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Whether there be any thing indifferent In actu exercito.
FOr our better light in this question, I will premit these consi∣rations, [Sect. I] 1. When we measure the goodnesse or the bad∣nesse of a human action, we must not only measure it by the object, and the end, but by all the circumstances which accompany it. q Fed. Morellus upon those words of Seneca, Refert quid, cui, quan∣do, quare, ubi, &c. saith, that without those circumstances of things,
persons, times, places, facti ratio non constat. Circumstances some∣times constituunt rerum earum quae aguntur speciem, r say our Divines, meaning that circumstances doe make an action good or bad. Humani actus say the Schoolmen, non solum ex objectis, verum ex circumstantiis boni vel mali esse dicuntur. It is not every mans part, (saith t one of our Opposites) to judge de circumstantia, quae reddit actionem vel bonam vel malam. Some circumstances saith u another of them, are intrinsecall and essentiall to actions, and specially making up their nature. The principall circumstances which here we speake of, are comprehended in this versicle.
Quis, Quid, Vbi, Quibus auxiliis, Cur, Quomodo, Quando.
The first circumstance which maketh an action good or bad, is, Quis, which designeth the person: If a Magistrate put to death a malefa∣ctor, the action is good, but if a privat person put him to death, it is evill.
The second is, Quid, which noteth the quality or condition of the object: If a man take sua, the action is good; If aliena, it is evill.
The third is, Vbi: If men banquet in their owne houses, the action is good: If in the Church, it is evill.
The fourth is, Quibus auxiliis: If men seek health by lawfull meanes, the action is good; If by the Divill, or his instruments, it is evill.
The fifth is, Cur: If I rebuke my brother for his fault, out of my love to him, and desire to reclaine him, the action is good: If out of hatred and spl•…•…ne, the action is evill.
The sixt is, Quomodo: for he who doth the worke of the Lord care∣fully doth well, but he who doth it negligently, doth evill.
The seaventh is, Quando: To doe servile worke upon the sixe dayes of labour, is good: but to doe it upon the Lords Sabbath, is evill.
2. There is another consideration which followeth upon the for∣mer, [Sect. II] and it is this. The goodnesse or badnesse of a humane action, may be considered two wayes, viz. either in actu signato, and, quo ad speciem; or in actu exercito, and quo ad individuum. For an action is said to be specificated by its object, and individuated by its circumstan∣ces. So that when an action is good or evill in respect of the object of it, then it is called good or evill quo ad speciem. When it is good or evill in respect of the circumstances of it, then it is said to be good or evill quo ad individuum.
3 Humane actions whether considered quo ad speciem, or quo ad indivi∣duum, are either such as proceed from the deliberation of reason, or
from bare imagination onely. To this latter kinde wee referre such actions, as are done through incogitancy, whiles the mind is taken up with other thoughts; for example, to clawe the head, to handle the beard, to move the foot, &c. which sort of things proceed only from a certaine stirring or fleeting of the imagination.
4. Let it be remembred, that those things we call morally good, which agree to right reason: those morally evill, which disagree from right reason: and those indifferent, which include nothing belonging to the order of reason, and so are neither consonant unto nor disso∣nant from the same.
5. When we speake of the indifferency of an individuall action, it may be conceived two wayes, either absolute & sine respectu ad aliud, or, comparate & cum respectu ad aliud. In the free will offrings, if so be a man offered according as God had blessed & prospered his estaite, it was indifferent to offer either a bullocke, or a sheep, or a goate; but if he choosed to offer any of them, his action of offering could not be indifferent, but either good or evill. When we speake of the indifferency of an action comparate, the sence is only this, that it is neither better not worse then an other action, and that there is no reason to make us choose to doe it, more then another thing. But when we speake of the indifferency of an action, considered abso∣lutely and by it self, the simple meaning is whether it be either good or evill, and whether the doing of the same must needs be either sinne or evill doing.
