin∣geth Sinne: so that Sinne now is the work of the Creature, not of the Creator. Secondly where it is obiected. That

God did create hys creatures to destructiō: this is most vntrue: for God doth condemne nothing of hys owne nature, but sinne onely: when God created man at the first, he created hym per∣fect, vpright,* 1.452 and without Sinne: he indued him also with freé, & absolute abilitie, not to sinne: thē he armed hym with sufficiēt furniture agaynst sinne, to witte: with an especiall admonitiō, so that the matter doth sufficiently declare it selfe, that God did so make man that he should not perish but be saued. Afterwardes sinne began to bud out, taking the sappe thereof not from God, but from Sathan,* 1.453 & the freéwill of man. Wherupon immediat∣ly ensued damnation, not layed vpon mans shoulders by reason of his creation, but willingly purchased by reason of his owne Sinne. For if Adam had stood fast, in that vprightnes, wherein he was created, and God had condemned hym then, beyng in that vprightnes, there might haue bene some cause peraduen∣ture that might haue moued him to this iust complaynt: That God by hys bare decreé had vniustly created hys owne creature to the end that he should be damned. But now sithence the whole race of mankinde did cast it selfe vnderfoote, through the default of hys own lust, and not through Gods default, this will be a good aunswere to the questiō: That God did not make hys crea∣ture vnto destruction, but that the creature it selfe, by defiling it selfe with sinne, contrary to the dignitie of hys creation,* 1.454 hath made it selfe an abhominable and vgly chaungeling, and trans∣formed it selfe from the creature of God, into the creature of the Serpēt. So that the creator himself in destroying hys creature may well be adiudged to haue condemned now not his creature which he made, but the creature of Sathan, which the Ser∣pent destroyed.

But you will say: Then was the Image of God deformed as soone as it was created. I know it: but by whose default? by Gods default? or mans default? but why did not the good creator of the world forbid it to be done, when as he foresaw it would come to passe?* 1.455 As though he gaue not an especiall commaundement to the same effect in playne wordes. Nay rather if your rea∣son be so captious, as will not be satisfied but with naturall rea∣son: I might more reasonably demaunde this reasonable questi∣on of you? why dyd not man obay the expresse restraynt of God?

For what do ye reade? was not Adam forbidden to touch the vn∣happy Apple of vnlucky knowledge? was he not carefully ad∣monished, and forewarned by denouncing the daunger that would ensue thereupon? And beyng sufficiently armed with the power of Freewill, hadd he not strength enough in him selfe to take heéde? why thē did he not looke to him selfe at the least in sea∣son, if he were not willyng to beleue and obey Gods aduertize∣ment? Certes as lōg as her reprosed him selfe, & his whole sauetie in the saue keépyng and custody of the Lord, he was in no daun∣ger at all. But settyng Gods commaundement at naught once, whenas he chose rather to become the bondslaue of Sathan, as∣pyring to be as wise as his Creator and God: here what should Gods Iustice doe now, which was not bounden to be any more carefull for an other bodyes Seruaūt? And yet for all this, God of his mercy did not so forsake, and yeld ouer his creature, al∣though his Creatour most vnkyndely forsooke him,* 1.456 beyng his Creature. He did beautifie this runneaway with the light of Reason, whereby he might know, what ought to be eschued and what ought to bee embraced. Furthermore to make him more carefull to regard vertue, he planted into him very deépe rootes and prickes of conscience, hee added moreouer Statutes and Lawes, not onely emprinted within euery ones hart, but engra∣uen also outwardly in spectible Tables.

Finally besides these written ordinaunces of the law, he did euer now and then among, rayse vppe Prophetes vnto them, who with liuely voyce and teachyng, should neuer cease by ay∣dyng, by promising, by terrifieng, by obtestyng, by sweéte exhor∣tyng, briefly by all maner of meanes should neuer cease to re∣teine the people in an vniuersall obedience, accordyng to order & duetie. What shall we say to this also? that he furnished the ve∣ry Gentiles them selues (though they were neuer so beastly and barbarous) with the doctrine of Philosophers oftentymes, with coūselles of grauen men, with wonderfull helpes of good letters and preceptes of Philosophy, persuadyng them to all thynges, and withall not sparyng to pricke them foreward to the embra∣cing of vertue and eschewing of vyce, with horrible examples of∣tentymes as it were with a spurre? I beseéke you now what wāted to be added more either to Gods Iustice, to expresse mercy?

or to his mercy, to expresse Iustice? or to his diligēce, to expresse his continuall fatherly carefulnesse?

But here wanted naturall strength (you will say). Yet was not God to bee blamed for this, but mans folly rather. And yet neither in this behalfe, did Gods fatherly goodnesse deny his as∣sistaunce: for euen for this so are also he made a playster: And to Cure this vniuersall poyson of nature, he gaue as vniuersall a Mythridatū, made with the precious bloud of his onely begot∣ten Sonne: wherewith the weakest Creature in the world, and the most ouerwhelmed with Sinne might easily atteyne reme∣dy of eternall lyfe.

For as much therefore as mankinde was of euery side so wōderfully fensed, with so many and so great benefites of Gods gracious mercy: what is there that any man may eyther want to be supplied by thys our most bountifull God, and Creator? or what could this good and mercifull God, haue done more li∣berally for hys creatures? but here bursteth out more contenti∣on and quarreling amongest the deuines, wherein they plunge thēselues to much. For whereas this fayth in Christ is not per∣tinent to all persons, and that the greater sort of people do not acknowledge the sonne of God, and that he is not so faythfully Reuerenced, as becommeth: and that they repose not the safety of their imbecillitie in this Christ as they should: now commeth here the question, what the cause should be then of this hys re∣iectiō? from whence it proceédeth? from out the will of men? or or from out the decreé of God? or out of both causes beyng cou∣pled together? Osorius here grounding hys authoritie vpon his fine Cicero doth very mightely affirme. That they were ther∣fore made the vessels of wrath because they would not be made the vessels of mercy. But how this may be true, I can not conceaue sufficiētly. Although I do not deny this, that those which eare made vessels of wrath are altogether replenished w^t a rebellious will, wherewith they do voluntarily forsake the of∣fered grace of their vocation, yet this same will is not the cause of reprobation, but the effect rather: & doth follow, and not go before it, and it selfe is made rather, then maketh reiectiō. For neither such as be razed out of the booke of Election, are there∣fore become the vessels of wrath, because they did forsake mer∣cye:

but they doe therfore throw away mercy offred vnto thē, by∣cause beyng excluded from the grace of Electiō, they were fore∣appoynted to be y^e Uessels of wrath & castawayes: so that Osor. might haue spoken more truely, on this wise: y^t such were made y^e vessels of wrath, whō God would not haue to be the Uessels of mercy: And for thys cause those Pharaonicall persequutors of the church were subiect to wrath: not onely because they will not be partakers of Gods mercy, but also because they cannot.

* 1.457Besides this also, in as much as all the Mercies of God are contayned in Christ onely, and in the knowledge of Christ, as as it were fast lockt in the Ark of God: in what sense will Osor. say, that they which will not beleeue are made the Uesselles of wrath? as though the sinne of Infidelity did not rather proceéde of the ignoraunce of Iudgement, then of any motion of will, & of purpose. For it consisteth not within the compasse of naturall strength,* 1.458 for euery man that will, to be able to know Christ as him listeth: But such as it is geuē vnto frō aboue, that they may be able to know and haue a will also to know Christ. Otherwise in what sense do the scriptures teach? that Christ shalbe the stone of offence, and Rock to stumble vpon to them, who doe not beleeue and do stumble vpon the worde of fayth, whereunto they are mar∣ked, if the whole matter were atchieued not by y^e decreé of God, but did hang vpon the determinatiō of man:* 1.459 euē as y^e Apostles doth testifie in an other place that all do not apprehend fayth. A∣gayne we heare also by the testimony of the same Paule. That it is neyther of him that runneth, nor of him that willeth, but of God that taketh mercy:* 1.460 finally of thē which are ordeined (sayth Luke) to eternall lyfe, and whose harts (as the same Luke recordeth) God doth open,* 1.461 to make them know the word of God. And agayne the same Paule doth deny them to haue knowne the Lord of glory for if they had knowne hym, they would not haue crucified Christ. But what was the cause, that they knew him not? but because the whole matter thereof rested not in their owne willes: but be∣cause by Gods secret decreé,* 1.462 it was not geuen to them that had eares to heare: and eyes to seé. For their eares were made deafe that they should not heare: and their hartes were blynded, that they should not vnderstand. And therefore the Lord himself doth openly pronounce:* 1.463 that manye were called but fewe are chosen.

Moreouer in an other place, the same Lord calleth his flock a lit∣tle flocke. And why doth he call it a little flocke, (good sir) I be∣seech you? If Gods mercy so largely poured abroad and so freé∣ly offered (as you seeme to blaze it out) doe extend it selfe to all persons indifferently without exception, why do not all persons then indefferētly repayre vnto Christ? at the least, why is not the greatest part drawne vnto him? forsooth because they will not (say you) You are come back agayne to the first question: For I demaund what the cause is why they will not, but because it is not geuen vnto them? so that ye may perceaue now, the very welspring of this fountayne springeth not from mans will, but from the counsell of God. Or els how doth Christ name them which be hys, to be but few in number? but that he foreknew as∣suredly that it would be so: or how did he foreknow it? but be∣cause it was decreed first of an infallible certeinty: And therfore Christ teaching his disciples spake openly and playnly vnto thē That it was geuē vnto them to know the misteries of the kingdome but to others in parables,* 1.464 that seeing they might not see, and hear∣ing they might not heare. Likewise Peter confirmed by the same spirite (speaking of the rock of offence) doth openly denounce,* 1.465 not onely what they should do which should be offēded at Christ, but also that they were ordayned of very purpose so to doe. And yet I will not deny that which they teach of the mercy of God. I do know and confesse that it is farre and wyde dispersed abroad euery where, and that the same mercy of GOD denyeth it selfe to no person (as Augustine sayth) but to such as will not receaue it. But in thys same very mercy neuerthelesse two thinges are to be considered:* 1.466 That God doth not onely offer those promises of benefites and blessings, of his meére mercy & bounteous libe∣ralitie: but also that he doth inspire y^e hart of man inwardly with hys spirite, to receaue those thinges that be offered.

And so after the first maner of speakyng, I do confesse, that there is a certayne generall grace of God,* 1.467 and a certayne freé choyse of Election layed open to all, without exception: that he may receaue it, that hath a will to receaue it, so that vnder thys word layd open Gods outward calling be vnderstanded, which consisteth in preceptes, in exhortatiōs, in Rules, writtē either in the tenne Cōmaundementes, or in the conscience, or in prea∣ching

of the word.* 1.468 And in this sense may we rightly say: y^e Pha∣rao hymself wanted not the grace of God, nor Saule: no nor any of the rest, whom he did oftentimes allure with gētle promises: terrifie w^t miracles, reward with giftes, enuyte to repentaūce with prolonging of punishment: suffer with much patience allu∣ring & calling all men dayly to amendment of lyfe. All which be infallible tokens of hys mercifull will, called Voluntas Signi.

But after the second maner of speakyng: if we behold the mercy of GOD, and that grace which maketh acceptable or if we respect that will of his, wherewith he not onely willeth all to be saued, but wherewith hee bringeth to passe, that these whom he will, shalbe saued: the matter doth declare it selfe suffi∣ciently:* 1.469 that that Mercy and Grace of acceptyng those thyngs, whereunto they are called is not layd open for all and euery one indifferently, but is distributed through a certeine speciall dis∣pensation and peculiar Election of God: whereby they that are called accordyng to the purpose of his grace, are drawen to cō∣sent. By meanes wherof it commeth to passe, that the same cal∣lyng accordyng to Gods purpose fayling, euery man hath not in his own hand to chuse, or refuse that earnest desire and gene∣rall Grace indifferently offered, but such as haue either recea∣ued the gift of God, or are denyed the gift of God. Neither doth the matter so wholy depende vpon the choyse of our will, either in chusing, or refusing totally: for then might it be verified, that there was no Predestination, before the foundations of the world were layd, if our Electiō were necessaryly guided by our willes, and that our will were the foundation of our Saluatiō. Therfore whereas they say, that God doth accept them, which will embrace his grace, and reiect thē which will not receaue it, is altogether vntrue. Nay it rather had bene more cōuenient to fetch our foūteine frō the wellspring of Grace, then frō y^e puddle of our owne will. So that we might speake more truly, on this wise:* 1.470 That God doth endue vs with his grace, and fauorable countenaunce, bycause we should be willyng to embrace his or∣dinaunces and Commaundementes: on the contrary part, as concernyng those that will not receaue his grace offered, that such do worthely perish. And that the very cause, that they will not receaue it, doth hereof arise, bycause their will is not holpē:

and that they do therfore not receaue it, bycause they are not thē selues receaued first.

For as touchyng the Obiection vrged out of Chrisostome,* 1.471 that God did as much vnto Pharao in deede, as hee could doe, to saue him: if ye referre Gods doyng there to that will which is called N••on signi, but to beneplaciti: which God could & would vtter in those, whom he made Vessels of mercy,* 1.472 wherof S. Paule maketh mention treatyng of the mercy of Predesti∣nation: surely the Scripture is quite repugnaunt agaynst it, saying: God did harden the hart of Pharao. For if GOD did harden the hart of Pharao, how then did he to Pharao, as much as he might?* 1.473 But if Pharao did harden his owne hart, after that God had not mollified his hart, had not tamed his in∣solencie, and not bowed him to godly inclinations (which he is accustomed to doe to his elect.) In what sence then is he sayd to haue done as much to Pharao, as to his other Vessels of mercy, whom Election had Predestinated to be saued?

But to let Chrisostome passe a whiles.* 1.474 Let vs heare Augu∣stine hereupon, and make him as it were Iudge of the cause. For where question is made. Whether God did call all men in∣differently by a generall inspiration to fayth and Saluatiō. Au∣gustine doth make this aunswere.

For as much as vocation or callyng is taken two maner of wayes, to witte internall, and exter∣nall? true it is (sayth he) that all men are indifferently called after the maner of that externall calling: but all are not as indifferent∣ly drawen by this internall vocation. And if the cause be sought for, why all are not drawen indifferently, but that to some it is ge∣uen, to others some not geuen. He maketh this aunswere. Some there be that will say (quoth he) it is the will of man. But we say, it is the Grace and Predestination of God. But God doth require mē to beleue. I confesse (sayth he) yet is fayth neuerthelesse the gift of God. For he that doth require faith, doth promise withall, that he will bring to passe, that they shall performe that which he com∣maundeth. &c.

