And if M^r. G. had stucke to this, I suppose M^r. B.* would not easily haue beene able to refute it, and so his Argument had stucke fast. But I refuse to take ad∣uantage of ought that in mine owne iudgement I deeme vnsound. For it is r not victory, but truth onely that I stand for.

But, saith he, the words seeme to be more generall, and are, word for word, thus in the Originall, [The Lot is cast into the lap: but euery iudgement or disposing of it, is of God.] Doth not confuting them, who hold onely extraordinary Lots to be meant in this place; and tran∣slating the Text [Euery iudgement] and expounding it [or disposing it] shew plainly that this place proueth mine Assumption to be vniuersally true?

I perceiue a man must not be ouer-liberall with M^r. B. for i•… a man giue him an inch, hee will too soone take an ell. He might well thinke me very sil∣ly, freely to grant him all this, and yet denie his As∣sumption, i•… this were so plaine a Confirmation of it.

That I confute them is not true: I shew onely my dissent from them. I leaue it to M^r. B. if he can, to confute them.

That I so translate and expound the Text, is true: Page  177 but very sorry assistance ariseth to M^r B^s. Assump∣tion from thence.

So that I maruell that he denieth this place to proue mine Assumption, because it concerneth Lots in gene∣rall.

And maruell well he might, did I reason on that manner. But hee wanteth matter, it seemeth, to maruell at, that he frameth such to himselfe. s It is one thing to say, It proueth not M^r. B^s. Assumption, though it concerne Lots in generall: and another to say, It proueth not M^r. B^s. Assumption, because it con∣cerneth Lots in generall. That is all that can be ga∣thered out of ought that I affirme. But M^r. B. his earnest desire belike to haue his Assumption confir∣med, suggested this to him.

For if it doe so, then it proueth that ordinary as well as extraordinary Lots, tend to the aduancing of the Name of God.

It seemeth that M^r. B. hath forgotten his owne Assumption. If he haue, I will make bold to put him in mind of it. It is this, The vse of Lots directly, or of it selfe, and in speciall manner tendeth to the aduan∣cing of Gods Name, in attributing to his speciall proui∣dence in the whole and immediate disposing of them, &c. Here is a great deale more than barely tending to the aduancing of Gods Name, which all things that are disposed by him (and t what is not disposed by him?) in some degree or other doe. A man might Page  178 maruell therefore rather why M^r. B. should not so much, but at all maruell at M^r. G^s. deniall, that this place so vnderstood, doth proue M^r. B^s. Assumption; yea, he might maruell, that M^r. B. should not see that it did not, if he remembred what his Assumpti∣on was.

Againe, p. 145. M^r. G. taking the words, as they are vsually read in the Geneua Translation, and the Kings Edition, to wit, [The Lot is cast into the lap, but the whole disposition, or disposing thereof, is of the Lord] granteth that the whole euent is of God.

1. What I yeeld of my liberalitie, M^r. B. is one thing: What you must make good, if you will main∣taine your owne cause, is another thing. That is the translation, say I, *word for word. Which vnlesse therefore he can either disproue, or proue his As∣sumption out of it, his Argument is vndone, and his cause with it, hauing indeed no colour of ground beside that place much wrung and wronged to sup∣port and vphold it.

2. I take not the words so, but supposing them so to be taken, I say, that no more is therein said of Lots, than may be said of all things that are done in the world, though by meanes the most of them, that the whole issue and euent of them is of God, be∣cause he not only hath an hand in them, but it is in his power either to afford or to deny such issue vnto them. And what hath M^r. B^s. cause gained hereby more than was granted it before? Or how is his Assumption hereby confirmed, when no more is Page  179 yeelded to be said therein of Lots, than may be said of a game at boules?

A grant, though true, yet turning the Reader aside from seeing the whole truth. For the Text is, [The whole disposing of the Lot cast into the lap.]

