Against Ierome Osorius Byshopp of Siluane in Portingall and against his slaunderous inuectiues An aunswere apologeticall: for the necessary defence of the euangelicall doctrine and veritie. First taken in hand by M. Walter Haddon, then undertaken and continued by M. Iohn Foxe, and now Englished by Iames Bell.

Sithence we haue now layd this foundation for our better furniture to be able to make aunswere: We will now addresse our selues to our aduersaries Argumentes. Wherein although he obserue no course, nor forme of cōmon Disputatiō, let vs yet helpe his lame Logicke as well as we may. And first of all, tou∣chyng y^e ouerthrow of Lawes (wherewith bycause it lyketh Mai∣ster Osorius to vrge this point chiefly before the rest) let vs geue our attentiue eares to his wordes, and marke well how cun∣nyngly he argueth.* 1.1 But I say (sayth he) that by this doctrine of Luther (whereby he doth teach that things are directed to their end by Necessitie) that Lawes are subuerted, De∣crees put to silence: and right and wrong confoūded toge∣ther. And why doth he not adde this much more also? that whole common weales are ouerthrowen? Well go to. I do heare very well what you say Osorius. But I haue not heard yet any sub∣staunciall Argumēt, whereby you proue this that you say to be true. Certes there be at this present within Christendome ma∣ny Natiōs, many Prouinces, many Kyngdomes, many Duke∣domes, many Cities and common weales that fauour Luthers doctrine: Wherein I appeale to your owne conscience (speake it if you can) haue you euer heard amongest all these (I say not of any one commō wealth or Citie) but of any one litle Uillage, or Ciuill familie, that hath bene any one iote defrauded of the benefite of their Lawes, or become lesse prouident for the cōmon quyet of their countrey, by followyng Luthers doctrine? Al∣though we haue not yet receaued frō Spayne and Portingall into our common wealth your bloudy lawes of Inquisition, em∣brued with Chriscian bloud, and do suppose also that no discrete common wealth will euer receaue them: Yet through Gods in∣estimable prouidence we bee not destitute of politique Lawes, nor of honest sciences, nor of vigilaunt Counsellours. Wherein albeit our grosse capacities may seéme vnworthy to bee compa∣red to the fine and pregnaunt wittes of Portingall: yet howsoe∣uer they seéme, we are by their direction sufficiently enough in∣structed to discerne betwixt the limittes of right & wrong, & not to confounde thē: neither haue we euer confounded thē as farre as I know: what maner of hotchpot you make of them in Por∣tingall I know not. For as much therefore as common experi∣ence

teachyng the contrary, doth most manifestly conuince you of open lyeng, with what face dare you so boldly affirme? that through this doctrine of Luther, Lawes are subuerted, Coun∣sels put to silence, and confusion and disorder of right and wrong to haue entred in? Whereof you neuer saw any proofe, ne yet can tell a dreame so much of any attempt practized in a∣ny common wealth. And therfore I marueile what kynde of le∣sing you will coyne at length to make this cauillation of yours to carry some shew of truth. I suppose veryly that (beyng disfur∣nished of proofe and recordes, and founde an open lyer in matter so euident) you will shrowde your selfe vnder some close couert of Pelagius. To witte. That where the vse of the law consisteth of two pointes principally, that is to say, in aduancyng vertue, and in punishyng vyce: hereupon Osorius will frame an Argu∣ment after this maner and forme.

Lawes are ordeined in vayne, vnlesse there be habilitie to performe them.* 1.2

But there is no habilitie to performe by the doctrine of Necessitie which Luther do threache.

Ergo, Lawes are ordeined in vayne by Luthers doctrine of Necessitie.

I do aunswere the Maior proposition were true,* 1.3 if this bon∣dage or Necessitie, which doth preiudice habilitie, were natu∣rall, and not of it owne faultynesse, that is to say: If we had bene created without this habilitie by nature, and had not throwen our selues into this inextricable Laberinthe of yelding, through our owne default. But as now hauyng heaped vpon our selues this Necessitie of sinnyng voluntaryly by our owne purchase, and hauyng made Necessitie (as Augustine sayth) of a penall offence: for good cause therefore lawes are of Necessitie establi∣shed, which may by some lawfull meane reduce vs to nature, or at least reteyne vs in some couenable order of lyfe:* 1.4 not ouerpas∣sing this also withall: that where the Maior treateth of the obe∣dience of mans lawes, in the Minor that Necessitie (which Lu∣ther doth teach) ought not be referred to mās lawes nor the di∣scipline of externall lyfe, but to the obediēce of Gods law onely.