6. Every thing which is indifferent in the nature of it, is not by & by indifferent in the use of it. But the use of a thing indifferent ought evermore to be either choosed or refused, followed or forsaken, ac∣cording to these three rules, delivered to us in Gods Word. 1. The rule of Pietie. 2. The rule of Charity. 3. The rule of Purity.
The first of these rules we finde 1. Cor. 10. 31. Whether therefore ye eat, or drinke, or whatsoever ye doe, doe all to the glory of God. And Rom. 14. 7. 8. For none of us liveth to himself, and no man dieth to himself. For whether we live, we live unto the Lord, and whether we die, we die unto the Lord. Where the Apostle (as y Calvine noteth) reasoneth from the whole to the part. Our whole life, and by consequence all the particular actions of it ought to be referred to Gods glory, and or∣dered according to his will. Againe, Col. 3. 17. And whatsoever ye doe in word or deed, do all in the name of the Lord Iesus. In the expounding of which words. Dr. Davenant saith well, that Etiam illae actiones quae sunt sua natura adiaphorae, debent tamen a Christianis fieri in nomine Christi, hoc est, juxta voluntatem Christi, & ad gloriam Christi.
The seconde rule is the rule of Charity: which teacheth us, not to use any thing indifferent, when scandall riseth out of it. Rom. 14. 21. It is good neither to eat flesh, nor to drinke wine, nor any thing whereby thy brother stumbleth, or is offended, or made weake; yea, though it doe not
weaken, if it be not expedient for edifying our brother, be it never so lawfull or indifferent in it's owne nature, the Law of Charity bin∣deth us to abstaine from it. Rom. 14. 19. Let us therefore followe after the things which make for peace, and the things wherewith one may edify ano∣ther, Rom. 15. 2. Let every one of us please his nighbour for his good to edifi∣cation, 1. Cor. 10. 23. All things are lawfull for me, but all things are not ex∣pedient: All things are lawfull for me, but all things edify not. Where the Apostle teacheth z that, In cibo, &c. In meat, drinke, and the whole kind of things indifferent, it is not enough to looke whether they be lawfull: but that further, we are to looke, whether to doe or omit the same, be expe∣dient and may edify. The Bishop of Winchester preaching upon Ioh. 16. 7. I tell you the trueth, it is expedient for you that I goe away, &c. marketh, that Christ would not goe away, without acquanting his Disci∣ples with the reason of it: and that reason was, because it was for their good. Whereupon he inferreth, 1. That we should avoide a Hophni's non vult enim, and make our vult our enim: that is, that we should not give our will for a reason, but a reason for our will. 2. That we should not with the b Corinthians stand upon licet, it is lawfull; but frame our rule by expedit, it is expedient. 3. That our rule should not be c Ca∣japhas expedit nobis, but Christs expedit vobis: for you it is good; you, the dis∣ciples: and make that, the rule of our going out, and our comming in. The heathens themselves co•…•…d say, that we are borne, partly for God, partly for our Country, partly for our friends, &c. How much more ought Christians to understand, that we are not borne for our selves, but for Christ and his Church? And as in the whole course of our life, so especially in the policy of the Church, we may doe nothing (be it never so indifferent in it self) which is not profitable for edifi∣cation, 1. Cor. 13. 26. Let all things be done to edifying. From which precept Pareus inferreth, that nothing ought to be done in the Church, which doth not manifestly make for the utility of all and every one: and that therefore not only unknowen toungs, but colde Ceremo∣nies, and idle gestures should be exploded out of the Church.
The third Rule is the rule of Purity, which respecteth our peace and plerophorie of conscience, without which any thing is uncleane to us, though it be cleane & lawfull in it's owne nature. Rom. 14. 14. To him that esteemeth any thing to be uncleane, to him it is uncleane. There∣fore d Si quis aliquam in cibo immunditiem imaginetur, eo libere uti non po∣test. Whatsoever indifferent thing a man judgeth in his conscience to be unlawfull, he may not lawfully doe it. Rom. 14. 5. Let every man be fully perswaded in his owne minde. And vers. 23. He that doubteth is dam∣ned, if he eate, because he eateth not of faith: for whatsoever is not of faith is sinne. Nefas est omnino faith e Calvine, quippiam aggredi quod putes illi (do∣mino) displicere, imo quod non persuasus sis illi placere. Now, if a thing indifferent be used according to these three rules, the use of it is not
only lawfull, but expedient also. But if it be not used according to these rules, the use of it is altogither unlawfull.