And doe not I speake of Lots in generall? Or do I exclude any such as be cast into the lap? Or is it materiall, whether they be cast into lap, or xhat, or yhelmet, or zlot-box, or *water-pot, or into none of all these, as in crosse and pile, or not cast at all, as in best-betrust? That M^r. G. should so slily seeke to conceale that, and by leger-demaine seeke to turne his Readers eye aside from it. But, saith M^r. B.

If then the Lot cast into the Lap, that is, of purpose disposed by man vnto a variable euent, be wholly dispo∣sed by God, so as the euent be that which pleaseth him, then God doth not mediately dispose the Lot to this or that euent: if not mediately, then immediately, because the whole disposition is of him.

And what if the Lots then be not cast into the lap, or be not by man disposed at all? If that alter the case, as may seeme here implied, then that will not be true of euery Lot, nor of many a Lot, that M^r. B. here saith.

But if M^r. B^s. meaning be (for I would faine vn∣derstand him) that there is an opposition betweene mans Act and Gods Act in the Text. So is there in those words, aThe preparations of the heart are inPage  180man: but the answer of the tongue i•… of the Lord. Which yet proue not an immediate worke of God therefore to be in euery answer that a man giueth, or in euery word that he vttereth.

But vnlesse M^r. B. can find some stranger matter in those words, cast into the lap, more than here he discouereth, or any man (I beleeue) seeth beside himselfe, he saith no more than he said that I gran∣ted before, to wit, that the whole disposing of the Lot is of God, so as the euent is what he pleaseth. Which doth not necessarily inferre an immediate act of God in it: No more than, if a man should say, as he truly may say, that bthe whole disposition of warre and battell (which * the Rabbines, some of them, compare here with a Lot, and so make this verse▪ cohere with the next before it) is of God the Lord of Hoasts, so that the issue and euent of it is such as he pleaseth; it would follow thereupon, that he de∣nied carmes to be of any vse in warre, or affirmed all victorie to come immediatly, and without meanes from God.

Doth not this then make good mine Assumption?

No indeed; not a whit: Vnlesse the asking of the Question doe ought in it.

But for all this M^r. G. will not haue it so. For as he translateth this place, he saith▪ It importeth thus much, [That there i•… a Prouidence in all things, euen the least, & most casual.] And this he would confirme by these my words, viz. [The disposing of the Chance i•… secret, that Page  181 it might be Chance indeed, and wholly of God, who di∣sposeth all things.] Doe these words iustifie M^r. G^s. interpretation of this place? Yes: for they say plaine∣ly, God directeth all things; and they say withall, The 〈◊〉 of the Chance (that is, of the things purposely •…isposed by a man vnto a variable euent) vnto a cer∣taine euent, is secret, that it may be Chance indeed, that 〈◊〉, an euent not by the will of man, but wholly of God. •…o that my words imply this Argument. God directeth •…ll things: therefore much more, in our discerning a Lot, the whole disposing whereof is of him. This is far from saying that thi•… place importeth only, That there is a prouidence in all things.

M^r. B^•. words I haue faithfully related; and they •…ustifie as much as I alledge them for, to wit, a con∣•…ession, that God directeth and disposeth as well all •…ther things as Lots. What M^r. B. may please to fish further out of his owne words, I am well content he doe: what the words themselues of themselues import, any man may soone see.

Neither doth M^r. G^s. translation inferre this im∣ported interpretation.

What it will necessarily inferre, is not materiall; what it will well beare, is for me enough. It is suffi∣cient, that no more can be inferred out of it: and that is all that I auerre. But M^r. B. (you shall see) will shew that there may.

For this discretion [But] doth so oppose euery Page  182 iudgement, or disposing of it (as he expoundeth Iudge∣ment) to a Lot cast into the lap, as that euery dispo∣sing, is all one with the whole disposing.

The discretiue (for so I suppose his meaning is) but, doth no otherwise oppose here than in the place before cited; butdthe answer of the tongue is of the Lord: nor doth it any more proue, that euery dispo∣sing is all one with the whole disposing, (though I re∣fuse not that also in such sense as I haue shewed) than that euery mans iudgement is all one with the whole iudgement of euery man; in that speech also of Salomon,eMany seeke to the Rulers face, but euery mans iudgement is of God.

