Atheomastix clearing foure truthes, against atheists and infidels: 1. That, there is a God. 2. That, there is but one God. 3. That, Iehouah, our God, is that one God. 4. That, the Holy Scripture is the Word of that God. All of them proued, by naturall reasons, and secular authorities; for the reducing of infidels: and, by Scriptures, and Fathers, for the confirming of Christians. By the R. Reuerend Father in God, Martin Fotherby, late Bishop of Salisbury. The contents followes, next after the preface.

The second Booke: (Book 2)

Of the Grounds of Arts. (Book 2)

CHAP. I.

That all Arts leade to God. 2. The Metaphysicks, by two Arguments. 3. The first is, the limiting of all finite things: as of naturall Bodies. 4. And of their naturall faculties. 5. And yet not by the Sunne, which it selfe is limited: 6. Both in his working: 7. And in his moouing 8. By the li∣miting also of ••ll artificiall faculties. 9. And finally, by the limiting of all spirituall Graces.

I Haue in the former Booke instructed the Atheist, out of The voyce of Nature; and proued vnto him, That there is a God, by that naturall perswasion, which is generally begotten in the hearts of all men. Which, like a priuate and domesticall Schoole-master, teacheth the Atheist that Lesson, by a secret suggestion, as it were, the A, B, C, and first elements of Religion. The force and power of which inward instruction, the very Atheist himselfe feeleth sensibly within him. For, there is no Atheist in the world, so obdurate and hardened, but hee is oftentimes inforced to confesse, There is a God. Yea, & that not only against his will, by the stroke of Gods iudgements, which extort an vnwilling confes∣sion from him; but also sometimes, by his will, and of his owne free motion, without any violence or outward compulsion, onely by the force of this in∣ward perswasion. Nay, there is none of them all, so desperately wicked, but that, at some time or other, in some sort or other, he will serue some God, though he pretend to contemne all. Or, if he refuse to serue him; yet hee can∣not chuse but feare him, euen because he serueth him not: as being conscious vnto himselfe, euen by Natures inward lessoning, that his seruice is due vnto him. And that therefore, for his neglect of it, he is subiect to due punishment: which is a reall confession of him, yea, and that a very strong one. Thus for∣cible an operation, hath this inward voyce of Nature, in the hearts of all men, euen in the wickedest among them.

Now, hauing thus, in the former Booke,* 1.1 instructed the Atheist in this first principle of Religion, by the voyce of his owne Nature, as of a domesticall

and priuate Instructor: in this Booke I intend to bring him out, a little fur∣ther, and to send him abroad vnto the Heathen Philosophers, as vnto the Schoole of more publique and expert Teachers. For that, which dame Na∣ture doth but only affirme vpon her bare word, that doe the Philosophers both confirme by reasons, and declare by sensible Demonstrations. And though none of all those Arts, which they inuented, doe purposely propound to in∣treat of God, as of their proper subiect; neither any of them haue this our pre∣sent position [That there is a God] for one of their principles, as Theologie hath: Yet is there none of them, but that it affordeth vs some matter or other, from whence we may collect, that there needes must be a God. As we may e∣uidently see, in all the seuerall parts of Philosophie. Let me giue you but a taste of some few, for all the rest: because the Argument is not popular. And therefore, it is but equall, that my stay vpon it should bee the shorter.

The instances whereupon I will chiefely insist bee these: Two, out of the Metaphysicks: The bounding and limiting of all finite things; and the ex∣tending of mens app••tites beyond all boundes and limits. Two, out of the Physickes: The first Cause, and, The first Moouer of all naturall things. Two, out of Phisick: Diseases, and their Remedies. Two out of the Politicks: the growing, and decaying of Kingdomes, and Empires. Two, out of the Ethicks: the way to Felicity, and Felicity it selfe. Foure, out of the Mathe∣maticks: Punctum in geometrie; Vnitas in Arithmeticke; Ordo in Astronomy; and Harmonia, in Musick. Finally, there is no Art, neither liberall, nor illibe∣rall; but it commeth from God, and leadeth to God. And this is the substance and oeconomy of this second booke.* 1.2

2 Let vs first beginne with the Metaphysicks; which Aristotle calleth, The first Philosophy, Primam Philosophiam: and so by degrees, descend downe vn∣to the rest.* 1.3 It affoordeth vs two considerations: from whence wee may col∣lect, euen by the light of nature, that There needes must be a God. The first is, The bounding and limiting of all finite things. The second, The boundlesse and vnlimited appetite of mens soules.

3 For the first of which two points; look throgh the whole world,* 1.4 & throgh all the sensible bodies, therein contained, & you shal euidently see, that though many of them be great, yet that none of them is infinite: there is none of them so great, as to be without his limit. As euen Aristotle himselfe, both affirmeth and proueth, in his first booke, De Coelo.* 1.5 Where, he plainely and categorically setteth downe this conclusion: Corpus infinitum, in ratione rerum, esse non pos∣se. That it is a thing, contrary to the nature of things, that there should bee any body, without his termes and limits; No, not euen the body of the vniuersall world it selfe: as,* 1.6 in the conclusion of the same chapter he expressely inferreth. Vniuersi corpus, infinitū esse non posse, ex ijs, quae diximus, patet. Then much lesse can any part of the world be infinite, if the whole be not. Vnlesse we should make the whole to be lesse then his owne part: which were vtterly absurde. And therfore all the parts of the world, must needs be limited, & determined.

Let me giue you an instance or two,* 1.7 to this purpose: and that out euen of Aristotle himselfe. Terra in Aqua; haec, in Acre; Aer, in Aethere; Aether, in Coelo est collocatus. Ipsum verò Coelum, nullo in alio corpore est vlteriùs collocatum. The Earth, that is bounded and limited with the Water; the Water with the Aire;

the Aire, with the Fire; the fire with the Heauen. The heauen is not bounded, with any further Body. How then is the Heauen bounded, if it be not boundlesse? Why thus. Euery one of the lower heauens is bounded or limited, by the con∣ca••e, or hollow part of his higher: vntill we come to that, which is the high∣est of all, and containeth all the rest, being contained of none. And yet, euen that is not without his bounds, but is limited and determined, within his owne conuexe or swelling superficies: as a man is, by his skin••e, or a bubble of water, by his thinne filme. So that, there is not, in Nature, any Body, that is infinite, nor any that is without all limit. To be vnlimited and boundlesse, is onely the Prerogatiue of the Maker of all things: as Prosper very well, and truly obserueth.

Níl{que} adeò magnum est,* 1.8 quod non certus modus arcet. Et Coelum, & Terras, & totum deni{que} mundum, Limes habet. Meta est altis, & meta profundis. Sed nusquam non esse, Dei est: qui totus, vbí{que}, Et penetrat Mundi membra omnia liber, & ambit. Ther's nought so vaste, as to be voyd of limit. Both H••au'n, and Earth, and all the world hath bounds. All heights and depths haue termes, is we esteeme it: Height ne're so high, be Depth ne're so pro••ound. Vnlimited, and no where not to be, Agrees to God alone: Who wholy is The whole World through, and euery least part: He Within doth pierce, without doth compasse this.

So that, there is not any Body, in Nature, so infinite, but that it is pre••••••ed within some bound and limit. Now, euery finite Body, being thus bounded & limited, it must needs haue had those bounds prescribed vnto it, by some o∣ther thing, and not by it selfe. For, euery thing, by nature, being desirous of scope, and seeking to inlarge it selfe, as farre as it is able; if it had the setting of his owne bounds and limits, it would set none at all; but would be as in∣finite, as God himselfe is: who hath the setting of limits vnto all things. And therefore (as you see) hath set none vnto himselfe: but is illimitable, and boundlesse. Nullis ne{que} finibus, ne{que}* 1.9 spacijs ••oarctatus: as Saint Hilarie teach∣eth: Being no way straitned, by any space, or place. And so would it be with all other things too; if they had the assigning of their owne bounds and limits: they would all of them, be boundlesse. Because all bounds, be like bonds, and like shackles, vnto all things: which they would neuer put vpon them, if they could be without them. For (as Scaliger well obserueth) Vnicui{que} enti,* 1.10 insita est appetitio infinitatis, There is in euery thing, an appetite to make it selfe infi∣nite. The Sea, if it could eate vp the whole Earth, and make all the Globe, Sea (as it once was) it would surely do it. For, the waters do desire,* 1.11 to stand aboue the mountaines;* 1.12 as the Prophet Dauid testifieth.

Againe, the Earth, if it could vtterly close vp the Sea, and make all the Globe, dry-land,* 1.13 it would surely doe it; as Esdras notable expresseth in a wit∣ty apologue. I came (saith he) into a Forrest, in the plaine, where the Trees held a Councell, and sayd; Come let vs fight against the Sea, that it may giue place to vs, and that wee may make vs more woods. Likewise, the floods of the Sea tooke

counsell, and sayd; Come, and let vs go vp, and fight against the Trees of the wood, that we may get another Country for vs. But the purpose of the wood, was vaine: for the fire came downe and consumed it. And the purpose of the Sea, was also vaine: for the sand stood vp, and stopped it. Whereby it appeareth, that there is, in all things, a desire to dilate, and to ingreat themselues. And therefore would neuer shut vp themselues, within bounds and limits, as it were, in a prison; if they themselues had the setting and appointing of them. Therefore, as it is true,* 1.14 that Nullum ens finitum, est a se: so it is likewise true, that Nullum ens, finitum est a se. As nothing, that is finite, is of it selfe: so no∣thing that is, is finite of it selfe. But all the finite things, in vniuersall nature, haue both their being, and their bounding of some other. And they all doe feele within them, the imperiall power of a superior Nature: which hath ap∣pointed, and prescribed those limits▪ vnto them: and therefore are wel content, to containe themselues within them: as obeying the command of him, that ruleth ouer them.

Nonnè vides (saith Claudian) operum,* 1.15 qui se, pulcherrimus ipse, Mundus amore ligat? nec, vt connexa, per aevum, Conspirant Elementa sibi? quî, limite Phoebus Contentus medio? contentus littore Pontus? Et quî perpetuò terras ambít{que}, vehít{que}, Non premat incumbens oneri, nec cesserit aër? See'st not the World, of Natures work's the fayrest, well I wot, How it, it selfe together tyes, as in a true-loues knot? Nor see'st how th' Elements, aye combin'd, maintaine one constant pl••••? How th' midst of Heau'n content's the Sun? and Shore containes the Sea? And how the Ayre both compasseth, and carrieth still Earths frame? Yet neither pressing burthens it, nor parting leaues the same?

This abiding of those things within their bounds and limits, cleane contrary vnto their naturall Appetites, doth euidently declare, that those bounds were neuer set vnto them by themselues, but appointed vnto all of them, by some other, whose prescribed law they are compelled to beare.

Now, who can this be, that thus circumscribeth all things, within their set limits, but onely God himselfe: who is, both the Maker, and Ruler of all things? For, what other could set bounds, both vnto Heauen and Earth, but onely the Creator and Maker of them both? who, must needes be God. And therefore he it is (as the Prophet Dauid testifieth) that hath botha 1.16 founded the Earth, vpon the waters;b 1.17 and bounded the Sea, within his bankes;c 1.18 and spread out the Heauen, as it were, a curtaine. He it is (as the Prophet Isay testifi∣eth) that doth,* 1.19 Palmo, coelos; pugillo, aquas; digitis, terras metiri: that coun∣teth out the heauen, with his span; and measureth the waters, with his fist; and comprehendeth the dust of the earth, in a measure; and weigheth the moun∣taines in a waite; and the hills, in a ballance.

So that, the bounding and limiting of al the forenamed things, is the worke of none other, but of God, their Creator: who (as Boetius truly calleth him) is

Principium,* 1.20 Vector, Dux, Semita, Terminus, idem. The first Beginner, and the Bringer on, The Guide, Path, Terme and all, is God alone.

A••d this is confessed, not onely by Christians; but also by diuers of the Hea∣thens themselus. Ovid, describing the creation of the world, he ascribeth it expressely vnto a God, though he could not tell what God. But he numbreth as his workes, all the forenamed particulars; Of compassing the earth about, with the water; that,* 1.21 with the ayre; and that, with the heauen; of the bounding of the Seas within their shores; of the stretching out of the feilds; the ray∣sing vp of hills; the pressing downe of valleyes; the growing vp of woods; and diuers such like. All which, he pronounceth to be the works of God. Yea, and that, not onely in respect of their creation, and making: but also, euen of their circumscribing, and limiting.

—Limitibus, dis••revit omnia, certis. With bounds distinguished, all things are limited.

Insisting, nominatìm, vpon this point of their limiting. So likewise, Orpheus.

Tu mundi terminos habes Vniuer si.

Th••u,* 1.22 God,* 1.23 hast in thy hands, Of all the world the bounds. So likewise Pindarus:

Sed discriminat omnia, interminata vis & potentis. It selfe a boundlesse power is, That setteth bounds to all things else.

And, that this was not the idle fiction of Poets, we may see by the grauer sen∣tences of the learnedest Philosophers: who casting about, with the best wit that they had, from whence this limiting of things should proceed; haue, at the last, beene constrayned, to ascribe it vnto God. Anaxagoras affirmeth, that there is, a certaine infinite Spirit,* 1.24 [Mens] whose power and vnderstan∣ding hath giuen bounds and limits, vnto euery finite thing. And of the same opinion was likewise his master Anaximenes; as Tullie reporteth, in the very same place. Anaxagoras, qui accepit ab Anaximene disciplinam, primus, om∣nium rerum descriptionem & modum, Mentis infinit••e vi ac ratione, designa∣ri, & confici voluit. And, indeed, Anaxagoras did so totally ascribe,* 1.25 all the noble workes of nature, vnto the working of this M••ns (which was his Philo∣sophicall appellation of God) that they vsed to call him, Mens, in derision. Yet, and, euen Aristotle himselfe, seemeth to taxe him, for it: and, yet,* 1.26 hee agreeeth with him in the very same point. For he saith, that there is, Quid. dam infinitum, cuius non est principium: sed hoc, principium caeterorum, quòd, & continet ipsum omnia, & gubernat. There is (saith he) a certaine infinite thing, which is it selfe without all beginning: and yet is the beginner of euery other thing: yea both their maintainer, and their gouernor. So that, this In∣finitum, is both the beginning, from whence all things doe proceede; and (as it were) the place, wherein all things are contayned; yea, and the very Gouernour, by whom all things are ruled. And this Infinitum (which doth thus finire, & continere omnia) he calleth afterward, Divinum, that is, a Di∣vine thing. Yea, and this, in the same place, hee plainely affirmeth, to be the common Tenet of all the Philosophers. Omnes,* 1.27 qui dignè Philosophiam tetigisse putantur, de Infinito sermonem fecerunt. Ac omnes, ipsum, vt principium quoddam eorum quae sunt, posuerunt. All those, that haue beene worthy to handle Philosophie, make mentiom of that Infinitum. Yea, and all of them confesse, that infinite thing to be the first beginner, and originall of all things. And that

it may appeare, that he reciteth not this opinion, as reprouing or disliking it, hee, in plaine words, confirmeth it: and saith, that it was, with great reason, that they affirmed it. Principium omnes, infinitum ponunt,* 1.28 cum ratione. Now Aristotle was a man, as greatly addicted, vnto his 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; as Anaxagoras was, vnto his 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: ascribing all things, so absolutely, vnto the power of Nature, as if hee had beene hired to write in her behalfe. Insomuch that, as he cal∣led Empedocles,* 1.29 Naturae interpretem:* 1.30 The interpreter of Nature: so Suidas calleth him Naturae Scribam, The Scriuener of Nature. And therefore, he would neuer haue transcribed this circumscribing power, from his beloued Nature, vnto any such supernaturall cause, as that Infinitum Diuinum was; if, with the Egyptian Sorcerers,* 1.31 hee had not beene constrayned to confesse, that in this worke, is the finger of God. Which yet, in another place, hee more plainly affirmeth. For he saith, that, God is therefore called, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, a 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Id est,* 1.32 circumscribi omnia: & quia nihil in rerum natura sit, quod in infini••∣tum ex••urrat. God is called Peproméne, from his bounding of all things, and leauing nothing vndefined, without his bounds and Limits. For, nothing can exceed those termes and limits, which Fate hath prescribed. Which worke, Philolaus also ascribeth directly vnto God: affirming expressely, Vn••∣versa, tanquam in carcere,* 1.33 a Deo contineri: That all things are shut vp, by the appointment of God, within their bounds and limits (as it were) into their prisons. And this worke, of thus bounding and limiting of all things, doe the Greeks acknowledg, to be the worke of God, in calling their great God Iu∣piter, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Limiferum, or, Rerum terminos afferentem,* 1.34 as Homers Tran∣slator renders: him that is, The appointer of limits vnto all things. And the Romanes likewise, doe seeme to acknowledge the very same, in calling the same God, Iovem terminalem: that is, Iupiter the Limiter, or the Bounder of all things. Thus,* 1.35 the bounding and limiting of all naturall bodies, doth leade vs, by the hand, vnto the knowledge of a God.

4 And so doth likewise, the bounding of their naturall powers and facul∣ties. For, in these inferior parts of the world,* 1.36 wee may obserue a fiue-fold difference among the Creatures: euery one of them, hauing their proper and peculiar faculties, so defined and circumscribed, that none of them can ex∣ceede the bounds of his owne nature, nor exalt it selfe to the state of his superior; but abideth in his owne; and can goe no further. By which Hie∣rarchie of the Creatures, we may easily ascend, and climbe vp vnto God, as it were by an Ascendent, consisting of fiue steppes. For, (as the Orator truly affir∣meth) Si a primis,* 1.37 inchoatís{que} naturis, ad vltimas perfectâs{que} volumus proce∣dere; ad Deorum naturam perveniamus, necesse est. If wee will first beginne with the vnperfect works of Nature,* 1.38 and by degrees ascend vnto those that are perfecter; they will leade vs, by the hand, to know the nature of God. And therefore,* 1.39 this Argument is much insisted on;* 1.40 both by Tullie, the Orator, in the forealledged place; and by Plotinus, the Philosopher, as Theodoret re∣cordeth; and by the learned Fathers, S. Augustine, and S. Gregorie: and yet, most fully, by Raymundus de Sabunde. Wherein, I haue obserued, that euery one of them,* 1.41 though they handle the same matter; yet, haue put vpon it a seue∣rall forme. And therefore, I wil not tie my selfe, vnto any one of them: but (imi∣tating their example) will cast the Argument, into a mold of mine owne.

Now, those fiue degrees of Creatures, bee these. That some things haue bare essence and being, allotted vnto them; and yet not either life, or sense: as, in si••ple bodies; the Heauens, and the Elements: in compound bodies; Stones, and Metals, and such like. Some other things, haue both Being, and Liuing▪ and yet not either sense, or motion: as Trees, and Plants. Some other things, ••aue both Being, and Liuing, and Feeling; and yet haue no proper, or animal-motion: as Oysters, and Muscles, and such other like conchylia; which haue no naturall motion of their owne, but are onely carried, as the water driueth them. And therefore, Aristotle, very wittily, calleth them,* 1.42 Aquatiles plantas; A kind of Waterplants: as he calleth earthly plants, Ostreaterrena; A kind of Land-Oysters: because they haue no more selfe-motion, then these,* 1.43 I meane Lation, or local-motion from one place to another. Some things againe, haue both Being, and Liuing, and Feeling, and Mouing; and yet haue no Reason, nor Vnderstanding: as Birds, and Beasts, and Fishes, and such like. And some things againe, haue all these powers and faculties vnited in one, both Essence, and Life, and Sense, and Motion, and Reason too: as we see they be in Men. And these distinctions of Creatures, are so obuious to all men, that he, which notes them not, is more worthy to be numbred among beasts, then among men. Now, if it should be demanded; Why a Stone hath not life, as well as a Tree? or, a Tree, not sense, as well as a Beast? or, a Beast, not reason, as well as a Man? wha•• other reason, can be giuen of all this, but one∣ly, that those powers are not in their owne power, to take so many of them, as they themselues thinke good: but, that they be limited and assigned vnto them, by a nature farre aboue them: euen the same nature that made them. And that they therefore haue them not; because that Nature gaue them not.

From whence, there follow these two Conclusions. First, that all those fore∣nam••d faculties and powers, though they be in those things, that haue them; yet they be not of those things, that haue them. They haue them, in them∣selues; but they haue them, not of themselues. For then, all would haue all of them, and none would content themselues with any part, were it neuer so great. Would a Tree (thinke you) be content to sticke fast in the earth, as a dead and rotten stake; if it could giue it selfe motion? Surely, no. The blinde man, in the Gospell, that thought he saw men walking like vnto Trees,* 1.44 should surely see Trees walking like vnto men, if they could take vnto themselues the facultie of mouing. Againe, would a Beast be content, to be so subiect vnto man, if it could giue it selfe Reason? Or would a Man be content, to liue here vpon the earth, if he could flee vp into heauen, and make himselfe a God? Surely, he neuer would. That which Tertullian affirmeth of the Romane Emperours, is true also, in all others, that; Si ipsi,* 1.45 se Deos facere potuiss••nt; certè quidem, homines nunquàm fuissent. If they could haue made themselues Gods, they would neuer haue continued Men. And so in all other things, as well as in these, they would all haue all those faculties, if they could giue them to themselues. Therefore, seeing that, which hath onely Being, cannot giue it selfe Life; and that, which hath onely Life, cannot giue it selfe Sense; and that which hath onely Sense, cannot giue it selfe Reason; this euidently sheweth vnto all that haue any Reason, that the ampliating, or restrayning of those na∣turall

indowments, is not in their owne free disposition, or election: but in his onely power, who freely bestoweth them. This is the first conclusion.

The second, That seeing those fore-named faculties are not in the power of the things themselues, that haue them; therefore they must needes proceede from some other power that gaue them; and that hath in it selfe, the whole power of dispensing them. And that can be none other, but a diuine and hea∣uenly power. For, that nature must needes be supernaturall and diuine, which is the fountaine and wel-spring both of Being, and Liuing, and Mouing, and Sense, and Reason: and which hath the power, to deriue the streames of those diuine graces, vnto all other creatures, in such differing degrees, limiting and proportioning vnto euery seueral creature, that power and faculty, which stan∣deth best with his pleasure: To some of them dispensing, but only one facul∣ty▪ to some two; to some three; to some foure; to some fiue: as the houshol∣der, in the Gospell,* 1.46 distributed his Talents vnto his seruants. This inestimable treasure of so many pretious Talents, and this admirable wisedome, which is vsed in dispensing them,* 1.47 cannot, in reason, be ascribed, but onely vnto God. He it is, that made the heauen, the earth, the sea, which haue onely being: the trees, the hearbs,* 1.48 the plants, which haue both being and liuing: the birds, the beasts, the fishes; which haue both liuing, sense, and moouing: Yea, and Man himselfe too; which (beside all these fore-named) hath also vnderstanding. As Mo••es plain∣ly sheweth in the Booke of Genesis. Yea, and the Apostle Paul confirmeth it,* 1.49 in his affirming, that it is onely God, in whom wee liue, and moue, and haue our being: naming in expresse tearmes, three of those fiue properties, which before were named by vs, Liuing, Moouing, and Being.

Yea, and adding for the rest, which he hath not named (as a generall conclusi∣on, to this particular enumeration,)* 1.50 that it is he, which giueth vnto all, both life, and breath, and all things. So that it is God (as Philo Iudaeus noteth) qui suas potentias cincundedit rebus omnibus, tanquàm fortissima vincula; & hijs, eas in∣dissolubiliter astrictas esse voluit. God hath giuen vnto all things, their naturall powers, with which he hath bound them, as it were, in strong bands; so that they haue no power to inlarge themselues. Yea, and euen the very Heathen them∣selues, haue (by reason) beene compelled to confesse, as well in this point, as they did in the former, that this must needes be the worke of God, and not of any other.* 1.51 Aristotle saith expressely, that; Omnes, Aeris, Terrae, Aquae, res, Dei opera dicere possis: Dei (inquam) qui mundum continet. We may truely affirme of all things, which are either in the Ayre, or in the Earth, or in the waters, that they be the workes of God: Yea, euen of that great God, which containeth the whole world.* 1.52 In whose hand (as the Psalmist teacheth) are all the corners of the earth. Yea, and Aristotle in the same place, confirmeth his owne assertion, by the testimony of Empedocles, who hath plainely deliuered as much in his verses, recounting all these things following, nominatìm, as Gods workes.

Omnia quae fuerant, quae sunt,* 1.53 quae{que} ipsa sequentur, Plantarum genus, at{que} hominum generosa propago, At{que} ferae, volucres, pisces in fluctibus alti. What things or haue beene, be, or what things euer shall, Of Plants the kinds, mans noble race, beasts, birds, and fishes all. [May, all of them, be numbred as the workes of God.]

Yea, & Virgil affirmeth the same thing, though in other words▪ where speaking of the powerful spirit of God, which pierceth through euery part of the world, he saith, that:

Inde hominum, pecudúm{que}, genu••, vitae{que} volantum, Et quae marmoreo fert monstra sub aequore pontus;* 1.54 Igneus est ollis vigor, & coelestis origo. From him, both men, and be••sts, and birds, and fishes too proceed, And whatsoeuer Monsters strange, in marbly Seas doe breed: All haue a vigorous kind of warmth, by an eternall law: And all their first originall from heauenly powers draw.

But yet, not from the Heauens, as of their proper influence; but from the Ru∣ler of the heauens, as of his grace and goodnesse. For (as Proclus truely t••sti∣fieth) Q••icquid bonum,* 1.55 ac salutare competit animabus (yea and animalibus too) caus••m a dijs definitam habet. What health or good soeuer there commeth to the creatures, it is definitely appointed vnto them by God. For (as Aristotle affirmeth vnto the same purpose) Et virent,* 1.56 & occidunt, diuinis parentia de••retis▪ They both s••••rish and perish by the decree of God. I might be plentifu••l in this point, if I would pursue that multitude of testimonies, both of Po••ts & Philosophers, which euery where occurre, ascribing vnto God the creating of all things; both of those that haue more, and of those that haue fewer Talents. But these now alledged, are (for a taste) sufficient.

5 Onely here, let me answer vnto one Obiection; which hath crept into the heads of diuers learned men,* 1.57 as concerning the limiting of those last na∣med faculties: before I proceede vnto the rest of the instances; and that is briefly this: That though it be apparant, that those fore-named Bodyes, be so distinguished by their naturall properties, that some haue onely being; some other, life, and motion; and others, sense and reason: yet doth it not appeare, that it is only God, that hath so distinguished and distributed those faculties; wee see not, that God doth it: but we see that the Sunne doth it: Whom A∣ristotle cal••eth, Authorem rerum procreandarum:* 1.58 The very Author and Parent of all generation: And vnto whom Trismegistus ascribeth, Omnium reram, in m••ndo, opificium; vt qui imperet omnibus, & faciat omnia: the making of all things in the world, as to him that ruleth all, and to him that doth all. Wee see, that the Sunne begetteth dayly in the earth, not onely Stones and Mettals, which haue onely being; but also Trees and Plants, which haue also life; yea, and Flyes and Wormes too,* 1.59 which haue both sense and motion:* 1.60 yea, and if wee should beleeue the reports of the Heathen, it hath also begotten Men, with their Reason and Vnderstanding. So that this great worke, which wee ascribe vnto God; and which we vse as an Argument, to perswade men, that there is a God; ought rather to be ascribed vnto the Sunne: by whom we see it appa∣rently done. And therefore doth not leade vs by any consequence, vnto Gods vnlesse we will acknowledge the Sunne to be God.

But vnto this obiection I answer: that if the Sunne performe this by his owne power and vertue, it must then needes bee a God; as performing that worke, which is proper vnto God. For who can giue life and motion, and sense, and reason, vnto things, by his owne power, but onely the Maker and Creator of all things? Who by those very workes declareth himselfe to be a God. So that our fore-named instances, in leading vs vnto

the Sunne, doe leade vs vnto a God; if he be the giuer and distributer of those powers, by his owne strength and power. But, if the Sunne doe this not by his owne proper power, but onely by the delegated power of his Maker and Creator, who vseth him but as his minister: then doe our fore-named instan∣ces leade vs vnto a God; who is aboue the Sunne, and is the God of the Sunne. Yea,* 1.61 and this, euen Trismegistus himselfe confesseth, in the very same place. For, though he professed of the Sunne, that hee doth, Hunc colere, ipsum{que} opificem agnoscere: Yet hee addeth this restriction; Post primum illum, & vnum: That though he acknowledge him, to be the Maker of all things; yet that it is, but vnder another, who is farre superior; being the first, and the onely, be∣fore all the rest. So that, both wayes, the limiting and distributing of those naturall faculties, in such diuers measures, vnto diuers subiects, doe necessari∣ly leade vnto a God: either vnto the true one; or vnto one in opinion. Which against the Atheist, is fully sufficient. That, by way of supposition. But now, for our position: it must be resolutely held, that, though the Sunne doth per∣forme diuers of those great works, in giuing those faculties vnto certaine bodies, according vnto their seuerall capacities: yet that it neither giueth them all (for it giueth not Reason, which is the chiefest of all) neither yet those which it giueth, doth it giue, by his owne vertue; but onely by a kinde of li∣mited facultie, which God his Creator hath giuen vnto it, to worke thus and thus, as the matter is prepared. So that, if the Sunne (the supposed giuer of all those other faculties) could but take vnto it selfe the facultie of speaking, it would certainely make the very same protestation, which was made by Saint Peter, in another like matter. Ye men of Israel, why maruaile ye at this, or why looke ye so stedfastly on vs?* 1.62 as though we, by our owne power, had made this man to goe. The God of Abraham, Isaac, and Iaacob, he hath glorified his Sonne.— And his name it is, that hath made this man sound. And this same profession which the Apostle here maketh, for giuing motion vnto this Lame man, would the Sunne also make (if it were able to speake) for his giuing of motion vnto any other thing. Yea,* 1.63 and euen for his owne motion. For (as Lactantius truly teacheth) Inest syderibus ratio, ad peragendos meatus suos apta: s••d Dei est ill a ratio, qui & fecit, & regit omnia; non ipsorum syderum quae mouentur. The Starrs haue a meane and a power in them, to dispatch their owne motion. But it is onely God, that hath giuen that power vnto them; Who is both the ma∣ker, and ruler of all things. It is not a power that is proper to the Starrs. And therefore, Trismegistus,* 1.64 though hee ascribe much to the Sunne; yet he calleth him, but, Secundum Deum, hunc mundum gubernantem: But a second Go∣uernour of the world, vnder God. Whereby it appeareth, that the Sunne is not that infinite limitour, which giueth seuerall gifts, and setteth seuerall bounds, vnto all other things; being it selfe boundlesse; but, that it must be numbred, among things limited. Yea, and that a great deale more straitly li∣mited, then many other things, that seeme inferior vnto it. And this may euidently be seene, both in his Working-power; and also, in his Mouing-power.

6 For first,* 1.65 for his working-power; it is most plaine and euident, that the Sunne is two wayes restrayned in it, that is both, in the Matter, and in the Manner of his working. By both which it appeareth, that hee hath not an

omnipotent, but a limited power in him.

And first, for the matter. We see this by experience, that it is not in the Suns power, to put euery forme vpon euery matter: but is confined, to the habilitie and capacitie of the matter, as it is either prepared, or vnprepared by nature. The S••nne cannot, by that heate, put hardnesse vpon waxe, by which, hee putteth hardnesse vpon a stone: Nor, by that heate, put softnesse vpon clay, by which hee both softneth and dissolueth the Snow. This cannot be done by him: because the matter will not suffer him. Againe, the Sunne hath not power to giue euery naturall propertie, vnto euery naturall body. Hee can∣not giue 〈◊〉〈◊〉 vnto a Tree, vpon that hard Rocke, where yet hee giueth Be∣ing vnto a Stone: Neither can hee giue being vnto a Stone, within that soft Dung-hill, where yet he giueth both being, and Liuing, and Mouing, and feeling, vnto a Worme. These things, hee can worke in one place; because the matter is prepared for him: in another hee cannot; because the matter is vnprepared for such and such a forme. For, hee cannot worke any where be∣yond the possibilitie or receptiuitie of his matter. Which euidently sheweth that the Sunne is not the first and vnlimited limitour, which distributeth those faculties, as he himselfe pleaseth: but is a meere seruant, that is limited himselfe, to doe no more then his Master pleaseth. Now, who is it, that li∣miteth this power vnto the matter; that some matter should only be capable of life; some other both of life, and sense; some other (beside these) of mo∣tion; and some of none of these, but onely of simple Being? This distribu∣tion the Sunne cannot make, in euery matter, but onely where the habilitie thereof will suffer. Therefore, the limitour of this susceptiue power vnto the matter, in such differing degrees, and measures, and manners, can (in truth) be none other, but onely that omnipotent Creator of the Matter: of whom it is sayd,* 1.66 in the beginning of Gods Booke; that, In the beginning, God made Heauen and Earth: and the Earth was voyde, and without forme. God hauing therefore made the matter, without any certaine forme of his owne, that it might be capable of euery other forme. And yet, not delegating so large a power vnto any Creature, as to superinduce any forme whatsoeuer, but onely as hee limiteth the capabilitie of the matter. And yet, vnto himselfe he hath reserued an infinite power, to put any forme vpon any matter. Which hee alwayes findeth plyant, and obsequent to his pleasure, euen against the proprietie of its owne particular nature.* 1.67 For (as Eusebius citeth out of Dio∣nysius) Penitùs nefandum est, si quis putet (sicut Artificem) ad materiae aptitu∣dinem, primam se causam accommodare. It is not to be spoken, that the first cause of all things, should (like an Artificer) be tied to the aptnesse and habilitie of his matter. For, he can easily worke, beyond all the power and possibilty of it. He can giue weight vnto the fire, which is the lightest of all things; and make it to fall perpendicularly downe, as it were a showre of raine; as he did vpon the Sodomites. He can giue hardnesse, and consistence,* 1.68 vnto the soft, and fluide waters, and make them to stand as stiffe as a wall▪* 1.69 as hee did vnto the Israelites. He can make dirt and clay,* 1.70 a Collyrium for the eyes;* 1.71 as hee did vnto the blinde man.* 1.72 He can make the mouth of a dumbe Asse to speake, as hee did vnto Balaam. Yea, and hee can; of very Stones,* 1.73 rayse vp Children vnto Abraham. Though Galen denie that power vnto him. But yet the

Scripture ascribeth it: which is of greater credit. Yea, and euen the Heathens Mythologie attribut••s it, in Deucalions transformation of Stones into men.

In{que} breui spacio,* 1.74 superorum numine, saxa Missaviri manibus, faciem traxêre virorum, In little space, by Gods high power, which all things makes, Stones, cast from out Mans hand, put on mens shapes.

So that God, who is the true limiter and distributer of these faculties, is not limited himselfe vnto any matter,* 1.75 though Plato thinke he be: but, he can make, at his pleasure, Ex quovis ligno Mercurium. He can make, Quidlibet ex quolibet: which the Sunne cannot. And therefore, it is God alone (and not the Sunne) that is both the Determiner, and the Dispenser of those naturall faculties, vnto their naturall bodies. Giuing where, and when he pleaseth, a passiue possibilitie vnto euery matter, of receiuing euery forme. Which pow∣er he hath not left, in the power of the Sun.

Now for the manner of his working, it may againe be demanded: Who it is, that hath so co••fined, and circumscribed the power of the Sunne, that, out of such a matter, he should be able to produce onely life; and yet, out of another matter, to produce both life, and sense? This euidently sheweth, that the Sunne is not able, to worke and effect what it will, where it will; but, like a meere Artificer, is co••fined to the hability, or imbecillity of his matter, and can go no further. Which sheweth that he is not an omnipotent worker, as is God the Creator.

7 And,* 1.76 as the Sunne is restrayned in his working-power; so that he can∣not effect, what he will: so is he likewise in his mouing-power; so that he can∣not goe, whither he will. But is, as strictly tied vnto his set-motion, as a Mill-horse to his Mil••: which cannot goe possibly out of his Circle. For, when he commeth to a certaine point Northward, hee can go no further that way; but returneth back againe. And, when he commeth to a certaine point South∣ward, he can go no further t••at way; but returneth backe againe. Whereup∣on those two points are called his two Topicks, or his two Returnes. Betweene which two points, he spendeth his whole time, mouing this way and that way, in going and returning: as the Sea doth, in his ebbing and flowing. And, when he is come vnto his period, he can go no further: but obeyeth the law of God his Creator. As the Sea likewise doth. For the very same God, which hath set bounds and limits vnto the Sea, and giuen it a commandement which it cannot breake:* 1.77 Hitherto shalt thou come, and no further, and here shalt thou stay thy pr••ud waues: hath also giuen the same commandement to the Sunne. Which it obeyeth accordingly. Yea, and that, by so strong and inuincible a necessity, that (as B••laam prof••ssed, in a very like case) it hath ••o power to trans∣gresse:* 1.78 It cannot exceede the commandement of the Lord. By whose law and commandement, it is more narrowly confined vnto a strict motion, then any other planet is, in all the whole heauen. For, it is, as it were, imprisoned in the Ecliptike line,* 1.79 and tied fast vnto it, as with a chaine of Adamant: so that it hath no latitude at all in the Zodiake. Now, who is it, that bindeth the Sun, with such a necessitie, but onely God himselfe? who (as the Apostle expresse∣ly testifieth) hath both assigned the times,* 1.80 and set downe the bounds of the habi∣tations

of men. Here is plainely, Iupiter terminalis: the true setter of bounds, and limits, vnto things: whose bounds and limits, though the Sunne it selfe haue no power to alter; yet God, the setter of them, hath. Hee can change and alter them, at his pleasure. As he plainely gaue good proofe: first, vnto Ioshua;* 1.81 in so holding the Sunne from mouing, that he could not go forward: and secondly, vnto Ezechias;* 1.82 in so withholding, and pulling him, that hee made him goe backward. Which manifestly sheweth, that the Sunne, in his mouing, is not in his owne power, but vnder the command of a superior Ruler: who turneth him, and returneth him, at his owne will and pleasure. So that, the Sunne, of it selfe, hath not so much scope and liberty in his motion, as many a man hath: nay, not, as any Beast hath. For they can runne, either this way, or that way, at their pleasure: but so cannot the Sunne. Hee is mo∣ued by another; by whom hee is so tied vnto a strict and vnalterable motion, that Astronomers can surely tell (vnto the very minute) all the Eclipses, that shall euer fall out, so long as the world it selfe shall last. As the Romane Ora∣tor hath expressely obserued.* 1.83 Defectiones Solis & Lunae, praedicatae{que} in omne posterum tempus, quae, quantae, quandò futurae. The Eclipses of the Sunne and Moone, are both knowne, and can be prognosticated, for all ages to come; both in what fashion and in what quantity, and at what time, they shall happen. Now, these praedictions could not be so infallible, but that the Sunne is tied vnto a course vnalterable. Which notable captiuity of the Sun, more then of any other of Gods Creatures, is excellently described, and set out by Prudentius.

Solem certa tenet regio,* 1.84 plaga certa coërcet. Temporibus varijs distinguitur, aut subit ortu, Aut ruit occasu, latet aut sub nocte recurrens. Non torquere facem potis est, ad signa Trionum; Orbe nec obliquo, portas Aquilonis adire; Nec solitum conversus iter reuocare retrorsum. Hic erit ergo Deus, praescriptis lege sub vnae Deditus officijs? Libertas laxior ipsi Concessa est homini: formam cuiflectere vitae, At{que} voluntatis licitum est: se••tramite dextro Scandere, seu laeuo malit decurrere campo: Sumere seurequiem, seu continuare laborem, Seu parere Deo, siue in contraria verti. Ista, ministranti regimen solenne dierum Haudquaqu••agrave;m Soli datur, a Factore potestas. Sed famulus subiectus, agit quodcun{que} necesse est.

The summe and effect of which verses, is thus much.

A certaine Region doth restraine the Sunne, Which is design'd for times distinction: It neuer wanders past the Tropicks Line, It's either rising, or it doth decline, Or else, by night, lyes hidden and returning, And neuer varyes from its common running. It cannot wreathe it selfe to th' Northerne Starr's, Nor can it reach, in oblique Orbe, so farre

As to the Southern Lists; nor change it place, Nor once call backe againe it wonted race. Can he then be a God, whom one law ties, And seruant makes, to such set officies? Surely, a greater freedome granted is, And much more large, to euery man, then this. For he can change his ••orme of life at pleasure, And moue which way he will, to euery measure: Whether the vp, or downe, he lust to take; The right hand, or the left, to sleepe or wake; Whether to labour he intend, or rest; God to obey, or not; what likes him best. This liberty th' All-maker hath not lent Vnto the Sunne, whose glorious regiment All dayes solemnize. It doth subiect stand, And still attends Necessities command.