Moreouer, for that I haue promised to helpe to vnderproppe Osorius Logicke, which is of it selfe very ruinous, and ready

to fall to the grounde. I will not refuse to frame by some order and forme, the remnaunt of his allegations into Argumentes, that the Reader may more easily be instructed, what aunswere to make to euery of them particularely.

* 1.5The freedome of mans will beyng takē away, the force of lawes preceptes and rules of good lyfe and all or∣dinaunces of Ciuill discipline and statutes do cease.

The Necessitie which Luther teacheth doth abolish all freedome of mans will.

Ergo, This doctrine of Necessitie being allowed. Lawes decay, good statutes and ordinaūces, and all ende∣uour of good and godly lyfe is extinguished.

* 1.6First in your Maior proposition this word Freedome must be distinguished: namely to be taken either as opposite to coac∣tiō, or opposite to bondage: if in the Maior you vnderstād of co∣acted freédome, then is the Maior true. For whosoeuer taketh away freédome from man, doth also dispoyle him of will. But if you vnderst̄ad of bonde freédome, then euen by this meanes is your Maior cleane false.

* 1.7Next we deny your Minor with Augustine, wherein also this word Necessitie must be distinguished. Whiche beyng de∣uided into two partes, the one whiche is called Cōpul••ary Ne∣cessitie, the other whiche is sayd to be of the Consequence, or ex Hypothesi, wherof the first ••euer any of our Writers dyd de∣ny, the other can none of all your Doctours deny: whiche con∣sistyng of the foreknowledge of God,* 1.8 by a certeine vnmoueable coniunction of causes, and byndyng Necessitie to thyngs fore-ordeined by God, doth vtterly abolish fortune and chaunce: but doth not take away will, nor withstandeth the freédome therof: as there is no contradiction, but one selfe thyng may be called both Uoluntary, and Necessary also. For freédome of will is not taken away through Necessitie, but through coaction. As for example, when we say that God liueth euerlastyngly, and orde∣reth all thynges vprightly: we doe confesse that both these are peculiar to Gods nature of Necessitie, and not by any forreine coactiō. After this maner in the booke of Exod. Whereas Pha∣rao did endeuour to stay the children of Israell from departyng out of Egypt, we must neédes confesse, that he did it of Necessi∣tie,

in respect of Gods secret appointemēt: & in deéde he neither could will, nor do otherwise:* 1.9 But in respect of his owne inclina∣tion, which was the very peculiar & nearest cause y^t moued him to stay thē••o Necessitie of coactiō forced his will to this vnwil∣lingly, but that which he did, he did uolūtaryly: and with no lesse earnest willingnes of mynde did he bring to passe y^e thing which his greédy affection had willed before. Although a man may be constrayned to do somethyng many tymes agaynst his will yet can he not be framed by any meanes to will a thyng y^t he would not. For the will which willeth not, is not now called will, but vnwillyngnesse: nay rather nothyng at all. And for the same ve∣ry cause, bycause there is no such thyng at all in the course of na∣ture, nor to be founde any where, therfore hath it no denomina∣tion nor vsuall name of speache, whereby it may be expressed in Latine: of the same sorte also are the other Argumentes tou∣chyng Artes and Sciences, whereof he cauilleth so much after this maner.

If all thynges that happen bee referred to the power of God and are done of Necessitie according to Luthers doctrine,* 1.10 which byndeth all the actions of men to Ne∣cessitie.

It would hereupon follow that all Sciences should be o∣uerthrowen, all endeuour of mā vtterly frustrate, nor any industry of mē (were it neuer so skilfull employed in husbandry, to byeng and sellyng, to traffique, to prouision for the familie, to Surgery and Phisicke, or any other actions of mans lyfe whatsoeuer) shall pro∣fite nor be auayleable.

I do aunswere this to bee most true,* 1.11 that the operation of all thynges ought to be referred to the will and prouidence of God, as to the chief and principall cause: by whiche prouidence all thynges are ordered of very Necessitie. But this Necessitie ta∣keth not away habilitie to endeuour from men, but causeth one∣ly that mens actions are not chaunceable. For albeit the thyngs that God willed, doe necessaryly come to passe: yet doth mans will neuertheles yeld her diligent endeuour, which will the pro∣uidence of God doth not take away, but gouerneth. In deéde mās will doth worke, yea and freély worketh: that is to say: wor∣keth

voluntaryly, not coactly: yet it worketh so, as if God helpe, it worketh well, if God doe not helpe, it worketh ill. And yet whether it worke well, or ill, it alwayes worketh of Necessitie: neither doth will employ her habilitie any io••e lesse beyng go∣uerned by God, but rather is encouraged to worke so much the more earnestly, bycause the thynges come to passe necessaryly, whatsoeuer Gods will hath foreordeined to bee done by the in∣dustry of man.