And agayne, If it be demaunded: whether mercy be therefore geuen to man, bycause he beleueth: or that mercy were therfore be∣stowed vpon him, bycause he should become beleuyng: to this questiō he maketh the very aunswere of the Apostles. I haue obteined

mercy, bycause I should be faythfull. He doth not say, bycause I was faythfull. &c. And this much hetherto out of Augustine. Let vs now come to Pighius. And bycause we are happened vp∣on this place to discourse vpon, to witte, the equall dispensatiō of Gods mercy: It shall not be amisse to consider briefly his opi∣nion herein, agreéyng with Osorius altogether. For these be the speaches of Pighius. God doth offer him selfe (sayth he) an e∣quall and indifferent father to all persons: he ouerspreadeth all mē generally with the one selfe same gladsome beames of mer∣cy and clemency without any difference.* 1.475 Now if some through this lenitie become tractable, and other some hereby made more indurate: this discrepaunce proceédeth frō the corruption of mē. There is no vnequallitie of distribution of lenitie, and mercy in God. For proofe whereof takyng a Similitude out of the Epi∣stle to the Hebrues the iiij. Chap. For as not euery land wate∣red with like bountyfulnesse of the heauenly dew doth yeld lyke fruite to the husbandman, but one land yeldeth forth corne, an o∣ther thornes & brambles, y^e one wherof is blessed of God, y^e other accursed, euen no lesse ioyously doth the mercy of God shyne in∣differently, with generall and equall largesse and bountie to∣wardes all vniuersally: which beyng set wyde open to all alike, doth deny it selfe to none, but such as will refuse it them selues. But some turne to amēdemēt of life through this mercy, others some do abuse this mercy to more outragious licentiousnes of sumyng. And agayne fetchyng a similitude frō the heate of the Sunne. Whereas the Sunne yeldeth one selfe same heate: we doe seé that through the same, the earth is made more stiffe and hard, and y^e waxe softened and made more plyable. Hereupō Pi∣ghius gathereth. That, what soeuer difference is betwixt the good and the reprobate, the same wholy to issue out of y^e corrup∣tion of men, and not out of the will of God.

* 1.476But our Expositours haue sufficiently aunswered this slip∣per deuise, that this Assertion of Pighius, and of his mate Oso∣rius, that Gods mercy is powred alike into all men, is vt∣terly false and absurde, & where they do affirme, that God ma∣keth no choyse in the dispensation of his Grace, & that there is great difference betwixt the godly & the vngodly: in deéde that there is great difference betwixt the good & bad we do not deny.

But where they doe ascribe the principall motion, and efficient cause hereof in mans will onely, and not in God onely, they are altogether deceaued. For as concernyng the common nature of mā,* 1.477 truly in this we may with more certeintie determine equa∣bilitie of condition in mankynd, as that they reteine one sembla∣ble condition and qualitie of freé choyse, for as much as all be∣yng created out of one lumpe, are alike all poysoned alike with one kynde of infectiō, as men that be altogether vnable of them selues to doe any thyng auayleable to Saluation. And for as much as this imbecillitie doth infect all mākynde alike, as with a generall pestilence: It appeareth therfore euidently, that this difference standeth not so much vpon the determination of their will: or at least if it stand vppon their will, yet that it doth not proceéde first from mans will, but from the callyng of God, whiche offereth it selfe not alike to euery one, nor after one maner to all ingenerall, but doth diuersly drawe some af∣ter one sort, and some after an other. For as I sayd before: The Scriptures haue set downe a double maner of callyng, the one wherof is generall and outward. The other is inward, accor∣dyng to purpose: to witte, the callyng of them, whose willes the holy Ghost doth enspire and enlighten with an inward effec∣tuallnesse.

But this Similitude of the Clay and Waxe is ridiculous and worthy to be laughed at.* 1.478 Bycause that this distinction can not be appliable to Freewill after the fall of Adam. For of the whole ofspryng of Adam, not some be plyable as Waxe, nor some lumpish as hard earth. For where God doth fashion ves∣sels of one kynde of Clay (as Paule sayth) some vnto honour, some vnto dishonour: no mā is so madd to affirme that the Clay is the cause of this difference, but the Potter rather.

Moreouer to as small purpose serueth that place to the He∣brues:* 1.479 which treateth not of Grace & Freewill: but of the word of God, and men, whom he doth exhort by way of demonstratiō, and cōparison of frutefull grounde, to receaue the word of God fruitefull and professe the same with effect. The same also is to be vnderstanded of that Parable of the good ground, yeldyng to the husbandman plenty and aboundaunce of fruite, mentioned in y^e Gospell. But how may these be applyed to Freewill? or what

will Pighius coyne hereof? If Gods word take roote in none, but such as be good, what auayleth this sentence to establish the doc∣trine of Freewill? For the question is not here, whether they onely be good, which receaue the word of eternall lyfe effectually: But this is the pointe that must be touched. From whence men re∣ceaue habilitie to be made good: of the nymblenesse of their owne will? or of the callyng of God? And therfore that Parable ser∣ueth to no purpose in this case, as beyng applied for none other end, but to signifie the dispensation and disposition of Gods ho∣ly word, which in a maner may aptly be compared to seede, wh though the husbandman do sow vpon euery ground indifferēt∣ly, yet it yealdeth forth fruite but in a fewe, yea & in those also that be good groundes.

But hauing now rent in sunder these slender and trifling cob webbes. The aduersaries notwithstanding be neuer a deale the more quieted, but hauing pyked together a fresh supply of skip∣tacks, do rush vpon the grace of predestination with a new Hoo∣boube agayne, for the maynteinaunce of Freewills quarrell. For with these shuttlecocks do these Redshankes with their Colo∣nell Osor. set vpō vs:* 1.480 for to Admitte (say they) that God doth make choyse but of a few, and passe ouer an infinite nūber of others: this seemeth to argue no small repugnācie in Gods mercy, & a wonderfull crueltie in hym: neyther is it conso∣nant to Reason. For if he suffer the more number to perish because he will not saue them, he is cruell: if he cannot saue them, he is not omnipotent: Moreouer if he cast them of without iust cause of offence, or deserte, he is vnrighteous: if in equall cause he make vnequall distributione of hys E∣lection, he shalbe iudged an acceptor of persons.* 1.481 But the al∣mighty and most mercifull God, doth nothing now, that is not in all respectes most consonaunt to reason, no cruelty, no vnrighteousnes finally no one thing that is not repleni∣shed with goodnes.

* 1.482Albeit this mowsy and drossy chaffe long sithence blowne a∣broad in y^e eyes of Augustine by the Pelagianes, hath bene suf∣ficiently fanned away in hys booke entituled De articulis falso impositis: Yet following Augustine herein (more then I neéde) somewhat to please Osorius withall, least he exclayme agayne

that his argumentes are not throughly resolued: I will auswere in few wordes on thys wyse. It cannot be denyed that few are chosē, and many called: yet is not the goodnes of God any ioate impeached in this respect, nor his cruelty encreased. First in that he did choose few, or any at all: was an especiall work of his goodnes. Then, in that it pleased hym to proclayme a generall calling to the participacion of hys Gospell for all men vniuer∣sally, was also a poynt of great clemency: but in that those y^t are called do not come, proceéded not of any cruelty in God, no nor yet is any fault thereof to be layd to hys charge, but vnto mens disobedience: but how can it be sayd to be mans fault say you, seéing that not their willes, but Gods predestination withstan∣deth them so, that they cannot be able to come? In deede that mens will is no obstacle vnto them to come, this doth no man affirme: for hereof springeth all the faulte y^t is in man.* 1.483 Agayne to saye that Gods eternall Predestination is no preiudice to them that fall away, surely no man can deny this likewise: but how this predestination of God is an Estoppell, must be seene: not by powringe in new poyson (for that neédeth not) but by for∣saking the olde: thus therefore the will of man is an obstackle, but not alone: So is Predestination also an obstackle, but not without the will of man. So that here both mans will worketh, and Gods predestination worketh, ech one in hys owne kynde, but after a seuerall maner of operacion: in the difference where∣of, because Osorius will seeme so bussardly blinde, we will not refuse to open it vnto hym.

And first Gods Predestination in deéde hath her operation according to the infallible will of hys most freé decreé, not so much in the thinges themselues, as most inespeciall in the wils of men: and expresseth in this their will such a kynde of o∣peration, that it felfe in the meane tyme is forced of none, and doth alwayes goe before the actions of mans will, and doth guyde and gouerne those wills: whiche direction and conduct mans will doth attēd vpon: which withall worketh also in things subiect vnto it, and after a certaine maner of her owne, doth moue it selfe freély, that is to say, doth with earnest affection bēd it selfe willingly of her owne accord, and voluntary inclination, to the thinges which it embraceth, or despiseth: for it doth ney∣ther

choose any thing, but that it willeth: nor refuseth any thing, but that it selfe willeth not: finally attempteth nothing at all, but willingly, that is to say of her owne accord, and with a very willing minde. And yet not altogether so freély as Osorius surmiseth whiche is in very deéde cause of Osorius hys error herein, and drowneth hys iudgement most in this question.

For as often as he heareth mencion made, that will doth vse her certaine freé choyse, in consenting or dissenting: he drea∣meth by and by, that the same will is such as is subiect to the di∣rection of none other, but is at her own libertie: and is endued with full and absolute power in her selfe (whiche power the Greékes do call 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, or 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 to eschew y^e thinges that it willeth,* 1.484 and to do the thinges that it willeth, so that it doth nothing of Necessitie, but which it might otherwise do ac∣cording to it owne pleasure if it will. Agayne if a man make ne∣uer so little motion of the purpose of predestination, he doth by and by so interprett thereof, as though nothing were left for man at all to be able to conceaue with reason, or deliberate with iudgement, or make choyse of, through any voluntary mo∣tion of will, but to be enforced to all thinges by a certeine exter∣nall coaction: as it were by vnauoydeable and fatall Necessitie. Both wh are vtterly false: & to speake directly, y^e very dotage of Osorius. For as we do not despoyle will of her libertye, nor ba∣nysh it out of the worlde, nor raze it out of our writinges, so doe we not magnifie it like an Idoll, we do not root it out of nature, but we make it subiect to God: nor do deny that it is freé after a certayne maner, but do declare in what sort it is freé: for then it is freé, when it is made free: we do not so derogate from it, as though in attempting,* 1.485 or Relenting, it had no feeling or sense: but we do neyther esteéme it of so great a price, as though it ac∣chieued any thing of her own strength, without the speciall con∣duct of Gods predestination. Moreouer we doe neyther so esta∣blishe thys same Predestination, working in mens willes, as though it enforced them agaynst their willes, and violently to do the thinges they would not.* 1.486 For will cannot chose but will, yea willingly alwayes, and freely, what soeuer it doth, nor can do any thing, but that it willeth. Or els will were no will at all whether it did wel or otherwise. But to will well, and to do well,

she is not able of her selfe, but boroweth her abilitie thereunto from els where: And yet to do euill, hath it more then enough in it selfe, yea without any helpe at all, which she doth both will of her selfe, and doth of her self bring to passe freely: albeit not al∣together so freely yet, but that this freedome is alwayes capti∣uate w^t miserable thraldome and bondage. For will beyng left destitute of heauēly assistance, is so subiect & seruile to her natu¦rall lust,* 1.487 & ouerwhelmed w^t backward affectiōs: y^t when it doth euill it cā do no better of it self though it would: nor is of it self able to do any thing y^t it doth otherwise, thē of very Necessitie.

Whereby appeareth euidently what kynde of freédome mans will enioyeth: which whether it consent to good thyngs, can neyther will nor do any thing of it selfe, beyng not assisted: a∣gayne if it dissent, cannot otherwise dissent, but of very Neces∣sity, beyng left ouer to her owne strength:* 1.488 For so deadly an infe∣ctiō hath poysoned the very Rootes & whole ofspring of nature, that it is neyther able to will any good thing, but being holpen by grace, no nor so much as to think a good thought.

What then? shall there be nothing left (say you) in the power of mans freedome. Yes truely Osorius I do not spoyle mans will so naked, that it can do nothing in heauenly thinges: but your opinion tendeth rather to this effect, that Gods prede∣stination can appoynt no certeinty in humayne acccions. For if mans will do possesse such a full and absolute freedome, as you say, as can by no meanes be subiect: what scope then geue you to Gods Election, but that it performe nothing at all freely, but be directed alwayes by the free conduct of some forren guyder, so that the whole force hereof now be not of him that calleth, but of him that is called rather. But if according to Paules doctrine, the whole exployt of thinges be gouerned by hym that calleth onely: what shall become of mans freedome then? If you will cut these two asunder, and yealde part thereof to will, and part to Predestination, ascribing all to mans power and abili∣tye, and little or nothing at all to Gods predestination: why then do you not instruct vs distinctly, what, and how much ech of them doth performe? and withall wherein the diuersitie and difference of them both consisteth? which if you will not distinguishe duely and orderly according to their naturall and proper distinctions

what other doctrine will ye teach vs but that Gods predestina∣tion must needes appeare both in order of tyme to be first,* 1.489 and elder, and in power alwayes more mighty and farre surmoun∣ting all the force of mans will? which beyng graunted, what will follow here of at the length? but that mans choyse will beé pro∣ued at the length so, & none otherwise freé, but y^t it must alwaies be in bondage, eyther to Gods grace beyng holpen to good, or to her owne lust, beyng cast of to wickednes.

But me seémeth I do heare what the secrett whisperings of Pelagius brood, and amongst them chiefly Osorius the stought Champion of that crew will bark agaynst thys.

To consent or not to consent (say they) is in our own po∣wer, nor is the grace of God otherwise effectuall, but as we embrace hys ayde and assistaunce offered vnto vs.* 1.490 Where∣vpon they conclude at the length, that it is in our owne power eyther to enterteine, the grace of God, or to for∣sake it.

This consequent we deny, as the which beyng made without all forme of art,* 1.491 is also as voyde of all ground of truth. As con∣cerning assenting, or dissenting: I doe confesse that these moti∣ones are numbred amongest the residue of the naturall powers of mans will, if we do consider of them, as in their bare and na∣ked powers,* 1.492 without their obiectes. But to assent rightly to the thinges whiche appertayne vnto fayth, and Gods calling: Au∣gustine doth aunswere very discretly, That vnto this we are al∣together vnable of our selues, but that our abilitie hereunto pro∣ceadeth wholy from hym, which doth first bring to passe, that of vn∣willing, we may be made willing, and doth draw them that are ob∣stinate to obedience, creating a new hart within thē to make them hys owne willing, voluntary, and seruiceable seruauntes. Moreo∣uer where they say that grace is none otherwise effectuall vnlesse we doe put our helping handes also together with grace: and that none are holpen but such as endeuour ther∣unto of their owne accord. It is true also, and the reason is: because God doth worke in man not with anye forraygne con∣straynt onely, as he vsually accustometh in brute beastes, and stoanes, but with mans own voluntary inclination and motion: But from whence this voluntary motion (in thinges appertay∣ning

to God inespecially) doth arise, Augustine will teach you:* 1.493 who doth deny that this grace of God doth finde any good will in vs, but doth make our wills to be good. And agayne where he testifieth that no man is able to resort to this grace for ayde, but whose stepps the Lord doth guyde thereunto: in so much that he boldly pronoun∣ceth, that the beginning of Grace is euen to feele a want of grace.