So that, though diuers of the Heathen haue foolishly collected, from the con∣stancy of his motion; that the Sunne must be a god: Yet Prudentius (as you see) a great deale more prudently, collecteth the contrary: Concluding, that this argueth him rather to be a meere seruant, then a god. Yea, and so like∣wise doth Lactantius.* 1.85 Argum••ntum illud, quo colligunt, vniversa coelestia, Deos esse; in contrarium valet. Nam, si Deos esse idcircò opinantur, quia certos & ra∣tionabiles cursus habent, errant. Ex hoc en••m appa••et, Deos non esse; quòd ex orbitare, illis, a praestitutis itineribus, non licet. Caeterùm. si Dij essent, hûc at{que} illûc passim, sine vlla ••ecessitate serrentur: si••ut animantes in terra: qu••rum, quia liberae sunt voluntates, hûc at{que} illûc vag ••ntur, vt lib••it: &, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 me••ns duxerit, eò fer••ur. That argument, from when••e the H••athen doe collect, that the starres must needes be gods, doth most pl••inely prooue the contrary. For, if they take them to be gods, b••cause of the cert••inty of their courses, they b•• therein much deceiued. For this plainely prooueth, that (indeed) they be no gods: ••ecause they be not able to depart from their courses. Further, if they were gods, they would moue, both this way, and that way in the heauens, as freely, as liuing crea∣tures vse to doe vpon the earth. Who, because they haue the liberty and freedome of their will, they wander vp and downe, whither they themselues will. From whence he there concludeth, Non est igitur astrorum motus voluntarius, sed necessarius: quia praestitutis legibus officijs{que} deseruiunt. The motion of the stars is not voluntarie, but necessarie: because they be so tied vnto set lawes and offices. Which Zacharias Mitylenensis also expressely confirmeth. For hee saith of the Sunne,* 1.86 that, Habet motum voluntatis expertem, velut seruus: That his mo∣tion is involuntarie, like the motion of a seruant: which must be directed by his masters commandement. Now, if the Sunne be but a seruant, both in his wor∣king,* 1.87 and in his mouing: who is then his Lord and Master, that setteth him so on doing? The Prophet Dauid cleeres that question. It is God that hath set a tabernacle for the Sunne, in the Heauens, and appointed him as a Gyant, to run his race. Quis, Solem per hiberna descendere signa praecipit? (saith Hugo de Vi∣ctore) Quis rursùm, per aestiva eum signa ascendere facit? Qui••, eum ab oriente in occidentem ducit? Quis iterùm, ab occidente in Orientem reuehit? Haec cuncta

sunt mirabilia: sed soli Deo possibilia. Who commandeth the Sunne to descend and goe downe into the signes of the Winter, and who, to ascend backe againe in∣to the signes of the Summer? Who leadeth him along from the East into the West? And who fetcheth him againe, from the West into the East? These workes to vs are wonderfull: but onely to God are possible. So that the Sunne is so farre from giuing bounds and limits vnto other things, that it selfe is the most streightly bounded and limited of all things. And that (as before I noted) not onely in his working, but also in his moouing. In his working: because (as Zacharias Mitylenensis obserueth) Nihil potest vel efficere vel operari,* 1.88 quàm quod consti∣tutum sit a Deo, ordinis Dictatore: He can neither doe, nor worke any thing, but as God, the prescriber of order, hath appointed him. In his moouing: because (as in the same place he affirmeth) Continuum faciens motum & modulatum, non excedit terminos, ab Opifice sibi impositos. Though hee bee in a continuall and perpetuall motion; yet doth he not exceede those bounds, that are praescribed him by that workeman that made him. So that God alone is the limiter of the Sun: and consequently of euery other thing:* 1.89 Giuing vnto all, both life, and breath, and all things: as the Apostle plainely testifieth. And therefore God may more properly be called the Sunne, for doing those things as the principall A∣gent; then the Sunne can be called God, for doing them none otherwise, but onely as Gods instrument. For, those things, though instrumentally they be wrought by the Sun; yet are they originally wrought, onely by God. And therefore, as Boetius very wittily collecteth:

Quem,* 1.90 quia respicit omnia solus, Verum possis dicere Solem. Whom, for he solely euery thing doth see, Thou mayst well say the true Sunne for to be.

But to proceede.

8 As it is in all the fore-named naturall powers, that they be limited and dispensed,* 1.91 according to the will and pleasure of the giuer: so is it likewise in all artificiall faculties. There is no man, adorned and indowed with al of them. But some man hath one, and some man another, but no man hath them all to∣gether.

Non enìm omnia pariter,* 1.92 Dij hominibus dare consueuerunt:

saith Homer.

Nor all at once, nor all alike, nor euer hath it bene, That God should offer, and conferre his fauours vpon men:

but dispenseth them by degrees, as he himselfe pleaseth. Which may as eui∣dently be seene, in his dispensing of Knowledges, of Arts, and of Sciences; as as in any of the fore-named naturall faculties. For, though all the seuerall Arts and Sciences in the world (which are in number infinite) haue beene deuised, and inuented by the wit of man: yet had neuer any man so infinite a wit, as to know and vnderstand the depth of all of them. Nay, no man of many of them. Nay, no man of any of them. No, not of that one Art, which by him∣selfe is professed, and wherein he desireth to bee accounted excellent. All which notwithstanding, are so limited by God, that they are not, either con∣founded or coincident: yet is our capacity so much straitlier limited, that it cannot reach to any of their limits. Let me insist a while vpon the seuerall

steppes of this gradation: and giue some light, by instances, in euery one of them.

That no man hath the knowledge of all Arts and Sciences, but is still limited and confined,* 1.93 either vnto some one, or else (at the most) but vnto some few of them: we may euidently see, if we will take a suruey, either of the Mechanicall, or of the liberall Arts. First for the Mechanicall, and ma∣nuarie Arts: wee see by experience, that the Plowman knoweth not, what belongeth vnto the Ship; nor the Shipman, vnto the Plow. But, as it is in the Poet.

Navita,* 1.94 de ventis; de Tauris, narrat Arator; Enumerat Miles, Vulnera; Pastor, Oves. The Seaman, doth discourse of Winds; The Plowman, talke of Oxen find's; The Soldior, doth recompt his knocks; The Shepheard, reckons vp his flocks.

Nay, euen in those inferior and ministeriall Arts, which are subiected vnto others, as to their Architectonicals; wee see, by like experience, that all of them are limited, within their owne precincts: and none of them acquainted with the mysteries of others: No not, though they all depende vpon the same head and principall. As namely, for example. The Art of the Sadler, although it be ordayned vnto the art of the Rider; yet hath not the Sadler any skill in Riding, but onely in making of Saddles to ride in. And so like∣wise, downward. The Rider hath not the Art of making his owne Saddle, nor his Bridle, nor his Horse-shooe, nor his Bit: but there be seuerall Arts belonging to all these; and yet all of them subseruing vnto the Art of Riding: whereof all they be ignorant: as the Rider, of all these: and each of these of others. And so it is likewise, in both our former instances. The Ship-wright, though hee haue the art of making a ship; yet hath hee not the art of guiding a ship: No more then the Saylor hath the art of the Ship-maker. And the same we may likewise see, in the Plowman; which is our second in∣stance.* 1.95 Non sibi Agricola aratrum conficit, ne{que} ligones, & rastros, &c. sed sunt fabri lignarij, & ferrarij; saith Plato. The Husbandman makes not his owne Plow, neither his owne Plowshare, nor his Rakes: But they are the works of Car∣penters, and Smiths.

So that, though the Plowman haue the knowledg of the plowing of his ground; yet hath he not the skill of making his owne plow: but that belon∣geth to the Carpenters occupation: who yet, hath not the skill and art of plowing. Now, who is it, that thus distributeth, and limiteth these meaner, and inferior arts vnto men? It is onely God himselfe, by the Heathens owne confession. Maximus Tyrius affirmeth, that, though all those men fore-named, be euery one ignorant of anothers art; yet that God is not ignorant of any one of them: but hath the perfect and generall skill of them all, imparting vn∣to men, but certaine small parcels and fragments of those knowledges, and re∣seruing to himselfe, as his owne prerogatiue, to haue the full and perfect knowledg of all of them. Non enìm,* 1.96 si aerarius faber, architecturae faciendae minimè sufficiat; aut, si agricola, nauticae sit artis ignatus; si navicularius, me∣dicine; aut alius quispiam terrestrium munerum peritus, maritimis; ac vicissìm,

maritimorum, terrestribus ineptus sit; ita etiam Deus, ab vnatantùm circum∣scriptus est arte. It followeth not (saith he) that though the Brazier, be igno∣rant of the Arte of the Carpenter; or, the Plowman, of the Shipmans; or, the Pilo••, of the Phisitians; or, any other that is skilful in the affayres of the land, be vtterly vnfit for the affayres of the Sea; that therefore God should be so limi∣ted, as to haue the knowledge but onely of one Art: because wee men haue, of no more. For, (as he there addeth, a little after) Deus, singulas Artes, tanquam haereditatem possidet; & tradere potest. God poss••sseth all Arts, as his proper in∣haeritance, and so ••e deliuereth them to others.

And, as it is in those illiberall Arts; so is it likewise in all liberall Arts, that no man hath all of them. For, though they all be thought to be lincked all together,* 1.97 as it were, in a Chayne; or rather, that they all doe make one single Ring, in that 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, whereof the Philosophers doe so plea∣sa••tly dreame: yet the Astronomer, is ignorant of the art of Musicke; and the Musitian of Astronom••e; the Geometrician, of Arithmetick; and the Arith∣metician, of Geometrie. And yet, all of those, be Mathematicians. And so like∣wise, in those foure Arts of speaking, which dwell, all of them, in the tongue; Grammar, Logick, Rhetorick, and Poetrie. The Grammarian, is ignorant of the Arte of Logick; the L••gician, of Rhetorick; the Rhetorician, of Poetrie; not∣withstanding their neere affinitie. So that, no man can attaine vnto the knowledge of all of them: but is confined to his portion, as vnto his Dimen∣sum; which, in comparison of the whole, is (God knoweth) a very little one.

Now, who is it, that limit••th these artificiall faculties vnto men, as well as the naturall; but onely God himselfe? It is he, and none else: as euen Homer plainly testifieth.

Coelestes etenim,* 1.98 non omnibus omnia praebent. Eloquium, Ingenium, Membrorum gratia, Vires, Non vni eveniunt.— God hath not all his gifts bestow'd on all, or any one. Words sweetnesse, and Wits sharpnesse, beautie, strength of bone, These rarities of mind and parts, doe all concurre, in none.

Where, he rendereth the true Reason, why all men haue them not: because God, who is their Giuer, bestowes them not. Nay, the strength of the body, and the sharpenesse of wit, are seldome, by God in any one man conioy••ed: as by many learned men,* 1.99 I finde it oftentimes obserued. Haud facilè fit (saith Diodorus Siculus) vt quisquam, & ingen••es corporis vires, & ingenium subtile habe••t. It falles not commonly out, that thesame man should haue, both strength of body, and strength of wit. But (as Maximus Tyrius obserueth) Qui mininè validus est ad gerendum negotium,* 1.100 ad obeundam speculationem, expeditum nactus est ingenium: contra, qui speculationem non sustinet, acriter agit. He that is but weake for action, is commonly good for contemplation: and he that is but dull in contemplation, is often vigorous in action.

Rarò,* 1.101 vtrum{que} Deus cuiquam largitur; vt idem Sit sapiens, & sit robusto corpore pollens:

saith Palingenius.

It's seldome seeme, that God should giue, both these, all men among; That one should be both wise in minde, and of a body strong.

But, as Cato affirmeth on the one side; that,

Consilio pollet,* 1.102 cui vim Natura negavit: He commonly excells in Counsells reach, Whose outward valour, Nature doth impeach

So Palingenius againe affirmeth on the other side; that,

Ingenio plerum{que} caret,* 1.103 qui robore praestat. He for the most part, wanteth wisdomes Lore, In Bodies strength, that others goes before.

Nay, euen in the gifts of the body onely; we see, that hee, which is excel∣lent in some one, is, oftentimes, defectiue in many other. Corporum vires (saith Seneca) non ad omnia,* 1.104 quae viribus perficiuntur, ••ptae sunt. The strength of the body, is not apt for all those things, that are done by strength only. And hee illustrateth his position, by diuers pregnant instances. Illi, nemo, luctando, par est: ille, ••d tollendam magni ponderis sarcinam, praeualet: ille, quicquid appre hendit, non•• emittit; sed in procliue nitentibus vehiculis, moraturas manus imicit. One man, is very strong in wrestling: anothers strength lieth all in bea∣ring, in listing, and carrying of great and weighty burthens: anothers strength lyeth all in holding whatsoeuer he casteth his hand vpon; as in staying of heauy carts,* 1.105 and wagons, when they are running downe the steepest hills. As Homer notably illustrateth, in describing the games of the Phaeacians, in Running, Wrestling, Leaping, Coyting; he nameth a seuerall Victor, in euery one of them. But no man, could win in Two: much lesse, in All of them. Now, who is it, that hath giuen this strength vnto men, in so strange and differing both mea∣sures and manners? Homer answereth that question, in Agamemnons expostu∣lation with Achilles:

Quòd singulari,* 1.106 praeter caeteros, robore praeditus es; id verò non Tutibi, sed Dij ded••runt. That thou in strength art singular, and others doest excel; Thou not thy selfe, but God to thee, hath giu'n it, know we well.

It is the Lord that is our Strength:* 1.107 as the holy Scripture also teacheth vs.* 1.108

Yea,* 1.109 and Seneca, in the former place, goeth further, and sheweth, that those faculties are limited, not onely vnto men; but also vnto Beasts too. As, in dogges; some of them are onely strong in fighting, some others, in running. And so in Horses too; some of them are onely strong in riding; some other of them, in onely drawing. And this gift, thus limited, euen to these brute beasts, doth God plainely assume vnto himselfe. Hast thou giuen vnto the horse his strength?* 1.110 sayth God vnto Iob: meaning, that this was not the worke of a man, but the proper and immediate worke of God.

Thus God, who hath the free disposing of all excellent gifts, in his owne only hands, bestoweth them as he pleaseth, both vnto men and beasts: giuing vnto some of them, more, and vnto others of them, f••wer; after the onely mo∣tion of his owne goodwill and pleasure. But all of them he hath not giuen, vnto any one man. Nay, not all, to any Nation. All nations are not eloquent. All nations are not Warlicke. All nations are not learned. And yet, as God hath giuen all gifts vnto none:* 1.111 so hath he depriued none of all. But as Seneca obseruet••) Omnibus sua decora sunt. Athenae, eloquentia, inclytae sunt; Thebae, sacris; Sparta, armis. Athens is glorious, for her eloquence; Thebes, for her ho∣lia••••se;

and Sparta, for her armes. And the like may bee sayd of diuers other C••••••tries, vnto whom God hath giuen to excell, in diuers particular gifts: But, to excell in all, to none: much lesse to any Man. For, as Homer againe testifieth:

Alij tribuit Deus bellica opera;* 1.112 alij saltationem; Alij cytharam, & cantum: alijs—animum p••udente••. God giues some, force of Armes, and arts of warre; To others actiue nimblenes to dance; These in the Harpe, and singing, skilfull are; Those haue a soule to wisdomes height aduanc't.

Which sentence of Homer, implyeth these two things. First, that all these fore-named things, are the onely gifts of God. And secondly, that hee pow∣reth them not lauishly, vpon all men, without diser••tion; but disp••nseth them aduisedly, according to his wisdome. For (as Tertullian very truely obserueth) God is not a Lauisher,* 1.113 but a Dispenser of his blessings: Dispensator bonitatis, non Profusor.

But here it may be obiected, that Elaeus Hippias had the knowledge of all Arts. For he openly professed:* 1.114 Nihil esse, in vlla arte, ••erum omnium; quod ille nesciret. That there was nothing in any Art, of which he was ignorant, instan∣cing, not onely in liberall and ingenious Arts, but also in fordide and igno∣ble: As namely, that hee had made with his owne proper hands, both the Cloake vpon his shoulders, and the Rings vpon his fiugers, and the Shooes vpon his feete. Whose vaine ostentation is worthily scoffed with scomme of the Orator,* 1.115 Scilicet nimìs hic quidem progressus est: He surely went a steppe or two, too farre. And the like vaine profession, did Gorgias also make: whose custome it was, to call openly vpon all men, to come and oppose him in any thing: for that hee was well prepared, to dispute of euery thing: yea and to say all, of all matters, that could possibly be sayd of them. And so likewise Demecri••us,* 1.116 who began his speech thus: Haec loquor de vniuersis. Nihil exci∣pit (sayth the Orator) de quo non profiteatur.* 1.117 Quid enìm esse potest extra vni∣uersa? I speake this of all things, he excepteth nothing. For what can be with out the compasse of All things?* 1.118 Much is also reported of the Emperour Ha∣dr••an, for the great variety of his learning. But much more is reported of the wise King Salomon; and much more truely too▪ whose knowledge was so generall, that there was not almost any thing, whereof hee had not spoken. Whereby it appeareth, that though many men haue attained but to few arts; yet that some men haue attained vnto many. Yea almost vnto all. For so it is reported of Democritus;* 1.119 that he was, in Philosophia 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: quia & Naturalia & Moralia, & Mathematica, & liberalium disciplinarum rationes, Artium{que} omnium peritiam callebat. That he was, in all Philosophie, an absolute man: hauing an excellent knowledge, both in the Physickes, and Ethi••••es, and the Mathematicks; and in all the rest of the liberall Arts. But vnto this I an∣swere, with the Romane Orator:* 1.120 That a slight and perfunctorie knowledge, may easily be attained, of many of those Arts: but a full and perfect, scarce of any; and much lesse, of all. So that, for those men fore-named; it rather may be thought, that they knew many Arts superficially, then any substantially. For, if they knew so many, they knew them not all fully; much lesse knew

they all absolutely. They knew, perhaps, more then others: but they kn••w not so much, but they might haue learned more themselues. Their knowledge was but such, as Simo reporteth to haue bene, in his sonne Pamphilus, that hee knew,* 1.121 Nihil egr••giè praeter caete••a: sed omnia mediocriter, They knew many things indifferently; but nothing exactly.

For first, for Elaeus Hippias, that vain-glorious Sciolus; how great his know∣ledge was, there is no man euer testified, but only he himselfe. He saith or him∣selfe, that hee was ignorant of nothing. But Tullie censure••h this, in him, to haue beene nothing else,* 1.122 but his boasting and ostentation. Cuncta penè audi∣ente Graecia, gloriatus est.

For Leontinus Gorgias, that bombasted Sophister, the greatnesse of his lear∣ning was rather in the peoples false opinion and ascription; then in his owne true poss••ssion:* 1.123 as Aelian noteth of him. Veterum Graecorum aetate, s••mmae glo∣ria floruerunt Gorgias Leontinus, & Protagor as Democriti filius: saptentia ve∣ro, tantum abfuerunt, quantum a viris pueri. In ancient time, among the Greeks, there were not men more renowned, then Gorgias, and Protagoras: Who yet came as short of many other, for their wisedome, as the weakenesse of a child, from the strength of a man. So that, for all their great fame, yet were they, in truth, but of a little learning.

And for the Emperour Had ian, whose variety of learning is set out vnto the full,* 1.124 both by Aurelius Victor; and by Aelius Spartianus: yet if it were no greater then is there reported, it came so farre short of an vniuersall know∣ledge in all Arts, that it might truely be said of him, that, th•• greatest p••rt of those things which he knew, were indeed, but the least of those things which hee knew not.

And for King Salomon though he had a singular prerogatiue in wisedome,* 1.125 yet was he so farre r••m attai•••••• vnto the perfection of all knowledge, that hee ingenuo••sly professeth,* 1.126 that hee was 〈◊〉〈◊〉 vtterly tyred, in se••king that which he had not: and notably vexedly that,* 1.127 which he had ••ot. So that, for all these we cannot yet meete with any man, but that he had all his learning and knowledge limited out vnto him: yea, and that by a scant scantli••g And therefore the va••rting of Hipp••as, & Gorgias, of such an vniuersall knowledge, that they would 〈◊〉〈◊〉 all that 〈◊〉〈◊〉 be spoken; was rather an argument of their solly, then it was of their 〈◊〉〈◊〉; as euen Aristotle expressely hath censured such vaine-glory. De omnibus eniti quidpiam dicere, nihil{que} praetermittere in∣sgnis stultitiae 〈◊〉〈◊〉 videbitur esse,* 1.128 aut animi valdè parati. To endeauour to speake vnto cu••ry n••atter, and to leaue out nothing, is either an argument of ex∣ceeding folly, or of very rare learning. Scoffing at their vanity, that imagined themselues to know all things so perfectly. Therefore,

Let vs now come vnto the second step of our forenamed Gradation:* 1.129 and there we shall see the truth of this conclusion, a great deale more plainely. For it is not or ely true, that, No man can haue the perfect knowledge of many Arts. Which Xen••phon directly, in expresse termes affirmeth: Non potest fieri, vt qui multis v••••••ur ••rtibus, is homo omnia pulchrè faciat: It cannot be, that if any man apply himselfe vnto many seuerall Arts, he should practise them all, either cunningly, or comely. In which his opinion, Plato likewise concurreth with him: yea, and goeth one step beyond him. For the same impossibility, which

Xe••••phon ascribeth vnto the learning of many Arts, doth Plato ascribe vnto the learning, but of any two of them. Duas artes, aut studia duo,* 1.130 diligenter ex∣ercere, human•• naturae non potest. It is aboue the power of our humane nature, for any one of vs, to be excellent, in either two Arts, or two Studies. No, not e∣uen in two mechanicals. And therefore he appointed it for a law in his Com∣mon-wealth, Vt n••mo, aerarius simul & lignarius saber sit—sed sing••l•• opi∣fi••••s, singulis artibus vacent. That no man shall be both a Brazier, and a Carpen∣ter: but that euery seuerall workeman, shall haue his seuerall occupation. Which law he would neuer haue ordained, but that he was perswaded, that two Arts together, cannot perfectly be l••arned. And therefore, Tullie is deceiued in both the parts of his sentence, when he saith, that, Interdictum non est, aut a re∣rum natura,* 1.131 aut a lege aliqua, t{que} more, vt singulis hominibus, non ampliùs, quam singulas artes nosse, liceat. That it is not forbidden, neither by Nature, nor by law, that any man should be learned, but onely in one Art. For Xenophon affirmeth, that Nature hath forbidden it; Fieri non potest: and Plato hath appointed a Law to forbid it. Yea, and that vpon this ground, because Nature hath for∣bidden it; Humana natura non potest.

And this we may plainely see verified, euen in Tullie himselfe, to go no fur∣ther for an instance. For, if any two Arts can be perfectly attained, by one and the same man; it is Oratorie, and Poetrie: because these two are so neere, that they be all one in a manner.* 1.132 Est sinitimus Oratori Poëta: A Poet is the very next Borderer vnto an Orator. Nay, there is not onely a very neere neighbourhood, but also a kindred betweene those two Arts:* 1.133 Poetis, est proxima cognatio cum Oratoribus: as Tullie himselfe confesseth. And yet, he himselfe, indeauouring to attaine vnto both of them, both with as great a wit, and as great a study, as euer did any man, came so farre short, in the one of them; that, that censure of Cat••••lus (with a little deflection) might very fitly bee applied vnto him, that he was,

Tanto pessimus omnium Poëta,* 1.134 Quanto—optimus omnium Patronus. Of all the Poets, he the worst by much; Who, of all Orators, was the true None-such.

So that, for all his excellency in Oratorie; yet could he scarce attaine to a me∣diocrity in Poetry. Which his weakenesse and deficiencie, the Poet Iuvenal, in his Satyre, derideth very bitingly: giuing instance in that noted verse of his:

O fortunat••m natam,* 1.135 me Consule, Romam: O Rome, thou fortunate, While I thy Consul sate:

And scoffing at it there, with this bitter Sarcasmus,

Antoni gladios potuit contemnere, si sic Omnia dixisset.— If Tullies pleas, Had all bene such as these; Hee might defie, The sword of Anthony.

Yea, and Seneca obserueth the very same defect in him: and compares him

with another: who being a very rare and excellent Poet; yet prooued but a meane, and a very silly Orator. Virgilium, illa felicitas ingenij, oratione soluta reliquit: Ciceronem, eloquentia sua, in carminibus, destituit. Yea,* 1.136 and hee proceedeth in the same place, vnto other examples. Orationes Salustij, in honorem historiarum, non leguntur. Eloquentissimi viri Platonis oratio, qu••e pro Socrate scripta est, nec patrono, nec reo digna ••st. Virgils hap∣pinesse of wit forsooke him in his proofe: and Tullies eloquence, him, in his verses. Salusts orations, are no honor to his historie; and Platoes made for Socrates, is vtterly vnworthy. So that, Virgil was a good Poet; but he was no goo•• Orator: Tullie a good Orator; but yet no good Poet: Salust a good Historiographer; but no good Declamer: Plato a good Disputer; and yet no good Orator. All which, with all their wit and labour, yet could not attaine to be excellent in two Arts: though both, almost of one nature: and though they sought after them, with great study and indeauour. And therefore Se∣neca, in the forealledged place, sets it peremptorily downe, as his resolute opinion, that, The excellentest wit, that euer was, yet cannot get to excell, in any mo••e, then in one thing. Magna quoque ingenia, quando, plus, quam in vno, eminuerunt op••re? When did the greatest wits, excell, in any more, then in one onely Art?

Nay,* 1.137 not in any one Art, to the full perfection of it: which in our Gra∣dation, is the third, and the last steppe. For, no man euer yet had any Art so perfect, but that he still found, that he could learne somewhat more in it: and that there was somewhat, which, as yet, hee had not learned. So that he had not attayned vnto the last quiddities, and vttermost bounds of it. Which Hippocrates insinuateth,* 1.138 in the first of his Aphorismes: Where, hee seemeth to complaine, that mans life was so short, that he could not reach the fulnesse and perfection of any Art.* 1.139 Vita breuis, Ars longa: Mans life is but short; but Art is very l••ng. Yea, and that so long: Vt discentes vita deficiat: as the Ora∣tor obserueth, euen in t••is very case.

And therefore, Theophrastus was wont to complaine of natures iniustice, that she had giuen so long a life vnto Crowes,* 1.140 and vnto Stags, that could make no good vse of it; and denied it vnto men, that could so profitably imploy it. All which their complaints, are builded vpon this ground, that, by the short∣nesse of our life, we are cut off, from attayning vnto any one single Arte, in his ful & true perfection. Whereof Xenephon hath giuen vsa very pregnant in∣stance, but in a manuarie-Arte; yea, and that, one of the meanest, to wit, the Arte of Shooemaking; wherein, a man would thinke, that there were not such deepe skill, but might easily be attained, by the shallowest skull. And yet, euen in this meane Arte, he there obserueth, that no man was perfect in in all the works of it: but that, Calceos facit, hic quidem, virorum; ille, m••∣lierum. Some are Shooemakers for men;* 1.141 and other some, for women. As it is with vs in Taylers: that some are Mens, and some are womens: and hard∣ly one is excellent in both. And yet, maintaineth himselfe well, by that his mutilated skill; though it be, in very deed, but a peece of an Arte. Yea and he glorieth greatly too, if he can excell, but euen in that: as Xenophon obser∣ueth in the forealledged place. Satis est, etiam vna, cui{que}, Ars, ad alendum; ac saepè, ne t••ta quidem vna. One Arte is sufficient to maintaine euery man: ye••,

〈◊〉〈◊〉 that, oftentimes not a whole Arte, but a peece of one. So hard a thing is 〈…〉〈…〉 full perfection, but of any one Arte; though it be but a meane 〈◊〉〈◊〉▪ As we may likewise see, in Platoes fore-named instances of his Smithes, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 his Wrights: how many seuerall Arts there be, vnder both these 〈◊〉〈◊〉. Some, Goldsmiths; some, Braziers; some Blacksmiths; some, Farri∣ers; some, Locksmiths. And so likewise, in the other of these heads. Some, Housewrights; some, Shipwrights; some, Cartwrights; and some, the loyners of smaller workes. And yet all of these, but one Arte, of Wright-Craft; and one Arte, of Smiths-Craft: though no man can attaine to be excellent in all of it. Which Tullie also sheweth, euen in his owne Arte of Rhetorick: and in those sixe persons, whom in his Bookes, De Oratore, he made his Interlo∣cutors: Crassus,* 1.142 and Antonius, Caesar, and Catulus, Cotta, and Sulpitius. Who had, euery one of them, a seuerall forme of eloquence of his owne, and yet was, as good as Nobody, in any of the kinds of any of his fellowes. And the like he there declareth, by diuers instances, both of Greeke, and Romane Orators. Who, though they all professed the same Arte of Rhetoricke; yet could none of them attaine, vnto all the graces of it. Nay, none indeede to many: but euery one had his owne; an•• that was commonly but one. Suavitatem,* 1.143 Isocrates; subtilitatem, Lysias; acumen, Hyperides; sonitum, Aeschi∣nes; vim, Demosthenes habuit. Quis eorum non egregius? tam••n, quis, cuius∣quam, nisi sui similis? I socrates, had his sweetnesse; Lysias his slynesse; Hyperides his sharpenesse, Aeschines, his voice, and Demosthenes, his force. Euery one of which Orators, were excellent, in their kindes: and yet none of them like any, but onely like themselues. And hee exemplifi••th it, yet further, by diuers other instances, among the Romane Orators. Grauitatem, Africanus; Lenitatem, Lelius; asperitatem, Galba; profluens qu••ddam habuit Carbo, & canorum. Qui•• horum, non princeps, temporibus illis, fuit? & suo tamen quis{que} in genere princeps. Africanus, had his grauitie; Lalius, his mild∣nesse; Galba, his austeritie; Carbo, his profluence. Euery one of all those, were the principals of their times: and yet euery one excelled but only in his owne kinde. Whereby it appeareth, that, euen this one Arte of Rhetorick though it be an art, concluded within his definite termes; Canco••lis circumscripta scientia;* 1.144 as euen the Orator himselfe acknowledgeth: yet is a facultie, of so large and, so wide an extension, that all the bounds of it, could neuer yet be reached, or touched by any man: but that, euery one thought it, to be glory ynough for him, if hee could but attaine to any reasonable portion: though in diuers others parts, hee had many great defects. Which Seneca also obserueth euen in this very Case.* 1.145 In ipsa oratione, quanvis vna materia sit; tamen ille, qui optimè argumentatur, negligentiùs narrat: ille, non tam benè implet, quam praeparat. In pleading (saith hee) though the Arte be all the same; yet some man argueth excellently, who openeth the cause, but negli∣gently: another hath the art to stirre vp his hearers, vnto diligent attention, and cannot hold them, when he hath done. And hee giueth, for an instance, his friend Passienus. Passienus noster, cùm coepit dicere, s••cundùm principium, slatim fuga fit: ad epilogum, omnes reuertuntur: media, tantùm quibus necesse est, audiunt. Whenas Passienus pleadeth, all his Auditors forsake him, when he hath done his exordium: and yet all returne againe, to heare his conclusion: but

••is middle part no man heareth, s••uing only those men, vnto whom it belongeth. Whereupon he there concludeth, that, Magna, & variares est eloquentia: 〈◊〉〈◊〉 vlli sic indulsit, vt tota contingeret. Sat••s foelix est, qui in aliqu••m ••ius p••rtem est receptus. Eloquence is a faculty, of an exceeding great varietie; whi••h yet hath neuer bene so fauourable vnto any, as to giue it selfe vnto him intirely,* 1.146 and wholy. That man is well, for his part, that can get but a peece of it. So that (as Saint Hilary admonisheth very wisely) Non tantum confidendum est, ••n prudentia humana, vt perfectum se quis putet, sapere quod sap••at. No man should be so confident, of his owne high wisdome, as to conceite, that he hath at∣tained vnto a perfection. And, as it is in pleading: so is it also, in disputing: Suid••s reporteth of Heraiscus:* 1.147 That he could excellently confirme a truth, but he was not able to conuince a lie. And Hierom reporteth of Lactantius: That he could be••••••r conf••••e a lie, then confirme a truth. Vtinam tam nostra confir∣mar•• potuisset, quam facile aliena destruxit.

Now, who is it, that thus narrowly confineth this facultie of the tongue, which no man can ••ame,* 1.148 but wildly runneth throughout the whole Earth; but onely God himselfe? He it is (sayth the Prophet) that giueth vnto men, the ••ongue of the learned: and that bestoweth eloquence, vpon whom hee plea∣seth: as euen he himselfe professeth, vnto Moses. For when hee detrected his going into Egypt, vpon a pretence, that he was not eloquent: God presently asked, Who it was, that had giuen the mouth vnto man? and who had made the deafe, and the dumbe? Insinuating thereby, that it was onely he. And this wee may euidently see to be true, in those strange tongues and languages, which were by him bestowed, vpon the Apostles. For, when the Holy Ghost de∣scended vpon them, they beganne, euery one, to speake in a strange tongue: yet not, as they themselues were pleased; but, as the Holy Ghost permitted. They spake with other tongues,* 1.149 as the Spirit g••ue them vtterance: hee that gaue them the gift, giuing also limits to it. So that, both their languages, and their vtterance, were the gifts of God: yea and limited vnto them, in one and the same measure: but vnto some of them, in one; and vn∣to others, in another. For, the Apostle Paul professeth, that hee spake with di∣uer•• tongues,* 1.150 more then all his others fellowes. And, that wee should not sup∣pose, that hee got those tongues by study, as it is with vs, hee expresly ascri∣beth that gift, vnto none other, but onely vnto God, as to the proper Author. To one, there is giuen the diversity of tongues; to another, the interpretation of tongues; by the very same Spirit. And therefore, he bese••cheth the Colossians, to pray to God for him,* 1.151 that a doore of vtterance might be opened vnto him. Whereby hee plainely acknowledged, that both the diuersitie of tongues, and the measure of vtterance, are the onely gifts of God.

Yea, and the selfe same is likewise acknowledged, euen by the very Heathen. Among all those graces, which Homer affirmeth to be the gifts of God, and by him to bee diuersly distributed vnto men, the first of them, is, Eloquium, that is,* 1.152 Eloquence of tongue. Y••a, and Pindarus also, in expresse termes, acknow∣ledgeth, God himselfe to be the only giuer of Eloquence.

A Dijs, & prudentes, & fortes, & loquentes nascuntur. Or wise,* 1.153 or strong or eloquent, Both one, and all, from God are sent.

Yea, and euen profane Lucian (for all his scoffing spirit) yet affirmeth, that, Eloquence is giuen vs,* 1.154 by the Spirit. He saith that men do, vim & potestatem dicendi, a Spiritu acciper••. Meaning there, the Holy Ghost; though he would seem•• to deride it. But God (that giueth the tongue) ouer-ruled his tongue, and made it speake the truth, against his will. Yea, and all the Orators them∣selues, bo••h of the Greekes, and Latines, doe plainely confesse the same: when, in the beginnings of their solemne Oratio••s, they call vpon God, to giue them good successe. And so doe Poets likewise:* 1.155 when they inuocate the Muses, and ••aine them to be their god Iupiters Daughters: They plainely therein confesse, that their facultie of Poetry, is giuen them, by the gods. De∣ceiued they are, in the particular, of ascribing that gift, vnto their false gods: but yet, right, in the generall, of ascribing it, to God: vnto whom, it is, indeed, of right,* 1.156 to be ascribed. As Pacianus hath plainely, and truely affirmed: Dic, oro, ••rater, Musae literas repererunt? Nonne per Dominum omnia? & a Deo omnia? Tell me (o my good Brother) were the Muses, the first inuenters of lear∣ning? Is it not from God, and by God, that a man knoweth euery thing? Yes, surely. For (as it is affirmed, in the booke of Iob) Though there be a spirit in a man;* 1.157 yet is it the inspiration of the Almighty, that giueth him vnderstanding. Then it is not, either the spirit of the Muses, nor the spirit of his Maisters, nor yet his owne priuate spirit, that teacheth a man any thing: but it is only Gods Spirit;* 1.158 by his onely annointing. Vnctio vos docet omnia: Ye need not (saith S. Iohn) that any man should teach you, any thing; For the annointing teacheth you all things.* 1.159 He is the Spirit of truth: and hee it is, that leadeth a man, into all truth; as well in Philosophie, as hee doth in Diuinity. And (as Plato well ob∣serueth, vnto the same purpose) If any man be not taught by him,* 1.160 it is but in vain••,* 1.161 that he giueth himselfe to learne. For, Nemo docebit, nisi Deus adiuuer it. No man can euer teach vs, if God himselfe doe not helpe vs. So that, all a mans knowledge, in all the Arts fore-named, is onely infused into him, by God, and by the breathing of his spirit; sometimes, working with his labour: yea and sometimes, without it. For it is generally true, which the Orator hath affirmed, that, Nemo, vir magnus, sine aliquo afflatu diuino, vnquam fuit. That no man euer was excellent,* 1.162 in any one Arte, if we were not inspired, with a spe∣ciall spirit for it. So then, it is God likewise, that limiteth vnto euery man, all his Arts. And it is God likewise, that limiteth vnto euery Arte, all his faculties.* 1.163 For (as Plato truly teacheth vs) Cui{que} Arti, facultas a Deo tribui∣tur, certi cuiusdam operis indicandi. God hath giuen a faculty vnto euery Arte, to iudge but of his own•• prop••r and definite worke. Ne{que} enìmea, quae guber∣natoria arte cognoscimus, medicina quo{que} percipiemus; ne{que} etiam, quae medicina perspiciemus, arch••ectura animadvertemus. We know not those things, by the Art of the Pilot, that we do by Phisicke; nor yet those by Phisicke neither, that we do by Architecture: but euery Arte is tied vnto his owne proper matter: and is precisely limited, both to his Subiectum in quo, & to his Subiectum cirea quod. And this Limiter, he affirmeth expressely to be God. And thus the limiting and bounding, not one of all naturall bodies, and their naturall powers; but also the limiting of all humane Arts, and Sciences, is the worke of God: who (as Iustine Martyr noteth) doth,* 1.164 & Naturae, & Arti, finem ponere: giue limits, both to Nature, and to Arte. Yea, and the contemplation of it, doth leade vs,

by the hand, vnto the knowledge of a God: who is, both the Author, and the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of them, by the direct confessions euen of the very Heathens.