And since a thing indifferent in the nature of it, can never be law∣fully [Sect. III] used, except according to these rules, hence it followeth, that the use of a thing indifferent is never lawfull to us, when we have no other warrant for using the same, beside our owne will and arbi∣trement.
f D. Forbesse speaketh unadvisedly, whiles he saith, Evenit nonnun∣quam, &c. It falleth out sometimes, that that which was expedient for thee to doe yesterday, and to omit this day, thou may notwithstanding afterward either doe it or not doe it, according to thy arbitriment. As if forsooth, our using of things indifferent, should not evermore be determined by the rule of expediency, which Gods Word giveth us, but sometimes by our owne will. g Dr. Davenant could not dreame that any ex∣cept the ignorant common people, could bee of this opinion, which D. Forbesse holdeth. Fallitur vulgus saith he, dum judicat licere sibi, u•…•… i•…•…victu, vestitu, sermone, aut quacunquere adiaphora pro arbitrio suo: nam haec omnia ad regulam adhibenda sunt.
Moreover, as we may not use any indifferent thing, at our owne pleasure; so neither may the Church at her will and pleasure, com∣mand the us•…•… of it: but as our practice, so the Churches injunction, must be determined and squared according to the former rules. And if any man think, that in the use of things indifferent, he may be ledde and ruled by the Churches determination, without examining any further; let him understand, that the Churches determination, is but a subordinate rule, or a rule ruled by higher rules.
D. Forbesse perceiving how these rules of Scripture may subvert his cause, desireth to subject them to the Churches determination, and to make it our highest rule. Iam autem h saith he, in talium re∣rum usu, id edificat, quod pacificum, illud est pacificum quod est ordinatum; is autem decens ordo est in Ecclesia ab ipso Christo constitutus, ut in talibus non suo quisque se gerat arbitratu, sed audiatur Ecclesia, & exhibeatur praepositis obedientia.
He hath beene speaking of the rules which Gods Word giveth us, concerning the use of things indifferent, and all of them he com∣prehendeth under this rule, that we should heare the Church, & obey them who are set over us, as if Gods rules were subordinate to mens rules, & not theirs to his. We say not that every man may use things indifferent suo arbitratu: but we say withall, that neither may the Church command the use of things indifferent, suo arbitratu. Both she in commanding, and we in obeying, must be guided by the rules of Scripture.
They who are set over us in the Church, have no power given them of Christ, which is not for edifying, Eph. 4. 12. The Councell
of the Apostles and Elders at Ierusalem, (which is a lively patterne of a lawfull Synode to the worlds end) i professed they would lay no other burden upon the Disciples, except such things as the law of Charity made necessary for shunning of Scandall: and so that which they decreed, had force and strength to binde, a Charitate propter Scandalum, saith k Sanctius. But suo arbitratu they injoyned nothing. It appeareth by this place (saith l Cartwright) that there may bee no abridg∣ment of liberty simply decreed, but in regard of circumstance, according to the rule of Edification. And if the Churches decrees and Canons, be not according to the rules of the Word, yet forasmuch as m every one of us shall give account of himselfe and his owne deed, we must looke, that whatsoever the Church decree, yet our practise in the use or omission of a thing indifferent, be according to the foresaid rules.
We may not for the commandement of men transgresse the rule of Piety, by doing any thing which is not for Gods glory, and orde∣red according to his will; neither ought any of us to obey men, ex∣cept n For the Lords sake; and o as the servants of Christ, doing the will of God; which teacheth us the manner how we ought to obey men, namely, p propter Christum & sicut Christus praecipit. For if we should know no more but the will of man for that which we doe, then we should be the q servants of men, not the servants of Christ. Neither yet may we for any humane ordinance, breake the rule of Charity: but r whatsoever either would weaken, or not edify our brother; be it never so lawfull; never so profitable to our selves; never so powerfully by earthly auctority injoyned; Christiās who are not borne unto themselves, but unto Christ; unto his Church; and unto the fellow members; must not dare to medle with it.