Now therefore followeth vpon these propositions thus graunted, that whersoeuer Gods effectuall grace is,* 1.494 there is no defect of will: on the contrary part, wheresoeuer appeareth any defect of will, there Gods grace is vneffectuall: which is com∣prehended in these ij. operations: namely: in eternall calling, and inward drawing: so that the receptacle of grace is within vs in deéde, but not as of our selues: but of the grace of God. But the refusall of grace is both in vs, and withall commeth of our own selues: and yet so neuerthelesse of our owne selues, as that being reiected from Gods grace, we cannot but reiect his grace, nor are we able of our selues to do otherwise, though we would ne∣uer so fayne. And what kinde of freedome shall Will be sayd to enioy here, then the which no kinde of seruile thraldome can beé more miserable or more wretched?

But our good Syr here will deny this. That God accor∣dyng to the inestimable goodnesse of his fatherly nature doth reiect any at any tyme from his mercy, which is indif∣ferently and equally layed open for all ingenerall. Hereof hath bene sufficiently discoursed before. Yet I will adde this one saying. If Gods grace do reiect no person from him, then must we of necessitie confesse that he doth not make choyse of any like wise. For where all are generally and indifferently chosen with out respect, there surely is no man cast away. Agayne where is no reiection at all, there can be then no place for Election. For in choyse we are not sayd to chuse all, but to accept out of all, not euery one, but whom we like best: Where a choyse is, and no mā reiected, there is not a choyse or Electiō properly, but an accep∣taunce, and an allowaunce rather. Neither can that be tearmed a choyse of men, which the Greciās do call 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 after the proper maner of speakyng, except it be out of the multitude of a remnaunt. But God (say you) hath left no man so destitute of his grace, but that euery mā is able of him selfe to be cōuer∣ted

aud to embrace grace,* 1.495 if he will: or not to be conuerted, if he will not. Who cā better vnloase this knot then Augustine? When the Gospell is preached, why do not all beleue, they are not all of the father? If we shall say (sayth he) bycause they will not be cō∣uerted, we shall answere here, to what purpose then was this spoken? Conuertyng vs O Lord, thou shalt quicken vs. And agayne. O God of hostes conuerte thou vs. &c. And therfore the same Augustine speaketh not vnfitly in an other place. GOD doth helpe them that are conuerted, and forsaketh them that are forsa∣ken, but to be conuerted God him selfe helpeth. &c. If none be con∣uerted vnto God, but those onely whom him selfe helpeth: Here∣by it appeareth playnly, that they which turne thē selues away from GOD, do not therfore turne away, bycause they will not turne vnto him: but y^t they will not therfore turn rather, bycause God forsaketh them. That is to say, bycause the Lord of hostes conuertyng doth not quickē them, that they may haue will to be conuerted. Albeit I will not deny in the meane whiles that vn∣willyngnesse doth proceéde from men them selues & from their owne Freewill, yet this vnwillyngnesse notwithstandyng is not so freé of it selfe, that they which are forsaken can do otherwise, then they be vnwillyng of very Necessitie: neither can there be any defect of this will any where, but where Gods effectuall Grace was not present before. For as no man is good (as Augu∣stine witnesseth) that will not be good:* 1.496 so is there no man euill, but through his owne voluntary will, which will being forsaken of God, can neuerthelesse not do any otherwise but euill.

And why doth God forsake thē (will you say) why doth not God helpe them whom he hath created? Let me moue you a counterquestion I pray you, euen in as few wordes. And why do they not aske it of their God? if they be without, why do they not knocke? if they be vnbeleuyng, why do they not seéke? if they dwell in Sinne, why do they not repent. How can they (say you) seyng that they haue no Freewill (as you say.) Ad∣mit the same: but in whse default? in Gods default? but God did create mā perfect at the first, and endued him with freédome: was it mans fault? Let them then accuse them selues, not God. But ye vrge agayne. And why then doth he cōmunicate his grace to some, which he denyeth to others? why is he not

indifferently mercyfull towardes all? and as inclinable to all vniuersally? At the begynnyng, when God created man, he did then create also all the nature of man fully furnished with all integritie, and freédome. Afterwardes when this state of in∣nocency & freédome was lost, when as also the whole ••umpe was defiled withall, God might withall haue so forsaken all the same ingenerall. Neuerthelesse his mercy doth not so, but would ra∣ther by Election chuse some out of this abhominable corruptiō, not forsakyng the other altogether in the meane tyme: onely he denieth helpe vnto them, vnto whom he was not boūde to geue assistaūce. And what though he were not so indifferently mercy∣full towardes all? Yet was he iniurious to none: what? do you not heare what him selfe speaketh? Is thine eye therefore wicked is it not lawfull to do with myne own as it pleaseth me? Or at least, do you not heare the Apostle? O man what art thou that conten∣dest agaynst God? Whereas God doth owe theé nothyng at all, doest thou therefore snarle at him, bycause doyng wrong to no man, he doth enlarge the richesse of his mercy towardes them, whom it pleaseth him?

But foreward crawleth Osorius Inuectiue.* 1.497 For as much as this is the mynde and meanyng of Paule: what outragi∣ous furie is this madd man intoxicate withall, that would endeuour to persuade such a cōstruction by Paules testimo∣ny? which would both ouerthrow the state of humaine so∣cietie, and withall make God guiltie of vnrighteousnesse? Sithēce this is y^e infallible meanyng of Paule, which we haue heretofore confirmed after y^e Iudgemēt of Luther, Bucer, Cal∣uine and by the testimony of the holy Scriptures chiefly, which also Osorius him selfe (were he neuer so sober & sounde witted) can neuer be able to confute: to what end rendeth this so foolish, and childish exclamation, proceédyng from an old and grayhea∣ded man? whereunto serue these Tragicall outcryes?* 1.498 that this Ruler of roste so ruffleth vppe of a trifle, thundring out such mō∣struous outragies and franticke exclamations.

Which doth ouerthrow (sayth he) the state of men. And what kynde of estate of men is this at the lēgth, which Luther doth so ouerthrow? If he meane the state of the cōmon weale, & Ciuill societie: herein truly are many seuerall degreés & estates

aswell of offices, as of persouages. For there be Princes, there be Dukes, there be Knightes of y^e noble order, there be Citizēs, there be diuers & seuerall Magistrates, some hygh, some low, vnder whō are the meane & inferiour subiectes, euē the rascall rable & multitude. So •••• there also seuerall distinctions of A∣ges, Artes, handycraftes & in manitary occupations: some yoūg, some old, some riche, some poore. All these now albeit in nōber innumerable, & in kynde & qualitie distinct, are neuertheles cō∣federate & knitte together in a certeine generall vnitie, & mutu∣all cōformitie of allyed leaque, through a certeine Ciuill polli∣cie, & institutiō of maners: are beautified with mutuall amitie: are vnited & linked together to God, in one participation of Re∣ligion: are orderly gouerned by force of lawes: do exercize mu∣tuall traffique togethers: are restreined frō licenciousnes of lyfe with one maner of generall correctiō: So that if they liue not in full perfectiō of vertue, accordyng to y^e prescript rule of y^e lawes, yet do they much lesse offende, for feare of Iustice and Iudge∣ment. Now Syr in this generall Regiment & state of thyngs, and of persones, what one Citie, what one Villadge, or what Family was euer made one myte y^e worse by Luthers doctrine? either in respect of their due obediēce to Ciuill Magistrates, or in breache of domesticall tranquillitie, or in their dutyfull alle∣giaunce to their Princes, or in any other Ciuill societie.

* 1.499One onely disorderous order of people hath entruded it selfe vpon this state of humaine societie, vsurpyng a certeyne Prince∣ly superioritie (I know no thy what meanes) crept in at the first: sure I am, was neuer established by God, nor by nature, ne yet by any necessary institution. But pressing to the pearche, partly through fraude, partly through oppression, and chiefly through the ambitious arrogaunoy of their owne proude Prelacy: not to vndertake any necessary or profitable function in the weale pu∣blique, nor to ioyne in administration of office with others for the behoofe of any common weale: but to hale all other gouerne∣mentes vnder their Iurisdiction, and to make subiect all other estates, potentates, and Empires vnder their stately Superi∣oritie, by erectyng a certeine new founde, and Luciferlike Mo∣narch vpon the earth. It is that Romishe Tyrannicall, and Pa∣pisticall dominion which I meane, and complayne vpon, which

through incredible subtiltie, craft, & secrete slye vnderminynges vnder a commendable title of the Church, hath by litle and litle, enhaunced it selfe to so wonderfull loftynesse: that all other e∣states and degreés (beyng enforced to yeld their neckes to the yoake, as it were) must maugre their beardes, not onely submit their heades, and shoulders to their oppression, and tyranny, but also lyke miserable bondslaues, must with all reuerence, and hu∣militie prostrate them selues, to kysse their feéte. In this Impe∣riall throne is enthronized chief aboue all others, & triumphyng ouer all other estates, the most mighty potentate and Monarch the Byshop of Rome. Next vnto him (as the principall stayes and proude pillers of this Ierarchy)* 1.500 aduaunce them selues the Cormoraunt Cardinalles:* 1.501 Then follow in order the Roystyng route of Mytred Prelates,* 1.502 of the Scarlet crew of Rochettes, & shauelynges. I speake not here of good & vertuous Byshops: nor of true Ministers of Christ, but of such as hang onely vpon the becke of y^e Bysh. of Rome. Last of all, after those ••olly Chāpiōs, whole droues of Monckes,* 1.503 & Friers, come tumblyng in heapes together, a rable of rascals as of all other people the most lazy, and lewde, so surroundyng the whole world in such vnmeasura∣ble warmes (issue as it were and broode of the earth) that the earth it selfe is scarse able to foster vppe her owne generation.

And therefore if your meanyng concerne the ouerthrow of this sorte of people: in this pointe I do agreé with you Osorius. That Luther trauayled in deéde earnestly herein, but atchieued not so much as was neédefull for the Christian common wealth. For albeit he could not vtterly raze out the rakyng Regiment of those Romishe roysters, most inordinately raysing them sel∣ues, not onely aboue all Empires and Regimentes of the earth, but also beyond all whatsoeuer is called God: yet did he pretely shake them: he pluckt of the vysours of those Apish stagers, dis∣couered their fraude, made y^e world acquaynted with their sub∣till sleyghtes, and lyeng doctrine, and confuted them with the manifest force of the truth: finally albeit by openyng the light of the Gospell, he could not vtterly ••ende in peéces the shryne of the beast, which so many hūdred yeares had suppressed & drow∣ned in darkenes the knowledge of Gods word, yet was his in∣dustry and labour not vnprofitably employed to the defacyng

therof. And I would to God he had bene able, not onely to haue defaced the power and outrage of y^e Seé, but also to haue pluc∣ked the same vppe by the rootes, and brought the memory therof to vtter confusion, and vanished it cleane out of y^e myndes & me∣moryes of men &, Nations for euer, in so doyng truly he could not haue done any exployte more acceptable to God, and more profitable to the state of Christianitie. Certes many thousandes of men and womē had bene wonderfully preserued thereby, who through the more then barbarous & vnspeakeable cruelty of this consumyng gulfe, haue bene miserably swallowed vppe and de∣uoured within a very few yeares in Englād, Fraunce, Spayne, Scotland, Flaunders, Germany and other Christian Nati∣ons: for as yet can not this vnsatiable Cormoraūt be sufficiētly englutted and fully gorged with Christiā goare. And yet for all this,* 1.504 poore seély Luther is accused, which durst so boldly presume to vnlade and cure Christiā consciences of so cancred a Fistula, of so poysoned in impostume, and so raunging a carbuncle. And bycause he did dare to vndertake the patronadge and defence of the truth agaynst manifest heresies, and more then palpable er∣rours, there is no lesse layed to his charge then hygh treason, as though he practized the vtter ouerthrowe not onely of all Chri∣stian societie, but of the state of the whole world also. And why may not the Wolfe w^t as good reason condenme the seély Lambe for troublyng his water? Let Isaack also be accused, bycause he restored to the Philistines the Welles pure, and cleansed from filthe,* 1.505 & baggage whiche them selues had maliciously dammed vppe before. Let the Phisition likewise be endi••ed of murder, who ministring wholesome potion to his patient agaynst the pe∣stilence or phrensie, hath preserued lyfe. Furthermore let it be lawfull for Osorius him selfe to barke agaynst the shynyng of the Sunne, bycause it reneweth the gladsome countenaunce of the pleasaunt dawnyng, by driuyng away the dazelyng darke∣nes of the vgly night.

Finally let him quarrell w^t Christ himselfe, & his most sacred spirit,* 1.506 who did not onely himselfe rayse vp Luther for this pur∣pose, but also by playne foretellings did so many yeares before prophesie of y^e darcknes, decay, & ouerthrow of y^e self same Seé.* 1.507 And he poured out hys vyall (sayth he) vpon the seate of the beast,

and hys kingdome was couered with darckenes, and they did gnawe their tongues for sorrow. &c. Which prophesie for asmuch as can not by any probable allusion: be applyed eyther to the Iewes or to the Turckes: Let the Romish Seé bethinke it selfe well, what kynde of kingdome at the length is foreshewed here, by y^e words of the holy Ghost. And to the same end do the wordes of Saint Paule tend likewise: where he declareth in what maner the Re∣uealyng of the Sonne of perdition should come to passe.* 1.508 But after the proper phrase of speéche nothyng is sayd to be Reuealed, but that which before did lye close, & hidden in couert: And ther∣fore if of very necessitie the Deuine spirite of Christ must be had to the discoueryng of this couert Enemy, which could not other∣wise be espyed by the pollicy and witte of man: Certes it could not be, but y^t this Antichrist whatsoeuer he be must lurke & sha∣dow him selfe wonderfull couertly, and craftely, and that much people should be deceaued in him, before he could be Reuealed and detected to the world.

What Person this Sonne of perdition is, I doe not at this present trouble my braynes about, surely for my part I know no one person els, neither by application of the signes, notes, or cir∣cumstaunces, and playne demōstrations (wherewith S. Paule doth painte him out vnto vs) can I gesse vpon any other, whom this counterfaite may resemble in any proportion, besides this one Prelate onely, who so lustely vaūteth him selfe in the Tem∣ple of God.

