take so much upon him, as imperiously to command what he thin∣keth good, in the disputes and deliberations, & to have every thing ordered, disposed, and handled according to his minde. To debate and define Theologicall controversies, and to teach what is Orthodoxall, what Hereticall, is the office of Divines; yet by a coactive auctority to judge this Or∣thodoxe Faith to be received by all, and Hereticall pravity to be rejected is the office of Kings, or the supreme Magistrates in every Commonwealth, saith the Bishop of Sarisburie. And againe, in Searching, Directing, Teaching; Divines, ordinarily and by reason of their calling, ought to goe be fore Kings themselves: but in commanding, establishing, compelling; Kings doe farre excell. Where he sheweth, how in defining of the Contro∣versies of Religion, in one respect Ecclesiasticall persons, and in another respect Kings have the first place.
In the debating of a question of Faith, Kings have not, by ver∣tue of their Princely vocation, any precedencie or chiefe place, the action beeing meerely Ecclesiasticall. For, howbeit Kings may con∣vocate a Councell, preside also and governe the same as concer∣ning the humane and politicall order, yet saith Iunius, Actiones, deliberationes, & definitiones, ad substantiam rei Ecclesiasticae pertinentes, à Sacerdotio sunt, à caetu servorum Dei, quibus rei suae administrationem man∣davit Deus. And with him the Archb. of Spalato saith in like man∣ner, that howbeit Christian Princes have convocated Councels, and civilly governed the same, yet they had no power nor auctority in the very discussing, handling, and deciding of matters of Faith.
What then? In the handling of controversies of Faith, have Prin∣ces no place nor power at all, beside that of Politicall governement onely? Surely by vertue of their Princely auctority, they have no other place in the hādling of these matters. Yet, what if they be men of singular learning and understanding in the Scriptures? Then let them propound their owne suffrage, with the grounds and reasons of it, even as other learned men in the Councell doe. But neither as Princes, nor as men singularly learned, may they require that others in the Councell shall dispute and debate matters, and that they themselves shall sit as Iudges having judiciall power of a ne∣gative voice. For in a Councell, no mans voice hath any greater strength, then his reasons and probations have. Non enim admit∣to, &c. For I admit not in a Councell (saith the same Prelate) some as Iudges, others as Disputators, for I have shewed that a conciliarie judge∣ment, consisteth in the approbation of that sentence, which above others hath been shewed to have most waight, and to which no man could enough oppose. Wherefore no man in the Councell ought to have a judiciarie voice, unlesse he bee withall a Disputator, and assigne a reason wherefore hee adheres to that judgement, and repels another, and that reason, such a one, as is drawen from the Scriptures onely, and from Antiquity.
Lastly, I hold, that after the definition and decision of a Coun∣cell,