Nor lastly, may we obey men, so as to breake the law of Purity, and s performe any action with a doubtfull conscience, that is, whereof ei∣ther the Word hath not, or we out of it have no warrant: in which case tender consciences must be tendered, rather then be racked by auctority: for bee the things in themselves never so lawfull, &c. they are utterly unlawfull to me, without such information. Whereas therefore some say, that in the use of matters indifferent, the lawes of those who are set over us ought to rule us; we still answer that our practise may not be ruled by any law of man, except it be according to the rules of the Word; where∣of one is this: t Tantum oportere esse obedientiae studium in Christianis, ut nihil agant, quod non existiment vel potius certi sint placere Deo.
These considerations beeing premitted, for resolution of the [Sect. IV] question in hand, we say, 1. As touching these actions which pro∣ceed from bare imagination, whether they be evill and inordinate quo ad speciem, forsomuch as the imagination from which they have their originall, doth not in those actions subject it self to the con∣duct and moderation of reason, but is like Gchazi, running away
without his masters leave, let the learned give their judgement. Howsoever, it can not be denied, u that such actions may be and are of en evill quo ad individuum, or in respect of the circumstances, which shew forth in them reproveable temerity, incogitancy, levity, and undecency. But such actions belong not to our purpose.
2. As for those actions which proceed from the deliberation of reason, howbeit many of them be indifferent quo ad speciem, yet none of them is, nor can be indifferent quo ad individuum. The reason of this difference and distinction is, x because every action hath it's species or kinde from the object; and a humane morall action, hath it's species or kind, from the object referred to the originall of hu∣mane actions, which is reason. Whereupon it commeth, that if the object of the action include something that agreeth to the order of reason, it shall be a good action, according to it's kind: for exam∣ple, to give almes to an indigent man. But if it include something that is repugnant to the order of reason, it shall be an evill action according to it's kind; as, to steale or take away another mans goods. Now sometimes it happeneth, that the object of an action doth not include something that belongeth to the order of reason; as, to lift a strave from the ground, to goe to the field &c. such actions are indifferent, according to their kinde. But we must pronounce farre otherwise of them, when wee speake of them quo ad individuum, be∣cause as they are individuated by their circumstances, so in their individuall beeing, they have their goodnesse or badnesse from the same circumstances, as hath been shewed. So that no such action as is deliberated upon, can bee indifferent quo ad individuum; because oportet saith y Thomas quod quilibet individualis actus habeat aliquam cir∣cumstantiam, per quam trahetur ad bonum, vel malum, ad minus ex parte in∣tentionis finis.
Friar Ambrosius Catarinus, following the Doctrine of Thomas, z maintained in the Councell of Trent, that to doe a good worke, the concurrance of all circumstances is necessary, but the want of one onely is sufficient for an evill: so that howsoever among the workes considered in generall, some are indifferent, yet in the sin∣gular, there is no medium between having all the circumstances and wantimg some; therefore every particular action is good or evill. And because among the circumstances, the end is one, all workes referred to a bad end are infected. He further alledged S. Augustine, that it is sinne not onely to referre the action to a bad end, but also not to referre it to a good end. Thus spake the learned Friar very appositly. And the same is the judgment of our owne Divines. De his rebus indifferentibus saith a Martyr, statuendum est, quod tantummodo ex genere atque natura sua. indifferentiam habeant, sed qnando ad electio∣nem descenditur nihil est indifferens. And so saith b Pareus likewise.
These things are so plaine and undeniable, that c D. Forbesse [Sect. V] himselfe; aknowledgeth no lesse, then that every individuall humane action is either good or bad morally; and that there is a goodnesse which is necessary to every action, namely, the referring of it to the last end, and the doing of it in Faith; which goodnesse if it be wan∣ting, the action is evill. Notwithstanding, he will have some ac∣tions even quo ad individuum, called indifferent, for this respect, be∣cause they are neither commanded of God, and so necessary to bee done, nor yet forbidden, and so necessary to be omitted.