And therefore these thunderboltes & great flashes of Osori. lightning touching the ouerthrowe of the state of Christianitie, do no more touch Luther, then the lying cauillation of Amasias the Priest of Bethell, did concerne the Prophet Amos, to be a seditious person, when he accused hym in the presence of Iero∣boam, the king; behold (sayth he) Amos hath conspired agaynst thee, euen in the middes of the house of Israell.* 1.509 Euen such like lie∣ger de mayne doth our Osorius vtter here, very finely expres∣sing vnto vs the wonderfull and singuler sleightes of the Papi∣sticall subtelties which those catholick counterfaytes seéme long sithence to haue sucked out of the crafty wyles, and practizes of that olde Comicall Phormio, who being chiefly to be detected for some crafty conueyaunce, steppe forth lyke call fellowes first,

and become accusers of others: supposing they shall hereby ac∣quite thēselues cleare of all suspicion of crime, if they cā first ac∣cuse others of the fault, whereof they ought themselues be im∣peached (And here in myne opinion) the very selfe same, or very like vnto the same, seemeth to haue happened to Luther, where∣with we read y^e wicked Achab did charge Elias y^e Prophet euē in like deceitfull maner,* 1.510 saying. Thou art he (quoth he) that do∣est trouble all Israell. Not much vnlike to that example of Nero whereof the histories make mention, who hauyng himselfe sett Roome on fire, playing and singing vpon hys harpe the destruc∣tion thereof in Homers verses, whiles it was on flame: did af∣terwardes lay the burning thereof to the Christians charge, to thend he might procure them (though altogether innocent) to be maligned, hated, and persequuted of the people. Euen in lyke maner (Osorius) whenas ye Papistes, & the generatiō of your holy Father haue long sithence tourned the state of the whole worlde, and the conditiōs and decrees of all Ciuill societie quite vpsidowne, according to your owne lust and pleasure: yea and dayly moyle and turmoyle the same, & haue left nothing sound, and in peacible order throughout the whole earth, continuyng still all maner of outrage, persequutyng continually with fire and sword, with your cursings and Bulles, with execrable In∣quisitions, horrible punishmentes, scourges, and tormentes, & with all maner of horrible tortures, triūphyng (as it were) vp∣on the Ransack of all Christian peace, & tranquillitie: Yet do yeé Papistes neuerthelesse rayle rudely vpon Luther. Thou art hee which doest trouble all Israell.

And why should not that song be chaunted rather euen into the eares of your holy Father the Pope? for this is he, the same very Troiane Horse: from out whose belly hath issued all cal∣lamitie, and mischief. This is that Dauus, that disturbeth all thynges. This is that Babilonicall strumpet Thais, the bruer of all misery. What will become of that Seé hereafter I know not: hitherto surely it hath so behaued it self, that it may be wor∣thely called the plague and cancker of all Europe: which may be easily made manifest by many and sundry testimonyes. And al∣though I speake thereof nothing at all, yet will their owne do∣ings and proceédings faythfully described by historiographers,

and deepely imprinted into the present view of the world, suffi∣ciently bewray their dealinges.* 1.511 The great and manifolde tur∣moyles of chaunged estates, the sundry vproares of people: schismes, slaughters of Christiās, the horrible disturbaūces of kinges, and kingdomes, the sundry alterations of the Romayne Empire, chaunges, and translations of the same from out the East first, into the West, do euidently declare the same: whenas the pope of Rome renouncing the othe wherwith the Romaynes and Italianes hadd obliged them selues to the Emperour of Greéce,* 1.512 did send for Charles Martellus out of Fraunce, into I∣talie, and crowned hym Emperour, contrary to the auncient order of Election. Afterwardes, because the Frenchmen would not yealde to their outragious ambitions, practised in procu∣ring the preéminence of the Popes Election, the Empire was sodenly translated from Fraunce, into Germany, by meanes of which inordinate alteration, can scarse be expressed by tongue, how great and how cruell warres and contentions followed be∣twixt the Frenchmen, and the Germaynes, in y^e raigne of Hen∣ry the first & Otto beyng then Emperoures. Neither was this amitye of the Pope towardes the Germayne Empire of any long continuance: whose onely and speciall practise was, that not onely all Bishops, but Emperours also shoulde runne to Roome for y^e Inuestiture and confirmation: Prouided alwayes, that it might by no meanes be lawfull for any of them, to enter∣meddle any thing at all in the Popes Iurisdictiō.* 1.513 Now because the Germaynes could not be made plyable hereunto vpō the so∣deine, as men who reuerēcing the dignity & maiestly of the Em∣pire (after the example of Otto, & other their Auncestours) were not willing to yeald to thabacing of their lawfull authoritie and prerogatiue imperiall: hereupon began incredible sturres and vproares to be kindled.* 1.514 This was the occasion of the great warres of the two Henryes, the fourth, and the v. Then also of Frederick the first, and the second: After them of Ludouick of Bauiere, and of his brother Frederick of Austrich: And agayne of Ludouick, & Rodolph, whom pope Gregory the seuenth of that name had priuily raysed vp against Ludouick the true and lawfull Emperour, sending hym a Crowne with thys proude inscriptiō or poesie, petra dedit Petro, Petrus diadema Rodolpho.

* 1.515What should I here renew the remembraunce of those old Tragedies of the Emperour Henry the vi. wherwith the whole world is well acquaynted? vpon whose head Pope Celestine the iiij. vaunced vpō an high throane, did set the imperiall Crowne not with hys hande, but with hys foote, and immediately with the same foote, ouerthrew the same Crowne agayne: most arro∣gantly boasting, that he had authoritie to create kinges and to depose them agayne. What shall I speake of Chilpericke the Frenche kyng?* 1.516 Whom Pope Zacharie agaynst all equitie and conscience dyd depose from hys true and possessed inheritaunce, and aduaunced in hys place Pypyne?* 1.517 And it lacked very little, but that king Phillip had bene driuen to the very same extremi∣tie:* 1.518 agaynst whom Pope Boniface the 8. did by all meanes pos∣sible teaze, and egge to battell Alberte the king of Romanes, to driue him out of hys kingdome. Like as before hym Pope Hil∣debrand, did mayntayne in armes Henry the Sonne, agaynst his own naturall Father Henry the fourth,* 1.519 who brought to passe by hys cruelty, that the Father (beyng taken prisoner by the Sonne, and shorne a Moncke) was thrust into a Monastery in stead of a prison, where he perished miserably, through famine, and want of foode. What shall I say of that, where Pope Alex∣ander the 3. that most meéke seruaunt of the seruauntes of God (treading vpon the neck of a most renowmed Emperour as vp∣on the imperiall maiesty trodden now vnder foote) applyed ther∣unto thys triumphant Sonnet takē out of the Psalmes of Da∣uid. Super Aspidem & Basiliscum ambulabis &c. Neyther was Frauncisce Dandalus king of Creéte and Cipres,* 1.520 and Duke of Uenice any iot more fréndly intreated, whom Clement y^e proud Romish Prelate would scarse at the lēgth after long sute admit vnto speech, though chayned with an Iron Roape, and lying vn∣der hys table amongest dogges. Surely I shall seeme to mea∣sure the sandes, when I enter vppon the gulfe of thys Romishe Ierarchy. Briefly therefore, and to be short: what Nation? what Countrey? what territory? what Iland did euer heare of the name of thys Seé? whiche hath not withall bene pinched with their crampes, spoyled with their exactions, and beggered w^t their trumperies: at or least skarse peépeth as yet frō the tiran∣nicall thraldome thereof? Yea what vproares? what commoti∣ones?

what warres haue wasted, or consumed any Christian na∣tion these many hundred yeares at any tyme? whereof this Ba∣bilonicall strūpet hath not bene wholy, or at y^t least for the more part the Author and procuror? And no meruayle at all. For what may be looked for els, at the handes of so proud a prelate? who beyng enflamed and boyling inwardly (as it were) with such an incredible inordinate desire of luciferlike superioritie: as that he would onely, and alone, rule the roast, and haue all others in subiection vnder hym, how then could such vnmeasurable ambi∣tione be possibly satisfied without infinite troubles, vproares, & tumultes? And therefore as touching that clamorous accusaci∣ons agaynst Luther: to be a common Barrettor and distur∣bor of all Ciuill societie, seémeth to me to be framed of Osori. none otherwise, then as though he would that Luther shoulde onely beare the name, but that the Bishoppe of Roome shoulde winne the game.

Deale playnly therfore (Osorius) and poynt directly to the Butte, that you ought to haue shotte at: Name the person by his name, if ye will be taken for a good Proctour at the Barre: yea if ye be so carefull for the preseruation of the common weale of Christendome (as ye are a curteous and Ciuill Gentleman) let the force of your wrotte eloquēce be blowen directly agaynst those persons, whiche are Enemyes to Christendome in deéde, which treade Empyres vnder foote, which doe writhe and wrest Scepters out of the handes of Princes, which moue commoti∣ons, styrre vpp y^e people agaynst the Nobilitie, y^e Subiectes a∣gaynst their Kynges, which do mainteyne the Sonnes in armes agaynst the fathers, which do cause the subiectes to abiure their sworne obedience due to their liege Lords, & teaze and prouoke the rude multitude to bende their force agaynst their naturall Princes, which doe ouerthrow the peace and tranquilitie of the Church of Christ, with their seditious Bulles, open warres, & Ciuill discensions, which do subuert all places of Iustice, Iudi∣ciall seates and Iudgementes, rende lawes asunder, are truce breakers, and disturbours of peace, are disseysours and disinhe∣ritors of lawfull discentes, proprieties, and possessiōs: & are pil∣lers and pollers of all cōmon weales: which do turne all thyngs vpsidowne, choppyng and chaungyng, and makyng a generall

confusion of all thynges: finally whiche doe neither render that vnto God that apperteyneth vnto God, nor geue that vnto Cae∣sar, which is due vnto Caesar: but rushe violently into both esta∣tes, aswell Temporall as Spirituall, makyng hauocke of all: and appointyng one onely Iudiciall Consistory in this world, to witte, Gods and the Popes. If these dealynges emporte not a generall ouerthrow of all Ciuill, & politicke gouernementes, let the accuser hym self deny it. But if he confesse it to be true: now then may I be so bold to demaunde of Osorius, that he will vouchsafe to aunswere me truely without parcialitie: For as much as that Pōtificall Romish Seé is to to much polluted, and defiled with all those enormities (wherof I haue made mention before) which one of these cā he pyke out at the length, that may be duely & truly layed to Luthers charge? where was Luther at any tyme moued with such desire to beare rule, as y^t he seémed willyng to beare full sway, and be Lorde and Ruler of all o∣thers? Where did he entrude vpon the right of any Prince, or tooke vpō him selfe violently the authoritie of the Ciuill Magi∣strate? where did he shew him selfe rebellious against the Supe∣riour powers? where did he disturbe the peace, and quiet gouer∣nement of any weale publique? What Church or Congregatiō did he molest & trouble? where did he euer shake of the obedience of due allegeaunce? or procured any Subiectes to rebellion a∣gaynst their Gouernours? What Empyres did he transpose? what Kyngdomes did he trouble? what warres was he the au∣thour of? what Kynges or Byshops did he euer minister poyson vnto? either in the Communion bread, or in the wyne within the Cōmunion Chalice? or in the common drinkyng goblet? as we read in the Hystories hath happened vnto the Emperour Hen∣ry, vnto Victor, and vnto Iohn kyng of England. And I would to God there had neuer bene besides there any other poysoned after the same sort. When? or to whom did Luther euer offer his feéte to be kissed? or vpon whose necke did he treade with his feéte any tyme? Finally in what Natiō or Countrey was Lu∣ther euer knowen with his curses Excōmunications & Bulles, to haue vsurped vpon the Maiestie of any Prince? or to haue a∣bated the due obedience of the people? or els to haue allured and drawen away the harts of the Subiectes (which were by oathe

obliged to their hygher power) to rebell? and pursue the destru∣ction of their Rulers and Magistrates? contrary to their othe, contrary to all Religion, contrary to all law, reason, and com∣mon course of nature it selfe? Which inordinate outrage beyng neither to be found (by report of any Chronographer) amongest the Scythianes, ne yet amongest the cruell Massigetes: yet this do we read, yea and haue seéne with our eyes to haue bene prac∣tized of late here in England, by the treachery of Pope Pius the fift, agaynst our most gracious Queéne Elizabeth: yea and not long sithence agaynst the late renowmed Kyngs Henry the viij. her Father, and Edward her brother.

But it comes already to my mynde, what aūswere Osorius will make to all this. For all that I haue spoken touchyng the ouerthrow of the peace of the church, and the scatteryng abroad of the possessions therof, Osorius will forthwith take holdfast of, and hurle violently with all the force of his eloquence agaynst Luther: speakyng in this maner. What? assoone as these bookes of Luther were scattered abroad,* 1.521 doe we not see how the quiet and peacible estate of the Churche is vexed and troubled euery where? how Monckes are driuen out of their selles? spoyled of their goodes? Chanones thrust out of their Colledges? Abbottes and Byshops throwen out from their rightfull possessiōs? In deéde we seé this to be done in ma∣ny places (Osori.) Euē so also do we seé the darke cloudes to va∣nish away after y^e rysing of the Sunne in y^e mornyng: we seé also the foggy mystes to be scattered abroad, y^e darkened night to be driuen away, the smaller starres to lose their brightnes, and the heauens to waxe cleare, beautifull, & fayre of hew, and men that before seémed blynde with drousy sleépe, to awaken, and shake of their sluggishnes at the cleare shining of the glittering light.

Now cōcernyng your Obiection agaynst Luther, in the be∣halfe of the Church, of the Byshoppes and Monckes, you shall then make partie colorable, & good, whenas ye haue right∣ly defined: First what y^e true Church is, who be true Byshops, and true Monckes. When I do heare this word Peace named, when I do heare mētion made of the Church & of Byshoppes,* 1.522 I can not chuse but acknowledge them to be honorable, names & cōmendable titles: yea euen such as all men do most gladly & 〈1 page duplicate〉〈1 page duplicate〉

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ioyfully embrace, but yet truely vnder these names lurke many tymes, many crafty conspiracies, I know that it is not vnfitly reported by the Poete. That Peace is the most precious pearle of Dame Natures stoare.* 1.523 And surely as euery man excelleth in vertue and pietie, so for the more part is heé studious & care∣full most for the due preseruation of Peace and of concorde. And therfore good men doe ioue Peace, yea and mainteyne Peace a∣mongest them selues, yet good men onely (good Syr) haue not Peace alone. How glorius & acceptable a thyng soeuer Peace is accoumpted to be in her owne nature, yea though it be chief∣ly embraced and hadd in greatest price with good men: Yet is not Peace alwayes, and altogether conuersaunt amongest good men onely,* 1.524 nor the entoyeng of Peace alone doth make men to be good. For there is a certeyne Peace amongest the wicked: Yea Pirates, Theéues, & Robbers haue their certeine Peace, and agreément in willes. Neither is it to be doughted, but that false Catholiques, and such like heretiques haue their seuerall Conuenticles, and peacyble bandes of concorde, and consent: e∣uē as the false Apostles and false Prophetes had in tymes past. They that worshypped the Golden Calfe, and they that conspired & took counsell agaynst the Lord cryeng Crucifige agaynst him, did represent a certeine forme of the Churche, and were firme∣ly knitte together in mutuall Peace,* 1.525 and agreément of myndes. If it be an haynous matter to dissolue the bandes of Peace, and knittyng together of fellowshyppes, concluded and determined vpon for euer occasion whatsoeuer: we must neédes thinke that Cicero dealt very wickedly,* 1.526 who at the tyme of Catelynes con∣spiracie did breake a sunder, and sparckle abroad the false trea∣theries of this detestable cōspiracie, beyng linked together with a certeyne wonderfull agreément of willes and affections, yea and affyed together & sworne in one, by drinkyng a cup of bloud. So also did Elias very naughtely,* 1.527 who detected so great a nū∣ber of the Priestes of Baal, agreéing together so constaūt in er∣rour, and in so great a tranquillitie, causing them to be slayne.

