The tvvoo bookes of Francis Bacon. Of the proficience and aduancement of learning, diuine and humane To the King.

THE SECOND Booke of FRANCIS BACON; of the proficience or aduancement of Learning, Diuine and Humane. To the King. (Book 2)

IT might seeme to haue more conuenience, though it come often otherwise to passe, (Excellent King) that those which are fruit∣full in their generati∣ons, & haue in them∣selues the fore sight of Immortalitie, in their descendents, should likewise be more carefull of the good estate of future times; vnto which they know they must transmitte and commend ouer their dea∣rest pledges. Queene Elizabeth was a soiourner in the world in respect of her vnmaried life: and was a blessing to her owne times; & yet so as the impres∣sion of her good gouernement, besides her happie

memorie, is not without some effect, which doth suruiue her. But to your Maiestie, whom God hath alreadie blessed with so much Royall issue, worthie to continue and represent you for euer: and whose youthfull and fruitfull bedde doth yet promise ma∣nie the like renouations: It is proper and agreeable to be conuersant, not only in the transitory parts of good gouernment: but in those acts also, which are in their nature permanent & perpetuall. Amongst the which (if affection do not transport mee,) there is not any more worthie, then the further endowe∣ment of the world with sound and fruitfull know∣ledge: For why should a fewe receiued Authors stand vp like Hercules Columnes, beyond which, there should be no sayling, or discouering, since wee haue so bright and benigne a starre, as your Ma: to con∣duct and prosper vs? To returne therefore where wee left, it remaineth to consider of what kind those Acts are which haue bene vndertaken, & performed by Kings and others, for the increase and aduance∣ment of learning, wherein I purpose to speake ac∣tiuely without digressing or dylating.

Let this ground therfore be layd, that all workes are ouercōmen by amplitude of reward, by sound∣nesse of direction, and by the coniunction of labors. The first multiplyeth endeuour, the second preuen∣teth error, and the third supplieth the frailty of man. But the principal of these is direction: For Claudus in via, antevertit cursorem extra viam: And Salomon excellently setteth it downe; If the Iron be not sharpe,

it requireth more strength: But wisedome is that which preuaileth: signifying that the Inuention or election of the Meane, is more effectuall then anie inforce∣ment or accumulation of endeuours. This I am in∣duced to speake; for that (not derogating from the noble intention of any that haue beene deseruers towards the State of learning) I do obserue neuer∣thelesse, that their workes and Acts are rather mat∣ters of Magnificence and Memorie, then of pro∣gression and proficience, and tende rather to aug∣ment the masse of Learning in the multitude of learned men, then to rectifie or raise the Sciences themselues.

The Works or Acts of merit towards learning are conversant about three obiects, the Places of lear∣ning; the Bookes of learning; and the Persons of the learned. For as water, whether it be the dewe of heauen, or the springs of the earth, doth scatter and leese it selfe in the ground, except it be collected into some Receptacle, where it may by vnion, com∣fort and sustaine it selfe: And for that cause the In∣dustry of Man hath made & framed Spring heads, Conduits, Cesternes, and Pooles, which men haue accustomed likewise to beautifie and adorne with accomplishments of Magnificence and State, as wel as of vse and necessitie: So this excellent liquor of knowledge, whether it descend from diuine inspi∣ration, or spring from humane sense, would soone perishe and vanishe to oblyuion, if it were not preserued in Bookes, Traditions, Conferences, and

Places appoynted, as Vniuersities, Colledges, and Schooles, for the receipt & comforting of the same.

The works which concerne the Seates and Pla∣ces of learning, are foure; Foundations, and Buyl∣dings, Endowments with Reuenewes, Endowmēts with Franchizes and Priuiledges, Institutions and Ordinances for gouernment, all tending to quiet∣nesse and priuatenesse of life, and discharge of cares and troubles, much like the Stations, which Virgil prescribeth for the hyuing of Bees.

Principio sedes Apibus, statio{que} petenda: Quo ne{que} sit ventis aditus, &c.

The workes touching Bookes are two: First Li∣braries, which are as the Shrynes, where all the Re∣liques of the ancient Saints, full of true vertue, and that without delusion or imposture, are preserued, and reposed; Secondly, Newe Editions of Au∣thors, with more correct impressions, more faith∣full translations, more profitable glosses, more dili∣gent annotations, and the like.

The workes pertaining to the persons of learned men (besides the aduancement and countenancing of them in generall) are two: The reward and de∣signation of Readers in Sciences already extant and inuented: and the reward and designation of Wri∣ters and Enquirers, concerning any partes of Lear∣ning, not sufficiently laboured and prosecuted.

These are summarilie the workes and actes, wherein the merites of manie excellent Princes, and other worthie Personages haue beene conuer∣sant.

As for any particular commemorations, I call to minde what Cicero saide, when hee gaue generall thanks. Di•…•…ffcile non aliquem; ingratum quenquam prae∣terire: Let vs rather according to the Scriptures, looke vnto that parte of the Race, which is be∣fore vs; then looke backe to that which is alrea∣die attained.

First therfore amongst so many great Foundati∣ons of Colledges in Europe, I finde strange that they are all dedicated to Professions, and none left free to Artes and Sciences at large. For if men iudge that learning should bee referred to action, they iudge well: but in this they fall into the Error described in the ancient Fable; in which the other parts of the body did suppose the stomache had beene ydle, be∣cause it neyther performed the office of Motion, as the lymmes doe, nor of Sence, as the head doth: But yet notwithstanding it is the Stomache that di∣gesteth and distributeth to all the rest: So if any man thinke Philosophie and Vniuersalitie to be idle Stu∣dies; hee doth not consider that all Professions are from thence serued, and supplyed. And this I take to bee a great cause that hath hindered the progres∣sion of learning, because these Fundamental know∣ledges haue bene studied but in passage. For if you will haue a tree beare more fruite then it hath vsed to do; it is not any thing you can do to the boughes, but it is the styrring of the earth, and putting newe moulde about the rootes, that must worke it. Neyther is it to bee forgotten, that this dedicating

of Foundations and Dotations to professory Lear∣ning, hath not onely had a Maligne aspect, and in∣fluence vpon the growth of Scyences, but hath also beene preiudiciall to States and gouernments. For hence it proceedeth that Princes find a solitude, in regard of able men to serue them in causes of e∣state, because there is no education collegiate, which is free; wher such as were so disposed, mought giue themselues to Histories, moderne langua∣ges, bookes of pollicie and ciuile discourse, and other the like inablements vnto seruice of estate.

And because founders of Colledges doe plant, and founders of Lectures doe water: it followeth wel in order to speake of the defect, which is in Pub∣lique Lectures: Namely, in the smalnesse and mea∣nesse of the salary or reward which in most places is assigned vnto them: whether they be Lectures of Arts, or of Professions. For it is necessary to the pro∣gression of Scyences, that Readers be of the most a∣ble and sufficient men; as those which are ordained for generating, and propagating of Scyences, and not for transitorie vse. This cannot be, except their condition, & endowmēt be such, as may cōtent the ablest man, to appropriate his whole labour, and continue his whole age in that function and atten∣dance, and therefore must haue a proportion an∣swerable to that mediocritic or competencie of ad∣uancement, which may be expected from a Profes∣sion, or the Practize of a Profession: So as, if you wil haue Scyences flourish, you must obserue Dauids

military lawe, which was, That those which slaied with the Carriage, should haue equall part with those which were in the Action: else will the carriages be ill atten∣ded: So Readers in Scyences are indeede the Gar∣dyans of the stores and prouisions of Scyences, whence men in actiue courses are furnished, and therefore ought to haue equall entertainment with them; otherwise if the fathers in Scyences be of the weakest sort, or be ill maintained.

Et Patrum invalidi referent ieiunia nati.

Another defect I note, wherin I shall neede some Alchimist to helpe me, who call vpon men to sell their Bookes, and to build Fornaces, quitting and forsaking Minerva, and the Muses, as barreyne vir∣gines, and relying vpon Vulcan. But certaine it is, that vnto the deepe, fruitefull, and operatiue studie of many Scyences, specially Naturall Phylosophy and Physicke, Bookes be not onely the Instrumen∣tals; wherein also the beneficence of men hath not beene altogether wanting: for we see, Spheares, Globes, Astrolabes, Mappes, and the like, haue bene prouided, as appurtenances to Astronomy & Cos∣mography, as well as bookes: We see likewise, that some places instituted for Physicke, haue annexed the commoditie of Gardeins for Simples of all sorts, and do likewise command the vse of dead Bo∣dies for Anatomyes. But these doe respect but a few things. In generall, there will hardly be any Mayne proficience in the disclosing of nature, except there be some allowance for expences about experimēts;

whether they be experiments appertaining to Vul∣canus or Dedalus, Furnace or Engyne, or any other kind; And therefore as Secretaries, and Spyalls of Princes and States bring in Bills for Intelligence; so you must allowe the Spyalls and Intelligencers of Nature, to bring in their Billes, or else you shall be ill aduertised.

And if Alexander made such a liberall assignati∣on to Aristotle of treasure for the allowance of Hun∣ters, Fowlers, Fishers and the like, that he mought compile an Historie of Nature, much better dothey deserue it that trauailes in Arts of nature.

Another defect which I note, is an intermission or neglect in those which are Gouernours in Vni∣uersities, of Consultation, & in Princes or superior persons, of Visitation: To enter into account and consideration, whether the Readings, exercises, and other customes appertayning vnto learning, aunci∣ently begunne, and since continued, be well institu∣ted or no, and thereupon to ground an amende∣ment, or reformation in that which shall be found inconuenient. For it is one of your Maiesties owne most wise and Princely Maximes,

that in all vsages, and Presidents, the Times be considered wherein they first beganne, which if they were weake, or ignorant, it derogateth from the Authoritie of the Vsage, and lea∣ueth it for suspect. And therefore in as much, as most of the vsages, and orders of the Vniuersities were deriued frō more obscure times, it is the more requi∣site, they be reexamined.

In this kind I will giue an

instance or two for exāple sake, of things that are the most obvious & familiar: The one is a matter, which though it bee ancient and generall, yet I hold to be an errour, which is, that Schollers in Vniuersities come too soone, & too vnripe to Logicke & Rhe∣toricke; Arts fitter for Graduates then children, and Nouices: For these two rightly taken, are the gra∣uest of Sciences, beeing the Arts of Arts, the one for Iudgement, the other for Ornament: And they be the Rules & Directions, how to set forth & dispose matter: & therfore for mindes emptie & vnfraught with matter, & which haue not gathered that which Cicero calleth Sylua and Supellex, stuffe and varietie to beginne with those Artes (as if one should learne to weigh, or to measure, or to painte the Winde) doth worke but this effect: that the wisedome of those Arts, which is great, & vniuersal, is almost made con∣temptible, & is degenerate into childish Sophystrie, & ridiculous affectation. And further, the vntimely learning of them hath drawen on by consequence, the superficiall and vnprofitable teaching & writing of them, as fitteth indeed to the capacity of childrē: Another, is a lacke I finde in the exercises vsed in the Vniuersities, which do make to great a diuorce be∣tweene Inuention & Memory: for their speeches are either premeditate in Verbis conceptis, where nothing is left to Inuention, or meerly Extemporall, where lit∣tle is left to Memory: wheras in life & action, there is least vse of either of these, but rather of intermixtures of premeditation, & Inuention: Notes & Memorie.

So as the exercise fitteth not the practize, nor the I∣mage, the life; and it is euer a true rule in exercises, that they bee framed as nere as may be to the life of practise, for otherwise they do peruert the Motions, and faculties of the Minde, and not prepare them. The truth whereof is not obscure, when Schollars come to the practises of professions, or other actions of ciuill life, which when they set into, this want is soone found by themselues, and sooner by others. But this part touching the amendment of the Insti∣tutions and orders of Vniuersities. I will conclude with the clause of Caesars letter to Oppins and Balbus, Hoc quemaamodum fieri possit, nonnulla mihi in mētem veniunt, & multa reperiri possunt: de ijs rebus rogovos, vt cogitationem suscipiatis.

Another defect which I note, ascendeth a little higher then the precedent. For as the proficience of learning consisteth much in the orders and instituti∣ons of Vniuersities, in the same States & kingdoms: So it would bee yet more aduanced, if there were more Intelligēce Mutual betweene the Vniuersities of Europe, then now there is. We see, there be many Orders and Foundatiōs, which though they be de∣uided vnder seuerall soueraignties, & territories, yet they take themselues to haue a kind of contract, fra∣ternitie, & correspondence, one with the other, in∣somuch as they haue Prouincials and Generals. And surely as Nature createth Brotherhood in Fa∣milies, & Arts Mechanicall contract Brotherhoods in communalties, and the Anoyntment of God su∣perinduceth

a Brotherhood in Kings & Bishops: So in like manner there cannot but bee a fraternitie in learning and illumination, relating to that Paterni∣tie, which is attributed to God, who is called the Fa∣ther of illuminations or lights.

The last defect which I wil note, is, that there hath not been, or very rarely been, any Publique Desig∣nation of Writers or Enquirers, concerning such parts of knowledge, as may appeare not to haue bin alreadie sufficiently laboured or vndertaken, vnto which point it is an Inducemēt; to enter into a view and examination, what parts of learning haue bin prosecuted, and what omitted; For the opinion of plentie is amongst the causes of want; and the great quantitie of Bookes maketh a shewe rather of super∣fluitie then lacke, which surcharge neuerthelesse is not to be remedied by making no more bookes, but by making more good books, which as the Serpēt of Moses, mought deuour the Serpēts of the Inchātors.

The remouing of all the defects formerly enu∣merate, except the last, and of the actiue part also of the last (which is the designation of Writers) are O∣pera Basilica; towards which the endeuors of a pri∣uate man may be, but as an Image in a crosse way; that may point at the way, but cannot goe it. But the inducing part of the latter (which is the suruay of Learning), may bee set forwarde by priuate trauaile; Wherefore I will now attempt to make a generall and faithfull perambulation of lear∣ning, with an inquiry what parts theroflye fresh and

wast, and not improued & conuerted by the Indu∣strie of man; to the end that such a plotte made and recorded to memorie, may both minister light to a∣nic publique designation: and also serue to excite voluntary endeuours; wherin neuerthelesse my pur∣pose is at this time, to note onely omissions and de∣ficiences; and not to make any redargution of Er∣rors, or incomplete prosecutions: For it is one thing to set forth what ground lyeth vnmanured; and a∣nother thing to correct ill husbandry in that which is manured.

In the handling & vndertaking of which worke, I am not ignorant, what it is, that I doe now mooue and attempt, nor insensible of mine own weakenes, to susteine my purpose: But my hope is, that if my extreame loue to learning carrie me too farre, I may obtaine the excuse of affection; for that It is not gran∣ted to man to loue, and to bee wise. But I know well I can vse no other libertie of Iudgement, then I must leaue to others, & I for my part shall be indifferent∣lie glad eyther to performe my selfe, or accept from another, that dutie of humanitie: Nam quierranti comiter monstrat viam: &c. I doe foresee likewise, that of those things, which I shall enter & Register, as Deficiences and Omissions: Many will conceiue and censure, that some of them are alreadie done & extant: others to bee but curiosities, and things of no great vse: and others to bee of too great difficul∣tie, and almost impossibilitie to bee compassed and effected: But for the twoo first, I referre my selfe to

the particulars. For the last, touching impossibilitie, I take it, those things are to bee held possible, which may be done by some person, though not by euerie one: and which may be done by many, though not by any one: and which may be done in succession of ages, though not within the houre-glasse of one mans life: and which may be done by publique de∣signation, though not by priuate endeuour. But notwithstāding, if any Man will take to himselfe ra∣ther that of Salomon, Dicit p•…•…ger, Leo est in via, then that of Virgil, Possunt, quia posse videntur: I shall be content that my labours bee esteemed, but as the better sorte of wishes: for as it asketh some know∣ledge to demaund a question, not impertinent; so it requireth some sense, to make a wish not absurd.

THE PARTS of humane learning haue refe∣rence to the three partes of Mans vnderstan∣ding, which is the seate of Learning. HISTORY to his MEMORY, POESIE to his IMAGI∣NATION, and PHILOSOPHIE to his REA∣SON: Diuine learning receiueth the same distribu∣tion, for the Spirit of Man is the same: though the Reuelation of Oracle and Sense be diuerse: So as Theologie consisteth also of HISTORIE of the Church; of PARABLES, which is Diuine Poesie: and of holie DOCTRINE or Precept. For as for that part, which seemeth supernumerarie, which is Prophecie: it is but Diuine Historie: which hath that prerogatiue ouer humane, as the Narration may bee before the fact, aswell as after.

HISTORY is NATV•…•…L, CIVIL•…•…, EC∣CLESIASTICALL & LITERARY, wherof the three first I allow as extant, the fourth I note as defi∣cient. * 1.1 For no man hath propounded to himselfe the generall state of •…•…arning to bee described and represented from age to age, as many haue done the works of Nature, & the State ciuile and Ecclesiasti∣cal; without which the History of the world seemeth to me, to be as the Statua of Polyphemus with his eye out, that part being wanting, which doth most shew the spirit, and life of the person: And yet I am not ignorant that in diuers particular sciences, as of the Iurisconsults, the Mathematicians, the Rhetoricians the Philosophers, there are set down some smal me∣morials of the Schooles, Authors, and Bookes: and so like wise some barren relations touching the In∣uentiō of Arts, or vsages. But a iust story of learning, containing the Antiquities & Originalls of Know∣ledges, & their Sects; their Inuentions, their Traditi∣ons; their diuerse Administrations, and Managings; their Flourishings, their Oppositions, Decayes, Depressions, Obliuions, Remoues; with the cau∣ses, and occasions of them, and all other euents con∣cerning learning, throughout the ages of the world; I may truly affirme to be wanting. The vse and end of which worke, I doe not so much designe for cu∣riositie, or satisfaction of those that are the louers of learning, but chiefely for a more serious, & graue purpose, which is this in fewe wordes, that it will

make learned men wise, in the vse and administra∣tion of learning. For it is not Saint Augustines nor Saint Ambrose workes that will make so wise a Diuine; as Ecclesiasticall Historie, throughly read and obserued: and the same reason is of Lear∣ning.

HISTORY of NATVRE is of three sorts: of NATVRE in COVRSE; of NATVRE ER∣•…•…ING, or VARYING; and of NATVRE AL∣TERED or wroght, that is HISTORY of CREA∣TVRES, HISTORY of MARVAILES, and HISTORY of ARTS. The first of these, no doubt is extant, and that in good perfection. The two la∣ter are handled so weakely and vnprofitably, as I am moued to note them as deficient. For I find no sufficient, or competent Collection of the Workes * 1.2 of Nature, which haue a Digression, and Deflexi∣on, from the ordinary course of Generations, Pro∣ductions, & Motions, whether they be singularities of place and region, or the strange euents of time and chance, or the effects of yet vnknowne pro∣prieties, or the instances of exception to generall kindes: It is true, I finde a number of bookes of fabulous Experiments, & Secrets, and friuolous Im∣postures for pleasure and strangenesse. But a substantiall and seuere Collection of the HETE∣•…•…, or IRREGVLARS of NATVRE, well examined & described I find not specially not with due reiection of fables, and popular Errors:

For, as things now are, if an vntruth in Nature bee once on foote, what by reason of the neglect of ex∣amination, and countenance of Antiquitie, and what by reason of the vse of the opinion in simi∣litudes, and ornaments of speeche, it is neuer cal∣led downe.

The vse of this worke, honoured with a pre∣sident in Aristotle, is nothing lesse, then to giue con∣tentment to the appetite of Curious and vaine wittes, as the manner of MIRABILARIES is to doe: But for twoo Reasons, both of greate waight: The one to correct the parcialitie of Axi∣omes, and Opinions: which are commonly fra∣med onely vppon common and familiar examples: The other, because from the Wonders of Nature, is the neerest Intelligence and passage towardes the Wonders of Arte: For it is no more, but by follo∣wing, and as it were, hounding Nature in her wan∣drings, to bee able to leade her afterwardes to the same place againe. Neyther am I of opinion in this HISTORY of MARVAILES, that super∣stitious Narrations of Sorceries, Witchecraftes, Dreames, Diuinations, and the like, where there is an assurance, and cleere euidence of the fact, be altogether excluded. For it is not yet knowne in what cases, and how farre, effectes attributed to superstition, do participate of Naturall causes: and therefore how-soeuer the practise of such things is to bee condemned, yet from the Speculation and

sideration of them, light may be taken, not onely for the discerning of the offences, but for the fur∣ther disclosing of Nature: Neither ought a Man to make scruple of entring into these things for inqui∣sition of truth, as your Maiestie hath shewed in your owne example: who with the two cleere eyes of Religion and naturall Philosophy, haue looked deepely and wisely into these shadowes, and yet proued your selfe to be of the Nature of the Sunne, which passeth through pollutions, and it selfe re∣maines as pure as before. But this I hold fit, that these Narrations, which haue mixture with super∣stition, be sorted by themselues, and not to be min∣gled with the Narrations, which are meerely and sincerely naturall. But as for the Narrations tou∣ching the Prodigies and Miracles of Religions, they are either not true, or not Naturall; and therefore impertinent for the Storie of Na∣ture.

For HISTORY of NATVRE * 1.3 WROVGHT, or MECHANICALL, I finde some Collections Made of Agriculture, and likewise of Manuall Arts, but commonly with a reiection of experiments familiar and vul∣gar. For it is esteemed a kinde of dishonour vn∣to Learning, to descend to enquirie or Meditati∣on vppon Matters Mechanicall; except they bee such as may bee thought secrets, rarities, and speciall subtilties: which humour of vaine, and

supercilious Arrogancie, is iustly derided in Plato: where hee brings in Hippias a vanting Sophist, dis∣puting with Socrates a true and vnfained inqui∣sitor of truth; where the subiect beeing touching beautie, Socrates, after his wandring manner of In∣ductions, put first an example of a faire Virgine, and then of a faire Horse, and then of a faire pot well glazed, whereat Hippias was offended, and said; More then for curtesies sake, hee did thinke much to dis∣pute with any, that did alledge such base and Sordide instances, whereunto Socrates answereth; you haue reason, and it becomes you well, beeing a man so trimme in your ves•…•…ments, &c. and so goeth on in an Ironie. But the truth is, they bee not the highest instances, that giue the securest informati∣on; as may bee well expressed in the tale so com∣mon of the Philosopher, that while he gazed vp∣wardes to the Starres, fell into the water: for if hee had looked downe hee might haue seene the Starres in the water, but looking aloft hee coulde not see the water in the Starres: So it commeth often to passe, that meane and small things disco∣uer great, better then great can discouer the small: and therefore Aristotle noteth well, that the nature of euery thing is best seene in his smallest portions, and for that cause hee enquireth the nature of a Com∣mon-wealth, first in a Family, and the Simple Coniugatiōs of Man and Wife; Parent, and Child, Maister and Seruant, which are in euery Cottage;

Euen so likewise the nature of this great Citie of the world and the policie thereof, must bee first sought in meane concordances, and small portions: So we see how that secret of Nature, of the turning of I∣ron, touched with the Loadestone, towardes the North, was found out in needels of Iron, not in barres of Iron.

But if my iudgement bee of any waight, the vse of HISTORIEMECHANICAL, is of all others the most radicall, and fundamentall to∣wardes Naturall Philosophie, such Naturall Phi∣losophie, as shall not vanish in the fume of subtile, sublime, or delectable speculation, but such as shall bee operatiue to the endowment, and bene∣fit of Mans life: for it will not onely minister and suggest for the present, Many ingenious practizes in all trades, by a connexion and transferring of the obseruations of one Arte, to the vse of another, when the experiences of seuerall misteries shall fall vnder the consideration of one mans minde: But surder, it will giue a more true, and reall il∣lumination concerning Causes and Axiomes, then is hetherto attained. For like as a Mans dispo∣sition is neuer well knowen, till hee be crossed, nor Proteus euer chaunged shapes, till hee was straightened and held fast: so the passages and vari∣ations of Nature cannot appeare so fully in the li∣bertie of Nature, as in the trialls and vexations of Art.

FOr CIVILE HISTORY, it is of three kinds, not vnfitly to be compared with the three kinds of Pictures or Images: for of Pictures or Images, wee see some are Vnfinished, some are parfite, and some are defaced: So of Histories, wee may finde three kindes, MEMORIALLS, PARFITE HI∣STORIES, and ANTIQVITIES: for MEMO∣RIALLS are Historie vnfinished, or the first, or rough draughts of Historie, and ANTIQVI∣TIES are Historie defaced, or some remnants of History, which haue casually escaped the shipwrack of time.

MEMORIALLS or PREPARATO∣RY HISTORY are of two sorts, wherof the on may be tearmed COMMENTARIES, & the other REGISTERS: COMMENTARIES are they which set downe a continuance of the na∣ked euēts & actiōs, without the motiues or designes, the counsells, the speeches, the pretexts the occasi∣ons, and other passages of action: for this is the true nature of a commentarie (though Caesar in modestie mixt with greatnesse, did for his pleasure apply the name of a commentarie to the best Historie of the world) REGISTERS are collectiōs of Publique Acts, as Decrees of counsell, Iudiciall procee∣dings, Declarations and Letters of estate, Orati∣ons, and the like, without a perfect continu∣ance, or contexture of the threed of the Narrati∣on.

ANTIQVITIES, or Remnants of Histo∣ry, are, as was saide, tanquam Tabula Naufragij, when industrious persons by an exact and scrupulous dili∣gence and obseruation, out of Monumēts, Names, Wordes, Prouerbes, Traditions, Priuate Recordes, and Euidences, Fragments of stories, Passages of Bookes, that concerne not storie, and the like, doe saue and recouer somewhat from the deluge of time.

In these kindes of vnperfect Histories I doe as∣signe no deficience, for they are tanquam imperfectè Mista, and therefore any deficience in them is but their nature. As for the Corruptiōs and Mothes of Historie, which are Epitomes, the vse of them de∣serueth to be banisht, as all men of sound Iudge∣ment haue confessed, as those that haue fretted and corroded the sound bodies of many excellent Histories, and wrought them into base and vnprofi∣table dregges.

HISTORY which may be called IVST and PARFITE Historie, is of three kinds, accor∣ding to the obiect which it propoundeth, or preten∣deth to represent: for it either represēteth a TIME, or a PERSON, or an ACTION. The first we call CHRONICLES, The second LIVES, and the third NARRATIONS, or RELA∣TIONS. Of these although the first bee the most compleate and absolute kinde of Historie, and hath most estimation and glory: yet the second ex∣celleth it in profit and vse, and the third in veritie

& sinceritie. For HISTORY of TIMES represen∣teth the magnitude of Actions, & the publique faces and deportmēts of persons, & passeth ouer in silence the smaller passages and Motions of men and Mat∣ters. But such beeing the workemanship of God, as he doth hang the greatest waight vpon the smal∣lest Wyars, Maxima è Minimis suspēdēs, it comes ther∣fore to passe, that such Histories doe rather set forth the pompe of busines, then the true and inward re∣sorts thereof. But Liues if they be well written, pro∣pounding to themselues a person to represent, in whom actions both greater and smaller, publique & priuate haue a commixture; must of necessitie con∣taine a more true, natiue, and liuely representation: So againe Narrations, and Relations of actions as the War of Peloponnesus, the Expeditiō of Cyrus Mi∣nor, the Conspiracie of Catiline, cannot but be more purely and exactly true, then HISTORIES of TIMES, because they may choose an argument comprehensible within the notice and instructions of the Writer: whereas he that undertaketh the sto∣ry of a time, specially of any length, cannot but meet with many blankes, and spaces, which hee must be forced to fill vp, out of his own wit and coniecture.

For the HISTORY of TIMES. (I meane of ciuil History,) the prouidence of God hath made the distribution: for it hath pleased God to ordaine and illustrate two exemplar States of the worlde, for Armes, learning, Morall Vertue, Policie, and Lawes. The STATE of GRECIA, and

the STATE of ROME: The Histories where∣of occupying the MIDDLEPART of time, haue more auncient to them, Histories which may by one common name, be tearmed the ANTI∣QVITIES of the WORLD; and after them, Histories which may bee likewise cal∣led by the name of MODERNE HISTO∣RIE.

Nowe to speake of the deficiences: As to the HEATHEN ANTIQVITIES of the world, it is in vaine to note them for deficient: de∣ficient they are no doubt, consisting most of fables and fragments: but the deficience cannot bee hol∣pen: for Antiquitie is like fame, Caput inter nubila condit, her head is mu•…•…ed from our sight: For the HISTORIE of the EXEMPLAR STATES, it is extant in good perfection. Not but I could wish there were a perfect Course of Historie for Grecia from Theseus to Philopaemen, (what time the affaires of Grecia drowned and extinguished in the affaires of Rome) and for Rome, from Romulus to Iustinianus, who may be truly saide to be Vltimus Romanorum. In which sequences of storie the Text of Thucidides and Xenophon in the one, & the Texts of Liuius, Polybius, Salustius, Caesar, Appianus, Tacitus, Herodianus in the other to be kept intyre without any diminutiō at all, and onely to be supplied and continued. But this is Matter of Mag∣nificence, rather to be commended then required:

and wee speake nowe of parts of Learning supple∣mentall, and not of superetogation.

But for MODERNE HISTORIES, where∣of there are some fewe verie worthy, but the grea∣ter part beneath Mediocritie, leauing the care of forreyne stories to forreyne States, because I will not bee Curiosus in aliena Republica, I cannot faile to represent to your Maiestie, the vnworthinesse of the Historie of Englande in the Maine continu∣ance thereof, and the partialitie, and obliquitie of that of Scotland, in the latest and largest Author that I haue seene; supposing that it would be ho∣nour for your Maiestie, and a worke very memo∣rable, if this Iland of great Brittanie, as it is now ioy∣ned in Monarchie for the ages to come: So were ioyned in one Historie for the times passed, after the manner of the sacred Historie, which draweth downe the storie of the Tenne Tribes, and of the Two Tribes, as Twinnes together. And if it shall seeme that the greatnesse of this worke may make it lesse exactly performed, there is an excellent Pe∣riode of a much smaller compasse of time, as to the storie of England that is to say, from the Vniting of the Roses, to the Vniting of the Kingdomes: a Por∣tiō of time wherin, to my vnderstanding, there hath bin the rarest varieties, that in like number of succes∣siōs of any hereditary Monarchie hath bin known: For it beginneth with the mixt Adeption of a Crowne, by Armes and Tytle: An entry by Bat∣taile, an Establishment by Mariage: and therefore

times answerable, like waters after a tempest, full of working and swelling, though without extreami∣tie of Storme; but well passed through by the wise∣dome of the Pylote, being one of the most sufficient kinges of all the number. Then followeth the Raigne of a King, whose actions howsoeuer con∣ducted had much intermixture with the affaires of Europe: balancing and inclyning them variably, in whose time also beganne that great alteration in the State Ecclesiasticall, an action which seldome commeth vppon the Stage: Then the Raigne of a Minor, then an offer of an vsurpation, (though it was but as Febris Ephemera). Then the Raigne of a Queene Matched with a Forreyner: Then of a Queene that liued solitary, and vnmarried, and yet her gouernment so masculine, as it had greater im∣pression, and operation vppon the States abroad, then it any waies receiued from thence; And now last, this most happie, and glorious euent, that this I∣land of Brittany deuided from all the world, should bee vnited in it selfe; And that Oracle of Rest gi∣uen to Aeneas, Antiquam enquirite Matrem, should nowe bee performed and fulfilled vpon the Nati∣ons of England and Scotland, being now revnited in the auncient Mother name of Brittany, as a full periode of all instabilitie & peregrinations: So that as it commeth to passe in Massiue bodies, that they haue certaine trepidations and wauerings be∣fore they fixe and settle: So it seemeth, that

by the prouidence of God, this Monarchy before it was to settle in your Maiestie, and your generati∣ons, (in which I hope it is nowe established for euer,) it had these prelusiue changes and varie∣ties.

For LIVES, I doe finde strange that these times haue so litle esteemed the vertues of the times, as that the Writings of liues should be no more fre∣quent. For although there be not many soueraigne Princes or absolute cōmanders, and that States are most collected into Monarchies; yet are there many worthy personages, that deserue better then disper∣sed report, or barren Elogies: For herein the Inuen∣tion of one of the late Poets is proper, and doth well inrich the auncient fiction; for he faineth, that at the end of the threed or Webbe of euery mans life, there was a little Medall containing the Persons name, and that Time waited vpon the sheeres, and assoone as the threed was cut, caught the Medalls, and carri∣ed them to the Riuer of Lethe, and about the banke there were many Birds flying vp and downe, that would get the Medals and carry them in their Beke a little while, and then let them fall into the Riuer. Onely there were a fewe Swannes, which if they got a Name, would carrie it to a Temple, where it was consecrate. And although many men more mortall in their affections, then in their bo∣dies, doe esteeme desire of name and memory, but as a vanitie and ventositie;

Animi nil magnaelaudis egentes:

Which opinion commeth from that Root, Non pri∣us laudes contempsimus, quam la•…•…danda facere desivi∣mus: yet that will not alter Salomons iudgement, Me∣moria Iusti cum laudibus, at impiorū nomē putresect: The one flourisheth, the other either cōsumeth to presēt obliuion, or turneth to an ill odor: And therefore in that stile or addition, which is & hath bin long well receiued, and brought in vse, Faeticis memoriae, piae me∣moriae, bonae memoriae, we do acknowledge that which Cicero saith, borrowing it frō Demosthenes, that Bona Fama propria possessio defunctorum, which possession I cānot but note, that in our times it lieth much wast and that therein there is a Deficience.

For NARRATIONS and RELATIONS of particular actions, there were also to be wished a greater diligence therein, for there is no great acti∣on but hath some good penne which attends it. And because it is an abilitie not common to Write a good History, as may well appeare by the small number of them: yet if particularitie of actions me∣morable, were but tolerably reported as they passe, the compiling of a complete HISTORIE of TIMES mought be the better expected, when a Writer should arise that were fit for its for the colle∣ction of such relations mought be as a Nursery gar∣dein, whereby to plant a faire and stately gardein, when time should serue.

There is yet another portion of Historie which Cornelius Tacitus maketh, which is not to be forgottē

specially with that application, which hee accou∣pleth it withal, ANNALS, and IOVRNALS, appropriating to the former, Matters of estate, and to the later, Acts, and Accidents of a meaner Na∣ture. For giuing but a touch of certaine Magnifi∣cent Buildings, he addeth, Cumex dignitate populi Ro∣mani repertum sit, res illustres annalibus, talia diurnis vrbis Actis mandare. So as there is a kinde of con∣templatiue Heraldry, as well as Ciuill. And as no∣thing doth derogate from the dignitie of a state more then confusion of degrees: So it doth not a little imbase the Authoritie of an Historie, to inter∣mingle matters of triumph, or matters of ceremo∣ny, or matters of Noueltie, with matters of State; But the vse of a IOVRNALL hath not onely been in the Historie of Time, but like wise in the Historie of Persōs, and chiefely of actions; for Princes in an∣cient time had vpon point of honour and policie both, Iournalls kept, what passed day by day: for we see the Chronicle which was red before Abassu∣erus, when he could not take rest, contained matter of affaires indeede, but such as had passed in his own time, and very lately before; But the IOVRNALL of Alexanders house expressed euery small particula∣ritie, euen concerning his Person and Court: and it is yet an vse wel receiued in enterprises memorable, as expeditions of Warre, Nauigations, and the like, to keepe Dyaries of that which passeth continually.

I cannot likewise bee ignorant of a forme of Writing, which some graue and wise men haue

vsed, containing a scattered History of those actions, which they haue thought worthy of memorie, with politique discourse and obseruation thereupon; not incorporate into the History, but seperately, and as the more principall in their intentiō: Which kind of RVMINATED HISTORY, I thinke more fit to place amongst Bookes of policie, whereof we shall hereafter speake, then amongst Bookes of History: for it is the true office of History to represent the e∣uents themselues, together with the counsels, and to leaue the obseruations, and conclusions thereup∣on, to the liberty and facultie of euery mans iudge∣ment: But Mixtures, are things irregular, whereof no man can define.

So also is there another kinde of History mani∣foldly mixt, and that is HISTORY of COSMO∣GRAPHY, being compounded of Naturall History in respect of the Regions themselues, of History ci∣uill, in respect of the Habitations, Regiments, and Manners of the people; and the Mathematiques in respect of the Climats, and configurations towards the Heauens, which part of learning of all others in this latter time hath obtained most Proficience. For it may be truly affirmed to the honor of these times, and in a vertuous emulation with Antiquitie, that this great Building of the world, had neuer through lights made in it, till the age of vs and our fathers: For although they had knowledge of the Antipodes:

Nosque vbi primus equis Oriens afflauit anhelis:

Illic sera rubens accēdit lumina vesper, yet that mought be by demonstration, and not in fact, and if by tra∣uaile, it requireth the voiage but of halfe the Globe. But to circle the Earth, as the heauenly Bodies doe, was not done, nor enterprised, till these later times: And therefore these times may iustly beare in their word, not onely Plus vltrà in precedence of the an∣cient Non vltrà, and Imitabile fulmen, in precedence of the ancient: Non imitabile fulmen,

Demens qui nymbos et non imitabile fulmen, &c. But likewise,—Imitabile Caelum: in respect of the many memorable voyages af∣ter the maner of heauē, about the globe of the earth.

And this Proficience in Nauigation, and disco∣ueries, may plant also an expectation of the •…•…urder proficience, and augmentation of all Scyences, be∣cause it may seeme they are ordained by God to be Coevalls, that is, to meete in one Age. For so the Pro∣phet Daniel speaking of the latter times foretelleth: Plurimi pertransibunt, & Multiplex erit Scientia, as if the opennesse and through passage of the world, and the encrease of knowledge were appointed to be in the same ages, as we see it is already performed in great part, the learning of these later times not much giuing place to the former two Periods or Re∣turnes of learning, the one of the Graecians, the o∣ther of the Romanes.

HISTORY ECCLSIASTICAL, receiueth the same diuisions with History ciuil; but furder in

the proprietie thereof may bee deuided into HIS∣TORY of the CHVRCH, by a general name. HIS∣TORY of PROPHECIE, & HISTORIE of PRO∣VIDENCE: The first describeth the times of the militant Church; whether it be fluctuāt, as the Arke of Noah, or moueable, as the Arke in the Wildernes, or at rest, as the Arke in the Temple; That is, the state of the Church in Persecution, in Remoue, and in Peace. This part I ought in no sort to note as defici∣ent, onely I would the vertue and sinceritie of it, were according to the Masse, and quantitie. But I am not now in hand with censures, but with omis∣sions.

The second, which is HISTORY of PRO∣PHECIE, consisteth of two Relatiues, the Pro∣phecie, and the accomplishment: and therefore the nature of such a worke ought to be, that euery pro∣phecie of the Scripture be sorted with the euent ful∣filling the same, throughout the ages of the world, both for the better confirmation of faith, and for the better illumination of the Church, touching those parts of Prophecies, which are yet vnfulfilled: allowing neuerthelesse that Latitude, which is a∣greable, and familiar vnto diuine Prophecies, be∣ing of the nature of their Author, with whom a thousande yeares are but as one day, and there∣fore are not fulfilled punctually, at once, but haue springing and germinant accomplishment throughout many ages, though the height or fulnesse of them may referre to some one age:

This is a worke which I finde deficient, but is to bee * 1.4 done with wisedom, sobrietie, and reuerence, or not at all.