Of an individuall action of this kind, he saith: manet homini respectu istius actus plena arbitrij libertas moralis, tum ea quae exercitij seu contradic∣tionis dicitur, tum etiam ea quae specificationis seu contrarietatis libertas ap∣pellatur. He holdeth, that though such an action be done in Faith, and for the right end (which generall goodnesse, he saith, is neces∣sary to the action, and commendeth a man to God) yet the action it self is indifferent, because it is not necessary: for a man hath liberty to omit the same, or to doe another thing, which he illustrateth by this example.
If the widow Sempronia marry at all, it is necessary that she marry in the Lord, yet it is not necessary that she marry. If she marry Ti∣tius, it is necessary that she marry him in the Lord, yet it is not ne∣cessary that shee marry Titius, but shee hath liberty to marry either him, or Caius, or Pomponius. If she marry not at all, but live a sin∣gle life, it is necessary that she live a single life in the Lord, yet it is not necessary that she live a single life. And so still it is indifferent and free for her, either to marry, or not to marry, or if she marry, it is free to her to marry either Titius, or Caius, or Pomponius.
Ans. the D. either mistaketh, or misseth the marke many wayes: [Sect. VI] which that we may discover, and withall levell better at the marke, let us note,
1. Our question is onely of individuall actions, considered both in respect of their originall, which is deliberation and election, and in respect of all their circumstances, none excepted. When d Pareus disputeth this question, whether there be any action indifferent; he resolveth that things indifferent are considered three wayes. 1. In se, or, quo ad substantiam operis, in themselves, or, in respect of the sub∣stance of the worke: and so many things are indifferent. 2. Ratione s•…•…i principij, h•…•…e. electionis & intentionis qua fiunt, in respect of their ori∣ginall, which is the election and the intention, wherewith they are done: and so there is no action indifferent, saith he, but either good or evill, according as it proceedeth from a good or evill election and intention. 3. Ratione effectus, in respect of the effect; and so he ac∣knowledgeth no action indifferent neither: for if Scandall followe upon it; it is evill: now if it edify not, it scandalizeth and destry∣eth,
which e hee proveth from Christs words, He that gathereth not with me, scattereth. And indeed, for so much as that which is impedi∣tivum boni spiritualis, is confessed to be scandalous, and every action which edifyeth not, hindreth our spirituall good, in that it should edify, but doth not; it followeth, that every action which edifyeth not, doeth certainly scandalize; which shall be yet more plaine, if we consider, that every action that is done to the notice and know∣ledge of a man, if it yeeld him no matter of profitable thoughts, it gives him occasion of vaine, idle, and hurtfull thoughts: for the thoughts and cogitations of mans minde, beeing stirred and set a∣worke by the view of some object, are like the upper and nether mil∣stones, which, when they have no graine to grinde, weare and spend themselves away, till at last one of them breake another. If then every action, which is done to the notice of other men, either edi∣fy or scandalize them, and every one of our actions (without excep∣tion) either edify or scandalize our selves, that is, either make us the better or the worse, it must needs follow, that there is not one of our actions indifferent, but either good or evill, in respect of the ef∣fect. Now all that the D. hath said, evinceth no more but the in∣differency of some actions considered onely in respect of the worke, not in respect of all the circumstances, (and by consequence, not quo ad individuum.) If hee had considered Sempronia, her act of mar∣rying, either in respect of the originall of it, or in respect of the ef∣fect of it, (much more if he had (as he ought to have) considered it in both these respects) he might easily have seen, that it can not bee called indifferent, because it either proceedeth from a good election and intention, or from a bad; and it hath either a good effect or a bad, I meane, it either edifyeth or scandalizeth. In which two re∣spects (we see) neither it nor any action is indifferent, in Pareus his judgement.