This place so troubleth M^r. G. that from it he would haue no more gathered, than that the whole euent (as of all things, so) of a Lot, is of the Lord. Yet so, as working by meanes in the most of them, and not implying immediate prouidence vniuersally in them.

Rather this place so troubleth M^r. B. being in∣deed the only maine bulwarke of his cause, that like a man in a maze he runneth backward and forward, from M^r. G^s. to the Geneua translation, and then backe to M^r. G^s. againe, as not enduring the triall of, or triall by either.

It is true, I auerre it, nor doth M^r. B. himselfe here denie, but that the whole euent of all things is of the Lord: nor haue the words of the Text in the or∣dinary Translations any one word more of a Lot, and no necessarie implication therefore of any immedi∣ate Page  183 prouidence in them, which M^r. B. would pick out of them.

I neede not examine the meanes or immediate proui∣dence of all the instances quoted in the margent. For here it is impliedly granted, (for he saith not, all, but, the most of them) that in some things God worketh not by meanes, and that there is an immediate proui∣dence particularly; for he denieth such a prouidence on∣ly, as being vniuersally.

M^r. B. it seemeth, little passeth what hee say, though neuer so little to the purpose, so hee may seeme to say something. The instances some of them are by M^r. B. himselfe, though contrary to his owne purpose, alledged. Mine Argument stan∣deth thus:

Now what is it to the purpose whether there be an immediate prouidence of God in some of them or no. This phrase that may be truly vsed, where none such is, proueth it not. The impropriety of speech here vsed I passe by, because it is nothing to the purpose. But till either the Antecedent here be disproued, or the Consequence (which I suppose no Page  184 man will once question) infringed, M^r. B. remai∣neth cleane put beside his maine bulwarke.

Howsoeuer it be in other things, I thinke it is mani∣fest to all, that will see, that God without meanes, and therefore immediatly, doth dispose the Lot cast into the lap vnto this, or that euent, what pleaseth him, where∣as man disposeth the things onely vnto a variable euent. As at cards a man shufleth them of purpose to dispose them vnto a variable euent. But by the immediate pro∣uidence of God, they are so shufled as that this or that euent followeth.

Here M^r. B. letteth goe his hold of that Text, and without any direct Answer at all giuen to mine Argument against his deduction, now vpon his bare word onely telleth vs, that it is so here, howsoeuer it be else-where, and we are all wilfully blinde if we see it not to be so as he saith. Let him pardon me; gI beleeue him not. He must first shew better Cards for it than he hath done yet, or else few wise men and well aduised, I suppose, will beleeue that either all Lots in generall, or the shufling of the Cards so and so, are effected without meanes. Any man, I thinke that hath his eies in his head, may soone see it to be otherwise.

Therefore (with M^r. G^s. fauour) any reasonable man may iudge it not senslesse to say (which he doubteth of. p. 147.) that in Childrens plaies at euen and odde, or at Heads & Points, there is an immediate prouidence, in inclining the will of the Child, & guiding his coniecture.

Page  185And with M^r. B^s. good fauour, I beleeue any iu∣dicious Reader will smile to heare M^r. B. here affirme it. But I would gladly know of M^r. B. why he skippeth thus from place to place in his Answer, and doth not goe thorow with my discourse and Argument about this very particular, but balke or stride ouer all that lieth betweene that he last dealt with, and this that commeth in the very end of it. But especially I would haue him tell what hee can answer to that instance of a Lot propounded next immediatly before this, wherein two appeale to the Cards as they lie left by those that last vsed them without further shuffling, who (suppose it) left the Cards (though vnknowne to the appealants) in some certaine manner sorted as to themselues then best seemed; whether the euent fall out by an immediate prouidence therein or no. Or, which I now adde, when two shall determine to shape their course by the tracke of a beast gone before them, which being driuen to the market by its owner, taketh this rather than that way, because the market that way lieth, whether this be also by an immediate prouidence or no.

