A manifeste detection of the notable falshed of that part of Iohn Frithes boke whiche he calleth his foundacion, and bosteth it to be inuincible: newly set foorthe by Iohn Gwinneth clerke.

Cap 24. (Book 24)

HERE.

Sir, I do now perceiue, that al this while, ye take one probable reason for an other, and not that probable reason, which Frith speaketh of.

CATH.

Hah, what saist thou? I pray the tel me that agein.

HE.

Mary sir I say, the probable reason that Frith speaketh of, is not the same, that ye take it for.

CATH.

Trowest thou so?

HERE.

No trewly.

CA.

What is it then

HE.

Ye know well enough, that there be two maner of pro∣bable reasons: of the which, the one hath in it a trewth ineuitable. And therfore it is or maie be called a pro∣bable reason existent. The other hath in it no trewth in dede, yet is it so like to be trew, that it is very hard to auoid, or to be otherwise perceiued or taked but for trew in dede. And therfore it is, or maie bee called a proba∣ble reason, apparent: but not existent.

CATH.

I can thee thanke countreyman, it is euen very well saide. And therfore doest thou thinke, that it is this probable reason, which is but aparent, that Frith speaketh of?

HERE.

Yea trewly that I dooe.

CATH.

Why so?

HERE.

For it can not stande with any reason, that it shuld be the other probable reason, whiche is trew, be∣cause (as I now perceiue my selfe) one trewth can ne∣uer leade vs to dissent from an other, but rather binde vs vnto it.

CATH.

Doubtles therin thou hittest the

nayle euen vpon the head: And therfore by that iust and good reason, it dooeth well apere, that when frith (spea∣king of charticles of our Creede) doth saie.

In the other is no perill, so we haue a probable reason to dissent from them.

It is not that probable reason, which hath in it the very trewthe in deede. But it is that probable reason, which is but only apparent, and doth but onely seeme to be trew & nothing els▪ therfore what so euer doth but only seme to be trew, without fayle is not trew in dede. And what so euer is not trew in dede, and yet semeth to be trew, is vtterly nothing els, but euen a meane to deceiue. And therfore the very conclusion is this, That wher he saith,

In the other veritees of scripture is no perill, so we haue a probable reason to dissent from them.

It is no more to say, but in the other veritees of scrip∣ture is no perill, so we haue a deceitfull meane to dissent from them, when a probable reason without trewth is none other, but (as I said) a meane to deceiue in dede.

HERE.

Nay sir I can not yet for all this, beleue that he ment so.

CATH.

No? not when his owne word{is} compelleth vs to take it so? For he can not speake of a probable reason, and meane it to bee nother trew nor false: except thou wilt saie (as of many a one it is, when he speaketh he wotteh nere what) that his wit is not his owne. Therfore he mēt it to be either trew or false. If he ment it to be trew: then is it as much to saie, as in the other veritees of scripture is no perill, so we haue suche a probable reason to dissent from them, as is not possi∣ble to be had. For it is not possible to haue trewth, a∣gainst trewth. Wherfore how foolishe at the leaste is he, to suggest vnto vs, any such case? Therfore of the other side, if he ment a probable reason but aparent, and not

trew in dede: Then is it no more to saie but this, In the other veritees of scripture is no perill, so we haue that probable reason to dissent from them, which is so redie and easie to be had, that al we ought, to blisse vs from it.

HERE.

Blisse vs from it, what nede that?

CATH.

Nedeth it not, to blisse vs from that probable reason, which might leade vs to dissent from ani veritee of scrip∣ture? For what is the scripture but god{is} worde? therfore what is any verite of scripture, but the verite of godes word? And what probable reasō is that, which ledeth one to dissent frō any veritee of god{is} word, but only y^e falsitee of y^e diuels worde? Yet herein, saith Frith, there is no pe∣ril. This thou seest, he moueth vs vnto. For with a proba∣ble reasō (he saith) we may without any peril, dissent frō all the veritees of scripture, saue .xii. and I saie, by that rule, from them to. Therfore, while Frith doth here in plaine wordes, shew vs a way, to dissent from the veri∣tees of holy scripture, whiche is the worde of god, what other thing therin doth he els, but vtterly shew vs the waie of the diuell? How be it herein, he teacheth vs but a poynt of his owne facultee. For by this probable rea∣son, founde he the meanes, to dissent and come awaie from the veritees of holy scripture him selfe. For els, without fayle, he had bid in them still. By this proba∣ble reason also, riseth the first heretike of euery secte. And by this probable reason, deceiueth he an other. By this probable reason gender they mo and mo. By this pro∣bable reason grow they, sometyme to a multitude. And by this probable reason they continew, to the disquiet∣nesse of the faithfull flocke of Christ. Also by this pro∣bable reason which is but apparent, which semeth iuste, and is not, which promiseth trewth, and paieth not,

which beareth in hand to dooe, that it can not. By this probable reason (I say) heretikes are enticed, perswa∣ded, and led, from the veritees of scripture, from the ve∣ritees of god{is} woorde, and from the veritees of euerla∣sting life. And by this probable reason, they are prouo∣ked and set a woorke, to crie to the people, and say beware of deceiuers, beware of false teachers, beware of subtill Sophisters. And what other thing therin do they els, but ignorātly and euen directly against their owne purpose, moue the audience to be ware of them, & of no men els? For such and the same are thei, & in dede none other. Therfore let vs now returne to his third case againe, brefly to see what we left therin behind (he saith)