9 Th••n,* 1.165 much more, must needes the limiting of all spirituall graces bee his, which are immediately ••men, by his owne most gracious hands. A••l which though 〈◊〉〈◊〉 ••iueth very liberally, and bountifully: yet doth he not giue them, either all, without measure; or vnto all, in the same measure: but vnto euery one such a proportion, as seemeth best vnto his diuine wisedome. As Saint Paule plainely declareth in the first of his Epistles vnto the Corrinthians, where he han••leth that Argument,* 1.166 ex professo. Vnto one (saith hee) is giuen by the Spirit, the word of Wisedome; to another the word of Knowledge, by the same Spirit: to another, is giuen faith, by the same Spirit; and to another, the gift of ••••aling, by the same Spirit; and to another, the operations of great workes; and to another, pr••phesies; and to another, the discerning of Spirits; and to another, the diuer 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of tongues; and to another, the interpretation of tongues. And all these, worketh euen the sel••e same Spirit, distributing to euery man seuerally, a•• he will. Out of which place o•• Saint Paul••, wee may obserue these three things. First, that none of all those graces, can be assumed of any man, as hee himselfe pleaseth: but they must be giuen to him, as their bestower pleaseth. Secondly, that they are not a••l giuen vnto any one man: but some of them vnto one, and some vnto another; as God doth all his workes;* 1.167 in number, weight, and mea∣sure. Thirdly, that the measure of all those Donatiues and Graces, is onely at the absolute will of their Giuer. But who is then this Gi••••, that in such sort disposeth those graces, as he pleaseth? That also the same Apostle, a little be∣fore expresseth.* 1.168 There are diuer s••ties of gifts, but the same Spirit. There are diuer s••ies of administrations, but the same Lord. There are diu••rsities of ope∣rations, but ••od is the same, who worketh all in all. So then, the Limiter of all those graces, is the Spirit; and that Spirit is the Lord; and that Lord is God. It is the Spir••t of God, and God the Spirit, who is the limiter and disposer of all spirituall gifts vnto men, in that manner and measure, as hee pleaseth to be∣stow them.* 1.169 〈◊〉〈◊〉 erìm Deus gra••iam suam, quam dat Ecclesiae suae ad men∣suram, saith ••uffine. Non 〈◊〉〈◊〉 proficit vnusquis{que} in virtute, & grat••a quan∣tum ••upit, sed quantum pl••et ei••d••uider, qui ••erminos pon••t. For, God li∣mus all th••se 〈◊〉〈◊〉, which he bestones vpon his Church: not giuing to euery man so much as he de••••reth: but onely so much, as hee 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Giuer pleaseth. And this Tertulli••n very notably confirmeth,* 1.170 by comparing this p••ace of S. Paule the Apostle, with another like place of Isaiah the Prophet: where this limi∣ting and confining Spirit,* 1.171 is called by that Spirit: The Spirit of the Lord, the Spirit of Wisedome and vnderstanding; the Spirit of counsell and strength; the Spirit of knowledge, and of the feare of the Lord. By a parallell of which two places, he perempto••••y concludeth, ••h••t the Apostle and Prophet, speake both of the same Spirit. Compara species Apostoli, & Isaiae: Alij (inquit) datur, per Spiritum, sermo s••••entie: statim & Es••••as, Spiritum s••p••entiae p••suit. Alij, sermo sc••••••tiae: hic erit intelligentiae, & consilij. Aly fides in eodum Spiritu: hic erit spiritus religionis, & 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Domini. Alij•• donum c••rationum; alij, virtutum: hic erit valentiae spiritus. Alij, prophetia; ali••, distinctiones spirituum; alij, ge∣nera linguarum; alij, interpretat to li••guarum: hic erit agn••tionis Spiritus. Com∣pare the Apostle•• place with Isaies. To one (saith the Apostle) is giu••n by the Spi∣rit,

the word o•• wisedome: the Spirit (saith the Prophet) is the spirit of wisedom. To another (saith the Apostle) is giuen the word of knowledge: the spirit (saith the Prophet) is the spirit of vnderstanding, and couns••ll. To another (saith th•• Apostle) is giuen fa••th, by the same spirit: the spirit (saith the Prophet) is the spirit of Religion, an•• of the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of God. To another (saith the Apostle) is gi∣uen the gift of healing; to another, the operation of great workes, by the same spi∣rit: the spirit (saith the Prophet) is the spirit of power and strength. To ano∣ther (saith the Apostle) is giuen propheci••; to another, the discerning of spirits, to another, the diuer••ity of to••gues; to another the interpretation of tongues: the Spirit (saith the Proph••t) is the spirit of knowledge. And he concludeth with these words: Vides Apostolu••, & in di••tributione facienda vnius spiritus, & in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 interpretand••, Prophet•• ••••••nsp••rantem. Thus you see, that the Apo∣stle, both in distributing the seuerall gifts of one and the same Spirit, and in spe∣cifying by interpretation, who was that one Spirit, doth fully conspire and agree with the Prophet. And so indeed, they do•••• speaki••g both of them the same things in differing words: yea, and sometimes not in diff••ring words neither▪ but in the very same words. So then, it is none other but the holy Spirit of God, that is the giuer and distribut••r of all spirituall g••aces. Which, as he se∣uerally dispenseth vnto seuerall persons; so doth he likewise, in seuerall man∣ners. As we way euidently see, in all the fore-named instances. This Spirit distributed Wisedome and Knowledge, vnto many: but in such measure as vnto Salomon,* 1.172 not vnto any. It distributed faith vnto all th•• beleeu••rs: but yet, it di∣stributed it in differing measures. The C••nanitish woma•• is commended,* 1.173 for a great faith. The Apostles themselues are reproo••ed for a little one. It di∣stributed vnto diuers, the power of working miracles: but it distributed it vn∣to them in differing proportions. The rest of the Apostles healed but where they were present:* 1.174 but the Apostle Paule, euen where he was absent: The rest, but by ••heir bodily touching;* 1.175 but P••ter, by his onely shadowing. The rest of the Prophets, but onely whilest they liued: but Elish••, after he was dead. It di∣stributed vnto all the Prophets, the high gift of prophecying: but in such mea∣sure, as vnto Moses, it gaue it vnto none of them. It distributed the gift of tongues, vnto all the Apostles: but yet vnto Saint Paule, more largely then to them all. Thus the holy Spirit of God is both the onely giuer of all spirituall gifts, vnto men; and the onely distributer of them all among men; and the on∣ly limiter of the same in all men. And thus, the limitation of all finite things, both of naturall bodyes, and of their naturall powers; and of artificiall ••acul∣ties; and of spirituall graces; doe all of them conclude, That there is a God: vnto whom, and to none other, that worke can be ascribed: And this, both by the consequence of naturall reasons; and also, by the testimonie of the weigh∣tiest authoriti••s▪ both humane and diuine. Which is the fi••st Metaphysicall Consideration.

CHAP. 2.

The immensitie of mens appetites doth shew, T••ere is a God. 2. The immen∣sitie of naturall appetites. 3. 〈…〉〈…〉 appetites. 4. The immensitie of intellectuall or spirituall app••tites. 5. The immensitie of De∣sire. 6. The immensitie of Anger. 7. The immensitie of will. 8. And yet God is able to fill them all.

THe second Metaphysicall consideration, from whence we may collect, that There is a God, is taken, from a place of a con∣trary Nature vnto the former. For, as the former concluded it, from the limited and bounded circumscription of all finite things; which cannot be the worke of any other Agent, but onely of God: so this concludeth it, from the vnlimited and vnbound ex∣tension of the Appetites of Man; which can haue none other sufficient and replenishing Obiect, but onely God. The defining and circumscribing of all finite things, doth shew, There is a God; by whom they haue beene limi∣ted. And the dilating and extending of mans infinite appetites, doth shew There is a God; by whom they must be filled. For an infinite appetite, can∣not be replenished, but by an infinite Obiect. So that, though the Soule of a man, haue many diuers powers and faculties in it, which represent vnto vs, diuers notable images of Gods diuine properties (as shall, God willing, be de∣clared in a speciall Treatise intended to that purpose:* 1.176) yet is there none of them all, which repr••senteth Gods Infinity, but onely that one facultie, which by Philosophers is called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is, the burning Appetite, and Desire of the Soule. Which is a thing so spacious, and in some sort so infinite, that it cannot be filled with any finite Obiect: as the Prophet Ha∣bakuk hath expresly declared: who, in this respect, compareth it vnto Hell, and vnto Death,* 1.177 that cannot be satisfied. From whence, it must needs fol∣low, that, seeing no finite Obiect is able to fill vp that gaping Chasma, and insatiable gulfe of the Soules appetite; that therefore there must needs bee some infinite Obiect prouided for it;* 1.178 which is able to fill it, vntill it crie, Ynough.

For (as Aquinas well obserueth) Quael••bet potentia appetit obiectum sibi conueniens.* 1.179 Euery facultie, in nature, requireth such an Obiect, as is fitting vnto it. And therefore Appetitus and Appetitum, must bee fitted, as iust to∣gether, as Locus and Locatum: or else there should be Vacuum in rerum na∣tura: yea,* 1.180 and Vanum too. For, if the appetite be neuer filled, and neuer attaine his ende; then (as Aristotle obserueth) Inanis, & vanus erit Appetitus: Our appetite shall both be vacuus, and vanus. And therefore, that Nature, which hath made the appetite so large, if it had not appointed some fitting and proportionated Obiect vnto it, whereby it may be filled; it hath framed and fashioned it so large in vaine, and transgrest in her proportion. But, that, Nature hath not done. She hath made, in all her works, neither vacuum, nor va••um:* 1.181 She hath made nothing in vaine, as Aristotle in plaine termes expresly affirmeth. For first, for vacuum; he saith, that, vacuum esse, Naturae ratio non patitur: The very nature of Nature, will not suffer any Vacuum. And secondly,* 1.182 for Vanum; hee expresly saith againe, that, Deus & Natura, nihil faciunt frustra: That neither God nor Nature, doth any thing in vaine. But the largenesse of the appetite, should in vaine haue beene created, if there were not in all nature, some Obiect to fill it. Which, no finite Obiect can possibly performe. And therefore, it followeth, There must needs be some

Infinite. And that can be nothing,* 1.183 but onely God: as Aqui••as plaine∣ly proueth.

2 Now, looke into all the seuerall appetites of Man, of what nature soe∣uer; and you shall finde them all,* 1.184 to be of an infinite, and vnsatiable nature: and such, as that none of them can be filled, with that ordinarie Obiect, which, in common vnderstanding, is appropriated vnto it: but expecteth, yea and exacteth, some other, of a more extended, and infinite, nature; be∣fore it can be filled,* 1.185 and throughly contented. Aquinas diuideth the gene∣rall Appetite, into these three speciall kindes: that, Some of them, be na∣turall; Some, sensible; and some intellectuall, or Spiritual. In all which, wee may see an infinite auiditie: and such, as cannot be satisfied, with any finite Obiect. Let me giue you, in euery head, some Examples, to illustrate it.

And first, for Naturall Appetites: Aristotle, in one place, giueth instance, of three of them;* 1.186 which are, the most common, and familiar vnto all men. And they be, the Appetites of Eating, of Drinking, and of Sleeping. And yet, none of them all, is able to content the appetite of the soule. As King Salomon, nominatìm, giueth instance, in all of them. For eating and drin∣king; hee expresly affirmeth of them, that though all the labour of a man, be onely for his mouth;* 1.187 yet that (for all that) the soule is not filled. Where∣by hee insinuateth, that though the Belly may be filled, both with eating and drinking; yet the appetite of the Soule, is not filled, with either of them. And wee see his obseruation to bee verified, euen to sense, in the daily practice of Gluttons, and Drunkards: who lose not their appe∣tites, with the filling of their stomacks; but, euen then, when their Bel∣lies are distended, and full; yet their appetites are ieiune, and emptie; and still desire more, euen when they haue too much: yea, and euen prouoking their oppressed Stomackes, to eate yet more, with their sawces; and to drinke yet more,* 1.188 with their salt•• meates so, adding thirst vnto drunken∣nesse: rising vp early, to follow it, and sitting vp late, at it: as the Pro∣phet complayneth, Yea, euen, ad diurnam stellam matutinam potantes: as the Comicke speaketh: drinking downe the Euening st••rre, and drinking vp the Morning starre; making so their ipsum viuere, to be nothing else, but Bibere.

Nec sitis est extincta priùs,* 1.189 quàm Vita, bibendo. His Thirst, yea and his Life, in drinke, Were quench't together, and extinct.

As though they had purposely beene made, for nothing, but onely, for the actions of eating, and drinking. And therefore Aristotle very truely calleth them: Furentes circa ventrem: Men out of their wits, with the pampering of their bellies:* 1.190 giuing a notable instance, in the Glutton Polyxenus; who wish∣ed, that his necke were as long as a Cranes, to prolong his pleasure, in eating, and drinking.

And yet,* 1.191 that curse of God doth continually pursue them, that though they eate much, yet they haue not enough; and though they drinke much, yet they are not filled. Their stomackes may be filled: but so are not their appetites. For (as Salomon truely noteth) Vente•• impiorum, est insaturabilis: The righteous eateth, to the satisfying of his soule:* 1.192 but the belly of the wicked euer wanteth. And so

it is likewise, in the third of his instances: the appetite of sleeping: which is, as vnsatiable, as any of the rest, if a man do giue himselfe vnto it: as Salomon also obserueth in it: who, so elegantly characterizeth the drowsie-headed Slug gards, that no Character in Theophrastus, is more graphically described. Which he hath done, in the forme of a short Colloquie or Dialogue, by an excellent 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Wherein first, hee rowseth him vp, and calleth vnto him, to wake him out of his slothfull and heauie sleepe. How long wilt thou sleepe, ô Sluggard?* 1.193 and when wilt thou arise out of thy sleepe? Then, he bringeth in the Sluggard, very earnestly intreating him, that hee would not molest him, but yet a while permit him, to haue a little further sleepe, a little longer slumber, a little more folding of the hands together. And finally, hee plainely threateneth him, that if hee continued in that Lethargie of his sleeping, his pouerty would presently ouertake him, as a Traueller; and seaze vpon him, like an armed Souldier. And yet would not all this serue the turne. Hee was so deepely possessed with his veternus, and sleeping sicknesse, as if hee had beene metamorphosed into a very Dormouse. So that, this drowsie humour like∣wise, is not diminished, by feeding it: but rather (like a dropsie) it is the more increased.

3 And,* 1.194 as it is in naturall appetites: so is it, in sensible appetites too. They cannot be satisfied, no more then the former. But euen, when they haue what they would, they yet still call for more. And this also, King Salomon illustrateth, by two direct instances; in Seeing, and in Hearing. The eye (sayth he) is not filled with seeing,* 1.195 nor the eare with hearing. The Eye, I grant, may bee wearied with seeing: but filled it cannot bee. As Musaeus expreslie noteth:

Intuens defessus sum; satietatem non inveni aspiciendi. My sight is wearied out with looking on;* 1.196 And yet my selfe, satiety haue none.

For,* 1.197 as the Graue and Destruction cannot be filled, so cannot the eyes of a man be satisfied: sayth Salomon againe, in another place. And so likewise the Eare. It may be wearied with hearing: but yet it cannot be filled neither. As Socra∣tes likewise expresly obserueth. Aures suscipiunt voces omnes: nunquam verò implentur.* 1.198 Our eares do receiue all manner of voices: and yet be there none of them, that be able to fill them. And the like may bee sayd, of all the rest: as I partly haue shewed before, in the Tast: and that, both in our eating, and also in our drinking. Whereof Tully hath giuen vs a very notable instance, in the Persian King Xerxes: who, hauing tired himselfe out, with all ancient, and knowne pleasures, propounded great rewards vnto the inuenters of new: where∣of when he had tasted; yet could he not with all of them, be contented. Praemium proposuit ci,* 1.199 qui invenisset nouam voluptatem; qua ipsa, non suit con∣tentus.

4 But in a mans intellectuall,* 1.200 or spirituall appetites, (for so, in a large sense, I accompt of all, which any way haue their seate in the Soule) the same may a great deale more euidently be shewed. Them, Aristotle reduceth, vnto these three heads: Cupiditas, Ira, Voluntas: Desire Anger, and Will. All of them,* 1.201 hauing their place in the soule: and yet euery one, in a seuerall part of the soule. For, whereas the Soule is deuided into three parts, or powers, or

faculties:* 1.202 Concupiscibilis, Irascibilis, and Rationalis: in euery one of these seue∣rall faculties, there be placed, by nature, their seuerall appetites. Cupidit is, in Concupisc••bili; Ira, in Irascibili; and Voluntas, in Rationali: In the Concupisci∣bl•• part or faculty of the soule▪ is seated the appetite of Desire; in the Iras••••••le part, the appetite of Anger; and in the reasonable, the appetite of Will. So that (as, in the same place, he concludeth) Si anima diuidatur in tres partes; in earum vn•• qu••{que} inerit appetit••••: If the Soule be deuided into his three parts; you shall find, that euery part hath his owne proper appetite. Yea, and all of them too, in their na∣ture, to be infinite.

5 And first,* 1.203 for Cupiditas, or Desire: there be foure principall Obiects, a∣bout which it is chiefly occupied: namely Power, Honour, Riches, and Pleasure. In all which, it bewrayeth it selfe to be infinite, and such as cannot be conten∣ted and satisfied. Whereby wee may see it plainly verified, which Aristotle hath obserued, that, Cupiditatis natura est in finita: that A mans desire is of an infinite nature.* 1.204

For first, as concerning Power;* 1.205 if a man doe but once set his appetite vpon it, he hath left himselfe no power to cast limits about it: but it will grow to bee so infinite, that all the power of the world will not bee able to content it. As we may euidently see, in Alexander the Great. Whose appetite of Power, was so infinitely great, that when he heard, Democritus to hold, There were many Worlds; hee fell into great sorrowing, because that, as yet, hee had not conquered one.* 1.206 Whereby it is euident, that all the power of one world, could not satisfie his appetite, though he might haue had it all. Nay, though there had bene as many worlds, as Democritus dreamed of, though hee might haue had all of them, yet would they not all haue contented him. For, as the Tragicall Poet hath truly obserued,

Auidis, duidis, natura parumest. To such as are ambitious, and so greedy,* 1.207 All Nature selfe doth seeme to be too needy.

Which Petronius Arbiter very notably exemplifieth, in the vnsatiable ambiti∣on of the Romans.

Orbem iam totum, victor Romanus h••bebat: Quâ mare,* 1.208 quâ terrae, quâ sidus currit vtrum{que} Nec satiatus erat.— The conquering Romans got into their hand, The whole worlds compasse; euen as farre as Land, Or any Sea••, or Heauen it selfe extended▪ And yet this Nation could not be contented.

For,* 1.209 the ambition of the proud inlargeth it selfe, like Hell; and is like vnto Death, that cannot be satisfied: as the Prophet obserueth. Yea and Liuie also not obscurely insinuateth. Animus hominis insatiabilis est, eo quòd fortun•• spondet. The minde of a man, will not be satisfied with any thing, if fortune do still promise, to bestow more vpon him. Neither was this the particular humor of those men fore-named; whose greatnes of ambition, might easily bee bred in them, by the greatnesse of their Fortune: but it is the generall humor of all men, be they neuer so meane. For (as Isocrates very truely affirmeth) Vniuer si mortales,* 1.210 in eo elaborant, vt plus alijs possint. It is the common desire and indea∣uour

of all men, to haue prerogatiue of some greater power, then there is in other men. Insomuch, that euery man, be he neuer so good, yet desireth a power, if it bee but to doe euill. And though hee neuer meane to vse it; yet he desireth to haue it.

—et qui nolunt occidere quenquam,* 1.211 Posse volunt.—

saith the Poet.

who haue to hurt, nor heart, nor Will; Yet wish •• haue power, euen to kill.

So Pilate, though he had no intention to hurt Christ; yet boasted vnto him, that he had power to doe it.* 1.212 Knowest thou not that I haue power to crucifie thee, and haue power to loose thee? And yet he vsed all meanes to saue him. Yea, and ••••ban,* 1.213 though his power was by God himselfe restrayned, yet he boasted that he had it. To conclude, a man hath not lesse power ouer himselfe in any thing whatsoeuer, then when he once fixeth his appetite vpon Power.

And so it is likewise,* 1.214 in the next Head of Honour. If a man doe chance, to set his desire vpon that, it groweth, by and by, so infinite, that hee cannot bee contained within any bounds and limits, neither of Reason, nor of Duty; no, nor of his owne Safety. As we may see by examples, in all these seuerall heads. For the first of them. The bounds of Reason, how grossely they oft••ntimes transgressed by ambition,* 1.215 the Orator hath pointed vs, to a notable instance, in the Heathen Philosophers. Of whom, though there were diuers so rigid, and sterne, as to publish whole Bookes in contempt of Vaine-glor••e, yet was the taste of that Vaine-glorie so delightfull to themselues, as that in the same bookes, they publisht their owne names. Which manifestly sheweth, that how∣soeuer they outwardly would seeme to contemne it, yet they inwardly affect∣ed it. So they affected glory in writing against Glory; and shewed themselues vaine, euen in calling it Vaine. Which folly they would neuer haue commit∣ted so euidently against their outward profession, but that their Reason was dazeled, and blinded by ambition.

And the like may be seene in the ambition of old men: who (contrary to all reason) are as greedy of Honour, in their decrepite old age, when they must by and by forgoe it; as they were euer in their youth, when they might long enioy it.* 1.216 For (as Thucidides well obserueth) Sola dulcedo Gloriae, ••en senescit. The onely humour of ambition, doth neuer grow feeble, or old in any man: but euen in those that are the oldest, and most decayed men, yet their ambition is still young. Yea, and he reprooueth in the same place, that vsuall prouerbe, as a very false position: that, In senecta, lucrari magis delectat, quam honore affici: That all men, in their age, are rather delighted with gaine, then with fame; with riches, then with honours. This he holdeth to be false. And wee may see the truth of it,* 1.217 in old Caius Marius: whose ambition sprouted greene, when his body was dry and withered, and in effect, halfe dead. Which manifestly shew∣eth, that though olde mens experience doe teach them many other things; yet that this is a lesson which it can neuer teach them: To set downe a stint vnto their owne ambition. So farre doth it transgresse all the lines and bounds of Reason.

And so doth it of duty too: yea, and that in a very high degree. Whereof

two Tragicks haue giuen vs two notable instances, in two ambitious brothers, or rather indeed monsters, E••eocles and Polinices; who were both of them so inflamed with the rage of ambition, and carried so violently through all the barres of duty, iustice and vertue, that Euripides bringeth in one of them with this execrable sentence:

Nam si violandum est ius,* 1.218 Regnandi gratia, Violand••••n est: alijs rebus, pictatem colas. If Iustice may be violate, for any cause at all, Then surely, for a Kingdomes sake, this violence may fall. In all things else, keepe Piety inuiolated you shall.

Thereby plainely declaring, that the ambition of honour is more violent then any other: breaking all the bonds of duty, both to iustice and piety. Which yet in his brother, may be seene much more plainely. For him Seneca bringeth in with another sentence, as impious as his brothers was, and a great deale worse:

—Pro regno velim Patriam,* 1.219 Denates, coniugem stammis dare. Imperia, precio quolibet, constant ben••. I could well, for a Kingdome, be content, To see my countrey, gods, and wi••e ybrent. All cost to get a Kingdome, is well spent.

Whereby it plainely appeareth, how immoderate the desire of glory and Ho∣nour is: contemning all the bonds of all the strictest duties that are betweene either God, or Man, and vs.

And, as ambition leadeth men, to transgresse and violate all the bounds of duty: so doth it oftentimes, to transgresse the bounds likewise, euen of their owne Safety. Whereof, Homer hath left a notable example, in the ambition of Achilles:* 1.220 who, hauing the condition propounded vnto him; either of a short life, with great glory; or of a long one, with little; he was so ambitious of praise and commendation, that he preferred the short life before the long. But Dion Nic••eus hath left vs a more notable example, in Agrippina, the Em∣presse:* 1.221 who being fore-told, that if Nero her sonne euer came to bee Empe∣rour, he would surely kill her: yet she was so ambitious of beeing mother to an Emperour, that she presently answered: A 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: Let him be a murtherer, so he first be an Emperour. Thus for the loue of Vaineglory, she despised her owne safety. But Laertius hath left vs a most notable exam∣ple,* 1.222 in the Philosopher Empedocles: Who, hauing by the cure of a dangerous disease (which was held for incurable) obtained great credit, and by certaine vaine people, hyperbolizing his fact, being palpably flattered; that hee could neuer (sare) haue done it, if he had not beene a god; hee grew by their flatte∣rie, into that madnesse of conceit, as to hope, that he might so art it, as indeed to be taken and beleeued for a god. And so, sleeping one night in the open fields, with diuers of his neighbours, he s••ily stole away, & cast himselfe secret∣ly into the mouth of burning Aetna; hoping by that his sudden dispearing, and neuer beeing heard of among men againe, to haue confirmed the growing opinion of his godhead. But he was greatly deceiued: for the violence of the fire casting backe againe his pantofle, discouered the fraud, & bewrayed which

way he went, and so was hee foully frustrated of the opinion of his Godhead, which now he had a great deale too dearely bought. So infinite and vnsatia∣ble was his ambition of Glory; that in comparison of it, he despised his owne safety. Yea, and Horace is of opinion, that if it were yet to doe, he would doe it againe. He would againe destroy his life, vpon hope of that foolish glorie, which he sought for in his death:

—Deus immortalis haberi,* 1.223 Dum cupit Empedocles, ardentem frigidus Aetnam Insiluit— Nec semel hoc fecit, nec si retractus erit, iam Fiet homo, &c ponet famosae mortis amorem.

While proud Empedocles would a God, immortall seeme to be, And so be thought, into the flames, of Aetna leapeth he. Nor this so done, the same recall'd, and made to draw new breath; The Man would not depose the loue, of such a famous death.

Thus vnquenchable is the thirst of ambition,* 1.224 if it once be throughly groun∣ded, and rooted in any man. And the like Suidas reporteth of Heraclides Ponticus.

And,* 1.225 as a mans appetite is infinite after Honour: so is it no lesse, after Riches, and Treasure. For, if hee once doe settle his desire vpon it, the Riches of the whole world, will be too little for it.

Nec Croesi fortuna vnquàm,* 1.226 nec Persica regna, Sufficient animo,—

saith the Heathen Poet.

Nor all King Croesus wealth, nor Persian Kingdomes can Suffice the greedy minde, of th'auaricious man.

And therefore (saith Lucilius) Qu•• credimus,* 1.227 divitias vllas animum expl••re posse? How can we beleeue, that the aboundance of any Riches, should be able to satiate a couetous mans minde? Aboundance of Riches, may well, inflare ani∣mum: but, it can neuer, implere: It may well be able, to puffe vp the minde (for so the Apostle Paul insinuates it doth) but yet, for all that, it can neuer ••ill it.* 1.228 For, ••Nunquam expletur, nec satiatur cupiditatis sitis, saith the Roman Orator: The couetous mans thirst, cannot possibly be quenched. But it groweth vpon him, like the thirst of a Dropsie, which is the more increased, by drin∣king, to extinguish it. For,

Crescit indulgens sibi dirus hydrops,* 1.229 Nec sitim pellit,—

saith another Poet.

This cursed Dropsie, by ind••••lgence, growes To such a thirst, as no repelling knowes.

No, nor replenishing neither: though, euen the couetous man himselfe, at the first,* 1.230 thinkes it may. For (as Aristotle obserueth) Primò, dicunt pauca sufficere, at{que} minima: mox verò, vbi illa sunt consecuti, plura semper appetunt quous{que} in infinitum procedant. At the first, themselues imagine, that a few things will content them: but, when they haue gotten them, they still seeke for more, after them: vntill at last their appetite groweth in them to be infinite. And so likewise, Aristophanes:

Nec quanquam hominum [Pluti] caepit satietas:* 1.231 Nam si quis acci piat talenta tredecim, Auidiùs contendit parare sedecim. Si & hec confece rit, quadraginta appetit.

And so is infinitun.

There neuer yet was man, with wealth so well content, But though he had attayn'd to treasure competent, He yet would striue still more his state for to augment.

For, as the fore-alledged Poet hath truly obserued:

Crescit amor nummi,* 1.232 quantum ipsa pecunia crescit; Et minùs hanc optat, qui non habet.— The loue of wealth increaseth still, as wealth doth selfe improue; And he loues Riches euer least, that hath the least to loue.

For, he that most loueth them, is alwayes least able to bee satisfied with them.

Cupit hic gazis implere famem;* 1.233 Nec tam••n omnis plaga gemmiferi Sufficit Istri, nec tota sitim Lydia vincit,

saith the Tragicall Poet.

A man, with Treasure, seek's to stake That hunger, which doth Riches rake. But all the gemm's of Ister shore, Nor all the gold of Lydia's store, Can fill the greedy Appetite. It is a thing, so infinite.

For (as Salomon affirmeth of it) He that loueth mony,* 1.234 he will neuer be satisfied with monie. Neuer. Take himselfe for an example of his owne position: yea, and that, a very good one. It is reported of him, that he had congested and amassed together such infinite monies, that, Siluer, in his time, was as common,* 1.235 as Stones.* 1.236 And yet, for all this his vnmeasurable store,* 1.237 he still had a desire of getting more and more. To with ende, hee still continued his new-begunne Trade, vnto the land of Ophyr: furnishing out a new Nauie, euery third yeere. Which is a manifest Argument, that his appetite, with all that hee had was not satisfied. For, as the Poet hath very well collected:

—nondum impleui gremium,* 1.238 si panditur vltrà. He hath not fill'd his lapp, that still doth hold it ope.

Yea, and (as before I noted, of the appetite of Honours) that it breaketh all the duties both vnto God,* 1.239 and Man: so doth Seneca set the same note, vpon the appetite of Riches. Per hominum Deorum{que} iras, ad aurum ibitur. Wee runne madding after Gold, contemning all the anger both of men and God. Whereupon Virgil truly noteth:

—quid non mortalia pectora cogis, Auri sacra fames?* 1.240 Of cursed Gold the hunger. starued loue, What is't, whereto mans heart it cannot moue?

And,* 1.241 as vnsatiable as is the desire of Treasure: so vnsatiable, is also, the de∣sire of Pleasure. For, if a man doe but once set his appetite vpon it, let him ingurgitate himselfe neuer so deepe into it; yet shall he neuer be able to fill his desire with it.* 1.242 For, as Aristotle also in this head obserueth: Voluptatum appe∣titio, est insatiabilis. There is nothing whatsoeuer, that is able to satisfie the appetite of pleasure. And Tully likewise, vnto the same purpose. Vnum n••scio, quomodò possit, qui luxuriosus est, finitas habere cupiditates. This one thing (saith he) I cannot vnderstand: How a man, that is intemperate, should haue his desire and concupiscence finite. Whereof, Eusebius yeelds an instance, in the Emperour Maxentius,* 1.243 of whom, he reporteth, that, Quamuìs infinitas ferè, liberas & ingenuas mulieres, per vim, flagitiose violasset; nullo tamen pacto, poterat intemperantem & effusam animi sui libidinem explere. Although hee had defiled an innumerable number of matrons & freewomen; yet was he ne∣uer able to satisfie the appetite of his filthy vnmeasurable lust. And the same we may see likewise, in Messalina the Empresse: a wonder, nay, a monster, for her following of filthy pleasure. For, she was so prodigiously giuen vnto it, that she might truly say, as it is in the Poet,

In me,* 1.244 tota ruens Venus, Cyprum deseruit. That Venus had forken her famous kingdome Cypres, And wholy plac'd her seate, in this lasciuious Empresse.

For she, because she would euen glut her selfe with fleshly delights, conueied her selfe once into the common Stewes, and there enioyed her filthy pleasure, vntil she was neuer the neerer. Her lewd and filthy appetite was still as greedy of it, as it was before. So that, at her parting, shee was forced to complaine that she had wasted, and wearied her selfe, in vaine: being, as that Poet no∣teth, but onely,

—Lassata vitis,* 1.245 nondùm satiata— Not filled, only tired, with pleasure she desired.

Ne{que} enìm vnquàm finem inueniet libido:* 1.246 saith the Romane Orator.* 1.247 For lust is an Appetite, that can neuer finde an end: It being, indeed, infinite; as Plato affirmeth of it. Voluptas est infinita, eiús{que} generis, quod nec principium, nec medium, nec finem in seipsa, suapte natura, continet, aut aliqundò continebit. The appetite of Pleasure is infinite; and of that nature, that it knoweth nor be∣ginning, nor middle, nor ending in it selfe; nor doth, nor can, nor will content, or containe it selfe.

6 And,* 1.248 as our appetite is vnsatiable in matters of Concupiscence; which is Aristotles first head: so is it also, in matter of Reuenge; which is his second head. A thing so sweete vnto our corrupt nature, that, as it is obserued, by the Heathen Philosopher:* 1.249 Inimicum vlcisci, vitam accipere est alteram: For a man to be reuenged of his enemy, seemeth as sweete as to receiue a second life giuen him. As it doth euidently appeare, in King Nabuchodonozer: who, hauing conceiued a grieuous displeasure, against some of his Neigh∣bours,* 1.250 he calleth out his Captaines, and giueth them a charge, to go out, and to reuenge him vpon all the whole earth, and to destroy all flesh, that would not obey the command of his mouth. Thereby, plainely declaring, that, as the Tragicke noteth,

—Arma non seruant modum,* 1.251 Reuenge extreame, can hold no mean••.

But, as in another place, he describeth it. It is,—Nulla dolor

Contentus p••ena; querens supplicia horrida,* 1.252 In••••gitata, infanda; Iunonem docens Quid odia vale••nt; nesciens iras••t satis. Reuenge is such a griefe, as no paine can content, But seek's out horrid, strange, and vncouth punishments, It teacheth Iuno rage, and angers rudiments.

As we may euidently see, in those immane cruelties, which diuers haue exerci∣sed, euen vpō mens dead bodies. A notable example of which barbarous inhu∣manity, there is recorded vnto vs, by Tully, in those notable immanities, which Dolabella exercised, vpon the body of Trebonius: of whom he thus writeth. Suam insatiabilem crud••litatem exercuit,* 1.253 non solùm in viuo, sed etiam in mor∣tuo. At{que} in eius corpore lacerando, atque vexando, cùm animum satiare non posset, oculos pauit suos. He exercised all his vnsatiable butchery, both vpon him aliue, and vpon his dead body: seeking to feede his eyes, by renting him in pieces, seeing he could not fill his appetite,* 1.254 with any cruelty of punishment. And, Hero∣dotus reporteth the like, of Cambises: who so hated King Amasis, that hee caused his dead body to be taken out of his graue, Deinde, verberibus caedi, ac vellicari, & stimulis pungi, omní{que} contumelia insestari: Then to bee lasht, and drawne,* 1.255 and stucke, and stabbed, and infested with all reproches, and vnworthy vsage. And the like crueltie, did Pope Sergius practise vpon Formosus: whom he digged out of his graue, and iudicially condemned, as if hee had beene aliue: and cast out into Tyber, as vnworthy of any Sepulcher.

7 And,* 1.256 as it is in matters of Reuenge; which is Aristotles second head: so is it also, in matters of Will; which is his third head. Which will, though it belong vnto the reasonable part of the Soule; yet doth it often∣times, so farre exceede all the lines and bounds of reason, that Aristotle per∣stringeth it, for this absurdity, that it oftentimes desireth things of meere im∣possibility.* 1.257 Voluntas, eorum etiam est, quae fieri non possunt. Our will and af∣fection reacheth oftentimes to such things, as cannot possibly be done. Wee of∣tentimes desire those things, that are vnlawfull: yea, and sometimes wee desire those things, that are impossible. And hee giueth this for in∣stance; That we desire to be immortall; although both God and nature hath made vs purely mortall. Neither doth our will onely transgresse the prescript lines of reason, in desiring of those things, which, in themselues, are vnlawfull: but also, in desiring euen of those things, which are lawfull: when we desire them, in vnlawfull either manner,* 1.258 or measure.

As for example, the loue of Children vnto their Parents, is both naturall and lawfull. And yet, the loue of Mirrha vnto her Father, was wicked and vnlawfull:* 1.259 because she loued him, in an vnlawfull manner. And so was like∣wise, the loue of Satyrus, vnto his: because he loued him in an vnlawfull mea∣sure. Whereupon, he was called Patris amator: The louer of his Father: as it were, by a nickname. And so is it likewise, on the other side too: when the loue of the Parents is too great vnto their Children;* 1.260 as Niobe's was to hers. A vice, which, in old Eli, euen God himselfe reproueth. Thou honourest thy Children, aboue me.

Now,* 1.261 these excesses, in our intellectuall appetites, doth Aristotle con∣demne, for meere exuperances, and vices. So that, these intellectuall appe∣tites, are oftentimes no lesse excessiue and immoderate, then either the natu∣rall, or the sensible. Let me giue yet one instance more, of a truly intellectuall obi••ct, exactly adequated and proportioned vnto the intellectuall appetite. And that is Learning, and Knowledge. Vpon which, if a man do but once set his minde, it carrieth him after it, with so infinite an appetite, that the more he getteth of it, the more he still desireth it; and yet can neuer bee fil∣led with it.* 1.262 For (as Ecclesiasticus obserueth of it) He that eateth of wisedome, shall haue the more hunger; and he that drinketh of her, shal haue the more thirst. A thing, which euen the very Heathen haue likewise obserued, of Knowledge, and Learning. That though it be, of all things the most sweete and pleasant: yet that it cannot possiby either glut, or fill the Appetite: Nec poteris artibus animum saturare,* 1.263 nec sapientia explere: saith Theognis. Thou canst not glut thy soule with learning; thou canst not fill it with wisedome and vnderstanding. Non enìm possunt Praeceptores, quemadmodùm qui in vas infundunt, implere mentem▪ saith Philo Iudaeus:* 1.264 No master can fill the minde of his Scholler, as men doe vse to fill a vessell with water. For there is no part of learning, that can fill the Soule, though there be no part of it, but that greatly delighteth it. Tullie no∣teth of Philosophie: that there was in Cato, inexhausta aviditas legendi, quae sa∣tiari non poterat: There was in him, an insatiable auidity of reading, which could not be satisfied,* 1.265 Whom therefore he calleth,* 1.266 Helluonem Librorum; A deuourer of Bookes.* 1.267 And Plutarch obserueth the same of Histories. Quae etiam∣si animum oblectant; tamen perpetuum veritatis studium non explent: Though Histories doe much delight and please the mind; yet can neuer replenish that in∣finite auidity, end desire of the truth, which in them the soule seeketh. And Tul∣lie againe affirmeth the like of Astronomy, and the motion of the Heauens: Quorum contemplatione, nullus expleri potest animus: With the contemplation whereof, it is vnpossible that the minde should euer bee satisfied. So that, no part of learning (no nor all of it, together) is able to fill the minde. When a man hath once setled his appetite vpon it.

Thus all the Appetites of man doe carry him headlong, beyond all the bound both of vertue and reason. And yet, when he hath followed them, vn∣till he be tired with them, he can finde no sound contentment in any one of them. Take King Salomon himselfe, for an example of examples, in all of them. For so he seemeth to propose himselfe, in euery one of the fore-named instan∣ces. For he ingenously confesseth, that one while he set his minde vpon no∣thing,* 1.268 but on pleasure, and to passe his time merrily, in pleasance and iollity. But he found himselfe quickly to be wearied with that, and to grow into so great a dislike of all mirth, that he sayd vnto Laughter, Thou art madnesse. A∣gaine, another while he gaue himselfe wholly vnto Eating and Drinking. Ano∣ther while, to Building. Another while, to Planting & Gardening. Then, to Wa∣ter-workes,* 1.269 and Fishing. Then to pompe in great House-keeping: entertaining a huge traine of seruants, and followers. Then, another while, to priuatenesse and heaping vp of Riches. Another while, to the study of learning and Wise∣dome. And thus was he driuen to shift and change his desire, from one thing vnto another, finding solid content in neuer a one of them: but (after some

small experience) great irkesomenesse in them all. So that, his poore soule (like the Doue, which was sent out of the Arke of Noe) could finde no sure footing vpon any one of them. Whereupon, he pronounceth of them all, without exception, that there is nothing in them but Vanity and Vexation. Thus, all the appetites of man, though they be almost innumerable, yet are all of them vnsatiable;* 1.270 and doe, all, with Agurs horseleech, cry nothing but Giue, Giue. And yet, when you haue giuen them all that euer you can, they are still as bare and empty,* 1.271 as were Pharaohs leane kine: being, for all they do deuoure, yet neuer a whit the fatter, neuer a whit the fuller. So that, as S. Bernard no∣teth of all of them: Fit vt per varia, & fallacia mundi oblectamenta, vagabun∣dus animus,* 1.272 inani labore discurrens, fatigetur; non satietur. It commeth to passe, that the minde of man, wandring ouer the world, through diuers delightfull and deceitfull pleasures, and spending her strength and trauell in vaine, is at last wea∣ried and wasted out, is surfeted, and yet not satisfied with them.

8 Now, what is the end of all this long discourse,* 1.273 but onely that, which I noted in the beginning of the Treatise? That seeing God hath made the ap∣petite of man, of such an infinite extent in euery branch of it, that none of all these obiects is able to content it, which are supposed to be the most naturall vnto it; that therefore there must needes bee some supernaturall Obiect ap∣pointed for it; which is able in euery corner to fill it: or else it must bee vnfil∣led: which were to bring a vacuum and emptinesse into the workes of God. Which is vtterly absurde. For as God in his prouidence did neuer make any belly so great, but that he prouided sufficient meate to fill it; yea, euen the great belly of that great beast Behemoth;* 1.274 which himselfe so greatly magnifi∣eth: so likewise, in his wisedome, would he neuer haue made a mans appetite so great, but that he hath appointed some obiect that can fill it: yea, and eue∣ry corner of it. Now, that the whole world is not able to doe. As may bee well vnderstood, by this Hierogliphicall conceit: That the world is of a circular forme: but the heart of a man is of a triangular. And there∣fore, as if wee should put a circle into a Triangle, we can neuer so fill it, but that all the corners will be empty in it: so if we should put the whole world into a mans heart; yet could it neuer fill it, nor reach into euery corner of it. And therefore the onely obiect that is able to fill this three cornered heart, cannot be any thing else,* 1.275 but onely the Holy and vndiuided Trinitie. This is an all-filling obiect, that is greater then our heart: and therefore is easily able to fill it,* 1.276 and to radiate into euery corner of it. Yea, so to fill a mans appetite, in euery chanell of it, vntill, like Dauids Cup, it euen runne ouer. For he is able to fill all our naturall appetites,* 1.277 both of eating, and drinking, and sleeping, and such like. For,* 1.278 He openeth his hand, and filleth with his blessing, euery liuing thing. And He it is, that giueth vnto his beloued sleepe.