Thus we see this place doth confirme mine Assump∣tion, and the proofe annexed, M^r. G^s. interpretation notwithstanding.

But no man, I am sure, vnlesse he borrow M^r. B^s. spectacles, will be able euer to see it.

But he giueth two reasons against an immediate prouidence in ordinary Lots.

Page  186Though I needed not to giue any: hhe that saith it, should proue it: yet I giue indeed not two onely; but more than two, if M^r. B. had pleased to take notice of them in the very same place where I giue these.

The former is this. That which agreeth to a thing as it is such, agreeth necessarily to all things that are such. Therefore if there be an immediate prouidence in a Lot, as it is casuall, then there is an immediate pro∣uidence in all things that are casuall. But the latter is not true: ergò not the former, p. 143. Why not the lat∣ter, if these Positions be true? That which seemeth Chance to vs, is a certaine word of God (saith Bernard,* but M^r. G. translateth it, is as a word of God) acquain∣ting vs with his will, p. 17. and, In casuall euents there is nothing guiding them but Gods prouidence, p. 22.

But for ouer-burdening this Booke, I would in∣sert here mine owne Argument at large: but so much as Mr. B. relateth shall suffice. Hee denieth (it seemes) here the Assumption; and so auerreth that which all euidence of daily experience doth abun∣dantly confute; and which some of those therefore that haue heretofore made this the maine ground of their opinion in this point now doe relinquish; that there is a speciall and immediate prouidence of God in euery thing that falleth out casually, as in euery meeting of any by the way vnsought for (though his businesse lying this way and mine that way at that time are the meanes of our meeting) the stum∣bling at a stone, or stepping in some vncleane thing, Page  187 while a man looketh vp or aside at some sight in a shop-window, and the like infinite accidents that daily occurre. For mine owne part the Assertion to me seemeth so senslesse, that I will no more spend time to dispute it with him that shall offer to defend it, than with one that shall affirme all the Riuers in the world to run with salt water.

Yea but there be some sayings in mine owne Booke that auerre it. Let vs heare them.

Why first Bernard saith, iThat which seemeth Chance to vs, is a certaine word of God acquainting vs with his will.

First for the Translation, then for the Exposition, and the end for which it is alledged. The words of Bernard are Sermo quidam, that is, word for word, some kinde of word, or to auoid ambiguitie, a word in some sort. For I hope M^r. B. when he translateth it, a certaine word, doth not take certaine in that sense that he did, who expounding the words of the Gospell, kThere was a certaine rich man, obserueth thence, that though the Rich man there mentioned, were otherwise an euill man, yet he was sure and certaine of his word. But M^r. G. translateth it, as a word. And who knoweth not that quidam and quoddam are vsually notes of diminution and quali∣fication? I wish M^r. B. had committed no greater fault in relating my words both here and else∣where, than I haue committed in translating Ber∣nard in that manner.

For the exposition of it how it is to be vnderstood, because I shew l there at large whence by M^r. B. it is cited, I doe thither refer my Reader. Only I adde Page  188 thereunto, vpon further view of the place, that it is euidently apparent by the whole sequell of the Sermon, (the maine scope whereof is to perswade men to rest satisfied with Gods will and pleasure in all accidents and occurrents, as losse of friends by decease, and the like) that Bernards* meaning is, that when ought falleth out, whether by casualtie (which hee mentioneth, because that might most be stuck at) or otherwise, Gods will was thereby manifested that so it should be, and therefore that we were to sub∣mit to Gods will in it. But no more will it hence follow, that there is an immediate prouidence of God in all casuall things, more than in any other sort of euents. Gods decreeing will in euery euent is reuea∣led by his worke. And euery euent, be it casuall, or not casuall, is a word of God reuealing his pleasure vnto vs, and acquainting vs with his will.

