Against Ierome Osorius Byshopp of Siluane in Portingall and against his slaunderous inuectiues An aunswere apologeticall: for the necessary defence of the euangelicall doctrine and veritie. First taken in hand by M. Walter Haddon, then undertaken and continued by M. Iohn Foxe, and now Englished by Iames Bell.

Osorius Argument.

* 1.1Whosoeuer do attribute the orderyng of all thynges to absolute Necessitie, exemptyng freedome from will, doe spoyle men of their vnderstandyng, depriue them of Iudgement and bereue them of reason, and do trāf∣forme them into brute beastes and stoanes.

Luthers doctrine doth bynde mens actions and willes to Necessitie.

Ergo, Luthers doctrine doth dispoyle mē of their senses and turneth them into stoanes.

* 1.2I deny the Maior of this Argument. In the Minor I distin∣guish this word Necessitie. Lastly the Argument is altogether vicious: and that for two causes. Either bycause Osorius thin∣keth:* 1.3 That no Necessitie at all byndeth thynges to be directed by the eternall prouidence and ordinaunce of God: or els he sup∣poseth this Necessitie to he such, as must neédes exclude all freé∣dome of will. Both which are false. And first touchyng Necessi∣tie. Luther & other aūcient writers do learnedly affirme:* 1.4 That the actions of mans lyfe are not subiect to fortune: but herein they do acknowledge the prouidence of God, which they assigne to be the onely and principall gouernesse and guide of mās lyfe, as which directeth mās purposes, boweth and bendeth his will, and ordereth all the enterprises thereof. Moreouer they teach the same prouidence to be such, as whiche is not whirled about through blynd and sudden motions (wherein no place is left to

the happenynges of fortune) nor such a prouidence as must neédes depend vpon inferiour causes,* 1.5 or vpon a necessary cou∣plyng together of causes (wherein destiny is excluded) nor such a prouidence as is vnaduisedly & vncerteinly tossed to & fro, ac∣cordyng to the wandryng chaunces of fortune (wherein fortune & chaunce is taken away) but such a prouidence, as consisteth in a certeine assured stedfast & permanent order,* 1.6 workyng so in the meane whiles by inferiour and mixte causes neuerthelesse, not as though it were tyed to those causes with any such necessary bonde of couplyng, that it may not possibly doe otherwise by her owne absolute and most freé motione, neither as though those causes could not possibly doe otherwise, but must of Necessitie follow the direction of the same prouidence, whereunto they be subiect. Whereby it commeth to passe, that Freewill beyng oc∣cupyed in these meane causes,* 1.7 neither ceaseth to be altogether freé (as being forced by no forreine constraint, but guided by her owne accord:) nor yet remayneth so absolutely freé, but that it is constrayned whether she wil or no, to yeld to y^e direction of Gods prouidence, voluntaryly notwithstandyng & not coactly. Wher∣upon amongest the learned this Necessitie is called Necessitas immutabilitatis aut certitud••nis:* 1.8 whiche though doe not vrge thynges with violent coaction, yet for as much as nothyng is in al the creation of nature of so small substance, as can be with∣out the cōpasse of Gods knowledge,* 1.9 therfore albeit many things seéme accordyng to our capacities to be done by chaunce, yet in respect of Gods prouidence (if wee duely consider the origi∣nall and principall cause of thynges that are done) wee shall finde nothing done, but which could not but be done, of very Ne∣cessitie. I make hast to the other absurdities: to witte: to Oso∣rius his most friuolous brabblynges. For in this sorte he craw∣leth from mans lawes and ciuill gouernement, to Gods lawes, arguyng as it were in this sort.

If will be nothing auayleable to good lyfe, nor of it selfe can do nothyng but Sinne: then are Gods lawes com∣maunded in vayne: in vayne also are exhortatiōs and aduertisementes ministred: in vayne are blessinges and cursinges set downe in the Scriptures.* 1.10

But no man wil say that these are cōmaūded in the Scrip∣tures

in vayne.

Ergo, this doctrine of Luther is false & execrable, whereby he leaueth none other habilitie to Freewill, but onely to sinne, & whereby he bindeth all things to necessity.