And therfore it is not enough to pretend the names & titles of Peace and of the Churche onely: if their effectes be not aun∣swerable. Peace (sayth Hillarie) hath a glorious name, and truth is had in great admiratiō: but who doughteth of this, that the one∣ly

vnitie and peace of the Church, and of the Gospell, is that which is of Iesu Christ alone? &c. Now as the Peace of Christ, and Christes true Churche doth alwayes lyue in a perfect vnitie, so together with vnitie doth it alwayes enioy perfect truth and veritie. On the contrary part, that Peace and Churche what∣soeuer is not grounded vppon the Rocke of Christes infallible truth, is not Peace, but Battell rather: is not the Churche of Christ,* 1.528 but a conspirary of naughty packes. And therfore we do seé many tymes come to passe, that vnder the name of Peace, ve∣ry naturall dissentiōs are fostered, and many persons are decea∣ued by the paynted vysour of the title of the Churche: yea they are many tymes accumpted seditious persons, which doe vp∣hold and mainteyne Peace and tranquilitie most. After this maner Tertullus the Oratour did accuse S. Paule to be a sedi∣tious fellow: so was Christ him selfe also, and his Apostles, ex∣claymed vpon as seditious by the Phariseés:* 1.529 the holy Martyrs were likewise charged w^t treasō, & procuring of vprores, by y^t vn∣beleéuyng Emperours and miscreant infidels. Euen so fareth it now a dayes with Luther, & the Lutheranes. Luther (sayth he) doth rende a sunder the Peace and tranquillitie of the Church with his writynges and preachynges: doth teare in peeces Christes Coate that is without seame, rayseth tu∣multes and vprores, doth entāgle whole Christēdome with dissentions and varieties of opinions.* 1.530 And why so (Osorius) I pray you? From sooth, bycause he doth discouer the liuely well∣springes of sounde doctrine, bycause he doth enstruct men to cō∣ceaue the most wholesome and souereigne Grace of God in his Sonne, and declareth vnto them the true rule of righteousnes, and the true Peace which is in Christ Iesu: bycause be allureth all men to the onely mercy of GOD, excludyng all mans merites, and vayne confidence of Freewill. Now bycause their bleare eyed dulnes could not endure the sharpenes of this light, from hence flush out all these fluddes of complaints, from hence rush out all these Tragicall scoldinges, & exclamations, where∣with these Rhetoricall Becons haue conceaued so greéuous a flame, ragyng out on this wise. Is not this mōstruous wicked∣nesse? is not this horrible maddnesse? is not this intollerable presumption? what feuer doth make thee so frantike Had∣don?

what furies doe possesse thee Luther? what paynes of haynousnesse doe pursue thee? And such like pleasurable or∣namentes of whotte eloquence, which scarse any man can read without laughyng.* 1.531 For who can endure to heare common out∣lawes complainyng of Sedition?

Truly I suppose (Osorius) that with the very same wordes and euen in the same maner of outrage, or surely not much vn∣like, Herode and the whole Nation of Phariseés did crye out, whenas the fame of Christes byrth being bruted abroad, it was sayd,* 1.532 that Herode the king was exceedingly troubled, and with him all Ierusulem also. And therfore accordyng to this Logicke, and Rhetoricke of Osorius. Let vs condemne Christ him selfe for a seditious fellow: bycause, vnlesse that child had bene borne, and that Sonne had bene geuen vnto vs, those troubles had neuer arisen amongest the Iewes. What shall we say to y^t? Where the same Christ afterwardes beyng now of well growē yeares, did declare in playne & open wordes, That he came not to send peace in the earth, but a sword, but diuision, but fire, and that he desired no one thyng more earnestly, thē that the same fire should be kinde∣led. Wherfore if it be so much to be feared, least breach of Peace and concorde, breéde offence: Let this Portingall aduise him selfe well, whether Christ shalbe here accused as farre forth as Luther, bycause in the Gospell he is sayd to sturre vppe the Fa∣ther agaynst the Sonne, the daughter agaynst the mother, the step∣mother agaynst the daughter inlawe, and the daughter in lawe a∣gaynst the stepmother, two agaynst three and three ogaynst two: or whether Luther ought to be acquited with Christ, for as much as in this accusation, he can not duely be impeached with any one cryme, which may not also aswell be charged vpon Christ. If the Peace of the Catholickes be disturbed in these our dayes through Luther, the same also happened to the Phariseés in old tyme, by the meanes of Christ and his Apostles, yea not to the Phariseés onely, but also in sturryng vppe all the Natiōs of the earth in an vproare: wherein yet no fault can be layed vpon Christ, who is himselfe the Prince of Peace, and can by no meanes be vnlike him selfe. In lyke maner, and with lyke con∣sideration Luthers doctrine is to be deémed (as I suppose). For what a sturre soeuer the Papisticall generation keépe in these

our dayes, yet surely is not their Peace hindered by Luther: or if it be, yet ought not he to be accused that ministred wholesome playster to the wound, but the fault was to be imputed rather to them, whose cankers were so vncurable, that could not endure the operation of the Medicine. And therefore as touchyng the crime of sedition, and troublesome disturbaunce of Peace layed vnto Luthers charge, therein the accusation is wrongfully mis∣tourned, and Luther iniuriously dealt withall. For it is not Lu∣ther, that hath turned the Peace of the Churche vpsidowne, but the worldlynges, with their Osorius do in a corrupt sense define the Peace of the Churche.

It is an vndoughted truth that they speake,* 1.533 and whiche wee also do confesse together with them to witte: that the Churches of Christ, as it is one, and most peacible: so delighteth in nothing more then in Peace. But let Osorius geue vs such a Peace, vn∣der vysor whereof lurketh no conspiracie agaynst the Lord: Let him geue such a Church wherein are not fostred Enemies, and traitoures of the true Church. I speake it not, because I recken them all enemies of y^e church that are Resiaunte within the bor∣ders and territories of that pontificall Ierarchye. So neyther Luthers vehement writings were bent agaynst them all. Nay rather Luther carpeth at no mans person priuately, inuadeth no mans possessions, nor seéketh the losse of any mans life. Onely a∣gaynst the wicked Assertiones, Determinations and decreés, of your pestilent patched doctrine,* 1.534 agaynst the established erro∣neous falshoods, abhominations, and heresyes, agaynst the wic∣ked worshipping of Idols, Breadworship and stock worshippe, and most pestiferous Superstitious Absurdities, wherewith y^e force & efficacy of y^e Euāgelicall fayth was well neére ouerwhel∣med (not without manifest perill of the losse of many thousandes of Christian Souldiers) Luther vndertaking the Necessary pa∣tronage of the truth, endeuoured with all hys skill and force, not to the end he would hurt any man, but that he might enduce o∣thers to the same cleare light, & sweéte ioyce of vnderstanding, whiche himselfe had sucked out of the pleasaunt source of holy Scriptures. If your darcknes vanish cleane away at the view of this light: If Herode withall hys Ierusalē be troubled, If y^e Gentiles do frett and fume and the people imagine vayne thinges,

If monasteries fall down altogethers: If Idols shiuer in peéces If the issues and sproughts of Religiones neuer planted by god, be plucked vp from the bottome of the Rootes: is this the fault of Luther? or the greuousnes of the malady rather? that will by no meanes eudure the launcing of the soare? or is it because the botches and plagues could no rather be handled, but woulde of thēselues burst out, and vanish away into vapours and smoke? And what if Landes and possessions long times englutted with gorbelly mouncks,* 1.535 became a pray to the spoylers: or were tour∣ned to some better vses? first what an iniury is thys to impute that vnto Luther, which Princes and Magistrates in their se∣uerall dominiones dyd establish, as they lawfully might? morco∣uer what is that to Luther? or what meruell is it if the byrdes do pluck their own fethers againe, which they gaue before to the though? And what should let but that a man being better adui∣sed, might reuoke and employ to better purpose, as may seéme him best, y^e thing wh he did foolishly or wickedly lauish out before? But hereof enough: and I am long sithence throughly weryed in spending so much breath and losse of so much tyme, in conten∣ding with such a trifling brabler, who accustoming himself to no∣thyng els almost but to lying, and slaundering, yet amonges so many notable lyes, & heaping together so many slaunders vpō slaunders, hath not hitherto iustified any one of all hys lyes, to beare but euen a bare resemblaunce of truth.

And here agayne commeth to hand an other most shamelesse, and abhominable lye: So conning a craftesman he is, that the further he proceédeth, by so much more he contendeth with hym∣selfe, yea and exceédeth hymself in slaundering.* 1.536 And thys is it forsooth? That Luther (as he sayth) doth accuse God to be an vnrighteous God. Good words I pray you good my Lord: In what place of all Luth. speaches, or writinges dyd you euer finde any such worde, or sillable? wherein heé layed the cryme of vnrighteousnes vpon God? Not so: but a man may gather no lesse by hys assertion. And no meruell: if you be the expositor thereof your selfe. For what other thing els doth the venimous spyder suck out of the most sweete honnysuckles, and pleasaunt roses? but poyson: But go to. Let vs heare at the length this no∣table Collection: for Luther doth affirme that all thinges doe

proce••de from out Gods eternall predestinatiō aswell whē such as beyng Vessells of wrath are damned through theyr owne default: as also, when such as are Vessells of mercye without any their desert are aduaunced to glory. Thys phrase of speeche beyng not founded first by Luther, but long before hys dayes preached by Paule, and confirmed by the full consent of the whole Scriptures: Osorius knittyng and plat∣tyng together many absurdities (which are both false and ill fa∣uouredly placed by the meanes of wrong misconceauing the said phrase of speeche) is come at the last to conclude on thys wyse. That God of Necessitie must be accompted vnrighteous,* 1.537 as one that doth vniustly punishe poore wretched miserable men for the euill deedes which they do not of their owne accord: but whereunto they are forced through eternall co∣action. But this conclusiō is not Luthers: but framed by Osori. hymself. And I think no man aliue besides Osorius was euer a∣ble to forge so madde a conclusion: who if were as voide of desire of friuolous cauilling, and slaundering, as Luther is cleare of this reproch, to condemne God to be an vnrighteous God, he would neuer haue patched vp his papers with such friuolous libels and vnsauory Argumētes, bewraying therein his notori∣ous ignoraunce. But that the matter may appeare more playn∣ly, let vs display and vnfold his whole captious argumentation which he hath framed to entangle Luther withall, standing in armes as it were agaynst him with a certeine brood of ill fauou∣red coupled propositions. And in this sorte crawleth forth thys slipper deuise for the more parte.

If be determined by the sure and established decree of predestination,* 1.538 what shall become of euery thing: and that it can not be, but as he hath decreed what soeuer he hath decreed shall come to passe. Then is it necessary that all things must be boūd and tyed to an euerlasting Necessitie.

If all thinges be brought to passe by an absolute Neces∣sitie: then must God be accompted the onely author and workes of all thinges, whether they be good or badde.

If all thinges good or euill, be ordered by the guyding of God the Author thereof. Then remayneth nothing for mans Freewill to put in execution.

If this be graunted: it followeth hereupon, that men when they rushed headlong into mischiefes, do not now cō∣mit wickednes of their owne accord, but as it were tooles and instrumentes of wickednesse, plyed thereunto by an o∣thers hand, and enforced with merueilous coaction.

Which propositions being thus argued by Luther, there∣ensueth vpon the same (being-layed together) this Necessary Conclusion.* 1.539 That God doth deale vniustly if he will punish that in man, which hymselfe willeth and determineth to be done.

* 1.540The Logitians that haue described the fourme of a Sorites doth deny that this kinde of arguyng is of any substaunce, vn∣lesse the parts of the true properties, and differences do accord and aunswere eche other, with a necessary coupling together of the kyndes and the formes, and that the proper effectes be ap∣plied to the proper causes: Of all which there is not one so much obserued in all this heape of wordes, and sentences, wherein if I might as lawfully vtter some follishe skill, by creeping for∣ward after the same sorte, with follish childish degrees of propo∣sitions: it would not be hard for me to conclude, out of gram∣tyng the freédome of mans will? That there were no Predesti∣station nor prouident of God at all in heauen: which we proued before out of Augustine•• was once concluded vpon by Cicero. First such as doe affirme, that God is the chief and principall cause of all thyngs, and do graunt all things to be subiect to his will, do not erre, except Augustine do erre, who discoursing vp∣on the will of God.* 1.541 The will of God (sayth he) is the first and So∣ueraigne cause of all formes and motions: for there is nothing done that issueth not fromout the secrett and intelligible closett of the highest Emperour according to vnspeakeable Iustice: for where doth not the omnipotent wisedome of God worke what it pleaseth hym? which mightely stretcheth hys power from one ende of the worlde to the other, and ordereth all thinges most sweetely? Thus much Augustine.* 1.542 And yet this cause doth not therefore enduce such a Necessitie of coactione, as Osori. doth imagine, as that no freédome of will should remayne in man, that he should do no∣thing of hys own accord, that he should deserue nothing worthy of punishment: but should serue in steede of an Instrument (as

it were) enforced through fatall coaction, & should be gouerned by an others power, that it selfe should bring nothyng to passe, wherefore it ought to be punished. Now for asmuch as Luthers Assertion, doth maintayne none of all these: what is become of that horrible accusation, wherein Luther is sayd to accuse God of vnrighteousnesse?

It is not agreable with Iustice (sayth he) that such as are onely instrumentes of wickednesse,* 1.543 should be punished. But according to Luthers doctrine men in doing wickedly, seeme nothing els then instrumentes of wickednes. Where finde you this M. Doctour? where haue you it? who euer besides Osorius spake on this wise either waking or sleéping? sometime Gods prouidence doth vse the seruice of man to punish euill do∣ers. Euen so did God auenge hym vpon the sinnes of owne people, by the Babilonianes. Agayne to take vengeaunce of the Assirianes, was Cirus the Duke of Persia raysed vppe. So did God vse also the malice of the Iewes, to finish the worke of our redemption: for vnlesse that Natione had conspired agaynst the sonne of God, we had not bene redeémed. And what is the deuill himselfe, but the Rodde of correction in the hand of God? and as it were an Instrument of vengeaunce, ordayned to pu∣nishe the outragies of euill doers? yet doth it not therefore fol∣low, that deuils and wicked persones, when they are called In∣strumentes of Gods wrath: are nothing els but Instrumentes, as though they were forced onely, and themselues did nothing at all, and as though by doyng nothing, themselues deserued no wrath. For neyther do we so imagine mē to be like vnto stoanes (as I haue sayd before) as though we left vnto them no abilitie in action:* 1.544 euen as the mynde of man, vnlesse it be ayded, can of it selfe do nothing but sinne: so doth no man sinne at any tyme, but by hys owne voluntary motione: which sinne albeit he doth not commit without the will of God, yet because he doth commit it contrary to the will, and commaundement of God, he is not acquired of hys fault. As when a murtherer killeth men, albeit he seeme after a certeine maner to exe••uute the will of God, yet because he doth not the deede onely beyng of the minde simply to serue hys God, but rather to follow the rage of his malice, ther∣fore is he neyther excusable: as beyng not faulty: nor is God to

be accused for vnrighteous, because he executeth hys wrath.