Or be it in case, that I here them, and vnderstand them and yet by the reasō of an other text misconstrew them

Here he driueth me to such a streit, that I can not tel whether I maie more wonder at him, or at his case. For tell me, if euer thou herdst of any such braine. How is it possible for any man to misconstrew the same, which he doth vnderstand? Is it one thing to vnder∣stand, and an other to know? Is any man therfore able to take a thing otherwise, then he knoweth it is? Doth not the knowlage or vnderstanding of a thinge, cleane put away the miscōstruing therof? For whereof, commeth misconstruing, but of misunderstanding? neuerthelesse,

Be it in case (he saith) that I vnderstande them, and yet by the reason of an other text misconstrew them.

Here thou seest plaine, that he putteth vnderstanding, and misconstruing, both together in one respect, and one case, and that by the reason (he saieth) of an other text. Therfore whether he meaneth the veritee of that other text, to be vnderstanded, or not vnderstanded, let vs trie what foloweth of each of them, and thē we shal be

sure, to come to his meaning, at the least in one of them. Therfore if he meane it vnderstanded, then this must fo∣lowe, that the vnderstanding of the veritee of that same one other text, maie put away the vnderstanding of all the veritees of scripture .xii. except: when it may, bring the vnderstander to the misconstruction of them, as by his words it may, when of them al (he saith)

Or be it in case that I here them, and vnderstand them,' and yet by the reason of an other text misconstrew them.' So that the trew vnderstanding of that same other text, is but a meane, to make the veritees of all the rest to be misconstrued, and that of him that vnderstandeth them. And what is that to say but this, that the trewe vnder∣standing of one text, maie bringe a man from the trewe vnderstanding of of an other, when it bringeth him to the misconstrewyng therof? And therfore doest thou not see, what good reason and trewth, he teacheth in this case? hast thou heard of this same lesson before that the trew vnderstanding of one text, shuld plucke a∣way the trew vnderstanding of an other, from him that hath it? I haue herde that the trew vnderstanding of one text, might induce and bring to light, the trew vn∣derstanding of an other: But I neuer herd a fore now, that the trew vnderstanding of one, might misconstrew, & so put away, the trew vnderstāding of an other, when trewth (as I tolde the before) is a meane to come by trewth, & not a meane to misconstrew & put awai trewth. for so, were trewth against trewth, and vnderstanding against vnderstanding: And therfore Frith doth here to saue al vpright, make miscōstruction, which is the great enemy of them both, to be as a stickeler betwene them: wherfore of the other side, if he meane y^t the verite of this

other text which may make this misconstruction, is not vnderstanded, then must this folow, that the ignorance, and not vnderstanding of the trewth of one text, may put away the knowlage and vnderstanding of the trewth of an other text, as it must nedes dooe, if it maie make it misconstrued, as Frith dooeth hold it maie. And so shall blinde ignorance be more mighty and able to ex∣pell and put away clere and perfite knowlage, from him that hath it, then persite knowlage is able to expell and put away it: as though the ignorance of one thing, were the driuer away of the knowlage of an other, whiche is an ouerthwart rule, contrary to all reason and trewth. For it is the naturall propertee and strengthe of knowlage, where so euer it commeth, to subdew and expell ignorance, and not of ignorance, to ouerthrow and expell knowlage. How be it I will not say. but ig∣norance maie and commonly doth in many cases, kepe trewth from knowlage and vnderstandinge: but yet when and wherin so euer knowlage and vnderstanding doth once get the victorie, and obteineth it in dede, ig∣norance then goeth streight to wrake, and is vtterly put to flight, for any thing therin it can dooe more. Wher. fore, the trewth of one text, vnderstanded or not vnder∣standed, can neuer driue the trewth of an other, out of vnderstanding, as it might doe, if it might driue it to misconstruction, as it can not, because there shulde be then (as I said) trewth against trewth, and vnderstan∣ding against vnderstāding, which can not be. Therfore whether the trewth of this other text, y^t Frith speaketh of, be vnderstād or not vnderstād, yet false is this his saiyng therof, that it may cause the trew vnderstanding of an o∣ther text or veritee of scripture, to be misconstrued of him

that hath it, and so put awaie: when it is not possible for the trew vnderstandynge of a thynge, and the miscon∣struynge of the same, to stande to gether, excepte Frith wyll saie, that he can ioigne them together this waie, as when he vnderstandeth a veritee neuer so wel, yet he can purposely misconstrewe the same neuerthelesse, to be∣guilde and deceiue his neghbour withall, and beare him in hande, it is otherwise ment, then he hym selfe, dooeth knowe it is.

HERE.

What sir, ye dooe but taunte hym nowe.