For the latter allegation M^r. B. most shamefully abuseth me, or himselfe, and his Reader rather, clip∣ping off iust so much of the sentence spoken by me; as to make it speake directly contrary to that that it doth. He bringeth me in affirming, that In casuall euents there is nothing guiding them but Gods proui∣dence. Whereas my words are these, mIf in casuall euents we consider ought beside the creature and the vncertaine motion thereof, (vncertaine, I say, to vs, be∣cause not determinable by vs, though determined ordi∣narily by some naturall cause or other) there is nothing guiding them but Gods prouidence. I remember one that in the Schooles gaue this Position to be disputed of, Virtus est vitium; and being required to shew some Author for it, produced Horace, where he saith, Page  189nVirtus est vitium fugere. And I could relate the like trick that a Popish Priest sometime shewed me in some things that passed in writing betweene him and me. And such shifting may well be seeme such as they are. But I would wish M^r. B. to be better ad∣uised than to deale thus, if he regard his owne cre∣dit. Which I wonder he would thus hazard the cal∣ling in question, vnlesse he thought that no body would take the paines to search the places quoted by him: where how that that I say, fitteth his turne, may soone be seene, or rather how directly it con∣tradicteth it.

But suppose there is not an immediate prouidence in all things that be casuall, what is that to the purpose? For all things casuall are not such with a Lot, wherein things are of purpose disposed by man vnto an vncer∣taine euent: which things so disposed by man, are wholly disposed by God vnto a certaine euent, this or that; so it is not in all other things that be casuall. Therefore all other casuall things and Lots are not such.

M^r. B. before denied mine Assumption. Now he denieth either the Conclusion, or nothing. Though it be so, saith he, in other casuall things, yet in a Lot it is not so; for they are wholly disposed by God, that is, in M^r. B^s. vnderstanding, there is an immediate proui∣dence of God in them, which is the contradictorie of my Conclusion.

What he talketh to no purpose in the world, of Lots not being such, is very friuolous. For either he vnderstandeth not what I say, or what himselfe Page  190 would. I ground my Proposition, vpon a generally receiued Axiome thus;

M^r. B. denieth neither Antecedent nor Conse∣quence: but telleth vs, that all casuall things are not such with a Lot. To what, thinke we, doth this An∣swer? Euery Casualty as it is a Casualty is such with each Casualty. For the same reason and common na∣ture of Casualtie is in each; though each of them haue something ouer and beside distinct either from other. And what agreeth therefore to any Casualty as it is a Casualty, must needs agree vnto all.

Neither is it said, an immediate prouidence is in a Lot, as it is casuall, but as the Lot being made casuall is wholly disposed by God to this or that euent.