Wherfore it is false and slaunderous which Osorius doth conclude vpon the Assertion of Predestination. For he cōcluded two absurdities chiefly, but with a farre more grosse absurditie The first.* 1.545 That God is the cause of destruction and repro∣bation. The secōd That they which offend are punished vn∣worthely. Both which are vnmeasurably vayne: For albeit the decreé of God be the first and soueraigne cause in all actiones, by the which all other second, and inferiour causes are gouer∣ned: and although there is condemnation to the Reprobates, without the same decreé: Yet neuerthelesse this same condem∣nation is both adiudged righteous: and floweth also from their own will properly, & not properly frō the decreé of God. For ma∣ny thinges be done agaynst the will of God, by a certayne won∣derfull and vnspeakeable maner (as I haue sayd) whiche come not passe notwithstanding,* 1.546 without hys will. He ruleth ouer the mindes of men (as Augustine reporteth) and worketh in their hartes to encline their will whither him listeth, eyther vnto good thinges for hys great mercyes sake, eyther to euill thinges accor∣ding to their deseruings, after the proportiō of his owne Iudgemēt, sometymes manifest, sometimes secrett, but alwayes most iust and righteous: bringing to passe by a certayne merueilous operation of hys owne power,* 1.547 that in the things which men do agaynst the will of God, it cannot be, but that the will of God must needes be fulfilled.

Therefore the will of God (as you seé) is the first and soue∣raigne cause of all causes, and motiones: whiche neuerthelesse must be so vnderstanded, that thys first cause respect properly nothyng, but the last ende. Now this ende is the glory of God, and the most excellent commendation of hys Iustice, and mer∣cy. In the meane tyme the other middle endes do depend vpon their owne middle, and proper causes, and are referred vnto the same. Whereby it commeth to passe, that betwixt Gods de∣creé, and the condemnation of the Reprobate, many causes of condemnation doe come betwene, to witte: Infidelitie: the In∣heritable corruption of Nature defiled: and whatsoeuer fruites spring thereof. Now the proper efficient cause of this Infideli∣tie, and naturall corruption, is mans will, not Gods predesti∣nation: which corruption and Infidelitie notwithstanding are so

gouerned by Gods decreé so subiect there vnto, that although they be not executed by the decree of God, yet chaunce they not at any tyme,* 1.548 besides hys decree, nor without hys decreé: whereof God (as Augustine sayth) is not the cause efficient, but the cause deficient.

Now therefore where is that fatall and euerlasting Necessi∣tie (Osorius) which (as you say) doth thrust men maugre their heades by violent coaction without any their owne will into all kynde of wickednes?* 1.549 where are the vndescrued punishmendes of oftendours? where is the ouerthrow of the cōmon weale? where is that haynous accusation of the vn∣righteousnes of God? And where are now those Protago∣ristes and Diagoristes, and men farre more wicked then any of those, of whom you preache so much? what aunswere shall I frame to this your malapere and currishe slaunderinge, O some of Iemini?* 1.550 If God haue cōmaunded you to lye so shame∣lesly without controlement, and to backbite vertuous persona∣ges in this sort, what remayneth for them, but that they pati∣ently endure this generall grief of the godly? and recomfort thē∣selues by the example of Dauid? If peraduenture the Lord will behold their affliction; and will render vnto them good thinges for this cursed slaunder. In the meane space: this one thyng de∣lighteth not a little, that whereas his fellow doth counterfayte and lye in all thinges, yet he doth the same so openly, that no man can choose but laugh at hym: and withall so Impudently, that euery man may detest hynm: and agayne so blockishly, that euery man may despise, and deryde him for it. Wherby it com∣meth to passe that he doth not so much preiudice to Luther, by euill speaking, as he doth bewray hys owne ignoraunce to the worlde, by worsse prouing hys false and forged lyes: seeing heé hath neyther seemed to haue learned any thinge of the truth as yet, nor proued those lyes which he hath forged, nor euer shalbe able to proue any of them. Go to, and what gaine (think ye) haue you made by these your slaunders and lyes? when as ye accuse Luther amongest the nūber of Atheistes. Diagoristes & Pro∣tagoristes? and farre more wicked also then any of these? as one that doth condemne God of vnrighteousness: affirmeth him to be the Author of euill, dispoyleth man of Iudgement &

reason, bryngeth in fatall Necessitie (excludyng all action and operation of Will) compelleth men to do wickedly a∣gaynst their willes: teacheth that men may freely be euill, and go vnpunished, couereth their naughtines with an ex∣cuse: These and other vnspeakeable treacheries when ye lay to Luthers charge, do ye beleue that ye shall make any man geue credite to your talke? And doe ye not think, that some one or o∣ther will ryse vppe vpon the sodayne, which by readyng Luthers bookes, will espye thys your manifest falshood in lying? Let e∣uery man that will peruse Luthers writinges, ouer and ouer, which he hath left behynde hym as pledges, and testimonyes of hys fayth: who hath euer iudged or written more honorably of Gods Iustice? who hath euer with more vehemency, reproued mans vnrighteousnes? or condēned it more sharpely? so farre is he of from shadowyng the wickednes of naughtipackes, with a cloude of excuse. And where then hath thys man affirmed, that God is the Author of euill? Or where doth he tye men to a Ne∣cessitie of sinnyng? such a Necessitie especially as Osori. drea∣meth of? This doth he affirme, That Nature being left desti∣tute of grace, cānot but sinne of very Necessitie: which Necessi∣tie notwithstādyng proceedeth frō no where els, then frō will it selfe beyng corrupted. But Osori. doth so snatch, and wrest this sentēce into a cauillation, as though Luther did bryng in such a Necessitie, as should leaue no freédome to man at all: moreouer such a Necessitie as should so abolish all libertie, as though will could vndertake nothing at all of his own voluntary choyse: but should be forced, and whirled (as it were) to all thinges through ••oaction and constraint: Such indifferency vseth Osorius here both to make an open lye himself, and to charge Luther with a lye also. In the first wherof the vayne error of Osorius is easily espyed, & in the second hys vnshamefast impudēcy discouereth it selfe. Now to make the same appeare more euidently, it will not be impertinent in this place to make a short collection of all the sentences and argumentes of ech partie, touching the whole cause of Freewill and Predestination: which beyng compiled in∣to certayne brief places, it will not be amisse likewise to expoūd the same: That by this meanes the Reader may more easily cō∣ceaue, and more substancially discerne betwixt the doctrine of

eche party, aswell of them y^t are of Luthers opiniō, as also of thē that hang vppon the Popes sleaue: what is truth, and what is false: and how slaunderous a toung Osorius hath: what soeuer therfore hath bene taught by Luther, Melancthon, Bucer, Cal∣uine and other Deuines of sounde Iudgement of Freewill and Predestinatiō, are to be reduced for the most part into this brief.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Of Prede∣stinatiō and Freewill. Pag. 149. 150. 151.
• * 1.2

  Hercules not able to stād agaynst two, yet O∣sorius a∣gaynst foure.
• * 1.3

  Osori. more couragious in accusing, then in ar∣guyng.
• * 1.4

  Osori. his stinolous & foolish tre∣atyng of Free will.
• * 1.5

  The princi∣pall partes of Osor. ac∣cusation, re∣duced into certeine pla¦ces.
• * 1.6

  Luther in his Assertiō Article. 36.
• * 1.7

  Pag. 151.
• * 1.8

  The repulse of the ca∣uill.
• * 1.9

  Will cā not be seuered frō Reason.
• * 1.10

  The sub∣staunce of Freewill is neuer seue∣red from Nature.
• * 1.11

  Adam crea∣ted in abso∣late free∣dome.
• * 1.12

  How mans will is free, & not free.
• * 1.13

  The title onely of Freewill.
• * 1.14

  The name of Freewill without ef∣fect.
• * 1.15

  August. vpō the wordes of the A∣post. Serm. 13.
• * 1.16

  Luther doth not take away will from man, but freedome from will.
• * 1.17

  The words of Luther touchyng title onely are expoun∣ded.
• * 1.18

  Freewill beyng with out grace whiles she doth what it can of it selfe, sin∣neth dead∣ly.
• * 1.19

  Of Luthers Hyperboli∣call maner of speach.
• * 1.20

  Outragi∣ous Hyper∣bolicall speaches in the Popish doctrine.
• * 1.21

  The Pa∣pistes can neither a∣way with fayth one∣ly: nor with grace one∣ly.
• * 1.22

  Luthers ve∣hemencie whereupon it began.
• * 1.23

  August. de grat. & Lib. A••bit. Cap. 16.
• * 1.24

  Aug. in his booke de bono perse∣uerentie. Cap. 13.
• * 1.25

  The diffe∣rences of tymes and persōs must bee distin∣guished.
• * 1.26

  Foure de∣grees of Freewill af∣ter Lom∣band. 2. Lib. Distinct. 25
• * 1.27

  Freewill weakened after the fall, but here must be obserued a distinctiō of actions.
• * 1.28

  Naturall a∣ctions.
• * 1.29

  Ciuill acti∣ons belon∣gyng to the vse of com∣mon lyfe.
• * 1.30

  Actions merely spi∣rituall.
• * 1.31

  Fiue kyndes of Questi∣ons.
• * 1.32

  1. Quest.
• * 1.33

  Aug. vpon the worde of the Apo∣stle, Serm. 2.
• * 1.34

  2. Quest.
• * 1.35

  Ambros. of the callyng of the Gē∣tils. Lib. 1. Cap. 3.
• * 1.36

  Capacitie, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.37

  August. E∣pist. 46.
• * 1.38

  August. de grat. & Lib. A••b. Lib. 1. Cap. 15.
• * 1.39

  Mans free∣dome is twofold. How free∣dome of will must be cōstrued.
• * 1.40

  How Free∣will must be taken.
• * 1.41

  3. Quest.
• * 1.42

  Whether will be free to those thynges whiche are ruled by reason.
• * 1.43

  The Mai∣ster of the Sentences. 2 booke Dist. 24.25.
• * 1.44

  Nazienze∣nus in Ora∣tione.
• * 1.45

  4. Quest.
• * 1.46

  August. de peccat. me∣rit. Lib. 1. Cap. 5.
• * 1.47

  Aug. wri∣tyng against 2. Epistles of the Pe∣lag. 1. booke Cap. 2.
• * 1.48

  Iohn. 8.
• * 1.49

  In the same booke the. 3 Chap.
• * 1.50

  Aug. of the wordes of the Apostle Serm. 13.
• * 1.51

  Aug. of the wordes of the Apostle Serm. 2. 11.
• * 1.52

  De Ecclesia¦stic. Dog∣matibus, 21
• * 1.53

  Mans will how it is free, & not free.
• * 1.54

  5. Quest.
• * 1.55

  Whether nature be∣yng not re∣generated haue any free motiōs in spirituall thinges.
• * 1.56

  Reason.
• * 1.57

  Will.
• * 1.58

  Freewill in respect of spirituall functions is not onely weakened in vs, but al∣together blotted out. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, power.
• * 1.59

  Aug. de bo•••• no perseue. Cap. 6.13.
• * 1.60

  Luthers pro¦position of bonde will defended.
• * 1.61

  The bare Freewill of man beyng deuoyde of grace, is none other∣wise thē as a dead man without a Soule.
• * 1.62

  1. Cor. 1.
• * 1.63

  Aug. in his booke of Retract.
• * 1.64

  Aug. En∣••hirid.
• * 1.65

  Freewill of it selfe vt∣terly lost.
• * 1.66

  Os••c. 13.
• * 1.67

  The Grace of God without our Free∣will onely sounde and perfect,
• * 1.68

  August. de Nuptijs & cōc••p. Lib. 2. Cap. 3.
• * 1.69

  Pag. 148.
• * 1.70

  Whether our conuer∣sion be the worke of God onely.
• * 1.71

  Pag. 149.
• * 1.72

  An auns∣were of August. De peccat. & merit. Lib. 2 Cap. 18.
• * 1.73

  August. De peccat. & merit. Lib. 2 Cap. 5.
• * 1.74

  August. De peccat. & merit. Lib. 2. Cap. 5.
• * 1.75

  Obiection.
• * 1.76

  Aunswere out of Au∣gust.
• * 1.77

  Freewill hath no power of her selfe ei∣ther of the whole or of any part to worke.
• * 1.78

  A Fallax, a Diuisis ad Coniuncta.
• * 1.79

  Pag. 149.
• * 1.80

  Against the 2. Epistle of the Pelag. 1. booke Cap. 18.
• * 1.81

  The suttel∣tie of the Argument framed by not yeldyng cause suffi∣cient.
• * 1.82

  August. a∣gaynst the 2. Epistle of Pelag. 1. booke Cap. 19.
• * 1.83

  Grace doth not knocke alone, but openeth mans will also.
• * 1.84

  August. de verbis A∣post. Sermo 13.
• * 1.85

  O Lord o∣pē thou our lyppes.
• * 1.86

  Obiection.
• * 1.87

  Aunswere.
• * 1.88

  Aug. vpon the wordes of the A∣postle the. 15. Sermon.
• * 1.89

  August. de grat. & Lib. Arbit. Cap. 16.
• * 1.90

  Freewill is made na∣ked of all maner me∣rite.
• * 1.91

  Aug. in the same booke the 13. Chap.
• * 1.92

  Pag. 149.
• * 1.93

  The bea∣tyng down of Osorius Argument.
• * 1.94

  Ezechiell. 11. Chap. and 36. Chap.
• * 1.95

  The Fallax from the proposition Secundum quid, to Sim¦pliciter.
• * 1.96

  Osori. dou∣ble fault.
• * 1.97

  Aug. contra Iulian. Lib. 4. Cap. 3.
• * 1.98

  Aristotles Ethickes booke. 3. Cap. 1.5.
• * 1.99

  Obiection.
• * 1.100

  The Aun∣swere.
• * 1.101

  How mans will doth execute the force of an instrument.
• * 1.102

  By what meanes wil doth both worke and suffer.
• * 1.103

  Aug. Lib. de Correp. & gratia Cap. 2.
• * 1.104

  How will demeaneth it selfe pas∣siuely and actiuely.
• * 1.105

  Mans will is taken for an Instru∣ment, yet free neuer∣thelesse.
• * 1.106

  Wherein the papistes do attribute to much to Freewill.
• * 1.107

  Pag. 149.
• * 1.108

  1. Cor. 3. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.109

  The state & substaunce of the que∣stiō of Free¦will.
• * 1.110

  How it is to be vnder¦stāded that the Apo∣stles were together workers with God.
• * 1.111

  The Argu∣ment of O∣sorius and the Papi∣stes.
• * 1.112

  Tne Aun∣swere.
• * 1.113

  How Lu∣thers wor∣des are to be cōstrued.
• * 1.114

  An other Argument of Osorius, Pag. 149.
• * 1.115

  An Aun∣swere.
• * 1.116

  Phil. 2.
• * 1.117

  The double errour of Osorius.
• * 1.118

  Pag. 149.
• * 1.119

  Osori. doth attribute our Salua∣tion, partly to Grace, & partly to Freewill,
• * 1.120