And,* 1.279 though the mouth of our appetite doe gape neuer so wide; yet hee openeth his hand wider,* 1.280 and filleth both the mouth, and the belly, with his hidden treasure. And so likewise, for our sensible appetites, of Hearing, See∣ing, and Tasting,* 1.281 and the rest: hee can easily fill them too. For, he hath proui∣ded such excellent things for vs, as neither Eye hath seene, nor Eare hath heard, nor yet, by the heart of man can be conceiued. He can fill all our intellectuall ap∣petites,* 1.282 both of Power, and Honour, and Treasure, and Pleasure. For he hath

prouided for vs,* 1.283 an incorruptible crowne of glorie. And, In his presence, is the fulnesse of ioy;* 1.284 and, at his right hand, are pleasures for euer more. Thus (as the Psalmist noteth) God can,* 1.285 Replere in bonis, de siderium nostrum: He can, euen fill our d••sire,* 1.286 with euery good thing. And therefore, in another place, he pro∣fesseth, that,* 1.287 There is nothing in heauen that he desireth, but him; nor any thing on earth, in comparison of him. He fixed his whole desire vpon God: because he alone could fill the whole of it, without any diminution. As the Psalmist againe, in another place, confesseth: I will behold thy face, in righteousnesse: and when I awake,* 1.288 I shall be satisfied with thine image. God is a fantasme, that can fill the fantasie; and an Obiect, that can still the appetite. Which, no∣thing in the world can doe, without him; no, not the whole world, nor all that is in the world: but onely God himselfe. For, as S. Augustine truely writeth.* 1.289 Si cuncta, quae fecit, Deus dederit, non sussicit, nisi s••••••sum dederit. Though God should giue thee all hee hath, yet would all that be n••thing, if hee gaue thee not himselfe. Whereupon hee professeth in another place, that Quicquid igitur mihi vult dare Dominus meus,* 1.290 auferat totum, & se mihi det. There is nothing in the world, that vnto me seemeth pleasant, but onely God. And therefore, if God would giue vnto me, al: that euer he hath; let him take all that away, and giue me onely himselfe. For, there is nothing else, that can fully content vs,* 1.291 as in his Confessions he plainly professeth: Domine, quia fecisti nos ad te, inqutetum est cor nostrum, donec requiescat in te. O Lord (saith hee) because thou hast purposely made vs for thy selfe, therefore our heart can no where finde any quiet, vntill it doe come to rest in thy selfe: Not in all the honours, not in all the riches, not in all the pleasures of the world. As is likewise very notable obserued, by S. Bernard:* 1.292 Ad imaginem Deifacta animarationalis, caeteris omnibus occuparì potest, repleri non potest. Capacem Dei, quicquid Deo minus est, non implebit. Inde est, quòd naturali quidem de∣siderio, summum quiuis probatur appetere bonum; nullam, nisi adepto eo, re∣qui••m habiturus. The soule of a man, being made vnto the image of God, may be busied about many other things, but can be filled with nothing but with him. For that, which is capable of God himselfe, cannot be ••illed with that, which is lesse then God himselfe. Hence euery man naturally desires the cheifest good, and can neuer rest, vntill he haue found it. For, as Bellarmine* 1.293 very aptly and wittily illustrates it, As the body of a man, cannot rest in the ayre, be it neuer so wide; nor yet in the water, be it neuer so deepe; but still sinketh downe, vntill it come vnto the earth, because that is his proper and na∣turall place: so the Soule of a man can neuer finde repose, neither in the aereal & stickering Honours, nor in the earthly and dirty Ri••hes, nor in the watery & softening Pleasures of this present world; but onely, in God alone, who is in∣deed, the proper place, and true Center of mans Soule, in whom it can onely repose it selfe securely. I will lay me downe to rest, and sleepe in peace, (saith the Psalmist) for it is the Lord onely that maketh me dwell in safetie.* 1.294 Here is the true repose, and naturall rest of the Soule, when it lodgeth vp it selfe, vnder the shadow of Gods wings.* 1.295 And therefore, Dauid beseecheth the Lord, that he would hide him, vnder the shadow of his wings. Professing in another place, that, vnder the shadow of his wings, should be his refuge. And in an∣other, that, his trust should be, vnder the shadow of his wings. And in another

that, he will reioyce, vnder the shadow of his wings. Thus, vnder the shadow of Gods wings, the Soule findes her true reposednesse, her refuge, her assu∣rance; and her fulnesse of ioy: so that when she is come thither, she can de∣sire no more. For, as a Buble (saith Gregorie Nyssen,* 1.296 vsing a contrary com∣parison vnto Bellarmines) cannot stay it selfe below, in the botome of the wa∣ter; but, by degrees, ascendeth vp, vntill it come vnto the toppe: and, when it is come thither, it then striues no longer to ascend vp any higher; but there breaking his thinne filme, powreth forth it selfe naturally, into the open ayre: so likewise, a mans Soule cannot content and stay it selfe in any of these earth∣ly and inferior things; but naturally ascendeth vpward, vntill it come to God: Whither when it is once come, it then hath no desire to ascend vp any further, but there naturally resteth; Yea, and like the Bubble, beforementioned, (with the Apostle Paul) desireth,* 1.297 to bee, euen dissolued, that it may be with God. And here a Mans desire hath his vttermost stint. For God (as Nazianzene* 1.298 truely teacheth) is, Intelligibilium omnium summus vertex, in quo deside∣rium omne consistit, ac defigitur, nec, supra eum, vsquàm fertur. God is the highest pitch of all our vnderstanding, and the totall summe of all our desiring. So that our vnderstanding can desire to fly no higher, because he is the highest; and our appetite can desire to comprehend no more, be∣cause he is the greatest.* 1.299 Nec aliquid est quod extra illum quaeratur, quia totum in illo invenitur quod desideratur, saith S. Augustine: We neede not to seeke for anything out of him, because all that we desire wee may easily finde in him.* 1.300 For (as S. Paul teacheth vs) God is, Omnia, in omnibus: all, in all. From which very place, Beda draweth this conclusion, that therefore, Deus est finis desideriorum nostrorum: That God is the last ende of all a mans appe∣tite. For, hee that hath God, hath all. And hee that hath all, he can desire no more; because there is no Obiect for his desire to couet. And therefore (saith he) when God promiseth vnto vs, Ego ero illorum Deus; he saith all one in a manner, as, Ego ero vnde satientur; I will be their God, that is, I will fill their appetite.

Now,* 1.301 saith Hugo de Victore, Cogita qualis esse possit, qui omnium vi••entium sensus fabricat, appetitus creat, ac in singulis quibus{que} an••mantibus, & quid appetere, & quantum appetere debeant, ordinat. Consider with thy selfe (saith he) what an one, be must needs be, that hath both giuen vnto all liuing things, all their senses; and created in them all, all their seuerall appetites: yea, and further hath appointed vnto euery one of them, both what, aud how much, they must desire in euerything. Surely, he that hath created so many infinite appetites, in so infinite many things, and yet is able to suffice them all, can be none other,* 1.302 but that one infinite Obiect, which is God all-sufficient. Who (as Irenaeus truly teacheth) is, omnium rerum pleroma, that is, the true plenitude, and ••ulfilling of euerything. Thus the infinite appetite of the soule, which cannot with any finite thing be fully satisfied, doth leade vs directly vn∣to God.* 1.303 For (as Saint Augustine well obserueth) Mens, dum inhianter cogi∣tanda appetit, & repentè denuò cogitata fastidit, docetur, quòd aliundè pendet. Ad Deum quippe suspensa est, a quo solo formata est. Mans soule (saith hee) whilest it greedily desireth euery thing that it thinketh of, and by and by despi∣seth what before it was greedy of, is taught, by this loathing of euery inferiour

creature, that it hath his whole dependance vpon a superior Nature; that is, onely vpon God, by whom onely it was made.

Whereupon, he there concludeth, that Quia omne, quod infra appetit, mi∣nus est; iure ei non sufficit, quicquid Deus non est. Because a mans appetite is so great and so infinite, that all earthly things are too little for it, it must needs from thence follow, that that which can suffice it, can bee nothing else but God. And therefore (as Pisanus very Christianly exhorteth vs) Cùm,* 1.304 sine Deo, nulla Creatura sibi satis sit; qui studet sibi sufficere, Deum quaerat. Seeing no Creature is sufficient for it selfe, without God: let him that would suffice himselfe, seeke his sufficiency in God.* 1.305 For (as Saint Paul truely teacheth vs) We are not of our selues sufficient for any thing, but all our sufficiency is of God. And here only, the soule of man doth finde his, Ne plus vltra: Because, God onely is both Summum verum, who can fill the vnderstanding, and Summum Bonum, who can fill the affection. This is the second Metaphysicall consideration, which leadeth a man vnto the knowledge of God; the infinite auidity and extent of his appetite, which cannot be satisfied, but with an infinite obi••ct, which no∣thing is, but God.

CHAP. 3.

That, euery thing in Nature, hath a Cause of his Being. 2. That, nothing can be the Cause, of his owne Being. 3. That, among the Causes, there is one first, and supreme Cause, which is the Cause of all the rest. 4. That, this first, and supreme Cause, is nothing else, but God.

IN the two former Chapters, I haue vnfolded, two Metaphysi∣call considerations, from whence we may collect, That there is a God: Namely, the limited circumscription of all definite things; and the vnlimited dilatation of mens infinite appe∣tites. In these two next Chapters, I purpose to vnfold two Physicall Considerations, which import the same inference. The first is, a C••usa, that is, from the first cause of all naturall things. The second is, a Motu, that is, from the first Moouer of all moueable things. Both which do con∣clude, That there must needs be a God: as being indeed nothing else, but two Philosophicall termes, in sense aequipollent vnto the very name of God, and so oftentimes promiscuously vsed. For the first of which two heads, to wit, The first cause of all thing; I will fashion the argument into the forme of a Sorites; wherein we may ascend, by foure steppes, and degrees, vnto the very presence, and intuitiue vision of God. The first of them is this, That there is nothing in Nature, but it hath his Cause. The second, That nothing in Nature, is the Cause of it selfe. The third, That among all the Causes, there is one su∣preme and first Cause, which is the true Cause of all the rest. The fourth, That the first Cause of all things, is nothing else, but God. All which foure positions, are held and maintained, by a generall consent, both of Christians, and Hea∣thens, with great confidence and assurance: yea and that, not as questionable, or disputable problemes; but as most vndoubted, and irrefragable axioms.

For the first of which foure points,* 1.306 That there is nothing in Nature, but it hath his Cause: Plato directly affirmeth it, in expresse and plaine termes. Quic∣quid gignitur, ex aliqua natura necessariò gignitur. Whatsoeuer is begotten, is be∣gotten,

is begotten of something. Yea, and Tully confirmes it, almost in the same termes. Quicquid oritur,* 1.307 qualecun{que} est, causam habeat à natura, necesse est. Whatsoeuer thing is bred, of what sort soeuer, it must needs haue some cause of his breeding in nature.* 1.308 For, Ex nihilo nihil fieri, That nothing can be made of nothing, (as Aristotle testifieth) is a common Principle, among all the Philo∣sophers. Non enìm est, vel cogitari potest, vt sit aliquid, non per aliquid: sayth Anselmus: It cannot be imagined, that there should be any thing, which hath not his beginning and being, from something. For, Nullius rei, sine Causa, est ortus: saith Plutarch: There can be no being, where there is no Cause of being. And so likewise Tully. Nullius rei, Causa remota, reperiri potest origo. Take a∣way the Cause from any thing, and you take away the beginning of his being. And therefore, in another place, hee peremptorily pronounceth, That nothing can be made, without his Cause: Illud exploratum habeto, Nihil fieri posse, sine Causa. Which, Palingenius also expressly affirmeth,

—sine Causa, Esse potest nihil,* 1.309 aut fieri— Without a Cause, nor being, nor ought can haue beginning.

And thereupon, Tully derideth it for a grosse and a palpable absurdity, and a paradox against the very grounds of Philosophy, to affirme that there can any thing (without a Cause of it) be either made,* 1.310 or done. Nihil turpius Physico, quàm fieri, sine Causa, quicquam dicere: There can be no fouler error in a na∣turall Philosopher, then to affirme this, That any thing can be done or made, with∣out a Cause. And, it is a very foule error indeed. For, to say, that any thing is made without a Cause, is to say, it hath a being, and yet no power of being. For,* 1.311 Causa is defined to be, cuius vi, res est: A Cause is a power, whereby euery thing hath his being. And, as Plato affirmeth directly to that purpose: Causa est, qu•••• principaliter rem facit.

So that, for the truth of this first position, that euery thing in Nature hath a Cause of his being: you see it, to be cleerly put out of al question, by the consen∣ting testimonies of many learned men. Yea, & the most of them, no way inga∣ged in our Religion; but following only the light and guidance of Reason.

2 And therefore, let vs now proceede vnto the second; That nothing in nature can be the Cause of it selfe.* 1.312 Which is a position, as euidently true, as that Nothing can be the Maker of it selfe. For (as a Christian Philosopher hath very well collected) Quod facit, est actu; quod fit, non est actu. Non ma∣gis igitur potest aliquid facere seipsum,* 1.313 quàm simul & esse, & non esse. That which maketh any thing, must needes be actually in being: that which is but in making hath as yet, no actuall being. And therefore, it is as impossible for any thing to make it selfe, as it is at the same time, to haue both being, and no being. For, if it be impossible (as Aquinas affirmeth) Vt aliquid sit simul & actu, & potentia,* 1.314 secundùm idem: then it is much more impossible. Vt aliquid sit si∣mul & actu, & non actu; or that Aliquid simul & actu sit, & actu non sit.* 1.315 A necessary disconuenience,* 1.316 where any thing is allowed to bee cause of it selfe. And therefore Trismegistus sets it downe for a peremp∣tory position, that, Nihil, quod est genitum, a se genitum est. Yea, and Gregory Nyssen directly subscribeth vnto him: Nullam rem sui ip sius principium & cau∣sam esse. That nothing can be the beginning or cause of it selfe. Yea, and Palin∣genius,

genius also expressely confirmes it.

—nil se gignit,* 1.317 nil provenit a se: Nil{que} sui causa esse potest.— Ther's nothing, that it selfe begets, or from it selfe proceedes: Ther's nothing of it selfe is cause, nor ought that causelesse breeds.

The Reasons, wherefore nothing can be the cause of it selfe, be principally two. The first, because, euery cause is a seuerall thing, in nature from his owne effect. The Cause, and his Effect, are so by nature seuered, that they cannot bee con∣founded. For,* 1.318 Causa, & cuius est Causa, aliud est, saith Aristotle. The Cause is one thing, and that whereof it is a cause, is another. And so likewise Palingeni∣us, in the fore-alledged place.

—causa, necesse est,* 1.319 Vt suo ab effectu distet, diuersa{que} res sit, Needes must the cause be differing: And from th' effect a diuers thing.

Yea, and Plato likewise expressely confirmeth it: not resting in the bare po∣sition:* 1.320 but forming it into a very strong reason. Aliud, est causa. Ne{que} enìm causa, ipsius causae causa esse potest. Causam enìm efficientem esse constat. Ab effe∣ciente verò effictum fit, non efficiens. Aliud autem est efficiens, aliud effectum. Non ergò caus••, ipsius causa est; sed eius, quod ab ipsa efficitur. The cause is of one nature, and that, which is of the cause, is of another. For, the cause is not the cause of a cause, but of an effect: because the cause is an efficient: and an effici∣ent bringeth not forth another efficient, but onely an Effect. Now, an effect is al∣wayes a thing different from his efficient. Therefore, a cause is not a cause of a cause, but of an effect, which is made by that cause. This is the first reason, why nothing can be the cause of it selfe: because then, it should differ from it selfe, and should not be the same thing with it selfe.

The second Reason is: because the cause is alwayes before his effect.

Causam, causato, dicimus esse priùs. The cause, before the caused, we do euer asseuere to be.

Efficiens & effectum vnita quidem sunt invicem (saith Trismegistus) sic tamen,* 1.321 vt vnum praecedat, alterum verò sequatur: The efficient and effect are vnited together, by a mutuall dependance one vpon another: and yet is the one of them before the other.* 1.322 For (as Zacharias Mytilenensis obserueth) Oportet effecto∣rem antiquiorem esse effectu, & opificijs Opificem: siquidem, id quod fit, secun∣dum est ab co quod efficit. The Efficient is more ancient then his owne effect; and the Workeman, then his worke. For, whatsoeuer thing is made, must needes bee po∣steriour vnto his Maker. So likewise Palingenius:

Causa,* 1.323 suo effectu prior est, Authòr{que}, opere ipso. The cause doth alwayes his effect fore-goe: Before the Worke, the Workeman is, we know.

Yea, and so Aristotle himselfe. Effector opificium praecurrere debet. Nihil au∣tem, scipso,* 1.324 prius & antiquius est. The Workeman must needes bee more ancient then his Worke. But nothing can be more ancient then it selfe. And therefore nothing can be the worke of it selfe: and consequently, nothing the cause of it selfe. For (as Aquinas from this place very truely collecteth) Impossibile est,* 1.325 vt aliquid sit causa efficiens sui ipsius: quia sic esset prius seipso. It is meere∣ly

impossible, that any thing should be the cause of it selfe. For then it should bee before it selfe. Yea, and Aristotle againe presseth the same Reason; yea, and backeth it with another not inferior: that if any thing were the cause of it selfe, it should not onely be before it selfe, but it should also bee superior vnto it selfe. For,* 1.326 the cause is superior vnto his effect. Whereupon he there infer∣reth, that, Nequaquam conuenit, quòd aliquid nuncupetur, vel sit, causa sui: vt falsum est, quòd aliquid Prius, quà prius, sit posterius seipso; & superans, quate∣nus tale, sit superatum. It is vtterly absurd, that any thing should bee called, or be the cause of it owne selfe: as it is false, that any first thing, as it is first and priour, should be posterior to it selfe, and that the excelling, in as much as such, should be the excelled.

So that, nothing can be the cause of it selfe: no not euen God himselfe. who is the cause of all things. For, if hee were the cause of himselfe, then must hee bee also the Effect of himselfe; which destroyeth his Omni∣potency: hee must bee another from himselfe; which destroyeth his Vnity, and Immutability: he must bee after himselfe; which destroyeth his Aeter∣nity: Yea, he must be the Worke and Creature of himselfe; which destoy∣eth his Infinity. But none of all these can fall into God. For (as Hi∣lary truely noteth) Neque aliud est,* 1.327 ne{que} aliundè, quod Deus est. God can neither be another from himselfe; not of any other, but himselfe. Therefore God, though he be the cause of all other things; yet can he not be the cause of himselfe; for the fore-named inconueniences.

It cannot bee denied, but that God is of himselfe: but not, as of a cause. He is of himselfe:* 1.328 because his Beeing, and Himselfe, are indeede all one; his Essence, and his Esse, as Aquinas prooueth plainely. For, his subsisting of himselfe,* 1.329 is indeede, his very substance: as Eusebius proo∣ueth out of Dionysius. Non-genitus Deus, per se est: vt, ipsum non∣genitum esse, substantia sua est. The vnbegotten God subsisteth of himselfe; and his beeing vnbegotten, is indeed his very substance. And therefore, when Seneca saith,* 1.330 that, Deus ipse, se fecit: and Lactantius, that Deus est ex seipso procreatus: their meaning is no more but this; that hee is, ab alio nullo factus, aut procreatus. Hee is therefore sayde to bee the Maker and begetter of himselfe; because hee had none other maker, nor begetter but himselfe: no, nor indeede himselfe neither, but is altogether vnbegotten. And so,* 1.331 when God is called by Apollo, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; and by Sibylla, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: that is, one that is made of himselfe, and begotten of himselfe: the meaning is no more but this; that hee is, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: that is, Vnmade, and vnbegotten: as it followeth in the same place: Neither made nor begotten, of any other, no, nor of himselfe neither.

For (as Iustin Martyr truely writeth) hee is neither 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.332 nor 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: Hee is neither produced out of himselfe, nor yet out of any o∣ther thing but himselfe. He is neither ex se; nor ex alio; no nor ex nihilo; as Anselmus addeth: yea,* 1.333 and prooueth very wittily in his Monologie. Where he summeth vp all these things together, vnto the same reckoning, that I haue done before: that seeing he is not made, or begotten of any thing; that there∣fore he must needs be vnmade and vnbegotten.* 1.334 Quoniam igitur nec per se, nec

ex se, nec per aliud, nec ex alio; nec per nihil, nec ex nihilo, habet principium; n••llo modo habet principium sedne{que} finem habebit. Because (saith he) God hath his be∣ginning, neither by himselfe, nor of himselfe; neither by any other thing, nor of any other thing; neither by nothing, nor of nothing; it followeth therefore, that he hath no beginning: as he shall haue no end.

And the truth of this doctrine is expresly confirmed, euen by the very Heathen:* 1.335 who hold it for a Maxime, that God is vnbegotten. Quaecun{que} gig∣nuntur, procedunt ab altero: saith Trismegistus. Est ergo aliquis factor istorum; at{que} is ingenitus, vt genitis sit antiquior. Those things that are made, are made by some other: and therefore they needes must haue a Maker, who must needs himselfe be vnmade; because hee is more ancient then any thing that is made. Thales likewise confirmes the same vnto vs.* 1.336 Deus est antiquissimus: est enìm ingenitus. God must, of necessity, be the ancientest of all things; because hee is not made, or begotten of any thing. For, Ingenitus praevenit omnia genita: saith Philo Iudeus:* 1.337 That which is vnmade must needs be more ancient then those things that are made. Now, if nothing be without a Cause (as I haue proued, in the former paragraph,) and yet nothing can bee the cause of it selfe, (as I haue proued, in this;) then must it needes follow, that euery thing that is, hath the Cause of his being, without it selfe: sauing onely God himselfe, who hath no cause of his being: but is himselfe all one with his owne being:* 1.338 as life it selfe is all one with its owne liuing.* 1.339 For, God is nothing else but Life. Tu es ipsa vita, qua viuis; & Sapientia, qua sapis: saith Anselmus: Thou art the Life it selfe; whereby thou liuest; and the Wisedome it selfe, whereby thou knowest. And therefore, as Life is not the cause of its owne liuing, but the very same identity with its liuing: so God is not the Cause of his owne being, but one and the same thing with his being.

3 Now,* 1.340 if nothing can be the Cause of it selfe; then must euery thing needes haue a cause without it selfe, which is another thing from it selfe. For, we see by experience, that there dayly be produced, many strange and notable effects in the world: which all of them proceed not from one and the same cause: and yet none of them is brought forth without his cause. And there∣fore, it commeth, in this place, to be discussed; Whether, among those Causes, there be no first Cause at all, but an endlesse proceeding and going on, in infini∣tum? or, whether, among them, there be many first Causes? or, whether, there be but one which is Causa causarum, that is, The true Cause of all the rest, and whereof all other Causes are but mere Effects?

For the first of which three problemes, were may dayly see by sense, how one Cause produceth, and begetteth another; and that, another; and that, another: and, that euery one of these, though it bee a cause of some inferior effect; yet is it an effect of his owne superior Cause. As for example: the beating of the Sunne vpon the Earth, worketh in it an heate; that heate pro∣duceth many kindes of fruites out of it; those fruites beget nourishment, both in men and beasts; that nourishment begetteth that Semen genitale, whereby yong ones are begotten, in all their seuerall kindes: and so from generation, to generation, continued. Now, in this connexion and series of Causes, if we ascend vpward, we must needes either ascend in infinitum, with∣out all end: or else, in the end, to arise vnto some highest Cause; where wee

must be forc't to rest, and can goe no further: because there is no higher. To proceede in infinitum;* 1.341 that (as the Orator speaketh) is Auribus Animis{que} hominum absurdum: It is an absurd thing, both to the eares and mindes of all men of vnderstanding. And (as Anselmus pronounceth, euen in this very cas••) Hoc, nemo non putat obsurdum, n••si qui nimis est absurdus: There is no man, but thinkes this very absurd, if himselfe be not too grossely so. And therefore, Palingenius very truly affirmeth, that there cannot be, in Causes, an infinite progresse.

—Ergo infinitus In Causis processus erit?* 1.342 Minimè, sed oportet Nimirùm esse aliquid primum: a quo maximus ordo Causarum incipiat; qui a summo tendit ad imum. What then, in Causes can there be an infinite processe; And can no End bee found? Oh no. There can be nothing lesse. But there must needs some first maine Cause of all the rest be set: Which th' order great of Causes all beginning doth beget; And in which, Highest, Lowest, Midst, are all together mett.

Thus he reiecteth this innumerability of Causes, & fixeth them, at last, in some one, that is the first. So that (as Aristotle himselfe affirmeth) Est principium aliquod: ne{que} sunt infinitae entium causae:* 1.343 There is some first cause, & the causes of of things are not infinite. For if there should be, in causes, an infinite procee∣ding, and no first cause among them;* 1.344 then (as Aquinas very wittily collecteth) there could be no second neither, nor no third, and so none at all. For these numerall termes of First, Second, Third, and so forward, are not onely names of number, but also of order. So that, as nothing can be first, which hath any thing before it: so nothing can be second, which hath not a first before it; nor third, which hath not a second, and so on, in all the rest. From whence it must needes follow, that, if there be no first cause, there can be no second, nor third, and by consequence none at all. But wee see by experience, that there be second causes; and therefore by necessitie, there must needs be a first. We see there be inferior causes, and therefore there must needs be also some supe∣rior; and by consequence, from which they all descend, and vpon which they all depend. For (as Aristotle himselfe affirmeth) Necesse est, quod prius est, Causam esse eorum,* 1.345 quae post illud sunt. In the series of Causes, that which goes before, is alway••s the cause of all them that follow after.

But now, commeth the second Probleme, that, If there must needs be some supreme and first cause: Whether there be Many of them; or, Whether be but one? That there cannot be Many Firsts, the very name of First doth necessarily import. For, if any thing be either before that, or with that, which wee intend to be First; then cannot it truly be called the First. If any thing be before it; then is it not Primum, but Secundum. If any thing be with it; then it is not Pri∣us, but Simul. So that, if it be first, it can be no more but one. Besides, if there should be many firsts; there would follow another very great inconueni∣ence, For then (as Palingenius obserueth)

Tunc discordabunt inter se, ac magna ciebunt Praelia, tot Reges: quia Regni summa potestas Non patitur plures. Sic, mundus non erit vnus,

Nec pulcher: nam{que} est Ordo, pulcher••ima rerum. So many Kings would ne're accord, but raise a grieuous broyle, For supreme Power suffer's not that many rule the soyle: And so the World it selfe nor one, nor beautifull should be; As lacking Order: Order 'tis doth all things beautifie.

But, we euidently see, those things to be cleane contrary. We both see, that there is but one world, and not many: and yet, that it is full both of order and beauty. And therefore it cannot haue many first Causes in it: as Palinge∣nius, in another place, concludeth.

Quare,* 1.346 non possunt plura esse exordia rerum, Ast vnum; quia perfectum non amplius vno est: A quo, sicrerum aeternus ducitur ordo: Vt monade a prima, innumeri generantur. Wherefore, more first beginnings cannot be Of things that ord'red are, but one prime Cause: Because no more but One is perfectly; From which, all order tak's eternall Lawes. As from a single vnion, who sees not; Innumerable numbers are begot?

Yea, and Trismegistus, from the fore-named inconueniences, expresly con∣cludeth: Impossibile est,* 1.347 duos aut plures esse factores: ne{que} enìm ordo vnus pro∣baretur in multis. Praeterea, qui inter illos imbecillior esset, potentiori invide∣ret. It is impossible, that there should be two or more Creators: for one and the same order would not be approued of many. Besides, he that should be the wea∣ker and more impotent,* 1.348 would euer enuy the more potent and mighty. So Cyprian. Non potuerunt multa & diuersa rerum esse principia. Quia, nisi ad vnum oni∣nia respicerent, discordia & infinita cuncta volverentur in chaos. There could not be many and diuers first causes of Creatures. Because, vnlesse all had re∣spect and reference vnto one prime and supreme cause, all would returne into their fist Chaos.

Anselmus, our learned Primate, hath, of set purpose, disputed this point: and proued, by strength of reason, that, among all the Causes, which are in the world, though they be in number infinite, yet, that there can bee no moe of them,* 1.349 but onely one First. His reason is this following. Quicquid est, non nisi per aliquid est. Quod cum ita sit, aut est vnum, aut sunt plura, per quae sunt cuncta quae sunt. Quòd si sunt plura, tunc aut ipsa referun∣tur ad vnum aliquod, per quod sunt; aut eadem plura singula sunt per se; aut ipsa per se inuicem sunt. At, si plura ipsa sunt per vnum, iam non sunt omnia per plura, sed potiùs per illud vnum, per quod [illa] plura sunt. Si verò illa plura singula sunt per se, vti{que}, est vna aliqua vis vel natura existendi per se, quam habent, vt per se sint. Non est autem dubium, quòd per illud vnum sint, per quod habent, vt sint per se Veriùs ergò, per ipsum sunt cuncta, quàm per plura, quae sine illo vno esse non possunt. Vt verò plura per se inuicem sint, nulla patitur ratio: quoniam irrationalis cogitatio est, vt aliquares sit per illud, cui dat esse. The whole summe of whose reason, is, in effect, thus much: Whatsoeuer thing hath being, must needs haue it, by Something. And that thing, which giueth it being, must needs be, either some one speciall thing asunder, or else many things

together. If many things concurre, to giue being vnto any thing; then must they needs be such, as that either all of them haue their being, from some one other thing; or, that all of them haue their being, euery one of himselfe; or that all of them haue their being, euery one from another, by a kind of inter∣changeable and mutuall power. Now, if all those many-things do themselues receiue their being from any other One-thing; then are not all things made by those many-things; but rather by that one-thing, which made all those many∣things▪ Now againe, If all those many-things, haue euery one of them his being of it selfe;* 1.350 then must there needs be one certaine power or Nature of Selfe-being; by participation whereof, they all haue their being of themselues. And then, they must needs be, all of them, only by that One-thing, by which they do all receiue their selfe-being. Therefore, all things haue their being more truely from that one-thing, then from those supposed many-things, which themselues do receiue all their being from that One-thing. As for that other opinion; that many things should mutually giue, each to other, his being; that is cleane against all reason. For it is a senselesse imagination, that any thing should from that receiue his owne being, vnto which it selfe hath giuen a being. A very good, and a sound reason; though somewhat, perhaps, perplexed vnto the vulgar vnderstanding, through the often iteration, and implexed application of the termes, of One, and Many, and Being, and Selfe-being, so intricately wouen in∣to so many seuerall parts and branches of the sentence. But vnto those that be learned, it is cleare enough and liquid.

So that, though the Series of Causes be neuer so long, yet must we needes, at last come, by degrees, vnto some first; which is the true Cause of all the rest: and cannot be the effect of any: because all other are of it. For, as Pa∣lingenius writeth:

Ens primum, causa est, & non effectus: at imum Effectus tantùm debet,* 1.351 non causa, vocari. Quae media existunt, his nomen adhaeret vtrum{que}. In Nature, and in order of all things in their respect, The first and highest called is a Cause, and no Effect: The last and lowest an Effect: but not a Cause at all. But those that stand twixt first and last, thou mayst by both names call.

Both Causes, and Effects. Causes of their inferiors, and Effects of their supe∣riors. As in the Series of the Categories, the highest, is only a Genus, and not a Species; the lowest, is onely a Species, and not a Genus; the subalternes, are both, in their diuers relations; Genera, to their inferiors; and Species, to their superiors. But the highest can bee no Species. And, no more, can the first Cause, be the Effect of any other: because it is not vnder any forme or higher:* 1.352 but is the highest it selfe: and is Ingenitum, as Aristotle teacheth. And therefore Trismegistus expresly affirmeth, that, Ex vno principio cuncta pen∣dent. That all things haue their being,* 1.353 and beginning, of one thing. And that, in the same place, hee affirmeth, to be God. And this, Nyssen* 1.354 affirmeth to bee the receiued opinion of all men. Constat inter omnes, ex vna causa pendere res omnes. It is confessed of all men, that all things depend vpon the supreme Cause.

And therefore Aristotle biddeth vs, that, in searching of the causes, wee

should,* 1.355 semper exquirere summam causam: That we should neuer cease, vntill we are come, vnto the supreme and the first cause. And so Gregory likewise, vn∣to the same purpose: In omni causa, solus ipse intuendus est, qui principaliter est. In euery cause, he only is to be eyed, that is the principall, and principally is. For, vpon it do all the rest depend, as Iamblicus likewise expresly teacheth. Ab vna causa integra, tota dependet multitudo:* 1.356 Ad{que} summam causam, plures alia referuntur. The multitude of all inferior causes, depend vpon one intire su∣preme cause: and to that, which is the highest, are all the rest referred. Thus, the multitude of these inferior causes doe leade vs vnto one supreme and first Cause: which can be nothing else, but God: which is the summe and sub∣stance of the fourth, and last paragraph.

4 Now,* 1.357 if euery thing that is, must needs haue a Cause: and, if nothing can be the Cause of it selfe; and, if, among all the Causes, there can bee but one first, and principall Cause; which is the true Cause of all the rest, and of all those Effects which proceed from all of them: then must needes that first Cause be nothing else, but God. For, what can that be, which giueth being vnto all things,* 1.358 but onely God? whom Damascene calleth, Infinitum quod∣dam essentiae pelagus, that is, A boundlesse Ocean of pure and simple being▪ which out of his fulnesse, imparteth their being vnto all other things, as the Ocean doth his waters, vnto fountaines and riuers. For, if this first Cause, which hath giuen their being vnto all the innumerable things of this world, bee something else, and not God: then, what hath God done? or, what hath God to do? to whom hath God giuen any being? or, how can hee possibly be a God, which hath giuen being vnto nothing? or, how can that bee any other thing then God, which hath giuen their being vnto all things in the world? Therefore, whosoeuer yeeldeth, that there is a first cause, hee must needes yeeld, by consequence, that, that first cause is God.

And this we may see verified, by a generall consent, both of Christians, and Heathens. Of whom, some doe call this first Cause, by such titles and ap∣pellations, as doe necessarily insinuate, that it must needes be God. Some collect it, by such reasons, as doe necessarily conclude it. And some, in direct and expresse termes, affirme it. For the first of which three heads, to wit, the titles, that are giuen to this first Cause, Palingenius (as before I shewed) cal∣leth it, Ens primum:

Ens primum,* 1.359 causa est, & non Effectus.— The first Ens, is a pure meere cause, it cannot an Effect be call'd.

Both which two titles, are the titles of God: both to bee, Ens; and to bee, Primum. For first, for Ens. Demascene expresly affirmeth, that, of all Gods o∣ther names,* 1.360 the name of Ens, is most proper vnto him. Ex omnibus nominibus, quae Deo tribuuntur, nullum aequè proprium videtur, at{que} Entis nomen. Of all the names, which are attributed vnto God, there is none so proper, as is the name of his Essence, or Being: he being named from his owne Being, I am. And for Primum: euen Aristotle himselfe affirmeth, that God is, Et primum, & princi∣pale principum:* 1.361 both the first, and the principall principle of all things. Yea and, euen God himselfe chalengeth both the same titles directly vnto himselfe. For he calleth himselfe,* 1.362 I am: which is al one, with Ens: and he calleth himselfe, The Ancient of dayes:* 1.363 which is all one, with Primus. Nay, Primus, in expresse

termes: Primus,* 1.364 & novissimus, Ego sum. Yea, and Aristotle further affirmeth, this primum Ens, to be, Ipsum quid est:* 1.365 which is all one, with I am: and to be, not an Accidens, but a Substance. Now, Aristotle, in another place, giueth to this first and supreme Cause, another title, which is as proper vnto God, as either of the former.* 1.366 And that is, To haue his being of it selfe. Suprema causa, est Natura, per se: The highest cause, is such a kind of Nature, as hath his being of it selfe.* 1.367 Which, (as Origen teacheth) is proper and peculiar vnto God. Tu solus es, ••ui, quod es, a nullo datum est: Thou only hast a being, who hast not thy being giuen thee, by any other thing. So that, this title of, Natura per se, is the proper and peculiar title of God:* 1.368 as Trismegistus expresly affirmeth. Solus Deus, & meritò solus, in se, & a se, & circum se, totus est plenus, & perfectus: is{que}, sua firma est stabilitas. It is God (sayth he) and nothing else but God, that hath, both in himselfe, and of himselfe, and about himselfe, his fulnesse and per∣fection: and it is only he, that is his owne strength and stability. Yea, and Plato affirmeth of this,* 1.369 Natura per se; that, Ab eo, quod verè est, non abest, nec mo∣tus, nec vita, nec anima, nec sapientia: That thing which truely is, and hath his being of it selfe, hath also both his mouing, and his liuing, and his spirit, and his wisedome, and all, of himselfe. Which are the meere properties and attri∣butes of God:* 1.370 who (as the Scripture testifieth) Hath his life in himselfe. This is proper and peculiar vnto God, to be, Natura per se. All other things are, Natura, per aliud. There is none of all them, that haue either their liuing, or their mouing, or their breathing, or their being, of themselues; all which nominatìm, Plato ascribeth vnto the first Cause: but all these things they doe onely receiue from God, as the Scripture nominatìm affirmeth of all of them. In him they liue,* 1.371 and mooue, and haue their being. And he it is, that giueth vn∣to all,* 1.372 both life, and breath, and all things. Who (as Palingenius affirmeth,)

Est per se viuens, sapìens{que}, bonús{que}; Anullo accipiens quod habet,* 1.373 verùm omnia ab illo Accipiunt: igitur quod habent, amittere possunt, &c. He by himselfe alone doth liue, selfe wise, selfe good he is: From none receiuing what he hath: but all receiue of his: And therefore they, what••er'e they haue, haue power it to lees.

Trismegistus giueth it another title, which is likewise the proper title of God. For he calleth it,* 1.374 Vnum principium, ex quo cuncta dependent. And in another place (as though hee had not yet spoken enough) he correcteth himselfe. Ex vno cuncta pendentia, ex eo potiùs defluentía. Hee sayth, that there is but one principall Cause,* 1.375 vpon which all things doe depend; or rather indeed, from which all things do descend. Now, this can bee nothing else but God. For (as Anselmus very well collecteth) Id quod per se est,* 1.376 & per quod alia cuncta sunt, summum esse omnium existentium, ratio docet. That which hath his being of it selfe, and which giueth being vnto euery other thing, must needs be, euen in rea∣son, the highest and most principall thing that hath a being. Now, God hath his being onely of himselfe: and hee likewise giueth being, vnto euery other thing: for there is nothing in the world, which hath any being, but it hath it, by participation from him. So that, nothing indeede can primarily and pro∣perly be called Ens, but onely God. Euery other thing, as it hath his depen∣dence vpon this first Cause, so can it bee called Ens, but in an vnproper and

secondarie acceptance: as the Accidens, which hath his whole Esse in his Substance.

And this, euen Aristotle himselfe expresly confesseth. Caetera Entia dicuntur, eò quòd,* 1.377 Entis propriè dicti, quaedam, sunt Quantitates; quaedam, Qualitates; quaedam, Passiones; quaedam, aliud aliquid tale. The other Categories, are called Entia, Be∣ings; as being some, Quantities; some, Qualities, some, Passions; and the like; of that Ens, or Being, which is properly so called. And that is the prime and onely Praedicament of Substance. And so it is, betweene the first Cause, which hath his being of it selfe; and all other things, which haue their being from it. They be indeed, but as Accidents, in comparison of it. And their being, vnto his, is no better then nothing:* 1.378 as is plainely and directly affirmed by Origen. Et quae in Coelo sunt, & quae in Te••ra, quantum ad naturam Dei pertinet, non sunt. Neither the things in Earth, nor the things in Heauen, in comparison of God, haue any true being. And immediately aboue. Nam, & vmbra, ad compara∣tionem corporis, non est; & fumus, ad comparationem ignis, non est. The shadow being compared with the body, hath no being; and no more hath the smoake nei∣ther, being compared with his fire. So that, all other things, in comparison of God, are, but Fumus, & Vmbra. And therefore this Vnum Principium, ex quo cuncta dependent, is nothing else, but God. Whom, euen the Scriptures themselues call (as Dionysius Areopagita affirmeth) Causam omnium,* 1.379 & Prin∣cipium, & Essentiam, & Vitam. The cause, Beginning, Being, and the Life of all. Ex quo suspensa sunt omnia, saith Seneca:* 1.380 Of whom all things depend. Yea, and in the same place, he affirmeth, that onely of him, Sunt omnes causae causa∣rum. That God is such a cause, as produceth the causes of all other things. For, all other causes bring forth nothing but Effects: but God is such a cause, as bringeth forth causes.* 1.381 He is tale Principium, quod quidem movetur, vt rursus extet principium: as Trismegistus affirmeth. He is such a cause, as, by his mo∣uing, produceth another ••ause. For hee is, Causa Causarum: and no cause could haue his operation, as a cause, but onely by the power of his gracious assistance.* 1.382 It is onely Gods blessing,* 1.383 which giueth vnto all causes their pro∣per operation. The Heauens, which drop downe fatnesse vpon the Earth, doe it onely by the vertue of the blessing of God. For, it is onely hee, that sendeth a gracious raine vpon his inheritance, and refresheth the same, when it is wea∣ry. And so likewise,* 1.384 the Earth though it drinke in the raine, yet can it bring forth no fruite, vnlesse it receiue a blessing from God. And so likewise the Fa∣ther, which begetteth his Childe, receiueth all his generatiue power of God. Behold children are the inheritance of the Lord, and the fruite of the wombe is his reward:* 1.385 saith the Prophet Dauid. Yea, and Euripides likewise, vnto the same purpose:

A Dijs, dantur liberi mortalibus.* 1.386 Children are giuen to men: It's God that giueth them.