* 1.11This Maior must bee denyed, beyng nothyng els but a most manifest cauillation: to witte: tendyng to this effect, as though God commaunded vs to doe nothyng, but that we might of our owne selues performe: whereunto Augustine aunswereth in this wise. O man in the commaundemēt learne what thou oughtest to doe, in the punishment learne thy weakenesse through thyne owne default: In the prayer learne from whence thou mayest obteyne. &c. By the law of commaundyng, and forebyddyng therefore accordyng to Augustine, we come to the knowledge of our Sinne and infirmitie, not of our owne strength & power, yet is not the law therfore cōmaunded in vayne. For to vs that aske in the Sonnes name, and acknowledge our infirmitie, is Grace promised: which worketh in vs both to will, and to doe: accor∣dyng as the same Augustine doth recorde in the same place: Let vs remember that hee doth say: make vnto your selues a new hart and n••w Spirite, who hath sayd. I will geue you a new hart, and I will geue you a new Spirite. How is it then that he that sayth make vnto your selues a new hart, fayth also, I will geue you a new hart? Why doth he commaunde if him selfe will geue? Why doth he geue, if mā be the worker? but bycause he geueth the thyng that he com∣maundeth, and helpeth him whom hee hath commaunded that hee may do it? For through grace it commeth to passe, that man is en∣dued with a good will, which was before of an euill will. &c. Ther∣fore by this Argument of Augustine appeareth that this word of admonition, exhortation, or of rebukyng vsed in the Scriptu∣res is as it were a certeine meane, or instrument which the holy Ghost doth vse in conuertyng the will of such, as are not yet re∣generate: and in beautifying the first issues of his good giftes in such as are regenerate, that they may grow to a more rype∣nesse through Repentaunce, through Fayth, and through Pray∣er. And by what wrest of Logicke doth Osorius gather habili∣tie of Freewill out of the holy ordinaūces, seyng Augustine doth in so many places so directly gayne say him, but especially in his 2. booke agaynst the two Epistles of Pelagius,* 1.12 writyng in this

wise. I can see nothyng in the whole Scriptures, geuen by God in commaūdement to man, to proue that man hath Freewill, that may not bee founde either to bee geuen of Gods liberalitie: or required to set forth the assistaunce of his grace. This much Augustine.

Briefly to knitte vp the matter in a word or two: if you will know to what end, commaundementes, couenaunts and exhor∣tations are deliuered by God. Learne this out of S. Paule, if Augustine cānot satisfie you. That is to say: Bycause after y^e knowledge of good & euill is once receaued, we are therfore vn∣der the law of Necessitie, & bycause also we are vnder y^e law,* 1.13 whether we be able, or not able to performe: the law speaketh vnto vs of Necessitie, that if we be able to performe them, we should ly••e by them: and that if we despise them euery mouth should be stopped, and all the world be culpable before God. And withall that such as are not yet regenerate in Christ, vnderstan∣dyng how much is cōmaunded beyond their habilitie & power, may fleé to prayer, and seéke for the Mediatour, and call vpon him for assistaunce of Grace: on the other side, such as the holy Ghost hath endued with more bountyfull giftes of his gracious liberalitie, may w^t more earnest bent affection, yeld them selues thankefull to God, who hath geuen them strength to be able to walke in his wayes. Whereby it is come to passe,* 1.14 that neither the Necessitie of the commaundement is made frustrate by our imbecillitie, nor mans endeuour any thyng weakened by the Necessitie of infallible certeintie, nor yet freédome or will disa∣bled by Gods prouidence, all which you do most falsely reporte to ensue vpon the doctrine of Luther. I come now at y^e last, to that great and most haynous matter, the very chief and well-spryng of all the other absurdities. To witte: Wherein Luther maketh God to be the Authour of all mischief, and chargeth him with vnrighteous dealyng, in this Argumēt for sooth. For where as Luther doth attribute the successes of all things,* 1.15 be they good be they euill to God as to y^e chief and principall originall, and doth conclude all thynges vnder the absolute Necessitie of pro∣uidence, hereupon the aduersary doth gather threé moustruous inconueniences.

The first, that by this meanes men haue not freédome vpon [unspec 1] their owne willes.

[unspec 2] The second, that men are not Authours of their owne sinne.

[unspec 3] The thyrd, that God doth execute his Iudgementes vpon men vniustly for the Sinnes, whereof they be not the Authours, but God. Whereupon Simme Suttle argueth from destructi∣on of the consequent on this wise.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Osor. cauill Pag. 151.
• * 1.2

  Aunswere.
• * 1.3

  Osori. dou∣ble errour.
• * 1.4

  All thyngs are subiect to Gods prouidence.
• * 1.5

  Chauncea∣ble thinges•• Destiny for∣tune chaūce be excluded from beyng the causes of actions.
• * 1.6

  The order of superiour and inferi∣our causes.
• * 1.7

  Freewill is neither alto¦gether bōd nor altoge∣ther free.
• * 1.8

  Necessitie vnchangea∣ble and of certeintie.
• * 1.9

  In respect of Gods prouidence all thynges are done of Necessitie and not by chaunce.
• * 1.10

  Obiection, An Argu∣ment taken frō the pre∣ceptes and exhortatiōs of Gods law. Pag. 15••.
• * 1.11

  Aunswere. August. de gratia & li∣bero arbit. Cap. 16.
• * 1.12

  August. a∣gaynst the 2. Epistles of Pelagius Cap. 10.
• * 1.13

  Why the Commaun∣dements of the law were ordei∣ned out of S. Paule. Rom. 3.5.
• * 1.14

  Mans infir∣mitie doth not take a∣way the Necessitie of the law, The Neces∣sitie of cer∣teintie doth not dimi∣nishe mans endeuour.
• * 1.15

  The fore∣knowledge of GOD doth not take away freedome from man.