2. Our question is of the indifferency of things considered abso∣lutely [Sect. VII] & by themselves, not comparatively and in relation to other things, (as we shew before.) If we speake of comparatives, there is no question, but there may be an action, which is neither better nor worse, then some other action. But if we hold us at positives, wee truly maintaine, that every action considered by it self, is either good or evill, and none indifferent. Now the D. onely compareth Sem∣pronia her marrying, with her living a single life, and her marrying of Titius, with her marrying of Caius or Pomponius. But if he had con∣sidered any one of all these things absolutely and by it self, and pro∣ven it to be in that respect indifferent, he had said something to the purpose. Nothing followeth upon that which he hath said, but that (these things beeing compared among themselves) Sempronia her marrying of Titius, is neither better nor worse, then her marrying
of Caius or Pomponius. Yet for all that, if shee marry any of them, her act of marrying that man, shall be either according to the rules of the Word, or not, & so either good or evill, not ind•…•…fferēt. Which purpose f Amesius illustrateth by this apposite simile. A statuarie or a graver of images oftimes hath no reason, wherefore he should make this Ima∣ge, more then another; yet if he make any Image at all, he must needs either make it good, by following the rules of his art, or else evill, by departing from the said rules.
3. Though in genere naturae a man hath liberty of contradiction, to [Sect. VIII] use things which are in their owne nature indifferent, or not to use them, and liberty of contrariety to use either this or that; yet in gene∣re moris, it is otherwise: a man hath not such morall liberty in the use of things, which are in their nature indifferent, as the D. alledgeth. For those things which are in their nature indifferent, are never in∣different in their use; and that because the use of them, is either ac∣cording to the rules of the Word, and then it is expedient; or not; and then it is unlawfull. The D. distinguisheth not betwixt the nature of things indifferent and the use of them: but so he reasoneth as if every thing indifferent in the nature of it, were also indifferent in the use of it. Which how false it is, men of lower degree then Doc∣tors can easily judge.
Goe to then; let us see how the D. reasoneth. He saith, it is indiffe∣rent & free to the widowe Sempronia either to marry or not to marry; and if she marry, she hath liberty to marry either this man or that man: and that because none of all these things is either commanded or forbidden of God. Iust so, might the strong among the Romans and Corinthians, have reasoned against Paul. Why doe you goe about to adstrict or limite our use of such things, as God hath neither com∣manded nor forbidden? it is indifferent and free to us, either to eat flesh or not to eat flesh, and if we eat flesh, either to eat this kind, or that. Nay, but the Apostle will not have the indifferency of the thing it self, in its owne nature, to be ground enough for the use of it: but he will have their practise and use of it, to be ever either expe∣dient or unlawfull, in respect of the circumstances, and according as these rules of Pietie, Charity, & Purity (which Gods Word gives concerning the use of things indifferent,) are observed or not obser∣ved. And so doe we answeare the D. That if a widowes act of mar∣rying be according to the rules of the Word, that is, if it tend to Gods glory, if it be expedient for edifying, & if shee be rightly per∣swaded in her conscience that shee hath a warrant from the Word for that which shee doth, (of whioh rules, I have said enough before) then is it good, not indifferent. If it be not according to these rules, then is it evill, not indifferent.
More plainly; her act of marrying, is either according to the rules
of the Word, or not. If it be according to the rules, then it is expe∣dient that she marry, therefore not indifferent; If it be not according to the rules, then it is unlawfull, therfore not indifferent. If it be said that the best man who lives tieth not himself to these rules, in the use of every indifferent thing, but oftimes useth or omitteth a thing of that nature, at his owne pleasure. I answere, g In many things we of∣fend all. And, h who can understand his errors? But in the meane time, the rules of the Word limit us so strictly, that we may never use a thing in it's owne nature indifferent, at our arbitrement and pleasure, and that the use of it is never lawfull to us, except it be done piously for Gods glory, profitably for mans edification, and purely with full assurance that that which we doe is approved of God. And as all this hath beene proven from Scripture heretofore, so now let us trie whether we can make it to follow upon that which the D. himself hath said.
i If a widow marry; he holds it necessary that shee marry in the Lord, because to her that marrieth it is commanded that shee marry in the Lord. Now when k the Apostle commandeth that shee who marrieth marry in the Lord, he meanes, that shee marry according to the will of the Lord, saecundum voluntatem Domini, as (o) Zanchius expoundeth him. And what is that, but that shee marry according to the rules of the Word? neither doth the Apostle allowe her to marry, except shee marry according to these rules. So he m bid∣deth children obey their parents in the Lord, that is, according to the will of the Lord.