  Osorius Obiection.
• * 1.121

  Aunswere.
• * 1.122

  August. de grat. & Lib. Arbit.
• * 1.123

  Otherwise worketh Gods Spi∣rite, other∣wise mans Freewill & the diuersi∣tie of them both.
• * 1.124

  Will doth nothyng in good things but whē it is holpen & applyed.
• * 1.125

  Grace doth plye, but is neuer plyed
• * 1.126

  Examples of mās will beyng hin∣dered euen in the euill whiche it purposed.
• * 1.127

  Will obey∣eth the spi∣rite of God many times whether it will or no.
• * 1.128

  The exāple of Paule & Peter.
• * 1.129

  August. de Correp. & grat. Cap. 8
• * 1.130

  Ierem. Cap. 10.
• * 1.131

  Luther in his booke of Asserti∣ons. Art. 36
• * 1.132

  Prouer. 16.
• * 1.133

  Man is not altogether depriued of free will to euil, though the same be ma¦ny tymes stayed.
• * 1.134

  Pag. 151.
• * 1.135

  Pag. 152.
• * 1.136

  Osor. lyeng rayling a∣gaynst ••u∣ther Melā∣cthon, Cal∣uine. &c.
• * 1.137

  Osor. Pag. 151.
• * 1.138

  Freewill is not of pow∣der simply & absolutely to make his wayes euill
• * 1.139

  August. de Ciuita. Del Lib. 5. Cap. 9.
• * 1.140

  Aug. in the same place.
• * 1.141

  August. de Correp. & gratia.
• * 1.142

  Luthers Artic. 36.
• * 1.143

  Osorius a lyeng Rhe∣thoritian & a grosse Lo∣gician.
• * 1.144

  Mans Free∣will is an Instrument of Gods Grace.
• * 1.145

  Esay.
• * 1.146

  Ezechi. Cap. 11. 36.
• * 1.147

  This worde freedome is discussed & distingui∣shed.
• * 1.148

  Luther. Lib. de S••r••o Arb. Cap. 46.
• * 1.149

  August.
• * 1.150

  The power of doyng wāteth not, but it •••• the freedome of power that wanteth.
• * 1.151

  August. de bono perse∣uer. Lib. 2. Cap. 13.
• * 1.152

  August. de grat. Chri∣sti contra Pellag. Lib. Cap. 20.
• * 1.153

  Luther de seruo Arb. Cap. 48.47.
• * 1.154

  Obiectiō of the Defen∣dours of Freewill taken out of the booke of Hypera∣spistes.
• * 1.155

  Aunswere.
• * 1.156

  Iohn. 8.
• * 1.157

  In that men are called holy and wise must be referred, not to their deseruyngs, but to grace wholy.
• * 1.158

  Aug. Epist. 89. ad Hil∣larium.
• * 1.159

  August. de serm. Dom. in monte. Lib. 2.
• * 1.160

  An Argu∣ment out of the wordes of August. to Hyllary.
• * 1.161

  In what sense Aug calleth will Freewill. Will see∣meth ra∣ther to bee termed vo∣luntary thē free.
• * 1.162

  The Con∣fession of Auspurgh.
• * 1.163

  Caluinus contra Alb. Ph••gium. Lib. 5.
• * 1.164

  August. de bono perse∣uer & pros∣per Cap. 12 and•• 21.
• * 1.165

  A compari∣son of Lu∣thers Asser∣tiōs and the Papistes.
• * 1.166

  The fruite and cōmo∣ditie of Lu∣thers doc∣trine.
• * 1.167

  Osorius Pag. 151.
• * 1.168

  The man hath spoke.
• * 1.169

  Ibidem.
• * 1.170

  Osori. Pag. 152.
• * 1.171

  The mani∣fold consi∣deration of Necessitie.
• * 1.172

  What is Necessary.
• * 1.173

  Two begin∣nynges of Neccessitie,
• * 1.174

  Necessitie of Coactiō.
• * 1.175

  Pag. 151. The shame¦lesse and ly∣eng cauill of Osorius.
• * 1.176

  Osori. Ar∣gument.
• * 1.177

  Aunswere,
• * 1.178

  Necessitie of sinnyng is not to be imputed to God, but to our selues.
• * 1.179

  An other Argument of Osorius.
• * 1.180

  Aunswere. Freedome taken two wayes.
• * 1.181

  Necessitie to be taken two maner of wayes.
• * 1.182

  The Neces∣sitie that Luther tea∣cheth, doth take awaye fortune and chaunce, but taketh not awaye freedome from will.
• * 1.183

  Freedome is taken a∣way by coa∣ction not by Necessitie.
• * 1.184

  Osori. Ar∣gument. Pag. 151.
• * 1.185

  The Cōfu∣tation.
• * 1.186

  Origene a∣gainst Cel∣sus. 2. booke
• * 1.187

  Our actiōs must be gu∣ded by ap∣proued rea∣son and not vncerteine certeinetie.
• * 1.188

  An other suttle So∣phisme of Osorius is opened. Pag. 151.
• * 1.189

  The Obie∣ctiō of Ce∣lestine the Pelagian a∣gaynst Au∣gustine.
• * 1.190

  Aug. Aun∣swere.
• * 1.191

  Obiection.
• * 1.192

  Aunswere.
• * 1.193

  August. vpō the wordes of the Apo∣stle the•• 2. Sermon.
• * 1.194

  August. E∣pistle to Sixtus.
• * 1.195

  Celestius the Pela∣gian against Augustine.
• * 1.196

  August. de Corr••pt. & grat. Cap. 6.
• * 1.197

  Osor. cauill Pag. 151.
• * 1.198

  Aunswere.
• * 1.199

  Osori. dou∣ble errour.
• * 1.200

  All thyngs are subiect to Gods prouidence.
• * 1.201

  Chauncea∣ble thinges•• Destiny for∣tune chaūce be excluded from beyng the causes of actions.
• * 1.202

  The order of superiour and inferi∣our causes.
• * 1.203

  Freewill is neither alto¦gether bōd nor altoge∣ther free.
• * 1.204

  Necessitie vnchangea∣ble and of certeintie.
• * 1.205

  In respect of Gods prouidence all thynges are done of Necessitie and not by chaunce.
• * 1.206

  Obiection, An Argu∣ment taken frō the pre∣ceptes and exhortatiōs of Gods law. Pag. 15••.
• * 1.207

  Aunswere. August. de gratia & li∣bero arbit. Cap. 16.
• * 1.208

  August. a∣gaynst the 2. Epistles of Pelagius Cap. 10.
• * 1.209

  Why the Commaun∣dements of the law were ordei∣ned out of S. Paule. Rom. 3.5.
• * 1.210

  Mans infir∣mitie doth not take a∣way the Necessitie of the law, The Neces∣sitie of cer∣teintie doth not dimi∣nishe mans endeuour.
• * 1.211

  The fore∣knowledge of GOD doth not take away freedome from man.
• * 1.212

  Osorius. Pag. 152.
• * 1.213

  Aunswere.
• * 1.214

  Of the truth of Gods Pre∣destination and fore∣knowledge
• * 1.215

  How thyn∣ges may be tearmed chauncea∣ble.
• * 1.216

  Luther falsely accu¦sed to make GOD the Authour of wickedness.
• * 1.217

  Luthers as∣sertion de∣fended a∣gaynst the cauill of Osorius.
• * 1.218

  An admo∣nitiō to the Readers.
• * 1.219

  August. En∣chirid. 100.
• * 1.220

  To be the cause of Sinne pro∣perly ought not to be imputed to God.
• * 1.221

  Ambrose of the callyng of the Gen∣tiles the se∣cond booke the last Chapter.
• * 1.222

  Cōmittyng of sinne can neither be without the know∣ledge of God, nor without his will al∣together & by what reason.
• * 1.223

  Will to be distingui∣shed in God.
• * 1.224

  Osor. Drift.
• * 1.225

  It is no re∣pugnancie to Gods righteous∣nes to will sinne in some res∣pect with∣out sinne.
• * 1.226

  There is ma¦ny tymes great diuer¦sitie in cau∣ses of one¦selfe same action.
• * 1.227

  Anselm. de casu Diabo li. Cap. 19.
• * 1.228

  Caluine a∣gaynst Pi∣ghi. Lib. 5.
• * 1.229

  Luthers & Caluines doctrine true and a∣greable tou∣chyng the cause of Sinne.
• * 1.230

  Gods will is not to be measured by the affe∣ction of mās will, where∣in Osorius doth erre.
• * 1.231

  Aug. Lib. 3. de Trinit.
• * 1.232

  The will of God higher then all o∣ther causes.
• * 1.233

  An Obie∣ction out of the Psalm. Aunswere.
• * 1.234

  Agaynst Gods will & without Gods will.
• * 1.235

  August. a∣gaynst I••liā the Pelag. Lib. 5. Cap. 3.
• * 1.236

  Gods will taken two maner of wayes. The secrete will of God that is vsu∣ally called his good pleasure. Gods will discouered in his word is termed, Voluntas Signi.
• * 1.237

  God is not cause of e∣uill accor∣dyng to his will reuea∣led by hi•• word.
• * 1.238

  Gods will can not be exempt al∣together from the or∣deryng of causes.
• * 1.239

  Mās, destru∣ction com∣meth of himselfe & yet not without Gods pro∣uidence.
• * 1.240

  Certayne actions in respect of man may be sinnes in respect of God may be righte∣ous.
• * 1.241

  God is the cause & not the cause of sinnes, in sundry res∣pectes.
• * 1.242

  August. de Praedest. & grat. Cap. 4
• * 1.243

  How blyn∣ding and hardning is to be taken with God.
• * 1.244

  Aug. de lib. Arb. & grat. Cap. 21.
• * 1.245

  2. Thessa. 2.
• * 1.246

  The true cause of sinne is pro∣perly in man not in God.
• * 1.247

  August. En∣chirid. Cap. 95.
• * 1.248

  An Argu∣ment out of August.
• * 1.249

  August. a∣gainst Iu∣lyan the Pe∣lagi. 5. book Cap. 3.
• * 1.250

  1. Kinges, Cap. 12.
• * 1.251

  1. Kings 12.
• * 1.252

  2. parillipo, Cap. 25.
• * 1.253

  1. Paralipo. 12.
• * 1.254

  2. Paralipo. 24.
• * 1.255

  Esay. 63.
• * 1.256

  Ezech. 14.
• * 1.257

  Iob. 1.
• * 1.258

  Iob. 1.
• * 1.259

  The meanes of Gods pro∣uidence is notified by example.
• * 1.260

  Not to striue a∣gaynst Lu∣ther: but to warre a∣gaynst God hym∣selfe.
• * 1.261

  Cicereos discourse, a∣gaynst Gods prouidence is detesta∣ble.
• * 1.262

  Cicero de natur. deor. lib. 2.
• * 1.263

  August. de Ciuitat. dei. 5. Booke Cap. 9.
• * 1.264

  Aug. de Ci∣uitat dei lib. 5. Cap. 9.
• * 1.265

  Aug. in the same booke and Chap.
• * 1.266

  A suttle So¦phisme pra¦ctizyng to persuade meere ab∣surdities.
• * 1.267

  An execra∣ble conclu∣sion.
• * 1.268

  The suttle∣tie of the Sophisme is disclosed.
• * 1.269

  August. de Ciuit. Dei Lib. 5. Cap. 9.
• * 1.270

  Luther doth nei∣ther teache euery Ne∣cessitie ab∣solutely, nor take a∣way free∣dome from all men.
• * 1.271

  August. de Natur. & Grat. Cap. 22.
• * 1.272

  Osorius. pag. 152.
• * 1.273

  An answere to the false diuinitie of Osorius.
• * 1.274

  Aug. de Correp, & grat. cap. 14.
• * 1.275

  August. de Ciuitat dei. lib. 5. Cap. 9.
• * 1.276

  Aug. de pec¦catis meri∣tis. lib. 2. Cap. 5.
• * 1.277

  Oso. Caui••.
• * 1.278

  August. in hys treatise vpon Gen. agaynst Ma∣nichaeus. lib. 1. Cap. 2.
• * 1.279

  How causes are called onely and proper cau∣ses.
• * 1.280

  Rom. 3.
• * 1.281

  Pag. 154.
• * 1.282

  Paules mea¦nyng expoūded accor∣dyng to O∣sorius.
• * 1.283

  Rom. 9.
• * 1.284

  Rom. 10.
• * 1.285

  Rom. 11.
• * 1.286

  The disposi∣cion of Paules dis∣course of predestina∣tion and e∣lection after the inter∣pretation of the faithful.
• * 1.287

  Osorius. pag. 152.
• * 1.288

  Examples of Isaac and Iacob. Isma∣el and Esau.
• * 1.289

  Rom. 9.
• * 1.290

  The exam∣ple of Pha∣rao.
• * 1.291

  All reward of merites excluded.
• * 1.292

  Osorius. Pag. 155.
• * 1.293

  Maior.
• * 1.294

  Minor.
• * 1.295

  Conclusiō.
• * 1.296

  Election what signi∣fieth after Osorius logick.
• * 1.297

  August.
• * 1.298

  Ephes. 1.
• * 1.299

  The ordina-Glose vpon the 1. chap. to the Ephe.
• * 1.300

  Whether Gods Ele∣ction doe depend vpō our actions to come.
• * 1.301

  Pag. 256.
• * 1.302

  How Osor. doth define the purpose of God.
• * 1.303

  Pag. 156.
• * 1.304

  The cause and reason of Election according to Osor. and the new pe∣lagianes.
• * 1.305

  The crafty cauillation of Osorius, Pag. 156.
• * 1.306

  Aunswere.
• * 1.307

  Rom. 11.
• * 1.308

  Rom. 9.
• * 1.309

  Workes foreseene, are not they which are done, but whiche are to be done accordyng to the schoolemē.
• * 1.310

  Workes foreseene are in no respect the cause of Gods elec∣tion.
• * 1.311

  The second Reason.
• * 1.312

  The third Reason.
• * 1.313

  The fourth Reason.
• * 1.314

  The fift rea∣son.
• * 1.315

  The sixth Reason.
• * 1.316

  The seuēth reason. Ezech. 1.16.
• * 1.317

  Corinth. 1.
• * 1.318

  August. ad Simplicia∣num.
• * 1.319

  The eight Reason.
• * 1.320

  the 9. Rea∣son.
• * 1.321

  Aug. retract lib. 1. cap. 19.
• * 1.322

  The 10. rea∣son.
• * 1.323

  Aug. contra Iulia. pelag. lib. 5. cap. 3.
• * 1.324

  August. ad Simplici. Lib. 1. Quaest. 2.
• * 1.325

  Osori. Ar∣gument.
• * 1.326

  Aunswere.
• * 1.327

  Aristot. E∣thic. Lib. 3. Cap. 3.
• * 1.328

  The Fallax from that whiche is not the cause to the cause.
• * 1.329

  4. Causes of Election or Predest. by Paule.
• * 1.330

  Rom 9. Ephe. 1. Rom. 9.
• * 1.331

  Osor. 2. ar∣gument.
• * 1.332

  The argu∣ment.
• * 1.333

  pag. 153.
• * 1.334

  Aunswere.
• * 1.335

  The Aduer∣saries obiect resolued.
• * 1.336

  Leuit. 20.
• * 1.337

  Numer. 11.
• * 1.338

  Marc. 1.
• * 1.339

  The reason of the ad∣uersaries touching the mercy and iustice of God, and the cause of the same, expounded and confu∣ted.
• * 1.340