So that, not onely all things in the world, are the works of God, but also all the Causalitie, which is to be found in any of those things, is onely the Effect of God, the first cause. Nay, as Bradwardine very truely teacheth; All the Effects, which are wrought in things by their second causes, yet are more imme∣diatly wrought by God, who is the first cause, then they be by their nearest causes

themselues.* 1.387 Nulla res potest aliquid facere, sine Deo. Et nulla res potest aliquid sacere, nisi Deus, per se, & immediatè faciat illud idem; imò, & immediatiùs, quolibet alio faciente. And thus the very titles, which Authors haue giuen vn∣to the first cause, doe necessarily imply that it must needs be God.

But yet,* 1.388 diuers of them goe further, and collect the very same, by way of Ar∣gument. Damascen proueth, that the first cause of things, must needs be God, by this Sorites. Quae mutabilia sunt, etiam creata sunt. Quae autem creata sunt, dubium non est, quìna quopiam creata sunt. Conditorem porrò increatum esse, necesse est. Nam si ipse quo{que} creatus est, a quopiam quo{que} creatus est. ld{que} tantisper locum habebit, quòad ad aliquid minimè creatum pervenerimu••. Increatus est ergò summus ille opifex, at{que} immutabilis. Hoc autem, quid aliud esse qu••at, quàm Deus? Whatsoeuer things are mutable [as are all, that be sensible] they must needs haue beene created. Whatsoeuer is created, is created of some Creator. That Creator himselfe must needs be vncreated. Or, if he also be created, hee must be created by something. And this holdes on, so long, vntill wee come at last vnto something vncreated. Therefore that great work-man, that is the maker of all things, must needs himselfe be both vncreated, and immutable. Now what can that be else, but onely God himselfe? This is Damascenes reason: whereby hee doth conclude, that the first cause of all things, can be nothing else,* 1.389 but God. Trismegistus, in like sort, doth presse the very same Argu∣ment, in matter fully agreeing, though in words somewhat differing. Quae sensu percipiuntur, facta sunt omnia; Genita non a seipsis, sed fiunt ab altero. Est ergò aliquis factor istorum, at{que} is ingenitus, vt genitis sit antiquio••. Those things that are subiect vnto sense, haue all of them beene made. Those things that are made, haue not beene made of themselues, but of something else. And therefore, they must needes haue had some maker. And hee must needs be vnmade: because hee is more ancient, then any thing that is made. He there proceedeth further, disputing much, both of the Power, and Wisdome, and Goodnesse, of this First cause, and Creator: and of his Dominion ouer euery creature: being much sollicitous, by what name he should call him: whether by the name of God, or of Maker, or of Father, or of all these three together? And hee resolueth his owne doubt: that hee may worthily be called, Deus, propter potentiam; Factor, propter actum; and Pater, propter bonum: A God for his power; a Creator, for his worke; and a Father, for his goodnesse. This is that Heathen mans discourse, vpon the first cause. And Seneca hee bringeth in, another Argument, vnto the same effect: which, though in the passage it be somewhat different; yet, in the conclusion, it fully agreeth with it. For he reckoneth vp fiue differing causes of the world.* 1.390 Id ex quo, Id a quo, Id in quo, Id ad quod, Id propter quod: that is, The Matter, the Efficient, the Forme, the Exemplar, and the End. But the power of all these he ascribes vnto the Efficient: making it, in effect, the onely true cause: and all the rest, to be ra∣ther as instruments vnto it, then Concauses with it. Quae nunc retuli, non sunt multae & singulae Causae, sed ex vna pendent; ex ea quae facit. It is onely the Efficient, whereupon they all depend. The Efficient is that, which praepareth the Matter, imposeth the Forme, conceiueth the Patterne, and propoundeth the End. And this Efficient of the world, he expresly affirmeth, to be nothing else, but God. Faciens hic, Deus est. And thus, they doe not onely insinuate,

The first Cause to bee God: but also, by Argument, they indeauour to proue it.

Yea and diuers of them, in expresse termes, affirme it: which is our third head.* 1.391 Seneca, whom I last named, shall bee the first of them. Hee saith ex∣presly of God, that,* 1.392 Ille est prima omnium Causa, ex qua caeterae pendent. God is the first and cheifest Cause of all things, whereupon they all do hang. And a∣gaine, in another place. Quaerimus quae sit Causa? Ratio faciens, id est, Deus. Do we inquire what is the Cause? Euen the Reasonable Spirit; that maketh it. And that Reason or Spirit,* 1.393 is God. The second is Trismegistus, whom I named next before him: who saith, that, that Efficient which is more ancient then any Effect, is nothing else but God. Efficiens & Effectum, vnita quidem sunt in∣uicem: sic tamen, vt vnum praecedat, alterum verò sequatur. Praecedens sanè Deus Essiciens: sequens verò, id quod est effectum. The Cause and his effect are alwayes vnited: yet so, that the one of them goeth before, and the other follow∣eth after. The Cause which goeth before, is nothing else but God: the thing which followeth after, is the Effect of that Cause. Yea, and in another place, he defineth God to be nothing else, but onely a generall Cause of all things. Deus profectò mens non est;* 1.394 at verò, vt sit mens, Causa est: nec spiritus; sed causa, qua spiritus extat: nec lumen; sed causa, qua lumen existit. God is not vnderstanding; but the cause of Vnderstanding.* 1.395 [It is the inspiration of the Almighty that giueth vnderstanding] God is not a spirit, but the Cause of all spirits;* 1.396 [The Father of Spirits] God is not a light, but the Cause of all light. [The Father of Lights.] So that, in his verdict, this first and chiefest Cause, is nothing else but God.* 1.397 Whom, in another place, he calleth, Bonum efficiens, Bonafaciens omnia: That good Efficient Cause, which bringeth forth all good Effects.* 1.398 The third of them, is Aristotle; whom I named before them both: who expresly affirmeth, that Deus est rebus omnibus & Causa, & Principium: that,* 1.399 God, is vnto all things, both a Beginner, and a Cause. Yea, and in another place, hee affirmeth,* 1.400 that he is, causa, quae continet omnia: making him, not one∣ly the first and cheifest Cause,* 1.401 but also, the generall cause of all thing. The fourth is Pythagoras;* 1.402 who calleth God directly, causam & efficientem & for∣mantem. Both the Efficient, & the Forming cause. The fifth is, Macrobius: who writeth thus of God:* 1.403 That Deus, qui prima causa & est & vocatur, vnus, omnium quae sunt, quae{que} videntur esse, princeps, & origo est. God, who is both called the first cause, and is so indeed; he is, both the Ruler, and Maker of all things. Vnto which fiue fore-named, I will onely adde a sixt. And that is Pindarus:* 1.404 who directly affirmeth, that God is the Efficient, and Author of all things. Omni rei Deum Authorem superponere oportet: Wee must acknow∣ledge God to be the Author of all things. The Greeke word is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. And thus (as you see) the yeelding of a first Cause, (which wee must yeeld of necessity) doth forcibly draw vs on, to the yeelding of a Deitie.

CHAP. 4.

That these sensible and second motions, direct vs vnto a first. 2. That a first motion, doth necessarily imply, a first Mouer. 3. That this first Mouer, is the cause of all the motions in the World. 4. And, that therefore, this first Mouer, is nothing else, but God.

I Haue already dispatched the first of those two physical conside∣rations, which I purposely selected, to declare, There is a God: taken from the first Cause, and Causer of all naturall things. I am now come to the second: (which is taken from the first Mo∣tion, and Moouer, of all moueable things. Wherein, I may bee the shorter, because this Argument runneth almost in the same tract, which was traced by the former. But it is an Argument, so much insisted on, both by Philosophers and Diuines, that I know not any other, that is either vrged oftener, or inforced further. And therefore, for the better vnderstanding of our order in proceeding, I will contriue this Argument, into this gradation. Fir•••• ••hat second motions direct vs, by necessitie, vnto a first. Secondly, that this First Motion, doth leade vs yet further, vnto a first Mouer. Thirdly, that this first Mouer is the onely cause, of all those seuerall Motions, that are found in all things. And, fourthly, that therefore this first Mouer, can be no∣thing else; but God.

For the first of those foure Steppes;* 1.405 That these second and inferior Moti∣ons, do leade vs by degrees, vnto one first and supreme Motion; Plato proueth by this reason.* 1.406 Quandò aliud ab alio movetur, illúd{que} rursum semper ab alio▪ eritnè in talibus aliquid, quod primò mouetur? At, quomodò id, cùm ab aliquo moveatur, eorum quae moventur primum erit? Certè, impossibile id est. Sed quan∣dò aliquid, seipsum mouens, aliud quo{que} mouebit, illúd{que} aliud, & sic deinceps plurima movebuntur; an aliud totius motus principium erit, quàm mutatio eius quod seipsum mouet? When as one thing is moued by another, and that still by another, and so in infinitum; can there then be any thing, that hath a first mo∣tion? [no, surely, there cannot.] For how can that be the first moouing of all o∣ther, which it selfe is moued by another? This is a thing vnpossible. But, if wee grant, that there is something, which is moued onely by it selfe, and not by any o∣ther thing; if that moue another thìng, and that another, and so there bee many things moued in their order; then, the first beginning of all those motions so mo∣ued by others, can be nothing else, but onely the Impulsion of that one first Mo∣uer, which mooueth of himselfe. Out of which discourse of Plato, wee may ga∣ther these two Aphorismes. First, that, if there should be in those motions, which are moued by another, an infinite progresse, there could none of them be first. Secondly, that, we must needs come, in the end, vnto some such thing, as is mo∣ued onely of it selfe, and not of any other thing. And thirdly, that, this on•• thing, which thus mooueth of it selfe, is the true cause of motion, vnto euery o∣ther thing.

Aristotle, in like manner, though, in many other points dissenting from his Maister; yet, in this point of Motion, he consenteth fully with him: yea, & pres∣seth the same reason, almost in the same forme. Omne quod mouetur, ab aliquo moueri necesse est.* 1.407 Et, aut ab eo quod mouetur ab alio, aut ab eo quod non mouetur ab alio. Si ab eo mouetur, quod ab alio motu cietur, mouens aliquod esse primum, quod ab alio non mouetur, necesse est. Fieri enìm non potest, vt in infinitum profi∣ciscatur id, quod mouet, at{que} mouetur ab alio: Quippe, cùm infinitorum nihil sit primum. Whatsoeuer thing is mooued, must needes be mooued of something; and that thing which moueth it, must needes it selfe be moued, either of ano∣ther,

or not of another. If it be mooued by such a thing as is mooued of ano∣ther, we must come, by necessity, vnto a first moouer, which is not mooued by any other. For it is vnpossible, to goe still on for euer, in those things that are moued by another. Because, in those things that are infinite, there can none of them be first. And therefore, where there is granted to be any first thing, there cannot be held to be an infinite proceeding.

Yea and againe, a little after. Fieri non potest, vt id, quo motus affertur, mo∣veat abs{que} eo quod movet a seipso. It cannot be, that that which is moued by an∣other, should be moued but by that which is moued by it selfe. And hee giueth these examples. Baculus mouet lapidem, & mouetur a manu, quae ab homine mouetur. The Staffe moues the stone, the hand moues the staffe, the man moues the hand: and the man is moued (in some sort) of himselfe. For (as the Ro∣mane Orator affirmeth) Quod animal est,* 1.408 motu mouetur interiore, & suo. Euery liuing thing is moued, by an internal motion of his owne. So that the summe of those two fore-named Reasons, which I haue aboue set downe in their Au∣thors owne words, is (in effect) thus much. That, Whatsoeuer thing is moued must needs be moued by something: and that thing, must either be moued by it selfe, or by some other thing. By it selfe can no inferior or second thing be moued, but alwayes by some former and superior. For, as it subsisteth not by it selfe, but by another; so moueth it also, not it selfe, but by another. Motum enìm suum non sibi debet,* 1.409 sed Authori, (saith Hilarie.) It oweth all his motion, not vnto his owne power, but to his Author and first Mouer. So that no infe∣rior thing is moued of it selfe, but onely by the power of the supreme and first Mouer. Now, if all these sensible and inferior things be moued of some other (as wee plainly see they are,) then may we, by them, ascend, as by steppes and degrees, from the lower to the higher, vntill we come at last, vnto that first Mouer. For, in those things that are moued by another, wee cannot proceede in infinitum; but must, at last, stay in one, which is the Mouer of all the other and yet it selfe is moued by none other, but hath both his motion, and his be∣ing, of himselfe. And therefore must needs be God. This is the whole summe a••d effect of that Argument. Whereby this first point is euidently cleered: That the contemplation of these secondarie motions, doe leade vs, by necessitie, vnto a first.* 1.410 Yea (and as Aquinas very wittily obserueth, as well in Motions as in causes) There can be no Second, if there be no First; no inferior, if there be no superior; no posterior, if no prior; nay, no last, if no first. And this holdeth, not onely in these relatiue denominations, but also in the true ex∣istence of the very things themselues. So that, the motions of these inferior Bodies, which we see, by sense, must leade vs, of necessitie, either to grant a first Mouer: who is the Author of all the motion in the world: and therefore must needs be God: or else, to yeeld, in motion, an infinite pro∣ceeding: which is absurd, euen to Reason, and vtterly destroyeth all order in things: or else, to hold, that There is no motion at all; as Melissus did, Motum non esse, sed videri esse: Which is the greatest absurditie of all. An absurditie so grosse,* 1.411 as is confuted, euen by sense. As Diogenes very wit∣tily proued, against a Philosopher, maintayning that error, that There was no motion. Behind whom he slily comming, whipt him sodainely about the Legges. And then, whilest hee was running, he scornefully asked him,

Whether now hee thought there were any motion? Not esteeming him worthy to be confuted by reason, but onely to be derided by that sensible demonstration.* 1.412 For (as Iosephus very well obserueth to this purpose) Insen satos, decet, non verbis, sed operibus arguere: or rather indeed, verberibus, as Diogen••s did: The best kinde of arguing with mad men, is, with a word and a blow; not with reason, but with stripes. And yet, euen this grosse absurditie would follow, vnlesse, from these secondarie motions, wee should arise vnto some first. For, Si primum nihil est, omninò causa nulla est, saith Aristotle, If there be no first cause,* 1.413 there can be no cause at all. And so, If there be no first mo∣tion, there can be no motion. Which, sense sheweth to be false. And if there be any second motion, there must needs be a first. This, Reason sheweth to be true.* 1.414 And therefore, for this first point, I conclude it with Aristotle, that, Si media sunt, necesse est finem esse. If there be any meane motion, there must needs be an end of them.* 1.415 And if an end, then a beginning. Ne{que} enìm infinitus est a••••quis motus, sed cuius{que} finis: saith he, in another place: There is no motion so infinite, but, in the end, it hath an end; and consequently, a beginning. For, as the Poet hath truly obserued,

—Finis{que} ab Origine pendet.* 1.416 This is a Rule, That euery End, On some Beginning must depend.

2 Let vs therefore now ascend,* 1.417 from the first step, vnto the second; that, If there be any first motion, then must there needs be a first Mouer, which moueth onely of himselfe, and not by any other. For, in euery motion there bee three things to be considered: The Mouer, The Motion, and The thing mo∣ued: And these three things are neuer confounded, though they euer be con∣ioyned. But, as the Motion is one thing, and the Moued another; so is it likewise betweene the Moued, and the Mouer. For (as Picus Mirandula ob∣serueth, very truely) In quolibet moto,* 1.418 Motor est alius are mobili. In euery motion, the Mouer is distinguished from the thing that is moued. Yea, and Aristotle himselfe, vnto the same purpose. Quod mouet, & quod mouetur, di∣uisum esse videtur.* 1.419 That which moueth, and that which is moued, are a diuers thing, and plainly diuided.

But yet, though these three be ioyned all together; yet is the Mouer, in or∣der, before either of the other, euen by the law of Nature. The Motion can∣not be before the thing moued; nor yet the thing moued before the Mouer of it: but alwayes, the thing moued is before his motion; and alwayes the Mo∣uer before either of them. For, as Philo Iudaeus affirmeth of the Motion; that Fieri non potest,* 1.420 vt motus rem motam praecesserit: It cannot be, that any moti∣on be, before the thing moued, be. And so Aristotle affirmeth also of the Mo∣uer; that,* 1.421 Motor rem mobilem praecurrere debet. The Mouer must forego the thing moued. Now, if the Mouer be distinguished both from the motion it selfe, and from the thing that is moued; yea and so distinguished, that it is before them both: then, as euery Effect doth argue his Cause; so doth euery motion, argue his Mouer: and consequently the first motion, his first Mo∣uer: Whom, though we doe not see with the Eyes of the body; yet may we easily collect by Reason,* 1.422 the Eye of the minde. To illustrate this point, by that familiar comparison, which the Orator pointeth at, in explication of this Reason. We see, by experience, in a Clocke (which is, as at were, an

Artificiall Heauen, measuring out vnto vs the diuisions of time) that euery Wheele is moued euery one of them by another, vntill at last we be brought vnto the waight it selfe, which moues them all together. Whither when we be come, we can proceede no further by sense; and therefore, must col∣lect the rest by reason. Now, Reason plainely teacheth vs, that though the waight doe moue all the wheeles of it selfe; yet that it could not tie it selfe vnto the line: but that, that must needs be done, by some other thing. And that therefore, there must needs haue beene some Author, and contriuer of that cunning peece of worke: who first conceiued in himselfe, by a mentall Idea, the whole reason and conueiance of all these seuerall motions; and then accordingly disposed all the wheeles, and waights, into their seuerall places. So that, the motion of the wheeles, in euery Clock, doth manifestly tell vs, that there must needs haue beene an Author of that curious worke: whose artificiall workemanship and contriuing, is that, which hath giuen, vnto all those wheeles, their motion. And, as it is in a Clocke (which I called before an Artificiall Heauen, because it measureth vnto vs the diuisi∣ons of time) so is it also in the Heauens themselues: which may as fitly be called a naturall Clock, for their measuring, by their motions, the distincti∣on of time. We see, by experience, in them, that all these inferior and elemen∣tarie Bodies, doe receiue their motions from the Heauens, their superiors: and so likewise, euen in the Heauens themselues, that the lower is still mo∣ued by his next higher, vntill wee come, by degrees, vnto the highest of all, called Primum mobile; that is, the first moueable body, which moueth all the rest. Now, when wee are come thither, sense can leade vs no further. But yet Reason can. For then, we must collect, that as the wheeles in a Clock could not set themselues on mouing; but that this must needs be the worke of their Maker: so likewise the Heauens, though they moue without all ceasing; yet haue not taken vnto themselues their motion, but haue had it giuen them,* 1.423 by their Author and Mouer. For, as Aristotle truely teacheth, Si motio cietur, necesse est, praeesse motorem aliquem: Wheresoeuer there is motion, there must needes haue beene some Mouer before, and some Modera∣tor and guider of that motion, from whom, at the first, it receiued his be∣ginning. So that, Primum Mobile doth necessarily imply, that there is a Pri∣mus Motor; which must needs be God: be hee who, or what soeuer. For, Quodnam erit,* 1.424 obsecro, (saith Nazianzene) a quo vniuersum hoc mouebitur? Quidnam illud vicissìm mouebit? Quid item illud? Id{que} adeò in infinitum? What, I pray you, is that which doth moue the whole world? What is that, which moueth it? And what againe that, which moueth it? and so in infinitum? Euen Aristotle himselfe resolueth that Quaestion:* 1.425 that Omne quod mouetur, a supe∣riore mouetur: Whatsoeuer thing is moued, is moued by some superior Mouer. From whence it must needs follow, that euen Primum Mobile it selfe, which the Orator calleth,* 1.426 Extremam oram, & determinationem mundi, that is; The furthest coast, and frontier of the world: though it be, among the Heauens, the highest of all other, yea, and that, which moueth them all together; yet hath it, aboue it, a superior mouer, by whom it selfe is moued: Which can be nothing else, but God. And thus, the first Mouer may necessarily be ga∣thered out of the first motion, euen by consequence of Reason. Yea, and

so it is likewise,* 1.427 euen by Aristotle himselfe. Si quid ab eo mouetur, quod ab alio motucietur, mouens aliquod esse primum, quod ab alio non mouetur, necesse est. If anything bee moued, by that which is moued of another, it will bring vs, at the last, vnto a first Moouer, which mooueth onely of it selfe, and not by any other

3 Let vs now come to the third steppe:* 1.428 that, If there be a first Mouer; as hath formerly beene proued; and, if hee haue the fountaine of all true mo∣tion in himselfe; as is generally confessed; that then, hee must needes be the first Cause of motion, vnto euery other thing. And this is likewise testified, by the principall Philosophers,* 1.429 with an vniforme consent. Plato saith directly, that, Initium omnium motionum, primum{que} motum, illum, fateri necesse est, quo quid seipsum mouet. Et, hanc esse antiquissimam omnium, potentissimam{que} motionem. We must needes confesse, that the very first motion and beginning of all motions, is onely that motion, whereby a thing moueth it selfe. This is both the most ancient, and the most potent motion. Now, there is nothing in the world, that moueth of it selfe, but onely God himselfe. No not, euen the soule of any liuing thing,* 1.430 if wee will properly speake. For, though it bee de∣fined to be, Actus primus corporis naturalis, that is, the very first act of a na∣turall Body: yet must that bee vnderstood, but onely of his owne body: yea, and that onely, but in respect of our sense. That is therefore sayd to bee, Actus primus; because there is not euident any sensible mouer of it, as there is in bodies: but in respect of this inuisible first Mouer (which is its Author and Creator) it is but Actus secundarius. Not a thing that is mooued by his owne proper power, but onely by a power receiued from another, namely from this first Mouer, who is Actus prìmus indeed, and in whom the Soule hath onely both his Liuing,* 1.431 Mouing, and Being. And so is it likewise in euery other thing. There is no motion in any thing, but it floweth from this first Mouer, as from his first fountaine: as Tully affirmeth in expresse and plaine termes.* 1.432 Quod seipsum mouet, caeteris quae mouentur fons est, & principium mo∣uendi: That which mooueth of it selfe, is the fountaine of motion vnto all other things.

So Aristotle likewise,* 1.433 almost in the same words. Id, principium aliarum motionum est, quod sibi motum affert. That is the Beginner of other motions, that is the Giuer of motion to it selfe. And againe, in another place: Fier•• non potest,* 1.434 vt id, quo motus affertur, moueat, abs{que} eo quod mouet a seipso. There is nothing can be moued, but only by that, which is moued by it selfe: meaning, as by the first Cause: though not, as by the Next. And againe, in an other place, he giueth direct instance, that, In Medijs, that is, in second and subalter••e motions; that which is inferior, is alwayes mooued by his next superior; and that,* 1.435 by his next; and that therefore all the rest must be moued by the first, from the highest vnto the lowest. Mediorum, quorum, extra, aliquid primum & vlti∣mum est, necesse est, quod prius est, Causam esse eorum, quae post illud sunt: In those middle motions, which haue any first, the former is alwayes the Cause of the latter: and so by consequent, The first, of all the rest. And this, in another place,* 1.436 hee directly affirmeth to be God. Natura diuina, de simplici quodam rei primae motu, virtutem proximis largitur: at{que}, de ijs iterum, ad remotiorae; quoàd per vniuersum trans••at. The diuine Nature, from a certain simple motion

of the first thing, giueth a mouing virtue to the next; and so, by them, vnto the more remote, vntill it haue pierced and passed throughout all the whole world. For, as Plutarch well obserueth,* 1.437 to this purpose: though, Quae{que} res suo mouetur modo: yet, vnicum est, quod mouet omnia. Though euery thing moue, after his owne proper manner; yet they all of them are moued, by one first and generall Mouer.

A••d that wee should not thinke, that there can be in motions a perpetual ascent, which can neuer finde an end; that Aristotle reiecteth, as an absurd conceit. Non est enim generatio to infinita sursum versùs. And so not Motio nei∣ther. But,* 1.438 as in another place hee directly affirmeth, Wee must needs, at the last, ascend vp vnto some first. Non in infinitum hoc proficiscitur, sed stabit tandem alicubi; at{que} er••t quidpiam, quod primò Causa erit vt omnia mo∣ueantur.* 1.439 We cannot proceede vnto infinitie in Motion: but wee must stay our selues at last, and come vnto some one thing, which is the first Cause of the moti∣on of all things. And this (as in another place hee affirmeth) is not onely his owne particular opinion, dissenting, vpon sigularitie, from others; but the generall Tenet, of all the Philosophers. Consid••rare oportet, vtrùm sit causa motus & principium,* 1.440 id, quod motu seipsum ciet; an id, quod ab alio ••gitatur? Illud, omnes vt••{que} ponent. He moueth the question, Whether of the twaine is the beginning of motion? That, which moueth of his owne power; or, That, which is moued of another? And he resolueth it, that, All men doe agree vpon the former.

So that, by the generall Consent of all men, it appeareth, that the first begin∣ning of all motion, must be by some such Mouer, as is not moued by any other: but hath all the power of motion shut vp in his owne power. And that therefore, this First mouer must needs be God, and none other. Which is the forth steppe of this Chapter.

4 For,* 1.441 if these secondarie and lower motions doe leade vs vp vnto a higher: and those vnto an higher, vntill at last wee ascend vnto some highest Mouer; which is the Cause of motion vnto all the lower: then, what can this highest Mouer be else, which moueth all other things, but onely God himselfe? This Tullie, in plaine and expresse termes, affirmeth: where he putteth both those properties, which before I haue named, into the very definition of God; that he is,* 1.442 both Omnia mouens, and Ipse praeditus motu sempiterno. Hee is both the Author of motion vnto all other things, and the Cause of motion in himselfe. Both these hee affirmeth to be the properties of God. And so Aristotle affir∣meth, that Locall motion,* 1.443 in what body soeuer, doth onely proceed from some diuine Power. Si nam{que} Latio Lationis Causa erit, illam quo{que} oportebit aliorum gratia esse. Quare, cùm non ••it processus in infinitum, finis omnis La∣tionis, erit diuinorum corporum aliquod, quae in Coelo feruntur. If one Local motion should be the cause of another; then it also should be caused and be from others, and for others sake. Wherefore, seeing there is no infinite progresse in things moueable; the end of all Lation (or Local motion) must be some one of those heauenly Bodies, which are carried about. Yea, and that wee should not thinke, that, by those Diuine Bodies, he meaneth any of the Starres: in another place he affirmeth,* 1.444 that this first and supreme Mouer, is a thing, aboue all sense; whereas all the Sarres are sensible. For, si non erunt alia, praeter sensibi∣lia

(saith he) non erit principium, nec ordo, nec generatio; sed semper principij principium: If there should be no other then sensible things; then should there be no beginning, nor order, nor generation of things: but alwayes a Prin∣ciple to euery Principle. Whereby hee infinuateth, that the first and supreme Mouer, is not of a sensible, but of a diuine, and a spirituall Nature. Yea, and Tully expresly affirmeth; that it is God, which giueth motion, euen vnto the very Heauens. Dedit autem Diuinis, duo genera motus,* 1.445 &c. He hath giuen to the Heauenly bodies,* 1.446 two kinds of Motions, &c. Yea, and Aristotle againe in ano∣ther place, compareth God vnto those Players with Puppets, that by the pul∣ling of one string, can set the whole Engine, and euery part of it, on mouing. Which Anaxagoras plainely acknowledgeth, when hee maketh his Mens,* 1.447 to be Principium motus:* 1.448 by which word,* 1.449 hee meaneth nothing else but God. Mens ením est Deus: saith Trismegistus. God, which is Mens, is the beginning of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 motion. And, as Zeno likewise expresly affirmeth, this title of Mens, is but the Philosophers name and appellation of God. Deum vnum esse, ipsúmque Mentem appellari. There is but one God, and he is called Mens. So that, when Anaxagoras called this first Mouer, Mens; his meaning, by Mens, is nothing else, but Deus. And, that wee impose not a forced sense, vpon that word, by other mens expositions; the same may bee gathered, euen out of his owne writings: and that, by two substantiall reasons. First, by those titles and ap∣pellations, which hee bestoweth vpon it: and then, by those workes, which hee ascribeth vnto it. Both which, are peculiar and proper vnto God. The titles, which hee bestoweth vpon his mens, be these Mentem,* 1.450 esse Principium omnium, solám{que}, rerum omnium, ipsam esse simplicem, & non mistam, & pu∣ram esse sinceram{que}. At{que} eidem Principio haec vtra{que} conuenire, Cognitionem, & motum; Vniuersum{que} mentem hanc mouisse. This mens (saith hee) was the first Beginning of all things, being it selfe most simple, and without any mix∣ture, most pure, and most sincere. And hauing, in it selfe, the true and reall pos∣session, not onely of knowledge, but also of motion: yea, and that all the whole world is moued by this minde, and by this Spirit. Now, these bee the peculiar properties of God: in whom (as the Apostle testifieth) are all the treasures both of knowledge, and Wisedome. Yea,* 1.451 and of motion too: for,* 1.452 in him we both liue, and moue, and haue our being. So that, by this description, his mens must needes be God. Yea and so is it likewise, by his ascription too. For hee as∣cribeth vnto this mens, the very making of the world: which is the worke of none other, but onely of God. Cùm omnia simul essent,* 1.453 at{que} infinito tempore quiscerent; mens mouit, ac segregauit. When as all things had lyen quiet, for an infinite space together, it was mens that first moued and ordered them asun∣der: alluding vnto that confused Chaos, wherein, as the Poet speaketh, there were,

Non benè iunctarum discordia semina rerum,* 1.454 There disagreeing seeds were clearely seene, Of things which had not well conioyned bene.

Now, this was the proper worke of God. Yea, and this was the proper Spi∣rit of God, that did it: as euen Plutarch, in plaine and expresse words, recor∣deth it. Anaxagoras dixit, initio constitisse corpora, Dei autem mentem ea digessisse,* 1.455 at{que} omnium rerum ortus effecisse; Anaxagoras sayd, that there were

bodies in the first beginning; but that the minde and hand of God digested and ordered them, and effected the originall of all things. Marke, Dei mentem. This m••ns, the Primus motor, which first gaue things their being, and reduced them into order, was nothing else, but Dei mens, The wisdome, and the Spirit of God:* 1.456 who (as it is also testified in the holy Scripture) when hee prepared the heauens, was ther••, and when he set the compasse vpon the deep••. Yea, and this was not the singular opinion of onely Anaxagoras; but the common o∣pinion of the most of the Philosophers. Yea, and of the Poets, too. Virgil sayth in expresse termes, that the first mouer of the world, was onely this Mens:

Mens agitat molem,* 1.457 & magno se corpore miscet.

Yea, and that wee should vnderstand, that vnder the name of mens, hee vn∣derstandeth nothing, but the Creator of the world, hee addeth in the next words:

Indè homìnum, pecudúm{que} genus, vitae{que} volantum. That massy Chaos bodies huge was moued by this Mens. And men, Beasts, Birds, and Creatures all forthwith proceeded thence.

All which workes, in another place, hee expresly attributeth vnto God, vnder his owne expresse name. He is the mouer of the World, he is the maker, both of men, and beasts, and birds.

—Deum nam{que} ire per omnes* 1.458 Terr••s{que} tractús{que} maris, calúm{que} profundum. Hìn•• p••cudes, armenta, viros, genus omne ferarum. &c. God walketh through the World, in euery Coast, And goes the winding Seas Tract vttermost: Yea, and the most high Heau'ns. From him, all liuing Both men, and Beasts receiue their life, and being.

Thus, that which before hee shadowed, vnder the name of mens, hee plainely now expresseth, vnder the name of God: making him the first mouer, and Creator of the world. And so likewise doth Plato. For hee saith, that there is a certaine Anima,* 1.459 or Spirit, which doth, in omnibus, quae mouentur, habitare, & coelum & cuncta gubernare: which dwelleth in all things, that haue any mo∣tion, and which gou••••neth both heauen, & euery other thing. So that, though hee alter Anaxagoras his terme; yet hee meanes the selfe same thing. For, as Parmenides affirmeth,* 1.460 Anima & mens idem sunt: Though they differ in name, yet are they one, and the same thing. Yea, and Plato, in the same place, af∣firmeth this Anima, which is the mouer of all things, to be God, and nothing else. Deumesse, omnes arbitramur. We all suppose, There is a God. And so likewise doth Theophrastus: who denieth, euen Nature it selfe to bee the first mouer, euen of naturall bodies: ascending vp higher, and ascribing all their motion vnto a superior and more diuine power.* 1.461 Hoc, alij cuidam meliori ac priori relinquendum est potestati. We must ascribe this, vnto another, and a bet∣ter, and a superior power. Now, what is there either better, or superior to Na∣ture, but onely the God of Nature? Yea, and a little before, hee expresly affir∣meth, that this first mouer, and Beginner, is indeede nothing else, but the very God of Nature. Diuinum omnium principium existit, per quod & sunt, & permanent vniuersa: That first Beginner, from whence all things haue both

their consisting, and existing, is a diuine power and Nature.

To conclude this whole Chapter. All those Arguments, which Tullie bringeth, to proue the Soule to be immortall, are much more concludent, to proue God to be aeternal, whose Motion is both of himselfe and perpetuall. For, there he plainely telleth vs, that there is a certaine thing, which moueth only of it selfe,* 1.462 and yet giueth motion vnto all other things. Quod caeteris fons est, & principium movendi. And therefore is, both without all beginning; quia, Principij nulla est origo: Of a Principle there is no Originall: and with∣out all ending; quia, Quod seipsum mouet, quontam nunquàm deseritur a se, nunqu••m moveri quidem desinet. That which moueth it selfe, inasmuch as it neuer deserteth it selfe. it neuer desisteth to be moued: and consequently must needs be aeternall. For, Quod seipsum movet, aeternum est. That which moueth it selfe (and is mou••d of no other) is aeternal: Now, none of all these proper∣ties, which here hee setteth downe doe agree vnto the soule, but onely in some comparison. For, the Soule hath neither his motion of it selfe, nor yet giueth motion vnto all other things, nor is aeternal or without all begin∣ning. This is proper and peculiar vnto God himselfe alone, whose title is, The aeternall.* 1.463 As for the Soule, though it may be called Immortall; yet can it not, aeternall. Immortall it is, because it hath no ende: but aeternall it is not, because it had a beginning. But God is truely the mouer of himselfe, and the giuer of motion vnto all other things. He is truely aeternall, both without all beginning, and without all ending, as one that hath all his be∣ing onely of himselfe: and therefore can neuer cease to be, because he cannot forsake himselfe.

Quic quid enìm per se est,* 1.464 semper durare necesse est, Cùm nullo indigeat, cùm solo pendeat a se; Cùm vi non possit, cùm nolit sponte perire,

saith Palingenius.

What e're subsisteth of it selfe, must needs be euer-lasting, As needing other none; and selfe-dependence neuer-wasting. And therefore perish cannot it by an externall sway, Nor by internall vnfor'ct minde will perish or decay.

So that, all those high properties, which both Plato and Tully doe apply,* 1.465 but vnproperly, vnto the Soule; may, most truely and properly, be applyed, vnto God: That hee, both hath all his motion of himselfe, and giueth all motion vnto all other things, and that hee hath neither beginning nor ending; but is truely aeternall from all euerlasting: being not onely The first Mouer, but the sole-mouer of all things, in whom, all other things haue their only motion, and from whom they doe all of them receiue their onely being. So that, we may truely affirme, as it is in the Epigram, that,

Principium Deus est Mundi, quo cuncta moventur,* 1.466 Et quae permittit, vel iubet, Author agit. The Worlds beginning, loe, 'tis God, by whom all things are moued: And what he suffer's, or command's, hee doth, as Author proued.

Especially in Motion (as Bradwardine very notably declareth in these foure true positions: that, Qualibet Creatura mouente,* 1.467 Deum necessariò commouere, That what Creature soeuer moueth, God alwayes moueth with it. The second:

That nothing can moue any other thing, except God himselfe doe properly moue the same thing. The third: That nothing can moue any other thing, except God doe immediately moue the same thing. The fourth: That nothing can moue another, except God moue it more immediatly, then any other second Mouer.

So that; to recapitulate the summe of this whole Chapter; If these se∣cond and inferior motions doe leade vs vnto a first, and that vnto a first Mo∣uer, which is the very fountaine of motion in all other: then must needs this First Mouer, be God himselfe, & none other. But, the first of these three points hath beene sufficiently proued, in the first three Sections of this Chapter. And therefore, the Conclusion followeth necessarily from them; That this first Mouer must be God, as we haue seene in this fourth. Yea, and that (be∣side the force of the consequence) by diuers direct Testimonies, both of Heathens, and Christians. Which is the second Consideration, borrowed from the Physicks, whereby it may be proued, That there is a God.

CHAP 5.

That the true cause of Sicknesse, is Sinne against God. 2. That God, for this cause, doth threaten, to sende Sicknesse. 3. That hee sendeth it ac∣cording to his threatening. 4. That Phisitions obserue the stroke of Gods Vengeance, to be in many Sicknesses.

I Haue hitherto vnfolded certaine Considerations, from whence we may collect, that There is a God: first, out of the Meta∣physicks; and then, out of the Physicks. Let vs now come vnto Physick. For, Vby desinit Philosophus, ibi incipit Medicus. Where the Philosopher endeth, there the Physitian entreth. And there∣fore, let vs propound some Considerations, out of it. For, it hath many in it. But in this, as in the former, I will insist, but vpon two: letting passe all the other: that is, vpon Diseases; and, vpon their Remedies. Both which are acknowledged, to be the proper and peculiar workes of God, almost by the generall confession of all men, both Christians and Heathens. For our better, and more orderly proceeding wherein, I will reduce this first discourse as concerning Diseases, vnto these foure heads. First, that they both con∣fesse, the first and originall cause of sicknesse, to be onely mens sinnes. Se∣condly, that God, for this cause, hath oftentimes threatened to punish men, with sicknesse. Thirdly, that accordingly, he hath sent diuers kindes of grie∣uous sicknesses, vnto many. And fourthly, that euen Physitians themselues doe finde in many sicknesses, that they be diuine punishments.

For the first of which foure Heads: What is the true Originall cause of sick∣nesse: S. Chrysostome telleth vs,* 1.468 that it is the part of euery good Physition; inquirere semper in morborum radic••m, t{que} ita pervenire ad ipsum mali fon∣tem: to s••arch into the roote of diseases and sicknesses, and so to proceede vnto the fountaine of those euils. And S. Basil hee telleth vs, that it is the part of a discreet and wise patient, not to leaue this inquisition only to the Physition, but he himselfe also to search into a the causes of his owne diseases, that so he may the better attaine to know their remedies. Nos,* 1.469 plagas a Deo suscipien∣tes, qui benè & prudenter vitam nostram moderatur; principio quidem inqui∣ramus

cognitionem rationis, ob quam nos flagellet. Whensoeuer we are scourged and chastised by God who guideth our whole life by his wisedome and goodnesse, we ought first to search carefully, for what cause hee so correcteth vs. For, the cause being once found, the Remedie is halfe found, and the cure, in a man∣ner, alreadie halfe performed. Medici,* 1.470 causa morbi invent••, curationem esse inventam, putan••. Physi••ians, hauing once found out the cause of a disease, they thinke they haue found the cure.

Now, for the true cause of diseases,* 1.471 and Sicknesses;* 1.472* 1.473 though it greatly haue puzelled,* 1.474 both the greatest Philosophers,* 1.475 and the learnedst Physitions, to finde out, what it is: some assigning them, vnto the excesse or defect of the primary Qualities of Heate, Cold, Moyst, Drye: some, vnto the impuritie and corrup∣tion of our meates: some, vnto the infection of vnwholesome and putrid ayres; and to diuers such other Materiall causes; wherein they be greatly di∣uided amongst themselues: Yet is there a full agreement, both of Heathens, and Christians, that God is the first Efficient cause of them; and that Sinne is the true Impulsiu•• cause, which inforceth him to send them. This the Pro∣phet Dauid expresly declareth, when he called Sicknesse, The Rebuke of God: and affirmeth,* 1.476 that, For sinne, hee inflicts it, vpon man. When thou, with rebukes doest chasten man for Sinne,* 1.477 thou makest his beautie to consume away. This al∣so the Apostle Paul expresly declareth, when he telleth vs that, By one man, Sinne entred into the world; and Death▪ by Sinne. And againe, in another place;* 1.478 where hee telleth the Corinthians, that, for their Abuses in receiuing the Sacrament, they were stroken by God, with diuers kinds of punishments: some of them, with Sicknesse; some of them, with Weakenesse; and some of them, with Death. Yea, and this our Sauiour Christ himselfe expresly decla∣reth, when hee biddeth the sick-man, whom hee had lately cured, to goe,* 1.479 and sinne no more, lest a worse thing come vnto him. Thereby plainely declaring, that his Sinne was both the cause of his former Sicknesse, and would bee also of his future, if he sinned any more.