Againe, n the D•…•…holdes it necessary, that whatsoever thing we doe, we doe it in faith, because as the Apostle teacheth, whatso•…•… is not of faith is sinne. Now whiles every thing is condemned which is not of faith, two sorts of actions are rejected, as o Calvine obser∣veth. 1. Such actions as are not grounded upon, nor approven by the Word of God. 2. Such actions as though they be approven by the Word of God, yet the mind wanting this persuasion, doth not cheerfully addresse it self to the doing of them. But I pray, doeth the Word underprope or approve the use of any thing indifferent, if it be not used according to the foresaid rules, and by consequence conveniently and profitably?
The D. thinkes it enough, that in the use of a thing indifferent, [Sect. IX] I beleeve it is lawfull for me to doe this thing, albeit I beleeve and certainly know, that it is lawfull to me to omit it, or to doe the con∣trary; so that the doing of a thing in faith, inferreth not the necessi∣ty of doing it. But for answere hereunto, we say,
1. We have sufficiently proven, that it is never lawfull for us to doe any thing which is in the nature of it indifferent, except we be
perswaded not only of the lawfullnesse of the thing, but of the expe∣diency of doing it.
2. Of his comparing of things indifferent togither, and not con∣sidering them positively & by themselves, we have also said enough before.
3. The doing of a thing in faith, inferreth the expediency and profit of doing it; and that is enough to take away the indifferency of doing it; for since every indifferent thing is either expedient to be done, or else unlawfull to be done, (as hath beene shewed,) it fol∣loweth, that either it ought to be done, or else it ought to be left un∣done: therefore it is never indifferent nor free to us, to doe it, or leave it undone, at our pleasure.
4. Because the D. (I perceive) sticketh upon the tearme of neces∣sity; and will have every thing which is not necessary to be indiffe∣rent: therefore to remove this scruple, beside that Chrysostome, & the Author of the interlineary glosse upon Math. 18. 7. take the mea∣ning of those words, It must needs be that offences come, to be this, It is profitable that offences come. Which glosse, though it be not to be re∣ceived, yet as p Camero noteth, it is ordinary to call that necessary, which is very profitable and expedient. Beside this (I say,) we fur∣ther mantaine, that in the use of things indifferent, that which we deliberat upon to doe, is never lawfull to be done, except it be also necessary, though not necessitate absoluta seu consequentis, yet necessitate consequentiae seu ex suppositione. Pauls c•…•…rcumcising of Timothie was law∣full: only because it was necessary, for q he behooved by this meanes to winne the good will of the people of Lystra who had once stoned him, otherwise he could not safely have preached the Gospell among them. Therefore he had done wrong, if he had not circumcised Ti∣mothie, since the circumcising of him was according to the rules of the Word, and it was expedient to circumcise him, and unexpedient to doe otherwise. And (because de paribus idem est judicium) whensoever the use of any indifferent thing is according to the rules of the Word, that is, when it is profitable for Gods glory and mans edification, & the doer is perswaded of so much, I say, putting this case, then (for so much as not only it may, but ought to be done,) the use of it is not only lawfull, but necessary: and (for so much as not only it needs not, but ought not to be omitted,) the omission of it is not only un∣necessary, but also unlawfull.
Againe, put the case, that the use of a thing indifferent be either against, or not according to the said rules, then (for so much as not only it may, but ought to be omitted, the omission of it is not only lawfull but necessary: and (for so much as not only it needs not, but may not, neither ought to be done) the doing of it, is not only unne∣cessary, but also unlawfull. For which it maketh, that the Apostles in r their decree, alledge no other ground for abstinence from blood
and things strangled (which were in their nature indifferent,) but the necessity of abstaining caused and induced by the foresaid rules.