The third, which is HISTORY of PROVI∣DENCE, containeth that excellēt correspondence, which is betweene Gods reuealed will, and his se∣cret will: which though it be so obscure, as for the most part it is not legible to the Naturall Man; no, nor many times to those that behold it from the Ta∣bernacle: yet at some times it pleaseth God for our better establishment, and the confuting of those which are as without God in the world; to write it in such Text and Capitall Letters, that, as the Pro∣phet saith, He that runneth by, may read it: that is, meere sensual persons, which hasten by Gods iudgements, and neuer bend or fixe their cogitations vpon them, are neuerthelesse in their passage and race vrged to discerne it. Such are the notable euents and exam∣ples of Gods iudgements, chastizements, deliue∣rances and blessings: And this is a work which hath passed through the labour of many, and therefore I cannot present as omitted.

There are also other parts of learning which are APPENDICES to HISTORY, for al the exterior proceedings of man consist of Wordes and Deeds: whereof History doth properly receiue, and retaine in Memory the Deedes, and if Wordes, yet but as Inducements and passages to Deedes: So are there other Books and Writings, which are appropriat to the custodie, and receite of Wordes onely: which

likewise are of three sorts: ORATIONS, LET∣TERS, & BRIEFE SPEECHES, or SAY∣INGS: ORATIONS are pleadings, speeches of counsell; Laudatiues, Inuectiues, Apologies, Reprehensions; Orations of Formalitie, or Ce∣remonie, and the like: Letters are according to all the varietie of occasions; Aduertisments, Aduises, Directions, Propositions, Peticions, Commenda∣torie, Expostulatorie, Satisfactorie, of complement, of Pleasure, of Discourse, and all other passages of Action. And such as are written from wise men, are, of all the words of Man, in my iudgement the best, for they are more Naturall then Orations, and publike speeches, & more aduised then cōferences, or present speeches: So againe Letters of Affaires from such as Manage them, or are priuie to them, are of all others the best instructions for History, and to a diligent reader, the best Histories in themselues. For APOTHEGMES: It is a great losse of that Booke of Caesars; For as his History, and those fewe Letters of his which wee haue, and those Apothe∣gmes which were of his owne, excell all mens else: So I suppose would his collection of APOTHE∣GMES haue done; For as for those which are col∣lected by others, either I haue no tast in such Mat∣ters, or else their choice hath not beene happie. But vpon these three kindes of Writings I doe not in∣sist, because I haue no deficiēces to propound con∣cerning them,

Thus much therefore concerning History, which is that part of learning, which answereth to one of the Celles, Domiciles, or offices of the Mind of Man; which is that of the Memorie.

POESIE is a part of Learning in measure of words for the most part restrained: but in all o∣ther points extreamely licensed: and doth truly re∣ferre to the Imagination: which beeing not tyed to the Lawes of Matter; may at pleasure ioyne that which Nature hath seuered: & seuer that which Nature hath ioyned, and so make vnlawfull Mat∣ches & diuorses of things: Pictoribus atque Poetis &c. It is taken in two senses in respect of Wordes or Matter; In the first sense it is but a Character of stile, and belongeth to Arts of speeche, and is not perti∣nent for the present. In the later, it is (as hath beene saide) one of the principalll Portions of lear∣ning: and is nothing else but FAINED HI∣STORY, which may be stiled as well in Prose as in Verse.

The vse of this FAINED HISTORIE, hath beene to giue some shadowe of satisfaction to the minde of Man in those points, wherein the Na∣ture of things doth denie it, the world being in pro∣portion inferiour to the soule: by reason whereof there is agreeable to the spirit of Man, a more am∣ple Greatnesse, a more exact Goodnesse; and a more absolute varietie then can bee found in the Nature of things. Therefore, because the Acts

or Euents of true Historie, haue not that Magnitude, which satisfieth the minde of Man, Poesie saineth Acts and Euents Greater and more Heroicall; be∣cause true Historie propoundeth the successes and is∣sues of actions, not so agreable to the merits of Ver∣tue and Vice, therefore Poesie faines them more iust in Retribution, and more according to Reuealed Prouidence, because true Historie representeth Acti∣ons and Euents, more ordinarie and lesse interchan∣ged, therefore Poesie endueth them with more Rarenesse, and more vnexpected, and alternatiue Variations. So as it appeareth that Poesie serueth and conferreth to Magnanimitie, Moralitie, and to delectation. And therefore it was euer thought to haue some participation of diuinesse, because it doth raise and erect the Minde, by submitting the shewes of things to the desires of the Mind; where∣as reason doth buckle and bowe the Mind vnto the Nature of things. And we see that by these insinua∣tions and congruities with mans Nature and plea∣sure, ioyned also with the agreement and consort it hath with Musicke, it hath had accesse and estimati∣on in rude times, and barbarous Regions, where o∣ther learning stoode excluded.

The diuisiō of Poesie which is aptest in the propri∣etie therof (besides those diuisiōs which are cōmon vnto it with history: as fained Chronicles, fained liues, & the Appēdices of History, as fained Epistles, fained Orations, and the rest) is into POESIE

NARRATIVE; REPRESENTATIVE, and ALLVSIVE. The NARRATIVE is a meere imitation of History with the excesses before remembred; Ohoosing for subiect cōmonly Warrs, and Loue; rarely State, and sometimes Pleasure or Mirth. REPRESENTATIVE is as a visible History, and is an Image of Actions as if they were present, as History is of actions in nature as they are, that is past; ALLVSIVE or PARABOLI∣CALL, is a NARRTION applied onely to expresse some speciall purpose or conceit. Which later kind of Parabolical wisedome was much more in vse in the ancient times, as by the Fables of Ae∣sope, and the briefe sentences of the seuen, and the vse of Hieroglyphikes may appeare. And the cause was for that it was then of necessitie to expresse any point of reason, which was more sharpe or subtile then the vulgar in that maner, because men in those times wanted both varietie of examples, and subtil∣tie of conceit: And as Hierogliphikes were before Letters, so parables were before arguments: And neuerthelesse now and at all times they doe retaine much life and vigor, because reason cannot bee so sensible, nor examples so fit.

But there remaineth yet another vse of POESY PARABOLICAL, opposite to that which we last mentioned: for that tendeth to demonstrate, and illustrate that which is taught or deliuered, and this other to retire and obscure it: That is when the Se∣crets and Misteries of Religion, Pollicy, or Philoso∣phy,

are inuolued in Fables or Parables. Of this in diuine Poesie, wee see the vse is authorised. In Hea∣then Poesie, wee see the exposition of Fables doth fall out sometimes with great felicitie, as in the Fa∣ble that the Gyants beeing ouerthrowne in their warre against the Gods, the Earth their mother in reuenge thereof brought forth Fame.

Illam terra Parens ira irritata Deorū, (Progenuit. Extremam, vt perhibent, Coeo Enceladoque Sororem

expounded that when Princes & Monarchies haue suppressed actuall and open Rebels, then the malig∣nitic of people, which is the mother of Rebellion, doth bring forth Libels & slanders, and taxatiōs of the states, which is of the same kind with Rebellion, but more Feminine: So in the Fable that the rest of the Gods hauing conspired to binde Iupiter, Pallas called Briareus with his hundreth hands to his aide, expounded, that Monarchies neede not feare any courbing of their absolutenesse by Mightie Sub∣iects, as long as by wisedome they keepe the hearts of the people, who will be sure to come in on their side: So in the fable, that Achilles was brought vp vn∣der Chyron the Centaure, who was part a man, & part a beast, expounded Ingenuously, but corruptly by Machiauell, that it belongeth to the education and discipline of Princes, to knowe as well how to play the part of the Lyon, in violence, and the Foxe in guile, as of the man in vertue and Iustice. Neuerthe∣lesse in many the like incounters, I doe rather think that the fable was first, and the exposition deuised,

then that the Morall was first, & thereupon the fable framed. For I finde it was an auncient vanitie, in Chrisippus, that troubled himselfe with great con∣tention to fasten the assertions of the Stoicks vpon fictions of the ancient Poets: But yet that all the Fables and fictions of the Poets, were but pleasure and not figure, I interpose no opinion. Surely of those Poets which are now extant, euen Homer himselfe, (notwithstanding he was made a kinde of Scripture, by the later Schooles of the Grecians) yet I should without any difficultie pronounce, that his Fables had no such inwardnesse in his owne meaning: But what they might haue, vpon a more originall tradition, is not easie to affirme, for he was not the inuentor of many of them. In this third part of Learning which is Poesie, I can report no defici∣ence. For being as a plant that commeth of the lust of the earth, without a formall seede, it hath sprung vp, and spread abroad, more then any other kinde: But to ascribe vnto it that which is due: for the ex∣pressing of affections, passions, corruptions and cu∣stomes, we are beholding to Poets, more thē to the Philosophers workes, and for wit and eloquence not much lesse then to Orators harangues. But it is not good to stay too long in the Theater: let vs now passe on to the iudicial Place or Pallace of the Mind, which we are to approach and view, with more re∣uerence and attention.

The knowledge of Man is as the waters, some

descending from aboue, and some springing from beneath, the one informed by the light of Nature, the other inspired by diuine reuelation. The light of Nature consisteth, in the Notions of the minde, and the Reports of the Sences, for as for knowledge which Man receiueth by teaching, it is Cumulatiue, and not Originall, as in a water, that besides his own spring-heade is fedde with other Springs and Streames. So then according to these two differing Illuminations, or Originals, Knowledge is first of al deuided into DIVINITIE, and PHILOSO∣PHIE.

In PHILOSOPHY, the contemplations of Man doe either penetrate vnto God, or are circum∣ferred to Nature, or are reflected or reuerted vpon himselfe. Out of which seuerall inquiries, there doe arise three knowledges, DIVINE PHILO∣SOPHY, NATVRAL PHILOSOPHY, and HVMANE PHILOSOPHY, or HVMANITIE. For all things are marked and stamped with this triple Character of the power of God, the difference of Nature, and the vse of Man. But because the distributions and partitions of knowledge, are not like seuerall lines, that meete in one Angle, and so touch but in a point, but are like branches of a tree, that meete in a stēme; which hath a dimension and quantitie of en∣tyrenes and continuance, before it come to discon∣tinue & break it self into Armes and boughes, ther∣fore

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it is good, before wee enter into the former distribution, to erect & constitute one vniuersal Sci∣ence by the name of PHILOSOPHIA PRI∣MA, PRIMITIVE or SVMMARIEPHI∣LOSOPHIE, as the Maine and common way, before we come where the waies part, and deuide themselues, which Sciēce whether I should report as deficient or noe, I stand doubtfull. For I finde a certaine Rapsodie of Naturall Theologie, and of diuers parts of Logicke: And of that part of Naturall Philosophie, which concerneth the Principles, and of that other part of Naturall Phi∣losophy, which concerneth the Soule or Spirit, all these strangely commixed and confused: but be∣ing examined it seemeth to mee rather a depredati∣on of other Sciences, aduanced and exalted vnto some height of tearmes, then any thing solide or substantiue of it selfe. Neuerthelesse I cannot bee ignorant of the distinction which is currant, that the same things are handled but in seuerall re∣spects: as for example that Logicke considereth of many things as they are in Notion & this Philoso∣phy, as they are in Nature: the one in, Apparance, the other in Existence: But I finde this difference better made then pursued; For if they had con∣sidered Quantitie, Similitude, Diuersitie, and the rest of those Externe Characters of things, as Philosophers, and in Nature: their inquiries must

of force haue beene of a farre other kinde then they are. For doth anie of them in handeling Quantitie, speake of the force of vnion, how, and how farre it multiplieth vertue? Doth any giue the reason, why some things in Nature are so common and in so great Masse, and others so rare, and in so small quantitie? Doth anie in handling Simili∣tude and Diuersitie, assigne the cause why Iron should not mooue to Iron, which is more like, but mooue to the Loadestone, which is lesse like? why in all Diuersities of things there should bee certaine Participles in Nature, which are almost ambiguous, to which kinde they should bee refer∣red? But there is a meere and deepe silence, tou∣ching the Nature and operation of those Common adiuncts of things, as in Nature; and onely a re∣suming and repeating of the force and vse of them, in speeche or argument. Therefore because in a Wryting of this Nature, I auoyde all subtilitie: my meaning touching this Originall or vniuersall Philosophie, is thus in a plaine and grosse descrip∣tion by Negatiue: That it bee a Receptacle for all such profitable obseruations and Axioms, as fall not within the compasse of any of the speciall parts of Phi∣losophie, or Sciences; but are more common, and of a higher stage.

Now that there are manie of that kinde neede not bee doubted: for example; Is not the rule: Si inaequalibus aequalia addas; omnia erunt inaequal•…•…a.

An Axiome aswell of Iustice; as of the Mathemati∣ques? And is there not a true coincidence be∣tweene commutatiue and distributiue Iustice, and Arithmeticall and Geometricall proportion? Is not that o•…•…er rule, Quae in eodem tertio conveniunt, & in∣ter se conveniunt, a Rule taken from the Mathema∣tiques, but so potent in Logicke as all Syllogismes are built vppon it? Is not the obseruation, Om∣nia mutantur, nilinterit, a contemplation in Philo∣sophie thus, that the Quantum of Nature is eter∣nall, In Naturall Theologie thus. That it requi∣reth the same Omnipotencie to make somewhat Nothing, which at the first made nothing some∣what? according to the Scripture, Di•…•…ici quod om∣nia operaquae fecil Deus, perseuerent in perpetuum, non possumus eis qui•…•…quam addere, nec auferre. Is not the ground which Machtavill wisely and largely dis∣courseth concerning Gouernments, That the way to establish and preserue them, is to reduce them ad Principia; a rule in Religion and Nature, aswell as in Ciuill administration? was not the Persian Magicke a reduction or correspondence of the Principles & Architectures of Nature, to the rules and policie of Gouernments? Is not the precept of a Musitian, to •…•…all from a discord or harsh accord, vpon a concord, or sweete accord, alike true in affection? Is not the Trope of Musi•…•…ke, to auoyde or slyde from the close or Cadence, common with the Trope of Rh•…•…ricke of deceyuing expectation? Is not the de∣light

of the Quavering vppon a stoppe in Mu∣sicke, the same with the playing of Light vppon the water?

Spiendet tremulo sub Lumine Pon•…•…

Are not the Organs of the sences of one ki•…•… with the Organs of Reflexion, the Eye with a gla•…•… the Eate with a Caue or Straight determined and bounded? Neither are these onely similitud•…•…s, as men of narrowe obseruation may conc•…•…yue them to bee; but the same footesteppes of Nature, trea∣ding or printing vppon seuerall subiects or Matters. This Science therefore (as I vnderstand 〈◊〉〈◊〉) I may * 1.5 iustlie reporte as deficient; for I see sometimes the profounder sort of wittes, in handeling some parti∣culer argument, will nowe and then drawe a Buc∣ket of Water out of this well, for their present vse. But the springhead thereof seemeth to mee, not to haue beene visited; beeing of so excellent vse, both for the disclosing of Nature, and the abridgement of Art.

This science beeing therefore first placed as a common parent, like vnto Berecinthia, which had so much Heauenlie yssue, Omnes Coe•…•…colas, om∣nes super alta tenentes; wee may returne to the for∣mer distribution of the three philosophies; Diuine, Naturall, and Humane. And as concerning D•…•…∣VINE PHILOSOPHIE. Or NATVRALL THEOLOGIE, It is that knowledge or Rudi∣ment of knowledge concerning GOD, which may be obtained by the contemplation of his Creatures

which knowledge may bee truely tearmed Diuine, in respect of the obiect; and Naturall in respect of the Light. The boundes of this knowledge are, that it sufficeth to conuince Atheisme; but not to informe Religion: And therefore there was neuer Miracle wrought by God to conuert an A∣theist, bycause the light of Nature might haue ledde him to confesse a God: But Miracles haue beene wrought to conuert Idolaters, and the superstitious, because no light of Nature extendeth to declare the will and true worship of God. For as all works do shewe forth the power and skill of the workeman, and not his Image: So it is of the works of God; which doe shew the Omnipotencie and wisedome of the Maker, but not his Image: And therefore therein the Heathen opinion differeth from the Sa∣cred truth: For they supposed the world to bee the Image of God, & Man to be an extract or compen∣dious Image of the world: But the Scriptures neuer vouch-safe to attribute to the world that honour as to bee the Image of God: But onely The worke of his hands, Neither do they speake of any other Image of God, but Man: wherfore by the contem∣plation of Nature, to induce and inforce the ac∣knowledgement of God, and to demonstrate his power, prouidence, and goodnesse, is an excellent argument, and hath beene excellently handled by diuerse. But on the other side, out of the contem∣plation of Nature, or ground of humane knowe∣ledges

to induce any veritie, or perswasion concer∣ning the points of Faith, is in my iudgement, not fate: Dafidei, quae fidei sunt. For the Heathen them∣selues conclude as much in that excellent and Di∣uine fable of the Golden Chayne: That men and Gods were not able to draw Iupiter down to the Earth, but contrariwise, Iupiter was able to draw them vp to Heauen. So as wee ought not to attempt to drawe downe or submitte the Mysteries of GOD to our Reason: but contrarywise, to raise and aduance our Reason to the Diuine Truthe. So as in this parte of know∣ledge, touching Diuine Philosophie: I am so farre from noting any deficience, as I rather note an excesse: wherevnto I haue digressed, because of the extreame preiudice, which both Religion and Philosophie hath receiued, and may receiue by beeing commixed togither; as that which vn∣doubtedly will make an Hereticall Religion; and an Imaginarie and fabulous Philosophie.

Otherwise it is of the Nature of Angells and Spirits, which is an Appendix of Theologie, both Diuine and Naturall; and is neither inscru∣table nor interdicted: For although the Scripture saith, Lette no man deceyue you in Sublime discourse touching the worship of Angells, pressing into that hee knoweth not, &c. Yet notwithstanding if you ob∣serue well that precept, it may appeare thereby, that there bee two things onely forbidden, Ado∣ration

of them, and Opinion Fantasticall of them, eyther to extoll them, further then appertaineth to the degree of a Creature; or to extoll a mans know∣ledge of them, further then hee hath ground. But the sober and grounded inquirie which may arise out of the passages of holie Scriptures, or out of the gradacions of Nature is not restrained: So of de∣generate and reuolted spirites; the conuersing with them, or the imployement of them is prohibited; much more any veneration towards them. But the contemplacion or science of their Nature, their power, their illusions; either by Scripture or reason, is apart of spirituall Wisedome. For so the Apostle saieth, Wee are not ignorant of his Stratagems: And it is no more vnlawfull to enquire the Nature of euill spirites, then to enquire the force of poysons in Nature, or the Nature of sinne and vice in Mo∣ralitie; But this parte touching Angells and Spi∣rites, I cannot note as deficient, for many haue oc∣cupyed themselues in it: I may rather challenge it in manie of the Wryters thereof, as fabulous and fantasticall.

Leauing therefore DIVINE PHILOSOPHY, or NATVRALL THEOLOGIE, (not DIVI∣NITIE, or INSPIRED THEOL'OGIE, which wee reserue for the last of all, as the Hauen and Sab∣bath of all Mans contemplations) wee will nowe proceede to NATVRALL PHILOSOPHIE: If then it bee true that Democritus sayde, That the

truthe of Nature lyeth hydde in certaine deepe My•…•… and Caues; And if it bee true likewise, that the Al∣chymists doe so much inculcate, That Vulcan is a second Nature, and imitateth that dexterouslie and compendiouslie, which Nature worketh by am∣bages, & length of time, It were good to deuide Na∣turall Phylosophie into the Myne and the Fornace, and to make two professions or occupations of Na∣turall Philosophers, some to bee Pionners, and some Smythes, some to digge, and some to refine, and Hammer: And surely I doe best allowe of a diuision of that kinde, though in more familiar and scholasticall tearmes: Namely that these bee the two parts of Naturall Philosophie, the INQVI∣SITION OF CAVSES, and the PRO•…•…VCTION OF EFFECTS: SPECVLATIVE, and OPE∣RATIVE, NATVRALL SCIENCE, and NA∣TVRALL PRVDENCE. For as in Ciuile matters there is a wisedome of discourse, and a wisedome of direction: So is it in Naturall: And heere I will make a request, that for the latter (or at least for a parte thereof) I may reviue and reintegrate the misapplyed and abused Name of NATVRALL MAGICKE, which in the true se•…•…se, is but NATVRALL WISEDOME, or NATVRALL PRVDENCE: taken according to the ancient ac∣ception, purged from vanitie & superstition. Now although it bee true, and I know it well, that ther•…•… is an entercourse betweene Causes and Eff•…•…, so as both these knowledges 〈◊〉〈◊〉 & 〈◊◊〉〈◊◊〉

a great connexion betweene themselues: yet be∣cause all true and frutefull NATVRALL PHI∣LOSOPHIE, hath A double Scale or Ladder, Ascen∣dent and Descendent, ascending from experiments to the Inuention of causes; and descending from causes, to the Inuention of newe experiments; Therefore I iudge it most requisite that these two parts be seue∣rally considered and handled.

NATVRALL SCIENCE or THEORY is deuided into PHISICKE and METAPHI∣SICKE, wherein I desire, it may bee conceiued, that I vse the word METAPHISICKE in a differing sense, from that, that is receyued: And in like man∣ner I doubt not, but it will easilie appeare to men of iudgement, that in this and other particulers, wheresoeuer my Conception & Notion may dif∣fer from the Auncient, yet I am studious to keepe the Auncient Termes. For hoping well to deli∣uer my selfe from mistaking, by the order and per∣spicuous expressing of that I doe propounde: I am otherwise zealous and affectionate to recede as little from Antiquitie, either in tearms or opinions, as may stand with truth, & the proficience of know∣ledge: And herein I cannot a little maruaile at the Philosopher Aristotle: that did proceede in such a Spirit of difference & contradiction towards all An∣tiquitie, vndertaking not only to frame new wordes of Science at pleasure: but to confound and extin∣guish all ancient wisedome; insomuch as hee neuer

nameth or mentioneth an Ancient Author or opi∣nion, but to confute and reproue: wherein for glo∣rie, and drawing followers and disciples, he tooke the right course. For certainly there commeth to passe, & hath place in humane truth, that which was noted and pronounced in the highest truth: Veni in nomine Patris, nec recipitis Me, Si quis venerit in no∣mine suo, eum recipietis. But in this diuine Aphoris∣me (considering, to whom it was applied, Namely to Antichrist, the highest deceiuer,) wee may di∣scerne well, that the comming in a Mans owne name, without regard of Antiquitie, or paternitie; is no good signe of truth; although it bee ioyned with the fortune and successe of an Eum recipietis. But for this excellent person Aristotle, I will thinke of him, that hee learned that humour of his Schol∣ler; with whom, it seemeth, hee did emulate, the one to conquer all Opinions, as the other to conquer all Nations. Wherein neuerthelesse it may bee, hee may at some mens hands, that are of a bitter disposition, get a like title as his Scholler did.

Foelix terrarum Praedo, non vtile mundo Editus exemplum &c. So Foelix doctrinae Praedo.

But to me on the other side that do desire as much as lyeth in my Penne, to ground a sociable enter∣course betweene Antiquitie and Proficience, it see∣meth best, to keepe way with Antiquitie vsque ad aras; And therefore to retaine the ancient tearmes,

though I sometimes alter the vses and definitions, according to the Moderate proceeding in Ciuill gouernment; where although there bee some alteration, yet that holdeth which Tacitus wisely noteth, Eadem Magistratuum vocabula.

To returne therefore to the vse and acception of the tearme METAPHISICKE, as I doe nowe vnderstand the word; It appeareth by that which hath bene alreadie saide, that I intend, PHI∣LOSOPHIA PRIMA: SVMMARIE PHILOSOPHIE and METAPHISICK, which heretofore haue beene confounded as one, to bee two distinct things. For the one I haue made as a Parent, or common Auncestor to all knowledge; And the other I haue now brought in, as a Branch or descendent of NATVRALL SCIENCE; It appeareth likewise that I haue assigned to SVMMARIEPHILOSO∣PHIE the common principles and Axiomes which are promiscuous and indifferent to seuerall Sciences: I haue assigned vnto it likewise the inqui∣rie touching the operation of the Relatiue and aduentiue Characters of Essences, as Quantitie, Similitude, Di∣uersitie, Possibilitie, and the rest: with this distin∣ction, and prouision: that they bee handled as they haue efficacie in Nature, and not logically. It appeareth likewise that NATVRAL THE∣OLOGIE which hereto fore hath beene handled confusedly with METAPHISICKE, I haue

inclosed and bounded by it selfe. It is therefore now a question, what is left remaining for META∣PHISICKE: wherein I may without preiudice preserue thus much of the cōceit of Antiquitie; that PHISICKE should contemplate that which is inherent in Matter, & therefore transitorie, and ME∣TAPHISICKE, that which is abstracted & fixed. And againe that PHISICKE shoulde handle that which supposeth in Nature onely a be∣ing and mouing, and METAPHISICKE should handle that which supposeth furder in Na∣ture, a reason, vnderstanding, and platforme. But the difference perspicuously expressed, is most familiar and sensible. For as wee deuided NATVRALL PHILOSOPHY in GENERALL into the EN∣QVIRIE of CAVSES & PRODVCTIONS of EFFECTS: So that part which concerneth the ENQVIRIE of CAVSES, wee doe subdiuide, according to the receiued and sound diuision of CAVSES; The one part which is PHISICKE enquireth and handleth the MATERIALL & EFFICIENT CAVSES, & the other which is METAPHISICKE handleth the FOR∣MAL and FINALCAVSES.

PHISICKE, (taking it according to the deri∣uation, & not according to our Idiome, for MEDI∣CINE) is scituate in a middle tearme or distance between NATVRALL HISTORY & ME∣TAPHISICKE. For NATVRAL HISTORY describeth the varietie of things: PHISICKE

the CAVSES, but VARIABLE or RESPE∣CTIVE CAVSES; and METAPHISICKE the FIXED and CONSTANT CAVSES.

Limus vt hic durescit, & haec vt Cara liquescit, Vno eodemque igni.

Fire is the cause of induration, but respectiue to clay: Fire is the cause of colliquatiō, but respectiue to Waxe. But fire is noe constant cause either of indu∣ration or colliquation: So then the Phificall causes are but the Efficient and the Matter. PHISICKE hath three parts, whereof two respect Nature Vni∣ted or collected, the third contēplateth Nature diffused or distributed. Nature is collected either into one en∣tyer Totall, or else into the same Principles or Seedes. So as the first doctrine is TOVCHING the CON∣TEXTVRE or CONFIGVRATION of THINGS, as De Mundo, de vniuersitate Rerum. The seconde is the Doctrine CONCERNING the PRINCIPLES or ORIGINALS of THINGS; The third is the doctrine CON∣CERNING all VARIETIE and PARTI∣CVLARITIE of THINGS; whether it be of the differing substances, or their differing qualities and Natures; whereof there needeth noe enumera∣tion; this part being but as a GLOS or PARA∣PHRASE that attendeth vpon the Text of NA∣TVRAL HISTORY. Of these three I cannot report any as deficient, In what truth or perfection they are handled, I make not now any Iudgement:

But they are parts of knowledge not deserted by the Labour of Man.

For METAPHISICKE, we haue assigned vnto it the inquirie of FORMALL and FI∣NALL CAVSES which assignation, as to the former of them may seeme to bee Nugatorie and voide, because of the receiued and inueterate Opi∣nion, that the inquisition of Man, is not competent to finde out essentiall formes, or true differences; of which opinion we will take this hold: That the In∣uentiō of Formes is of al other Parts of Knowledge the worthiest to bee sought, if it bee Possible to bee Found. As for the possibilitie, they are ill discoue∣rers, that thinke there is no land when they can see nothing but Sea. But it is manifest, that Plato in his opinion of Ideas, as one that had a wit of eleuation s•…•…uate as vpon a Cliffe, did descry, that formes were the true obiect of knowledge; but lost the reall fruite of his opinion by considering of formes, as absolutely abstracted from Matter, & not confined and deter∣mined by Matter: and so turning his opinion vpon Theologie, wherewithall his Naturall Philosophy is infected. But if any man shall keepe a continuall watchfull and seuere eye vpon action, operation, and the vse of knowledge, hee may aduise and take Notice, what are the formes, the disclo∣sures whereof are fruitful and important to the State of Man. For as to the formes of substāces (Man one∣ly except, of whom it is said, Formavit hominem de li∣moterrae, & spirauit in faciem eius spiraculum vitae, and

not as of all other creatures, Producant aquae, produ∣cat terra, the formes of Substances I say (as they are nowe by compounding and transplanting multi∣plied) are so perplexed, as they are not to bee en∣quired. Noe more then it were either possible or to purpose, to seeke in grosse the formes of those Soundes which make wordes, which by composition and transposition of Letters are infinite. But on the otherside, to enquire the forme of those Soundes or Voices which make simple Letters is easily comprehēsi∣ble, and being knowen, induceth and manifesteth the formes of all words, which consist, & are compoun∣ded of them; in the same maner to enquire the forme of a Lyon, of an Oake, of Gold: Nay of Water, of Aire, is a vaine pursuite: But to enquire the formes of Sence, of voluntary Motion, of Vegetation, of Co∣lours, of Grauitie and Leuitie, of Densitie, of Tenui∣tie, of Heate, of Cold, & al other Natures and quali∣ties, which like an Alphabet are not many, & of which the essences (vpheld by Matter) of all creatures doe cōsist: To enquire I say the true formes of these, is that part of METAPHISICKE, which we now define of. Not but that PHISICKE doth make enquirie, and take consideration of the same Natures, but how? Onely, as to the material and efficient causes of them, and not as to the formes. For example, if the cause of whitenesse in Snowe or froth be enquired, and it be rendred thus: That the subtile intermixture of Ayre and water is the cause, it is well rendred, but ne∣uerthelesse

is this the forme of whitenesse? Noe but * 1.6 it is the efficient, which is euer but vehiculum formae. This, part of METAPHISICKE: I doe not finde laboured and performed, whereat I maruaile not, Because I hold it not possible to bee inuented by that course of inuention which hath beene vsed, in regard that men (which is the Roote of all er∣ror) haue made too untimely a departure, and to re∣mote a recesse from particulars.

But the vse of this part of METAPHISICKE which I report as deficient, is of the rest the most ex∣cellent in two respects: The one because it is the dutie and vertue of all knowledge to abridge the in∣finitie of indiuiduall experience, as much as the conception of truth will permit, and to remedie the complaint of vita brevis, ars longa; which is per∣formed by vniting the Notions and conceptions of Sciences: For knowledges are as PYRAMIDES, whereof HISTORY is the BASIS: So of NATV∣RAL PHILOSOPHY the BASIS is NATVRAL HISTORY: The STAGE next the BASIS is PHI∣SICKE: The STAGE next the VERTI∣CALPOINT is METAPHISICKE: As for the VERTICALLPOINT, Opus quod o∣peratur deus a principio vsque ad finem, the Summary law of Nature, wee knowe not whether Mans enquirie can attaine vnto it. But these three be the true Stages of knowledge, and are to them that are depraued no better then the Gyants Hilles.

Ter sunt conati imponere Pelio Ossam: Scilicet atque Ossaefrondosum involuere Olympum.

But to those which referre all thinges to the Glorie of GOD, they are as the three acclama∣tions: Sancte, Sancte, Sancte: holy in the descrip∣tion or dilatation of his workes, holy in the con∣nexion, or concatenation of them, and holy in the vnion of them in a perpetuall and vniforme lawe. And therefore the speculation was excellent in Par∣menides and Plato, although but a speculation in them, That all things by scale did ascend to vnitie. So then alwaies that knowledge is worthiest, which is charged with least multiplicitie, which appeareth to be METAPHISICKE, as that which con∣sidereth the simple formes or differēces of things, which are few in number, and the degrees and coordinations whereof, make all this varietie: The second respect which valueth and commendeth this part of ME∣TAPHISICKE is, that it doth enfranchise the power of Man vnto the greatest libertie, and possi∣bilitie of workes and effects. For Phisicke carri∣eth men in narrow and restrained waies, subiect to many accidents of impedimēts, imitating the ordi∣narie flexuous courses of Nature, But Latae vndique sunt sapientibus viae: To sapience (which was ancient∣ly defined to be Rerum diuinarum, & humanarum sci∣entia) there is euer choise of Meanes. For Phisicall

causes giue light to newe inuention in Simili materia; But whosoeuer knoweth any forme knoweth the vtmost possibilitie of superinducing that Nature vpon any varietie of Matter, and so is lesse restrained in o∣peration, either to the Basis of the Matter, or the con∣dition of the efficient: which kinde of knowledge Salomon likewise, though in a more diuine sort ele∣gantly describeth, Non arctabuntur gressus tui, & cur∣rens non habebis offendiculum. The waies of sapience are not much lyable, either to particularitie or chance.

The 2. part of METAPHISICKE is the ENQI∣RY of FINAL CAVSES, which I am moued to report, not as omitted, but as misplaced; And yet if it were but a fault in order, I would not speake of it. For order is matter of illustration, but pertaineth not to the substance of Sciences: But this mispla∣cing hath caused a deficience, or at least a great im∣proficience in the Sciences themselues. For the handling of finall causes mixed with the rest in Phi∣sicall enquiries, hath intercepted the seuere and di∣ligent enquirie of all reall and phisicall causes, and gi∣uen men the occasion, to stay vpon these satisfacto∣rie and specious causes, to the great arrest and preiu∣dice of furder discouerie. For this I finde done not onely by Plato, who euer ancreth vppon that shoare, but by Aristotle, Galen, and others, which doe vsually likewise fall vppon these flatts of discoursing causes; For to say that the haires of the

Eye-liddes are for a quic-sette and fence about the Sight: Or, That the firmenesse of the Skinnes and Hides of liuing creatures is to defend them from the extre∣mities of heate or cold: Or, That the bones are for the columnes or beames, whereupon the Frame of the bodies of liuing creatures are built; Or, That the leaues of trees are for protecting of the Fruite; Or, That the cloudes are for watering of the Eearth; Or, That the solidnesse of the Earth is for the station and Mansion of liuing creatures: and the like, is well in∣quired & collected in METAPHISICKE, but in PHISICKE they are impertinent. Nay, they are indeed but Remoraes and binderances to stay and slugge the Shippe from furder sayling, and haue brought this to passe, that the search of the Phisicall Causes hath beene neglected, and passed in silence. And therefore the Natural Philosophie of Democri∣tus, and some others who did not suppose a Minde or Reason in the frame of things, but attributed the form thereof able to maintaine it self to infinite essaies or proofes of Nature, which they tearme fortune; seemeth to mee (as farre as I can iudge by the recitall and fragments which remaine vnto vs) in particularities of Phisicall causes more reall and better enquired then that of Aristotle and Plato, whereof both inter∣mingled final causes, the one as a part of Thelogie, and the other as a part of Logicke, which were the fauou∣rite studies respectiuely of both those persons. Not

because those finall causes are not true, and worthy to bee inquired, beeing kept within their owne pro∣uince; but because their excursions into the limits of Phisicall causes, hath bred a vastnesse and solitude in that tract. For otherwise keeping their pre∣cincts and borders, men are extreamely deceiued if they thinke there is an Enmitie or repugnancie at all betweene them: For the cause rendred that the haires about the Eye liddes are for the safegard of the sight, doth not impugne the cause rendred, that Pilositie is incident to Orisices of Moisture: Mu∣scosi fontes &c. Nor the cause rendred that the firmenesse of hides is for the armour of the body against extremities of heate or cold: doth not impugne the cause rendred, that contraction of pores is inci∣dent to the outwardest parts; in regard of their adiacence to forreine or vnlike bodies, and so of the rest; both causes beeing true and compatible, the one de∣claring an intention, the other a consequence one∣ly. Neither doth this call in question or dero∣gate from diuin•…•… Prouidence, but highly confirme and exalt it. Fo•…•…s in ciuill actions he is the greater and deeper pollitique, that can make other men the Instruments of his will and endes, and yet neuer acquaint them with his purpose: So as they shall doe it, and yet not knowe what they doe, then hee that imparteth his meaning to those he employeth: So is the wisdome of God more admirable, when

Nature intendeth one thing, and Prouidēce draw∣eth forth another; then if hee had communicated to particular Creatures and Motions the Chara∣cters and Impressions of his Prouidence; And thus much for METAPHISICKE, the later part wher∣of, I allow as extant, but wish it confined to his pro∣per place.

Neuerthelesse there remaineth yet another part of NATVRALL PHILOSOPHIE, which is commonly made a principall part, and holdeth ranke with PHISICKE speciall and METAPHISICKE: which is Mathematicke, but I think it more agreable to the Nature of things, and to the light of order, to place it as a Branch of Metaphisicke: For the subiect of it being Quantitie, not Quantitie Indefinite: which is but a Relatiue, and belongeth to Philosophia Prima (as hath beene said,) but Quantitie determined, or proportionable, it ap∣peareth to bee one of the essentiall formes of things; as that, that is causatiue in Nature of a number of Effects, insomuch as wee see•…•… the Schooles both of Democritus, and of Pithagoras, that the one did ascribe Figure to the first seedes of things, and the other did suppose numbers to bee the principalles and originalls of things; And it is true also that of all other formes (as wee vnderstand formes) it is the most abstracted, and separable from matter and therefore most proper to Metaphisicke; which

hath likewise beene the cause, why it hath beene better laboured, and enquired, then any of the other formes, which are more immersed into Matter. For it beeing the Nature of the Minde of Man (to the extreame preiudice of knowledge) to delight in the spacious libertie of generalities, as in a champion Region; and not in the inclosures of particularitie; the MATHEMATICKS of all other knowledge were the goodliest fieldes to satisfie that appetite. But for the placing of this Science, it is not much Materiall: onely we haue endeuoured in these our Partitions to obserue a kind of perspectiue, that one part may cast light vp∣on another.

The MATHEMATICKS are either PVRE, or MIXT: To the PVRE MATHE∣MATICKS are those Sciēces belonging, which handle Quantitie determinate meerely seuered from any Axiomes of NATVRALL PHLOSO∣PHY: and these are two, GEOMETRY and ARITHMETICKE, The one handling Quantitie continued, and the other disseuered. MIXT hath for subiect some Axiomes or parts of Naturall Philosopie: and considereth Quantitie determined, as it is auxiliarie and incident vnto them. For many parts of Nature can neither be inuented with sufficient subtiltie, nor demonstra∣ted with sufficient perspicuitie, nor accommodated

vnto vse with sufficient dexteritie, without the aide and interueyning of the Mathematicks: of which sorte are Perspectiue, Musicke, Astronomie, Cosmogra∣phie, Architecture, Inginarie, and diuers others. In the Mathematicks, I can report noe deficience, except it be that men doe not sufficiently vnderstand the ex∣cellent vse of the pure Mathematicks, in that they doe remedie and cure many defects in the Wit, and Faculties Intellectuall. For, if the wit bee to dull, they sharpen it: if to wandring, they fix it: if to inherent in the sense, they abstract it. So that, as Tennis is a game of noe vse in it selfe, but of great vse, in respect it maketh a quicke Eye, and a bodie readie to put it selfe into all Postures: So in the Mathematickes, that vse which is collaterall and interuenient, is no lesse worthy, then that which is principall and intended. And as for the Mixt Mathematikes I may onely make this prediction, that there cannot faile to bee more kindes of them, as Nature growes furder disclosed. Thus much of NATVRAL SCIENCE, or the part of Nature SPECVLATIVE.