And, that Sinne is indeed the true cause of diseases, wee may see it plainely verified, in all these memorable Sicknesses, that are recorded vnto vs, in the Holy Scriptures. The Botches,* 1.480 wherewith the Egyptians wery smitten, was, for their rebellion against God, and their oppression of his People. The Leprosie wherewith the Prophetesse Miriam was smitten,* 1.481 was, for being so enuious against the Prophet Moses.* 1.482 The Pestilence, wherewith the Israelites were smitten, was for their adulterie with the Daughters of Moab; and for their idolatrie with their prophane god.* 1.483 The Emerods, wherewith the Phili∣stins were smitten, was, for their Impietie in detayning the Arke of God.

And so generally, in all the rest. There is almost, in no place, any mention of any greiuous and exemplary Sicknesse, but there is, in the same place, some mention of that Sinne, for whose punishment it was sent. In which forena∣med instances, we may obserue these two things. First, that, not onely the pesti∣lence, and leprosie, and such like grieuous and infectious Sicknesses (which are called Morbi Sontici, that is, mischeiuous diseases) are the scourges,* 1.484 and strokes of God: but also all other inferior diseases, as Emerods, & Botches, and such like smaller annoyances,* 1.485 as euen hee himselfe professeth in another place. Second∣ly,

that those diseases are sent by God vnto men, to correct and chasten them, for their sinne.

Neither is this the testimony of the Holy Scripture onely, but also of the Heathens, euen in their owne Histories. Wherein, wee may obserue, that whensoeuer there befell them, the publike calamity of any generall sicknesse, they still imputed it vnto their sinnes, prouoking the anger of some or other of their gods. As may be manifestly shewed,* 1.486 by manifold instances. Herodo∣tus ascribeth that greiuous sicknesse which was sent vpon the Scythians, to their sacrilege,* 1.487 in sacking the Temple of Venus. Pausanias ascribeth that de∣uouring sicknesse, which was sent among the Iones, vnto the profane lust of Menalippus,* 1.488 and Comaetho: And that generall abortion, which happened a∣mong the Caphyens wiues, onely vnto the cruelty of their bloody husbands; in stoning (for a ••leight cause) certaine young and wanton Children. The hand of diuine Iustice inflicting their punishment, in the very same subiect, wherein they had offended. Their crueltie exercised vpon other mens Chil∣dren, being iustly punished by the death of their owne, in a most equall reta∣liation.* 1.489 The same Author ascribeth the dropsie and lousie-sicknesse of Cassan∣der,* 1.490 vnto his crueltie and infidelitie vnto Alexander his Maister. And Herodo∣tus againe reporteth of the Persians, that they generally held, that whosoeuer was smitten with the leprous infection, hee was surely a profane person; and had (doubtles) committed some great and grieuous sinne, against their god, the Sunne: though they knew not what it was. And therefore, they banished them, out of all their Cities: collecting from the sicknesse, the stroke of Gods Iustice, euen in an vnknowne Cause. And this, which we haue seene in the Histories of the Greekes, wee may see yet more plainely, in the Histories of the Romanes.

For,* 1.491 Plutarch ascribeth that destroying plague, which happened among them, in the time of Romulus, vnto the trechery, which was practised in the murther of Tatius. And Liuy ascribeth another such like plague, which fol∣lowed the condemnation of Manlius Capitolinus, vnto that iniustice, which was vsed in his death. And thus haue, euen the Heathen, bene taught, in the very Schoole of Nature, without going any further, that the true cause in∣deede of all sicknesse and diseases, are onely mens sinnes, prouoking Gods Iustice to take vengeance of their wickednesse.* 1.492 As Dauid plainely confesseth in one of the Psalmes, There is nothing sound in my flesh, becouse of thine anger; neither is there rest in my bones, because of my sinne.

2 Which Lesson, may,* 1.493 yet a great deale more perfectly, bee learned, in the holy Schoole of God. For there, hee himselfe threatneth (and that, in many places) that, if men doe refuse to obey his Commandements, hee will punish their disobedience, with diuers greiuous sicknesses. Of which places (for example) I will instance but in one: which is, indeed, most excellent; and which, very sufficiently, may serue for all the rest. It is, in the Booke of Deu∣teronomy. Where, God threatneth most seuerely,* 1.494 that, If they will not obey the voice of the Lord, to keepe, and to do his commandements, and ordinances: that then all these Curses shall come vpon them, and ouertake them. Cursed shall they be in the Towne, and cursed in the field. Cursed in their basket, and cursed in their dough. Cursed in the fruite of their body, in the fruite of their land,

and in the fruite of their Cattle. Cursed when they go out,* 1.495 and cursed when they come in. Yet further. That the Lord will make the Pestilence to cleaue vnto them, vntill he haue consumed them. That he will smite them, with the consump∣tion, and with the feuer, and with the burning ague, and with the feruent heate, and with the sword, and with blasting, and with mildewe. And with the botch of Egypt, and with the Em••rods, and with the scab, and with the itch; so that they cannot be healed. And with madnesse, and with blindnesse, and with astony∣i•••••••• 〈◊〉〈◊〉. And that he, will smite them, in the knees, and in the thighes, with a sore b••tch••▪ so t••••t they cannot be healed; euen from the sole of the foote, vnto the ••••ppe of the he••d. And that he will make their plagu••s wonderfull, and the plagues of their seede, euen great plagues, and of long continuance; and sore diseases, and of long durance. So that, they shal want that common comfort of al sicknesses; Si longus, leuis; si grauis, breuis, that if it be long,* 1.496 it wil be the lighter; and if it be fierce, it will be the shorter. But hee threatneth such a sicknesse, as shall be, both Longus and Grauis: both fierce, and of continuance. And hee brought such a one,* 1.497 vpon the King Iehoram: whom, for his crueltie and ido∣latrie, God threatned to plague, with an incurable sicknesse, which should ex∣haust and consume him, by the rotting of his bowells. Which sicknesse, be∣ing sent accordingly vnto him, it dispatcht him not at once (as it did Herod, and Antiochus) but,* 1.498 held him in greiuous torments, for the space of two whole yeares. Now, thus many threates of so many sicknesses, God would neuer haue made, but that he knew his owne power, and could command all maner of diseases, at his wil & pleasure. For, to threaten, is ridiculous; but euen among vs men, where, there is not a power, to inflict, what one doth threaten?

3 But, that hee threatned not more in word, then hee was well able to performe in deede,* 1.499 we may euidently see throughout the whole tract of the holy historie. Where there is so particular mention, of all those same disea∣ses, to haue beene really inflicted by God, which, before, by name are mentio∣ned, that it manifestly appeareth, that God is both mindfull and true of his word▪ most faithfully performing, not onely what he promiseth, but also what hee threatneth And therefore saith S. Augustine. Nemo dicat, in corde suo; Verum est, quod promittit; falsum, quod minatur. Nam sicut, quod pro∣mittit verum est; sic quod minatur, certum est. Let no man once surmise,* 1.500 that God is true, in his promises; but false, in his threatnings. For, as that, which he promiseth, is true: so that, which he threatneth, is sure. As we may euidently see, in all those particular diseases, which, in the fore-alledged place, God reckoneth vp vnto vs. For the first of them, the Plague: God in••licted that sicknes, vpon his owne people,* 1.501 the Israelites, for their grudging and mur∣muring against the Prophet Moses. For the second of them, the Consumpti∣on: he inflicted that sicknesse vpon the wicked King Iehoram: of whom it is recorded expresly, that hee was, Longa consumtus tabe. Yea,* 1.502 and the good King Dauid was also touched with it, as it may bee gathered out of his owne complaint: I am euen consumed by the stroke of thine hand. For the third of them,* 1.503 the Feuer: hee inflicted that sicknesse, both vpon Peters wiues mother, and vpon Publius his father. For the fourth of them, The feruent heate: hee inflicted that sicknesse, at another time, vpon the Israelites. The inhabitants of the Land, are burned vp, and few men are left. Yea,* 1.504 and euen heerein also

he spared not his owne beloued Dauid.* 1.505 Who complaineth againe, That his Reynes are full of burning, and that there is nothing sound in his flesh. For the fift of them,* 1.506 Boyles and Botches:* 1.507 though they be called in that place the Botch of Egypt; yet inflicted hee it, not onely vpon the Egyptians, but also vpon the Iewes. From the sole of the foote vnto the head, there is nothing whole, but wounds, and swelling, and sores: full of Cor∣ruption. For the sixt of them,* 1.508 the Emerods: he inflicted that disease, vpon the Philistims. For the seauenth of them, the itch and the scabb: hee inflicted that disease,* 1.509 vpon his seruant Iob. For the eight of them, Madnesse: hee in∣flicted that euill,* 1.510 vpon the Princes of Noph, by mingling among them, the spirit of giddinesse. For the ninth of them, Blindnesse: hee inflicted that euill,* 1.511 both vpon the Sodomites,* 1.512 and vpon the Aramites. And for the tenth, and last of them, that is to say, Amazement and Astonishment of heart: hee inflicted that disease vpon King Antiochus.* 1.513 When the King had heard these words, he was astonished and sore moued: therefore hee layde him downe vpon his bed, and fell sicke for sorrow: confessing that his sleepe was departed from him, and that, for very care, his heart fayled within him. So that, there is none of all the fore-named sicknesses, which he threatened in word, but he sheweth that hee had power to inflict the same in deed. By all which memorable in∣stances, it euidently appeareth, that there is no sicknesse at all, neither so great nor so little, but that God can inflict it, both when, and where he will.

Yea, and euen the very Heathen confesse also the same. For, euen their owne Histories, as well as the Scriptures, do number all the forenamed diseases to be nothing else indeed, but onely diuine punishments. For the first of them the Plague: that memorable Pestilence, which Homer so describeth to haue fallen among the Greekes, in the Troians warre, is by him ascribed vnto Apolloes anger:

Apollo, plenus irarum,* 1.514 nocti{que} ipsi assimilis. Apollo, full of wrath and rage, Seem's like an hideous night's praesage.

And that fearefull plague,* 1.515 which Thucidides describeth to haue fallen vpon the Athenians, in the Peloponnesian warre, is ascribed by him also, vnto the anger of Apollo. And that wasting and deuouring pestilence, which Ovid describeth to haue fallen vpon the Aeginets, is by him ascribed vnto the wrath of Iuno:

Dira lues populis,* 1.516 irâ Iunonis iniquae, Incidit.— A cursed Plague vpon the People fell, It was, cause Iuno was not pleased well.

And that destroying plague, which fell againe vpon the Athenians, for their condemning of Socrates, is ascribed by another vnto the wrath of Iupiter. Pro Iovis offensa, Pestis accessit.* 1.517 Where he calleth it expresly, the Iudgment of God. Eiusmodi iudicijs vtitur Deus. They all of them directly reputing the Plague to be nothing else, but the vengeance of God. They were wrong in the particu∣lar, in ascribing those sicknesses vnto their false gods, who being but dead men, were not able to doe them either good or harme: but yet right in the generall, in ascribing them to God; for God indeed was he that sent them, though haply hee vsed the Deuills ministerie in them. For the second of

them, the Consumption: Pausanias reporteth of Phyallus,* 1.518 Captaine of the Phocenses; that hee first was threatned by Apollo in a dreame, that hee should consume, as bare as a certaine brazen 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which was consecrated vnto him, in his Temple, by Hippocrates. Which miserable consumption, hee af∣terward accordingly did bring vpon him. For the third of them, the feuer: Quintus Curtius reporteth of Alexander Magnus,* 1.519 that he, abusing the conse∣crated vessells of Hercules, in the very same Citie, yea and in the same man∣ner, as 〈◊〉〈◊〉 had before,* 1.520 in his abusing of the vessells Gods holy Temple: hee was sodainely strooken, in the middest of his Banket, euen as hee was in drinking. Nondùm Herculis Scypho epoto, repentè, velut telo confixus, ingemuit. He sodainly cried out, as if he had bene shot with a deadly dart. Which stroke was none other,* 1.521 but onely the sodaine blow of a feuer:* 1.522 as Sabellicus relateth his disease. And with the same disease was Titus also smitten, as Suetonius reporteth: Yea and that no lesse sodainly, in his returning from their playes. Which stroke he well perceiuing to be inflicted by God himselfe vpon him, hee ca••e his eyes vp vnto heauen, most pitifully complaining, that hee had most vniustly and without his desert killed him. For the fourth of them, the feruent heate: Ouid reporteth, that together, with that grieuous plague, which Iuno inflicted vpon the men of Aegina, there was ioyned with it, so fer∣uent a heate, that when they cast themselues vpon the earth, to haue cooled their bodies, the earth it selfe was so sodainely and so vehemetly hea∣ted by their bodies, that they could receiue no benefit, nor comfort at all, from it.

Dura sed in terra ponunt praecordia:* 1.523 nec fit Corpus humo gelidum: sed humus de corpore feruet. They cast their naked bodies on the ground; Their bodies by the Earth not cooler found: But th' earth from bodies doth with heate abound.

And thereupon another Poet calleth the plague,

—Pestem flammiferam.

For the fifth of them,* 1.524 Boiles, and Botches: Aurelius Victor reporteth, that Galerius Maximianus was smitten with that disease: whereby (as he relateth it) Defecit,* 1.525 consumptis genitalibus. But Pomponius Laetus describeth his disease, more filly to the purpose.* 1.526 Incidit in morbum: vlcus inguinibus innatum viri∣lia exedit: marecescente tota illa corporis parte, vermes pullulârunt: remedia deerant: medici desperauerunt. He fell into a foule disease. An vlcer, bred in his secret parts did eate off his priuities: and all that part of his body, rotting away, and full of crawling wormes, perished. Noremedies were present. All Physitians despayred.

And this his greiuous sicknesse, Eusebius affirmeth, to bee nothing else, but the stroke of Gods vengeance: Vltio diuinitùs illata. For the sixt of them,* 1.527 the Emerods:* 1.528 Caelius Rhodiginus reporteth,* 1.529 that Philoctetes was smitten with it,* 1.530 for his killing of Paris.* 1.531 For the seauenth of them, the Scab: Volateran repor∣teth of the Emperour Copronymus, that hee was strooken with it, and died of it. Perijt, Elephantiae morbo. And Baptista Egnatias addeth, that he died of it in great extremity of torment. Post infinita flagitia, exquisitissimo cruciatu consumptus. For the eighth of them, Madnesse: Pausanias reporteth, that

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the Calidonians were strucken with it, by Bacchus, at the earnest prayer of his Priest,* 1.532 Cor••sus: as the Greekes were, with the Plague, at the like request of Apolloes Priest, Chryses. And this sicknesse (as the Poet Caecilius affir∣meth) is absolutely in Gods hand, to inflict where he pleaseth.

Deo in manu est, quem esse dementem velit,* 1.533 Quem s••pere, quem sanari, quem in morbum inijci. Sic enìm Lambinus. Whom God will haue a foole, or wise be found, He shall be so, and so; or sicke, or sound.

For the ninth of them, Blindnesse: Herodotus reporteth of Phero, King of Egypt,* 1.534 that hee was sodainely smitten blind, as by the dart of God. And for the tenth of them, Astonishment, and Stupiditie of minde: Aelianus reporteth that the Celtish nation were so possest with it,* 1.535 that they would not so much as runne out of an house, when they euidently saw it, either falling vpon their heads, or burning about their eares: but would rather chuse, voluntarily to perish, then wisely to withdraw themselues from their death. Which, though that Author ascribe vnto a kind of valour: yet may it, much more truely, be reduced to Stupiditie. And thus, euen the Heathens, as well as wee Christians; and secular Histories, as well as Holy Scriptures, doe number all the fore-named sicknesses, to be nothing else, but the punishments of God. Yea,* 1.536 and so doe they also, all other, not named. As Plutarch, in the Delphians giueth an expresse instance; Deum iratum hominibus, omnis generis tetros m••rbos intulisse: That, their God being angry and offended with them, sent all m••nn••r of greiuous dise••ses, among thom. Whereby it appeareth, that disea∣ses and sicknesses doe not come vnto men, by blinde chance and fortune,* 1.537 as the Philistims would faine imagine: but (as they found vnto their cost) they bee sent vnto men by the ordinance of God. They come not out of the dust: as Iob teacheth in his booke, that is: Not onely from their second and infe∣rior causes, but from God their first Cause. Who, as sometimes hee worketh with those naturall Causes, by infecting the aire, and corrupting the water; and blasting our fruites,* 1.538 with vnwholesome dewes and mildewes, as hee him∣selfe professeth: so worketh hee often-times without them, by his owne im∣mediate stroke: As when he sent his Angell into the host of Seneherib,* 1.539 and, in one night destroyed to the number of an hundred and fourescore and fiue thousand. And therefore Saint Hierom, inquiring into the true cause of all sicknesse, hee flyeth aboue those inferior and naturall concauses, vnto the su∣preme and supernaturall Cause. Non dubitemus, ista dicere, vocem flagel∣lorum esse: Licèt nonnulle, haec,* 1.540 vel ex corrupto aere, vel ex escarum & corporum diuer sitate, accidere dicant. Let vs not doubt, but that sicknesse is the lash of Gods scourge: though some men do impute it vnto the corrupnes of the ayre, or to the vncleannesse of our meates, or to some one diuesity or other in our bodies. But the true, and the first cause, indeed, is onely God. For, as Stobaeus hath noted, out of Euripides:

Morbi mortalium alij, nostraculpa, fiunt,* 1.541 Alij diuinitùs immittuntur. Some sicknesses, by mens owne fault; and some By Gods iust iudgment, sometimes on vs come.

Nay alwayes by Gods iudgment. And then, most of all, when they come by our fault; whether our fault in feeding, or our fault in liuing; they still come by Gods sending. For as the Tragicall Poet hath very truly noted:

Quicquid patimur,* 1.542 mortale genus, Quicquid facimus, venit ab alto. Whate're we suffer, or what e're we doe, Com's from aboue, and is not bred below.

And another of them, vnto the same purpose:

Deo volente, quis{que},* 1.543 & ridet, & dolet. As God will, so Men laugh, or weepe.

For, as S. Ambrose, to this purpose, very truely obserueth, Omnia,* 1.544 iudicio Dei fiunt: vt aegrum corpus aliquis habeat, aut salubre; vt diues, aut pauper sit; vt iuuenis moriatur, aut senex. All things doe fall out, by the iudgement of God. Whether a man be sick, or in health; whether hee be rich, or poore; whether hee die yong, or old. All these, are appointed vnto him by God.

4. Ye••, and that Sicknesse is nothing else, but the very stroke of God, some∣times instructing vs,* 1.545 not to sinne; and sometimes correcting vs, for our sinne: S Basil plainely teacheth vs. Saepe, disciplinae gratia, in morbos incidimus. And a little after. Saepe, peccatorum sunt flagella, infirmitates. Sicknesses are often sent vs, for our instruction sake. Oftimes, our sorrowes and infirmities, are the scourges of our sinnes and iniquities. And this we may further see, by the iudgement of Physitions; vnto whose art it more properly belongeth, to search out the true causes of all diseases. For, they often-times doe finde, in many Sicknesses, that, beside the disor'red and peccant humors of mens bo∣dies, which are the materiall cause of all Sicknesse, there is in it beside, the speciall stroke of Gods hand. Whereunto they are inforced to reduce it, as vnto his true and proper Efficient. Because they see it oftentimes to fall out that many diseases, which they, at the first, thought to be but slight and con∣temptible; yet doe proue, in the end, to be mortall, and incurable: doe they all what they can; the power of their medicines, being manifestly hin∣dered, from their naturall working, in the body of this man, which yet worke most kindly, in the body of another man. For (as Solon obserueth, to this very purpose:

Saepè, è modico dolore,* 1.546 morbus fit magnus: Quem nemo soluerit, blanda remedia praebens. Ofttimes we see, from small greene wounds, and from a litle griefe, A greater Sore and Sicknesse grow's, then will admit reliefe.

So that, as another Poet, in the same case,* 1.547 obserueth:

Non est in medico semper, releuetur vt aeger: Interdum, docta plus valet arte, malum. It is not alwayes in Physitions skill, To cure the Patient, that is sick, and ill. For sometimes sicknesse on the Patient's part, Prou's stronger farre, then all Physitions Art.

Yea, and in another place, he confirmeth his owne obseruation, by a reall de∣monstration,* 1.548 in the plague of the Aeginets:

Exitium superabat opem, quae victa iacebat.

The Poyson of the Maladie, Was stronger then the Remedie.

The malice of the sicknesse surpassing all the helpe of the most approued medicines.

And this incurablenesse in euery sicknesse (which is, indeed, the very soule of the sicknesse, whereby it liueth, though the Patient dieth) doth himselfe chalenge,* 1.549 to be his owne peculiar worke.* 1.550 The Lord will smite thee, with the Botch of Egypt, and with Emerods, and with the Scab, and with the Itch; so that thou shalt not be healed. And therefore, Hippocrates giueth this good coun∣sell vnto all Physitions, that when they come vnto their Patients, they should consider with themselues;* 1.551 whether there be not, Diuinum quiddam, in morbis: The stroke of God, in the Sicknesse. Because, then it should seeme, that hee held his case for desperate: and that it was but in vaine, to apply any medi∣cine. For,* 1.552 as the Roman Orator hath recorded of him: Desperatis, Hippocrates vetat adhibere medicinam: Hippocrates forbiddeth the Physition, to apply any medicine, to a desperate man. But yet, by the leaue of that learned Phisition, the Case is not so despereate. For then, no sicknesse should be cured. Be∣cause, in euery sicknesse, there is the stroke of God. There is no sicknes so lit∣tle, but God hath a finger in it, if it be but the aking of thy little finger. For,* 1.553 though there be in the body, but onely one disease, that is called Sacer morbus: yet is it most certaine, that there is, Sacrum quiddam, in omni mor∣bo: There is the stroke of God in euery sicknesse. And yet euery sicknesse is not vnto death,* 1.554 as our Sauiour Christ testifieth. But, that sicknesses and disea∣ses, are nothing else, but Gods stripes, we may see it plainely verified, both by God himselfe, who chalengeth it; and by the Scriptures, which ascribe it; and by the Fa••thers, who teach it; and by the very Heathen themselues which confesse it. For the first of which foure proofes, to wit, the chalenge of God: The Lord himselfe expresly threateneth in the fore-alledged place, That he wil smite them with the Consumption, and with the ••euer,* 1.555 & with the burning Ague, and with the feruent Heate, and with the Sword, and with Blastings, and with Mildew. Marke, God will smite them, with all these. Thereby plainely in∣sinuating, that all those diseases are as truely Gods smiting, as his smiting with the Sword, which hee numbreth there among them. And againe hee threateneth, in the very same place, that he will smite them, with the Botch of Egypt,* 1.556 and with the Emerods,* 1.557 and with the Scab, and with the Itch. And yet a∣gaine: that he will smite them, with Madnesse, and with Blindnesse; and with Astonying of heart. So that, all those Sicknesses, he chalengeth and assumeth to be his strokes, and his Smitings.

Yea, and the Scriptures themselues ascribe the same vnto him, yea, and vn∣der the same name: and that in both Testaments. In the Old, the Lord de∣nounceth against King Pharaoh,* 1.558 that if he will not let the Israelites depart, he will send all his plagues, vpon his heart. The words of the Text are (as Arias Montanus hath ad verbum, translated them) Mitto omnes plagas meas, in cor tuum: I will send all my strokes, vpon thy heart. Therefore all the Egyptian plagues, were nothing else, but Plagae, that is to say, Gods smitings. So againe, in another place; the Leprosie is called,* 1.559 Plaga Leprae, that is, the stroke of Lepro∣sie. And so the Prophet Dauid beseecheth the Lord, to take his plague away from him. Amoue a me plagas tuas Calling his diseases,* 1.560 plagas, that is, the

strokes of God. And so likewise, in the New Testament; diseases and sick∣nesses are called Gods scourges: Flagella, his whipps, or his rods. The Euange∣list Saint Marke, calleth the womans bloody issue, her scourge, or her rod. And, in another place, he saith, that there pressed vpon Christ, but onely to touch him, so many as had plagues.* 1.561 The Greeke signifieth Scourges.* 1.562 And so likewise, the Euangelist Saint Luke hee sayth, that our Sauiour cured many, of their sick∣nesses, and plagues. The Greeke againe is,* 1.563 Scourges. 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: Hee cured them of their Scourges. Therefore Sicknesse are Scourges.

Yea; and the Fathers, in their writings, doe perpetuate the same phrase. S. Basil calleth Sicknesses, Plagas,* 1.564 & flagellationes Dei: The strokes and Stripes of God.* 1.565 And Saint Hierom hee calleth them, Flagella Diaboli; The Scourges of the Deuill: In corporis malis, flagellum Diaboli intelligimus.

The one Father, from the Author, calleth them, the Scourges of God: the o∣ther, from the Instrument, the Scourges of the Deuill. As wee see they were, in Iob: and,* 1.566 in that crooked woman,* 1.567 whom our Sauiour Christ healed. But yet, the Author of both their infirmities, was God: because the Deuill could do nothing, but as hee was fore-limited. And therefore, euen the Heathen, who before confessed sicknesse to be sent from God, yea and to be sent, as a punish∣ment, for sinne, against God, do also acknowledge it, to be the Stroke of God. The Philistims call their Emerods,* 1.568 the stroke of Gods hand: euen as plainely and directly,* 1.569 as Dauid himselfe doth: I am euen consumed, by the stroke of thine hand. Yea, and the Poet Iuuenal affirmeth of all the Heathen in generall, that,

—missum ad sua corpora morbum,* 1.570 Infesto credunt a numine. Saxa Deorum Haec, & tela putant.— If they but feele a little Sicknes sent, To touch the body: Then they thinke it meant Euen from some angry God, whom they haue grieu'd, For Sinne inflicted. And being thus mischieu'd. They deeme and name Diseases, miseries, The Slings and Darts of wronged Deities.

This he reporteth for the common opinion of all the Heathen, that all of them beleeue, both that God is the sender of all kindes of sicknesses, and that they be the Strokes of his darts, and arrowes. Which, wee may further see confirmed, by that Censure, which Homer giueth of the plague of the Greekes: which hee both ascribeth vnto their God, Apollo; and calleth it there expresly, Telum Dei. A title, which, euen the Scripture it selfe giueth also,* 1.571 to that Sicknesse: Thou shalt not be afraid of the feare of the night; nor yet of the arrow,* 1.572 that flyeth by day; nor of the pestilence, that walketh in the dark∣nesse: expressing in the latter words, what hee meant in the former, to wit, that, by that arrow, he vnderstood, the pestilence. Neither is this Sicknes on∣ly, called one of Gods arrowes:* 1.573 but all other Sicknesses too. Thine arrowes light vpon me (saith the Psalmist of his Sicknesses) and there is nothing sound in my flesh, because of thine anger, neither is there any rest in my bones, because of my Sinnes. Which place of the Psalmist, expresseth in effect, the whole summe of this Chapter, and of euery Branch of it. First, naming the Cause

of his sicknesse, to be Sinne Secondly, the Effect of his sinne, to be Gods an∣ger. Thirdly, the fruite of Gods anger, to be his sicknesse. And fourthly, the forme of his sicknesse, to be (as it were) the stroke of an Arrow. Now (to forme this whole discourse, vnto our present purpose:) If the true cause of sicknesse, be onely Sinne against God: If God himselfe doe threaten, for this cause to send sicknesse: If he truly hath performed, as much as he hath threate∣ned: And, if sicknesse be nothing else, but the Stroke of Gods hand: Then must there needs be a God, which worketh all those things. But all the fore-named points haue sufficiently beene proued, not onely by Scriptures, and the doctrine of Christians; but also by the testimonie, euen of the very Hea∣then. And therefore, That there is a God, doth neede no further proofe. This first consideration of Physick, of the nature of Sicknesse, is proofe more then ynough.

CHAP. 6.

The God is the giuer of health vnto men. 2. That hee is the preseruer of it. 3. That he is the restorer of it. 4. Both by giuing medicinable herbes vn∣to men. 5. And by teaching them the right vses of them. 6. And by ioy∣ning his blessing vnto their working.

THat sicknesses and diseases doe not come to men by chance, nor 〈◊〉〈◊〉 out of the dust; but are sent by the Iustice and Iudgement of God, either to correct men for sinning, or to restruine men from sinning; I haue already proued in the former Chapter. Now, that the Remedies of diseases are also sent from God, and from none other author, I take to proue in this Chapter. A thing, which followeth, in a manner, vpon the granting of the former. For, if wee grant, that God is the Author of diseases; we must also grant, that he is the Author of Remedies. Or else, we shall be forced to yeeld vnto the one, of these two grosse absurdities: Either, that there be two Gods; or else, that something, which is not God, yet is better then God. For, if we yeeld, that diseases come from one Author, and their Remedies from another; then doe wee make two diuers Authors: Duo Principia,* 1.574 Two Principles, and two Gods, as Zoroastres did. And if we hold, that that Author, from whome Remedies doe come, is not God; then hold we, that something is better then God. For, it is better to giue Remedies, then it is to giue diseases: as it is better to giue good things, then it is, to giue euill. So that, except God be the Author of Remedies, as well as of diseases, he shall not be the Soueraigne fountaine of Goodnesse, but shall haue a more base and inferior office, then some of his owne crea∣tures. And so, God shall not be God: But that other, which is the giuer of good things;* 1.575 shall be God. For, (as Plato truly teacheth) Bonorum, solus Deus, causa est: malorum verò, quamlibet aliam, praeter Deum, caus••m quaerere decet. It is onely God, that is the Cause of all good things: but euill things haue not God, but some other thing, for their cause. Therefore, for the clearing of this doubt; that there be not two diuers Authors and Princes in the world; the one sending diseases; the other, their Remedies; but, that both of these doe come from one Author, who is God, and none other; it is euidently

anounched, in the Holy Scripture, as it were of set purpose, for the preuenting of this error.

Thus the Prophet Moses telleth the Israelites, that,* 1.576 If they will obey al Gods holy commandements, the Lord will both take from them, all their owne in fir∣mities, and will not put vpon them, any Egyptian diseases. Thereby plainely in∣sinuating, that it is absolutely in Gods power, both to impose diseases, and to send releases. Thus Eliphaz, without all insinuation,* 1.577 affirmeth in expresse and plaine tearmes: God maketh the wound, and he bindeth it; he smiteth, and his hand maketh whole. Thus Hannah, in her song, The Lord killeth,* 1.578 and maketh aliue; he bringeth downe vnto the graue, and heraiseth vp. Thus Moses, in his Psalme,* 1.579 Thou turnest a man vnto destruction; Againe thou saist, Returne, yee sonnes of Adam.* 1.580 Thus likewise Hosea: The Lord hath wounded, and hee will binde vs vp. By all which Testimonies, it euidently appeareth, that there is not one God which striketh vs, and another which healeth vs: but it is one and the same God, which doth both these vnto vs.

Vna manus nobis vulnus,* 1.581 opem{que} feret.

As it is in the Poet.

All is but one, and selfe same hand, that thus, Both one while hurteth, and that helpeth vs.

It is but one and the same God,* 1.582 Qui & caedit, & sanat: as it is in Tertullian Who both killeth and cureth.

Who yet is not good in the one action, and euill in the other; but truely good in them both. Iust, when he afflicteth, which is one kinde of Goodnes; and Mercifull when he releaseth, which is another kinde of Goodnesse. Nay, then also mercifull, euen when he afflicteth: being Deus, ad inferos vs{que} mise∣ricors. And therefore, Optimus, si reddit placatus, quod abstulerat iratus: as it followeth in the same place. He is such a God, as is mercifull, euen downe vn∣to hell. And therefore must n••edes be very excellently good, if hee restore that health againe, when he is appeased, which he tooke away when he was displeased. So that the very necessity of Reason inferreth, that if God be the sender of dis∣eases vnto men (as I haue formerly prooued him) then must hee also bee the sender of remedies vnto them. Else can he not be God; nay, else can hee not be Good. For how can he be either God or good, who is willing to hurt vs, if he know, that he hath not the power againe to helpe vs? But God is truely and perfectly good, and hath in this point as great a power, as he hath in any other; and extendeth it as graciously vnto the benefit of all men: being indeed both the Giuer and the Preseruer, and the Restorer of health vnto them; from whose onely grace and fauour, all these heauenly blessings come.

For the first of which three points: That God is the Giuer of health vnto men,* 1.583 the Prophet Dauid expressely affirmeth it,* 1.584 in calling God in one place,* 1.585 His strength;* 1.586 and in another, His saluation; and in another, The strength of his saluation. The Fathers they acknowledge it: Philo Iudaeus deliuereth his opinion in these words:* 1.587 Sic opinor, Sanitatem meram, quam nullus morbus praecessit in corpore, Deum, perse, solum largiri: liberationem autem a morbo, e∣tiam per artem, aut medicinam; ipse sanans vel per haec, vel citra horum operam. This is mine opinion, That pure and perfect health, which hath not beene attain∣ted with any sicknesse, is giuen immediately by onely God himselfe. But a release

from any sicknesse, he oftentimes worketh by the meanes of Physicke; yet healing vs, as he pleaseth, either with it, or without it. Acknowledging God directly, not onely to be the bestower of health, but also the deliuerer from sicknesse. So likewise Gregorie Nyssen: Hoc est perfectae Prouidentiae opus,* 1.588 non solùm contractos curare morbos, verùm etiam prohibere, antequam contrahantur. This is the worke of Gods perfect Prouidence, not only to cure Diseases, when they are come vpon vs, but also to preuent them, before they come vnto vs. So like∣wise Saint Augustine: Salus Hominum,* 1.589 à quo? A Deo. Tell me, from whom it is, that health commeth vnto men? He answereth that Question, that, It onely comes from God.* 1.590 And againe, in another place. Deus dedit carni, originem pulchritudinem, valetudinem, propagationem, foecunditatem, membrorum dispo∣sitionem, salutem. It is God that hath giuen vnto the body of a man, both his be∣ginning, and his beauty, his strength, and his foecunditie, his comelinesse, and his Health.

Yea, and euen the very Heathen acknowledge also the very same. Critias saith expresly.

—bonam valetudinem, Dij, munus iucundissimum,* 1.591 dederunt hominibus. It is God that hath giu'n good health vnto men, Which, of all other gifts, is most sweete vnto them.

To this end, the Romans did consecrate, Salus, among their other gods: Insi∣nuating thereby,* 1.592 that it is God, that is the Giuer of all health, and all safetie. And therefore, among those other titles, which they bestowed vpon God, they called him* 1.593 Sotera, that is to say, A Sauiour, quia Salutem dat: as the Orator expoundeth it. Is nimirùm Soter est, qui salutem dedit: He one∣ly is a Sauiour, that giueth health vnto men. By which very name, they wor∣shipped,* 1.594 euen Iupiter himselfe, among them; as Pausanias instanceth, in the Troczenians: Adesi & I••vcs fanum, ••••gn••mine Seruatoris. They haue a Temple of Iupiter, surnamea the Sauiour. A title so essentiall and proper vnto God, that Basil reproueth it,* 1.595 as a kind of profanenesse, for any man to giue it vnto his Phisitions, and to call them, Saluatores, or Sauiours: though, by them, they haue bene saued, from never so grieuous sicknesses. Because all Phisitions, euen then, when they cure their Patients, yet doe it not by their owne power, but by the power of God, who is the true Sauiour: yea, and the onely Sauiour too. For, Beside him there is no Sauiour.* 1.596 And therefore, King Philip of Ma∣cedon did iustly deride the dotage of Menecrates, a fantasticall Phisition, for calling himselfe Iupiter, that is, A helping Father: as that name is etymolo∣gized by the Romane Orator: Iupiter id est, Iuuans Pater: as though hee (like another Iupiter) had,* 1.597 in his hand, a full power, to bestow health and safety, vp∣on any man whomsoeuer. Which folly that wise King derided very sauorly: and, in that his derision, acknowledged, that Health commeth onely from God,* 1.598 and not from the Phisition. And therefore saith the Orator, that, Homi∣nes ad Deos, nulla re propiùs accedunt, quam salutem hominibus dando. That Men not come nerer vnto God in any thing, then they do, in giuing of health vn∣to men. But yet, this is not enough, to make them called Suiours. For hee that properly is a Sauiour, must saue, onely by his owne power: as our Sauiour Christ did. Who,* 1.599 both healed all infirmities,* 1.600 and gaue all kindes of healths, by his owne onely power: Sight, vnto the blind; Strength, vnto the lame;

Hearing, to the deafe; Clensing, to the Lepers; and life vnto the dead: as is expresly testified. So that, euen in this respect (though there were none other) yet might he truly and properly be called a Sauiour & 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: as indeed hee is. But,* 1.601 as for his Disciples, though they did, all the same works; yet could none of all them properly be called a Sauiour:* 1.602 because they did them, not by their owne power,* 1.603 but by his. As the Apostle S. Peter ingenuously confesseth. Ye men of Israel (saith he,* 1.604 when he healed the Creeple, at the gate of the Tem∣ple) why meruaile ye at this thing? or why looke ye so stedfastly vpon vs? as though we by our owne power, had made this man to goe. It is onely the name of Iesus, that hath made this man sound. Not, that the name of Iesus (though it signifie, A Sauiour) doth carrie with it any necessarie Charme,* 1.605 for either healing of diseases, or casting out of deuills, as some men vainely haue ima∣gined: for in the sons of Scaeua the Iew, the contrarie was plainely proued: but, the Name of Iesus,* 1.606 that is to say, the power of Iesus, hath giuen this man his strength. For, all the miracles, which his disciples wrought, were done on∣ly by his power; As is expresly testified, by plaine words in the Scripture: He gaue them power, against vncleane spirits,* 1.607 and to heale euery sicknesse. They had all their power, but onely by his gift. But he wrought all his miracles, on∣ly by his owne might. They wrought theirs, but Precando: but he his, Im∣perando: as Hegesippus distinguisheth.* 1.608 And therefore, though they saued many from very grieuous sicknesses: yet they, doing those works, not by their owne power, but onely by our Sauiour Christ Iesus his power; not they, but he meriteth the name of a Sauiour: as being the very fountaine, from whence all health springeth vnto euery man. So that, it is, neither the strong constitution of our parents, nor the well-tempered complexion of our selues,* 1.609 that is the true fountaine of our health: but as the Psalmist very truly acknowledgeth, Domini est salus, It is onely the Lord that is the giuer of our health. Who therefore is worthily called a Sauiour.

2 And, as God is the only Giuer of health vnto men, so is he likewise the only Preseruer of the same. It is none of all those things,* 1.610 whereof Tullie giueth in∣stance, as the principallest means for the preseruation of health, that are able to continue it; if God himselfe put not vnder his gracious hand, to sustaine & vp∣hold it. Neither,* 1.611 Notitia sui corporis; nor Obseruatio, quaeres aut prodesse soleant aut obesse; nor, Continentia in victu at{que} cultu; nor, Praetermissae voluptates; nor, Ars eorum, quorum ad scientiam haec pertinent. Neither the knowledg of our owne bodies; nor the Obseruation, of either helpful, or hurtfull things; nor abstinence in meat; nor continencie from pleasures; nor the art of Physitions: No, nor yet, those other helpes,* 1.612 praescribed by him also, vnto his seruant Tiro: neither 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, nor 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, nor 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, nor 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, nor 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: neither the procuring of ready concoction, not the auoyding of wearisome labouring, nor the entertay∣ning of moderate walking, nor the disposition vnto liberall recreation, nor the benefit of facile and soluble egestion: no nor any thing else, that can preserue health vnto vs, if God himselfe doe not sustaine vs. But, notwitstanding all those helpes, yet, if we want his speciall helpe and blessing, we shall soone be driuen to complaine with Iob,* 1.613 that, Our health doth vanish away like a Cloude. And therefore the Prophet Dauid, with thankfulnesse, professeth, that, It is the Lord only, that maketh him dwell in safetie, that is,* 1.614 which preserueth and

continueth him in health. Of whose fatherly protection, in preseruing of his from sicknesses, hee hath composed a notable Psalme, wherein hee giueth men assurance,* 1.615 that they are kept so safe vnder the shadow of Gods wings, that the Plague shall not come neere them, though a thousand should fall at their side, and ten thousand at their right hand. And therefore Iob calleth him,* 1.616 Custodem ho∣minum, The Preseruer of men. What shall I doe vnto thee, ô Thou Preseruer of men? Which Tittle he there giueth him, not onely, because hee preserueth men from sicknesse; but also vpholdeth them in their health. Without whose speciall prouidence, in keeping them, they shall neuer be able, to perserue themselues, though they vse neuer so great carefulnesse, or haue, at their el∣bowes, neuer so great Physitians. For,* 1.617 as S. Hierom very truely teacheth vs; Nisi Dominus custodierit Ciuitatem,* 1.618 frustrà vigilauit, qui custodit eam: sic nisi Dominus custodierit Sanitatem, in vanum custodiunt, qui praecepta Salutis custo∣diendae edunt. Except the Lord keepe the Cittie, the Watchman watcheth but in vaine: And so, except the Lord keepe thy safetie, the Physition lesson's thee in vaine. The Lord, that first hath giuen it, he also must keepe it: else both thou and the Physition, doe, but in vaine, indeauour it.