The Apostle sheweth that that measure of liberality whereunto hee exhorteth the Corinthians, was not by any Divine commande∣ment necessary, yet he adviseth it as a thing expedient. 2 Cor. 8, 8. 10. And were not the Corinthians thereunto bound because of this expe∣diency of the matter, though it was not necessary? Iuxta verbum, &c. According to Gods Word (saith s the Bishop of Sarisburie,) we are obli∣ged to glorify God by our good workes, not onely when necessity requireth, but also when ability furnisheth, and oportunity occurreth, Gal: 6. 10. Tit. 2. 14.
As touching the scope of all this Dispute, which is the indiffen∣rency of the controverted Ceremonies, we shall heare sundry rea∣sons [Sect. X] against it afterward. For the present I say no more but this. As in every case, so most especially when we meddle with the Wor∣ship of God, or any appurtenance thereof, the rules of the Word tie us so straitly, that that which is in it's owne nature indifferent, ought either to be done, or to be left undone, according as it is ei∣ther agreeable or not agreeable to these rules, and so is never left free to us, to be done or omitted at our pleasure. For if at all we be (as certainely we are) abridged of our Liberty, chiefly it is in things per∣taining to Divine worship.
But I marvell, why D: Forbesse, discourseth so much for the indif∣ferency of the Ceremonies, for lib. 1. cap. 7. He holdeth, that there were just reasons in the things them selves, why the pretended As∣sembly of Perth, should injoyne the five Articles; so me of which he calleth very convenient and profitable, and others of them neces∣sary in themselves. Sure, if he stand to that which he hath there writ∣ten, he can not choose but say, that it is unlawfull both for us, and for all Christians any where, to omit the controverted Ceremonies, and that all such as have at any time omitted them, have thereby sinned in leaving that undone which they ought to have done: for the conveniency and necessity of them which he pretendeth, is per∣petuall and universall.
Schol. in lib. 2. de Ben•…•…f.
Iun. de pol. mos. cap. 7.
Camer. prael tom. 2. pag. 49.
(s) Aquin. 1a 2a. q. 18. art. 3.
D. Bur∣gess of the lauf of kneel. c. 1.
com. in illum locum.
Pareus com. in il∣lum locum.
1. Sam. 2. 15.
Cor. 6. 13. & 10. 23.
10. 1•…•…. 50.
Calv. com. in il∣lum locum.
In Rom. 14. 7. 8.
Iun. lib. 1. cap. 12. §. 16.
expos in. Col. 3. 17.
ubi su∣pra cap. 11. sect. •…•…6.
Act. 15. 28.
In Act. 15. n. 18.
Annot. on Act. 15 sect. 10.
Rom. 14. 1•…•….
1 Pet. 2. 13.
Eph. 6. 6.
Zanch. in Ephes. 6. 5. 6.
1 Cor. 7. 23•…•…
Taylor on Tit. 1. 15. p. 295.
Id. ibid. p. 289.
Calv. in Rom. 14. 5.
Ames. lib 3 de consc. cap. 8. q. 5.
Aquin. 1a. 2a. q. 18. art 8.
ibid. art. 9.
Hist. of the counc. of Trent. lib. 2 p. 196.
Com. in 1 Cor. 6. 12.
in Rō. 14. dub. 1.
Iren. lib. 1. cap. 13. §. 7. 9. 10.
In Rom. 14. dub. 1.
In Rō. 14. 20.
lib. 3. de conss. cap. 18.
Ia. 3. 2.
Psal. 19. 12.
ubi su∣pra. §. 7.
1. Cor. 7. 39.
(〈◊〉〈◊〉) com. in Eph. 6 1.
Eph. 6. 1.
ubi su∣pra.
com. in Rom. 14. 23.
prael. Tom. 2. pag. 345.
G. •…•…anct. in Act. 16. 3.
Act. 1•…•…. 28.
de Instit. actual. cap. 42. p. 490.