M^r. B. hath here giuen so sore a cut to his owne cause, as o he will neuer be able to cure againe with all the skill that he hath. For what hath beene the maine ground, yea the onely ground in effect where∣upon these Games haue beene by his Master herein, himselfe, and those that concurre with them con∣demned, but this, because they depend vpon Casualty either in whole or in part? Aske M^r. B. himselfe why these Games are vnlawfull; the very pTitle of his Booke telleth you, because they consist in Chance. In his Epistle dedicatory hee repeateth the Page  191 same againe. In the entrance into his Dialogue, Dice are therefore vnlawfull, because they depend vpon Chance. And after, Dice wholly euill, because they de∣pend wholly vpon Chance; Cards and Tables somewhat euill because they depend somewhat vpon Chance: And are therefore Lots, for from thence they haue the deno∣mination of a Lot, which in Latine is called Sors, that is, Chance or hazard; and therefore vnlawfull. And againe, Whether you call Cards and Tables Lots or no, you play with chance or vse Lottery, and by so doing make God an vmpire in play, which must needs be a sin: because you take the name of God in vaine and tempt the Almighty by a game some putting of things to hazard, and making play of Lotterie. Againe what doe those words imply, the disposing of chance is secret that it may be chance indeed, and wholly of God: but that therefore it is wholly (that is in M^r. B^s. meaning immediatly) of God, because it is Chance, which else it were not. Go•… we a little higher from M^r. B. to his Teacher (as himselfe termeth him) herein M^r. F. qThe Nature of a Lot, saith he, lieth wholly in this, that although the thing be of vs, yet the disposition is wholly of God, that is, he vseth not our meanes of cun∣ning, practise, strength, &c. but taketh it wholly to him∣selfe. And therefore Dice, dealing of Cards, &c. where the matter is laid on hazard (as they call it) or rather Gods prouidence, without vsing any cunning of ours to dispose, is vpon the same reason of a Lot vnlawfull. Yea hence he inferreth that to say, rwhat lucke is this! how crooked! is in plaine termes (so he speaketh) as much as to say, what a God, or a crooked prouidence of God is this! as presuming that lucke, chance, or hazard,Page  192 (for all is one in effect) is nothing else but Gods pro∣uidence. Now what doth all this tend vnto but this: That therefore these games are vnlawfull because they depend vpon Casualty, which maketh them to bee Lots: and that therefore it is vnlawfull to vse any game depending vpon Casualty; because in that regard there is an immediate prouidence of God in it? Where∣as M^r. B. therein crossing all this, and ouerturning his owne grounds, here telleth vs, that It is not said an immediate prouidence is in a Lot, as it is casuall. But how then? forsooth as being casuall it is wholly di∣sposed by God to this or that euent. That is as much as to say, An immediate prouidence of God is not in a Lot, as it is casual, (though that be the ground whereupon we haue formerly affirmed it to be) but as there is an immediate prouidence of God in it; (idem per idem) for that is, to be wholly disposed by God; as M^r. B. still meaneth. Thus you see how M^r. B. hath now mended the matter, and made good his owne grounds. But he will haue somewhat out of my words yet, before he haue done with them.

So that from M^r. G^s. axiome this Argument may be framed. An immediate prouidence in an extraor∣dinary Lot is acknowledged by M^r. G. as it is a Lot (say I) wholly disposed by God: Therefore an immedi∣ate prouidence is in an ordinary Lot, (as it is a Lot) wholly disposed by God. For there is no difference be∣tweene these sorts of Lots (as they be Lots) and so di∣sposed. For M^r. G. hath shewed that Prou. 16. 33. spea∣keth as well of one sort of Lots, as of another.

How this that followeth commeth in with a, Page  193So that, I know not. Yet let vs see what it is. M^r. G. he saith, hath shewed, (I grant it indeed, but I shew it not; it is he that should shew it, or hee will neuer be able to conuince those that say otherwise) that Prou. 16. 33 speaketh of Lots in generall as well ordi∣nary as extraordinarie. Be it so, what of that? But I acknowledge also an immediate prouidence in an ex∣traordinary Lot; and that is therein as it is a Lot; saith M^r. B. and therefore by M^r. G^s. Axiome, it must bee so in an ordinary one also. For this I suppose it is that he would say. But he must first shew where I acknowledge an immediate prouidence to be in euery extraordinary Lot, which I deny to be in many thousands of them: and then proue it to be in such a Lot as it is a Lot; which to affirme and not proue, is to require that in effect without proofe to be granted, which all the controuersie is about, and which he must not thinke will be yeelded vpon his bare, I say.

The other Argument is this, which is the Kil kow. If in euery Lot there be necessarilie an immediate worke and prouidence of God, then it is in the naturall power of man to make God worke immediatly at his plea∣sure.

But to say that it is in mans power naturally to set God on working immediately at his pleasure, is absurd. There is not therefore an immediate worke and proui∣dence of God necessarily in euery Lot. M^r. G. like an Orator seemeth desirous to draw his Aduersary into ha∣tred by these words, [Necessarily, Naturall power, Set God on working, At pleasure, To say, and Ab∣surd]Page  194Verba dum sint, surdo canit. But hoping bet∣ter, I answering his Logicke deny the Assumption. For it is as much in mans naturall power to set God on work∣ing immediatly in an ordinarie, as in an extraordinary Lot. For both God and man doe respectiuely as much in the one Lot as in the other.