For NATVRALL PRVDENCE, or the part OPERATIVE of NATVRALL PHI∣LOSOPHY, we will deuide it into three parts, EXPERIMENTAL, PHILOSOPHICAL and MAGICAL, which three parts ACTIVE haue a correspondēce and Analogie with the three parts SPECVLATIVE: NATVRAL HI∣STORY,

PHISICKE, and METAPHI∣SICKE: For many operations haue bin inuented sometime by a casuall incidence and occurrence, sometimes by a purposed experiment: and of those which haue bene found by an intentionall experi∣mēt, some haue bin found out by varying or exten∣ding the same experiment, some bytransferring and compounding diuers experiments the one into the other, which kind of inuention an Emperique may manage. Againe by the knowledge of Phisicall cau∣ses, there cannot faile to followe, many indications and designations of new particulers, if men in their speculation will keepe one eye vpon vse & practise. But these are but Coastings along the shoare, Pre∣mendo littus iniquum, For it seemeth to me, there can hardly bee discouered any radicall or fundamentall alterations, and innouations in Nature, either by the fortune & essayes of experiments, or by the light and direction of Phisical causes. If therfore we haue reported METAPHISICKE deficient, it must fol∣lowe, * 1.7 that wee doe the like of NATVRAL MA∣GICKE, which hath relation thereunto. For as for the NATVRAL MAGICKE whereof now there is mention in books, containing certaine credu∣lous and superstitious conceits and obseruations of sympathies, and Antipathies and hidden Pro∣prieties, and some friuolous experiments, strnnge rather by disguisement, then in themselues, It is as fardiffering in truth of Nature, from such a know∣edge as we require, as the storie of King Arthur

of Brittaine, or Hughe of Burdeaux, differs from Caesars commentaries in truth of storie. For it is manifest that Caesar did greater things de vero, then those Imaginarie Heroes were fained to doe. But hee did them not in that fabulous manner. Of this kinde of learning the fable of Ixion was a figure: who designed to enioy Iuno the Goddesse of pow∣er: and in stead of her, had copulation with a Cloud: of which mixture were begotten Centaures, and Chymeraes. So whosoeuer shall entertaine high and vapourous imaginations, in steede of a labori∣ous and sober enquirie of truth shall beget hopes and Beliefes of strange and impossible shapes. And therefore wee may note in these Sciences, which holde so much of imagination and Beliefe, as this degenerate Naturall Magicke, Alchimie, Astrolo∣gie, and the like, that in their propositions, the de∣scription of the meanes, is euermore monstrous, then the pretence or ende. For it is a thing more probable, that he that knoweth well the Natures of Waight, of Colour, of Pliant, and fragile in respect of the hammer, of volatile and fixed in respect of the fire, and the rest, may superinduce vpon some Met∣tall the Nature, and forme of Gold by such Me∣chanique as longeth to the production of the Naturs afore rehearsed, then that some graynes of the Medecine proiected, should in a fewe Moments of time, turne a Sea of Quick-siluer or other Ma∣teriall

into Gold. So it is more probable that he that knoweth the Nature of Arefaction; the Nature of assimilation, of nourishment to the thing nourished; the Maner of encrease, and clearing of spirits: the Ma∣ner of the depredations, which Spirits make vpon the humours and solide parts: shall, by Ambages of diets, bathings, annointings, Medecines, motions, and the like, prolong life, or restore some degree of youth or viuacitie, then that it can be done with the vse of a sewe drops, or scruples of a liquor or receite. To conclude therefore, the true NATVRALL MAGICKE, which is that great libertie and La∣titude of operation, which dependeth vppon the knowledge of formes, I may report deficient, as the Relatiue thereof is; To which part if we be serious, and incline not to vanities and plausible discourse, besides the deriuing and deducing the operations themselues from METAPHISICKE, there are pertinent two points of much purpose, the one by way of preparation, the other by way of caution: The first is, that there be made a Kalender resembling an Inuentorie of the estate of man, containing all the * 1.8 inuentions, (being the works or fruits of Nature or Art) which are now extant, and whereof man is al∣readie possessed, out of which doth naturally result a Note, what things are yet held impossible, or not inuented, which Kalender will bee the more artificiall and seruiceable, if to euery reputed impos∣sibilitie, you adde what thing is extant, which

commeth the nearest in degree to that Impossibili∣tie; to the ende, that by these Optatiues and Potenti∣alls, Mans enquirie may bee the more awake in di∣ducing directiō of works from the speculatiō of cau∣ses. And secondly that those experimēts be not one∣ly esteemed which haue an immediate & presēt vse, but those principally which are of most vniuersall consequence for inuention of other experimēts, & those which giue most light to the Inuētion of cau∣ses; for the Inuētion of the Mariners Needle, which giueth the direction, is of noe lesse benefit for Naui∣gation, then the inuention of the sailes which giue the Motion.

Thus haue I passed through NATVRALL PHILOSOPHIE, and the deficiences there∣of; wherein if I haue differed from the ancient, and receiued doctrines, and thereby shall moue contra∣diction; for my part, as I affect not to dissent, so I purpose not to contend; If it be truth.

—Non canimus surdis respondent omnia syluae;

The voice of Nature will consent, whether the voice of Man doe or noe. And as Alexander Bergia was wont to say of the expedition of the french for Naples, that they came with Chaulke in their hands to marke vp their lodgings, and not with weapons to fight: So I like better that entrie of truth which commeth peaceably with Chaulke, to marke vp those Mindes, which are capable to lodge and har∣bour it, then that which commeth with pugnaci∣tie and contention.

But there remaineth a diuision of Naturall Phi∣losophy

according to the Report of the Enquirie, and nothing concerning the Matter or subiect, and that is POSITIVE and CONSIDERA∣TIVE: when the enquirie reporteth either an Assertion, or a Doubt. These doubts or Non Liquets, are of two sorts, Particular and Totall. For the first wee see a good example thereof in Aristotles Pro∣blemes, which deserued to haue had a better con∣tinuance, but so neuerthelesse, as there is one point, whereof warning is to be giuen and taken; The Re∣gistring of doubts hath two excellent vses: The one that it saueth Philosophy from Errors & falshoods: when that which is not fully appearing, is not col∣lected into assertion, whereby Error might drawe Error, but reserued in doubt. The other that the entrie of doubts are as so many suckers or sponges, to drawe vse of knowledge, insomuch as that which if doubts had not preceded, a man should neuer haue aduised, but passed it ouer without Note, by the suggestion and sollicitation of doubts is made to be attended and applied. But both these com∣modities doe scarcely counteruaile an Inconueni∣ence, which wil intrude it selfe if it be not debarred, which is that when a doubt is once receiued, men labour rather howe to keepe it a doubt still, then howe to solue it, and accordingly bend their wits. Of this we see the familiar example in Lawyers and Schollers, both which if they haue once admitted a doubt, it goeth euer after Authorized for a doubt. But that vse of wit and knowledge is to be

allowed which laboureth to make doubtfull thinges certaine, and not those which labour to make cer∣taine things doubtfull. Therefore these Kalen∣ders of doubts, I commend as excellent things, so that there be this caution vsed, that when they bee throughly sifted & brought to resolution, they bee from thence forth omitted, decarded, and not con∣tinued to cherish and encourage men in doubting. * 1.9 To which Kalender of doubts or problemes, I aduise be annexed another Kalender as much or more Ma∣teriall, which is a Kalender of popular Errors, I meane chiefly, in naturall Historie such as passe in speech & conceit, and are neuerthelesse apparantly detected & cōuicted of vntruth, that Mans knowledge be not weakened nor imbased by such drosse and vanitie. As for the Doubts or Nonliquets generall or in Totall, I vnderstand those differences of opinions touching the principles of Nature, and the fundamentall points of the same, which haue caused the diuersi∣tie of Sects, Schooles, and Philosophies, as that of Empedocles, Pythagoras, Democritus, Parmenides, and the rest. For although Aristotle as though he had bin of the race of the Ottomans, thought hee could not raigne, except the first thing he did he killed all his Brethren; yet to those that seeke truth and not Ma∣gistralitie, it cannot but seeme a Matter of great pro∣fit, to see before them the seueral opinions touching the foundations of Nature, not for any exact truth that can be expected in those Theories: For as the

same Phenomena in Astronomie are satisfied by the receiued Astronomie of the diurnall Motion, and the proper Motions of the Planets, with their Eccen∣triques and Epicicles and likwise by the Theorie of Copernicus, who supposed the •…•…arth to moue; & the Calculations are indifferently agreeable to both: So the ordinarie face and viewe of experience is many times satisfied by seuerall Theories & Philosophies, whereas to finde the reall truth requireth another manner of seueritie & attention. For, as Aristotle saith that children at the first will call euery woman mother: but afterward they come to distinguish according to truth: So Experience, if it be in child∣hood, will call euery Philosophie Mother; but when it commeth to ripenesse, it will discerne the true Mo∣ther. So as in the meane time it is good to see the Seuerall Glosses and Opinions vpon Nature, wher∣of * 1.10 it may bee euery one in some one point, hath seene clearer then his fellows; Therfore I wish some collection to be made painfully and vnderstanding∣ly de Antiquis Philosophijs out of all the possible light which remaineth to vs of them. Which kinde of worke I finde deficient. But heere I must giue warning, that it bee done distinctly and seuere∣ly; The Philosophies of euery one throughout by themselues; and not by titles packed, and fagotted vp together, as hath beene done by Plutarch. For it is the harmonie of a Philosophie in it selfe, which giueth it light and credence; whereas if it bee sin∣gled

and broken, it will seeme more forraine and dissonant. For as, when I read in Tacitus, the Ac∣tions of Nero, or Claudius, with circumstances of times, inducements and occasions, I finde them not so strange: but when I reade them in Suetonius Tran∣quillus gathered into tytles and bundles, and not in order of time, they seeme more monstrous and in∣credible; So is it of any Philosophy reported entier, and dismembred by Articles. Neither doe I ex∣clude opinions of latter times to bee likewise repre∣sented, in this Kalender of Sects of Philosophie, as that of Theophrastus Paracelsus, eloquently reduced into an harmonie, by the Penne of Seuerinus the Dane: And that of Tylesius, and his Scholler Do∣nius, beeing as a Pastorall Philosophy, full of sense, but of no great depth. And that of Fra∣castorius, who though hee pretended not to make any newe Philosophy, yet did vse the absolutenesse of his owne sense, vpon the olde. And that of Gilber∣tus, our countreyman, who reuiued, with some alterations, and demonstrations, the opinions of Xenophanes, and any other worthy to be admitted. Thus haue we now dealt w^t two of the three beames of Mans knowledge, that is Radius Directus, which is referred to Nature, Radius Refractus, which is refer∣red to God, and cannot report truely because of the inequalitie of the Medium. There resteth Radius Re∣flexus, whereby Man beholdeth and contemplateth himselfe.

WE come therefore now to that knowledge, whereunto the ancient Oracle directeth vs,

which is, the knowledge of our selues: which deserueth the more accurate handling, by howe much it tou∣cheth vs more neerely. This knowledge as it is the end and Terme of Naturall Philosophy in the inten∣tion of Man: So notwithstanding it is but a portion of Naturall Philosophy in the continent of Nature: And generally let this be a Rule, that all partitions of knowledges, be accepted rather for lines & veines, then for sections and separations: and that the continu∣ance and entirenes of knowledge be preserued. For the contrary here of hath made particular Sciences, to become barren, shallow, & erronious: while they haue not bin N•…•…urished and Maintained from the cōmon fountaine: Sowe see Cicero the Orator com∣plained of Socrates and his Schoole, that he was the first that separated Philosophy, and Rhetoricke, whereupon Rhetorick became an emptie & verball Art. So wee may see that the opinion of Copernicus touching the rotation of the earth, which Astrono∣mie it self cānot correct; because it is not repugnant to any of the Phainomena, yet Naturall Philosophy may correct. So we see also that the Science of Me∣dicine, if it be destituted & forsaken by Natural Philo∣sophy, it is not much better then an Empeirical pra∣ctize: with this reseruation therefore we proceed to HVMANE PHILOSOPHY or HVMANITIE, which hath two parts: The one considereth Man segregate, or distributiuely: The other congregate or in societie. So as HVMANE PHILOSOPHY is either SIMPLE and PARTICVLAR,

or coniugate and Ciuile; HVMANITIE PARTI∣CVLAR consisteth of the same parts, whereof Man consisteth, that is, of KNOVVLEDGES WHICH RESPECT THE BODY, & of KNOVVLEDG∣ES THAT RESPECT THE MIND. But before we distribute so far, it is good to constitute. For I doe take the consideration in generall, and at large of HVMANE NATVRE to be fit to be emancipate, & made a knowledge by it self; Not so much in regard of those delightfull and elegant discourses, which haue bin made of the dignitie of Man, of his mise∣ries, of his state and life, and the like Adiuncts of his common and vndeuided Nature, but chiefe∣ly in regard of the knowledge concerning the SYMPATHIES AND CONCORDANCES BE∣TVVEENE THE MIND AND BODY, which being mixed, cannot be properly assigned to the sciences of either.

This knowledge hath two branches; for as all leagues and Amities consist of mutuall Intelligence, and mutuall Offices So this league of mind and bo∣dy, hath these two parts, How the one discloseth the o∣ther, and how the one worketh vpon the other. Di∣scouerie, & Impression. The former of these hath be∣gottē two Arts, both of Predictiō or Prenotion where of the one is honoured with the enquirie of Aristo∣tle, & the other of Hippocrates. And although they haue of later time beene vsed to be coupled with

superstitious and fantasticall arts; yet being purged and restored to their true state; they haue both of them a solide ground in nature, and a profitable vse in life. The first is PHYSIOGNOMIE, which dis∣couereth the disposition of the mind, by the Lynea∣ments of the bodie. The second is the EXPOSI∣TION OF NATVRALL DREAMES, which discouereth the state of the bodie, by the imaginati∣ons of the minde. In the former of these, I note a deficience. For Aristotle hath verie ingeniously, and diligently handled the factures of the bodie, but not the gestures of the bodie; which are no lesse comprehensible by art, and of greater vse, and ad∣uantage. For the Lyneaments of the bodie doe dis∣close the disposition and inclination of the minde in generall; but the Motions of the countenance and parts, doe not onely so, but doe further disclose the present humour and state of the mind & will. For as your Maiestie sayth most aptly and elegantly; As the Tongue speaketh to the Eare, so the gesture speaketh to the Eye. And therefore a number of subtile persons, whose eyes doe dwell vpon the faces and fashions of men; doe well know the aduantage of this ob∣seruation; as being most part of their abilitie; nei∣ther can it bee denied, but that it is a great discoue∣rie of dissimulations, and a great direction in Bu∣sinesse.

The later Braunch, touching IMPRESSION hath not beene collected into Art; but hath beene handled dispersedly; and it hath the same relation

or Antistrophe, that the former hath, For the con∣sideration is double, EITHER HOVV, AND HOVV FARRE THE HVMOVRS AND A•…•…∣FCTS OF THE BODIE, DOE ALTER OR WORKE VPON THE MIND; or againe, HOVV AND HOVV FARRE THE PASSIONS, OR APPREHENSIONS OF THE MINDE, DOE ALTER OR WORKE VPON THE BODIE. The former of these, hath beene enquired and con∣sidered, as a part, and appendix of Medicine, but much more as a part of Religion or superstition. For the Phisitian prescribeth Cures of the minde in Phrensies, and melancholy passions; and pretendeth also to exhibite Medicines to exhilarate the minde, to confirme the courage, to clarifie the wits, to cor∣roborate the memorie, and the like; but the scruples and superstitions of Diet, and other Regiment of the body in the sect of the Pythagoreans, in the Heresy of the Manicheas, and in the Lawe of Mahumet doe exceede; So likewise the ordinances in the Cere∣moniall Lawe, interdicting the eating of the blood, and the fatte; distinguishing between beasts cleane and vncleane for meat; are many and strict. Nay, the faith it selfe, being cleere and serene from all cloudes of Ceremonie, yet retaineth the vse of sa∣stings, abstinences, and other Macerations and hu∣miliations of the bodie, as things reall, & not figura∣tiue. The roote and life of all which prescripts, is (besides the Ceremonie,) the consideration of that dependancie, which the affections of the mind are

submitted vnto, vpon the state and disposition of the bodie. And if any man of weake iudgement doe conceiue, that this suffering of the minde from the bodie, doth either question the Immortalitie, or de∣rogate from the soueraigntie of the soule: hee may be taught in easie instances, that the Infant in the mothers wombe, is compatible with the mother, and yet separable: And the most absolute Monarch is sometimes ledde by his seruants, and yet without subiection As for the reciprocall knowledge, which is the operation of the conceits and passions of the minde vppon the bodie; We see all wise Phisitians in the prescriptions of their regiments to their Pati∣ents, doe euer consider Accidentia animi: as of great force to further or hinder remedies, or recoueries; and more specially it is an inquirie of great depth and worth, concerning IMAGINATION, how, and howe farre it altereth the bodie proper of the Imaginant. For although it hath a manifest power to hurt, it followeth not, it hath the same degree of power to helpe. No more than a man can conclude, that because there be pestilent Ayres, able sodainely to kill a man in health; therefore there should bee soueraigne ayres, able sodainly to cure a man in sick∣nesse. But the inquisition of this part is of great vse, though it needeth, as Socrates sayd, A Delian diuer, being difficult & profound. But vnto all this know∣ledge DE COMMVNI VINCVLO, of the Con∣cordances betweene the Mind and the bodie: that part of Enquirie is most necessarie, which conside∣reth

of the Seates, and Domiciles which the seuerall faculties of the minde, doe take and occupate in the Organs of the bodie, which knowledge hath been attempted, and is controuerted, and deserueth to bee much better inquired. For the opinion of Plato, who placed the Vnderstanding in the Braine; Animositie, (which hee did vnfitly call Anger, hauing a greater mixture with Pride) in the Heart; and Concupiseence or Sensualitie in the Liuer, deserueth not to bee despised, but much lesse to be allowed. So then we haue constituted (as in our own wish and aduise) the inquirie TOVCH∣ING HVMANE NATVRE ENTYER; as a iust portion of knowledge, to be handled apart.

The knowledge that concerneth mans bodie, is diuided as the good of mans bodie is diuided, vnto which it referreth. The good of mans body, is of foure kindes; Health, Beautie, Strength, and Pleasure. So, the knowledges are Medicine, or Art of Cure: Art of Decoration; which is called Cosme∣tike: Art of Actiuitie, which is called Athletike: and Art Voluptuarie, which Tacitus truely calleth Eruditus Luxus. This Subiect of mans bodie, is of all other thinges in Nature, most susceptible of re∣medie: but then that Remedie is most susceptible of errour. For the same Subtilitie of the subiect, doth cause large possibilitie, and easie fayling: and therefore the enquirie ought to be the more exact.

To speak therfore of Medicine, & to resume that we haue sayd, ascending a litle higher; The ancient opi∣nion

that Man was Microcosmus, an Abstract or Mo∣dell of the world, hath beene fantastically streyned by Paracelsus, and the Alchimists, as if there were to be found in mans body certaine correspondences, & parallells, which shold haue respect to all varieties of things, as starres, planets, minerals, which are extant in the great world. But thus much is euidently true, that of all substances, which Nature hath produced, mans bodie is the most extreamly compounded. For we see hearbs & plants are norished by earth & wa∣er; Beasts for the most part, by hearbs & fruits; Man by the flesh of Beasts, Birds, Fishes, Hearbs, Grains, Fruits, Water, & the manifold alterations, dressings, and preparations of these seuerall bodies, before they come to be his food & aliment. Adde hereunto that Beasts haue a more simple order of life, and lesse change of Affections to worke vppon their bo∣dies, whereas man in his Mansion, sleepe, exercise, passions, hath infinit variations; and it cannot be de∣nied, but that the bodie of Man of all other things, is of the most compounded Masse. The soule on the other side is the simplest of substances, as is well expressed.

Purum{que} reliquit Aethereum sensum, atque Aurai simplicis ignem.

So that it is no maruaile, though the soule so placed, enioy no rest, if that principle be true, that Motus rerum est rapidus extra locum, Placidus in loco. But to the purpose, this variable composition of mans bodie hath made it as an Instrument easie to to distemper; and therefore the Poets did well to

conioyne MVSICKE and MEDICINE in Apollo, because the Office of Medicine, is but to tune this curious Harpe of mans bodie, and to reduce it to Harmonie. So then the Subiect being so Variable, hath made the Art by consequent more con∣iecturall, and the Art being Coniecturall, hath made so much the more place to bee left for imposture. For almost all other Arts and Sciences, iudged by Acts, or Master peeces, as I may terme them, and not by the successes, and euents. The Lawyer is iudged by the vertue of his plea∣ding, and not by the yssue of the cause: The Master in the Shippe, is iudged by the directing his course aright, and not by the fortune of the Voyage: But the Phisitian, and perhaps the Politique, hath no particular Acts demonstratiue of his abilitie, but is iudged most by the euent: which is euer but as it is taken; for who can tell if a Patient die or recouer, or if a State be preserued, or ruyned, whether it be Art or Accident? And therefore many times the Im∣postor is prized, and the man of vertue taxed. Nay, we see weakenesse and credulitie of men, is such, as they will often preferre a Montabanke or Witch, before a learned Phisitian. And therefore the Poets were cleere sighted in discerning this ex∣treame folly, when they made Aesculapius, and Circe, Brother and Sister, both Children of the Sunne, as in the verses.

Ipse repertorem medicinae talis & artis, Fulmine Phoebigenam stygias detrusit ad vn•…•…as,

And againe.

Diues inaccessos vbi Solis filia Lucos, &c.

For in all times in the opinion of the multitude, Witches, and old women, and Impostors haue had a Competicion with Phisitians. And what followeth? Euen this that Phisitians say to themselues, as Salo∣mon expresseth it vpon an higher occasion: If it be∣fall to me, as befalleth to the fooles, why should I labour to be more wise? And therefore I cannot much blame Phisitians, that they vse commonly to intend some other Art or practise, which they fancie, more than their profession. For you shall haue of them: Anti∣quaries, Poets, Humanists, States-men, Marchants, Diuines, and in euerie of these better seene, than in their profession, & no doubt, vpon this ground that they find, that mediocrity & excellency in their Art, maketh no difference in profite or reputation to∣wards their fortune: for the weakenesse of Patients, and sweetnesse of life, and Nature of hope maketh men depend vpon Phisitians, with all their defects. But neuerthelesse, these things which we haue spo∣ken of, are courses begotten betweene a little occa∣sion, and a great deale of sloath and default: for if we will excite and awake our obseruation, we shall see in familiar instances, what a predominant facul∣tie, The Subtiltie of Spirite, hath ouer the Varietie of Matter, or Fourme: Nothing more variable then faces and countenances: yet men can bea•…•…e in memorie the infinite distinctions of them. Nay, a Painter with a fewe shelles of

colours, and the benefite of his Eye, and habite of his imagination can imitate them all that euer haue ben, ar, or may be, if they were brought before him. Nothing more variable than voices, yet men can likewise discern them personally, nay you shall haue a Buffon, or Pantomimus will expresse as many as hee pleaseth. Nothing more variable, than the differing sounds of words, yet men haue found the way to re∣duce thē to a few simple Letters; so that it is not the insufficiency or incapacity of mans mind; but it is the re∣move standing or placing thereof, that breedeth these Mazes and incomprehensions; for as the sence a far off, is full of mistaking, but is exact at hand, so is it of the vnderstanding; The remedie whereof, is not to quicken or strengthen the Organ, but to goe nee∣rer to the obiect; and therefore there is no doubt, but if the Phisitians will learne, and vse the true ap∣proaches and Auenues of Nature, they may assume as much as the Poet sayth;

Et quoniam variant Morbi, variabimus artes, Mille Mali species, mille Salutis erunt.

Which that they should doe, the noblenesse of their Art doth deserue; well shadowed by the Po∣ets, in that they made Aesculapius to be the sonne of Sunne, the one being the fountaine of life, the other as the second streame; but infinitely more honored by the example of our Sauiour, who made the body of man the obiect of his miracles, as the soule was the obiect of his Doctrine. For wee reade not that euer he vouchsafed to doe any miracle about honor,

or money, (except that one for giuing Tribute to Caesar) but onely about the preseruing, sustayning, and healing the bodie of man.

Medicine is a Science, which hath beene (as wee haue sayd) more professed, than labored, & yet more labored, than aduanced; the labor hauing been, in my iudgement, rather in circle, than in progression. For, I finde much Iteration, but small Addition. It considereth causes of Diseases, with the occasions or im∣pulsions: The Discases themselues, with the Acci∣dents: and the Cures, with the Preseruations. The Deficiences which I thinke good to note, being a few of many, & those such, as ar of a more open and manifest Nature, I will enumerate, and not place.

The first is the discontinuance of the auncient and serious diligence of Hippocrates, which vsed to * 1.11 set downe a Narratiue of the speciall cases of his pa∣tientes, and how they proceeded, & how they were iudged by recouery or death. Therefore hauing an example proper in the father of the art, I shal not neede to alledge an example forraine, of the wise∣dome of the Lawyers, who are carefull to reporte new cases and decisions, for the direction of future iudgements. This continuance of Medicinall History, I find deficient, which I vnderstand neither to be so infinite as to extend to euery common Case, nor so re∣serued, as to admit none but Woonders: for many thinges are new in the Manner, which are not new in the Kinde, and if men will intend to obserue, they shall finde much worthy to obserue.

In the inquirie which is made by Anatomie, I finde * 1.12 much deficience: for they enquire of the Parts, and their Substances, Figures, and Collocations; But they enquire not of the Diuersities of the Parts; the Secre∣cies of the Passages; and the seats or neastling of the hu∣mours; nor much of the Foot-steps, and impressions of Diseases; The reason of which omission, I suppose to be, because the first enquirie may be satisfied, in the view of one or a few Anatomies: but the latter being comparatiue and casuall, must arise from the view of many. And as to the diuersitie of parts, there is no doubt but the facture or framing of the inward parts, is as full of difference, as the outward, and in that, is rhe Cause Continent of many diseases, which not being obserued, they quarrell many times with the humors which are not in fault, the fault being in the very frame and Mechanicke of the parte, which cannot be remoued by medicine alteratine, but must be accomodate and palliate by dyets and medicines familiar. And for the passages and pores, it is true which was aunciently noted, that the more subtile of them appeare not in anatomyes, because they are shut and latent in dead bodies, though they be open and manifest in liue: which being supposed, though the inhumanity of Anatomia viuorū was by Celsus iust ly reproued: yet in regard of the great vse of this ob∣seruation, the inquiry needed not by him so sleightly to haue ben relinquished altogether, or referred to the casuall practises of surgerie, but mought haue been well diuerted vpon the dissection of beastes a∣liue,

which notwithstanding the dissimilitude of their parts, may sufficiently satisfie this inquirie. And for the humors, they are commonly passed ouer in Anatomies, as purgaments, whereas it is most neces∣sarie to obserue, what cauities, nestes & receptacles the humors doe finde in the parts, with the differing kinde of the humor so lodged and receiued. And as for the footesteps of diseases, & their deuas•…•…ations of the inward parts, impostumations, exulcerations, discontinuations, putrefactions, consumptions, con∣tractions, extensions, convulsions, dislocations, ob∣structions, repletions, together with all preterna∣tural substances, as stones, carnosities, excrescences, wormes, and the like: they ought to haue beene ex∣actly obserued by multitude of Anatomies, and the contribution of mens seuerall experiences; and carefully set downe both historically according to the appearances, and artificially with a reference to the diseases and symptomes which resulted from them, in case where the Anatomy is of a desunct pa∣tient wheras now vpon opening of bodies, they are passed ouer sleightly, and in silence.

In the inquirie of diseases, they doe abandon the cures of many, some as in their nature incurable, * 1.13 and others, as passed the periode of cure; so that Syl∣la and the Triumvirs neuer proscribed so many men to die, as they doe by their ignorant edictes, where∣of numbers do escape with lesse difficulty, then they did in the Romane proscriptions. Therfore I wil not doubt, to note as a deficience, that they inquire not

the persite cures of many diseases, or extremities of diseases, but pronouncing them incurable, doe enact a lawe of neglect, & exempt ignorance from discredite.

Nay further, I esteeme it the office of a Phisiti∣on, * 1.14 not onely to restore health, but to mittigate pain and dolors, and not onely when such mittigation may conduce to recouery, but when it may serue to make a fayre and easie passage: for it is no small fe∣licitie which Auguslus Caesar was wont to wish to himselfe, that same Euthanasia, and which was speci∣ally noted in the death of Antoninus Pius, whose death was after the fashion and semblance of a kind∣ly & pleasant sleepe. So it is written of Epicurus, that after his disease was iudged desperate, he drowned his stomacke and senses with a large draught and in∣gurgitation of wine, whereupon the Epigram was made; Hinc stygias Ebrius hausit aquas: He was not sober enough to taste any bitternesse of the stygian water. But the Phisitions contrariwise doe make a kinde of scruple and Religion to stay with the pati∣ent after the disease is deplored, wheras, in my iudg∣ment they ought both to enquire the skill, and to giue the attendances for the facilitating & asswaging of the paynes and agonies of death.

In the consideration of the Cures of diseases, I find a deficience in the Receiptes of proprietie, respec∣ting * 1.15 the particular cures of diseases: for the Phisiti∣ans haue frustrated the fruite of tradition & experi∣ence by their magistralities, in adding and taking out

and changing, Quid pro quo, in their receiptes, at their pleasures, commanding so ouer the medicine, as the medicine cannot commmād ouer the disease: For except it be Treacle and Mythridatū, & of late Diascordium, and a few more, they tye themselues to no receiptes seuerely and religiously: for as to the confections of sale, which are in the shoppes, they are for readines, and not for proprietie: for they are vpon generall intentions of purging, opening, com∣forting, altering, and not much appropriate to, par∣ticular Diseases; and this is the cause why Empe∣riques, and ould women are more happie many times in their Cures, than learned Phisitians; be∣cause they are more religious in holding their Medi∣cines. Therefore here is the deficience which I finde, that Phisitians haue not partly out of their owne practize, partly out of the constant probations reported in bookes; & partly out of the traditions of Emperiques; setdowne and deliuered ouer, certaine Experimentall Medicines, for the Cure of particular Diseases; besides their owne Coniecturall and Magi∣strall descriptions. For as they were the men of the best Composition in the State of Rome, which either being Consuls inclined to the people; or being Tri∣bunes inclined to the Senat: so in the matter we now handle, they be the best Phisitians, which being lear∣ned incline to the traditions of experience; or being * 1.16 Emperiques, incline to the methods of learning.

In preparation of Medicines, I doe finde strange specially, considering how mineral Medicines haue

beene extolled; and that they are safer, for the out∣ward, than inward parts, that no man hath sought, to make an Imitation by Art of Naturall Bathes, and Medicinable fountaines: which neuerthelesse are confessed to receiue their vertues from Minerals: and not so onely, but discerned and distinguished from what particular Mynerall they receiue Tin∣cture, as Sulphur, Vitriole, steele, or the like: which Nature if it may be reduced to compositions of art, both the varietie of them will be encreased, & the temper of them will be more commanded.

But least I grow to be more particular, than is a∣greeable, * 1.17 either to my intention, or to proportion; I will conclude this part with the note of one defici∣ence more, which seemeth to me of greatest conse∣quence, which is, that the prescripts in vse, are too compendious to attaine their end: for to my vnder∣standing, it is a vaine and flattering opinion, to think any Medicine can be so soueraigne, or so happie, as that the Receit or vse of it, can worke any great ef∣fect vpon the bodie of man; it were a strange speach, which spoken, or spoken oft, should reclaime a man from a vice, to which he were by nature subiect: it is order, poursuite, sequence, and interchange of application, which is mightie in nature; which al∣though it require more exact knowledge in prescri∣bing, and more precise obedience in obseruing, yet is recompenced with the magnitude of effects. And although a man would thinke by the day∣ly visitations of the Phisitians, that there were a

poursuance in the cure; yet let a man look into their prescripts and ministrations, and he shall finde them but inconstancies, and euerie dayes deuises, without any setled prouidence or proiect; Not that euerie scrupulous or superstitious prescript is effectuall, no more than euerie straight way, is the way to heauen, but the truth of the direction, must precede s•…•…ueritie of obseruance.

For Cosmetique, it hath parts Ciuile, and parts Ef∣feminate: for cleanesse of bodie, was euer esteemed to proceede from a due reuerence to God, to socie∣tie, and to our selues. As for artificiall decoration, it is well worthy of the desiciences which it hath: be∣ing neither fine inough to deceiue, nor handsome to vse, nor wholesome to please.

For Athletique, I take the subiect of it largely; that is to say, for any point of abilitie, whereunto the bo∣die of man may be brought, whether it be of Acti∣uitie, or of Patience, wherof Actiuitie hath two parts, Strength and Swifinesse: And Patience likewise hath two parts, Hardnesse against wants and extremities; and Indurance of payne, or torment; whereof we see the practises in Tumblers, in Sauages, and in those that suffer punishment: Nay, if there be any other facultie, which falles not within any of the former diuisions, as in those that diue, that obtaine a strange power of contayning respiration, and the like, I re∣ferre it to this part. Of these thinges the practises are knowne: but the Philosophie that concerneth them is not much enquired: the rather I thinke,

because they are supposed to be obtayned, either by an aptnesse of Nature, which cannot be taught; or onely by continuall custome; which is soone pre∣scribed; which though it bee not true: yet I for∣beare to note any deficiences: for the Olympian Games are downe long since: and the mediocritie of these thinges is for vse: As for the excellencie of them, it serueth for the most part, but for mercenary ostentation.

For Arts of pleasure sensuall, the chiefe deficience in them, is of Lawes to represse them. For as it hath beene well obserued, that the Arts which flo∣rish in times, while vertue is in growth, are Milita∣rie: and while vertue is in State are Liberall: and while vertue is in declination, are voluptuarie: so I doubt, that this age of the world, is somewhat vpon the descent of the wheele; with Arts voluptuarie, I couple practises Iocularie; for the deceiuing of the sences, is one of the pleasures of the sences. As for Games of recreation, I hould them to belong to Ci∣uile life, and education. And thus much of that par∣ticular HVMANE PHILOSOPHIE, WHICH CONCERNES THE BODIE, which is but the Tabernacle of the minde.

FOr HVMANE KNOVVLEDGE, WHICH CONCERNES THE MIND, it hath two parts, the one that enquireth of THE SVBSTANCE, OR NATVRE OF THE SOVLE OR MIND; The other, that enquireth of the FACVLTIES OR

FVNCTIONS THEREOF: vnto the first of these, the considerations of the Originall of the soule, whe∣ther it be Natiue or aduentiue; and how farre it is ex∣empted from Lawes of Matter; and of the Immortalitie thereof; and many other points do appertaine, which haue been not more laboriously enquired, than variously reported; so as the trauaile therein taken, seemeth to haue ben rather in a Maze, than in a way. But although I am of opinion, that this knowledge may be more really and soundly enquired euen in Nature, than it hath been; yet I hold, that in the end it must be bounded by Religion; or else it will bee subiect to deceite and delusion: for as the substance of the soule in the Creation, was not extracted out of the Masse of heauen and earth, by the benedicti∣on of a Producat: but was immediately inspired from God; so it is not possible that it should bee (o∣therwise than by accident) subiect to the Lawes of Heauen and Earth; which are the subiect of Philosophie; And therefore the true knowledge of the Nature, and state of the soule, must come by the same inspi∣ration, that gaue the substance. Vnto this part of knowledge touching the soule, there be two appen∣dices, which as they haue ben handled, haue rather vapoured foorth fables, than kindled truth; DIVI∣NATION, and FASCINATION.

DIVINATION, hath beene anciently and fitly diuided into Artificiall and Naturall; whereof Ar∣tificiall is, when the minde maketh a prediction by argument, concluding vpon signes and tokens: Na∣turallis,

when the minde hath a presention by an in∣ternall power, without the inducement of a signe. Artifi•…•…iall is of two sorts, either when the argument is coupled with a deriuation of causes, which is rati∣onall; or when it is onely grounded vpon a Coinci∣dence of the effect, which is experimentall; whereof the later for the most part, is superstitious: Such as were the Heathen obseruations, vpon the inspection of Sacrifices, the flights of birds, the swarming of Bees; and such as was the Chaldean Astrologie, and the like. For Artificall Diuination, the seuerall kinds thereof are distributed amongst particular knowled∣ges. The Astronomer hath his predictions, as of coniunctions, aspects, Eclipses, and the like. The Phisitian hath his predictions, of death, of recoue∣rie, of the accidents and issues of Diseases. The Po∣litique hath his predictions; O vrbem vaenalem, & cito perituram, si emptorem inucnerit; which stayed not long to bee perfourmed in Sylla first, and after in Caesar. So as these predictions are now impertinēt, & to be referred ouer. But the Diuination, which sprin∣geth frō the internal nature of the soul, is that which we now speak of which hath ben made to be of two sorts; Primitiue and by influxion. Primitiue is groun∣ded vpon the supposition, that the minde when it is withdrawne and collected into it selfe, and not dif∣fused into the Organes of the bodie, hath some ex∣tent and latitude of prenotion; which therefore ap∣peareth most in sleepe, in extasies, and nere death; and more rarely in waking apprehensions; and is in∣duced

and furthered by those abstinences, and ob∣seruances, which make the minde most to consist in it selfe. By influxion; is grounded vpon the conceit, that the mind, as a mirror or glasse, should take illu∣mination from the fore knowledge of God and spi∣rits, vnto which the same Regiment doth likewise conduce. For the retyring of the minde within it selfe, is the State which is most susceptible of di∣uine influxions; saue that it is accompanied in this case with a feruencie and eleuation, (which the an∣cients noted by furie) and not with a repose and and quiet, as it is in the other.

Fascination is the power and act of Imagination, intensiue vpon other bodies, than the bodie of the Imaginant; for of that we spake in the proper place: wherein the Schoole of Paracelsus, and the Disciples of pretended Naturall Magicke, haue beene so in∣temperate, as they haue exalted the power of the imagination, to be much one with the power of Miracle-working faith: others that drawe neerer to Probabilitie, calling to their view the secret pas∣sages of things, and specially of the Contagion that passeth from bodie to bodie, doe conceiue it should likewise be agreeable to Nature, that there should be some transmissions and operations from spirit to spirit, without the mediation of the sences, whence the conceits haue growne, (now almost made ciuile) of the Maistring Spirite, & the force of confidence, and the like. Incident vnto this, is the inquirie how to raise and fortifie the imagination, for if the Ima∣gination

fortified haue power, then it is materiall to know how to fortifie and exalt it. And herein comes in crookedly and dangerously, a palliation of a great part of Ceremoniall Magicke. For it may bee pretended, that Ceremonies, Characters, and Charmes doe worke, not by any Tacite or Sacramentali con∣tract with euill spirits; but serue onely to strengthen the imagination of him that vseth it; as Images are said by the Romane Church, to fix the cogitations, and raise the deuotions of them that pray before them. But for mine owne iudgment, if it be admitted that Imagination hath power; and that Ceremontes fortifie Imagination, & that they be vsed sincerely & intentionally for that purpose: yet I should hold them vnlawfull, as opposing to that first edict, which God gaue vnto man. In sudore vultus comedes Panem tu∣um. For they propound those noble effects which God hath set foorth vnto man, to bee bought at the price of Laboure, to bee attained by a fewe easie and slothful obseruances. Deficiences in these know∣ledges I wil report none, other than the generall de∣ficience, that it is not knowne, how much of them is veritie, and how much vanitie.