Yea, and euen the very Heathen doe hold, in their Religion, that God is not onely the Giuer of health, but also the Preseruer and maintayner of it. The Mantinenses dedicated two Temples vnto their great god Iupiter: the one of them,* 1.619 Iovi Datori; the other, Iovi Servatori. The one of them, vnto God the Giuer; the other of them, vnto God the Preseruer. And therefore Menan∣der bringeth in certaine persons making of this prayer.

Deos omnes coelestes precamur,* 1.620 —nobis vt salutem dent. Integram valetudinem, bona multa: Et eorum, quae iam parta sunt, Laetum ac commodum vsum. We pray the Gods, that safetie they And perfect health would grant to vs; With all the many Gifts, that may Men happy make. Not onely thus, But this beside we further craue, A ioyous Vse of what we haue.

Ascribing to their gods, not onely the giuing, both of health and all good things, but also the continuing of the prosperous vse of them. And so like∣wise Terence, he bringeth in, another, making, in effect, the same Prayer:

—O Iupiter,* 1.621 Serua (obsecro) haec nobis bona. O God, these goods which we possesse, We pray, with thy praescruing blesse.

Acknowledging the continuing, as well as the giuing of all good things, to be onely of Gods goodnesse. But, aboue all the rest, the continuance of our health. For, as Tullie recordeth; among Iupiters other Titles, hee was cal∣led, Salutaris, that is, The Giuer of Health. Of which his appellation, he ren∣dreth this reason;* 1.622 Quia salus hominum in eius sit tutela: Because all a mans safetie, is onely in his custodie. Yea, and euen the profane Emperour and Per∣secutor

Maximinus, though otherwise most irreligious; yet ascribeth it one∣ly vnto Gods especiall goodnesse,* 1.623 that the corruptions of the ayre do not infect all of vs: quòd corrupta coeli temperies squallentia corpora in mortem non conijciat. Thereby plainely confessing, that it is God onely, and none else, which is the Preseruer, and Maintainer of mans health.

3 Now, as God is both the Giuer,* 1.624 and Preseruer of health: so is he also, the Restorer of it. Hee both gaue it vnto vs, when we had it not: and pre∣serueth it vnto vs, whilst wee haue it: and restoreth it vnto vs, when as wee haue lost it. And this point may also, as clearely be demonstrated, by the Testi∣monies, both of Holy Scriptures, and of Heathen writers, as any of the for∣mer. Of which Testimonies, some bee such, as doe onely expresse their opi∣nion, in words: some such, as declare the strength of it, by deedes: and some such, as demonstrate the truth of it, by effects. For the first of which three heads: the Prophet Moses assureth the Israelites,* 1.625 that, if they will obey Gods holy Lawes and Ordinances, hee will, not only take all infirmities from them, but also, will not put any euill disease vpon them. Thereby plainely declaring, that God hath a power in him; both to preserue men in their health; and to bring them vnto sicknesse; and to deliuer them from sicknesse. The Prophet Dauid likewise expresly confesseth, that it is the Lord onely,* 1.626 which both forgi∣ueth all our iniquities, and healeth all our infirmities. Taking first away the Cause of our Sicknesse, which is onely our sinne: and then applying his owne healing grace, as a soueraigne Medicine. And so likewise Iehoram King of Israel confesseth, by insinuation, euen the very same thing. For, when the King of Aram writ vnto him, that he should heale the Leprosie of Naaman: hee asked in great passion;* 1.627 Whether he were a God,* 1.628 that he should doe this great thing? Thereby manifestly insinuating, that the power of healing is the worke of a God, and not of a man. Yea, and euen Naaman himselfe, when the worke was done, acknowledged, that God was the onely doer of it: Now I know, there is no God, in all the world, but in Israel. And how came hee to know this? He knew it, by the miraculous healing of his sicknesse. For, as Ecclesiasticus directly testifieth: The power of healing,* 1.629 commeth onely from the most High.

Yea, and euen the very Heathen do hold the same opinion. Coelius Rhodi∣ginus reporteth out of Plutarchs Symposiachs,* 1.630 of a very notable and learned Phisition, named Philon; that hee, hauing confected diuers excellent Medi∣cines, Regia quaedam, & auxiliaria medicamenta; called those his Medicines, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, that is, the hands of God. Which glorious appellation, whether he doe irreligiously apply vnto his owne medicines, as though they were able to procure a mans health, as well as Gods owne hands; or religiously, as not being able to worke any health, without the helpe of Gods hand: yet both wayes, he acknowledgeth, the working of health, to bee the power of Gods owne hand.

And so doth Tully likewise,* 1.631 when he writeth thus, vnto his wife: Statim ita leuatus sum, vt mihi Deus aliquis fecisse medicinam videatur: I was sodainely so eased, as if a medicine had bene sent vnto me from God. Thereby plainely ac∣knowledging, that the hand of God is the most soueraigne Medicine. And thus, both Christians and Heathens haue deliuered their opinions, in ex∣presse

and plaine words: That it is onely God himselfe, that is the Restorer of men, vnto their health.

And, that this is not, in them, onely a verball profession, or a volant and fleeting imagination, but a very strong perswasion, both inwardly setled and deepely grounded in them, as a sprout of naturall Religion; they haue, both of them, declared, as well by their deedes, as they haue by their words: which is the second sort of our Testimonies. For, euer, when they haue beene afflicted with any kind of sicknesse, either publike, or priuate, they haue still sought, to obtaine their remedy from God, by offering vp vnto him, both Supplications, and Sacrifices; as vnto the onely Restorer of their health. Thus did Moses; when,* 1.632 by the fire of God, very many of the Israe∣lites were deuoured and consumed, he sought for the remedie, only at his gra∣cious hand: vsing prayer, for his water, to extinguish that fire. Thus likewise did Aaron; when a grieuous plague was sent by God himselfe, among them, he sought onely for the remedie,* 1.633 at that hand which had smitten them, by offe∣ring vp incense, for a sauour of rest, and making an atonement for the people, with God. And thus likewise did King Dauid; when,* 1.634 at another time, ano∣ther like plague happened, he sought for the remedie onely at the hand of God, by appeasing of his wrath, with Burnt-Offerings, and Peace-Offerings.

Yea, and euen the very Heathens themselues, in all their like Calamities, haue euer held this, for the chiefest of their Medicines, to obtaine release of God, by their prayers and supplications. Whereof, euen their owne Histories affoord vs both great plenty, and great variety of Examples. In that great plague,* 1.635 which hapned in the Campe of the Greekes, at the siege of Troy; they sought onely, for their remedie, at the hand of God, by lenifying his an∣ger, with sacrifice and prayer; precibus & sacrificijs. In that great plague, which hapned vnto the Aeginets; their King sought for remedie, at the hand of God onely.

Ipse ego sacra Ioui pro me Patriá{que},* 1.636 &c: Euen I my selfe, do, for my selfe, and for my Countries sake, To Iupiter by sacrifice, our whole atonement make.

In that great plague, which happened among the Athenians; they consulted with Apollo, what should be their best remedie: vnto whom, when hee an∣swered; That they should purge and cleanse their Citie: whenas they were de∣uising how to doe it,* 1.637 by other meanes; Epimenides aduised them to performe it by sacrifice: which is indeed the best purgation, and the most certaine ex∣piation.

Yea and the Romane Storie affoords no lesse varietie: as we may euident∣ly see, in many places of Liuie. In that great plague, which happened among the Romans, in the time of Tullus Hostilius, they all of them went into this opinion: Vnam opem aegris corporibus relictam; si pax venia{que} ab Dijs impetra∣ta esset: That there was but one Remedie,* 1.638 for those that were sicke; and that was, to obtaine peace and pardon of God. And that their practise was sutable vnto their opinion, he hath giuen vs, in another place, a very notable instance,* 1.639 in that great plague, which hapned in the time of Camillus. Where their expi∣ation was performed with so great a solemitie, as equalled almost that of Iosias,* 1.640 for ceremony. Which in these words is described, and set out, by Liuie:

Tristem hi••mem (siue ex intemperie Coeli, raptìm mutatione in contrarium

facta) gravis pestilens{que} omnibus animalibus aestas excepit. Cuius insanabilis perniciei, quandò nec causa nec finis inveniebatur, Libri Sibyllini, ex Senatus∣consulto, aediti sunt: duumviri, sacris faciundis (lectisternio tunc primùm in vrbe Romana facto) per dies octo, Apollinem, Latonám{que}, & Dianam, Hercu∣lem, Mercurium at{que} Neptunum, tribus (quam amplissimè tunc apparari poterat) stratis lectis, placauêre. Privatìm quo{que} id sacrum celebratum est: tota vrbe patentibus ianuis, promiscuó{que} vsu rerum omnium in propatulo posito: notos ig∣notós{que} passìm aduenas in hospitium ductos ferunt, & cum inimicis quo{que} benig∣nè & comiter sermones habitos, iurgijs & litibus temperatum. Vinctis quo{que} dempta in eos dies vincula; religioni deinde fuisse, quibus eam opem Dij ••u∣li••••at, vinciri. There followed, after an heauy winter, a most contagious Som∣mer: Whether it grew from the vnwholsomnesse of the Ayre, occasioned by many sodaine alterations, or from some other cause: but pernicious it was vnto all li∣uing things. Of which incurable euill, whenas they could neither finde out any cause, nor perceiue any end, the Senators decreed; that the bookes of Sibylla shold be searched; that two officers should be appointed, to looke to the performance of their holy seruice: their holy feasting in their Temples (which they call their Lectisternium) being at that time first ordayned in the Citie of Rome; for eight whole dayes together, they appeased the anger, both of their God Apollo, and of his mother Latona, and of his sister Diana; and of Hercules, Mercurius, and Neptunus: the Feast being held as sumptuously, as in those dayes could be possi∣bly, in three seuerall places. Yea, and the same Feast was kept holy, as well pri∣uately, as publikely. All the dores in the Cittie were then set wide open: All things, for the time, were vsed in common: all men, both knowne and vnknowne, yea and euen the very Strangers, were ••alled into their houses: Louing con∣ferences were vsed, euen with their very enemies; and an vtter cessation of all suites, debates, and quarells: Yea the Prison dores were opened, during all those high feast-dayes. And those, that, by the benefit of their gods, were then relea∣sed, were neuer after that (vpon meere Religion) imprisoned. Thus ••arre proceedeth Livie. Out of which his narration we may obserue these two things. First, that though this great plague might, in part, be attributed vnto the often and sodaine alteration of the ayre, as vnto an immediate and in∣ferior Cause: yet that they looked higher, vnto the first Cause, and ascribed it to God, from whom it came indeed. Secondly, that, as they acknowledged the disease to come from God: so they sought for their remedie, no where else, but of God. So confessing him directly, to be both the sender of sick∣nesse, and the Restorer of health. As we may euidently see, in the very same Author, by diuers other instances, in diuers other places: as namely. Lib. 7. p. 121. 129. Lib. 10. p. 187. Lib. 27. p. 308. Lib. 38. p 482. Lib. 41. p. 528. In all which places,* 1.641 he, reporting of very greiuous plagues, sheweth still, that they sought for their remedie at God, by appeasing of his wrath, with their Sacrifices and prayers. This sense hath God ingra••ted both into Christians, and Heathens.

Neither doth Religion onely teach them, to seeke their remedie at God, in such publique calamities, but also euen in their priuate sicknesses. King Dauid,* 1.642 being afflicted with a dangerous sicknesse, maketh this request to God, Heale me (ô Lord) I haue sinned against thee. Thereby plainely insinuating

these three things vnto vs. First, that onely sinne is the cause of all sicknesse. Secondly, that onely God is the restorer vnto health. And Thirdly, that on∣ly Prayer is the meanes of obtayning that grace. And though it may seeme a very strange request, to desire God to heale him, because hee had sinned a∣gainst him: which was the very cause, for which God had smitten him: yet it is not so indeed, if the words be well resolued. For his meaning is no more but this: that God, who had stricken him, for committing of his sinne; should now againe heale him, for confessing of his sinne. As if he should say, as it is in the Orator,* 1.643 Sit erranti medicina confessio. Let my confession be my Me∣dicine. Or, as in other words He expresseth it, but to the same effect: Let my prayer ascend vp before thee, as incense; and the lifting vp of my hands be as an euening Sacrifice. Thus,* 1.644 in his priuate sicknesse, as well as in the publike, he sought for all his helpe, at the onely hand of God.

And the same disposition is also ingrafted into the mindes of the Heathen: Who (as Iuuenal obserueth) if they chance but to feele the least touch of a feuer, they straightway interpret it the effect of Gods Anger: and therefore they doe presently betake them to their vowes, and seeke to appease him by the promise of some sacrifice. They doe,* 1.645

—Pecudem spondere sacello Balantem, & Laribus cristam promittere Galli. They vow vnto the Shrine, a bleating sheepe, And to the Gods that doe their Houses keepe, They vow their Cocks heads, &c.

Thus haue they beene taught, euen by the light of Reason, that, if the disease haue proceeded from God, the ease must also be sought for at his hand. For (as Aquinas hath very well obserued) The Remedie must alwayes be proportio∣nated vnto the Meladie: else will it do•• no good. Medicus (saith he) non tan∣to magìs sanat, quanto maiorem dat medicinam; sed quanto medicina est mor∣bo magìs proportionata. The Physitian doth not alwayes then heale the most strongly, when he giueth the strongest medicines; but when the medicine, which he ministreth, is best tempered, and proportioned vnto the qualitie of the sick∣nesse. And therefore, if the sicknesse haue proceeded from God, it is but Medicina proportionata, that is to say, a Medicine made in his due proportion, that the Remedie should also be fetched from him.

And, that, in thus doing, they haue not beene deceiued, neither in their practice, nor in their opinion, God himselfe hath declared, by euident de∣monstration: by sending a present release from euery sicknesse, whensoeuer they entreated it by their prayers and supplications,* 1.646 as all the fore-named Authors, in all the fore-named places, haue left testified vnto vs: which is the third ranke of our testimonies. For in all the selfe same places, where there is mention made both of the diseases to be sent from God, and of helpe to haue beene entreated of him; there is also mention made, that, at their supplica∣tions, it hath beene sent vnto them. As the Reader may plainly see, in all the fore-alledged places, both of the holy Scriptures, and of the secular writers. Vnto whom, for breuities sake, I refere him.

By all which Examples and Testimonies,* 1.647 it appeareth that the most soue∣raigne Medicine, for the cure of any sicknesse, is, vti Serapi medicina, & quo∣tidie

precari: as Varro aduiseth: to vse the medicine of Serapus; and to powre out vnto God, our continuall and dayly prayers. And therefore the wise King Salomon, in that solemne and excellent prayer, which he made when he dedicated his new built Temple vnto God,* 1.648 hee made this request for one; that, if either Famine, or Pestilence, or Blasting, or Mildew, or Grashopper, or Caterpiller, should at any time afflict them; if they came into that house, and there should powreout their supplications vnto God; that their prayer might be accepted, and their punishment released. Thereby plainely insi∣nuating, that Prayer vnto God, is Panchrestum medicamentum,* 1.649 as the Orator speaketh, A salue for euery sore, and a Cure of euery sicknesse. A probatum est, whereof we may see in Hezechiah, who being attatched with a dangerous sicknesse (some thinke it was the Plague) yet did heale himselfe more soundly by his effectuall prayers,* 1.650 then could a whole Colledge of the learnedest Phisitions. And therefore the Patient, he is appoined to pray: My sonne,* 1.651 faile not in thy sicknesse to pray vnto the Lord,* 1.652 and hee will make thee whole. The Phisition, he is appointed to pray: They shall pray vnto the Lord, that he would prosper that which is giuen for thine ease, and their Phisicke for the prolonging of life. And the Congregation they are appointed to pray: Is any man sicke among you? Let him call for the Elders of the Church, and let them pray for him,* 1.653 and anoint him with oyle in the name of the Lord. And the prayer of faith shall saue the sicke, and the Lord will raise him vp: and if hee haue committed any sinne, it shall be forgiuen him. In which place is congested, the whole summe of all those heades which before I haue collected, both in this present Chapter, and also in the former, namely; First, that Sinne is the true cause of sicknesse, vpon whose forgiuenesse there followeth a release, as Mathew, 9. 2. Secondly,* 1.654 that God for this cause, sendeth sicknesse vnto men. Thirdly, that God is not onely the sender of sicknesse, but also the restorer vnto health. And fourthly, that the principall meanes to recouer, is earnest and hearty prayer; our owne, our Phisitions, and our faithfull Ministers. So that, in this Case, it is not amisse (though Tullie deride it,* 1.655 as a kinde of mad∣nesse) ad aegros, non Medicos adducere▪ sed Vates, & Ariolos: to bring vnto the Patient,* 1.656 not a Phisition, but a Prophet. For so did God himselfe vnto Heze∣chiah, in his sicknesse. He sent vnto him, not Medicum, but Vatem, the Pro∣phet Isay to visite him: by whom notwithstanding hee was both comforted, and cured. Thus God (as I haue shewed you) is both the Giuer, and the Restorer of Health; yea, and that oftentimes immediately of himselfe, with∣out all externall meanes: sending it downe sometime immediately out of heauen,* 1.657 by the only power of prayer, as he did Elias his fire. Thereby plainely declaring, that it was both a false & impious opinion, which was held by Leo∣gorus: Se fortuitò potiùs, quàm Dei voluntate, valetudinem recepisse:* 1.658 That hee recouered by Fortune, rather then by Gods blessing. For, it was not by Fortune, that euen Pheraeus Iason recouered health,* 1.659 when his Enemy smiting him chanc't, to breake his impostume. This was onely Gods blessing. Hee was his Phisition.

4 Yea,* 1.660 and so is he likewise vnto all other men, euen when they vse their best meanes: because all the vertue of them is onely giuen by him. He it is, that hath giuen all medicinall herbes and plants vnto man. He it is, that

hath giuen the Art of the Phisition, and the skill how to vse them. And hee it is, that onely giueth all the efficacie vnto them, by ioyning his blessing with them. And all this is confessed, as well by the very heathens, as it is by vs Christians.

For the first of which three points: that God is the giuer of all medicines vnto Man; we see this by experience, that there is a sanatiue and medicinable power giuen both vnto herbes, and vnto rootes, and vnto stones, and vnto mineralls; yea and euen vnto diuers kinds of pure & simple earths; called Terrae sigillatae, because they be printed and sealed for diuers seuerall vses in mans sicknesses and infirmities. With all which seuerall medicines the body of the earth is so euery where replenished, yea and the sur-face of it so euery where ouer-strew∣ed, as if the whole earth were nothing else but a great bolus, or masse of soue∣raigne medicines, made vp, by God himselfe, for mans seuerall diseases.

Now the Question is, whence this healing virtue commeth, vnto all the forenamed Simples? whether, from the qualitie of the earth, wherein they grow? or, from the influence of the starres, whereby they grow? or, from some inward nature in themselues? or, from fate? or, from chance? or, from diuine prouidence? For, it needes must proceede from some one of these. But that it cannot come from any one of the fiue first imaginary causes; it is (by diuine prouidence) most euidently declared, in the Booke of Genesis: Where, it is expresly testified (as it were for the preuenting of this fond opi∣nion) that God made euery plant of the field,* 1.661 before he put it into the Earth; and euery h••rbe, before it grew. A worke of so great carefulnesse, as hee hath not expressed in any other of his Creatures: man himselfe alone excepted. Now this place dischargeth all those forenamed causes of doing any worke in this notable effect. The Earth, that hath not giuen this virtue vnto plants: be∣cause they all were made before they were put into the Earth. The Starres, they haue it not giuen vnto them: because all the plants were made before them. For the plants of the Earth were made the third day: but the Pla∣nets of Heauen were not made before the fourth: no,* 1.662 nor the sixt Starres neither, as appeareth in the Scripture. Their owne power and nature hath not giuen it vnto them: because they had not their very being of themselues, but receiued it of another, euen the Diuine Creator. Fate, that hath not giuen it vnto them: because they alwayes possesse it not, neither worke, by necessity, vnto their owne effect. Chance, that hath not giuen it vnto them: because then, the remedies could not haue answered so aptly vnto the diseases, nor so constantly, in all places. Now, if neither Earth, nor Heauen, nor Nature, nor Fate, nor Fortune, haue giuen those qualities vnto Herbes, and Plants: then must Prouidence needes haue done it. For,* 1.663 as Plutarch collecteth, in the very like case, that, Omnia quaene{que} fortuitò fiunt, ne{que} necessariò, ne{que} diuinitùs, res sunt naturales: so may we collect, from the very same diuision, vsing a little inuersion: that, Quae ne{que} fortuitò fiunt, ne{que} necessariò, ne{que} naturâ, ea fiunt di∣uinitùs. Those things, which are neither done by Fortune, nor by Fate, nor by Nature, they must needs be done by Prouidence.

And, for our present instance; that the virtues of herbes are giuen to them by Prouidence, we may further collect, by two other Obseruations. The first whereof, is this: That the body of a man is not subiect vnto any sicknesse,

though neuer so dangerous, but that it hath some remedie prouided for it; if man were as skilfull, in discerning of them as God hath beene bountifull, in prouiding of them.

And therefore saith Bachiarius: Ab sit hoc a fide mea,* 1.664 vt aliquam dicam esse plaga••, qu••e non haebeat consolationem: cùm mihi Propheta proclamet: Nun∣quid Medicus non est in Galaath? aut resina non est illùc? Farre be it from me to beleeue, that there can be any maladie, which hath not his remedie: seeing that the Prophet calleth out vnto me; Is there no balme in Gilead? and is there no Physition there? Whereby it appeareth, that those medicinall qualities were bestowed vpon plants, by such a prouidence as was full of all goodnes, entertayning a generall care for all of vs; yea and for euery disease that might befall any of vs; that there shold not be any one, but that it had his medicine.

The second of those obseruations is this: That those medicinable plants are so graciously disposed, in all the parts of the earth, that, as there is no sicknesse, but it hath his redresse: so is there no place, but it may be found in it: no region but it hath a naturall medicine, to cure euery sicknesse that is naturally bred in it, if man, in his ignorance, did not mistake it. Yea and that so vniuersally, that (as Plinie obserueth) Ne Syluae quidem,* 1.665 horridiòr{que} naturae facies medicinis carent; sacra illa parente rerum omnium nusquā non re∣media disponente homini. Euen the woods themselues, and the roughter face of Nature, be not without their medicines; the holy Parent of all things pro∣uiding helps for men, in all coasts, and all places. Whereby againe it appea∣reth, that those Medicines were ordayned, by such a kind of Prouidence, as both had infinite wisedome, to vnderstand, what medicines were fit, for what diseases; and infinit power, to produce them, in all places. For, as Galen,* 1.666 no lesse religiously, then wisely, collecteth: Invidere nulli•• bona, est perfectae bonitatis; invenire cunctis bona, est summae sapientiae; sed efficere cunctis bona, est, insuperabilis potentiae. To enuie good to nothing, is a note of perfect good∣nes; To finde out good for all things, is a note of perfect wisedome; But to doe good vnto all, is a note of perfect power. So that, as concerning those me∣dicinable plants, it is very true, which S. Basil obserueth, that, Non sponte sua ex Tellure germinant Herbae,* 1.667 quae contra quoscun{que} morbos accommodae sunt: sed, eae, voluntate Opificis, ad nostram vtilitatem productae sunt. Those Herbes which men vse for the cure of all diseases, doe not grow out of the earth of them∣selues: but, by their Creators goodnesse, they were made to profit vs. And so likewise Theodoret, vnto the same purpose: Creator rerum, Terram quo{que},* 1.668 multas Herbarum species, non advescendum modò, sed & eas, quae esui inuti∣les sunt, germinare iussit: quandoquidem non alimento modò, verùm etiam valetudinis ••ura, nobis opus est. The Creator of all things commanded the Earth to produce all kinds of Herbes; not onely such herbes, as are fit to be our meates; but also such Herbes, as be vnfit for that purpose: because a man stands in need, as well of medicines, as of meates. So that, all kindes of Herbes, with all their vertues,* 1.669 whether nutritiue, or sanatiue, they be onely the gifts of God vnto Man: Who (as Ecclesiastic•••• testifieth) hath created all the Medicines of the Earth: and hee that is wise, will not abhorre them.

Yea, and euen the very Heathen confesse also the same. Tullie reckoneth vp this,* 1.670 as one of the greatest bounties of Nature, that there be, in all places

great store of wholsome medicines: Medicamentorum salutarium plenissimae Terrae. And Plinie speaking of simple medicines,* 1.671 referreth their frequencie vnto Natures benignitie. Naturae placuit, esse remedia parata vulgo, inuentu facilia, ac sine impendio. Nature hath prouided, that all her wholesome Me∣dicines should be ready at hand, easie to be found, and not deare to be purcha∣sed. Adding a little after, that, Remedia vera, pauperrimus quis{que} coenat. That the best, and truest Medicines, are euery day eaten, euen by poore men, in their Suppers. As for exotick and compounded medicines; hee affirmeth, in the same place, that they haue only beene i••uented by the fraud of Physitions, rather to giue a false credit to their Art, then to bring any true benefit vn∣to their Patient.

Now, though both these two Authors, doe ascribe the making of those plants vnto Nature: yet, vnder that word, they vnderstand God. When they praise the benignitie & bountie of Nature, for giuing such medicinable plants vnto men, they doe meane, The diuine Nature. Or if they meane by Nature, any setled and fixed order of generation; then, when they ascribe those plants vnto Nature, they meane onely in respect of their present pro∣pagation; and not in respect of their first Creation. For, that themselues confesse to be the worke of God: as Trismegistus expresly acknowledgeth; Constat,* 1.672 de Herbis, de Lapidibus, de Aromatibus, vim Diuinitatis naturalem in se habere: It is certaine, both in Herbes, and in Stones, and in Spices, that they haue a naturall force of Diuinitie in them. So that, it is so naturall, that it is also diuine. It is naturall, in respect of their present propagation; which holdeth a naturall course, in their generation; but it is supernaturall and diuine, in respect of their first Creation. It is so, Vis naturalis; that it is also, Vis Divinitatis; as he plainely there affirmeth.

5 And,* 1.673 as the Heathen acknowledge, that medicinable Qualities are gi∣uen vnto plants; and plants, with their Qualities, are giuen vnto men, only by the gift of God: so doe they also confesse, that the finding out of those Qualities in them, and the skill how to vse them, is onely the worke of his goodnesse vnto man, and not the effect of Mans owne invention. Mirari li∣cet (saith Tullie) quae sint animaduersa a Medicis Herbarum genera,* 1.674 quae Radi∣cum▪ ad morsus bestiarum, ad oculorum morbos, ad vulnera: quorum vim at{que} naturam ratio nunquàm explicavit. It is a wonder to consider, how many sorts of Herbes, and how many kindes of Rootes are obserued by Physitions for the biting of Serpents, or other hurtfull Beasts, the diseases of the Eyes, and the healing vp of wounds. The nature and power of all which seuerall plants is so infinite an inuention, as could neuer haue beene found out by Mans wit and reason. Now if the wit of man could not finde out this great secret: what was it then, that hath found it out? Surely nothing else, but a diuine illumi∣nation, and inspiration of God. And this, euen the Heathen themselues haue confessed. Deorum fuisse apparet (saith Plinie) aut certè divinum,* 1.675 etiam cùm Homo inveniet. It is apparent that this was Gods inuention, or, at the least, that it was a diuine inuention, euen though it were inuented and found out by man: But he resolueth, that this is so high a skill and vnderstanding, as was rather giuen by God, then euer found by man. Eandem omnium parentem, & ge∣nuisse hac, & ostendisse, nullo vitae miraculo maiore, si verum fateri volumus.

That vniuersall Parent and Creator of all things, who first created those Me∣dicines for man, hath also declared the vse of them vnto him. A thing most strange and miraculous, if we will confesse the truth. And, a little before, hee rendereth a reason, why the knowledge of those things must needs be rather the teaching of God, then the inuention of man. Because, if God hath on∣ly giuen those virtues vnto plants; and man, without God, hath found them out; man hath done the greater worke, and God the lesse: Superata hoc modo videri posset naturae ipsius munificentia, si humani operis esset inuentio. And therefore, a little after, hee concludeth, that, Si quis illa fortè ab homine exco∣gitari posse credit, ingratè Deorum manera intelligit: If any man do thinke, that such things could haue bene found by the wit and reach of man, hee is an vn∣thankfull interpreter of the gracious gift of God. Vnto whom Homer also as∣cribeth this blessing, that for all kind of Medicines, it is onely hee that posses∣seth them:

Pharmaca cunctorum Iupiter vnus habet:* 1.676 God only hath the remedie, For euery kinde of malady.

And thus, euen the very Heathens themselues do expresly acknowledge, both the plants themselues to be the workes of God, and the knowledge of their vses to be the gift of God.

Neither stay they only heere, in this particular branch of Phisicke; but they acknowledge the whole Art,* 1.677 to be the gift of God. Hippocrates affirmeth it, in expresse and plaine words; Medicam facultatem Deorum esse munus. And so Tully likewise:* 1.678 Medicinae vtilitas Deorum immortalium inuentioni est consecrata. The Art of Phisicke, is of so great a profit, that the inuention of it, is ascribed vnto God. So Plinie: Dijs inuentores suos assignauit. Yea,* 1.679 and it is expresly affirmed by Homer,* 1.680 to bee both a diuine Science, and greater then any other.

Ast, Medicum, reliquis diuina scientia, maior Instruit.

Yea, and Apollo, one of their chiefest gods, doth boast of this inuention to be his,* 1.681 and none others.

Inuentum Medicina meum est, opifer{que} per Orbem Dicor: & Herbarum est subiecta scientia nobis. The Art of Phisicke, it is mine Inuention, and an Art Diuine. And I am call'd, the World all o're, The common Helper of their sore. The Nature of all Plants is knowne Only to Me, it is mine owne.

And therefore they called Apollo, Vlion, Salutiferum, and Artemidem; ex eo,* 1.682 quòd integros faceret, as Strabo reporteth: because he made men whole. But Plutarch reduceth this Art, a great deale higher, referring it, not to Apollo,* 1.683 but euen vnto Iupiter, or if there be any God, who is greater. For hee con∣demneth it, as one of the greatest absurdities of the Stoicks, that they do as∣cribe this Art, vnto any of the petty and inferior gods, and not rather vnto him, that is the chiefest of them. Wherein hee erred not. For it is, indeede,

the gift of the greatest God. It is hee (saith Ecclesiasticus) that hath giuen men this knowledge,* 1.684 that he might be glorified,* 1.685 in his wondrous workes. And therefore he exhorteth vs, To honour the Phisition, because of necessitie. Ad∣ding there this reason: For the Lord hath created him. He hath created him; not onely as he is a man; but also as he is a Phisition. As it is expresly testi∣fied, by Saint Augustine. Illa corporis medicina ••on inuenitur,* 1.686 vnde ad Homi∣nes manare potuerit, nisi a Deo: Cuirerum omnium status salus{que} tribuenda est. It cannot bee found out, from whence the Art of Phisicke should come vnto men, but onely from God: vnto whom the health and safetie of all things ought to be ascribed. So Basil: Ars medica,* 1.687 à Deo, vitam nostram mo∣derante, concessa est. The Arte of Phisicke is giuen vs of God who onely ruleth our whole life. So Theodoret: Quia Deus, qui te mortalem in hac vita condi∣dit, sciuit, te morbis quo{que} exercendum fore, simul medicam artem te docuit: cuius scientiam morborum incur sionibus opposuit. Because God, who made man mortall in this present life, foresaw, that he needs must be exercised with sick∣nesses, he therefore taught him the Arte of Phisicke: opposing that knowledge,* 1.688 against the assaults of all kindes of diseases. And so likewise Ephra••m Syrus, comprehending in one sentence both these last fore-named points; Deus, Herbas, & Terrae pharmaca, & Medicorum studia, ad morbos corperis curandos concessit: God hath giuen vs, both Herbes, and other wholsome Medicines; and beside, both the study, and skill of Phisitions, to cure all the maladies, and disea∣ses of our bodies. So that, it is onely hee, which hath giuen both all medici∣nable plants vnto the Earth, and all skill to the Phisition, in what manner to vse them. And thus, both the Heathens, and Christians agree, that both the Phisicke, and the Phisition, are the onely gifts of God, for the health, and good of man.

6 But yet, neither of both these can doe any good vnto him, if they bee not assisted with Gods speciall blessing. For first,* 1.689 for the Phisition: that it is not in his power, with all his skill, to make any sicke-man whole; we may see it,* 1.690 in the old Testament, by the example of King Asa: whose too great confi∣dence in his Phisitions, and too little in his God, was that which brought him vnto his end. And the same we may likewise see,* 1.691 in the new, in the woman dis∣eased with the bloody issue: Of whom it is testified, that though shee had suffered many things from her Phisitions, and continued long with them, and vsed great change of them, and spent all she had vpon them; yet was she ne∣uer the better for them, but rather much the worse. And the like is also re∣ported of the Emperor Adrian; that hee,* 1.692 at his death, was forced to com∣plaine, that, Turba Medicorum interfecit Regem: The multitude of Phisitions had brought the Emperour vnto his death. Whereby it appeareth, that no Phisition hath power to heale any man, if God do not giue a special blessing vnto him. As the Philosopher Taurus insinuated to that Phisition,* 1.693 that came to heale A: Gellius. Cum Dijs bene volentibus, opera tua, sistas hunc nobis sanum. Implying, that his labour and Gods blessing must worke both together, before the sick-man could recouer. For, as Ecclesiasticus expresly testifieth, Nei∣ther the Apothecary can finish his owne worke, in making of the Medicine; nor yet the phisition, his, in applying of the medicine; if they be not assisted, with Gods speciall blessing. The Apothecarie (saith he) doth make a confection: and yet he

cannot finish his owne worke. For of the Lord commeth prosperitie, and wealth, ou••r all the Earth. Then he commeth from him, vnto the Phisition: Giue place to the Phisition,* 1.694 for the Lord hath created him. Let him not go from thee: for thou hast neede of him. But what? can he heale thee when he list? No. But he addeth: The houre may come, that their enterprises may haue good successe. But how? He addeth further: For they shall pray vnto the Lord, that he would prosper that which is giuen for ease; and their Physick, for the prolonging of life. So then the Physition toucheth: but it is God that healeth. There is greater effica∣cie vnto health, in the Physitions prayer, then there is in his power: the whole prosperitie of the medicine depending vpon Gods blessing. And therefore saith S. Hierom:* 1.695 De omni infirmitate dicendum est, quòd abs{que} mise∣ricordia Dei, medendi ars nihil valeat. In all a mans infirmities, without Gods speciall goodnesse, the arte of the Physitions is of very little worth. And in an∣other place, he confirmes his owne assertion, by the fore-named instance, of the diseased woman.* 1.696 Quis Medicorum sanare 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 potuit, nisi tu solus? ad cuius contactum fimbriae, flatìm redijt sanitas. which of all the Physitions could heale that diseased woman, but onely thou alone? Who wast able to restore her health vnto her, by touching, but onely, the hemme of thy vesture.

Yea, and the same Father againe reporteth of Hilarion: that, when a like diseased woman was brought vnto him, desiring to be cured, and com∣playning that no Physick could doe her any good, that holy Father replyed: Si quae in Medicis perdidisti, Pauperibus dedisses,* 1.697 curasset te verus Medicus Iesus: If that, which thou hast lost vpon thy Physitions, thou hadst bestowed vp∣on poore and needy persons, Iesus Christ, the true Physition, would haue cured thee long agone. And therefore S. Basil hath giuen vs a good Caueat: not to repose so strong a confidence in any kind of Physicke, be it neuer so good; because all is but weake,* 1.698 without the blessing of God. Satagendum est, vt h••c Arte, si quandò illa opus est, ita vtamur, vt non omnem illi causam sanita∣tis ascribamus. We must take heed, that when we vse the helpe of Physick; yet that we ascribe not all our health vnto it. For, as hee addeth a little after: Irrationale est,* 1.699 propriae salutis spem in manus ponere Medicorum. It is against all reason, to put all the hope of our health in the hand of the Physition; who hath it not in his hand: as before I haue shewed.

And, as it is not in the Arte of the Physition to giue health vnto the sicke-man: so is it not also in the power of any Medicine. For, as it is af∣firmed in the Booke of Wisedome (speaking of those Israelites that were stong and bitten by the firie Serpents) It was neither Herbe,* 1.700 nor Plaister that healed them, but the word of the Lord, that healeth all things. Nay, it was not the Brazen Serpent that healed them, though for that very purpose it was speci∣ally appointed; but it was only God himselfe that healed them by it, as is ex∣presly there affirmed:* 1.701 He that turned towards it, was not healed by that thing which he saw, but by thee, ô Sauiour of all. Whereby it appeareth, that it is not the outward medicine, but the inward blessing, that healeth. And that, as S. Augustine obserueth, our health commeth vnto vs, onely from God, the Creator:* 1.702 euen then, when we receiue it, by meanes of the Creature. De Creatura mihi salus est? A Deo est. And this we may see verified, both in

the old,* 1.703 and new Testament. God appointed King Hezechiah, to apply a plaster vnto his sore▪ but, in the same place, he telleth him, that it is he, that doth heale him. And,* 1.704 S. Iames biddeth the Elders, to annoint the sicke m••n with oyle; but, in the same place, he addeth, that it is the Lord, that doth raise him vp. So that, as S. Augustine very well obserueth,* 1.705 Corporis medica∣menta, quae hominibus ab hominibus adhibentur, non, nisi ijs, pro∣sunt, quibus Deus operatur salutem. Qui, & sine illis mederi potest; cùm, sine ipso, illa non possunt. Those bodily Medicines, which are applied by men, doe profit none but those, vnto whom God himselfe doth worke, for their health. Yet he can heale, without any Medicine: but so cannot any medicine without 〈◊〉〈◊〉. And this also is confessed,* 1.706 euen by the very Heathen: Etiam, sine Me∣dico, medicinam dedit Minerua. God can heale any Sicknesse, euen without a Physition. He can heale, euen by his onely word. He sent his word, and hea∣led them. Nay, he can heale, by his onely will, as is noted by S. Basil. Sola vo∣luntate contentus. And he giueth this for instance. Volo: mundare. I will: Be thou cleane. Thus, it is onely God that healeth, whether it be with the Medicine, or without the medicine. For, All health is of him; as is testified in the Psalme.

Now, to recollect all these Heads; and to apply them vnto that, which is our maine purpose. If God be both the Giuer and the Praeseruer, and the Resto∣rer of health: if he haue both giuen vs all those Medicines, that vphold and maintaine it: and taught vs, the true and right vses of them: and giuen his blessing, to assist their working: then must there needs be a God, that pro∣cureth all this good. But, that the first of these is true: it appeareth in the seuerall sections of this Chapter. And therefore, the second must likewise needs be true.

CHAP. 7.

Little Citties doe rise to be great. 2. Great Cities doe fall to be little. 3. Yet is not this the worke, of either Fate, or Fortune: 4. But of Gods owne Pro∣uidence, and Praeor dination. 5. Who limiteth their powers. 6. Boundeth their Dominions. 7. And praescribeth their continuance.

THe next Consideration is taken from the Politicks: and therein from the rising and falling of Cities, of Kingdomes, and Com∣monwealths. Which great and notable works, though diuers of the Heathen haue partly ascribed to Fate, and partly vnto Fortune; yet falsely vnto both of them: as being in very deede the onely worke of God. Who, as sometime he raiseth poore men, out of the very dust,* 1.707 and lifteth vp their heads, to make them sit with Princes, cal∣ling them (as he did Dauid) A caula ad aulam: so doth he oftentimes,* 1.708 with Ci∣ties, and Nations, aduancing them from poore Originals, to be great and mighty Monarchies. Carthage, which at last grew so mighty and potent, as to fight with Rome it selfe,* 1.709 for the Empire of the world:* 1.710 yet was,* 1.711 at first, no larger then could be encompassed with the thongs of a Bulls hide. Yea, and euen Rome it selfe, which obtayned that Empire, and Lorded it ouer all with an iron Scepter: yet was extended no further by Romulus, but onely to

the number of a thousand houses. In so much that the Italian Poet wonde∣reth at the wonderfull increasings of it:

Aspice, nec longè repotam,* 1.712 modó Roma minanti Impar Iüdenae contentá{que} crescere Asylo, Quò se extulerit dextrìs.

Loe; but of late, how little Rome; To what a greatnes now She's come!

Yea and Venice, at this time the Venus of all Cities, and the strongest For∣tresse and Balwarke of all Christians; yet was,* 1.713 at first, but a Marish, inhabited by poore Fishers. And the like may be obserued, almost of all those other renowmed and famous Cities: whose glorious gests and victories haue so greatly innobled them, in the register of Histories: they haue, most of them, bene raised from such ignoble and contemptible originalls; that, when they view themselues in the ruffe of their greatnes, they are vtterly ashamed, to thinke of their first littlenesse.