Certes this saying of Luther is vndoubtedly true, that no∣thyng happeneth in all the actions of mans lyfe, either well, or euill, either without Gods knowledge, or without his will, or els without his direction. And yet bycause the successes of those thynges are vncerteine vnto vs, therefore followyng the rule of our will and reason, and withall obeyeng the will of God (who cōmaundeth vs to do our endeuour) we do apply all our diligēce earnestly to worke, cōmending in the meane whiles both our sel∣ues, & the successe of our trauaile to the tuitiō of almighty God: at whose especiall commaundement all thynges come to their end necessaryly, & obey his direction of very Necessitie. Wher∣by you perceaue that our endeuours and trauailes doe nothyng lesse decrease or waxe more dull to worke, bycause they are fore∣knowen, and directed by God: but our will is by so much more encouraged to worke, bycause we will obey Gods will, who cō∣maundeth to worke. And therefore that Sophisme of yours is altogether Sophisticall & deceauable, not much vnlike to that, whiche we read in Origine in his second booke agaynst Celsus: where the Sophister, to dissuade the sicke body from counsell of Phisicke,* 1.12 frameth this Argumēt. If thou be Predestinate (sayth hee) to recouer health, thou shalt surely be hoale whether thou take Phisicke, or no: but if thou be Predestinate to dye, the Phi∣sition shall both loase his labour, and thou cast away thy money to no purpose. Whom the sicke person perceauyng to be to∣wardes Mariadge, with the lyke Sophisme (driuyng out as it were one nayle with an other) aunswereth after this maner. If it be thy destiny to haue issue of thy body, thou shalt haue one, whether thou marry a wife, or not marry a wife: but if thou be predestinate to be childlesse, thou shalt surely be childies, though thou marry a wife neuer so much. The deceite of this So∣phisme

lurketh herein. Bycause our endeuours,* 1.13 and Imagina∣tions ought not to depend vpō an vncerteine certeintie, whiche may be applyable to good or euill indifferently, or vpon chaun∣geable aduenture (the successe wherof we know not) but must be ordered by a direct assured rule of reason. For albeit on the one side it may so come to passe, that he that marryeth a wife shall haue no children: yet on the other part, for as much as it is im∣possible to haue children without copulation of man and womā: therfore that ought to be yelded vnto, that seémed consonaunt to reason, not that which y^e Argument concluded videl. therfore he must not marry a wife. In lyke maner fareth it with the other Argument concernyng the Phisition. Although it may so come to passe that no Phisicke may helpe me, yet bycause it is most a∣greable to reason that vnlesse Phisicke be ministred, health will not bee recouered, I will follow herein the most approued rule of reason, and will not wilfully throw my selfe by an vncerteine Necessitie of destiny, into that whiche seémeth impossible, or at least lesse agreable to reason. Wherfore as these assumptions be false, thou shalt in vayne marry a wife, & thou shalt vse Phi∣sicke in vayne: in lyke maner I aunswere that Osorius Argu∣ment is Sophisticall, where hee argueth that our endeuours are applyed in vayne, & that we do trauaile in vayne. Well: to go foreward to the other triflyng toyes of this Sophister.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Pag. 151. The shame¦lesse and ly∣eng cauill of Osorius.
• * 1.2

  Osori. Ar∣gument.
• * 1.3

  Aunswere,
• * 1.4

  Necessitie of sinnyng is not to be imputed to God, but to our selues.
• * 1.5

  An other Argument of Osorius.
• * 1.6

  Aunswere. Freedome taken two wayes.
• * 1.7

  Necessitie to be taken two maner of wayes.
• * 1.8

  The Neces∣sitie that Luther tea∣cheth, doth take awaye fortune and chaunce, but taketh not awaye freedome from will.
• * 1.9

  Freedome is taken a∣way by coa∣ction not by Necessitie.
• * 1.10

  Osori. Ar∣gument. Pag. 151.
• * 1.11

  The Cōfu∣tation.
• * 1.12

  Origene a∣gainst Cel∣sus. 2. booke
• * 1.13

  Our actiōs must be gu∣ded by ap∣proued rea∣son and not vncerteine certeinetie.