THE KNOVVLIDGE WHICH RESPECTETH THE FACVLTIES OF THE MINDE OF MAN, is of two kinds: The one respecting his VNDERSTANDING and REASON, and the other his WILL, APPETITE, & AFFECTION, wherof the former produceth POSI∣TION or DECREE, the later ACTION or EXECVTI∣ON. It is true that the Imagination is an Agent, or Nun∣tius

in both Prouinces, both the Iudiciall, and the Ministeriall. For Sence sendeth ouer to Imagination, before Reason haue iudged: and Reason sendeth ouer to Imagination, before the Decree can be acted. For Imagination euer precedeth Voluntary Motion. Sa∣uing that this Ianus of Imagination hath differing faces; for the face towards Reason, hath the print of Truth. But the face towards Action, hath the print of Good; which neuerthelesse are faces,

Quales decet esse sororum. Neither is the Imagination simply and onely a Messenger; but is in∣uested with, or at least wise vsurpeth 〈◊◊◊〉〈◊◊◊〉 no small authoritie in it selfe; besides the duty of the Message. For it was well sayd by Aristotle: That the minde hath ouer the Bodie that commaundement which the Lord hath ouer a Bond-man; But, that Reason hath ouer the Imagination that Commandement, which a Ma∣gistrate hoth ouer a free Citizen; who may come also to rule in his turne. For we see, that in matters of Faith & Religion, we raise our Imagination aboue our Reason, which is the cause why Religion sought euer accesse to the Minde by Similitudes, Types, Pa∣rables, Visions, Dreames. And againe in all per∣swasions that are wrought by eloquence, and o∣ther impression of like Nature, which doe paint and disguise the true appearance of thinges, the cheefe recommendation vnto Reason, is from the Imagination. Neuerthelesse, because I finde not any Science, that doth properly or fitly per∣taine to the. IMAGINATION, I see no cause

to alter the former diuision. For as for Poelie, it is rather a pleasure, or play of imagination, than a worke or dutie thereof. And if it be a worke; wee speake not nowe of such partes of learning, as the Imagination produceth, but of such Sciences, as han∣dle and consider of the Imagination. No more than wee shall speake nowe of such Knowledges, as rea∣son produceth, (for that extendeth to all Philosophy) but of such Knowledges, as doe handle and enquire of the facultie of Reason; So as Poesie had his true place. As for the power of the Imagination in na∣ture, and the manner of fortifying the same, wee haue mentioned it in the Doctrine De Anima, wher∣vnto most fitly it belongeth. And lastly, for Imagi∣natiue, or Insinuatiue Reason, which is the subiect of Rhetericke, wee thinke it best to referre it to the Arts of Reason. So therefore we content our selues with the former diuision, that Humane Philosophy, which respecteth the faculties of the minde of man, hath two parts, RATIONALL and MORALL.

The part of humane Philosophie, which is Ra∣tionall, is of all knowledges to the most wits the least delightfull: and seemeth but a Net of subtilitie and spinositie. For as it was truely sayd, that Knowledge is Pabulumanimi; So in the Nature of mens appetite to this foode, most men are of the tast and stomach of the Israelites in the desert, that would faine haue returned Adollas carnium, and were wearie of Man∣na, which though it were celestiall, yet seemed lesse nutritiue and comfortable. So generally men tast

well knowledges that are drenched in flesh and blood, C•…•…ile Historie, Mora•…•…litie, Policie, about the which mens affections, praises, fortunes doe turne and are conuersant: But this same Lumensiccum, doth parch and offend most mens watry and soft natures. But to speake truly of thinges as they are in worth, RATIONALL Knowledges; are the keyes of all other Arts; For as Aristotle sayth aptly and elegantly, That the hand is the Instrument of Instruments; and the minde is the Fourme of Fourmes: So these be truely said to be the Art of Arts: Neither do they onely direct, but likewise confirme and strengthen: euen as the habite of shooting, doth not onely inable to shoote a neerer shoote, but also to draw a stronger Bowe.

The ARTS INTELLECTVALL, are foure in number, diuided according to the ends whereunto they are referred: for mans labour is to inuent that which is sought or propounded: or to iudge that which is inuented: or to retaine that which is iudg∣ed: or to deliuer ouer that which is retained. So as the Arts must bee foure: ARTE of ENQVIRIE or INVENTION: ART of EXAMINATION or IVDGEMENT: ART of CVSTODIE or ME∣MORIE: and ART of ELOCVTION or TRA∣DITION.

INVENTION is of two kindes much diffe∣ring; The one of ARTS and SCIENCES, and the other of SPEECH and ARGVMENTS. The for∣mer of these, I doe report deficient: which seemeth to me to be such a deficience, as if in the making of

an Inuentorie, touching the State of a defunct, it should be set downe, That there is no readie money. For as money will fetch all other commodities; so this knowledge is that which should purchase all the rest. And like as the West Indies had neuer been discouered, if the vse of the Mariners Needle, had not been first discouered; though the one bee vast Regions, and the other a small Motion. So it cannot be found strange, if Sciences bee no further disco∣v•…•…ered, if the Art it selfe of Inuention and Discouerie, hath been passed ouer.

That this part of Knowledge is wanting, to my Iudgement, standeth plainely confessed: for first Logicke doth not pretend to inuent Sciences, or the Axiomes of Sciences, but passeth it ouer with a Cui{que} in sua arte credendum. And Celsus acknowledgeth it grauely, speaking of the Empirical and Dogmaticall Sects of Phisitians, That Medicines and Cures, were first found out, and then after the Reasons and causes were discoursed: and not the Causes first found out, and by light from them the Medicines and Cures discouered. And Plato in his Theoetetus noteth well, That parti∣culars are infinite, and the higher generalities giue no safficient direction: and that the pythe of all Sciences, which maketh the Arts-man differ from the inexpert, is in the middle propositions, which in euerie particular knowledge are taken from Tradition & Experience. And therefore wee see, that they which discourse of the Inuentions and Originals of thinges, referre them rather to Chaunce, than to Art, and rather to Beasts,

Birds, Fishes, Serpents, than to Men.

Dictamnum genetrix Cretaea carpit ab Ida, Puberibus caulem folijs, & flore comantem Purpureo: non illa feris incognita Capris, Gramina cum tergo volueres haesere 〈◊〉〈◊〉.

So that it was no maruaile, (the manner of Anti∣quitie being to consecrate Inuentors) that the Aegyp∣tians had so few humane Idols in their Temples, but almost all Brute:

Omnige•…•…umqne Deum monstra, & latrator A•…•…bis Contra Neptunū & Venerem, contra{que} Mineruam &c.

And if you like better the tradition of the Greci∣ans, and ascribe the first Inuentions to Men, yet you will rather beleeue that Prometheus first stroake the flints, and maruailed at the sparke, than that when he first stroke the flints, he xpected the sparke; and therefore we see the West Indian Prometheus, had no intelligence with the Europoean, because of the rarenesse with them of flint, that gaue the first occa∣sion: so as it should seeme, that hetherto men are ra∣ther beholden to a wilde Goat for Surgerie, or to a Nightingale for Musique or to the Ibis for some part of Phisicke, or to the Pot-lidde, that flew open for Artillerie, or generally to Chaunce, or any thinge else, than to Logicke for the Inuention of Arts and Sciences. Neither is the fourme of Inuention, which Virgill describeth much other.

Vt varias vsus medit ando extunderet artes, Paulatim,

For if you obserue the words well, it is no other

methode, than that which brute Beasts are capable of, and doe put in vre; which is a perpetuall intending or practising some one thing vrged and imposed, by an ab∣solute necessitie of conseruation of being; For so Ci•…•… sayth verie truly; Vsus vni rei deditus, & Naturam & Artem sape vincit: And therefore if it bee sayd of Men,

Labor omnia vincit Improbus, & duris vrgens in rebus egestas;

It is likewise sayd of beasts, Quis Ps•…•…taco do•…•…uit su∣um 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉? who taught the Rauen in a drowth to throw pibbles into an hollow tree, where she spyed water, that the water might rise, so as shee might come to it? who taught the Bee to sayle through such a vast Sea of ayre, and to finde the way from a field in flower, a great way off, to her Hiue? who taught the Ant to bite euerie graine of Corne, that she burieth in her hill, least it should take roote and growe? Adde then the word Extandere, which im∣porteth the extreame difficultie, and the word Pau∣latin, which importeth the extreame slownesse; and we are where we were, euen amongst the Egyptians Gods; there being little left to the facultie of Reason, and nothing to the dutie of Art for matter of In∣uention.

Secondly, the Induction which the Logitians speake of and which seemeth familiar with Pla∣to, whereby the Principles of Sciences may be pre∣tended to be inuented, and so the middle proposi∣tions by deriuation from the Principles; their

fourme of Induction, I say is vtterly vitious and in∣competent: wherein their erroar is the fowler be∣cause it is the duetie of Art to perfecte and exalt Nature: but they contrariewise haue wron∣ged, abused, and traduced Nature. For hee that shall attentiuely obserue howe the minde doth ga∣ther this excellent dew of Knowledge, like vnto that which the Poet speaketh of Aere•…•…mellis caele∣stia dona, destilling and contryuing it out of parti∣culars naturall and artificiall, as the flowers of the field and Garden: shall finde that the mind of her selfe by Nature doth mannage, and Acte an Induction, much better than they describe it. For to conclude vppon an Enu•…•…me∣ration of particulars, without instance contradictorie: is no conclusion: but a coniecture; for who can assure (in many subiects) vppon those particulars, which appeare of a side, that there are not other on the contrarie side, which appeare not? As if Samuell should haue rested vppon those Sonn•…•…s of Issay, which were brought before him, and fayled of Dauid, which was in the field. And this fourme (to say truth) is so grosse: as it had not beene possible for wittes so subti'e, as haue man∣naged these thinges, to haue offered it to the world, but that they hasted to their Theories and Dogmaticals, and were imperious and scornefull toward particulars, which their manner was to vse, but as Lictores and Via•…•…ores for Sargeants and Wifflers, Ad summouendam tu•…•…bam, to make

way and make roome for their opinions, rather than in their true vse and seruice; certainely, it is a thing may touch a man with a religious woonder, to see how the foot steps of seducement, are the very same in Diuine and Humane truth: for as in Diuine truth, Man cannot endure to become as a Child; So in Humane, they reputed the attending the Indu∣ctions (whereof wee speake) as if it were a second Infancie or Child hood.

Thirdly; allowe some Principles or Axiomes were rightly induced; yet neuerthelesse certaine it is, that Middle Propositions, cannot be diduced from them in Subiect of Nature by Syllogisme, that is, by Touch, and Reduction of them to Principles in a Middle Terme. It is true, that in Sciences popular, as Moralities, Lawes, and the like, yea, and Diuinitie (because it pleaseth God to apply himselfe to the capacity of the simplest) that fourme may haue vse; and in Naturall Philoso∣phie likewise, by way of argument or satisfactorie Reason, Quae assensum parit, Operis Effoeta est: But the subtiltie of Nature and Operations will not bee in∣chayned in those bonds: For Arguments consist of Propositions, and Propositions of Words, and Wordes are but the Current Tokens or Markes of popular Notions of thinges: which Notions if they bee grossely and variably collected out of Particulars; It is not the laborious examination either of Consequences of Arguments,, or of the truth of Propositions, that can euer correct that Errour; being (as the Phi∣sitians

speake) in the first digestion; And therefore it was not without cause, that so many excellent Philosophers became Sceptiques and Academiques, and denyed any certaintie of Knowledge, or Comprehension, and held opinion that the know∣ledge of man extended onely to Appearances, and Probabilities. It is true, that in Socrates it was sup∣posed to be but a fourme of Irony, Scientiam dissimu∣lando simulauit: For hee vsed to disable his know∣ledge, to the end to inhanse his Knowledge, like the Humor of •…•…iberius in his beginnings, that would Raigne, but would not acknowledge so much; And in the later Academy, which Cicero embra∣ced; this opinion also of Acatalepsia (I doubt) was not held sincerely; for that all those which excelled in Copie of speech, seeme to haue chosen that Sect, as that which was fittest to giue glorie to their eloquence, and variable discourses: be∣ing rather like Progresses of pleasure, than Iourneyes to an end. But assuredly many scat∣tered in both Academyes, did hold it in subtiltie, and integritie. But heere was their cheefe •…•…r∣rour; They charged the deceite vppon the THE SENCES; which in my Iudgement (not∣withstanding all their Cauillations) are verie suffi∣cient to certifie and report truth (though not alwayes immediately, yet by comparison; by helpe of instrument; and by producing, and vr∣ging such things, as are too subtile for the sence, to some effect comprehensible, by the sence, and other

like assistāce. But they ought to haue charged the de∣ceit vpon the weaknes of the intellectual powers, & vpon the maner of collecting, & concluding vpon the reports of the sences. This I speake not to disable the minde of man, but to stirre it vp to seeke helpe: for no man, be he neuer so cunning or practised, can make a straight line or perfect circle by steadinesse of hand, which may bee easily done by helpe of a Ruler or Com∣passe.

This part of Inuention, concerning the Inuention of Sciences, I purpose (if God giue mee leaue) * 1.18 hereafter to propound: hauing digested it into two partes: whereof the one I tearme Experientia literata, and the other Interpretatio Naturae: The former, being but a degree and rudiment of the la∣ter. But I will not dwell too long, nor speake too great vpon a promise.

The Inuention of speech or argument is not properly an Inuention: for to Inuent is to discouer that we know not, & not to recouer or resūmon that which wee alreadie knowe; and the vse of this Inuention, is no other; But out of the Knowledge, whereof our minde is alreadie possest, to drawe foorth, or call before vs that which may bee pertinent to the pur∣pose, which wee take into our consideration. So as to speake truely, it is no Inuention; but a Remem∣brance or Suggestion, with a Application: Which is the cause why the Schooles doe place it after Iudgement, as subsequent and not precedent. Ne∣uerthelesse, because wee doe account it a Chase,

aswell of Deere in an inclosed Parke, as in a Forrest at large: and that it hath alreadie obtayned the the name: Let it bee called Inuention; so as it be perceyued and discerned, that the Scope and end of this Inuention, is readynesse and present vse of our knowledge, and not addition or amplification thereof.

To procure this readie vse of Knowledge, there are two Courses: PREPARATION and SVG∣GESTION. The former of these, seemeth scarcely a part of Knowledge; consisting rather of Diligence, than of any artificiall erudition And heerein Aristotle wittily, but hurtfully doth de∣ride the Sophists, neere his time, saying. They did as if one that professed the Art of Shooe-making, should not teach howe to make vp a Shooe, but onely ex∣hibite in a readin•…•…sse a number of Shooes of all fashions and Sizes. But yet a man might reply, that if a Shooe∣maker should haue no Shooes in his Shoppe, but onely worke, as hee is bespoken, hee should bee weakely customed. But our Sauiour, speaking of Diuine Knowledge, sayth: That the Kingdome of Heauen, is like a good Ho•…•…sholder, that bringeth foo•…•…th both n•…•…we and ould store: And wee see the ancient Writers of Rhetoricke doe giue it in precept: That Pleaders should haue the Places, whereof they haue most continuall vse, readie handled in all the varietie that may bee, as that, To speake for the literall Interpretation of the Lawe against Equitie, and Contrarie: and to speake for Pre∣sumptions

and Inferences against Testimonie; and Contrarie: And Cicero himselfe, being broken vnto it by great experience, deliuereth it plainely; That whatsoeuer a man shall haue occasion to speake of, (if hee will take the paines) he may haue it in effect premeditate, and handled in these. So that when hee commeth to a particular, he shall haue nothing to doe, but to put too Names, and times, and places; and such other Circumstances of Indiuiduals. We see likewise the exact diligence of Demosthenes, who in regard of the great force, that the entrance and accesse into causes hath to make a good impression; had readie framed a number of Prefaces for Orati∣ons and Speeches. All which Authorities and Pre∣sidents may ouer way Aristotles opinion, that would haue vs chaunge a rich Wardrobe, for a paire of Sheares.

But the Nature of the Collection of this Prouisi∣on or Preparatorie store, though it be common, both to Logicke, and Rhetoricke; yet hauing made an en∣trye of it heere, where it came first to be spoken of; I thinke fitte to referre ouer the further handling of it to Rhetoricke.

The other part of INVENTION, which I terme SVGGESTION, doth assigne and direct vs to certaine Markes or Places, which may excite our Minde to returne and produce such Knowledge, as it hath formerly collected: to the end wee may make vse thereof. Neither is this vse (truely taken) onely to furnish argument, to dispute probably

with others; But likewise to Minister vnto our Iudgement to conclude aright within our selues. Neither may these places serue onely to apprompt our Inuention; but also to direct our enquirie. For a facultie of wise interrogating is halfe a knowledge; For as Plato saith; Whosoeuer seeketh, knoweth that which he seeketh for, in a generall Notion; Else how shall he know it, when he hath found it? And therfore the larger your Anticipation is, the more direct and compendious is your search. But the same Places which will help vs what to produce, of that which we know alreadie; will also helpe vs, if a man of experience were be∣fore vs, what questions to aske; or if we haue Bookes and Authors, to instruct vs what points to search and reuolue: so as I cannot report, that this part of Inuen∣tion, which is that which the Schooles call Topiques, is deficient.

Neuertheles Topiques are of 2. sorts general & speci∣all. The generall we haue spokē to; but the particular hath ben touched by some, but reiected generally, as inartificial & variable. But leauing the humor which hath raigned too much in the Schooles (which is to be vainly subtile in a few thinges, which are within their command, and to reiect the rest) I doe receiue particular Topiques, that is places or directions of Inuention and Inquirie in euery particular knowledg, as thinges of great vse; being Mixtures of Logique with the Matter of Sciences: for in these it holdeth; Ars inueniendi adolescit cum Inuentis: for as in go∣ing of a way, wee doe not onely gaine that part

of the waye which is passed, but wee gaine the better sight of that part of the waye which remay∣neth: So euerie degree of proceeding in a Science giueth a light to that which followeth; which light if wee strengthen, by drawing it foorth into que∣stions or places inquirie, wee doe greatly aduance our poursuyte.

Nowe wee passe vnto the ARTES OF IVDGE∣MENT, which handle the Natures of Proofes and Demonstrations; which as to Induction hath a Co∣incidence with Inuention: For all Inductions whe∣ther in good or vitious fourme, the same action of the Minde which Inuenteth, Iudgeth; all one as in the sence: But otherwise it is in proofe by Syl∣logisme: For the proofe beeing not immediate but by meane: the Inuention of the Meane is one thinge: and the Iudgement of the Consequence is another. The one Excyting onely: the other Examining: Therefore for the reall and exacte fourme of Iudgement, wee referre our selues to that which wee haue spoken of Interpretation of Nature.

For the other Iudgement by Syllogisme, as it is a thinge most agreeable to the Minde of Man: So it hath beene vehementlye and excellently labou∣red. For the Nature of Man doth extreamelye couet, to haue somewhat in his Vnderstanding fixed and vnmooueable, and as a Rest, and Sup∣port of the Mind. And therefore as Aristotle en∣deuoureth to prooue, that in all Motion, there is

some pointe quiescent; and as hee elegantlye ex∣poundeth the auncient Fable of Atlas, (that stood fixed, and bare vp the Heauen from falling) to bee meant of the Poles or Axel tree of Heauen, where∣vppon the conuersion is accomplished; so assu∣redlye men haue a desire, to haue an Atlas or Axel tree within: to keepe them from fluctuati∣on; which is like to a perpetuall perill of falling: Therefore men did hasten to sette downe some Principles, about which the varietie of their dispu∣tations might turne.

So then this Art of IVDGEMENT, is but the Reduction of Propositions, to Principles in a Middle Tearme. The Principles to bee agreed by all, and exempted from Argument; The MIDDLR TEARME to bee elected at the libertie of euerie Mans Inuention: The Reduction to be of two kindes Direct, and Inuerted; the one when the Proposi∣tion is reduced to the Principle, which they terme a Probation ostensiue: the other when the contra∣dictorie of the Proposition is reduced to the con∣tradictorie of the Principles, which is, that which they call Per Incommodum, or pressing an absurditie: the Number of Middle Termes to be, as the Propo∣sition standeth, Degrees more or lesse, remooued from the Principle.

But this Arte hath twoo seuerall Methodes of Doctrine: the one by way of Direction, the other by way of Caution: the former frameth and setteth downe a true Fourme of Consequence, by the

variations and deflexions, from which Errours and Inconsequences may bee exactly iudged. To∣ward the Composition and structure of which fourme, it is incident to handle the partes thereof, which are Propositions, and the partes of Proposi∣tions, which are SIMPLE WORDES. And this is that part of Logicke, which is comprehended in the Analytiques.

The second Methode of Doctrine, was introdu∣ced for expedite vse, and assurance sake; disco∣uering the more subtile fourmes of Sophismes, and Illaqueations, with their redargutions, which is that which is tearmed ELENCHES. For although in the more grosse sortes of Fallacies it happeneth (as Seneca make the comparison well) as in iugling feates, which though wee knowe not howe they are done; yet wee knowe well it is not, as it see∣meth to bee: yet the more subtile sort of them doth not onely put a man besides his answere, but doth many times abuse his Iudgment.

This part concerning ELENCHES, is excel∣lently handled by Aristotle in Precept, but more excellently by Plato in Example: not onely in the persons of the Sophists, but euen in Socrates him∣selfe, who professing to affirme nothing, but to infirme that which was affirmed by another, hath exactly expressed all the fourmes of obiection, fal∣lace and redargution. And although wee haue sayd that the vse of this Doctrine is for Redargu∣tion: yet it is manifest, the degenerate and cor∣rupt

is vse for Caption and Contradiction, which pas∣seth for a great facultie, and no doubt, is of ve∣rie great aduauntage; though the difference bee good which was made betweene Orators and Sophisters, that the one is as the Greyhound, which hath his aduauntage in the race, and the other as the Hare, which hath her aduantage in the turne, so as it is the aduauntage of the weaker crea∣ture.

But yet further, this Doctrine of ELEN∣CHES, hath a more ample latitude and extent, than is perceiued: namely vnto diuers partes of Knowledge: whereof some are laboured, and other omitted. For first, I conceiue (though it maye seeme at first somewhat strange) that that part which is variably referred, sometimes to Lo∣gicke, sometimes to Metaphysicke, touching the Common adiuncts of Essences, is but an Elenche: for the great Sophisme of all Sophismes, beeing Aequiuo∣cation or Ambiguitie of Wordes and Phrase, spe∣cially of such wordes as are most generall and interueyne euerie Enquirie: It seemeth to mee that the true and fruitfull vse, (leauing vaine sub∣tilities and speculations) of the Enquirie, Ma∣ioritie, Minoritie, Prioritie, Posterioritie, Iden∣titie, Diuersitie, Possibilitie, Acte, Totalitie, Partes, Existence, Priuation, and the like, are but wise Cautions againste Ambiguityes of Speech. So againe, the distribution of thinges into certaine Tribes, which we call Categories or

Predicaments, are but Cautions against the confu∣sion of Definitions and Diuisions.

Secondly, there is a seducement that worketh by the strength of the Impression, and not by the subtiltie of the Illaqueation, not so much perplex∣ing the Reason, as ouer-ruling it by power of the Imagination. But this part I thinke more proper to handle, when I shall speake of RHETO∣RICKE.

But lastly, there is yet a much more important and profound kinde of Fallacies in the Minde of Man, which I finde not obserued or enquired at all, and thinke good to place heere, as that which of all others appertayneth most to rectifie IVDGE∣MENT. The force whereof is such, as it doth not dazle, or snare the vnderstanding in some par∣ticulars, but doth more generally, and inwardly infect and corrupt the state thereof. For the mind of Man is farre from the Nature of a cleare and equall glasse, wherein the beames of things should reflect according to their true incidence; Nay, it is rather like an inchanted glasse, full of superstition and Imposture, if it bee not deliuered and re∣duced. For this purpose, lette vs consider the false appearances, that are imposed vppon vs by the generall Nature of the minde, behoulding them in an example or twoo, as firste in that instance which is the roote of all superstition: Namely, That to the Nature of the Minde of all Men it is consonant for the Affimatiue, or Actiue to

affect, more than the negatiue or Priuatiue. So that a fewe times hitting, or presence, counteruayles oft times fayling, or absence, as was well answered by Diagoras, to him that shewed him in Neptunes Temple, the great number of pictures, of such as had scaped Shippe-wracke, and had paide their Vowes to Neptune, saying: Aduise nowe, you that thinke it folly to inuocate Neptune in tempest: Yea, but (sayth Diagoras) where are they painted that are drowned? Lette vs behould it in another instance, namely, That the spirite of man, beeing of an equall and vnifourme substance, doth vsually suppose and faine in Nature a greater equalitie and vniformitie, than is in truth; Hence it commeth, that the Mathemati∣tians cannot satisfie themselues, except they reduce the Motions of the Celestiall bodyes, to perfect Circles, reiecting spirall lynes, and laboring to be dis∣charged of Eecentriques. Hence it commeth, that whereas there are many thinges in Nature, as it were Monodica sui Iuris; Yet the cogitations of Man, doe fayne vnto them Relatiues, Parallelles, and Coniugates, whereas no such thinge is; as they haue fayned an Element of Fire to keepe square with Earth, Water, and Ayre, and the like; Nay, it is not credible, till it bee opened, what a num∣ber of fictions and fantasies, the similitude of hu∣mane Actions, & Arts, together with the making of Man Communis Mensura, haue brought into natu∣rall Philosophie: not much better, than the Here∣sie of the Anthropomorphites bredde in the Celles

of grosse and solitarie Monkes, and the opini∣on of Epicurus, answearable to the same in hea∣thenisme, who supposed the Gods to bee of hu∣mane Shape. And therefore Velleius the Epicu∣rian needed not to haue asked, why God should haue adorned the Heauens with Starres, as if he had beene an Aedilis: One that should haue set foorth some magnificent shewes or playes? for if that great Worke master had beene of an Hu∣mane disposition, hee woulde haue caste the starres into some pleasant and beautifull workes, and orders, like the frettes in the Roofes of Houses, whereas one can scarce finde a Posture in square, or tri•…•…angle, or streight line amongest such an infinite numbers, so differing an Har∣monie, there is betweene the spirite of Man, and the spirite of Nature.

Lette vs consider againe, the false appearances imposed vpon vs by euerie Mans owne indiuiduall Nature and Custome in that fayned supposition, that Plato maketh of the Caue: for certainely, if a childe were continued in a Grotte or Caue, vn∣der the Earth, vntill maturitie of age, and came suddainely abroade, hee would haue strange and absurd Imaginations; So in like manner, although our persons liue in the view of Heauen, yet our spirites are included in the Caues of our owne complexions and Customes: which minister vnto vs infinite Errours and vaine opinions, if they bee not recalled to examination. But heereof wee

haue giuen many examples in one of the Errors, or peccant humours, which wee ranne briefely ouer in our first Booke.

And lastly, lette vs consider the false appearan∣ces, that are imposed vpon vs by words, which are framed, and applyed according to the conceit, and capacities of the Vulgar sorte: And although wee thinke we gouerne our wordes, and pre∣scribe it well. Loquendum vt Vulgus, sentiendum vt sapientes: Yet certaine it is, that wordes, as a •…•…ar∣tars Bowe, doe shoote backe vppon the vnder∣standing of the wisest, and mightily entangle, and pernert the Iudgement. So as it is almost neces∣sarie in all controuersies and disputations, to imi∣tate the wisedome of the Mathematician•…•…, in set∣ting downe in the verie beginning, the definitions of our wordes and termes, that others may knowe howe wee accept and vnderstand them, and whe∣ther they concurre with vs or no. For it commeth to passe for want of this, that we are sure to end there where wee ought to haue begun, which is in questions & differences about words. To conclude therefore, it must be confessed, that it is not possible to diuorce our selues from these fallacies and false appearances, because they are inseparable from our Nature and Condition of life; So yet neuerthe∣lesse * 1.19 the Caution of them (for all Elenches as was saide, are but Cautions) doth extreamely importe the true conducte of Humane Iudge∣ment. The particular Elenches or Cautions against

these three false appearances, I finde altogether de∣ficient.

There remayneth one parte of Iudgement of great excellencie, which to mine vnderstanding is so sleightly touched, as I maye reporte that also de∣ficient, which is the application of the differinge kindes of Proofes, to the differing kindes of Sub∣iects: for there beeing but foure kindes of de∣monstrations, that is by the immediate consent of the Minde or Sence; by Induction; by So∣phisme; and by Congruitie, which is that which Aristotle calleth Demonstration in Orbe, or Circle, and not a Notioribus, euerie of these hath cer∣taine Subiects in the Matter of Sciences, in which respectiuely they haue chiefest vse; and certaine o∣ther, from which respectiuely they ought to be ex∣cluded, and the rigour, and curiositie, in requiring the more seuere Proofes in some thinges, and chiefely the facilitie in contenting our selues with the more remisse Proofes in others, hath beene amongest the greatest causes of detryment and hinderance to Knowledge. The distributions and assignations of demonstrations, according to the Analogie of Sciences, I note as defici∣ent. * 1.20

The Custodie or retayning of Knowledge, is either in WRITING or MEMORIE; where∣of WRITINGE hath twoo partes; The Na∣ture of the CHARACTER, and the order of the

ENTRIE: for the Art of Characters, or other vi∣sible notes of Wordes or thinges, it hath neerest coniugation with Grammar, and therefore I referre it to the due place; for the Disposition and Co•…•…o∣cation of that Knowledge which wee preserue in Writing; It consisteth in a good Digest of Common Places, wherein I am not ignorant of the preiu∣dice imputed to the vse of Common-Place Bookes, as causing a retardation of Reading, and some sloth or relaxation of Memorie. But because it is but a counterfeit thing in Knowledges to be for∣ward and pregnant, except a man bee deepe and full; I hould the Entrie of Common places, to bee a matter of great vse and essence in studying; as that which assureth copie of Inuention and contra∣cteth Iudgment to a strength. But this is true, that of the Methodes of Common places, that I haue seen, there is none of any sufficient woorth, all of them carying meerely the face of a Schoole, and not of a World, and referring to vulgar matters, and Pe∣danticall Diuisions without all life, or respect to Action.

For the other Principall Parte of the Custodie of Knowledge, which is MEMORIE; I finde that facultie in my Iudgement weakely enquired of; An Art there is extant of it; But it seemeth to me that there are better Precepts, than that Art, and better practises of that Art, than those recei•…•…ed. It is certaine, the Art as it is) may bee raysed to points of ostentation prodigious: But in vse (as it is nowe

mannaged) it is barrein, not burdensome, nor dan∣gerous to Naturall Memorie, as is imagined, but barren, that is, not dexterous to be ayplyed to the serious vse of businesse and occasions. And there∣fore I make no more estimation of repeating a great number of Names or Wordes vppon once hearing; or the powring foorth of a number of Verses or Rimes ex tempore; or the making of a Satyricall Simile of euerie thing, or the turning of euerie thing to a Iest, or the falsifying or contra∣dicting of euerie thing by Cauill, or the like (wher∣of in the faculties of the Minde, there is great Co∣pie, and such, as by deuise and practise may bee ex∣alted to an extreame degree of woonder;) than I doe of the trickcs of Tumblers, Funambuloes, Ba∣ladynes; the one being the same in the Minde, that the other is in the bodie; Matters of strangenesse without worthynesse.

This Art of Memorie, is but built vpon two Intenti∣ons: The one Praenotion; the other Embleme: Prae∣notion, dischargeth the Indefinite seeking of that we would remember, and directeth vs to seeke in a narrowe Compasse: that is, somewhat that hath Congruitie with our Place of Memorie: Embleme re∣duceth conceits intellectuall to Images sensible, which strike the Memorie more; out of which Axiomes may bee drawne much better Practique, than that in vse, and besides which Axiomes, there are diuers moe, touching helpe of Memorie, not in∣ferior to them. But I did in the beginning distinguish,

not to report those thinges deficient, which are but onely ill Managed.

There remayneth the fourth kinde of RATIO∣NALL KNOVVLEDGE, which is transitiue, con∣cerning the expressing or transferring our Knowledg to others, which I will tearme by the generall name of TRADITION OR DELIVERIE. TRA∣DITION hath three parres: the first concerning the ORGANE OF TRADITION: the se∣cond, concerning the METHODE OF TRA∣DITION: And the thirde, concerning the ILLVSTRATION OF TRADITION.

For the ORGANE OF TRADITION, it is ei∣ther SPEECH OR WRITING: for Aristotle sayth well: Wordes are the Images of Cogitations, and Letters are the Images of Wordes: But yet is not of ne∣cessitie, that Cogitations bee expressed by the Medi∣um of Wordes. For whatsoeuer is capable of sufficient differences, and those perceptible by the sense; is in Na∣ture competent to expresse Cogitations: And therefore we see in the Commerce of barbarous People, that vnderstand not one anothers language, & in the pra∣ctise of diuers that ar dumb & deafe that mens minds are expressed in gestures, though not exactly, yet to serue the turne. And we vnderstand further, that it is the vse of Chyna, and the Kingdomes of the High Leuant, to write in Characters reall, which ex∣presse neither Letters, nor words in grosse, but Things or Nottons: in so much as Countreys and Prouinces, which vnderstand not one anothers language, can neuerthelesse read one anothers Writings, because

the Characters are accepted more generally, than the Languages doe extend; and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 therefore they haue a vast multitude of Characters, as many (I sup∣pose, as Radicall words.

These Notes of Cogitations are of twoo sortes; The one when the Note hath some Similitude, or Congruitie with the Notion; The other Ad Pla∣citum, hauing force onely by Contract or Accep∣tation. Of the former sort are Hierogliphickes, and Gestures. For as to Hierogliphickes, (things of An∣cient vse, and embraced chiefely by the Aegyp∣tians, one of the most ancient Nations) they are but as continued Impreases and Emblemes. And as for Gestures, they are as Transitorie Hierogli∣phickes, and are to Hierogliphickes, as Words spoken are to Wordes written, in that they abide not; but they haue euermore as well, as the other an affini∣tie with the thinges signified: as Periander beeing consulted with how to preserue a tyrannie new∣ly vsurped, bid the Messenger attend, and re∣port what hee sawe him doe, and went into his Garden, and topped all the higest flowers: signi∣fying that it consisted in the cutting off, and kee∣ping low of the Nobilitie and Grandes; Ad Placi∣tum, are the Characters reall before mentioned, and Words: although some haue ben willing by Curious Enquirie, or rather by apt fayning, to haue de∣riued imposition of Names, from Reason and In∣tendment: a speculation elegant, and by reason it searcheth into Antiquitie reuerent: but sparingly

mixt with truth, and of small fruite. This por∣tion of knowledge, touching the Notes of thinges, * 1.21 and Cogitations in generall, I finde not enquired, but deficient. And although it may seeme of no great vse, considering that Words, and Writings by let∣ters, doe far excell all the other wayes: yet because this part concerneth, as it were the Mint of know∣ledge (for wordes, are the tokens currant and ac∣cepted for conceits, as Moneys are for values and that it is fit men be not ignorant, that Moneys may bee of another kind, than gold and siluer) I thought good to propound it to better Enquirie.

Concerning SPEECH and WORDES, the Consideration of them hath produced the Sci∣ence of GRAMMAR: for Man still striueth to re∣integrate himselfe in those benedictions, from which by his fault hee hath been depriued; And as hee hath striuen against the first generall Curse, by the Inuention of all other Artes: So hath hee sought to come soorth of the seconde generall Curse, (which was the confusion of Tongues) by the Art of GRAMMAR; whereof the vse in ano∣ther tongue is small: in a forreine tongue more: but most in such Forraine Tongues, as haue ceased to be Vulgar Tongues, and are turned onely to lear∣ned tongues. The duetie of it is of twoo Natures: The one Popular, which is for the speedie, and per∣fect attayning Languages, as well for intercourse of Speech, as for vnderstanding of Authors: The other Philosophicall, examining the power and Na∣ture

of Wordes, as they are the foot-steppes and prints of Reason: which kinde of Analogie be∣tweene Wordes, and Reason is handled Sparsim, bro∣kenly, though not entirely: and therefore I cannot report it deficient, though I thinke it verie worthy to be reduced into a Science by it selfe.

Vnto GRAMMAR also belongeth, as an Ap∣pendix, the consideration of the Accidents of Wordes, which are Measure, sound, and Eleuati∣on, or Accent, and the sweetenesse and harsh∣nesse of them: whence hath yssued some curi∣ous obseruations in Rhetoricke, but chiefely Poesie, as wee consider it, in respect of the verse, and not of the Argument: wherein though men in learned Tongues, doe tye themselues to the Ancient Mea∣sures, yet in moderne Languages, it seemeth to me, as free to make newe Measures of Verses, as of Daunces: For a Daunce is a measured pace, as a Verse is a measured Speech. In these thinges the Sence is better Iudge, than the Art.

Coenae fercula nostrae; Mallem conuiuis, quam placuisse Cocis.

And of the seruile expressing Antiquitie in an vnlike and an vnfit Subiect, it is well sayd, Quod tempore antiquum videtur, id incongruitate est maxi∣me nouum.

For CYPHARS; they are commonly in Letters or Alphabets, but may bee in Wordes. The

kindes of CYPHARS, (besides the SIMPLE CYPHARS with Changes, and intermixtures of NVLLES, and NONSIGNIFI∣CANTS) are many, according to the Na∣ture or Rule of the infoulding: WHEELE∣CYPHARS, KAY-CYPHARS, DOV∣BLES, &c. But the vertues of them, whereby they are to be preferred, are three; that they be not laborious to write and reade; that they bee impossible to discypher; and in some cases, that they bee without suspition. The highest De∣gree whereof, is to write OMNIA PER OMNIA; which is vndoubtedly possible, with a proportion Quintuple at most, of the wri∣ting infoulding, to the writing infoulded, and no other restrainte whatsoeuer. This Arte of Cypheringe, hath for Relatiue, an Art of Discyphe∣ringe; by supposition vnprofitable; but, as things are, of great vse. For suppose that Cyphars were well mannaged, there bee Multitudes of them which exclude the Discypherer. But in regarde of the rawnesse and vnskilfulnesse of the handes, through which they pas•…•…e, the greatest Mat∣ters, are many times carryed in the weakest Cy∣phars.

In the Enumeration of these priuate and rety∣red Artes, it may bee thought I seeke to make a greate Muster-Rowle of Sciences; naminge them for shewe and ostentation, and to little o∣ther purpose. But lette those which are skilfull

in them iudge, whether I bring them in onely for apparance, or whether in that which I speake of them (though in fewe Markes) there be not some seede of proficience. And this must bee remem∣bred, that as there bee many of great account in their Countreys and Prouinces, which when they come vp to the Seate of the Estate, are but of meane Ranke and scarcely regarded: So these Arts being heere placed with the principall, and su∣preame Sciences, seeme petty thinges: yet to such as haue chosen them to spende their la∣bours studies in them, they seeme great Mat∣ters.

For the METHODE OF TRADITION, I see it hath mooued a Controuersie in our time. But as in Ciuile businesse, if there bee a mee∣ting and men fall at Wordes, there is common∣ly an end of the Matter for that time, and no pro∣ceeding at all: So in Learning, where there is much controuersie, there is many times little Enquirie. For this part of knowledge of Methode seemeth to mee so weakely enquired, as I shall report it deficient.