It is M^r. B^s. guise not mine to seeke to draw his Aduersaries into hatred, by traducing them as Plea∣ders for Dice play and such abuses as attend thereon, where it is vsed otherwise than it ought, because they deny euery lusorious Lot to be vnlawfull, or dice∣play simply euill in regard of the Lot vsed in it. I rea∣son but here from what M^r. B. himselfe granteth, as shall hereafter appeare.

But M^r. B. denieth the Assumption, which is this, To say that it is in mans power naturally to set God on working immediatly at his pleasure, is absurd. And dare M^r. B. then deny this Assumption? He might as well say, It is in mans power naturally to set God on working of miracles at his pleasure; as say, It is in his power naturally to set God on working immedi∣ately at his pleasure. For is not euery immediate worke of God, or euery worke wrought without means, miraculous? Some miracles haue beene wrought by meanes: but nothing is wrought wholly without meanes, that is not miraculous. Well, I will not say, that it is blasphemous to •…erre this: but yet I beleeue it commeth neerer blasphemy than any thing in my Booke doth.

Yea but M^r. B. hath some good reason for the deniall of mine Assumption. For, It is as much inPage  195mans power naturally to set God on working immediat∣ly in an ordinary as in an extraordinary Lot. Very true, s as much in the one as in the other. That is in very truth in neither. If there be in an extraordinary Lot of Gods speciall appointment, (for in no other is there any certainty of it) an immediate prouidence, neither is that there by any power of man naturally procu∣red, nor is God set a worke therein at mans pleasure, but he worketh therein vpon his owne pleasure, and man onely by his appointment. This M^r. B. himselfe saw well, and addeth therefore,

But an extraordinary Lot is by the speciall direction of God. True; So is an ordinary Lot by Gods speciall ad∣uice to end a controuersie.

It followeth not from the one to the other. And the reason is apparent. Because in the extraordinary Lot the euent required, be it, to finde out a malefa∣ctor, as in tAchans case, or to discouer who the man is that God hath fore-appointed to such an office, as in uSauls case, cannot certainly bee effected without such an immediate prouidence; whereas in the ordinary Lot, nothing is to be determined, but may well and certainly be decided without it. But if it be so, as M^r. B. saith, that therefore in an ordina∣ry Lot there is an immediate prouidence; and therefore a setting of God on working immediately so oft as such a Lot is vsed, because an ordinary Lot is by Gods speciall aduice to end a Controuersie: How is that true both in his Dialogue, and in the very next words im∣plied Page  196 by him, that in a lusorious Lot God is thus set on working? For if God haue giuen no allowance for lusorious Lots, how is he in them set so on working, who doth not so worke, but where Lots are vsed by his owne allowance? Or how sinne they in setting God on working there, where he doth not worke? M^r. B. therefore here hangeth fast in the briers.

If then euery Lot be a setting of our glorious God on working, there ought to be praier, if not by words, yet in heart in the vse as well of ordinarie as extraor∣dinarie Lots. If so, then Lots are not to be vsed in sports.

If euery Lot be, saith M^r. B. contrary to what be∣fore he implied, that vnlesse it be done by Gods assigne∣ment, it is not. If it be so indeed, the rest will fol∣low. But that is it that is to be proued. And for Conclusion of this Argument, let it be obserued, that M^r. B. cannot make this good, whereupon the whole strength of this his principall Argument de∣pendeth, & for the proofe wherof he alledgeth, Pro. 16. 33. to wit, that there is an immediate prouidence of God in euery Lot whatsoeuer, vnlesse this absurd Position be also granted him, that

And that little children as oft as they cast for crosse and pile, cause God therein to worke a miraculous worke. That which the rather I require to be obser∣ued and remembred, because the whole pith of thePage  197next Argument, yea of all the rest in a manner, de∣pendeth vpon this point.