  The respect of merites are directly against Gods free power.
• * 1.341

  Pag. 156. 157. Osori. Ob∣iection.
• * 1.342

  Aunswere.
• * 1.343

  August. de nat. & grat. Cap. 5.
• * 1.344

  Math. 12.
• * 1.345

  Rom. 3.
• * 1.346

  Arguments.
• * 1.347

  Both the propositiōs of the argu∣ments are denyed.
• * 1.348

  All the de∣fence of Gods iustice doth consist in hys will.
• * 1.349

  Aug. de Tri∣nit. lib. 3.
• * 1.350

  Obiectiō of a Sclaunde∣rer.
• * 1.351

  The argu∣ment of the Aduersary.
• * 1.352

  Maior.
• * 1.353

  Minor.
• * 1.354

  Conclusion.
• * 1.355

  An Aun∣swere out of S. Paule.
• * 1.356

  The Apo∣stle doth aunswere two manner of waies.
• * 1.357

  Rom. 9. The simili∣tude of the Potter. Rom. 9.
• * 1.358

  S. Paules Argument against fore¦seene wor∣kes.
• * 1.359

  The aun∣swere of this Proc∣tour and others.
• * 1.360

  The confu∣tatiō of the aduersaries aunswere.
• * 1.361

  Rom. 9. August. de Praedest. & grat. Cap. 7.
• * 1.362

  Electiō de∣pēdeth not vpon fayth in our wor∣kes: but fayth and workes de∣pende vpon Election.
• * 1.363

  The stino∣lous cauil∣lation of Osorius hys ouerthrow.
• * 1.364

  Rom. 11.
• * 1.365

  Rom. 9.
• * 1.366

  Rom. 11.
• * 1.367

  Aug. depre∣dest. grat. Cap. 7.
• * 1.368

  Osorius ta∣ken tardy as Enemy to Grace.
• * 1.369

  Osori. pag. 257.
• * 1.370

  The summe of Christian doctrine doth con∣sist in foure thynges chiefly.
• * 1.371

  Electiō and Predestina∣tion.
• * 1.372

  Vocation & Conuersiō.
• * 1.373

  Iustificatiō and lyfe e∣uerlastyng.
• * 1.374

  Glory of immortali∣tie.
• * 1.375

  Osori. doth couer an E∣nemy of Grace vn∣der a glori∣ous pray∣sing of ver∣tue.
• * 1.376

  Rom. 9.
• * 1.377

  Osori. pag. 157.
• * 1.378

  August. ad simplicia. Lib. 1. Quest. 2.
• * 1.379

  The mea∣nyng of Paule ope∣ned by Au∣gustine.
• * 1.380

  The defēce of Gods Iu∣stice consi∣steth not in any thing els thē in the onely mercy of God ac∣cording to Osorius.
• * 1.381

  Esau. Iacob.
• * 1.382

  The harde∣nyng of Pharao.
• * 1.383

  Osorius. Pag. 158.
• * 1.384

  The confu∣tation of Osori. Ob∣iection.
• * 1.385

  The chief meanes wherewith Gods Iu∣stice may be defended.
• * 1.386

  Rom. 9.
• * 1.387

  An other exception of Osorius, confuted.
• * 1.388

  Osorius. pag. 158.
• * 1.389

  The reason of Osorius touchyng the cause & order of predestina∣tion.
• * 1.390

  Aug. ad sim∣plici. lib. 1. quest. 2.
• * 1.391

  Rom. 9.
• * 1.392

  The words of Paul ex∣pounded.
• * 1.393

  August. ad simplici. Lib. 1. Quaest. 2.
• * 1.394

  In Predest. the first cause must be coupled with the last end.
• * 1.395

  Osori, pag. 158. 159. 160.
• * 1.396

  The aun∣swere to Osorius cōclusion.
• * 1.397

  Pag. 161.
• * 1.398

  Osori. pag. 161.
• * 1.399

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.
• * 1.400

  The office of a Iudge & of a crea∣tour farre diuerse.
• * 1.401

  Rom. 9. Osori. pag. 161.
• * 1.402

  The Argu∣ment of O∣sori. out of S. Paule
• * 1.403

  The aun∣swere with an explica∣tion of S. Paule.
• * 1.404

  Osori. Ca∣uill vpō the wordes of Paule.
• * 1.405

  Fashioned.
• * 1.406

  The will & purpose of God the first cause.
• * 1.407

  Election & Predesti∣nation.
• * 1.408

  Creation.
• * 1.409

  Calling ac∣cordyng to his pur∣pose.
• * 1.410

  Vocation accordyng to purpose.
• * 1.411

  Fayth. Iustificatiō.
• * 1.412

  The Glory of God, the last end.
• * 1.413

  Pag. 161.
• * 1.414

  Osori. Ob∣iection. pag. 161.
• * 1.415

  Aunswere.
• * 1.416

  Aunswere, Whether vessels of honour be made of wickednes onely as of the first cause.
• * 1.417

  Pharaoes Reiection proceeded not of his Rebellion, but his Re∣bellion ra∣ther of his reiection,
• * 1.418

  A double considera∣tion of the Vessels of wrath.
• * 1.419

  Rom. 9.
• * 1.420

  Cauilles of the aduer∣saries.
• * 1.421

  An answere to Osorius Cauils.
• * 1.422

  Gods will taken two manner of wayes.
• * 1.423

  Psal. 113.
• * 1.424

  Luke 10.
• * 1.425

  Gods will is the begin∣ning and rule of all thinges.
• * 1.426

  How wic∣ked men do the will of God.
• * 1.427

  I. Thessa. 4.
• * 1.428

  The order and processe of causes.
• * 1.429

  Rom. 9.
• * 1.430

  The place of Paule to the Rom 9. expounded.
• * 1.431

  The cause effecient.
• * 1.432

  The cause deficient.
• * 1.433

  How the causes of E∣lection and damnation do differr & agree be∣twixt them selues.
• * 1.434

  How Gods will doth behaue it self in the Elect.
• * 1.435

  The damna¦tion of the wicked ought not to be impu∣ted to God.
• * 1.436

  In the dam∣nacion of the wicked two thinges are to be cōsidered.
• * 1.437

  Malum cul∣pae. Malum poenae.
• * 1.438

  How the damnation of thē that perish tho∣row their owne de∣fault tourn∣eth to good in the sight of God. Aug. Enchi. Cap. 95. Aug. Enchi. Cap. 100.
• * 1.439

  How the efficient cause of sal∣uation and damnation do differre.
• * 1.440

  The effici∣ent cause.
• * 1.441

  The deficiēt Cause out of Aug. lib. de Ciuit. dei. 12. Cap. 6.9.7.
• * 1.442

  Question.
• * 1.443

  Answere.
• * 1.444

  The pro∣mise of God is generall with a pro∣mise.
• * 1.445

  Singuli ge∣nerum.
• * 1.446

  Gunera sin∣gulorum.
• * 1.447

  The end of Creation to Godward.
• * 1.448

  The proui∣dēce of god ought not to be accu∣sed in the destruction of the Re∣probates.
• * 1.449

  How Gods sufferaunce dealeth in mens acti∣ons or life.
• * 1.450

  Whether Gods suffe∣raunce or hys will beare more rule in mans lyfe.
• * 1.451

  A dubble obiection.
• * 1.452

  The origi∣nall of sinne is to be as∣cribed vnto the Crea∣ture not vn¦to the Cre∣atour.
• * 1.453

  God dyd not create man to the ende he should pe∣rish.
• * 1.454

  Frō whēce the cause of damnation sprang at the first.
• * 1.455

  The Obie∣ctions con∣futed.
• * 1.456

  The cause of eche mās dānation is within him selfe.
• * 1.457

  Infidelitie proceedeth rather of ignoraunce thē of will.
• * 1.458

  Fayth being the gift of God sprin∣geth not frō mans will.
• * 1.459

  1 Peter. 2. 2. Thessa. 1.
• * 1.460

  Actes. 13.
• * 1.461

  1. Cor. 2.
• * 1.462

  Esay. 6.9.
• * 1.463

  Math. 20.
• * 1.464

  Luke. 8.
• * 1.465

  1. Pet. 2.
• * 1.466

  Two things to be consi∣dered in Gods mer∣cy.
• * 1.467

  Whether Gods mer∣cy be gene∣rall to all indifferent∣ly, and how it is gene∣rall.
• * 1.468

  Grace of Vocation.
• * 1.469

  Grace of Election.
• * 1.470

  Fayth and Saluation take their originall from Grace rather then from our owne will.
• * 1.471

  An Aun∣swere to the place of Chriso∣stome.
• * 1.472

  The secret will of his good plea∣sure vnre∣uealed. i. Benepla∣citi.
• * 1.473

  The ex∣presse will of God re∣uealed. i. Voluntas Signi.
• * 1.474

  Vocation taken two maner of wayes ac∣cordyng to Augustine•• August. ad Simplici.
• * 1.475

  Pighius touchyng the equali∣tie of Gods Grace to∣wardes all. Pighius si∣militude ta¦ken out of the Epistle to the He∣brues.
• * 1.476

  The Rea∣son of Pi∣ghius and Osor. is cō∣feted.
• * 1.477

  Whether it be of God or of man that the good and the euill do differre.
• * 1.478

  An answere Pighi. simi∣litude.
• * 1.479

  The place out of the Epist. to the Hebrues.
• * 1.480

  An other Reason of the aduer∣sary leading to absurdity.
• * 1.481

  An acceptiō of persones.
• * 1.482

  The aduer∣saries obie∣ctions are mett with∣all.
• * 1.483

  That those that are not chosen doe not come how mans will & gods predestina∣tion: do se∣uerally work.
• * 1.484

  Selfe power or libertie to liue after her own will.
• * 1.485

  Aug. contra. 2. Epist. pela. lib. 1. Cap 3.
• * 1.486

  Aug. de pre∣dest 1. sancti. Cap. 3.
• * 1.487

  Mans will is neuer so free but that it is alwaies coupled with Ne∣cessitie.
• * 1.488

  The strēgth of Orignall sinne.
• * 1.489

  Gods pre∣destination both elder in tyme and in power surmonn∣ting all mās will.
• * 1.490

  The obie∣ctions of the Aduersaries.
• * 1.491

  The aun∣swere.
• * 1.492

  Aug. ad bo∣nifacium. lib. 1. Cap. 19. De lib. arb. Cap. 2. &. 17.
• * 1.493

  Aug. de cor∣rep. & grat. Cap. 1. epist. 107. ad vi∣ctalem.
• * 1.494

  Wherein effectuall Grace doth consiste.
• * 1.495

  Aug. de gra. & libe. arbit. Cap. 5.
• * 1.496

  Aug. con∣tra. 2. Epist. pela. lib. 1. Cap. 18.
• * 1.497

  Osori. pag. 162.
• * 1.498

  The com∣playnt of Osorius a∣gaynst Lu∣ther tou∣chyng the subuersion of Ciuill so¦cietie.
• * 1.499

  The Tyran∣nicall state of the Po∣pe some∣what trou∣bled by Lu∣ther.
• * 1.500

  The Pope.
• * 1.501

  The Cardi∣nalls.
• * 1.502

  Mytred By¦shoppes.
• * 1.503

  Droues of Monckes & Friers.
• * 1.504

  The Wolfe doth accuse the Lambe for trou∣blyng the water.
• * 1.505

  Gene. 26.
• * 1.506

  The seat of the beast in the Apo∣cali.
• * 1.507

  Apoc. 16.
• * 1.508

  2. Thessa. 2.
• * 1.509

  Amos. 7.
• * 1.510

  3. Kyngs.
• * 1.511

  It is decla∣red by exā∣ples what and how many mis∣chiefes the Romishe See hath ••ay sed.
• * 1.512

  The Trans∣lations of Empires,
• * 1.513

  The confir∣ming of Bi∣shops taken away from Emperours,
• * 1.514

  The warres of Hēry the 4. and Fre∣dericke. 1. & 2. ••••donick of Bauie re, Frederick of Austriche, Ludouicke and Ro∣dolphe.
• * 1.515

  The Trage∣dies of Hē∣ry the 6.
• * 1.516

  Chilperick the French Kyng.
• * 1.517

  The Scep∣ters of Em∣perours and Kynges o∣uerthrowē and takē a∣way by the Popes.
• * 1.518

  Phillippe the Frenche Kyng.
• * 1.519

  Hēry the 5. agaynst Hē¦ry the iiij. the Sonne in armes a∣gaynst the Father tho∣rough the practize of the Pope of Rome.
• * 1.520

  Frācis. Dā∣dalus, an Ambassa∣dour of Ve∣nice first: af∣terwardes Duke of Ve¦nice & kyng of Creete.
• * 1.521

  Osorius quarrell a∣gaynst Lu∣ther.
• * 1.522

  Peace. Church. Bushoppes.
• * 1.523

  Sillius.
• * 1.524

  Peace is a common thing both to the good and the wic∣ked.
• * 1.525

  The forme of the chur∣che is alto∣gether beu∣tifull: but not alwayes true.
• * 1.526

  Cicero.
• * 1.527

  Elias.
• * 1.528

  Vnder the name of peace many tymes lur∣keth horri∣ble breach of vnitie.
• * 1.529

  Christ, Paule, the Apostles, and Martirs, falsely accused as disturbers of the peace.
• * 1.530

  Luther ac∣cused of the Portugall Tertullus without all reason.
• * 1.531

  Iuuenal.
• * 1.532

  Math. 2.
• * 1.533

  Where the Church is, there is the vnity of fayth, but not where vnity is, there the Church is alwayes.
• * 1.534

  Luther dyd not inueigh agaynst any priuate per∣sones by name: but gaynst their pestiferous Sectes.
• * 1.535

  The ouer∣throw of Monasteries not to be imputed to Luther.
• * 1.536

  Osorius shameles slaunder vp-Luther.
• * 1.537

  Osori. pag. 162. 163.
• * 1.538

  Osor. cree∣pyng So∣phisme.
• * 1.539

  Conclusiō.
• * 1.540

  Aunswere. The nature of the Sori∣tes expla∣ned. Generum. Specierum.
• * 1.541

  August. de Trinitat. Lib. 3.
• * 1.542

  Necessitie of coaction.
• * 1.543

  Osori. pag. 163.
• * 1.544

  No mā sin∣neth, but by his own will. Without the will of God. And contrary to the will of God.
• * 1.545

  Two absur∣dities in O∣sorius.
• * 1.546

  August. de Lib. Arbitr. & Grat. Cap. 20. & 21.
• * 1.547

  August. de Praedestin. Sanct. Lib. 1. Cap. 16.
• * 1.548

  August. de Ciuita. Dei. Lib. 12. Cap. 6. 7. 8.
• * 1.549

  Osori. pag. 163.
• * 1.550

  2. Kyng. 16.