METHODE hath beene placed, and that not amisse in Logicke, as a part of Iudgement; For as the Doctrine of Syllogismes comprehendeth the rules of Iudgement vppon that which is inuented; So the Doctrine of Methode contayneth the rules of Iudgement vppon that which is to bee deliue∣red,

for Iudgement precedeth Deliuerie, as it fol∣loweth Inuentions. Neither is the METHODE, or the NATVRE OF THE TRADITION ma∣teriall onely to the Vse of Knowledge, but like∣wise to the Progress•…•…on of Knowledge: for since the labour and life of one man, cannot attaine to perfection of Knowledge; the Wisedome of the Tradition, is that which inspireth the felicitie of continuance, and proceding. And therefore the most reall diuersitie of Methode, is of METHODE REFERRED TO VSE, and METHODE RE∣FERRED TO PROGRESSION, whereof the one may bee tearmed MAGISTRALL, and the o∣ther of PROBATION.

The later whereof seemeth to be Via deserta & interclusa. For as Knowledges are now deliuered, there is a kinde of Contract of Errour, betweene the Deliuerer, and the Receiuer: for he that deli∣uereth knowledge; desireth to deliuer it in such fourme, as may be best beleeued; and not as may best examined: and hee that receiueth knowledge, desireth rather present satisfaction, than expectant Enquirie, & so rather not to doubt, than not to erre: glorie making the Author not to lay open his weak∣nesse, and sloth making the Disciple not to knowe his strength.

But knowledge, that is deliuered as a threade to bee spunne on, ought to bee deliuered and intimated, if it were possible, In the same Methode wherein it was inuented; and so is it possible of know∣ledge

induced. But in this same anticipated and preuented knowledge; no man knoweth howe hee came to the knowledge which hee hath obtayned. But yet neuerthelesse Secundum maius & minus, a man may reuisite, and descend vnto the founda∣tions of his Knowledge and Consent: and so transplant it into another, as it grewe in his owne Minde. For it is in Knowledges, as it is in Plantes; if you meane to vse the Plant, it is no matter for the Rootes: But if you meane to re∣mooue it to growe, then it is more assured to rest vppon rootes, than Slippes: So the deliuerie of Knowledges (as it is nowe vsed) is as of faire bodies of Trees without the Rootes: good for the Carpenter, but not for the Planter: But if you will haue Sciences growe; it is lesse matter for the shafte, or bodie of the Tree, so you looke well to the takinge vp of the Rootes. Of which kinde of deliuerie the Methode of the Mathema∣tiques, * 1.22 in that Subiect, hath some shadowe; but generally I see it neither put in vre, nor put in Inquisition: and therefore note it for de∣ficient.

Another diuersitie of METHODE there is, which hath some affinitie with the former, vsed in some cases, by the discretion of the Auncients; but disgraced since by the Impostures of many vaine persons, who haue made it as a false light for their counterfei•…•…e Marchandizes; and that is Enigmaticali and Disclosed. The pretence where∣of,

is to remooue the vulgar Capacities from beeing admitted to the secretes of Knowledges, and to reserue them to selected Auditors: or wittes of such sharpenesse as can pearce the vayle.

Another diuersitie of METHODE, where∣of the consequence is great, is the deliuerie of knowledge in APHORISMES, or in ME∣THODES; wherein wee may obserue, that it hath beene too much taken into Custome, out of a fewe Axiomes or Obseruations, vppon any Subiecte, to make a solemne, and formall Art; filling it with some Discourses, and illustratinge it with Examples; and digesting it into a sensi∣ble Methode: But the writinge in APHO∣RISMES, hath manye excellent vertues, whereto the writinge in Methode doth not ap∣proach.

For first, it tryeth the Writer, whether hee be superficiall or solide: For Aphorismes, except they should bee ridiculous, cannot bee made but of the pyth and heart of Sciences: for discourse of illustration is cut off, Recitalles of Examples are cut off: Discourse of Connexion, and order is cut off; Descriptions of Practize, are cutte off; So there remayneth nothinge to fill the Ap•…•…ismes, but some good quantitie of Obseruation: And therefore no man can suffice, nor in reason will at∣tempt to write Aphorismes, but hee that is sound and grounded. But in Methodes,

Tantum Series iuncturaque Pollet, Tantum de Medio sumptis, accedit honoris:

As a Man shall make a great shew of an Art, which if it were disioynted, would come to little. Se∣condly; Methodes are more fit to winne Consent; or beleefe; but lesse fit to point to Action; for they carrie a kinde of Demonstration in Orbe or Circle, one part illuminating another; and therefore satis∣fie. But particulars beeing dispersed, doe best a∣gree with dispersed directions. And lastlye A∣phorismes, representing a knowledge broken, doe inuite men to enquire further; whereas Methodes carrying the shewe of a Totall, doe secure men; as if they were at furthest.

Another Diuersitie of METHODE, which is likewise of great weight, is, The handling of know∣ledge by Assertions, and their Proofes; or by Questions, and their Determinations: The latter kinde whereof, if it bee immoderately followed, is as preiudiciall to the proceeding of Learning, as it is to the proceedinge of an Armie, to goe a∣bout to besiege euerie little Forte, or Holde. For if the Field bee kept, and the summe of the Enterprize pursued, those smaller thinges will come in of themselues; Indeede a Man would not leaue some important peece Enemie at his backe. In like manner, the vse of confutation in the deliuerie of Sciences ought to beverie spa∣ring;

and to serue to remooue stronge Preoccu∣pations and Preiudgements, and not to minister and excite Disputations and doubts.

Another Diuersitie of Methodes, is, According to the Subiect or Matter, which is handled. For there is a great difference in Deliuerie of the Mathematiques, which are the most abstracted of knowledges, and Policie, which is the most immer∣sed; And howsoeuer contention hath been moo∣ued, touching an vniformitie of Methode in Mul∣tiformitie of Matter: Yet wee see howe that opi∣nion, besides the weakenesse of it, hath beene of ill desert, towardes Learning, as that which taketh the way, to reduce Learning to certaine emptie and barren Generalities; beeing but the ve∣rie Huskes, and Shales of Sciences, all the ker∣nell beeing forced out, and expulsed, with the torture and presse of the Methode: And therefore as I did allow well of particular topiques for Inuen∣tion: so I doe allow likewise of particular Methodes of Tradition.

Another Diuersitie of Iudgement in the deliuerie and teaching of knowledge, is, According vnto the light and presuppositions of that which is deliuered: For that knowledge, which is newe and forreine from opinions receiued, is to bee deliuered in another fourme, than that that is agreeable and familiar; And therefore Aristotle, when he thinkes to taxe Democritus, doth in truth, commend him; where hee sayth: If wee shall indeede dispute, and not fol∣lowe

after Similitudes, &c. For those, whose con∣ceites are seated in popular opinions, neede onely but to prooue or dispute: but those, whose Conceits are beyonde popular opinions, haue a double la∣bour; the one to make themselues conceiued, and the other to prooue and demonstrate. So that it is of necessitie with them to haue recourse to si∣militudes, and translations, to expresse themselues. And therefore in the Infancie of Learning, and in rude times, when those Conceits, which are now triuiall, were then newe; the World was full of Parables and Similitudes; for else would men either haue passed ouer without Marke, or else reie∣cted for Paradoxes, that which was offered; be∣fore they had vnderstoode or iudged. So; in Di∣uine Learning, wee see howe frequent Parables and Tropes are; For it is a Rule, That whatsoeuer Science is not consonant to presuppositions, must pray in ayde of Similitudes.

There be also other Diuersities of METHODES vulgar and receiued: as that of Resolution, or Ana∣lysis, of Constitution, or Systasis, of Concealement, or Cryptique, &c. which I doe allowe well of; though I haue stood vpon those which are least handled and obserued. All which I haue remembred to this purpose, because I would erecte and constitute * 1.23 one generall Enquirie (which seemes to mee defi∣cient) touching the Wisedome of Tradition.

But vnto this part of Knowledge, concerning METHODE, doth further belong, not onely the

Architecture of the whole frame of a Worke, but also the seuerall beames and Columnes thereof; not as to their stuffe, but as to their quantitie, and figure: And therefore, Methode considereth, not onely the disposition of the Argument or Sub∣iect, but likewise the Propositions: not as to their Truth or Matter, but as to their Limitation and Manner. For herein Ramus merited better a great deale, in reuiuing the good Rules of Propositions, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. &c. than he did in introdu∣cing the Canker of Epitomes: And yet, (as it is the Condition of Humane thinges, that according to the ancient Fables, The most pretious thinges haue the most pernitious Keepers) It was so, that the at∣tempt of the one, made him fall vpon the other. For hee had neede be well conducted, that should designe to make Axiomes Conuertible: If he make them not withall Circular, and Non promouent, or Incurring into themselues: but yet the Intention was excellent.

The other Considerations of Methode, concer∣ning Propositions, are chiefely touching the vt∣most Propositions, which limit the Dimensions of Sciences: for euerie Knowledge may bee fit∣ly sayd, besides the Profunditie (which is the truth and substance of it, that makes it solide) to haue a Longitude, and a Latitude: accounting the latitude towardes other Sciences: and the Longitude to∣wards Action: that is, from the greatest Genera∣litie, to the most particular Precept: The one

giueth Rule howe farre one knowledge ought to intermeddle within the Prouince of another, which is the Rule they call 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. The other giueth Rule, vnto what degree of particularitie, a knowledge should descend: which latter I finde passed ouer in silence; being in my Iudgement, the more materi∣all. For certainely, there must bee somewhat left to practise; but howe much is worthy the Enqui∣rie: wee see remote and superficiall Generalities, doe but offer Knowledge, to scorne of practicall men: and are no more ayding to practise, than an Ortelius vniuersall Mappe, is to direct the way be∣tweene London and Yorke. The better sort of Rules, haue beene not vnfitly compared to glasses of steele vnpullished; where you may see the Ima∣ges of thinges, but first they must bee filed: So the Rules will helpe, if they bee laboured and pul∣lished by practise. But howe Christallyne they * 1.24 may bee made at the first, and howe farre forth they may be pullished afore-hand, is the question; the Enquirie whereof, seeemeth to me deficient.

There hath beene also laboured, and put in pra∣ctise a Methode, which is not a lawfull Methode, but a Methode of Imposture; which is to deliuer know∣ledges in such manner, as men may speedily come to make a shewe of Learning, who haue it not; such was the trauaile of Raymundus Lullius, in ma∣king that Art, which beares his name; not vn∣like to some Bookes of Typocosmy, which haue beene made since; beeing nothing but a Masse

of words of all Arts; to giue men countenance, that those which vse the tearmes; might bee thought to vnderstand the Art; which Collections are much like a Frippers or Brokers shoppe; that hath ends of euerie thing, but nothing of worth.

Nowe wee descend to that part, which concer∣neth the ILLVSRATION OF TRADITION, comprehended in that Science, which wee call RHETORICKE, OR ART OF ELO∣QVENCE; A Science excellent, and excellent∣ly well laboured. For although in true value, it is inferiour to Wisedome, as it is sayd by God to Moses, when he disabled himselfe, for want of this Facultie, Aaron shall bee thy Speaker, and thou shalt bee to him as God: Yet with people it is the more mightie; For so Salomon sayth: Sapiens Corde ap∣pellabitur Prudens; sed dulcis Eloquio Maiora repe∣rict: Signifying that profoundnesse of Wisedome, will helpe a Man to a Name or Admiration; but that it is Eloquence, that preuayleth in an actiue life; And as to the labouring of it, the Emulati∣on of Aristotle, with the Rhetoricians of his time, and the experience of Cicero, hath made them in their Workes of Rhetorickes, exceede themselues. Againe, the excellencie of Examples of Eloquence, in the Orations of Demosthenes and Cicero, ad∣ded to the perfection of the Precepts of Eloquence, hath doubled the progression in this Arte: And therefore, the Deficiences which I shall note, will rather bee in some Collections, which may as

Hand-maydes attend the Art; than in the Rules, or vse of the Art it selfe.

Notwithstanding, to stirre the Earth a little a∣bout the Rootes of this Science, as we haue done of the rest; The dutie and Office of Rhetoricke is, To apply Reason to Imagination, for the better moouing of the will; For wee see Reason is disturbed in the Administration thereof by three meanes; by Illaque∣ation, or Sophisme, which pertaines to Logicke; by Imagination or Impression, which pertaines to Rheto∣ricke, and by Passion or Affection, which pertaines to Moralitie. And as in Negotiation with others; men are wrought by cunning, by Importunitie, and by vehemencie; So in this Negotiation within our selues; men are vndermined by Inconsequences, sol∣licited and importuned, by Impressions or Obuersati∣ons: and transported by Passions: Neither is the Na∣ture of Man so vnfortunately built, as that those Powers and Arts should haue force to disturbe Rea∣son, and not to establish and aduance it: For the end of Logicke, is to teach a fourme of Argument, to se∣cure Reason, and not to entrappe it. The end of Moralitie, is to procure the Affections to obey Rea∣son, and not to inuade it. The end of Rhetoricke, is to fill the Imagination to second Reason, and not to oppresse it: for these abuses of Arts come in, but Ex oblique, for Caution.

And therfore it was great Iniustice in Plate, though springing out of a iust hatred of the Rhetoricians of his time, to esteeme of Rhetoricke, but as a voluptuarie

Art, resembling it to Cookerie, that did marre whol∣some Meates, and helpe vnwholesome by varietie of sawces, to the pleasure of the tast. For wee see that speech is much more conuersant in adorning that which is good, than in colouring that which is euill: for there is no man but speaketh more honestly, than he can doe or thinke; And it was excellently noted by Thucidides in Cleon, that because he vsed to hold on the bad side in Causes of estate; therefore hee was euer inueying against Eloquence, and good speech; knowing that no man can speake faire of Courses sordide and base. And therefore as Plato sayd elegantly: Th•…•…t vertue, if shee could be seen, would mooue great loue and affection: So seeing that she can∣not bee shewed to the Senca, by corporall shape, the next degree is, to shewe her to the Imagination in liuely representation: for to shewe her to Reason, on∣ly in subtilitie of Argument, was a thing euer de∣rided in Chrysippus, and many of the Stoykes, who thought to thrust vertue vppon men by sharpe dis∣putations and Conclusions, which haue no Sympa∣thy with the will of Man.

Againe, if the affections in themselues were plyant and obedient to Reason, it were true, there shoulde bee no great vse of perswasions and insinuations to the will, more than of naked proposition and Proofes: but in regard of the con∣tinuall Mutinies and Seditions of the Affections:

Video meliora, Proboque; D•…•…teriora sequor;

Reason would become Captiue and seruile, if

Eloquence of Perswasions, did not practise and winne the Imagination, from the affections part, and con∣tract a Confederacie betweene the Reason and Ima∣gination, against the Affections: For the Affections themselues, carrie euer an appetite to good, as Reason doth: The difference is, That the Affecti∣on beholdeth meerely the present; Reason behouldeth the future, and summe of time. And therefore, the Present, filling the Imagination more; Reason is commonly vanquished; But after that force of Elo∣quence and perswasion, hath made thinges future, and remote, appeare as present, than vppon the re∣uolt of the Imagination, Reason pre•…•…ayleth.

Wee conclude therefore, that Rhetoricke can bee no more charged, with the colouring of the worse part, than Logicke with Sophistrie, or Mo∣ralitie with Vice. For wee knowe the Doctrines of Contraries are the same, though the vse be oppo∣site: It appeareth also, that Logicke differeth from Rhetoricke, not onely as the fist, from the pawme, the one close, the other at large; but much more in this, that Logicke handleth Reason exacte, and in truth; and Rhetoricke handleth it, as it is planted in popular opinions and Manners: And therefore Aristotle doth wisely place Rhetoricke, as betweene Logicke on the one side, and Morall or Ciuile Knowledge on the other, as participating of both: for the Proofes and Demonstrations of Logicke, are toward all men indifferent, and the same: But the Proofes and perswasions of Rhetoricke, ought to

differ according to the Auditors,

Orpheus in Syluis, inter Delphinas Arion;

Which application, in perfection of Idea, ought to extend so farre: that if a Man should speake of the same thing to seuerall persons: he should speake to them all respectiuely and seuerall wayes: though this Politique part of Eloquence in priuate Speech, it is easie for the greatest Orators to want: whilest by the obseruing their well graced fourmes of speech, they leese the volubilitie of Application: and there∣fore, * 1.25 it shall not be amisse to recommend this to bet∣ter enquirie, not being curious, whether we place it heere, or in that part which concerneth Policie.

Nowe therefore will I descend to the defici∣ences, which (as I sayd) are but Attendances: and first, I doe not finde the Wisedome and diligence * 1.26 of Aristotle well poursued, who began to make a Collection of the popular signes and colours of good and euill, both simple and comparatiue, which are as the Sophismes of Rhetoricke, (as I touched be∣fore.) For Example.

SOPHISMA.

Quod laudatur, bonum: Quod vttuperatur, malum.

REDARGVTIO.

Laudat vaenales, qui vult extrudere merces.

Malum est, Malum est (inquit Emptor) sed cum re∣•…•…rit, tumgloriabitur. The defects in the labour of Aristotle are three: One, that there be but a few of many: another, that their Elenches are not annex∣ed;

and the third, that hee conceiued but a part of the vse of them: for their vse is not onely in pro∣bation, but much more in Impression. For many fourmes are equall in Signification, which are diffe∣ring in Impression: as the difference is great in the piercing of that which is sharpe, and that which is flat, though the strength of the percussion be the same: for there is no man, but will be a little more raysed by hearing it sayd: Your enemies will be glad of this,

Hos I thacus velit, & magnomercentur Atridae,

Than by hearing it sayd only, This is euill for you.

Secondly, I do resume also, that which I mentioned before, touching Prouision or Praeparatorie store, for the Furniture of speech, and readinesse of Inuenti∣on; which appeareth to be of two sorts; The one in resemblance to a shoppe of peeces vnmade vp; the other to a shopp of thinges ready made vp, both to be applyed to that which is frequent, and most in request; The former of these I will call Antitheta, & the latter Formulae.

Antitheta are Theses argued, pro & contra, wherin men may be more large & laborious; but (in such as * 1.27 are able to doe it) to auoyd prolixity of entry, I wish the seedes of the seuerall arguments to be cast vp in∣to some briefe and acute sentences: not to bee cy∣ted: but to bee as Skaynes or Bottomes of thread, to bee vnwinded at large, when they come to be vsed: supplying authorities, and Examples by re∣ference.

Pro verbis legis,

Non est interpretatio, sed diuinatio, quae recedit a littera, Cum receditur a littera Index transit in legislatorem,

Pro sententia Legis.

Ex omnibus verbis est Elu•…•…endus sensus, qui interpretatur singula:

Formulae are but decent and apt passages or conuey∣ances of speeche, which may serue indifferently for differing subiects, as of Preface, Conclusion, Digression, Transition, Excusation, &c. For as in buildings there is great pleasure and vse in the well casting of the staire cases, entryes, doores, windowes, and the like, so in speeche, the conueyances and passages are of speciall ornament and effect.

A conclusion in a Del•…•…eratiue.

So may we redeeme the faults passed & preuent the inconue niences future.

There remayn two Appendices touching the tradi∣tion of knowledge, The one Criticall, The other Pe∣danticall. For all knowledge is eyther deliuered by Teachers, or attayned by mens proper endeuors: And therefore as the principall part of Tradition of knowledge concerneth chiefly in writing of Books; So the Relatiue part thereof concerneth reading of Bookes Wherunto appertayn incidently these consideratiōs. The first is cōcerning the true Correction & editiō of Authors, wherin neuerthelesse rash diligēce hath don gret preiudice. For these Critiques haue oftē presumed that that which they vnderstandnot, is false set down; As the Priest, that where he found it written of S. Paul Demissus est per sportam, mēded his book, and made it De∣missus

est per portam because, Sperta was an hard word, and out of his reading; and surely their errors, though they be not so palpable and ridiculous, yet are of the same kind. And therefore as it hath beene wisely no∣ted, the most corrected copies are cōmonly the least correct.

The second is concerning the exposition and ex∣plication of Authors, which resteth in Annotations and Cōmentaryes, wherin it is ouer vsual to blaunch the obscure places, and discourse vpon the playne.

The third is concerning the times, which in many cases giue great light to true Interpretations.

The fourth is concerning some briefe Censure and iudgement of the Authors, that men therby may make some election vnto themselues, what Bookes to reade:

And the fift is concerning the Syntax and dispo∣sition of studies, that men may know in what order or pursuite to reade.

For PEDANTICALL knowledge, it contayneth that differēce of Tradition which is proper for youth: Whereunto appertaine diuers considerations of greatfruit.

As first the tyming and seasoning of knowledges, as with what to initiate them, and from what for a time to refraine them:

Secondly, the consideration where to begin with the easiest, and so proceede to the more difficult, And in what courses to presse the more difficulte and then to turne them to the more easie: for it is one

Methode to practise swimming with bladders, and a∣nother to practise dauncing with heauy shooes.

A third is the application of learning according vnto the propriety of the wittes; for there is no defect in the faculties intellectuall, but seemeth to haue a proper Cure contayned in some studies; As for ex∣ample, If a Child be Bird-witted, that is, hath not the facultie of attention, the Mathematiques giueth a re∣medy thereunto; for in them, if the witte be caught away but a moment, one is new to begin. And as sci∣ences haue a propriety towards faculties for Cure and helpe; So faculties or powers haue a Simpathy to∣wards Sciences for excellency or speedy profiting: And therfore it is an enquity of greate wisedom what kinds of wits and Natures are most apt and proper for what sciences.

Fourthly the ordering of exercises is matter of great consequence to hurt or helpe; For as is well ob serued by Cicero, men in exercising their faculties if they be not wel aduised doe exercise their faultes & get ill habits as well as good; so as there is a greate iudgement to be had in the continuance and inter∣mission of Exercises. It were to longe to particularize a number of other consideratiōs of this nature, things but of meane appearance, but of singular efficacy. For as the wronging or cherishing of seeds or young plants, is that, that is most important to their thriuing And as it was noted, that the first six kings being in trueth as Tutors of the State of Rome in the infancy thereof, was the principal cause of the immense great∣nesse

of that state which followed. So the culture and manurance of Minds in youth, hath such a forcible (though vnseen) operacion, as hardly any length of time or contention of labour can counteruaile it af∣terwards. And it is not amisse to obserue also, how small and meane faculties gotten by Education, yet when they fall into greate men or great matters, doe work great and important effects: whereof we see a notable example in Tacitus of two Stage-plaiers, Per∣cennius and Vibulenus, who by their facultie of play∣ing, put the Pannonian armies into an extreame tu∣multe and combustion. For there arising a mutinie amongst them, vpon the death of Augustus Caesar, Bloe∣sus the lieuetenant had committed some of the Mu∣tiners which were suddenly rescued: whereupon Vt∣bulenus got to be heard speake, which he did in this manner, These poore innocent wretches appointed to cruell death, you haue restored to behould the light. But who shall restore my brother to me, or life vnto my brother? that was sent hither in message from the legions of Germany, to treat of the common Cause, and he hath murdered him this last night by some of his sencers & ruffians, that he hath about him for his executioners vpon Souldiours: Answer Blaesus, what is done with his body: The mortallest Enem'es doe not deny buriall: when I haue performed my last duties to the Corpes with kisses, with teares, command me to be slaine be∣sides him, so that these my fellowes for our good meaning, and our true hearts to the Legions may haue leaue to bury vs. With which speeche he put the army into an infi∣nite fury and vprore, whereas truth was he had no

brother, neyther was there any such matter, but hee plaide it meerely as if he had beene vpon the stage.

But to returne, we are now come to a period of RATIONALL KNOVVLEDGES, wherein if I haue made the diuisions other than those that are receiued, yet would I not be thought to disallow all those diui∣sions, which I doe not vse. For there is a double ne∣cessity imposed vpon me of altering the diuisions. The one because it differeth in end and purpose, to sorte together those things which are next in Nature, and those things which are next in vse. For if a secretary of Estate, should sort his papers, it is like in his study, or generall Cabinet, he would sort together things of a Nature, as Treaties, Instructions, &c. But in his Boxes, or particular Cabinet, hee would sort togi∣ther those that he were like to vse together, though of seuerall Natures: So in this generall Cabynet of knowledge, it was necessary for me to follow the di∣uisions of the Nature of things, whereas if my selfe had beene to handle any particular knowledge, I would haue respected the Diuisions fittest for vse. The other, because the bringing in of the Deficiences did by Consequence alter the Partitions of the rest, For let the knowledge extant (for demonstration sake) be 15. Let the knowledge with the Deficiences be 20. the parts of 15. are not the parts of 20, for the parts of 15, are 3. and 5. the parts of 20. are 2. 4. 5. and 10. So as these things are without Contradiction, and could not otherwise be.

WE proceed now to that knowledge which cō sidereth of the APPETITE and WILL OF Man, whereof Salomon sayth Anteomnia fili custodi cor tuum, nam inde procedunt actio∣nes vilae. In the handling of this science, those which haue written seeme to me to haue done as if a man that professed to teach to write did only exhibit faire copies of Alphabets, & letters ioyned, without geuing any precepts or directiōs, for the cariage of the hād & framing of the letters. So haue they made good & fair Exemplars & coppies, carieng the draughts and pour traiturs of Good. Vertue, Duety, Felicity. propoūding thē well described as the true obiects and scopes of mās wil and desires: But how to attain these excellēt marks, and how to frame and subdue the will of man to be∣come true and conformable to these pursuites, they passe it ouer altogether, or slightly and vnprofitably For it is not the disputing. That morall vertues are in the Minde of man by habite & not by nature: or the distinguishing. That generous spirites are wonne by doctrines and perswasions, and the vulgar sort by re∣ward & punishment, and the like scattered glances and touches that can excuse the absence of this parte.

The reason of this omission I suppose to be that hidden Rocke wherevppon both this and many other barques of knowledge haue beene cast away, which is, that men haue dispised to be conuersant in ordina∣ry and common matters, the iudicious direction whereof neuerthelesse is the wisest doctrine: (for life

consisteth not in nouelties nor subtilities) but con∣trariwise they haue compounded Sciences chiefly of a certaine resplendent or lustrous masse of matter chosen to giue glory either to the subtillity of disputa∣cions or to the eloquence of discourses. But Seneca, giueth an excellent check to eloquence Nocet illis elo∣quentia, quibus non rerum cupiditatem facit sed sui, doc∣trines should be such as should make men in loue with the Lesson, and not with the Teacher, being di∣rected to the Auditors benefite, and not to the Au∣thors commendation: And therefore those are of the right kinde which may be concluded as Demosthe∣nes concludes his counsell Quae si feceritis non Orato∣rem duntaxat inpraesentia laudabitis sed vosmetipsos etiā nō ita multo post statu rerum vestrarum meliore.

Neyther needed men of so excellent parts to haue despaired of a Fortune, (which the Poet Virgill promi∣sed himselfe, and indeed obtained) who got as much glory of eloquence, wit, and learning in the expres∣sing of the obseruacions of husbandry, as of the he∣roicall acts of Aeneas.

Nec sunt animi dubius verbis ea vincere magnum. Quam sit & augustis his addere rebus honorem.

And surely if the purpose be in good earnest not to write at leasure that which mē may read at leasure, but really to instruct and suborne Action and actiue life, these Georgickes of the mind concerning the hus∣bādry & tillage therof, are no lesse worthy thē the he∣roical descriptiōs of vertue, duty, & felicity wherfore the maine & primitiue diuision of Morall knowledge see∣meth

to be into the EXEMPLAR or PLATFORME of GOOD, and the REGIMENT or CVLTVRE OF THE MIND; The one describing the nature of Good the other prescribing rules how to subdue, apply and accomodate the will of man therevnto.

The Doctrine touching the PLATFORME or Na∣TVRE of GOOD considereth it either SIMPLE or COMPARED either the kindes of Good or the de∣grees of Good: In the later whereof those infinite dis∣putations, which were touching the supreme degree thereof, which they terme Felicity, Beatitude, or the highest Good, the doctrines concerning which were as the heathen Diuinity, are by the christian faith dis∣charged. And as Aristotle saith, That yong men may bee happy, but not otherwise, but by Hope; So we must all ac∣knowledge our Minority, and embrace the felicity, which is by hope of the future world.

Freed therefore, and deliuered from this doctrine of the Philosophers heauen, whereby they fayned an higher eleuation of Mans Nature, then was; For we see in what an height of stile Seneca writeth, Vere Mag∣num, habere fragilitatem hominis, securitatem Dei.) We may with more sobriety and truerh receiue the rest of their Enquiries, and labors? Wherein for the Na∣ture of Good Positiue, or simple, they haue set it downe excellently, in describing the fourmes of Vertue and Duty, with their situations and postures, in distribu∣ting them into their kinds, parts, Prouinces, Actions, and Administrations, and the like; Nay furder, they haue commended them to Mans Nature, and spirite

with greate quicknesse of Argumente, and beauty of persuasions, yea, and fortified and entrenched them (as much as discourse can doe) against corrupt and popular opinions. Againe, for the degrees, and Comparatiue Nature of Good, they haue also excel∣lentlye handled it in their triplicity of Good; in the comparisons betweene a Contemplatiue and an actiue life, in the distinction between vertue with re∣luctation, and vertue secured; in their encounters be∣tween honesty and profit, in theyr ballancing of ver∣tue with vertue, and the like; so as this parte de∣serueth to bee reported for excellentlye labou∣red.

Notwithstanding, if before they had commen to the popular and receiued Nocions of vertue and vice, pleasure and payne, and the rest, they had stayed a little longer vpon the Enquirye, concerning the Rootes of Good and euill, and the Strings of those Rootes, they had giuen in my opinion, a great light to that which followed; and speciallye if they had consulted with Nature, they had made their doctrins lesse prolixe, and more profound; which beeing by them in part omitted, and in part handled with much Confusion, we will endeauour to resume, and open in a more cleare Manner.

There is fourmed in euery thing a double Nature of Good; the one, as euery thing is, a Totall or substantiue in it selfe; the other, as it is a parte or Member of a greater Bodye; whereof the

the later is in degree the greater, and the worthier, because it tendeth to the conseruation of a more ge∣nerall fourme. Therefore we see, the Iron in particu∣ler simpathye mooueth to the Loadstone; But yet if it exceede a cettayne quantity, it forsaketh the affecti∣on to the Loadstone and like a good patriot mooueth to the Earth which is the Region and Countrye of Massie Bodyes; so may we goe forward, and see that Water and Massie bodyes moue to the Center of the earth But rather thē to suffer a diuulsiō in the cōtinuāce of Nature they wil mooue vpwards from the Center of the Earth: forsaking their dutye to the Earth in re∣gard of their duty to the World. This double nature of Good & the com-paratiue thereof is much more engrauē vpon Man, if he degenerate not: vnto whō the Cōseruation of duty to the publique ought to be much more pecious then the Conseruation of life and being: according to that Memorable speache of Pompeius Magnus when being in commission of purueiance for a famine at Rome, and being dissua∣ded with great vehemency and instance by his frinds about him that he should not hazard himselfe to Sea in an exreemity of weather he sayd only to them: Necesse est vt eam, non vt viuam: But it may be truly affirmed that there was neuer any phylosophy, Reli∣gion or other discipline, which did so playnly and highly exalt the good which is Communicatiue and depresse the good which is priuate and particuler as the Holy faith: well declaring that it was the same God, that gaue the Christian Law to men, who gaue

those Lawes of nature, to inaminate Creatures that we spake of before; for we reade that the elected Saints of God haue wished themselues Anathemi∣zed, and razed out of the Booke of life, in an extasie of Charity, and infinite feeling of Communion.

This being set downe and strongly planted doth iudge and determine most of the Controuersies wherein Morall Philosophie is Conuersant; For first it decideth the question touching the preferment of the Contemplatiue or actiue life, and decideth it against Aristotle; For all the reasōs which he bringeth for the Contemplatiue, are priuate, and respecting the pleasure and dignity of a mans selfe, (in which re∣spects no question the contemplatiue life hath the preemynence;) not much vnlike to that Compari∣son, which Pythagoras made for the gracing and Mag nifying of Philosophy, and Contemplacion who be∣ing asked what he was, answered: That if Hiero were e∣uer at the Olimpian games, he knew the Manner, that some came to try their fortune for the prizes, and some cam as Merchants to vtter their commodities, and some came to make good cheere, and meete their friends, and som came to looke on, & that he was one of them that came to look on. But men must know, that in this Theater of Mans life, it is reserued onely for God and Angels to be loo kers on, Neither could the like question euer haue beene receiued in the Church, notwithstanding their (Preticsa in oculis Domini mors sanctorum eius) by which place they would exalt their Ciuile death, and regu∣ler professions, but vpon this defence, that the Mo∣nastical

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life is not simple Contemplatiue, but perfor∣meth the duty either of incessant prayers and suppli∣cations which hath been truly esteemed as an office in the church, or els of writing or in taking instruc∣tions for writing concerning the law of God as Mo∣ses did, when he abode so long in the Mount. And so wee see Henoch the. 7. from Adam who was the first Contemplatiue & walked with God, yet did also en∣dow the Church with prophesy which Sainte Iude citeth. But for contemplation which should be fini∣shed in itselfe without casting beames vpon society, assure•…•…ly diuinity knoweth it not.

It decideth also the controuersyes betweene Zeno and Socrates, and theyr schooles and successions on the oneside, who placed felicity in vertue simply or attended: the actions and exercises wherof do chiefly imbrace and concerne society; & on the other side, the C•…•…renaiques & Epicureans, whoplaced it in pleasure and made vertue, (as it is vsed in some comedyes of Errors, wherein the Mistres and the Maide change ha bits) to be but as a seruāt, without which, pleasure cā∣not be serued and attended, and the reformed schoole of the Epicureās, which placed it in serenity of mind and freedome from perturbation: as if they woulde haue deposed Iupiter againe, and restored Saturne, and the first age, when there was no summer nor winter, spring nor Autumne, but al after one ayre and season And Herillus, which placed felicity in extinguishmēt of the disputes of the mind, making no fixed Nature of Good and euill, esteeming things according to the

cleernes of the desires, or the reluctation: which opini on was reuiued in the heresy of the Anabaptists, mea suring things according to the motions of the spirit, and the constancy or wauering of beleefe, all which are manifest to tend to priuate repose & cōtentment, and not to poynt of society.

It censureth also the philosophy of Epictetus which presupposeth that felicity must bee placed in those things which are in our power, least we belyable to fortune & disturbance: as if it were not a thing much more happy to saile in good and vertuous ends for the publicke, then to obtayne all that wee can wish to our selues in our proper fortune: as Consaluo sayd to his souldiers, shewing them Naples and protesting, he had rather dy one foote forwards, then to haue his life secured for long, by one foote of retrayt: Where∣unto the wisedome of that heauenly Leader hath sig∣ned, who hath affirmed that A good Conscience is a continuall Feaste, shewing plainly that the conscience of good intencions howsoeuer succeeding, is a more continuall ioy to nature, then all the prouision which can be made for security and repose.

It censureth likewise that abuse of Philosophy, which grew generall about the time of Epictetus, in conuer∣ting it into an occupation or profession: as if the pur∣pose had bene, not to resist and extinguish perturba∣tions, but to fly and auoide the causes of them, & to shape a particular kind and course of life to that end, introducing such an health of mind, as was that health of body, of which Aristotle speaketh of Herodic•…•…, who

did nothing nothing all kis life long, but intend his health, whereas if men refer themselues to dutyes of Society; as that health of Body is best, which is ablest to endure all alterations and extremityes, So likewise that health of Mind is most proper, which can goe through the greatest temptations and perturbations. So as Diogenes opinion is to be accepted, who Com∣mended not them which absteyned, but them which sustayned, and could refraine their Mind in Precipitio, and could giue vnto the mind (as is vsed in horsman ship) the shortest stop or turne.

Lastly it censureth the Tendernesse and want of application in some of the most auncient and reue∣rend Philosophers and Philosophicall men, that did retyre too easily from Ciuile businesse, for auoyding of Indignities & perturbations, whereas the resolu∣tion of men truly Moral, ought to be such, as the same Consaluo sayd, the honor of a souldior should be F te∣la Crassiore, and not so fine, as that euery thing should catch in it, and endanger it.

To resume priuate or particular good, it falleth into the diuisiō of Good Actiue & Passiue; For this differēce of Good, (not vnlike to that which amongst the Ro∣mās was expressed in the familiar or houshold terms of Promus, and Condus,) is formed also in all things, & is best disclosed in the two seuerall Appetites in crea tures; the one to preserue or continue themselues, & the other to dilate or Multiply themselues; whereof the later seemeth to be the worthyer; For in Nature the heauens, which are the more worthy, are the A

gent, and the earth, which is the lesse woorthye is the Patient. In the pleasures of liuing creatures, that of generation is greater then that of foode. In diuine Doctrine, Beatius est dare quam accipere: And in life there is no mans spirit so soft but este∣meth the effecting of somwhat that he hath fixed in his desire more then sensuality: which priority of the Actiue Good, is much vpheld by the Consideration of our estate to be mortall & exposed to fortune: for, if wee mought haue a perpetuity and Certainty in our pleasures, the State of them would advance their price. But when we see it is but Magni aestimamus Mori tardius and Ne glorieris de crastino. Nescis Partum diei it maketh vs to desire to haue somwhat secured and exempted from Time, which are onelye our deedes and works, as it is sayd Operaeorum sequuntur eos. The preheminence likewise of this actiue good is vpheld by the affection which is naturall in man towardes variety and proceeding which in the pleasures of the sence which is the principal part of Passiue good) can haue no great latitude. Cogita quamdiu eadem feceris: Ci bus, Somnus, Ludus, per h•…•…nc Circulū curritur, mori velle nō tantū fertis aut miser aut prudens sed etiā fastidiosus po∣test. But in enterprises, pursutes & purposes of life ther is much variety, wherof men are sēsible with pleasure in theyr inceptions, progressions, recoyls, reinteg ati∣ons, approches and atteynings to their ends. So as it was wel said: Vita siue proposito languida & vaga est. Nei∣ther hath this Actiue good an•…•… Identity with the good of Society, though, in some case, it hath an in∣cidence

into it: For although it do many times bring forth Acts of Beneficēce yet it is with a respect priuate to a mās own power, glory, amplificatiō, cōtinuāce: 〈◊〉〈◊〉 appeareth plainly when it findeth a contrary Sùbiect For that Gygātine state of mind which possesseth the trowblers or the world, such as was Lucius Sylla and infinit other in smaller model, who would haue all mē happy or vnhappy as they were their friends or Eni∣mies, and would giue fourm to the world according to their owne humors (which is the true Theomachy) pretendeth and aspireth to Actiue good, though it recedeth furthest from good of Society which wee haue determined to be the greater.

To resume Passiue Good it receiueth a subdiuision of Conseruatiue and Perfectiue. For let vs take a brief Review of that which we haue said, we haue spoken first of the Good of Society the intention whereof embraceth the Fourm of Humaine Nature, whereof we are members & Portions: and not our owne pro∣per and Indiuidual fourme: we have spoken of Actiue good and supposed it as a part of Priuate and particu lar good. And rightly: For there is impressed vppon all things a triple desire or appetite proceeding from loue to themselues, one of preseruing and contynuing theyr form, another of Aduancing and Perfitting their fourm and a third of Multiplying and extending their iourme vpon other things: whereof the multiplying er signature of it vpon other things, is that which we handled by the name of Actiue good. So as there re∣mayneth the conseruing of it and parfiting or raising

of it: which later is the highest degree of Passiue good For to preserue in state, is the lesse; to preserue with aduancement is the greater. So in man

Ign•…•…us est ollis vigor, & coelestis •…•…rigo. His approach or Assumptiō to diuine or Angel•…•…icall Nature, is the perfection of his forme, The error or false Imitatiō of which good is that whichis the tēpest of humane life whileman vpō the instinct of an aduācement Formal, and Essential is carried to seek an aduancement Locall. For as those which are sick, & finde no remedy, doe tumble vp and downe and chaunge place, as if by a Remoue Locall, they could obtayne a Remooue In∣ternall: So is it with men in ambition, when fayling of the meane to exalt their Nature, they are in a perpe∣tuall estuation to exalte theyr Place. So then passiue Good, is, as was sayde, eyther Conseruatiue or Per∣fectiue.

