The lavviers logike exemplifying the præcepts of logike by the practise of the common lawe, by Abraham Fraunce.

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Title
The lavviers logike exemplifying the præcepts of logike by the practise of the common lawe, by Abraham Fraunce.
Author
Fraunce, Abraham, fl. 1587-1633.
Publication
At London :: Imprinted by William How, for Thomas Gubbin, and T. Newman,
1588.
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Subject terms
Logic -- Early works to 1800.
Common law -- Early works to 1800.
Link to this Item
http://name.umdl.umich.edu/A01231.0001.001
Cite this Item
"The lavviers logike exemplifying the præcepts of logike by the practise of the common lawe, by Abraham Fraunce." In the digital collection Early English Books Online. https://name.umdl.umich.edu/A01231.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed June 7, 2025.

Pages

The 13. Chapter. Of Distribution. (Book 13)

IN Distribution and Definition there is a most necessary reciprocation or conuersion: in distri∣bution, of all the parts with the whole: in defi∣nition, of the thing defined, with the definition it selfe.

A distribution is, when the whole is distributed into his partes. And as the distinguishing of the whole into his parts, is called Distribution: so the collection or gathering together of all the parts to make vp the whole, is named Induction.

Distribution is made of arguments which are agréeable to the whole, but disagréeable among themselues: so that it is so much the more perfect distribution, by how much the

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partes doo more agrée with the whole; and disagrée among themselues.

Annotations.

REciprocation:] In other arguments not necessary. For it is not in all causes, but onely betwéene the forme and the thing formed: not in all subiects, but betwéene the subiect and his proper adiunct, not in all contraries, but onely in Re∣latiues. Whereas in distribution and definition, the reci∣procation is perpetuall.

Such is the excellency of distribution and definition, that almost they alone doo suffice for the absolute putting downe of any art. Therefore Socrates in Phaedro Platonis sayth, that if he finde any man who can cunningly diuide, he will follow his steps, and admire him for a God.

[Induction:] Therefore as the one is an argument, and no argumentation, so also is the other. Nam Inductio arguit distributum siue totum, sine vlla dispositione tertij argumenti.

[More agree with the whole:] For in distribution of the subiect and adiunct, the partes and the whole doo not essenti∣ally agrée, as we shall sée héereafter. Therefore by this rule the best diuision is from the cause and effect. Againe, the more that the partes doo disagrée among themselues, the better is the diuision. By which it appéereth that the best diuision must be of partes that be most repugnant, which can bee but two, therefore Dichotomia is most excellent, a diuision con∣sisting onely of two partes. For, as among agreeable argu∣ments the cause and thing caused doo best agrée, so of all disa∣gréeable; the repugnant be most disagréeable. But as in the most generall and subalternall, Dichotomia must bee obser∣ued, so in the most speciall it is not to be exacted.

Elenchs.

Plato in Phaedro compareth inartificial diuiders so bung∣ling Cookes, who in stead of artificiall ear•…•…ing, vse rudely to breake and dismember thinges. This is a lamentable want in our law, I meane exact diuisions, in place whereof wee haue nothing els, but eyther A B C methode without cohe∣rence, or primo notandum, 2. not. 3. not. 4. not. & so on 〈◊〉〈◊〉 till

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hée come to decimotertiò notandum, like dunses in schooles, and séelly bablers in pulpits: that a man were farre better make a new spéech, than remember their waste and confused Schediasmata. Lyttleton did what hée could in this behalfe, although it were but litle, as in those his distinctions, Estate taile is generall or speciall: Dower is per le comen ley, per custom, ad ostium ecclesiae, ex assensu patris, de la pluis beale. Uillen per prescription ou confession: Item in gros ou re∣gardant. Rent est rent seruice, charge, seck. Conditions in fayt, en ley. Garrantie, lineall, collaterall, perdisseisin, &c.

Well then, one generall Elench in a distribution, is the not vsing of it, when the matter requireth. Another is, when wée vse it, but inartificially, when any thing eyther wanteth in it, or is supersiuous. Want, as in that which Virgil hath 5. Aeneid. where hée propoundeth in his distribution onely foure kindes of exercises, but afterwards expoundeth fiue.

Prima citae Teucris ponam certamina classis, Qui{que} pedum cursu valet, & qui viribus audax, Aut iaculo incedit melior, leuibus{que} sagittis, Seu crudo fidit pugnam committere cestu, Cuncti adsint, meritae{que} expectent praemia palmae, Ore fauete omnes, & cingite tempora ramis.

For besides these foure, followeth the fift, not named here in the distribution, and that is the race of horses.

For superfluitie, that shall serue which Tully hath in his second booke De finibus, where hée speaketh thus of Epicurus.

Quomodo autem philosophus loquitur tria esse genera cu∣piditatum? Naturales & necessarias, naturales & non necessa∣rias, nec naturales nec necessarias. Primùm diuisit inleganter: duo enim genera quae erant, fecit tria: hoc est, non diuidere, sed frangere rem. Qui si diceret, Cupiditatum duo esse genera, naturales & inanes: naturalium quo{que} duo, necessarias & non necessarias, confecta res esset. Vitiosum est enim in diuidendo, partem in genere numerare.

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