To resume the good of conseruation or Comforte, which consisteth in the sruicion of that which is agree∣able to our Natures, it seemeth to be the most pure and Naturall of pleasures, but yet the sostest and the low∣est. And this also receiueth ā differēce, which hath nei∣ther beene well iudged of, nor well inquired. For the good of fruition or contentment, is placed eyther in the Sincerenesse of the sruition, or in the quicknesse & vigor of it, the one superinduced by the Aequality, the o ther by Vicissitude: the one hauing lesse mixture of Euil, the other more impressiō of Good. Whether of these, is the greter good, is a questiō cōtrouerted, but whether

maus nature may not be capable of both, is a questi∣on not inquired.

The former question heing debated between So∣crates, and a Sophist, Socrates placing felicity in an e∣quall and constan•…•… peace of mind; and the Sophist in much desiring, and much enioying: they fell from Ar∣gument to ill words: The Sophist saying that Socrates felicity, was the felicity of a block or stone, and Socra∣tes saying that the Sophists felicity, was the felicity of one that had the itch, who did nothing but itche and skratch. And both these opinions, do not want their supports. For the opinion of Socrates is much vpheld by the generall consent, euen of the Epicures them∣selues, that vertue beareth a great part in felicity: and if so, certain it is, that vertue hath more vse in clee∣ring perturbations, then in compassing desires. The Sophists opinion is much fauoured, by the Assertion we last spake of, that good of Aduancement, is greater then good of simple Preseruation: because, euery obtay∣ning a desire, hath a shew of aduancement, as mocion though in a Circle, hath a shew of progression.

But the second question, decided the true waye, maketh the former superfluous. For, can it be doub∣ted, but that there are some, who take more pleasure in enioying pleasures, then some other; and yet ne∣uerthelesse, are lesse troubled with the losse or lea∣uing of them? So as this same; Non vti, vt non appetas: Non appetere, vt non metuas, sunt animi pusilli & diffiden∣tis. And it seemeth to me, that most of the doctrines of the Philosophers are more fearefull and cautionary

then the Nature of things requireth. So haue they en∣creased the feare of death, in offering to cure it. For, when they would haue a mans whole life, to be but a discipline or preparation to dye: they must needes make men thinke, that it is a terrible Enemy, against whom there is no end of preparing. Better saith the Poet,

Qui sinem vitae extremum inter Munera ponat Naturae:

So haue they sought to make mens minds to vniforme and harmonicall, by not breaking them sufficiently to cō∣trary Motions: the reason whereof, I suppose to be, because they themselues were men dedicated, to a pri uate, free, and vnapplied course of life. For, as we see, vpon the lute, or like Instrument, a Ground, though it be sweet, and haue shew of many changes, yet brea∣keth not the hand to such strange and hard stoppes and passages, as a Set song, or Voluntary: much after the same Manner was the diuersity betweene a Philoso∣phicall and a ciuile life. And therefore men are to I∣mitate the wisedome of Iewellers, who, if there be a graine, or a cloude, or an ise which may be ground forth, without taking to much of the stone, they help it: but, if it should lessen and abate the stone to much they will not meddle with it: So ought men, so to pro∣cure Serenity, as they destroy not magnanimity.

Hauing therefore deduced the Good of Man, which is priuate & particular, as far as seemeth fit: wee will now returne to that Good of man, which respecteth and be

beholdeth Society which we may terme Duty; bi∣cause the term of duty is more propper to a minde well framed & disposed towards others, as the terme of vertue is applyed to a mind well formed & cōpo∣sed in it selfe, though neither can a man vnderstand vertue without some relation to Society, nor duety without an inwarde disposition, This part may seem at first to pertaine to Science Ciuile and Politicke: but not if it be wel obserued, For it concerneth the Rcgimēt & gouernment of euery man, over himself, & not ouer others. And as in architectur, the directiō of framing the postes beames & other parts of buil∣ding is not the same with the maner of ioyning them and erecting the building: And in mechanicalls, the direction how to frame an Instrument or Engyne, is not the same with the manner of setting it on woorke and imploying it: and yet neuerthelesse in expressing of the one, you incidently expresse the Aptnesse towardes the other: So the doctrine of Coniugation of men in Socyety, differereth from that of their conformity therevnto.

This part of Duty is sudiuided into two parts: the common duty of euery man, as a Man or member of a State: The other the respectiue or speciall duty of euery man in his prosession vocation and place: The first of these, is extāt & wel laboured as hathbeen said. The secōd like wise I may report rather dispersed thē dcficiēt: which maner of dispersed writing in this kind of Argumēt, I acknowledge to be best. For who cā take vpō him to write of the proper duty, vertue cha

and right, of euery seuerall vocation profession, and place. For although sometimes a Looker on may see more then a gamester and there be a Prouerb more arrogant theu sound That the vale best discouereth the hill: yet there is small doubt but that men can write best and most really & materialy in their owne pro∣fessions: & that the writing of speculatiue men of Actiue Matter, for the most part doth seeme to men of Experience as Phormioes Argument of the warrs seemed to Hannibal, to be but dreames and dotage, Onely there is one vice which accompanieth them, that write in their own professions that they magnify thē in excesse, But generally it were to be wished, (as that which wold make learning indeed solide & fruit ful) that Actiue men woold or could become writers

In which kind I cannot but mencion Honoris causa your Maiesties exellent book touching the duty of a king: a woorke ritchlye compounded of Diuinity Morality and Policy, with great aspersion of all other artes: & being in myne opinion one of the moste sound & healthful writings that I haue read: not dist∣empered in the heat of inuention nor in the Could∣nes of negligence: not sick of Dusinesse as those are who leese themselues in their order; nor of Convul∣sions as those which Crampe in matters imperti∣nent: not sauoring of perfumes & paintings as those doe who seek to please the Reader more then Na∣ture beareth, and chiefelye wel disposed in the spirits thereof, beeing agreeable to truth, and apt for ac∣tion: and farre remooued from that Naturall

insirmity, whereunto I noted those, that write in their own professions to be subiect, which is, that they ex∣alt it aboue measure. For your Maiesty hath truly des∣cribed, not a king of Assyria, or Persia, in their extern glory: but a Moses, or a Dauid, Pastors of their people. Neither can I euer leese out of my remembraunce, what I heard your Maiesty, in the same sacred spirite of Gouernment, deliuer, in a great cause of Iudicature which was: That Kings ruled by theyr lawes, as God did by the lawes of Nature, and ought as rarely to put in vse theyr supreme Prerogatiue, as God doth his power of working Mi∣racles. And yet notwithstandiug, in your book of a free Monarchy, you do well giue men to vnderstand, that you know the plenitude of the power and right of a King, as well as the Circle of his office and duty. Thus haue I presumed to alledge this excellent writing of your Maiesty, as a prime or eminent example of Trac∣tates, concerning speciall & respectiue dutyes: wherin I should haue said as much, if it had beene written a thousand yeares since: Neither am I mooued with cer tain Courtly decencyes, which esteeme it flattery to prayse in presence. No, it is flattery to prayse in ab∣sence: that is, when eyther the vertue is absent, or the occasion is absent: and so the prayse is not Naturall, but forced, either in truth, or in time. But let Cicerobe read in his Oration pro Marcello, which is nothing but an excellent Table of Caesars vertue, and made to his face, besides the example of many other excellent per sons, wiser a great deale then such obseruers: and we will neuer doubt, vpon a full occasion, to giue iust

prayses to present or absent.

But to return, there belongeth further, to the handling of this partie touching the duties of profe∣ssions and vocations a Relatiue or opposite touching the fraudes cautels, impostures, & vices of euery pro∣fession, which hath been likewise handled. But howe? rather in a Satyre & Cinicaly, then seriously & wisely for men haue rather sought by wit to deride and tra∣duce much of that which is good in professions then with Iudgement to discouer and seuer that which is corrupt. For as Salomon saith. He that cometh to seeke after knowledg with a mind to scorne and cen∣sure, shalbe sure to finde matter for his humor but no matter for his Instruction. Quaerenti derisori Scientiam, ipsa se abscondit: sed Studioso sit obuiam. But the mana∣ging of this argument with integrity & Truthe, which I note as deficient, seemeth to me to be one of the best fortifications for honesty and vertue that can be planted. For, as the fable goeth of the Basilisk, that if he see you first you die for it: but if you see him first, he dieth. So is it with deceits and euill arts: which if they be first espied they leese their life, but if they pre∣vent they indanger. So that we are much beholden to Macciauell & others that write what men doe and not what they ought to do. For it is not possible to ioyn serpentine wisedom with the Columbine Inno∣cency, except men know exactly all the conditions of the Serpent: his basenesse and going vpon his bellye, his volubility, and lubrioity his enuy and stinge, and the rest, that is al fourmes and Natures of euill For

without this vertue lyeth open and vnfenced. Nay an honest man can doe no good vppon those that are wicked to reclaime them, without the helpe of the knowledge of evil. For mē of corrupted minds presup∣pose, that honesty groweth out of Simplicitye of manners, and beleuing of Preachers, schoolmasters, and Mens exterior language. So as, except you can make them perceiue, that you know the vt most reaches of theyre owne corrupt opinions, they despise all moralitye. Non recipit stultus verba pru∣dentiae, nisi ca dixeris, quae versantur in Corde e∣ius.

Vnto this part touching Respectiue duty, doth also appertayne the dutyes betweene husband and wife, parent and childe, Master and Seruant. So likewise, the lawes of friendship and Gratitude, the ciuile bond of Companyes, Colledges, and Politike bodies, of neighbourhood, and all other proportionate duties: not as they ar parts of Gouernment and Society, but as to the framing of the minde of particular per∣sons.

The knowledge concerning good respecting Society doth handle it also not simply alone but Comparatiuely whereunto belongeth the weighing of duties, betwen person and person, Case and Case, particular & pub∣like: As we see in the proceeding of Lucius Brutus, a∣gainst his own Sons, which was so much extolled yet what was sayd?

Inf•…•…lix, vt cunque serent easata Minores.

So the case was doubtfull, and had opinion

on both sides: Againe we see, when M. Brutus and Cassius inuited to a supper certaine, whose opinions they meant to feele, whether they were fit to be made their Associates, and cast foorth the question tou∣ching the Killing of a Tyrāt being an vsurper they wer deuided in opinion, some holding, that Seruitude was the Extreame of Euils; and others, that Tyranny was better, then a Ciuile war: and a number of the like ca∣ses there are, of cōparatiue duty. Amōgst which, that of all others, is the most frequent, where the question is of a great deale of good to ensue of a small Iniust∣ice. Which Iason of Thessalia determined against the truth; Aliqua sunt iniustè sacienda, vt multa iuste fieri possint. But the reply is good; Authorem praesentis Iusti∣titiae habes; sponsorem futurae non habes; Men must pur∣sue things which are iust in presente, and leaue the future to the diuine prouidence: So then we passe on from this generall part touching the Exemplar and description of Good.

Now therefore, that we haue spoken of this fruite of life, it remaineth to speake of the Husbandry that belongeth thereunto, without which part, the former * 1.28 seemeth to be no better then a faire Image, or statua, which is beautifull to contemplate, but is without life and mocion: whereunto Aristotle himselfe subscribeth in these words: Necesse est scilicet de virtute dicere, & quid sit, & ex quibus gignatur. Inutile enim sere suerit, vir∣tutem quidem nosse, acquirendae autem eius modos & vias ignorare Non enim de virtute tantum, qua specie sit, quae∣rendum est, sed & quomodo sui copiam faciat, vtrunque e∣nim

volumus, et rem ipsam nosse & eius compotes fieri: Hoc autem ex voto non succedet, nisi sciamus & ex quibus & quo modo. In such full wordes and with such iteration doth he inculcate this part: So saith Cicero in great Commendation of Cato the second, that he he had applyed him self to Philosophy. Non ita dis∣putandi Causa, sed ita viuendi. And although the neg∣lect of our tymes wherein few men doe houlde any Consultations touching the reformation of theire life (as Seneca excellently saith, Departibus vitae quis∣que deliberat, de summa nemo) may make this part seem superfluous: yet I must Conclude with that Aphorism of Hypocrates, Qui graui morbo correpti dolores non senti∣unt, ijs mens aegrotat. They neede medicine not onely to asswage the disease but to awake the sense And if it be saide, that the cure of mens Mindes belongeth to sacred diuinity, it is most true: But yet Morall Philoso∣phy may be preferred vnto her as a wise seruaunt, and humble handmaide. For as the Psalme saith, That the eyes of the bandmayde looke perpetually towardes the mist∣resse, and yet no doubt many things are left to the dis∣cretion of the handmayde, to discerne of the mistresse will: So ought Morall Philosophy to giue a constant attention to the doctrines of Diuinity, and yet so as it may yeeld of her selfe (within due limits) Many soūd and profitable directions.

This Part therefore, because of the excellency ther∣of, I cannot but find exceeding strange, that it is not reduced to written enquiry, the rather because it con∣sisteth of much matter, wherein both speech and acti∣on

is often conuersant, and such wherein the common talke of men (which is rare, but yet commeth some∣times to passe) is wiser then their Bookes: It is reaso∣nable therefore that we propound it in the more par∣ticularity, both for the woorthinesse, and because we may acquite our selues for reporting it deficiēt, which seemeth almost incredible, and is otherwise conceiued and presupposed by those themselues, that haue writ∣ten. We wil therfore enumerate some heads or Points thereof, that it may appeare the better what it is, and whether it be extant.

First therefore in this, as in all things, which ar prac∣ticall, we ought to cast vp our account, what is in our power, and what not: for the one may be dealte with by waye of alteration, but the other by waye of ap∣plication onely. The husbandman cannot command, neither the Nature of the Earth, nor the seasons of the weather: no more can the Physition the consti∣tution of the patiente, nor the varietye of Accidentes. So in the Culture and Cure of the mynde of Man, two thinges are without our commaund: Poyntes of Nature, and pointes of Fortune. For to the Basis of the one, and the Conditions of the other, our worke is limited and tied. In these thinges therefore, it is left vnto vs, to proceede by application, Vincenda est omnis fortuna serendo: and so likewise vincenda est omnis Natura serendo. But, when that wee speake of sufferinge, wee doe not speake of a dull, and neglected sufferinge, but of a wise and industrious sufferinge, which draweth,

and contriueth vse and aduantage out of that which seemeth aduerse and contrary; which is that property which we cal, Accomodating or Applying. Now the wisedome of Application resteth principally in the exact & distinct knowledge of the precedent state, or disposition, vnto which we do apply: for we cannot fit a garment, except wee first take measure of the Body.

So then the first Article of this knowlede is to set downe Sound and true distributions and descripti∣ons of the seueral characters & tempers of mens Na∣tures and dispositions specially hauing regard to those differences which are most radicall in being the fountayns and Causes of the rest or most frequent in Concurrence or Commixture; wherein it is not the handling of a fewe of them in passage the better to describe the Mediocrities of vertues that can satisfie this intention for if it deserue to be considered That there are minds which are proportioned to great mattes, & others to smal, (Which Aristotle handleth or ought to haue handled by the name of Magnaminity) doth it not deserue as well to be Considered. That there are mindes proportioned to intend many matters and others to few? So that some can deuide them selues others can perchance do exactly wel, but it must bee but in fewe things at once; And so there cometh to bee a Nar∣rownes of mind as wel as a Pusillanimity. And againe, That some mindes are proportioned to that which may bee dispatched at once or within a short return of time: others to that which begins a farre of, and is to be won with length of

pursute,—Iam tū tenditque fo•…•…etque; So that there may be fitly said to be a long animity which is Comonly also ascribed to God as a Magnanimity. So further deserued it to be consideted, by Aristotle That there is a disposition in Conuersation (supposing it in things which doe in no sort tonch or concerne a mans selfe) to soothe and please; And a disposition contrary to Contradict and Crosse; And deserueth it not much better to be consi∣dered, That there is a disposition, not in conuersation or talke, but in matter of mere serious Nature (and supposing it still in things meerly indifferent) to take pleasure in the good of another, and adisposition contrarywise, to take distast at the good of another; which is that properly, which we call good Nature, or ill Nature, benignity or Malig∣nity: And therefore I cannot sufficiently Maruayle, that this parte of knowledge touching the seuerall Characters of Natures and dispositions should bee omitted both in Morality and policy, considering it is of so great Ministery, and suppeditation to them both A man shall find in the traditions of Astrology, som prety and apt diuisions of mens Natures according to the predominances of the Planets; Louers of Quiet Louers of action, louers of victory, louers of Honour, louers of pleasure, louers of Arts, louers of Change, and so forth: A man shall find in the wisest sort of these Relations, which the Italians make touching Conclaues, the Na∣tures of the seuerall Cardinalls, handsomlye and liuely painted fourth: A man shall meete with in e∣uery dayes Conference the denominations of Sensi∣tiue, dry, formall, reall, humorous, certayne, Humo di Prima impressione, Huomo di vltima impressione, and the like,

and yet neuerthelesse this kind of obseruations wan∣dreth in wordes, but as not fixed in Enquiry. For the distinctions are found (many of them) but we con∣clude no precepts vpon them, wherein our faulte is the greater, because both History, Poesye, and daylie experience are as goodly fields where these obser∣uations grow, whereof wee make a few poesies, to hould in our hands, but no man bringeth them to the confectionary, that Receits mought be made of them for vse of life.

Of much like kinde are those impressions of Nature, which are imposed vpon the Mind by the Sex, by the Age, by the Region, by health, and sicknesse, by beauty and deformity, and the like, which are inhe∣rent, and not externe: and again those which are cau∣sed by extern fortune: as Soueraygnty, Nobility, obscure birth, ritches, want, Magistracye, priuatenesse, prosperity, aduersity, Constant fortune, variable fortune, rising per saltum, per gradus, and the like: And therefore we see, that Plautus maketh it a wonder, to see an oulde man beneficent, Benignitas huius vt adolescentuli est: Saint Paul concludeth that seuerity of discipline was to be vsed to the Cretans, Increpa eos durè, vpon the disposition of their Country Cretenses semper mendaces, malae Bestiae, ventres pigri. Salust noteth, that it is vsuall with Kinges to desire Contradic∣toryes, sed plerunque Regiae voluntates, vt vehementes sunt, fic mobiles, saepeque ipsae sibi aduersae. Tacitus ob∣serueth

how rarely-raising of the fortune mendeth the disposition, solus Vespas•…•…anus, mutatus in melius, Pindarus maketh an obseruation, that greate and suddaine fortune for the most parte defeateth men Qui magnam foelicitatem concoquere non possunt: So the Psalme sheweth it is more easie to keep a mea∣sure in the enioying of fortune, then in the in∣crease of fortune. Diuitiae si affluant, nolite Cor ap∣ponere: These obseruations and the like, I denye not, but are touched a little by Aristotle as in pas∣sage in his Rhetoricks, and are handled in some scattered discourses, but they were neuer incor∣porate into Morall Philosophy, to which they doe essentiallye appertayne: as the knowledg of the di∣uersitye of groundes and Mouldes doth to Agri∣culture, and the knowledge of the diuersity of Com∣plexions and Constitutions doth to the Phisition; except we meane to follow the indiscretion of Empe riques, which minister the same medicines to all pa∣tients.

Another Article of this knowledge is the Inquirye touching the affections: for as in Medicining of the body it is in order first to know the diuers Complex∣ions and constitutions, secondlye the diseases, and lastlye the Cures: So in medicining of the Minde, after knowledge of the diuers Charact∣ers of mens natures, it foloweth in order to know the diseases and infirmites of the mind, which ar no o∣ther thē the perturbations & distempers of the affec∣tions.

For as the aunciente in politiques in po∣puler Estates were woont 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to Compare the peo∣ple to the sea, and the Orators to the winds because as the sea would of it selfe be caulm and quiet, if the windes did not mooue and trouble it; so the people would be peaceable and tractable if the seditious ora tors did not set them in working and agitation. So it may be fitly said, that the mind in the nature thereof would be temperate and stayed, if the affections as winds, did not put it into tumulte and perturbation. And here againe I find straunge, as before, that A∣ristotle shoulde haue written diuers volumes of E∣thiques, and neuer handled the affections, which is the principall subiect thereof, and yet in his Retoricks where they are considered but collaterally, & in a se∣cōd degree, (as they may be mooued by speech) he findeth place for them, and hādleth them well for the quātity but where their true place is, he pretermitteth them. For it is not his disputations about pleasure and paine that can satisfie this inquiry, no more then hee that should generally handle the nature of light can bee said to handle the nature of Colours: for pleasure and paine are to the particuler affections as light is to particular collours: Better trauailes I suppose had the Stoicks taken in this argument, as far as I can ga∣ther by that which wee haue at second hand: But yet it is like, it was after their manner rather in subtiltye of definitions (which in a subiect of this nature are but curiosities) then in actiue and ample descriptions and obseruations: so likewise I finde some particular

writings of an elegant nature touching some of the affections, as of Auger, of Comforte vpon aduerse accidentes, of Tendernesse of Countenance and o∣ther. But the poets and writers of Histories are the best Doctors of this knowledge, where we may finde painted fourth with greate life, How affections are kindled and incyted: and how pacified and refrai ned: and how againe Conteyned from Act, & furder degree: how they disclose themselues, how they work how they varye, how they gather and fortifie, how they are inwrapped one within another, and howe they doe fighte and encounter one with another, and other the like particularityes: Amōgst the which this last is of speciall vse in Morall and Ciuile mat∣ters: howe I say to sett affection againste affection, and to Master one by another, even as wee vse to hunt beast with beaste, and flye byrde with birde, which otherwise percase wee coulde not so easily recover: vpon which foundation is erected that excellent vse of Praemium and pana. whereby Ciuile states Consist, imploying the predominante affections of feare and hope, for the suppressing and brideling the rest. For as in the gouernemente of states, it is sometimes necessarye to bridle one faction with another, so it is in the gouernmente with∣in.

Now Come we to those poynts which are within 〈◊〉〈◊〉 our owne cōmand and haue force and operacion vpon the mind to affect the wil & Appetite & to alter Manners: wherin they ought to haue hādled Custome

Exercise, Habit, Educacion, example, Imitation, Emulation Company, Frinds, praise, Reproofe, exhortatiō, fame, lawes, Bookes, studyes: theis as they haue determinate vse, in moraliryes, from these the mind suffereth, and of these are such receipts & Regiments compounded & described, as may seeme to recouer or preserue the health and Good estate of the mind, as farre as per∣taineth to humane Medycine: of which number wee will visit vpon som one or two as an exāple of the rest, because it were too long to prosecute all; and there∣fore wee doe resume Custome and habite to speake of.

The opinion of Aristotle seemeth to mee a negli∣gent opinion. That of those thinges which consist by nature, nothing can be changed by custome, vsing for example: That if a stone bee throwne ten thousande tymes. vp, it wil not learne to assend, and 〈◊〉〈◊〉 that by, often seeing or hearing, wee doe not learne to see or heare the better. For thoughe this principle bee true in things wherein nature is Peremptory (the reason whereof we cannot nowe stande to discusse) yet it is otherwise in things wherein nature admitteth a lati∣tude. For he moughtsee that a streight gloue wil come more easily on with vse, and that a wand will by vse bend otherwise then it grewe: and that by vse of the voice wee speake lowder and stronger, and that by vse of enduring heate or coulde, we endure it the better, and the like: which later sort haue a neerer re∣semblance vnto that subiect of Manners he handleth then those instāces which he alledgeth; But allowing

his Conclusion that vertues and vices consist in habit, he ought so much the more to haue taught the man∣ner of superinducing that habite: for there bee many precepts of the wise ordering the exercises of the minde, as there is of ordering the exercises of the body, wherof we wil recite a fewe.

The first shal bee, that wee beware wee take not at the first either to High a strayne or to weake: for if, too Highe in a differēt nature you discorage, in a con∣fident nature, you breede an opinion of facility, and so a sloth, and in all natures you breede a furder expec∣tation then can hould out, and so an insatisfaction on the end, if to weake of the ether side: you may not looke to performe and ouercome any great taske.

Another precept is to practise all thinges chiefly at two seuerall times, the one when the mind is beste disposed, the other when it is worste disposed: that by the one you may gaine a great step, by the other you may worke out the knots and Stondes of the mind, and make the middle times rhe more easily and plea∣sant.

Another precept is, that which Aristotle mencio∣neth by the way, which is to beare euer towards the Contrary extreame of that wherevnto we are by Na∣ture inclyned: like vnto the Rowing against the stream or making a wand straight by bynding him Contra∣ry to his natural Crookednesse.

Another precept is, that the mind is brought to a∣ny thing better and with more sweetnesse and happi∣nesse, if that wherevnto you pretend be not first in the

intention but Tanquā aliud agendo, because of the Na¦turall hatred of the minde against necessity and Con¦straint. Many other Axiomes there are touching the Managing of Exercise and custome: which being so Conducted, doth prooue indeed another nature: but being gouerned by chance, doth cōmōly prooue but an ape of nature, & bringeth forth that which is lame and Counterfette.

So if wee shoulde handle bookes and studies and what influence and operation they haue vpon man∣ners, are there not diuers precepts of greate caution and direction appertaining thereunto? did not one of the fathers in greate indignation call Poesy vinum Demonum, because it increaseth temptations, pertur∣bations and vaine opinions? Is not the opinion of A∣ristotle worthy to be regarded wherein he saith, That yoūg men are no fitte auditors of Moral Philosophy, because they are not setled from the boyling heate of their affections, nor attempered with Time and experience? and doth it not hereof come that those excellent books and discourses of the aunciente writers, (whereby they haue perswaded vnto vertue most effectually, by representing her in state and Ma∣iesty; and populer opinions against vertue, in their Para∣sites Coates, fitt to be scorned and derided,) are of so little effect towards honesty of life, because they are not red & reuolued by mē in their mature and setled yeares, but confined almost to boyes & beginners? But is it not true also, that much lesse, young men are fit auditors of Matters of Policy, till they haue beene

throughly seasoned in religion & Morality, least their Iudgementes be corrupted, and made apt to thinke that there are no true Differences of things, but ac∣cording to vtility and fortune, as the verse describes it. Prosperum et Foelix scelus virtus vocatur: And Againe Ille crucem pretium sceleris tulit, Hic diadema: which the Poets do speak satyrically and in indignation on ver∣tues behalfe: But books of pollicre doe speake it seri∣ously, and positiuely, for so it pleaseth Machiauell to say That if Caesar had bene ouerthrowne, he woulde haue beene more odious then euer was Catiline; as if there had beene noe difference but in fortune, between a very fury of lust & bloud, and the most excellēt spirit (his am∣biciō reserued) of the world? Again is there not a Cau∣tion likewise to be giuen of the doctrines of Morali∣ties thēselues (some kindes of thē) leaste they make men too precise, arrogāt, incōpatible, as Cicero saith of Cato in Marco Catone. Haec bona quae videmus diuina & egregia ipsius scitote esse propria: quae nonnunquam requi∣rimus, ea, sunt omnia, non a naturâ sed a Magistro? Many other Axiomes & aduises there are touching those proprieties & effects, which studies doe infuse & instil into maners: And so likewise is there touchinge the vse of all those other points of Company: fame, lawes and the rest, which we recited in the beginning in the doctrine of Morality.

But there is a kind of CVLTVRE of the MIND; that semeth yet more accurate & elaborate thē the rest & is built vpon this ground: That the minds of all men are at some times in a state more perfite, and at o∣other

tymes in a state more depraued. The purpose ther∣fore of this practise is to fixe and cherishe the good howers of the mind and to obliterate and take fourth the Euil: The fixing of the good hath bene practised by two meanes, vowes or Constant resolutions, and obseruances, or exercises which are not to be regar∣ded so much in themselues, as because they keepe the mynd in continual obedience. The obliteratiō of the Euill hath been practised by two Meanes, some kind of Redemption or expiation of that which is past, and an Inception or account de Nouo, for the time to come: but this part, seemeth sacred and religious, and Iustly: for all good Morall Philosophy (as was said,) is but an handmaide to Religion.

Wherefore we will conclude with that last pointe which is of all other meanes the moste compen∣dious and summarye, and againe, the moste noble and effectual to the reducing of the minde vnto ver∣tue and good estate: which is the electing and pro∣pounding vnto a mans selfe good & vertuous ends of his life, such as may bee in a reasonable sorte within his Compas to attaine. For if these two things be sup osed: that a maset before him honest & Good ends, and againe that he bee resolute, Constant, and true vnto them; it will follow that hee shall Moulde him∣selfe into al vertue at once: and this is indeede like the worke of nature; whereas the other course, is like the worke of the hand. For as when a caruer makes an image, hee shapes onely that parte whereupon hee worketh, as if hee bee vpon The face that parte which

shal bee the body is but a rude stone stil, til such times as hee comes to it. But contrarywise when Nature makes a flower or liuing creature, shee fourmeth rudi∣ments of all the parts at one time; so in obtaining ver tue by habite, while a man practiseth Temperance, he doth not profit much to fortitude, nor the like; But when he dedicateth & applyeth himselfe to good ends, loke what vertue soeuer the pursute and passage to∣wards those ends doth commend vnto him, he is in∣uested of a precedent disposition to conforme him∣selfe thereunto: which state of mind Aristotle doth ex∣excellently expresse himself, that it ought not to bee called vertuous, but Diuine: his words are these; Imma∣nitati autem consentaneum est, opponere eam, quae supra humanitatem est, heroicā siue diuinam virtutem. And a little after; Nā vt ferae, neque vitiū, ne{que} virtus est sic ne{que} Dei. Sed hic quidē status altius quiddā virtute est, ille aliud quiddā a vitio. And therfore we may see what Celsitud of honor Piinius secundus attributeth to Traiane in his funerall oration, where he said. That men needed to make noe other praiers to the Gods, but that they woulde Continue as good Lords to them, as Traiaine had beene: as if he had not beene onely an Imitation of diuine na∣ture, but a patterne of it. But these be heathen & pro∣phane passages having but a shadowe of that diuine state of mind, which Religion and the holy faith doth conduct men vnto; by imprinting vpon their soules Charity which is exellētly called the bond of Perfectiō: bicause it cōprehēdeth & fastneth al vertues together. And it is elegantly said by Menander of vaine loue

which is but a false Imitation of diuine loue. Amor melior Sophista, Lauo, ad humanam vitam, that Loue teacheth a man to Carry himselfe better, then the Sophist or Praeceptor, which he calleth Left handed, be∣cause with all his rules & preceptiōs he cannot form a man so Dexteriously, nor with that facility to prize himself & gouern himself as loue cā do: So certainly if a mās mind be truly inflamd with charity it doth work himsodainly into greter perfectiō then al the Doctrin of moralitye can doe, which is but a sophist in com∣parison of the other. Nay furder as Xenophon obser∣ved truely that all other affections though they raise the minde, yet they doe it by distorting, and vncom∣linesse of extasies or excesses; but onely Loue doth exalt the mind, and neuerthelesse; at the same instant doth settle and Compose it. So in all other excellen∣cyes though they aduance nature yet they are subiect to Excesse. Onely Charity admitteth noe Excesse; for soe we see, aspiring to be like God in power, the Angells transgressed and fel: Ascendam, & ero simitis altissimo: By aspiringe to be like God in knowledge man transgressed and fell. Eritis sicut Dii scientes bo∣uum & malum; But by aspiring to a similitude of God in goodnesse or loue, neyther Man nor Angell euer transgressed or shall transgresse. For vnto that im∣itation wee are called, Diligite inimicos vestros, Benefacite eis qui odernut vos, & orate pro perse∣quentibus & Calumniantibus vos, vt sitis filii patris vestri qui in coelis est, qui solem suum oriri facit super

bonos & malos, & pluit super iustos & iniustos. So in the first platfourme of the diuine Nature it self, the heathē Religion speaketh thus, Optimus Maximus, and the sa∣cred scriptures thus, Misericordia eius super omnia opera eius.

Wherefore I doe conclude this part of Morall knowledge concerning the Culture and Regiment of the Mind, wherin if any man considering the parts ther∣of, which I haue enumerated, doe iudge, that my la∣bor is but to Collect into an Art or Sciēce, that which hath bin pretermitted by others, as matter of cōmon Sence, and experience, he iudgeth well: But as Philocra∣tes sported with Demosthenes: you may not maruaile (A thenians) that Demosthenes and I doe differ, for hee drink∣eth water, and I drinke wine: and like as wee reade of an aunciente parable of the two gates of sleep.

Sunt geminae somni portae, quarum altera fertur Cornea, qua veris facilis datur exitus vmbris: Altera Candenti perfecta nitens Elephanto, Sed falsa ad coelum mittunt insomnia manes.

So if wee put on sobriety and attention, we shall finde it a sure Maxime in knowledge: that the more pleasaunte Liquor (of Wine) is the more vaporous, and the brauer gate of Iuorye, sendeth foorthe the falser dreames.

But we haue now concluded, That generall part of Humane Philosophye, which contemplateth man se∣gregate, and as hee consisteth of bodye and spirite; Wherein wee maye further note, that there

there seemeth to be a Relatiō or Conformity betwen the good of the mynd, and the good of the Body. For as we devided the good of the body into Health, Beau ty, strength, and Pleasure, so the good of the mynde inquired in Rationall and Morall knoweledges tendeth to this, to make the minde sound, and with∣out perturbation, Beautifull and graced with decen∣cie: and Strong and Agill for all duties of life. T•…•…eis three as in the bodye, so in the minde seel∣dome meete, and Commonly seuer: For it is ea∣silye to obserue, that many haue Strength of witte and Courage, but haue neither Healthe from per∣turbations, nor any Beauty or decencie in theire doings: som againe haue an Elegancy and finenesse of Carriage, which haue neither soundnesse of ho∣nestie, nor substance of sufficiencye: And some againe haue honest and refourmed Myndes that can neither become themselues nor Manage Businesse, and sometimes two of them meete, and rarely all three: As for pleasure, wee haue likewise de∣termined, that the minde oughte not to bee redu∣ced to stupide, but to retayne pleasure: Confined rather in the subiect of it, then in the strength and vigor of it.

CIVILE KNOVVLEDGE is conversant about a subiect which of all others is most immersed in matter, and hardliest reduced to Actiome.

Neuerthelesse, as Cato the Censor saide, That the Romane; were like sheepe, for that a man were better driue a flock of them, then one of them; For in a flocke, if you could get but some fewe goe righte, the rest would follow: So in that respect Morall philosophie is more diffi∣cile then Pollicie. Againe, morrall Philosophye propoundeth to it selfe the framing of Internall goodnesse: But ciuile knowledge requireth onelye an Externall goodnesse: for that as to societye suffi∣ceth: And therfore it cometh oft to passe that therebe Euill Times in good gouernments: for so we finde in the holy story when the kings were good, yet it is ad∣ded. Sed adhuc populus non dixerat cor suum ad domi∣num Deumpatrum suorum. Againe States as great En∣gines mooue slowly, and are not so soone put out of frame: for as in Aegypt the seauē good years sustained the seauen badde: So gouernments for a time well grounded doe beare out errors following. But the resolution of particuler persons is more so dainly sub verted. These respects doe somwhat qualifie the ex∣treame difficulty of •…•…iuile knowledge.

This knowledge hath three parts according to the three summary Actiōs of society, which are, Cō∣versation, Negotiatiō and Gouernment. For mā see∣keth in society comfort, vse and Protection: & theybe three wisedōs of diuers natures, which do oftē seuer: wisedome of the behauiour, wisedom of Businesse; & wisedome of state.

The wisedome of of conuersation ought not to be ouer mvch affected, but much lesse despised: for it

hath not onely an honour in it selfe, but an influ∣ence also into businesse and gouernment; The poet saieth.

Nec vultu destrue verba tuo. A man maie destroy the force of his woords with his counte∣nance: so may he•…•… of his deeds saieth Cicero, recom∣mending to his brother affability and easy accesse, Nil interest habere ostium apertum, vultum clausum.

It is nothing wonne to admitte men with an open doore, and to receiue them with a shutte and reserued countenaunce. So wee see Atticus, be∣fore the first interuiewe betweene Coesar and Cice∣ro, the warre depending, did seriouslye aduise Ci∣cero touching the composing and orderinge of his countenaunce and gesture. And if the gouerne∣mente of the countenaunce bee of such effecte, much more is that of the speeche, and other car∣riage appertayning to conuersation; the true mo∣dele whereof seemeth to mee well expressed by Lt∣uye, though not meante for this purpose; Ne aut arrogans videar, aut obnoxius, quorum alterum est alie∣nae libertatis obliti, alterum suae: The summe of beha∣uioure is to retayne a mans owne dignitye, without in∣truding vpon the libertye of others: on the other side, if behauioure and outwarde carriage bee intended too much, first it may passe into affection, and then Quid deformius quam Scaenam in vitam transferre, to acte a mans life? But although it proceede not to that extreame, yet it consumeth time, and imploy∣eth

the minde too much. And therefore as wee vse to aduise younge studentes from company kee∣ping, by saying, Amici, sures Temporis: So certainely the Intending of the discretion of behauioure is a great Theefe of Meditation: Againe, such as are ac∣complished in that howr of vrbanity, please them∣selues in name, and sildome aspire to higher vertue: whereas those that haue defect in it, do seeke Com∣lines by Reputation: for where reputacion is, almost euery thing becommeth: But where that is not, it must be supplied by Puntos and Complementes: A∣gayne, there is no greater impediment of Action, then an ouercurious obseruaunce of decency, and the guide of decencye, which is Tyme and season. For as Salomon sayeth, Qui respicit ad ventos, non seminat, & qui respicit ad nubes, non metet: A man must make his opportunity, as ofte as finde it. To conclude; Behauiour seemeth to me as a Garment of the Minde, and to haue the Condicions of a Garmente. For it ought to bee made in sashi∣on: it ought not to bee too curious: It ought to bee shaped so, as to sette foorthe anye good making of the minde: and hide any deformity; and aboue all, it ought not to be too straighte, or re∣strayned for exercise or mocion. But this parte of Ciuile knowledge hath beene elegantlye hand∣led, and therefore I cannot reporte it for defici∣ent.

The wisedome touching Negotiation or businesse

hath not bin hitherto collected into writing to the great derogacion of learning, and the professors of learninge. For from this roote springeth chiefly that note or opinion which by vs is expressed in A∣dage, to this effecte: That there is noe greate con∣currence betweene learning and Wisedome. For of the three wisedomes which wee haue sette downe to pertaine to ciuil life, for wisedome of Behauiour, it is by learned men for the moste parte despised, as an Inferiour to Vertue and and an Enemy to Medi∣tacion; for wisedome of Gouernmente they acquite themselues well when they are called to it, but that happeneth to fewe. But for the wisedome of Busi∣nesse wherein mans life is moste conuersant, there bee noe Bookes of it, excepte some fewe scattered aduertisementes, that haue noe proportion to the magnitude of this subiecte. For if bookes were writ∣ten of this, as the other, I doubt not but learned men with meane experience, woulde farre excell men of longe experience withoute learning, and out∣shoote them in their owne bowe.

Neither needeth it at all to be doubted, that this knowlddge shoulde bee so variable as it falleth not vnder precept; for it is much lesse infinite then science of Gouernmente, which wee see is laboured and in some parte reduced. Of this wisedome it see∣meth some of the auncient Romanes in the saddest and wisest times were professors: for Cicero repor∣teth, that it was then in vse. For Senators that had

name and opinion, for generall wisemen as Cerun∣canius, Curius, Loelius and manie others; to walke at certaine howers in the Place, and to giue audience to those that would vse their aduise, and that the par∣ticuler Citizens would resort vnto them, and con∣sulte with them of the marriage of a daughter, or of the imploying of a sonne, or of a purchase or bar∣gaine, or of an accusatiō and euery other occasion in∣cident to mans life; so as there is a wisedome of Counsaile and aduise euen in priuate Causes: arisinge out of an vniuersall insight into the affayrs of the world, which is vsed indeede vpon particuler cases propoūded, but is gathered by generall obser, uation of causes of like nature. For so wee see in the Booke which Cicero writeth to his brother De pe∣titione consultatus, (being the onely booke of businesse that I know written by the auncients) although it cō∣cerned a particuler action then on foote, yet the sub∣stance thereof consisteth of manie wise and polli∣tique Axioms which containe not a temporary, but a perpetuall direction in the case of popular Electi∣ons; But chiefly wee may see in those Aphorismes which haue place amongest Divine writings com∣posed by Salomon the King, of whom the scriptures testifie that his hearte was as the sandes of the sea, in∣compassing the world and all worldly matters we see I saie, not a few profound and excellent cauti∣ons, precepts, positions, extending to much vari∣etie of occasions; wherevpon wee will staie a while

offering to consideracion some number of Exam∣ples.

Sed & eunctis sermonibus qui dicuntur, ne accom∣modes aurem tuam, uè fortè audiaes seruum tuum male∣dicentem tibi. Heere is concluded the prouidente staye of enquiry, of that which we wolde be loathe to finde: as it was iudged greate wisedome in Pom∣petus Magnus that he burned Sertorius papers vnper∣used.

Vir sapiens si cum stulto contenderit, siue irascaetur, siue rideat, uon inueniet requiem. Here is described the great disaduantage which a wise man hath in vndertaking a lighter person then himselfe, which is such an in∣gagemente, as whether a man turne the matter to ieast, or turne it to heate; or howsoeuer hee change copye, hee can no wayes quitte himselfe well of it.

Qui delicatè à pueritia nutrit seruum suum, postea sentiet eum contumacem. Heere is signified that if a man beginne too highe a pitche in his fauoures, it doeth commonlye end in vnkindnesse, and vnthank∣fulnesse.

Vidisti virum velocem in opere suo, coram regibus stabit nec erit inter ignobiles. Here is obserued that of all ver∣tues for rising to honoure, quicknesse of dispatche is the best; for superiours many times loue not to haue those they imploy too deep, or too sufficient, but redy and diligent.

Vidi cunctos viuentes, qui ambulant sub sole cum ado∣adolescente

secundo qui consurgit pro eo. Here is expre∣ssed that which was noted by Sylla first, and after him by Tiberius; Plures adorant solem orientem, quam occiden∣tem vel meridianum.

Si spiritus potesta•…•…m habentis ascenderit super te, locum tuum ne dimiseris, quia Curatio faciet cessare peccata maxima. Here caution is giuen that vpon displeasure, retiring is of all courses the vnfittest; for a man leaueth thinges at worst, and depri∣ueth himselfe of meanes to make them bet∣ter.

Erat Ciuitas parua pauci in ea viri; venit con∣tra eam rex magnus, & vadauit eam, instrxuitque munitiones per Gyrum, & perfecta est obsidio inuentusquae est in ea vir pauper & sapiens, & liberauit eam per sapi∣entiam suam, & nullus deinceps recordatus est hominis illius pauperis; Here the corruptions of states is sette foorh; that esteeme not vertue or merite longer then they haue vse of it.

Mollis responsio frangit iram. Here is noted that si∣lence or rough Answeare, exasperateth: but an an∣swear present and temperate pacifieth.

Iter pigrorum, quasisepes spinarum. Here is liue∣lie represented how laborious sloth prooueth in the end; for when thinges are differred till the laste instant, and nothing prepared before hande, euerye stepp findeth a Bryer or Impediment, which catcheth or stoppeth.

Melior est finis orationis quam principium. Here is tax∣ed the vanitie of formall speakers, that study more

about prefaces and inducements, then vpon the con∣clusions and issues of speache.

Qui cognoscit in iudicio faciem, non bene facit, iste et pro buccella panis des•…•…ret veritatem. Here is no∣ted that a iudge were better be a briber, then a res∣pecter of persons: for a corrupt Iudge offendeth not so lightly as a facile.

Vir pauper calumnians pauperes, similis est imbrive∣hementi, in quo paratur fames; here is expressed the extreami•…•…y of necessitous extortions, figured in the aunciente fable of the full and the hungry horse∣leech.

Fons turbatus pede, & vena corrupta, est iustus cadens coram impio: here is noted that one iudiciall and ex∣emplar iniquity in the face of the world, doth trouble the fountaines of Iustice more, then many particuler Iniuries passed over by conniuence.

Qui subtrahit aliquid a patre & a matre, & di∣cit hoc non esse peccatū, particeps est homicidij; here is noted that whereas men in wronging theyr best frindes, vse to extenuat: their faulte, as if they moughte presume or bee bolde vpon them, it doth contrariwise indeede aggrauate their fault, & turneth it from I•…•…iury to impiety.

Noli esse amicus homini iracundo, nec ambulato cum homine furioso; here caution is giuen that in the election of our friends wee doe principalliy avoide those which are impatiente, as those that will espouse vs to many factions and qua∣rels.

Qui conturbat domum suam possidebit ventum: here is noted that in domesticall separations & brea∣ches men doe promise to themselues quietting of theire minde and contentemente, but still they are deceived of theire expectation, and it turneth to winde.

Pilius sapiens laetificat patrem, filius vero stultus maesti∣eia est matri sueae. Here is distinguished that fathers haue moste comforte of the good proose of of their sonnes; but mothers haue moste discomfort of their ill proofe, because women haue little discer∣ninge of vertue but of fortune.

Qui celat delictum quoerit amicitiam, sed qui altero ser∣mone repetit, seperat faederatos; here caution is giuen that reconcilemente is better managed by an Am∣nesty and passing ouer that which is past, then by A∣pologies and excusations.

In omni opere bono erit abundantia, vbi autem verba sunt plurima, ibi frequenter egestas: here is noted that words and discourse aboundeth moste, where there is idlenesse and want.

Primus in sua causa iustus, sed venit altera pars, & in∣quiret in éum, Heare is obserued that in all causes the first tale possesseth much, in sorte, that the preiudice, thereby wrought wil bee hardly remooued, ex cepte some abuse or falsitie in the Information be detec∣ted.

Verba blinguis quasi simplicia, & ipsa perueniunt ad interiora ventris; there is distinguished that flatterye and insinuation which seemeth set and artificiall,

sinketh not farre, but that entreth deepe, which hath shewe of nature, libertie, and simplicity,

Qui erudit deriso rem, ipse t•…•…bi 〈◊〉〈◊〉 facit & qui arguit Impium sibi maculam geri•…•…. Here caution is giuen howe wee tender reprehension to arro∣gante and sco•…•…nefull natures, whose manner is to esteeme it for contumely, and accordingly ro re∣tourne, it,

Da sapienti occasionem & addetur ei sapientia, Here is distinguished the wisedome broughte into habite, and that which is but verball and swimming onely in conceite: for the one vpon the occasione presented is quickned and redoubled: the other is a∣mazed and confused.

Quo modo in aquis resplendent vultus prospicien∣tium, sic corda hominum manifestasunt prudentibus. Here the mind of a wise man is compared to a glasse, wherein the Images of all diuersitie of Natures & Customs are represēted, frō which representatiō proceedeth that application,

Qui sapit innumeris moribus aptus erit,

Thus haue I staide some what longer vpon these sentences pollitique of Salomon, then is ag•…•…e, able to the proportion of an example: ledde with a desire to giue authority to this parte of knowe∣ledge, which I noted as deficiente by so excel∣lente a presidente: : and haue also attended them with briefe obseruations, such as to my vnder∣standinge, offer noe violence to the sence, though I knowe they may bee applyed to a more diuine vse:

But it is allowed euen in diuinity, that some Interpretations, yea and some writings haue more of the Eagle, then others: But takinge them as Instructi∣ons for life, they moughte haue receiued large dis∣course, if I woulde haue broken them and illustrated them by diducements and examples.

Neither was this in vse only with the hebrews, But it is generally to be found in the wisdome of the more auncient Times: that as men sounde out any obser∣uatiō that they thought was good for life, they would gather it and expresse it in parable. or Aphorisme, or fable. But for fables they were vicegerents & sup∣plies, where Examples sàiled: Nowe that the times abounde with historie, the Ayme is better when the marke is aliue. And therefore the fourme of wri∣ting which of al others is fittest for this variable argu mente of Negotiation and occasions is that which Machiauel chose wisely and aptly for Gouernmente: namely discourse vpon Histories or Examples. For knoweledge drawne freshly and in our view out of particulers, knoweth the waie best to particulers a∣gaine. And it hath much greater life for practise: when the discourse attendeth vpon the Exam∣ple, then when the example attenddeth vpon the discourse. For this is no pointe of order as it seemeth at firste but of substance. For when the Example is the grounde being set downe in an history at large, it is set down with al circumstā∣ces: which manye sometimes controul the discourse

thereupon made, and sometimes supply it; as a verie patterne for gaine; wheras the Examples alledged for the discourses sake, are cited succinctly, and with out particularity, and carry a seruile aspecte towards the discourse, which they are broughte in to make good.

But this difference is not amisse to bee remem∣bred, that as historye of Tymes is the best grounde for discourse of Gouernemente, such as Machyauel handleth; so Histories of Liues is the moste pro∣per for discourse of businesse is more con∣versante in priuate Actions. Nay, there is a ground of discourse for this purpose, fitter then them both which is discourse vpon letters, such as are wise and weightie, as manie are of Cicero ad Atticum and others. For letters haue a greate and more par∣ticuler representation of businesse, then either Chronicles or Liues, Thus haue wee spoken both of the matter and fourme of this patte of Ciuile knowledge touching Negotiation, which wee note to be deficient.

But yet there is another part of this part, which diffe∣reth as much frō that wherofwe haue spoké as sapere, & sibi Sapere: the one moouing as it were to the circū rence, the other to the center: for there is awise∣dome of counfell, and againe there is a wise∣dome of pressi•…•…ng a mans owne fortune; and they doe sometimes meet, and often seuere. For many are wise in their owne ways, that are weak for

gouernmente or Counsell, like Ants which is a wise creature for it self, but very huttefull for the gar∣den- This wisedome the Romanes did take much knoweledge of, Nam polsapiens (saith the Comicall Poet) Fingit fortunam sibi, and it grewe to an adage, Faber quisque fortunae propriae•…•… and Liure attribu•…•…eth it to Cato the first, In hoc viro tanta vis animi & ingenij inerat, vt quocunque Loco natus esset sibi ipse fortunam sacturus videre tur.

This conceit or position if it bee too much declared and professed, hath beene thoughte a thinge impolitique and vnlucky, as was obserued in Timotheus the Athenian: who hauinge done manie greate seruices to the Estate in his gouernmēt and giuinge an accounte thereof to the people as the manner was, did conclude euery particuler with this Clause, And in this fortune had noe part And it came so to passe that hee neuer prospered in any thinge hee tooke in hande afterwarde: for this is too high and too arrogant savouring of that which Ezechiel saith of Pharaoh: Dicis: fluuius est meus & ego feci memet ipsum: or of that which another prophette speaketh: That men offer Sacrifices to theire nettes and snares, and that which the Poett expre∣sseth,. Dextra mihi Deus, & telum quod inutile libro.

Nunc adsinte:

For these confidences were euer vnhal∣lowed, and vnblessed. And therefore those that were great Pollitiques indeede euer afcribed their succcesses to their felicitie: and not to theire skill or

vertue. For so Sylla surnamed himselfe Foelix•…•…, not Magnus So Caesar saide to the Maister of the shippe, Caesarem portas & fortunam eius.

But yet neuerthelesse these Positions Faber quis{que} fortunae suae, sapiens dominabitur astris: Inuia virtuti nullaest via, and the like, being takē and vsed as spurs to Industry, and not as stirops to insolency rather for resolution then for the presumption or outwarde de∣claration, haue beene euer thoughte sounde and good, and are no question imprinted in the greatest mindes: who are so sensible of this opinion, as they causcarce containe it within. As we see in Augustus Caesar) who was rather diuerse from his vncle, then, inferiour in vertue) how when he died, he desiered his friénds aboute him to giue him a Plaudite: as if hee were consciente to himselfe that he had played his parte wel vpon the stage. This parte of knowledge we doe reporte also as deficient: not but that it is practised too much, butit hath not beene reduced to writinge. And therefore least it shoulde seme to any that it is not comprehensible by Axiome, It is requi∣site as wee did in the former, that wee set down some * 1.29 heads or passages of it.

Wherein it maye appeare at the first a newe and vnwoonted Argumente to teach men how to raise and make theire fortune a doctrine wherein euery man perchance will bee ready to yeeld him∣selfe a disciple til he seethe difficulty: for fortune la∣yeth as heauy impositions as vertue, and it is as harde and severe a thinge to bee a true Polli∣politique,

as to be truelye morall. But the handlinge hereof, concerneth learning greatly, both in honour, and in substance: In honour, because pragmaticall men may not goe away with an opinion that lear∣ning is like a Larke that can mount, and singe, and please her selfe, and nothing else; but may knowe that she houldeth as well of the hauke that can soare aloft, and can also descend and strike vpon the pray. In substance, because it is the perfite lawe of enqui∣ry of trueth, That nothing bee in the globe of matter, which should not be likewise in the globe of Crystall, or Fourme, that is, that there be not any thing in being & action, which should not bee drawne and collected into contemplation and doctrine: Neyther doth lear∣ning admire or esteeme of this Architecture of for∣tune, otherwise then as of an inferiour worke; For no mans fortune can be an end woorthy of his being, and many times the woorthiest men doe abandon theyr fortune willingly for better respects: but neuer∣thelesse fortune as an organ of vertue and merit de∣serueth the consideration.

First therefore the precept which I conceiue to bee most summary, towardes the preuayling in for∣tune; is to obtaine that windowe which Momus did require, who seeing in the frame of mans heart, such Angles and recesses, sounde fault there was not a windowe to looke into them: that is, to pro∣cure good informacions of particulars touching per∣sons, their Natures, their desires & ends, their customs

and fashions, theyr helpes and aduantages, and wher∣by they cheesly stand; so againe their weaknesses and disaduantages, and where they lye most open and ob∣noxious, their friendes, factions, dependaunces: and againe theyr opposites, enuiors, competitors, theyr moods, and times, Sola viri molles adytus, & tēporanoras theyr principles, rules, and obseruacions: and the like; And this not onely of persons, but of actions: what are on foote from time to time: and how they are con ducted, fauoured, opposed; and how they importe: and the like; For the knowledge of present Acti∣ons, is not onely materiall in itselfe, but without it also, the knowledge of persons is very erronious: for men chaunge with the actions; and whiles they are in pursuite, they are one, and when they retourne to theyr Nature, they are another. These Infor∣mations of particulars, touching persons and acti∣ons, are as the minor propositions in euery actiue syl logisme, for no excellencye of observacions (which are as the maior propositions) can suffice to ground a conclusion, if there be error and mistaking in the mi∣nors.

That this knowledge is possible, Salomon is our surety who sayeth. Consilium in corde viri tanquam a∣qua profunda, sed vir prudens exhauriet illud: And although the knowledge it selfe falleth not vn∣der precept, because it is of Indiuiduals, yet the In∣structions for the obtaining of it may.

We will beginne therefore with this precept, ac∣cording to the aunciente opinion, that the Synewes

of wisedome, are slownesse of beleefe, and distrust: That more trust bee giuen to Countenances and Deedes, then to wordes: and in wordes, rather to suddaine passages, and surprised wordes: then to set and purposed wordes: Neither let that be feared which is sayde, fronti nulla fides, which is meant of a generall outward behauiour, and not of the priuate and subtile mocions and labours of the countenance and gesture, which as Q. Cicero elegantly sayth is A∣nimi Ianua, the gate of the Mynd: None more close then Tyberius, and yet Tacitus sayth of Gallus, Etenim vul∣tu offersionem coniectauerat. So againe noting the dis∣fering Character and manner of his commending Germanicus and Drusus in the Senate: he sayeth, tou∣ching his fashion wherein hee carried his speeche of Germunicus, thus: Magis in fpeciem adornatis ver∣bis, quam vt penitus sentire crederetur, but of Drusus thus, Paucioribus sed intentior, & fida oratione: and in another place speaking of his character of speech, when he did any thing that was gratious and popu∣ler, he sayeth, That in other thinges hee was velut e∣luctantium verborum: but then againe, Solutius loque∣batur quando subueniret. So that there is no such arti∣ficer of dissimulation: nor noe such commaunded countenaunce (vulius tussus), that can seuer from a fai∣ned tale, some of these fashions, either a more sleight and carelesse fashion, or more set & sormall, or more tedious and wandring or comming from, a mā more drily and hardly.

Neither are Deedes such assured pledges, as that

they may be trusted without a iudicious cōsideraciō of their magnitude and nature; Fraus sibi in paruis fidem praestruit, vt maiore emolumento sallat: and the Italian thinketh himselfe vpon the point to be bought and sould: when he is better vsed then he was woont to be without manifest cause. For small fauoures, they doe but lull men a sleepe, both as to Caution, and as to Industry, and are as Demosthenes calleth them, Alimen∣ta socordiae. So againe we see, how false the nature of some deeds are in that particular, which Mutianus practised vpon Antonius Primus, vpon that hollowe and vnfaithfull reconcilement, which was made be∣tween them: whereupon Mutianus aduanced many of the friends of Antonius: Simul amicis eius praesecturas & tribunatus largitur: wherein vnder pretence to streng∣then him, he did desolate him, and won from him his dependances.

As for words (though they be like waters to Phisi∣tions, ful of flattery and vncertainty) yet they are not to be dispised, specially with the aduantage of passi∣on and affection. For so wee see Tyberius vpon a stinging and incensing speech of Agrippina, came a step foorth of his dissimulacion when he sayd, You are hurt, because you doc not raigne: of which Tacitus sayeth, Audita hec, raram occulti pectoris voccm elicuere: correplamque Groeco versu admonuit: ideo laedi quia non regnaret. And therefore the Poet doth elegantly cal passions, tortures, that vrge men to confesse theyr secrets.

Vino tortus & ira.

And experience sheweth, there are few men so true to themselues, and so setled; but that sometimes vpon heate, sometimes vpon brauerye, sometime: vpon kindenesse, sometimes vpon trouble of minde and weaknesse, they open themselues; specially if they be put to it with a counter-dissimulatiō, according to the prouerb of Spain, Dimentira, y sacar as verdad: Tell a lye, and find a truth.

As for the knowing of men, which is at second hand from Reportes: mens weakenesse and faultes are best knowne from theyr Enemies, theyr ver∣tues, and abilityes from theyr friendes; theyr cu∣stomes and Times from theyr seruauntes: their con∣ceites and opinions from theyr familiar friends, with whom they discourse most. Generall fame is light, & the opinions conceiued by superiors or equals are de∣ceitful: for to such men are more masked, Verior sama è domesticis emanat.

But the soundest disclosing and expounding of men is, by theyr natures and endes, where∣in the weakest sorte of men are best interpreted by theyr Natures, and the wisest by theyr endes. For it was both pleasauntlye and wiselye sayde (though I thinke verye vntruely) by a Nuntio of the pope, returning from a certayne Nation, where hee serued as LIDGER: whose opinion beeing asked touching the appointemente of one to goe in his place, hee wished that in anye case they did not send one that was too wise: because no very wise man would euer imagine, what they in that country

were like to doe: And certaynelye, it is an er∣rour frequent, for men to shoot ouer, and to suppose deeper ends, and more compasse reaches then are: the Italian prouerb being elegant, & for the most part true.

Di danari, di senno, e di fede, C'n è manco che non credi:

There is commonly lesse mony. Iesse wisedome, and lesse good faith, then men doe accompt vpon: But Princes vpon a farre other Reason are best inter∣preted by their natures, and priuate persons by theyr ends, For Princes beeing at the toppe of humane de∣sires, they haue for the most part no particular endes, whereto they aspire: by distaunce from which a man mought take measure and scale of the rest of theyr actions and desires. which is one of the causes that maketh theyr heartes more inscructable: Neyther is it sufficient to infourme onr selues in mens endes and natures of the variety of them onely, but also of the predominancy what humour reigneth most, and what end is principally sought. For so wee see, when Tigellinus sawe himselfe out-stripped by Petrouius Turpilianus in Neroés humours of pleasures Metus eius rim•…•…, he wrought vpon Neroes fears, wherby he brake the others neck.

But to all this parte of Enquierie, the most com∣pendious waye resteth in three thinges: The first to haue generall acquaintaunce and in wardnesse with those which haue generall atquaintance, and looke most into the worlde: and speciallye according to

the diuersitie of Businesse, and the diuersitye of Per∣sons, to haue priuacye and conuersation with some one friend at least which is parfite and well intelli∣genced in euery seuerall kinde. The seconde is to keepe a good mediocritye in libertie of speeche, and secrecy: in most thinges libertye: secrecy where it im∣porteth: for libertye of speeche inuiteth and prouo∣keth libertye to bee vsed againe: and so bringeth much to a mans knowledge: and secrecie on the o∣ther side induceth trust and inwardnesse. The last is the reducing of a mans selfe to this watchfull and serene habite, as to make accompte and purpose in e∣uerye conference and action, aswell to obserue as to acte. For as Epictetus would haue a Philosopher in eue ry particular action to say to himselfe, Et hoc volo, & etiam institutum seruare: so a politique man in euerye thing should say to himself; Et hoc volo, ac etiam aliquid addifcere. I haue staied the longer vpon thit precept of obtaining good information, because it is a maine part by it selfe, which aunswereth to all the rest. But aboue al things, Caution must be taken, that Men haue a good staye and houlde of themselues, and that this much knowing doe not draw on much medling: For nothing is more vnfortunate then light and rash intermeddling in many matters: So that this variety of knowledge tendeth in conclusion but onely to this, to make a better & freer choise of those actions, which may concern vs, & to conduct them with the lesse er∣ror and the more dexterity.

The second precept concerning this knowledge is

for men to take good informacion touching theyre own person and well to vnderstand themselues: know, ing that as S. Iames sayth, though men looke oft in a glasse, yet they do sodainly forget themselues, wher∣in as the diuine glasse is the word of God, so the po∣litique glasse is the state of the world, or times wher∣in we liue: In the which we are to behould our selues.

For men ought to take an vnpartiall viewe of their owne abilities and vertues: and againe of their wants and impediments; accounting these with the most, & those other with the least, and from this view and exa∣mination to frame the considerations following.

First to consider how the constitution of their nature sorteth with the generall state of the times: which if they find agreeable and fit, then in all things to giue themselues more scope and liberty, but if differing and dissonant, then in the whole course of theyr life to be more close retyred and reserued; as we see in Tyberius who was neuer seen at a play: and came not into the Senate in 12. of his last yeers: whereas Augustus Caesar liued euer in mens eyes, which Tacitus obserueth, Alia Tiberio morum via.

Secondly to consider how their Nature sorteth with professions and courses of life, & accordingly to make election if they be free, and if ingaged, to make the de¦parture at the first opportunity: as we see was doone by Duke Valentine, that was designed by his father to a sacerdotal profession, but quitted it soon after in re∣gard of his parts and inclination being such neuerthe∣lesse, as a man cannot tel wel whether they were worse

for a Prince or for a Priest.

Thirdly to consider how they sorte with those whom they are like to haue Competitors and Con∣currents and to take that course wherin there is most solitude, and themselues like to be most eminent: as Caesar Iulius did, who at first was an Orator or Pleader but when he saw the excellency of Cicero, Hortensi∣us, Catulus, and others for eloquence, and sawe there was no man of reputation for the warres but Pompeius vpon whom the State was forced to relie; he for∣sooke his course begun toward a ciuile and popular greatnesse; and transgressed his designes to a mar∣shall greatnesse.

Fourthly in the choyse of their friends, and de∣pendaunces, to proceeed according to the Compo∣sition of their own nature, as we may see in Caesar, all whose friends and followers were men actiue and ef∣fectuall, but not solemn or of reputation.

Fiftly to take speciall heed how they guide them selues by examples, in thinking they can doe as they see others doe: whereas perhappes their natures and carriages are farre differing; in which Error, it see∣meth Pompey was, of whome Cicero sayeth, that hee was woont often to saye: Sylla potuit; Ego non potero? wherein he was much abused, the natures and pro∣ceedinges of himselfe and his example, beeing the vnlikest in the worlde, the one being fierce, vi∣olent, and pressing the fact; the other solemn, and full of Maiesty and circumstance, and therefore the lesse effectuall.

But this precept touching the politicke knowledge of our selues hath many other branches whereupon we cannot insist:

Next to the wellvnderstanding and discerning of a mans selfe, there followeth the well opening and reuealing a mans selfe, wherein we see nothing more vsuall then for the more able man to make the lesse shewe. For there is a greate aduantage in the well setting foorthe of a mans vertues, fortunes, me∣rites, and againe in the artificiall couering of a mans weakenesses, defectes, disgraces, staying vpon the one slyding from the other, cherishing the one by cir∣cumstaunces, gracing the other by exposition, and the like; wherein we see what Tacitus sayth of Mu∣tianus, who was the greatest politique of his time, Omnium quae dixerat fecer atque, arte quadam ostentator: which requireth indeed some arte, least it turne tedi∣ous and arrogant, but yet so; as ostentation (though it be to the first degree of vanity) seemeth to me ra∣ther a vice in Manners, then in Policye; for as it is sayd, Audacter calumniari, semper aliquid haeret, So ex∣cept it be in a ridiculous degree of deformity Au∣dacter te vendita semper aliquid haeret. For it will sticke with the more ignoraunt and inferiour sort of men, though men of wisedome and ranke doe smile at it and despife it, and yet the authority wonne with many, doth counteruaile the difdaine of a few. But if it be carried with decency and gouernement, as with a naturall pleasaunt and ingenious fashion, or at times when it is mixte with some perill and vn∣safety,

(as in Military persons) or at tymes when o∣thers are most enuied; or with easie and carelesse passage to it and from it, without dwelling too long, or being too serious: or with an equall freedome of taxing a mans selfe, aswell as gracing himselfe, or by occasion of repelling or putting downe others iniurye or insolencie: It doth greately adde to re∣putation; and surelye not a fewe solide natures, that wante this ventositye, and cannot saile in the heighth of the windes, are not without some preiudice and disaduantage by theyre modera∣cion.

But for these flourishes and inhansements of ver∣tue, as they are not perchaunce vnnecessary: So it is at leaste, necessary that vertue be not disualewed and imbafed vnder the iust price: which is doon in three manners; By offering and obtruding a mans selfe; wherein men thinke he is rewarded when he is accepted. By doing too much, which wil not giue that which is well done leaue to settle, and in the end induceth saciety: and: By finding to soone the fruit of a mans vertue, in commendation, applause, honour, fauoure, wherein if a man be pleased with a little, let him heare what is truly said, Caue ne insuetus rebus ma∣ioribus videaris, si haec te res parua sicuti magna delec∣tat:

But the couering of defects is of no lesse impor∣tance, then the valewing of good parts. which may be doone likewise in three manners, by Caution, by Colour, and by Confidence, Caution is, when men doe

ingeniously and discreetely auoyde to be put into those things for which they are not propper: wher∣as contrarywise bould and vnquiet spirits will thrust themselues into matters without difference, and so publish and proclaime all their wantes; Coloure is when men make a way for themselues, to haue a construction made of their faultes or wantes: as proceedinge from a better cause, or intended for some other purpose: for of the one, it is well sayde;

Saepe latet vitium proximitateboni:

And therefore whatsoeuer want a man hath, he must see, that he pretend the vertue that shadoweth it, as if he be Dull, he must affect Grauitie, if a Cowarde, Mildenesse, and so the rest: for the second, a man must frame some probable cause why he should not doe his best, and why he should dissemble his abi∣lities: and for that purpose must vse to dissemble those abilities, which are notorious in him to giue colour that his true wants are but industries and dis∣simulations: for Confidence it is the last but the su∣rest remedie: namely to depresse and seeme to des∣pise whatsoeuer a man cannot attaine, obseruing the good principle of the Marchantes, who endeuour to raise the price of their owne commodities, and to beate down the price of others. But there is a confi∣dence that passeth this other: which is to face out a mans own defects: in seeming to conceiue that he is best in those things wherein he is failing: and to help that againe, to seeme on the other side that he hath

least opinion of himselfe, in those things wherein he is best: like as we shall see it commonly in Poets, that if they shew their verses, and you except to any, they will say, That that lyne cost them more labour then any of the rest: and presently will seeme to disable, and suspect rather some other lyne, which they know well enough to be the best in the number. But aboue al in this righting and helping of a mans selfe in his owne carriage, he must take heed he shew not him∣selfe dismantelled and exposed to scorne and iniu∣ry, by too much dulcenesse, goodnesse, and facility of nature, but shew some sparkles of liberty, spirit, and edge. Which kind of fortified cariage with a readye rescussing of a mans selfe from scornes, is somtimes of necessity imposed vpon men by somwhat in their person or fortune, but it euer succeedeth with good felicity.

Another precept of this knowledge is by all possible endeauour, to frame the mind to be pli∣aunt and obedient to occasion; for nothing hinde∣reth mens fortunes so much as this: Idem manebat, nequeidem decebat: Men are where thty were, when occasions turne, and therefore to Cato, whom Liuie maketh such an Architect of fortune, hee addeth that he had Versatile Ingenium: And thereof it commeth that these graue solemne wittes which must be like themselues, and cannot make departures haue more dignity then foelicity: But in some it is nature to bee somewhat viscouse and inwrapped,

and not easie to turne: In some it is a conceipte, that is almost a nature, which is that men can hardlie make themsel•…•…ns beleeue that they oughte to chaunge their course, when they haue found good by it in former experience. For Macciaue noteth wisely how Fabius Maximus would haue been tem∣porizing still, according to his ould biasse, when the nature of the warre was altered, and required hotte pursuite; In some other it is want of point and pe∣netration in their iudgemente, that they do not dis∣cerne when thinges haue a periode, but come in, too late after the occasion: As Demosthenes compareth the people of Athens to country fellowes, when they play in a fence-schoole, that if they haue a blow then they remooue their weapon to that warde, and not before: In some other it is a loathnesse to leese labours passed, and a conceite that they can bring a∣bout occasions to their plie, and yet in the end, when they see no other remedye, then they come to it with disaduantage, as Tarquinius that gaue for the third part of Sybillaes bookes the treeble price, when he mought at first haue had all three for the simple. But from whatsoeuer roote or cause this Restiuenesse of mind proceedeth, it is a thing most preiudiciall, and nothing is more politique then to make the wheels of our mind concentrique and voluble with the wheels of fortune.

Another precept of this knowledge, which hath some affinity with that vvelast spake of, but with dif∣ference is that which is well expressed, satis accede

Deisque, that men do not only turne with the occasi∣ons but also runne with the occasions and not strain their credit or strength to ouer-harde or extreame points: but choose in their actions that which is most passable: for this will preserue men from foyle, not occupy them too much about one matter, winne opinion of moderation, please the moste, and make a showe of a perpetuall foelicitye in all they vndertake, which cannot but mightely increase re∣putation.

Another part of this knowledge seemeth to haue some repugnancy with the former two, but not as I vnderstand it, and it is that which Demosthenes vtte∣reth in high tearmes: Et quemadmodum receptum est, vt exercitum ducat Imperator: sic & a cordatis viris res ipsae ducendae, vt quae ipsis videntur, ea gerantur, & non ip∣si euentus persequi cogantur. For if we obserue, we shall find two differing kinds of sufficiency, in managing of businesse: some can make vse of occasions aptly and dexterously, but plotte little: some can vrge and pur∣sue their owne plottes well, but cannot accommodate nor take in: either of vvhich is very vnperfite without the other.

Another part of this knowledge is the obseruing a good mediocrity in the declaring or not declaring a mans selfe, for although depth of secrecy, and ma∣king way (qualis est via •…•…uis in Mari, which the French calleth Sourdes Menees, when men set thinges in worke without opening themselues at all) be som∣times

both prosperous and admirable: yet many times Dissimulatio errores parit, qni dissimulatorem ip∣sam illaqueant. And therefore we see the greatest pol∣litiques haue in a naturall and free manner professed their desires, rather then bin reserued and disguised in them. For so we see that Lucius Sylla made a kind of profession, That hee wished all men happy or vnhappie as they stood his friendes or enemies: So Caesar, when hee went first into Gaul, made no scruple to professe, that hee had rather bee first in a village, then second at Rome. So againe as soone as hee had begunne the warre, we see what Cicero sayth of him, Alter (mea∣ning of Coesar) non recusat, sed quodam modo postulat, vt (vt est) sic appelletur Tyrannus. So we may see in a letter of Cicero to Atticus, that Augustus Caesar in his very entrance into affaires, when he was a dearling of the Senate, yet in his harauges to the people, would sweare It a parentis honores consequi liceat, (which was no lesse then the Tyranny,) saue that to helpe it, hee would stretch foorth his hand towardes a statua of Caesars, that was erected in the place: and men laughed and woondered and sayde, Is it pos∣sible, or did you euer heare the like, and yet though hee meant no hurte, hee did it so hand∣somlye and ingenuouslye, and all these were pros∣perous, where as Pompeye who tended to the same ends, but in a more darke and dissembling manner, as Tacitus sayeth of him, Occultior non melior, wherein Salust concurreth ore probo, animo inuerecun∣do

made it his disseigne by infinite secret Engines, to cast the state into an absolute Anarchy and confusi∣on, that the state mought cast it selfe into his Armes for necessity and protection, and so the soueraigne power bee putt vpon him, and he neuer seene in it: and when hee had broughte it (as he thoughte) to that pointe when hee was cho∣sen Consull alone; as neuer any, was; yet hee could make noe greate matter of it, because men vnder∣stoode him not: but was faine in the end, to goe the beaten tracke of getting Armes into his handes, by coulour of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 the doubte of Caesars dessignes: so tedi∣dious, casuall, and vnfortunate are these deepe dissi∣mulations, whereof it seemeth Tacitus made this iudgement, that they were a cunning of an inferiour fourme in regard of true pollicy, attributing the one to Augustus, the other to Tiberius, where speaking of Liuia, he sayth: Et cum ariibus mariti simulatione filij bene composita: for surely the continuall habite of dissimula∣tion is but a weake and sluggish cunning, & not great∣ly politique.

Another precept of this Architecture of For∣tune, is, to accustome our mindes to iudge of the proportion or valewe of things, as they conduce, and are materiall to our particular ends, and that to doe substantially and nor superficially. For wee shall finde the Logicall parte (as I maye tearme it) of some mens mindes good, but the Mathe∣maticall part erroneous, that is, they can well iudge of consequences, but not of proportions and

comparison, preferring things of shewe and sence∣before things of substance and effect. So some fall in loue with accesse to Princes, others with popu∣lar same and applause, supposinge they are things of greate purchase, when in many Cases they are but matters of Enuy, perill, and Impediment:

So some measure thinges accordinge to the la∣bour and difficulty, or affiduity, which are spent a∣boute them; and thinke if they bee euer moo∣vinge, that they must needs aduance and proceede, as Caesar saith in a dispisinge manner of Cato the second, when hee describeth howe •…•…orious and indefatigable he was to noe greate purpose: Haec omnia magno fludio agebat. So in moste thinges men are ready to abuse themselues in thinking the greatest means to be best, when it should bee the Fittest.

As for the true marshalling of mens pursutes towards theire fortune as they are more or lesse materiall, I houlde them to stand thus; Firste the amendment of their own Minds. For the Remooue of the Impediments of the mind wil sooner cleare the passages of fortune, then the obteininge fortune wil remooe the Impediméts of the mind; In secōd place I set downe wealth and meanes, which I know most men woulde haue placed firste: because of the gene∣rall vse which it beareth towardes all varietie of oc∣casions. But that opinion I may condemne with like reason as Macchiauell doth that other: that monies weretl•…•…e sinews of the warres, wheras (saith he)

the true sinews of the warres are the sinews of mens Armes, that is a valiant, populous and Military Nation: & he voucheth aptly the authority of Solon who when Craesus shewed him his treasury of goalde saide to him, that if another came that had better Iron, he woulde be maister o•…•… his Gould In like man∣ner it may be truly affirmed, that it is not monies that are the sinews of fortune, but it is the sinews and steele of mens Mynds, Witte, Courage, Audacity, Resolution, Temper, Industry, and the like: In thirde place I set down Reputation, because of the peremp∣tory Tides & Currants it hath, which if they bee not taken in their due time, are sildome recouered, it beinge extreame harde to plaie an after game of reputation. And lastly, I place honoure, which is more easily wonne by any of the other three, much more by all, then any of them can bee pur∣chased by honour. To conclude this precepte, as there is order and priority in Matter, so is there in Time, the proposterous placing whereof is one of the commonest Errors: while men fly to their ends when they shoulde intend their beginninings: and doe not take things in order of time as they come on, but marshall them according to greatnes and not according to instance, not obseruing the good pre∣cepte Quod nunc instat agamus.

Another precept of this knowledge is, not to imbrace any matters, which doe occupie to great a quantity of time, but to haue that sounding in a mans eares.

Sed fugit interea, fugit irreparabile tempus, and that is the cause why those which take their course of ri∣sing by professions of Burden, as Lawyers, Orators painefull diuines, and the like, are not common∣lie so politique for their owne fortune, otherwise then in their ordinary way, because they want time to learne particulars, to waite occasions, and to deuise plottes.

Another precept of this knowledge is to imitate nature which doth nothing in vaine, which surely a man may do, if he do well interlace his businesse, and bend not his mind too much vpon that which he prin cipally intendeth. For a man ought in euery particu∣lar action, so to carry the motions of his mind, and so to haue one thing vnder another, as if he cannot haue that he seeketh in the best degree, yet to haue it in a second, or so in a third, and if he can haue no parte of that which he purposed, yet to turn the vse of it to sō∣what els, and if he cannot make any thing of it for the present, yet to make it as a seed of somwhat in time to come, and if he can contriue no effect or substaunce from it, yet to win som good opinion by it, or the like so that he should exact an account of himself of eue∣ry action, to reape somwhat, and not to stand amazed and confused if he saile of that he chiefly meant: for nothing is more impollitique then to mind actions wholly one by one. For he that dooth so, leeseth infinite occasions which enterveine, and are many times more proper and propitious for somewhat, that he shall need afterwards: then for that which

he vrgeth for the present; and therfore men must be parfite in that rule: Haec oportet facere, & illa non o∣mittere.

Another precept of this knowledge is, not to in∣gage a mans selfe peremptorily in any thing, though it seem not liable to accident, but euer to haue a win∣dow to flie out at, or away to retyre; following the wisedom in the ancient fable, of the two frogs, which consulted when their plash was drie, whether they should go and the one mooued to go down into a pit because it was not likely the water would dry there, but the other answered, True, but if it do, how shall we get out againe?

Another precept of this knowledge is that ancient precept of Bias, construed not to any point of perfidi∣ousnesse, but only to caution and moderation Et ama tanquam inimicus suturus, & odi tanquam amaturus: For it vtterly betraieth al vtility, for mē to imbarque them selues to far, into vnfortunate friendships: troublesom spleans; & childish & humorous enuies or aemulatiōs.

But I continue this beyond the measure of an ex∣ample, led, because I wold not haue such knowledges which I note as deficient to be thought things Imagi∣natiue, or in the ayre; or an obseruation or two, much made of but thinges of bulke and masse: whereof an end is hardlier made, then a beginning. It must be likewise conceiued that in these pointes which I mencion and set downe, they are far from complete tractates of them: but onelye as small peeces for patternes: And lastlye, no man I suppose will

thinke, that I meane fortunes are not ob∣teyned without all this adoe; For I know they come tumblinge into some mens lappes, and a nomber obtaine good fortunes by dilligence, in a plaine way: Little intermedlinge: and keeping themselues from grosse errors.

But as Cicero when he setteth down an Idea of a par∣fit Orator, doth not mean that euery pleader should be such; and so likewise, when a Prince or a Courtier hath been described by such as haue handled those subiects, the mould hath vsed to be made accordinge to the perfectiō of the Arte, and not according to cō mon practise: So I vnderstand it that it ought to be done in the description of a Pollitique man. I meane pollitique for his owne fortune.

But it must be remembred al this while, that the pre∣cepts which we haue set down, are of thatkind which may be coūted & called Bonae Artes, as for euill arts, if a man would set down for himselfe that principle of Machiauel: That a man seeke not to attaine vertue it selfe: But the apparance onely thereof, because the credite of vertue is a helpe, but the vse of it is cumber: or that o∣ther of his principles: That he presuppose, that men are not fitly to be wrought otherwise but by feare, and therefore that he seeke to haue euery mā obnoxius, lowe, & in streight which the Italiās cal seminar spine, to sowe thornes: or that other principle cōteined in the verse which Cice ro cyteth cadant amici, dūmodo Inimici intercidāt, as the Trium virs which fould euery one to other the liues of their friends for the deaths of theire enemiees: or

that other protestation of L. Catilina to set on fire & trouble states, to the end to fish in droumy waters, & to vnwrappe their fortunes. Ego si quid in fortunis meis excitatum sit incendium, id non aqua sed ruina restinguam, or that other principle of Lysāder That childrē are to be deceiued with cōfittes, & men with othes, & the like euil and corrupt positions, whereof (as in al things) there are more in number then of the good: Certainly with these dispensations from the lawes of charity & inte∣gryty the pressing of a mans fortune, may be more ha sty and compendious. But it is in life, as it is in ways The shortest way is comonly the fowlest & surely the fairer way is not much about.

But men if they be in their own power & doe beare & sustaine themselues, and bee not caryed awaye with a whirle winde or tempest of ambition: oughte in the pursute of their owne fortune, to set before their eies, not only that general Map of the world. That al things are vanity & vexatiō of spirit, but many other more par ticular Cards & directiōs, cheefly that, That Being, without wel being: is a curse; & the greater being, the greater curse, And that all vertue is most rewarded, & al wickednesse most punished in it selfe: according as the Poet saith excellently.

Quae vobis que digna viri, pro laudibus istis Premia posse rear solui? pulcherrima primum Dij moresque dabunt vestri:

And so of the contrary. And secondly they oughte to looke vp to the eternal prouidence and diuine iudge∣mente, which often subuerteth the wisdome of euyll

plots & imaginations, according to that scripture He hath conceiued mischiefe & shal bring soorth a vainething And although men should refraine themselues from iniury and euil artes, yet this incessant & Sabbathlesse pursute of a mans fortune, leaueth not tribute which we owe to God of our time who (we see) demandeth a tenth of our substāce, & a seauenth, which is more strict of our time: and it is 〈◊〉〈◊〉 to smal purpose to haue an erected face towards heauē, & a perpetual groue∣ling spirit vpon earth eating dust as doth the serpent, Atque affigit humo Diuinae particulam aurae: And if any mā flatter himself that he will imploy his fortune wel, though he shold obtain it ill, as was said concerning Aug. Caesar, & after of Septimius Seuerus, That either they shold neuer haue bin born or else they shold nener haue died, they did so much mischief in the pursut & ascētof their greatnes, & so much good when they were established yet these cōpensations & satisfactions, are good to be vsed, but neuer good to be purposed: And lastly it is not amisse for mē in their race toward their fortuneto cooll thēselues a litle with that cōceit which is elegāt ly expressed bythe Emperor, Charls the 5. in his instruc tiōs to the K. his son, That fortune hath sowhat of the na∣ture of a womā, that if she be too much woed, she is the farder of. But this last is but a remedy for those whose Tasts are corrupted: let mē rather build vpo that foūdation which is as a cornerstone of diuinity and philosophie, wherein they ioyne close, namely that same Primum quaerite. For diuinity sayth Primum quaerite regnū Dei & ista omnia ad•…•…iciētur Vobis: & Philosophy saith, Primū quaerite bona animi, coetera aut aderunt, aut non oberunt.

And although the humane foundation hath some∣what of the same, as we see in M: Brutus when hee brake forth into that speech.

—Te colui (Virtus) vt rem: ast tu nomen inane es;

Yet the diuine foundation is vpon the Rocke. But this may serue for a Tast of that knowledge which I noted as deficient.

Concerning gouernment, it is a part of know∣ledge, secret and retyred in both these respects, in which things are deemed secret: for some things are secret, because they are hard to know, and some be∣cause they are not fit to vtter: wee see all gouern∣ments are obscure and inuisible.

—Totamque infusa per artus, Mens agitat molem, & magno corpore miscet.

Such is the description of gouernments; we see the gouernmēt of God ouer the world is hidden; inso∣much as it seemeth to participate of much irregula∣ritie and confusion; The gouernment of the Soule in moouing the Body is inward and profound, and the passages therof hardly to be reduced to demon∣stration. Againe, the wisedome of Antiquitie (the shadowes whereof are in the Poets) in the descripti∣on of torments and paines, next vnto the crime of Rebellion, which was the Giants offence, doth de∣test the offence offacilitie: as in Sysiphus and Tanta∣lus. But this was meant of particulars; Neuerthelesse euen vnto the generall rules and discourses of polli∣cie, and gouernment, there is due a reuerent and re∣serued handling.

But contrariwise in the gouernors towards the go∣uerned, all things ought as far as the frailtie of Man permitteth, to be manifest, & reuealed. For so it is ex∣pressed in the Scriptures touching the gouernment of God, that this Globe which seemeth to vs a dark and shady body is in the view of God, as Christall, Et in conspectu sedis tanquā mare vitreū simile christallo. So vnto Princes and States, and specially towardes wise Senats and Councels, the natures and disposi∣tions of the people, their conditions, and necessi∣ties, their factions and combinations, their animosi∣ties and discontents ought to be in regard of the va∣rietie of their Intelligences, the wisedome of their obseruations, and the height of their station, where they keepe Centinell, in great part cleare and tran∣sparent; wherefore, considering that I write to a king that is a maister of this Science, and is so wel as∣sisted, I thinke it decent to passe ouer this part in si∣lēce, as willing to obtaine the certificate, which one of the ancient Philosophers aspired vnto, who being silent, when others contended to make demonstra∣tion of their abilities by speech, desired it mought •…•…e certified for his part, that there was one that knewe how to hold his peace.

Notwithstanding for the more publique part of Gouernment, which is Lawes, I think good to note onley one deficience, which is, that all those which haue writtē of Lawes, haue written either as Philo∣sophers, or as lawiers, & none as Statesmen. As for the Philosophers, they make imaginary Lawes for imaginary cōmon-wealths, & their discourses are as

the Stars, which giue little light because they are so high. For the Lawyers, they write according to the States where they liue, what is receiued Law, & not what ought to be Law; For the wisedome of a Law∣maker is one, & of a Lawyer is another. For ther are in Nature certaine fountaines of Iustice, whence all Ciuil Lawes are deriued, but as streames; & like as waters doe take tinctures and tastes from the soyles through which they run; So doe ciuill Lawes vary according to the Regions and gouernments where they are plāted, though they proceed from the same fountaines; Againe the wisedome of a Lawmaker consisteth not onely in a platforme of Iustice; but in the application thereof, taking into consideration, by what meanes Lawes may be made certaine, and what are the causes & remedies of the doubtfulnesse and incertaintie of Law, by what meanes Lawes may be made apt and easie to be executed, and what are the impediments, and remedies in the execution of lawes, what influence lawes touching priuate right of Meum & Tuum, haue into the publike state, and how they may be made apt and agreable, how lawes are to be penned and deliuered, whether in Texts or in Acts, briefe or large, with preambles, or without howe they are to bee pruned and reformed from time to time, and what is the best meanes to keepe them frō being too vast in volumes, or too ful of mul∣tiplicitie & crosnesse, how they are to be expounded, When vpon causes emergent, and iudicially dis∣cussed, and when vpon responses and conferences touching generall points or questions, how they

are to be pressed, rigorously, or tenderly, how they are to be Mitigated by equitie and good conscience, and whether discretion and strict Lawe are to be mingled in the same Courts, or kept a part in seuerall Courts; Againe, how the practise, profession, and e∣rudition of Lawe is to be censured and gouerned, and many other points touching the administrati∣on, and (as I may tearme it) animation of Lawes. Vpon which I insist the lesse, because I purpose (if * 1.30 God giue me leaue) hauing begunne a worke of this Nature, in Aphorismes, to propound it hereaf∣ter, noting it in the meane time for deficient.

And for your Maiesties Lawes of England, I could say much of their dignitie, and somewhat of their defect: But they cannot but excell the ciuill Lawes in fitnesse for the gouernment: for the ciuill Law was, non hos quaesitum munus in vsus: It was not made for the countries which it gouerneth: hereof I cease to speake, because I will not intermingle matter of Action, with matter of generall Lear∣ning.

THus haue I concluded this portion of learning touching Ciuill knowledge, & with Ciuill know∣ledge haue concluded HVMANE PHILO∣SOPHY and with Humane Philosophy, PHI∣LOSOPHY in GENERAL; and being now at some pause, looking backe into that I haue passed through: This writing seemeth to me (Si nunquam sailit imago) as farre as a man can iudge of his owne

worke, not much better then that noise or sound which Musitiās make while they are in tuning their Instrumēts, which is nothing pleasāt to hear, but yet is a cause why the Musique is sweeter afterwardes. So haue I beene content to tune the Instruments of the Muses, that they may play, that haue better hands. And surely when I set before me the condi∣tion of these times, in which learning hath made her third visitation, or circuite in all the qualities thereof: as the excellencie and viuacitie of the wits of this age; The noble helpes and lights which we haue by the trauailes of ancient writers: The Art of Printing, which communicateth Bookes to men of all fortunes. The opēnesse of the world by Nauiga∣tion, which hath disclosed multitudes of experi∣ments, and a Masse of Naturall History: The leasure wherwith these times abound, not imploying men so generally in ciuill businesse, as the States of Grae∣cia did, in respect of their popularitie, and the State of Rome in respect of the greatnesse of their Monar∣chie: The present disposition of these times at this instant to peace: The consumption of all that euer can be said in controuersies of Religiō, which haue so much diuerted men from other Sciences: The perfection of your Maj: learning, which as a Phoe∣nix may call whole volyes of wits to followe you, and the inseparable proprietie of Time, which is e∣uer more and more to disclose truth: I cannot but be raised to this perswasion, that this third period of time will farre surpasse that of the Graecian and Ro∣mane

Learning: Onely if men will know their own strength, and their owne weakenesse both: and take one from the other, light of inuention, and not fire of contradiction, and esteeme of the Inquisition of truth, as of an enterprise, & not as of a qualitie or or∣nament, & imploy wit and magnificence to things of worth & excellencie, & not to things vulgar, and of popular estimation. As for my labors, if any man shall please himselfe, or others in the reprehension of them; they shall make that ancient and patient re∣quest, ver bera, sed audi. Let men reprehend them so they obserue and waigh them: For the Appeale is lawfull (though it may be it shall not be needefull) from the first cogitations of men to their second, & from the neerer times, to the times further of. Now let vs come to that learning, which both the former times were not so blessed as to knowe, Sacred & in∣spired Diuinitie, the Sabaoth and port of all mens la∣bours and peregrinations.

THe prerogatiue of God extendeth as well to the reason as to the will of Man; So that as we are to obey his law though we finde a relucta∣tiō in our wil•…•… So we are to belieue his word, though we finde a reluctation in our reason: For if we be∣leeue onely that which is agreeable to our sence, we giue consent to the matter, and not to the Au∣thor, which is no more then we would doe towards a suspected and discredited witnesse: But that faith which was accounted to Abraham for righteous∣nesse

was of such a point, as where at Sarah laughed, who therein was an Image of Naturall Reason.

Howbeit (if we will truly consider of it) more worthy it is to belieue, then to knowe as we now know; For in knowledge mans mind suffereth from sence, but in beliefe it suffereth from Spirit, such one as it holdeth for more authorised then it selfe, & so suffereth from the worthier Agent: otherwise it is of the state of man glorified, for then faith shal cease, & we shall knowe as we are knowne.

Wherefore we conclude that sacred Theologie (which in our Idiome we call Diuinitie) is groun∣ded onely vpon the word & oracle of God, and not vpon the light of nature: for it is written, Caelienarrāt gloriam Dei: But it is not written Caelienarrant volun∣tatem Dei: But of that it is said; Ad legem & testimoni∣um si non fecerint secundū verbum istud &c. This hol∣deth not onely in those points of faith, which con∣cerne the great misteries of the Deitie, of the Crea∣tion, of the Redemption, but likewise those which concerne the law Moral truly interpreted; Loue your Enemies, doe good to thē that hate you. Be like to your hea∣uenly father, that suffereth his raine to fal vpon the Iust & Vniust. To this it ought to be applauded, Nec vox ho∣minē sonat, It is a voice beyond the light of Nature: So we see the heathen Poets when they fall vpon a libertine passion, doe still expostulate with lawes and Moralities, as if they were opposite and malignant to Nature: Et quod natura remitti•…•…,

invida Iura negant: So said Dendamis the Indian vnto Alexanders Messengers: That he had heard some∣what of Pythagoras, and some other of the wise men of Graecia, and that he held them for excellent Men: but that they had a fault, which was that they had in too great reuerence and veneration a thing they called Lawe and Manners: So it must be confessed that a great part of the Lawe Morall is of that per∣fection, whereunto the light of Nature cannot a∣spire: how then is it, that man is saide to haue by the light and lawe of Nature some Notions, and con∣ceits of vertue and vice, iustice & wrong, good and euill? Thus, because the light of Nature is vsed in two seuerall senses: The one, •…•…at which springeth from Reason, Sense, Induction, Argument, accor∣ding to the lawes of heauen and earth: The other that which is imprinted vpon the spirit of Man by an inward Instinct, according to the lawe of consci∣ence, which is a sparkle of the puritie of his first E∣state: In which later sense onely, he is participant of some light, and discerning: touching the perfection of the Morall lawe: but how? sufficient to check the vice, but not to informe the dutie. So then the do∣ctrine of Religion, as well M•…•…all as Misticall, is not to be attained, but by inspiration and reuelation from God.

The vse notwithstanding of Reason in spirituall things, and the latitude thereof is very great and ge∣nerall: for it is not for nothing, that the Apostle cal∣leth Religion our reasonable seruice of God, inso∣much

as the verie Ceremonies and Figures of the oulde Lawe were full of reason and signification, much more then the ceremonies of Idolatrie and Magicke, that are full of Non-significants and Surde Characters; But most specially the Christian faith, as in all things, so in this deserueth to be highly magni∣fied, houlding and preseruing the golden Medio∣critie in this point, betweene the law of the Heathen, and the law of Mahumet, which haue embraced the two extreames. For the Religion of the Heathen had no constant beleefe or confession, but left all to the libertie of argument: and the Religion of Ma∣humet on the otherside, interdicteth argument al∣together; the one hauing the verie face of Errour: and the other of Imposture; whereas the Faith doth both admit and reiect Disputation with dif∣ference.

The vse of Humane Reason in Religion, is of two sorts: The former in the conception and ap∣prehension of the Mysteries of GOD to vs reuea∣led; The other, in the inferring and deriuing of doctrine and direction thervpon: The former ex∣tendeth to the mysteries themselues: but how? by way of Illustration, and not by way of argument. The later consisteth indeed of Probation and Ar∣gument. In the former wee see God vouch safeth to descend to our capacitie, in the expressing of his misteries in sort as may bee sensible vnto vs: and doth grifte his Reuelations & holie doctrine vpon the Notions of our reason, and applyeth his Inspi∣ratiōs

to open our vnderstāding, as the forme of the key to the ward of the locke; for the later, there is allowed vs an vse of Reason, and argument, se∣condarie and respectiue; although not originall and absolute: For after the Articles and princi∣ples of Religion are placed and exempted from ex∣amination of reason: It is then permitted vnto vs to make deriuations and inferences from, and accor∣ding to the Analogie of them, for our better directi∣on. In Nature this holdeth not, for both the princi∣ples are examinable by Induction, though not by a Medium or Sillogisme: and besides those principles or first positions, haue noe discordance with that reason which draweth downe and diduceth the in∣feriour positions. But yet it holdeth not in Religion alone, but in many knowledges both of greater and smaller Nature, namely wherin there are not onely Posita but Placita, for in such there can be noe vse of absolute reason, we see it familiarly in Games of wit, as Chesse, or the like; The Draughts and first lawes of the Game are positiue, but how? meerely ad placitum, and not examinable by reason; But then how to direct our play thereupon with best aduan∣tage to winne the game, is artificiall and rationall. So in Humane lawes, there be many groundes and Maximes, which are Placita Iuris, Positiue vpon au∣thoritie and not vpon reason, and therefore not to be disputed: But what is most iust, not absolutely, but relatiuely, and according to those Maximes, that affordeth along field of disputation. Such ther∣fore

is that secōdarie reason, which hath place in di∣uinitie, which is grounded vpon the Placets of God.

Here therefore I note this deficience, that there hath not bin to my vnderstanding sufficiently en∣quired * 1.31 & handled, The true limits and vse of reason in spirituall things: as a kinde of diuine Dialectique, which for that it is not done, it seemethto me a thing vsuall, by pretext of true conceiuing that, which is reuealed, to search and mine into that which is not reuealed, and by pretext of enucleating inferences and contradictories, to examine that which is posi∣tiue: The one sort falling into the Error of Nicode∣mus, demanding to haue things made more sensible then it pleaseth God to reueale them; Quomo∣do possit homo nasci cum sit senex? The other sort into the Error of the Disciples, which were scandalized at a shew of contradiction: Quid est hoc quod dicit no∣bis, modicum, & non videbitis me, & iterum modicum, & videbitis me &c.

Vpon this I haue insisted the more, in regard of the great and blessed vse thereof, for this point well la∣boured and defined of, would in my iudgement be an Opiate to staie and bridle not onely the vanitie of curious speculatiōs, wherewith the schooles labour but the furie of cōtrouersies, wherewith the church laboureth. For it cannot but open mens eyes to see that many controuersies doe meerely pertaine to that which is either not reuealed or positiue, and that many others doe growe vpon weake and ob∣scure Inferences or deriuations which latter

sort of men would reviue the blessed stile of that great Doctor of the Gentiles, would bee carryed thus: Ego, non Dominus, and againe-Secundum consilium meum, in Opinions and counsells, and not in positions and oppositions. But Men are nowe ouer readie to vsurpe the stile. Non Ego, sed Domi∣nus, and not so only, but to binde it with the thun∣der and denunciation of Curses, and Anathemaes, to the terror of those which haue not sufficiently lear∣ned out of Salomon, that The causelesse Curse shall not come.

Diuinitie hath two principall parts: The mat∣ter informed or reuealed: and the nature of the In∣formation or Reuelation: and with the later wee will beginne: because it hath most coherence with that which wee haue now last handled. The na∣ture of the information consisteth of three braun∣ches: The limites of the information; the sufficien∣cie of the information; and the acquiring or obtai∣ning the information. Vnto the limits of the infor∣mation belong these considerations: howe farre forth particular persons continue to bee inspired: how farre forth the Church is inspired: and howe farre forth reason may be vsed; the last point wher∣of I haue noted as deficient. Vnto the sufficiency of the information belong two considerations, what points of Religion are foundamentall, & what per∣fectiue, beeing matter of founder building and per∣fection vpon one, and the same foundation: and againe how the gradations of light according to the

dispensation of times, are materiall to the sufficien∣cie of beleefe.

Here againe I may rather giue it in aduise, then note it as deficient, that the points foundamentall, * 1.32 and the points of further perfection onely ought to bee with piety and wisedome distinguished: a sub∣iect tending to much like ende, as that I noted be∣fore: for as that other were likely to abate the nom∣ber of controuersies: So this is like to abate the heate of manie of them. Wee see Moses when he sawe the Israelite and the Egyptian fight, hee did not say, Why striue you? but drew his sworde, and slewe the Egyptian: But when hee sawe the two Israelites fight, hee said, You are brethren, why striue you? If the point of doctrine bee an Egyptian, it must bee slaine by the sword of the spirit, and not reconciled. But if it be an Israelite, though in the wrong: then Why striue you. We see of the foundamentall points, our Sauiour penneth the league thus, Hee that is not with vs is against vs, but of points not fundamentall, thus Hee that is not against vs, is with vs. So wee see the Coate of our Sauiour was entier without seame, and so is the Doctrine of the Scriptures in it selfe: But the gouernment of the Churche was of diuers colours, and yet not deuided: wee see the chaffe may and ought to be seuered from the corne in the Eare: But the Tares may not be pulled vp from the corne in the field: So as it is a thing of great vse well to define, what, and of what latitude those points are, which doe make men meerely aliens and dis∣incorporate

from the Church of God.

For the obtaining of the information, it resteth vpon the true & sound Interpretation of the Scrip∣tures which are the fountaines of the water of life. The Interpretations of the Scriptures are of two sorts: Methodical, and Solute, or at large, for this di∣uine water which excelleth so much that of Iacobs Well, is drawne forth much in the same kinde, as Naturall Water vseth to bee out of Wells and Fountaines: either it is first forced vp into a Ce∣sterne and from thence fetcht and deriued for vse: or else it is drawne and receiued in Buckets and Vessels immediately where it springeth. The for∣mer sort whereof though it seeme to bee the more readie, yet in my iudgement is more subiect to cor∣rupt. This is that Methode which hath exhibited, vnto vs the scholasticall diuinitie, whereby diuinity hath bin reduced into an Art, as into a Cesterne, & the streames of doctrine or positions fetcht and de∣riued from thence.

In this, Men haue sought three things, a summa∣rie breuitie, a compacted strength, and a comple∣ate perfection: whereof the two first they faile to finde, and the last they ought not to seeke. For as to breuitie, wee see in all summarie Methodes, while men purpose to abridge, they giue cause to dilate. For the summe or abridgement by contracti∣on becommeth obscure, the obscuritie requireth exposition, and the exposition is diduced into large comentaries, or into common places, and titles, which growe to be more vast then the originall wri∣tings,

whence the summe was at first extracted. So we see the volumes of the schoole-men are greater much then the first writings of the fathers, whence the Maister of the sentēces made his summe or col∣lection. So in like manner the volumes of the mo∣dern Doctors of the Ciuil Law exceed those of the ancient Iurisconsults, of which Tribonian compiled the digest. So as this course of summes & cōmenta∣ries is that which doth infallibly make the body of Sciēces more immense in quantitie, and more base in substance.

And for strength, it is true, that knowledges redu∣ced into exact Methodes haue a shew of strength, in that each part seemeth to support & sustaine the o∣ther: But this is more satisfactorie then substantiall, like vnto buildings, which stand by Architecture, and compaction, which are more subiect to ruine, then those that are built more stronge in their seue∣rall parts though lesse compacted. But it is plaine, that the more you recede from your grounds, the weaker doe you conclude, & as in nature, the more you remoue your selfe from particulars, the greater peril of Error you doe incur: So, much more in Di∣uinitie, the more you recede from the Scriptures by inferences and consequences, the more weake and dilute are your positions.

And as for perfection, or compleatnes in diuinitie it is not to be sought, which makes this course of Artificiall diuinitie the more suspecte: For hee that will reduce a knowledge into an Art, will make it round and uniforme: But in Diuinitie

manie things must bee left abrupt and concluded with this: O altitudo Sapientiae & scientiae Dei, quam incomprehensibilia sunt Iudicia eius, & non inuestigabi∣les viae eius? So againe the Apostle saith, Eu parte scimus, and to haue the forme of a totall, where there is but matter for a part, cannot bee without supplies by supposition and presumption. And therefore I conclude, that the true vse of these Summes and Methods hath place in Institutions or Introductions, preparatorie vnto knowledge: but in them, or by diducement from them, to han∣dle the mayne bodie and substance of a knowe∣ledge; is in all Sciences preiudiciall, and in Diui∣nitie dangerous.

As to the Interpretation of the Scriptures so∣lute and at large, there haue beene diuers kindes in∣troduced & deuised, some of them rather ruinous and vnsafe, then sober and warranted. Notwith∣stāding thus much must be confessed, that the Scrip∣tures being giuen by inspiration, and not by hu∣mane reason, doe differ from all other books in the Author: which by, consequence doth drawe on some difference to be vsed by the Expositor. For the Inditer of them did knowe foure things which noe man attaines to knowe, which are the misteries of the kingdome of glorie; the perfection of the Lawes of Nature: the secrets of the heart of Man: and the future succession of all ages. For as to the first, it is said. He that presseth into the light, shall be oppressed of the Glorie. And againe, Noe man shall see

my face and liue. To the second, When he prepared the heauens I was present, when by lawe and compasse he en∣closed the deepe. To the third, Neither was it needefull that any should beare witnesse to him of Man, for he knewe well what was in Man. And to the last, From the begin∣ning are knowne to the Lord all his workes.

From the former two of these haue beene drawne certaine senses and expositions of Scriptures, which had need be contained within the bounds of sobri∣etie; The one Anagogicall, and the other Philosophi∣call. But as to the former, Man is not to preuent his time; Videmus nune per speculum in Aenigmate, tunc au∣tem facie adfaciem, wherein neuerthelesse there see∣meth to be a libertie graunted, as farre forth as the polishing of this glasse, or some moderate expli∣cation of this Aenigma. But to presse too farre into it cannot but cause a dissolution and ouerthrowe of the spirite of man. For in the body there are three degrees of that we receiue into it: Aliment Medecine and Poyson whereof Aliment is that which the Na∣ture of Man can perfectly alter & ouercom: Mede∣cine is that which is partly conuerted by Nature, & partly conuerteth nature: & Poyson is that which worketh wholy vpon Nature without that, that na∣ture can in any part worke vpon it. So in the minde whatsoeuer knowledge reason cannot at all worke vpon & conuert, is a meere intoxication and indan∣gereth a dissolution of the minde & vnderstanding.

But for the latter, it hath beene extreamely set on foote of late time by the Schoole of Paracelsus, and

some others, that haue pretended to finde the truth of all naturall Philosophy in the Scriptures; scan∣dalizing and traducing all other Philosophie: as Heathenish and Prophane: But there is noe such enmitie betweene Gods word, and his workes. Neither doe they giue honour to the Scriptures, as they suppose, but much imbase them. For to seeke heauen and earth in the word of God, Whereof it is saide, Heauen and Earth shall passe, but my worde shall not passe, is to seeke temporary things amongst eternall; And as to seeke Diuinitie in Philosophy, is to seeke the liuing amongst the dead; So to seeke Philosophy in Diuinitie is to seek the dead amongst the liuing; Neither are y^e Pots or Lauers, whose place was in the outward part of the Temple to be sought in the holiest place of all; where the Arke of the testimonie was seated. And againe the scope or purpose of the spirit of God is not to expresse mat∣ters of Nature in the Scriptures, otherwise then in passage, and for application to mans capacitie and to matters morall or Diuine. And it is a true Rule, Authoris aliud agentis parua authoritas. For it were a strange conclusion, if a man should vse a similitude for ornament or illustration sake, borrowed from Nature or historie, according to vulgar conceit, as of a Basiliske, an Vnicorne, a Centaure, a Briareus, an Hydra or the like, that therefore hee must needes bee thought to affirme the matter thereof positiuely to be true; To conclude therefore these two Inter∣pretations,

the one by reduction or Aenigmaticall, the other Philosophicall or Phisicall, which haue beene receiued and pursued in imitation of the Rab∣bins and Cabalists, are to be confined with a Noli al∣tum sapere, sed time.

But the two later points knowne to God, and vnknowne to Man; touching the secrets of the heart, and the successions of time: doth make a iust and sound difference betweene the manner of the ex∣position of the Scriptures: and all other bookes. For it is an excellent obseruation which hath beene made vpon the answeres of our Sauiour Christ to many of the questions which were propounded to him, how that they are impertinent to the state of the question demanded, the reason whereof is, be∣cause not being like man, which knowes mans thoughts by his words, but knowing mans thoughts immediately, hee neuer answered their words, but their thoughts: much in the like manner it is with the Scriptures, which being written to the thoughts of men, and to the succession of all ages, with a fore∣sight of all heresies, coatradictions, differing estates of the Church, yea, and particularly of the elect, are not to be interpreted only according to the latitude of the proper sense of the place, and respectiuely towardes that present occasion, whereupon the wordes were vttered; or in precise congruitie or contexture with the wordes before or after, or in contemplation of the principall scope of the place,

but haue in themselues not onely totally, or colle∣ctiuely, but distributiuely in clauses and wordes, infinite springs and streames of doctrine to wa∣ter the Church in euerie part, and therefore as the literall sense is as it were the maine streame or Ri∣uer: So the Morall sense chiefely, and sometimes the Allegoricall or Typicall are they whereof the Church hath most vse: not that I wish men to be bold in Allegories, or Indulgent or light in Allusions: but that I doe much condemne that Interpretation of the Scripture, which is onely after the manner as Men vse to interprete a prophane booke.

In this part touching the exposition of the Scrip∣tures, I can report noe deficience; but by way of re∣membrance this I will adde, In perusing Bookes of Diuinitie, I finde many Bookes of controuersies, and many of common places and treatises, a masse of positiue Diuinitie, as it is made an Arte: a num∣ber of Sermons and Lectures, and many prolixe commentaries vpon the Scriptures with harmonies and concordances: but that forme of writing in Di∣uinitie, which in my Iudgement is of all others most rich and precious; is positiue Diuinitie collected vpon particular Texts of Scriptures in briefe obser∣uations, not dilated into common places: not chase∣ing after controuersies, not reduced into Methode of Art, a thing abounding in Sermons, which will vanish, but defectiue in Bookes which wil remaine, and a thing wherin this age excelleth. For I am per∣swaded, and I may speake it, with an Absit invidia

verbo, and no waies in derogation of Antiquitie but as in a good emulation betweene the vine and the oliue, That if the choise, and best of those obser∣uations vpon Texts of Scriptu•…•…es which haue beene made dispersedly in Sermons within this your * 1.33 Maiesties Ilands of Brittanie by the space of these fortie yeares and more (leauing out the largenesse of exhortations and applications thereupon) had beene set downe in a continuance, it had beene the best worke in Diuinitie, which had beene written since the Apostles times.

The matter informed by Diuinitie is of two kinds, matter of beliefe, and truth of opinion: and matter of seruice, and adoration; which is also iudged and directed by the former: The one being as the internall soule of Religion, & the other as the exter∣nall body thereof: & therfore the heathen Religion was not onely a worship of Idolls, but the whole Religion was an Idoll in it selfe, for it had noe soule that is, no certaintie of belief or confession, as a man may well thinke, considering the chiefe Doctors of their Church were the Poets, and the reason was, because the heathen Gods were noe Iealous Gods, but were glad to be admitted into part, as they had reasō. Neither did they respect the purenesse of hart, so they mought haue externall honour and rites.

But out of these two doe result and issue foure maine branches of Diuinitie; Faith, Manners, Ly∣turgie, and Gouernment: Faith containeth the Do∣ctrine of the Nature of GOD, of the attributes of

GOD, and of the workes of GOD; The nature of GOD consisteth of three persons in vnitie of GOD-head; The attributes of GOD are ei∣ther common to the deitie, or respectiue to the per∣sons; The workes of GOD summarie are two, that of the Creation, and that of the Redemption: And both these workes, as in Totall they appertaine to the vnitie of the God-head: So in their parts they referre to the three persons: That of the Creation in the Masse of the Matter to the father, in the dispo∣sition of the forme to the Sonne, and in the continu∣ance and conseruation of the being to the Holy spirit: So that of the Redemptiō, in the election and counsell to the Father, in the whole Act and consū∣mation, to the Sonne: and in the application to the Holy spirit: for by the Holy Ghost was Christ con∣ceiued in flesh, and by the Holy Ghost are the Elect regenerate in spirite. This worke likewise we consi∣der either effectually in the Elect, or priuately in the reprobate, or according to apparance in the visible Church.

For manners, the Doctrine thereof is contained in the lawe, which discloseth sinne. The lawe it selfe is deuided according to the edition thereof, into the lawe of Nature, the lawe Morall, and the lawe Posi∣tiue; and according to the stile, into Negatiue and Affirmatiue, Prohibitions and Commandements. Sinne in the matter and subiect thereof is deuided according to the Commandements, in the forme thereof it referreth to the three persons in deitie,

Sinnes of Infirmitie against the father, whose more speciall attribute is Power: Sinnes of Ignorance against the Sonne, whose attribute is wisedome: and sinnes of Malice against the Holy Ghost, whose attribute is Grace or Loue. In the motions of it, it either mooueth to the right hand or to the left, either to blinde deuotion, or to prophane & libertine transgressiō, either in imposing restraint, where GOD granteth libertie, or in taking liber∣tie where GOD imposeth restrainte. In the de∣grees and progresse of it, it deuideth it selfe into thought, word, or Act. And in this part I com∣mend much the diducing of the Lawe of GOD to cases of conscience, for that I take indeede to bee a breaking, and not exhibiting whole of the bread of life. But that which quickneth both these Doctrines of faith and Manners is the eleuati∣tion and consent of the heart, whereunto apper∣taine bookes of exhortation, holy meditation, chri∣stian resolution, and the like.

For the Lyturgie or seruice, it consisteth of the reciprocall Acts betweene GOD and Man, which on the part of GOD are the Preaching of the word and the Sacraments, which are seales to the couenant, or as the visible worde: and on the part of Mans Inuocation of the name of GOD, and vn∣der the law: Sacrifices, which were as visible praiers or confessions, but now the adoration being in Spi∣ritu & veritate there remaineth only vituli labiorum,

although the vse of holy vowes of thankefulnesse and retribution, may be accounted also as sealed pe∣titions.

And for the Gouernment of the Church, it consisteth of the patrimonie of the church, the fran∣chises of the Church, and the offices, and iurisdicti∣ons of the Church, and the Lawes of the Church directing the whole: All which haue two consi∣derations; the one in them selues: the other how they stand compatible and agreeable to the Ciuill Estate.

This matter of Diuinitie is handled either in forme of instruction of truth: or in forme of con∣futation of falshood. The declinations from Re∣ligion besides the primitiue which is Atheisme and the Branches thereof, are three, Heresies, Idolatrie, and Witch-craft, Heresies, when we serue the true GOD with a false worship. Idolatrie, when wee worship false Gods, supposing them to be true: and Witch-craft, when wee adore false Gods knowing them to be wicked and false. For so your Maiestie doth excellently well obserue, that Witch-craft is the height of Idolatry. And yet we see thogh these be true degrees, Samuel teacheth us that they are all of a nature, when there is once a receding from the word of GOD, for so he saith, Quasi Peccatum ariolandi est repugnare, & quasi scelus Idolo∣latriae nolle acquiescere.

These thinges I haue passed ouer so briefely because I can report noe deficience concerning

them: For I can finde no space or ground that li∣eth vacant and vnsowne in the matter of Diuini∣tie, so diligent haue men beene, either in sowing of good seede, or in sowing of Tares.

Thus haue I made as it were a small Globe of the Intellectuall world, as truly and faithfully as I coulde discouer, with a note and description of those parts which seeme to mee, not constantly occupate, or not well conuerted by the labour of Man. In which, if I haue in any point receded from that which is commonly receiued, it hath beene with a purpose of proceeding in melius, and not in aliud: a minde of amendment and profici∣ence; and not of change and difference. For I could not bee true and constant to the argument I handle, if I were not willing to goe beyond others, but yet not more willing, then to haue others goe beyond mee againe: which may the better appeare by this that I haue propounded my opinions na∣ked and vnarmed, not seeking to preoccupate the li∣bertie of mens iudgements by confutations. For in any thing which is well set downe, I am in good hope, that if the first reading mooue an obiection, the second reading will make an answere. And in those things wherein I haue erred, I am sure I haue not preiudiced the right by litigious arguments; which certainly haue this contrarie effect and ope∣ration, that they adde authoritie to error, and de∣stroy the authoritie of that which is well inuented.

For question is an honour and preferment to fal∣shood, as on the other side it is a repulse to truth. But the errors I claime and challenge to my selfe as mine owne. The good, if any bee, is due Tanquam adeps sacrificij, to be incensed to the ho∣nour first of the diuine Maiestie, and next of your Maiestie, to whom on earth I am most bounden.

Notes

• * 1.1

  Historia Literarū.
• * 1.2

  Historia Naturae Errantis.
• * 1.3

  Historia Mechani∣ca.
• * 1.4

  Historia Propheti∣ca.
• * 1.5

  〈1 line〉〈1 line〉
• * 1.6

  Metaphi∣sica siue De formis & F•…•…∣bus Rerū.
• * 1.7

  Naturalis Magiasiue Phisica O∣peratiua Maior.
• * 1.8

  Inuentari∣um Opum bumana∣rum.
• * 1.9

  Continua∣tio Proble∣matum in Natura. Catalogus Falsitatū grassantiū in historia Naturae.
• * 1.10

  De Anti∣quis Phi∣losophijs.
• * 1.11

  Narratio∣nes Medi∣cinales.
• * 1.12

  Anatomia compara∣ta.
• * 1.13

  Inquisitio vlterior de Morbis in∣sanabisi∣bus.
• * 1.14

  De Eutha∣nasia exte∣riore.
• * 1.15

  Medicinae experi∣mentales.
• * 1.16

  Imitatio Naturae in Balneis, & Aquis Me∣dicinalibus
• * 1.17

  Filum Me∣dicinale, si∣ue de vici∣bus Medi∣cinarum.
• * 1.18

  Experien∣tia litera∣ta, & in∣terpretatio Naturae.
• * 1.19

  Elenchi magni, s•…•…e d•…•… Idolis a∣nimi hu∣mani, nati∣uis & ad∣uentitijs.
• * 1.20

  De Analo∣gia Demon∣strationum.
• * 1.21

  De Notis Rerum.
• * 1.22

  De Me∣thode syn∣cera, siue ad filios Scientia∣rum.
• * 1.23

  De pru∣dentia Traditio∣nis.
• * 1.24

  De Produ∣ctione Ax∣iomatum.
• * 1.25

  Depruden∣tia sermo∣nis priuati.
• * 1.26

  Colores bo∣ni & mali, simplicis & compa∣rati.
• * 1.27

  Antithe∣ta rerum.
• * 1.28

  De cul∣tura, Animi.
• * 1.29

  Faber Fortu∣nae siue de Am. bitu vitae.
• * 1.30

  De prudē∣tia legisla∣toria, fiue, de fontibus Iuris.
• * 1.31

  De vsu le∣gittimo ra∣tionis hu∣manae in diuinis.
• * 1.32

  Degradi∣bus vnita∣tis in Ci•…•…i∣tate Dei.
• * 1.33

  Emanatio∣nes Scrip∣turarum, in doctrinas Positiuas.