2 And, as we may obserue diuers poore and little Cities,* 1.714 to haue growne great and potent, being raysed from the dust, to sit among the Starres: so may we likewise obserue, on the contrary part, diuers great and potent Cities, to haue become very little ones, being pluck't downe from the Starres, to sit downe in the dust.* 1.715 God threatneth against Edom, that though they exalted themselues like vnto Eagles, and placed their nest among the Starres, yet would he bring them downe. And he calleth vnto Babel, that proud Monarch of the East: Come downe, ô Daughter Babel, and sit in the dust: sit vpon the ground: for there is no more throne,—Sit still,* 1.716 and get thee into darknesse:* 1.717 for thou shalt no more be called, The Lady of Kingdomes. And, that this his threatning was not brutum fulmen, an idle flash of Lightning; but that it had his full effect, vpon that proud Citie, we may euidently see, by comparing this place of the Prophet; wherein she is sayd to be, Tender and delicate; with another place of the Psalmist, wherein she is sayd to be,* 1.718 a Citie wasted with misery. Babel vastata. Whereby it appeareth that this threatned deuastation, had, euen in those dayes, begunne to seaze vpon them. Which happeneth oftentimes so sodainely,* 1.719 that that which in many yeares was not builded, yet is, in a mo∣ment, destroyed: as Isaiah giueth instance both in Ar, and Kir: which both were destroyed, and brought to silence, in a night. And Phauorinus obserueth the same of Helice, and Bura: that they were sodainely swallowed vp. Absorptae sunt, & tanquam nauigantes perierunt: & perished in a moment, as Saylors do,* 1.720 by Shipwracke. And the like may be obserued, of diuers other mighty Cities, heretofore the Imperiall seates of great and potent Monarchs; that now they are so vtterly demolished, as that, euen their very places can no more be found, nor no man say, that, Here they stood; as Niniue, Susis, Ecbatane, and diuers others recknoned vp by Pausanias. Mycenae,* 1.721 quae in bello Troiano impe∣rârunt Graecis; Ninus deinde, in qua Assyriorum Regia fuit; tertiò, Th••bae Boeoticae, quae principem olìm locum in Graecia obtinuerunt: hae omnes ad inter∣necionem vs{que} sunt desolatae. Mycenae, which, in the time of the Troian warre, was the head of all Greece; and Ninus, where was sometimes the Royall Palace of the Assyrian Monarchs; and Thebes of the Boeotians, one of the chiefest Cities of all the Graecians, are now quite destroyed and made vtterly desolate.

Vpon which occasion, hee entreth a meditation of the notable ••ragilitie of all humane prosperitie; giuing, in that place, diuers other very pregnant and remarkeable instances, of Thebes in Aegypt, and Orchomenus, sometimes two rich and populous Cities, but now reduced beneath the fortune of diuers priuate persons: So likewise of Delus, sometimes the most frequented and common Mart of all the Graecians, now vtterly deserted and forsaken of all Nations: So likewise of Babilon, sometime the greatest Citie that euer the Sunne look't vpon; but, at that time, so little, that there was nothing there left, but a Wall, and at Temple. Contrariwise, of Alexandria, and Seleucia; which, though they were builded but euen the other day; yet started vp so sodainly to great wealth and glo∣rie. Whereas Chryse and Hiera, sometimes two famous Islands, at that time lay drowned, and buried in the waters. Concluding his meditation, with this ••piphonema: Sic res mortalium sunt momentaneae, & nulla ex parte firmae: Thus the things of mortall men, are both of small continuance, and subiect vnto great mutabilitie of chance. And it should seeme this meditation had made a deepe impression into diuers other of the Heathen, and not a little troubled them. Ouid, lighting into it, addeth diuers other instances vnto those of Pausanias:

Nunc humilis veteres tantummodò Troia ruinas,* 1.722 Et pro divitijs tumulos ostendit avorum. Clara fuit Sparte, magnae viguêre Mycenae, Necnon & Cecropis, nec non Amphionis arces. Vile solum Sparte est: alta cecidêre Mycenae. Oedipodioniae, quid sunt, nisi nomina Thebae? Quid Pandioniae restant, nisi nomen, Athenae? Now humbled Troy is turn'd to dust, and nothing hath to show, But rubbish, for her riches; and the ruin'd Toombs, I trow, Of ancient Inhabiters. So Sparta famous was; And Mycene great, and glorious; and Theb's a stately place; Renowned Athens was the like. But now, faire Sparta is A Soyle most vile; and Mycene high is falne full low, I wis: And as for Theb's and Athens both; to both betides the same; For both, and all, haue nothing left, besides a naked name.

So that,* 1.723 as the Prophet Obadiah speaketh, They are now become, as if they had neuer bene.* 1.724 And Strabo noteth the same of diuers other Cities, about the mount Carmel: which, he saith, are nothing now, but Oppidorum Nomina, meere names of Cities: vt Sycaminorum ciuitas, & Bubulcorum ciuitas, & Crocodilorum ciuitas: As the Citie of the Sycamines, and the Citie of the Cowheards, and the Citie of the Crocodiles. And that, which these Authors haue obserued of Cities,* 1.725 hath Philo Iudaeus obserued of whole Kingdomes. Quòd si non libet singulorum fortunas perquirere, vide regionum integrarum & gentium mutationes, &c, If you list not to insist vpon the particular fortune of Cities, consider the mutations of whole Countries, and Nations: how (as Lucr••tius also obserueth:)

Augescunt aliae gentes,* 1.726 aliae minuuntur. Some Nations florish, Other some do perish.

3 Now,* 1.727 whence commeth this rising, and falling of Cities; and why doth this happen rather vnto the principals, then it doth vnto others? It appeareth in Plutarch, to be an old conceit, to attribute this to Fate, and to a kind of Destinie bestowed vpon those Cities, in their genethliacks, and na∣tiuities, by the aspects and positure of the Stars.* 1.728 But this the Psalmist re∣iecteth, in expresse and plaine termes:* 1.729 Promotion (saith he) commeth neither from the East, nor from the West, nor from the North, nor from the South. It commeth not from the East, from whence the Stars doe come in their diurnall motion: nor yet from the West, from whence they come againe in their naturall motion: nor yet from North, or South, from whence they goe and come in that motion of theirs which is called Trepidation. From none of all these motions doth Promotion come. But (as it followeth in that Psalme) It is God, that is the Iudge; hee putteth downe one, and setteth vp ano∣ther. And this is true, as well in the fortunes of Cities, and Nations, as of particular persons. As wee may euidently see in the prophecy of Isaiah. Be∣hold (saith he) it is the Lord that maketh the earth empty,* 1.730 and he maketh it waste; He turneth it vpside downe, and hee scattereth abroad the Inhabitants of it. And therefore Plutarch derideth this opinion of the Stars,* 1.731 that they should giue fortune vnto Cities: and reckoneth it among the number of Fables. Yea, and that very worthily. For, if it were fatall for those Cities to rise, how come they to their fall? Is there now crept in a mutabilitie into Fate? Is it now be∣come contrarie vnto it selfe; to depresse the same thing, which before it selfe aduanced? Or, haue things two Fates? the one, whereby they be aduanced, and the other, whereby they are depressed? These things doe not cohere. And therefore some haue runne a cleane contrary course,* 1.732 & ascribed all to Fortune. So Manilius.

—Quoties Fortuna per orbem, Seruitium, imperiúm{que} tulit, varie{que} revertit? How oft hath Fortune, through the world, thinke I, Brought Slauerie, borne Imperie, and wheeled diuers••y?

So Seneca.

Imperia sic excelsa Fortunae obiacent,* 1.733 So highest Empires stoope to Fortunes feete.

So Plutarch, who ascribeth all the prosperitie of the Romanes, onely to their Fortune: writing a Booke of that Argument: De Fortuna Romanorum. So Pausanias, who affirmeth, Vniversa, tum firma, tum imbecilla, quae{que} re∣cèns facta sunt, quae{que} perierunt, a Fortuna immutari, eiús{que} arbitratu, summa vi & necessitate, omnia trahi. All things, both weake, and strong, both things done now of late, and things done long agone, are subiect vnto Fortune: she drawing all things after her, at her owne will and pleasure. And hee giueth, in that place, diuers fit and pregnant instances, as well in the rising, as falling of Cities. For the rising of them, hee there nameth Alexandria, and Seleucia, of whom hee affirmeth, that, Ideo ad tantam magnitudinem & felicita∣tem excreuerunt, quòd Fortuna eos, tanquam manu, duxerit: That they therefore grew vnto such greatnes and felicitie, because Fortune led them to it, as it were, by the hand. In the falling of Cities, he nameth these before mentioned, of Thebes, My••enae, Delus, Babilon, and the rest: of whom hee addeth this Conclusion, that they all were destroyed, by the iniquitie of Fortune:

Et haec quidem prorsùs Fortuna abolevit. So that he ascribeth, as well the ri∣sing, as falling of Cities, to be the worke, not of Prouidence, but of Chance. But, that herein hee is deceiued, it appeareth by this argument: That both the rising, and falling of many Cities, haue beene truely and certainely fore∣told: Which they could not haue beene, if it had beene by Fortune. For, these things which are fortuitous, cannot be foreseene by Prouidence: & therefore not foretold. Who can foretell, that at such a time, such a man shall haue a fall? No more could any man foretell, that at such a time such a king∣dome should haue his fall, if it were meerely casuall. But wee see, by expe∣rience, that both the rising of some Cities, and the falling of others, haue bin certainly foretold, by diuers of the Prophets.* 1.734 The Prophet Daniel, not on∣ly foretelleth, both the rising, and the falling, of the foure grand Monarchies; but also graphically describeth them, by their seuerall properties: yea and paintes them out, vnto our eyes, in two liuely emblemes: the one, of the foure-parted Image; the other,* 1.735 of the foure fearefull Beasts. Yea, and in the transla∣tion and succession of those Monarchies, he plainely describeth the falling of one of them, and the rising of another, vnder the figure of a Battell, betweene a Ramme,* 1.736 and a Goate: wherein the Goate preuayled. Which Goate, he there affirmeth, to be the King of the Graecians; as he doth the R••mme, to be the King of the Persians. Where, if the euent had fallen out contrary vnto his praediction,* 1.737 he being so definite, and confident in his asseueration, hee had beene vtterly shamed,* 1.738 and had iustly incurred the note of a false Prophet. But he knew whom he beleeued,* 1.739 and that hee could not be deceiued: because these things were by God himselfe reuealed; by whom they were both fore-knowne, and fore-appointed. So likewise, the Prophet Ionas, in his foretelling of the destruction of Niniveh, was as definite and peremptorie in appointing the certaine dayes, as Daniel was before, in naming the certaine Nations. Yet forty dayes and Niniveh shall be destroyed.* 1.740 Which finall destruction (though the meanes be vnknowne) yet had certainely happened, if by their earnest re∣pentance, it had not beene auerted.

Another like destruction, there is also foretold, by the Prophet Balaam; to happen from the Grecians,* 1.741 or Romans, vnto the Kingdome both of the As∣syrians, and of the Hebrewes. The Ships shall come from the Coasts of Chittim and shall subdue Assur, and shall subdue Heber, & he also shall come to destructi∣on. A very true prophecie, though vttered by a false Prophet. For, whether we take Chittim for the Greeks, or the Romans, (as it is sometimes for both,) by those two Nations, were those two Kingdomes subdued; and the latter of those Kingdomes, by the latter of those Nations, was not onely subdued, but also subuerted, according to the prophecie in that place deliuered. Now these things could not haue beene thus certainely foreshewne, if they had not beene as certainely foreseene. And that they could not haue beene, if they had fallen out by Fortune. So that, as concerning Fate; Solon excludeth that, in one of his Elegies,* 1.742 cited by Demonsthenes.

Nostra quidem Fato Iovis vrbs non occidet vnquàm: Our famous Cities glorious State Shall neuer fall by force of Fate.

And, for Fortune,* 1.743 Tullie excludeth that: Nostris vitijs, non Cas•• aliquo, Rem∣pub.

••misimus. We haue lost our State, by our offences, and not by any Fortune. Nay euen Pausanias himselfe, in the very same place, where he so resolutely ascri∣beth this worke vnto Fortune; yet (as either forgetting himselfe, or remem∣bring his error) hath plainely confessed, that it is the worke of God. Minimè mir••r, Megalopolin omnia ornamenta ac pristinam felicitatem amisisse,* 1.744 cùm Deum sciam nouis semper rebus delectari. I meruaile not, that the magnificall Citie Megalopolis, hath lost all her ornaments, and ancient eminence; whenas I consider, and know well, how God delighteth himselfe, with the changing of Cities and States. Nay,* 1.745 euen the Deuill himselfe, in assuming the disposing of all kingdomes vnto himselfe, euen there asserteth them vnto a kinde of prouidence, and denieth them both vnto Fate, and vnto Chance.

4 Therefore we must hold this, as a fixt and certaine truth, that both the rising and falling of Cities,* 1.746 Kingdomes, and Common wealths, are the de∣crees and appointments of Gods onely Prouidence. Wherein we haue many very pregnant and cleare testimonies: Yea, and that not onely of the Holy Scriptures,* 1.747 but also of Heathen and Secular Writers. King Salomon saith, in the person of God: By me Kings raigne, and Princes decree iustice. By me Princes rule, and Nobles, and all the Iudges of the Earth. For, as Tertullian truely teacheth, Indè est Imperator, vndè est & homo,* 1.748 antequàm Imperator: indè potestas illi, vndè Spiritus. By him a man is made a King, by whom he was made a Man, before he was a King. Hee gaue him his dominion, that gaue to him his breathing.* 1.749 Now that is onely God: who (as the Apostle testifieth) hath gi∣uen vnto all men, both life, and breath, and all things, He it is (saith the Pro∣phet Daniel) that hath power ouer the Kingdome of men,* 1.750 and that giueth it, vn∣to whom hee pleaseth; yea, euen vnto the very abiects. Whom afterward, if they grow proud, he casteth downe againe. Dij & secunda elatos fortuna, qu••m celerrimè, cùm velint, euertere, & abiectos excitare facilè possunt, sayth Xenophon. God quickly can, at his pleasure, depresse those,* 1.751 that are prided with prosperous Fortune; and easily aduance those, that are deiected with aduerse. Yea, and it was Platoes opinion (as Sabellicus reporteth it) Nullam posse Ciui∣tat••m, sine fauore Numinis, vel prosperè constitui, vel constituta feliciter admi∣nistrari. That there cannot any Citie, either, at the first, be happily planted, or afterward, be prosperously gouerned, without the speciall blessing, and fauour of God. And this may be obserued, to bee particularly affirmed, of all those foure great Monarchies fore-named For the Babilonian Monarchie; the Prophet Daniel expresly ascribeth that vnto God.* 1.752 The most high God (saith he) gaue vnto Nebuchadnezzar, both a Kingdome, and Maiesty, and honour, and glorie. For the Persian Monarchie; King Cyrus himselfe ascribeth that vnto God. For he saith,* 1.753 that, The Lord God of heauen, had giuen him all the King∣domes of the Earth.

Yea, and Themist••cles likewise confessed it, in plaine words, vnto Artaba∣nus, one of the Persian Princes.* 1.754 Ego parebo vestris legibus, quandò ita visum Deo, qui Persas extulit: & propter me plures, quàm nunc sunt, erunt, qui vestrum Regem adorent. I am ready to obey your Persian Lawes, seeing God hath so or∣dained, who hath so greatly exalted the Persians. And I my selfe will bee a meane, that many moe, then now doe, shall giue honour to your King. For the Grecian Monarchie;* 1.755 the Prophet Daniel againe ascribeth that vnto God. For

he saith, that the third Beast, which was like vnto a Leopard (wherein the Greci∣an Monarchie was prefigured,) had his power, and dominion giuen vnto him. And therefore he had it not of himselfe: as Hananias, one of the seauenty two Interpreters, very plainely proueth vnto King Ptolomeus, by this familiar rea∣son.* 1.756 Non quenquam esse Regemex sese, inde patet, Quia omnes cupiunt conse∣qui hanc dignitatem, sed non possunt: cùm Dei donum sit. It appeareth, that no man can make himselfe a King, because all men doe desire it, and yet cannot at∣taine it; because it is Gods gift. As Seneca acknowledgeth in the person of Nero: Munus Deorum est, ipsa quòd seruit mihi Roma, & Senatus. It is Gods gift, that the Citie and the Senate are subiect to me. And for the Romane Mo∣narchie; Plutarch ascribeth that directly vnto God. For,* 1.757 hee saith of Rome, that it could neuer haue growne, á tam vili & paruo initio, ad tantam gloriam & potentiam, sine Numinis praesentia: From so despicable and poore a begin∣ning to so admirable a power and glorie, without the presence & prouidence of God. And this hee there reporteth, not as his owne single and particular opi∣nion, but as a vulgar and common, receiued and maintained among the most of them. And,* 1.758 in another place, hee affirmeth of Rome, that, Fundamenta Romae iecit Tempus cum Deo: That the Foundation of Rome was layd by God and Time. It was layd by God, to continue for a long time, as he wittily there expresseth, by this fit deuice and fiction: That Fortune quickly flew ouer both the Persians, and Assyrians, and Macedonians, and Aegyptians, and Syrians, and Carthaginians: but, when shee came vnto the Romanes, she then put off her wings, as purposing to stay with them, and not to fly from them. So that God gaue them their beginning, in laying their foundation: and hee vpheld their continuing; in giuen to them Time. This is Plutarchs iudgement of them. Yea, and Tully likewise ascribeth all the Romane greatnesse, vnto none other cause, but onely to the bounty and goodnesse of their gods. Quis est tam vecors, qui, cùm Deos esse intellexerit, non intelligat, eorum numine, hoc tantum imperium esse natum, & auctum, & retentum? Who is there so mad, but knowing there is a God, he must also vnderstand, that by his speciall goodnesse, the great Empire of the Romanes is both founded, and increased, and continued? Yea, and in the same place hee ascribeth the dilatation of their Empire, rather vn∣to their religion,* 1.759 then either vnto their valour, or vnto their wisdome. Nec nu∣mero, Hispanos; nec robore, Gallos; nec calliditate, Poenos; nec artihus, Graecos; nec hoc ipso huius Gentis ac Terrae domestico natiuo{que} sensu, Italos Latinos{que}: sed pie∣tate, & Religion•• at{que} hac vna sap••entia, quòd Deorum immortalium numine omnia regi, gubernari{que} perspeximus; omnes gentes nationés{que} superauimus. We haue not ouercom the Spaniards, by our number; nor the French, by our power; nor the Carthaginians, by our pollices; nor the Graecians, by our Arts; nor the Italians, or Latines, by the naturall sharpenesse, and finenesse of our wits: but it is only our pietie, and religion, and this speciall wisedome of ascribing all things to the go∣uernement of the gods, that hath subdued vnto vs so many Countries, and Na∣tions. Thereby plainely insinuating, that the greatnesse of their Empire was bestowed by God vpon them, onely as a reward of their pietie, and religion. Which Caecilius also expresly confirmeth. For he saith of the Romanes,* 1.760 that, Imperium suum, vltra Solis vias, & ipsius Oceani limites, progagârunt, dùm ex∣ercent in armis virtutem religiosam: The exercise of vertue, and of Religion,

was that which inlarged the Romane dominion. For (as he addeth a litle after) Dum vniversarum Gentium sacra suscipiunt, etiam Regna meruerunt. While they receiue the Religions of all Nations, they deserue also their Dominions. This he falsly ascribeth vnto their false religion: which yet may truly be ascribed vnto the true one. And Camillus,* 1.761 in his Oration recorded by Liuie, expresly affir∣meth, that al the calamities of the Romans sprung only from ther offences against God; as, on the contrary, all their prosperity grew only from their piety. Which is true, in very deed, if it be rightly vnderstood, and be referred, as it ought, vn∣to to the true God.* 1.762 For (as Ecclesiasticus very truely affirmeth) It is the feare of the Lord, which causeth, that the Kingdome faileth not: but a Kingdome is lost, by crueltie and pride. And therefore King Ochus, being asked by his sonne, by what meanes he had preserued his kingdome so long? answered,* 1.763 That this was done, Pietate, in Deos; et iustitia, in Homines: By his Pietie, towards God; and his aequitie, towards men.* 1.764 For (as Elihu truely telleth vs) Iudgment and aequitie maintaine all things:* 1.765 Yea, euen the very throne it selfe, as King Salomon acknowledgeth; The Throne is established by Iustice. But it is sup∣planted* 1.766 and ouerthrowne by wickednesse (as Ecclesiastcus) obserueth Because of vnrighteous dealing, and wrongs, and riches gotten by deceit, the Kingdome is translated from one people to another. So that, as King Salomon himselfe in another place affirmeth,* 1.767 Iustice exalteth a nation: but sinne bringeth a people to confusion. A notable example whereof, God himselfe hath left vnto vs,* 1.768 in the Babilonians: whose kingdome and Nation hee professeth that hee will bring vnto vtter desolation, for their sinnes and iniquities. And this we may obserue to haue beene a strong notion, very deepely imprinted in the mindes euen of the Heathens: That, as nothing praeserueth Kingdomes more firmely, then vertue;* 1.769 so nothing destroyeth them more certainly, then vice. A. Gellius ascribeth the rising of the Romans onely vnto their vertues. Omnibus virtu∣tum ganeribus exercendis, colendis{que}, Populus Romanus, è parua origine, ad tantae megnitudinis instar emicuit. The Romans (saith he) ascended from their low and meane beginnings, to such an height of greatnes, only by their practice of all kind of vertues. And Tullie on the contrarie, he saith: They lost their greatnes by degenerating from their ancient vertue vnto vice, in the fore-alledged place: Nostris vitijs, non casu aliquo, Rempub. amisimus; It is not by chance, but it is by our vice, whereby we haue decayed and lost our common-wealth. And therefore in the same place, he pronounceth, that, There is,* 1.770 Nihil tam inimicum Ciuitati, quàm iniustitia; quae, sine magnae iustitia, nec geri, nec stare potest. That there is no such Enemie vnto any Citie, as iniustice is, and iniurie: because, without great Iustice, there cannot any Citie be either well gouerned, or safely praeserued. For, as the Tragicall Poet hath very truely noted:

—Vbi non est pudor,* 1.771 Nec cura iuris, sanctitas, pietas, fides; Instabile Regnum est. Where is nor modestie, nor equitie, nor sanctitie, No pietie, no veritie, no, nor civilitie, In such a Kingdome, certainly, There can be no stabilitie.

Which sentence of the Tragick, is also confirmed, by another of the Comick:

Where hee bringeth in a seruant, disputing with a Virgine, about the fortification and munition of their Towne.

—Vt munitum muro, tibi visum est oppidum?

saith hee.

How like you here, the warlike strength of this our walled Towne? Vnto which she answered presently.

Si incolae benè sint morati, pulchrè munitum arbitror.* 1.772 Perfidia, & peculatus ex vrbe, & avaritia si exulant. Quarta invidia, quinta ambitio, sexta obtrectatio, Septimum periurium, octaua indiligentia, Nona iniuria, decimum (quod pessumum aggressu) scelus. Haec nisi vrbe aberunt, centuplex murus rebus seruandis parùm est. If Citizens be manner'd well; well mann'd and wall'd, I deeme it. If Citie Sinnes be banisht all; then strong, may all esteeme it. If Trecherie, and Robberie, and Auarice be gone, If Enuie, and Ambition, and Backbiting he none; If Periurie, if Idlenesse, if Iniurie be out, And truly, if that Vilainie, the worst of all the rout. Vnlesse these Vices banisht beene, what euer forts you haue, An hundres Walls together put, will not haue power to saue.

Because, by those vices, they do euen inforce God to ouerthrow their Walls, as sometime he did Hiericoes. For, as Bacchylides truely affirmeth,* 1.773

—Alta a coeli sede Diruit oppida—superba, Qui summum in Omnes imperium tenet. It's God, that ruleth ouer all, Who giu's proud Cities such a fall.

Nay, wicked Citizens, by their vices, doe ouerthrow their owne Cities, and digge downe their Walls, as Solon well obserueth.

Nostra quidem Fato Iovis vrbs non ••ccidet vnquàm, Propitijs{que} Dijs, salua manere potest. Moenia sed ciues stolidi, cupidí{que} lucrorum,* 1.774 Ardua, subverti, per sua facta student. It is not Fate our Citie can destroy: We may, long time, in safetie it enioy, The Gods to vs being propitious. But Citizens themselues, so vicious, So foolish are, and couetous; that they Their owne walls raze, and vtterly decay.

And therefore saith Theognis vnto the same purpose:

Nullam vnquam (Cyrne) boni Ciuitatem perdiderunt viri. Sed quando,* 1.775 contumeliosis esse, malis placuerit, Populúm{que} corruperint, iudicia{que} iniustis dederint, Propriorum lucrorum causa, & potentiae; Existima, non diû illam civitatem quietam fore, Et si nunc manet al••a in quiete. Good men did ne're their Cities ruine bring.

But when euill men shall iniuries begin, Not caring to corrupt and violate The Iudgements seates, for their owne Lucres sake: Then looke, that Citie cannot long haue peace, Though for the present it haue rest and ease.

Now, this consent of the Heathen, in thus generally ascribing the rising of Cities and Commonwealths, vnto vertue; and their falling, vnto vice; im∣plyeth, that they beleeued, that God is the Author and worker of both these. Because hee is the Rewarder of vertues, and the punisher of vices: who for the transgressions and wickednesse of men, both abateth and abaseth, and transformeth, and transferreth all their Kingdomes and Commonwealths, as hee himselfe pleaseth. Of all which, the Holy Scriptures haue left vs euident examples.

He abated the Kingdome of the Israelites; when hee tooke from Reho∣boram, ten of the twelue tribes, and bestowed them vpon Ieroboam.* 1.776 He aba∣sed the Kingdome of the Caldeans;* 1.777 when hee called vnto Babel, to come and sit downe in the dust: and draue out their proud King from the compa∣ny of men, compelling him to liue among the brute Beasts: And all that, to teach him but this very lesson, which I now am in prouing: That the most High bereth rule ouer the Kingdomes of men, and that he disposeth them,* 1.778 as it seemeth best vnto him. Hee transformed the Kingdome of the Israelites; when hee changed it from their Iudges, vnto their Kings: as hee likewise did the Romanes, from their Consuls, vnto their Emperours. In which change of that State, it is worthy obseruation, which is written by Plutarch: That God,* 1.779 determining to alter the Commonwealth of the Romanes, from their Optima∣cie, to a Monarchie; hee purposely suffered Brutus to bee ouerthrowne by Octauius, lest hee should bee a meane to ouerthrow that gouernment, which God then determined to set vp, hee being a knowne Enemie vnto the state of a Monarchie.

And finally, he transferred them; the kingdomes of the Canaanites, vnto the Israelites; of the Israelites, vnto the Caldeans; of the Caldeans, vnto the Medes, and Persians; of the Persians, vnto the Graecians; and of the Graecians, vnto the Romanes. All which, haue, in the Scripture, their particular testimo∣nies, to be the workes of none other, but onely of God himselfe: who (as Iob affirmeth in his booke) both looseth the Collar of Kings, aud girdeth their loynes with a girdle; both increaseth the People, and destroyeth them;* 1.780 both in∣largeth the Nations,* 1.781 and bringeth them in againe.* 1.782 And (as Daniel addeth, vnto the same purpose) He both setteth vp Kings, and taketh away Kings. So that (as Tertullian well collecteth) Ille Regna dispensat, cuius est & orbis qui regna∣tur, & Homo ipse qui regnat.—Ille Ciuitates extollit, & deprimit,* 1.783 sub quo fuit aliquandó sine Ciuitatibus genus humanum. He disposeth of Kingdomes, whose both the World is that is ruled, and the Men that rule it. He both exalteth and depresseth Cities, whose Subiects men were, before they had any Cities. And this was vnderstood, euen of the very Heathen: as we may gather out of that prayer, which King Darius made, before his battaile with great Alexander: which Plutarch thus reporteth. Dij natales, at{que} regij, id primùm vos precor,* 1.784 Quam mihi Persarum fortunam dedistis, cam restitutam ego vti posteris relin∣quam;

vti victor, Alexandro rependam, quae in meos, mea calamitate ictos, con∣tulit beneficia. Sìn fa••ale adest tempus, ita{que} visum est Nemesi, & rerum vi∣••issitudini, vti Persarum regnum cesset; vt nemo hominum, praeter vnum Alex∣andrum, in Cyri sedeat solio. Oye immortall Gods, that are mens Creators, and Kings Protectors, first of all I beseech you, that I may leaue the same prosperity of the Persians vnto my Successors, which from you I receiued by my Predeces∣sors; that so I may repay vnto Alexander, those great benefits and fauours, which, in this time of my calamitie, hee hath royally bestowed vpon my dearest friends. But, if the fatall period of time bee now come, wherein the Persians Kingdome must needes change, and be vndone; then againe I beseech you, that the succession of King Cyrus his Throne may fall vnto King Alexander, and vn∣to none other. In which prayer it appeareth, that he verily beleeued, as well the preseruation, as translation of Kingdomes, to be seated in the power of God.

So that, for this point, of the rising and falling of Kingdomes and Com∣monwealths; it seemeth vtterly absurd, not onely to the religion of well be∣leeuing Christians, but also to the reason of vnderstanding Heathens, to re∣ferre and ascribe it vnto any other cause, then onely to Gods prouidence. Es∣pecially not to chance. For, can wee thinke, that that prouidence, which is so precisely curious, as to marke and obserue the falling of Sparrowes, should bee so supinely incurious, as to slight and neglect the falling of Kingdomes?* 1.785 This were absurd to thinke. For; (as Saint Augustine collecteth from diuers other the like workes of prouidence:) Qui non solùm Angelum, & Hominem,* 1.786 sed nec exigui & contemptibilis animantis viscera, nec auis pennulam, nec herbae flosculum, nec arboris folium, sine suarum partium conuenientia dereliquit; nullo modo credendus est, regna Hominum, eorúm{que} dominationes, & seruitutes, a suae prouidentiae legibus alienas esse voluisse. That God, who hath made, not onely Men, and Angells, but hath also ordered, with so great a conuenience, the very entraills of the least and most contemptible ••east, the feather of euery Bird, the flower of euery Herbe, and the leafe of euery Plant; cannot in any wise bee thought, to leaue without the lawes and compasse of his prouidence, the domini∣ons, and slaueries of Kingdomes, and Commonwealths.

5 And this may further be seene, by an other obseruation: that God hath incompassed al the Kingdomes of the earth with a threefold restraint; to wit,* 1.787 a limitation of their powers; a circumscription of their bounds; & a prefinition of their periods. There was neuer, as yet, any kingdome in the world; which ei∣ther for his power, was illimitable; or, for his place, vniuersall; or, for his time, perpetuall. But, God, in his prouidence, hath so incompassed all of them, that euermore their powers, haue bin reduced vnto measures; their dominiōs, vnto bounds; & their cōtinuance, vnto periods. As we may see, by plaine examples in the holy Scriptures. And first, as concerning the restraint of their powers: that may euidently bee shewed, in three Easterne Kings. The first of whom, is Saul: who pursued the Prophet Dauid,* 1.788 with such implacable hatred, that he hunted him in all places, as a Partrich in the wildernes. And yet, when he offe∣red himselfe into his hands, hee had no power to hurt him; but (as Esau in the like case pursuing his brother Iacob) though he came out against him with a purpose to kill him;* 1.789 yet,* 1.790 contrary vnto his purpose, he both louingly & humbly reconciled himselfe vnto him. So that, it might be said, as it is in the Tragicke:

Otium è tanto subitum tumultu Quis Deus fecit?* 1.791 What God, so soone, so great a calme Could bring, from out so great a storme?

Surely euen the same God, who, (as a King testifieth) hath the hearts of all Kings in his hand,* 1.792 and who turneth them, like riuers of waters, whither hee thinketh good. He it was, that so restrayned the power of this wicked King Saul, that he had no power in him, once to touch his Annointed,* 1.793 or to doe his Prophet any harme.

The second of those kings, is Nebuchadnezzer: who was so vainely in∣flated, with the conceit of his owne power, that hee commanded his Cap∣taines to goe fortn, and to see him auenged vpon all the earth,* 1.794 to fill all the face of the earth with his Armies,* 1.795 and to destroy all flesh that obeyed not his commandements: yea to destroy all the gods of all other Nations, a••d to set vp him to be worshipped for the God of the whole world. And thus he proiected to extend his owne power, beyond all due measure, and to aduance his owne honour aboue humane Nature. So that (as the Heathen Poet speaketh) he did

Coelum ipsum petere stultitiâ.* 1.796 He sought, in his deepe foolishnes, To climbe into Heauens Holinesse.

But, what was the euent of this his proud conceit? Surely this his exorbi∣tant and vnmeasurable ambition, and impotent desire of inlardging his power, beyond humane condition, was, by a superior power, restrained, and himselfe of all vaine purposes defeated. His Captaines were destroyed, his armie dispersed: His honour blemished, by the hand of a woman. Yea,* 1.797 and euen his owne person was banished from among the societie of men,* 1.798 and forced to liue wilde among the beasts of the field.* 1.799 So that (as Olympias com∣plained* 1.800 ouer her sonne Alexander, in the very like case) Whilst hee affected the honour of a God, he was depriued of the honour of a man. And all this (as euen hee himselfe confessed) did fall out vnto him,* 1.801 by the appointment of God.

The third, and the last of these Kings, is Senaherib; propounding vnto himselfe the like amplification of his power and dominion, fell himselfe into the like, or a greater confusion. For he sending out all his warlike forces and powers to the siege of Ierusalem;* 1.802 and there, by the mouth of his grandilo∣quus Orator, insulting ouer all the gods of the Heathen; yea and not for∣bearing the very God of Heauen: when he had euen deuoured that king∣dome in hope, and swallowed it downe, for as good as his own: God himselfe putteth his hooke into the nose of that Lion, and brought him backe a∣gaine the same way that hee came, destroying,* 1.803 in one night, an hundred foure∣score and fiue thousands of his Soldiers, and giuing him to be destroyed, by the hands of his owne Sonnes. Thus God, who alway resisteth the proud,* 1.804 resisted the attempts of these three proud kings; curtailling their power, and restray∣ning their ambition; and thereby euidently shewing them, that,* 1.805 as No man can adde one cubite to his stature; so no man can adde one ynch vnto his power, be he neuer so great a King. For (as the Apostle Paul teacheth vs)

there is no power but of God, and the powers that be are ordained of God.* 1.806 Yea, and this the very Heathen themselues confesse likewise. Summi est potestas omnis, & gloria Dei: as our Sauiour Christ testifieth. And, no man hath either kingdome,* 1.807 or power, or glory, but only from him. And therefore king Salomon hath giuen vnto kings a very good exhortation, to remember whence their rule and power commeth. Giue eare ye that rule multitudes, and glorie in the number of your people.* 1.808 For the rule is giuen you of the Lord, and power by the most High: adding, that they be but the officers of his Kingdome.

6 And,* 1.809 as God hath limited vnto all kingdomes their powers: so he hath also circumscribed their dominions, reducing them into compasse, and confining them within their owne bounds and limits. For, as hee hath giuen vnto no king or kingdome an infinite power; no more hath he giuen them an infinite Dominion. Infinitie is Gods owne propertie: which is so peculiar vnto the diuine Nature, that it is not communicable vnto any Creature whatsoeuer. Much lesse to any man, whose largest dominion cannot reach beyond the Circle of the Earth: which is but as a prick. And yet euen this Earth, as small as it is, was neuer yet allowed vnto any one King, were hee neuer so great: no, nor yet a quarter of it. It is true indeed, that the mighty Romane Monarchie was amplified so exceedingly by certaine of the Romans, as though they had gotten the whole world into their hands: and, as though it might truely be affirmed of them (as it is of God himselfe in the Psalme) that in their hands were all the corners of the Earth.* 1.810 Tullie saith of the Romane Empire, that it was, Orbis Terrarum terminis definitum, That it had no other limits, but the limits of the world.* 1.811 And, in another place, hee, speaking of those notable victories, which the Romanes had obtayned by Cn. Pompeius, hee affirmeth of them,* 1.812 that they were, ijsdem, quibus Solis cursus, regionibus ac terminis contentae: contained, within no fewer Regions, then the Sunne incompasseth in his course. This seemed not ynough vnto Caecilius. For he saith, that the Romanes did, Imperium suum, vltra Solis vias, propagare: They inlarged their dominion beyond the course of the Sunne. And Ovid, hee commeth not a steppe behind them, in this their exaggerated amplification. For he saith, that if God should looke downe from heauen vpon the earth, he could see nothing there, without the power of the Romanes.* 1.813

Iupiter, arce sua, totum cùm spectet in Orbem, Nil, nisi Romanum, quod tueatur, habet.

Yea,* 1.814 and (as Egesippus recordeth) there were many, that thought the Romane Empire so great, and so largely diffused ouer the face of the whole Earth, that they called, Orbem Terrarum, Orbem Romanum: they called, the Globe of the Earth, the Globe of the Romanes; the whole world, the Romane World. And the same follie, which possessed the Romanes for their power, possessed also the other Monarchs for theirs. Nebuchadnezzer the Monarch of the Caldeans,* 1.815 conceited, that hee had vnder him, all nations, and languages. And Cyrus, the Monarch of the Persians, professed, that he was the Lord of the whole world: The Lord God of Heauen, hath giuen me all the Kingdomes of the Earth. Thus blinde and bewitching a thing is Ambition, that it dazeleth the sight of com∣mon sense and reason. For,* 1.816 all this great ostentation is indeed nothing else, but, either the rhetoricall amplification of hyperbolizing Orators; wherein

there is truely audacia Tropi; or, the vaine imagination of those fore-na∣med Monarchs, doting vpon their owne greatnesse. For, the two first Monarchies of the Caldeans and Persians, were both of them shut vp, within the lists of Asia, and scarcely touched the skirts of either Europe, or Africa. The Graecian Monarchie wrought Eastward into Asia too: which, though it stretched further then either of the former; yet were there many great Countries, euen in Asia it selfe, both Northward, Southward, and Eastward, where it neuer so much as touched. The Romane indeed stretched furthest of all the rest, as being possessed of large Kingdomes and Dominions, both in Asia, Europe, and Africa. But yet, for all that, they were so farre from ob∣taining the Empire of the whole world, that they could neuer get wholy any of these three parts of it: but there were in all of them diuers Regions and Countries, Vbi nec Pelopidarum facta, ne{que} famam audiebant:* 1.817 Where they ne∣uer so much as heard,* 1.818 either the facts or the fame, of either Grecians, or Ro∣names. As Macrobius ingenuously acknowledgeth: Gangem transnare, aut Caucasum transcendere, Romani nominis fama non valuit. The fame of the Ro∣manes, as great as it was, yet was neuer so great, as either to be able to swim ouer the Riuer Ganges, nor yet climbe ouer the mountaine Caucasus. So that, euen their Fame came farre short of those swelling amplifications, which before you saw vsed, by their Orators, and Poets. But their Dominion came much shorter: as is expresly affirmed by the fore-alledged Author, Totius Terrae,* 1.819 quae ad Coelum puncti locum obtinet, minima quaedam particula, à nostri generis hominibus, possidetur. That though the whole Earth, compared with the Hea∣uens, be no bigger then a Center in the midst of a Circle; yet that scarce the least parcell of this little Earth, did euer come into the hands of the Romanes. Thus, euen these great and mighty Monarchies, which were the highest Columnes of Maiestie vpon the Earth, yet haue, all of them, beene reduced within their bounds and limits: yea and those very streight ones. And therefore none of the minor and inferior Kingdomes could be left without limits. As Tertul∣lian plainely proueth, by a particular enumeration of the greatest, and most famous of them. Si Salomon regnauit, in finibus tantùm Iudeae; à Bersabe vs{que} Dan, termini eius Regni signantur. Si verò Babilonijs & Parthis regnauit Da∣rius; non habuit potestatem vlteriùs, vltra fines Regni sui, non habuit in omni∣bus gentibus potestatem. Si Aegyptijs Pharaoh, vel quis{que} ei in haereditate Regni successit, illìc tantùm potitus est Regni sui dominium. Si Nabucodon••sor cum suis Regulis, ab India vs{que} Aethiopiam, habuit Regni sui terminos. Si Alexander Macedo nunquam Asiam vniversam, & caeteras Regiones, postquàm devicerat, tenuit. Si Germani adhuc vs{que} limites transgredi non sinuntur. Britanniae, intra Oceani ambitum, conclusae sunt. Maurorum gens, & Getulorum barbaries a Romanis obsidentur, ne Regionum suarum fines excedant. Quid de Romanis dicam, qui de legionum suarum praesidio imperium sunm muniunt, nec trans istas Gentes porrigere vires Regni sui possunt?

If Salomon raigned as a King, yet was it but onely in the Kingdome of Iu∣dea: the borders of his Kingdome extended no farther then from Dan vnto Beersheba. If Darius raigned ouer the Babylonians and Parthians; yet had be no dominion beyond the bounds of his owne Kingdome: hee could not com∣mand ouer euery other nation. If Pharaoh and his Successors raigned ouer the

Aegyptians, yet all his dominion was onely ouer them. If Nabucodonosor and his Princes haue raigned from India vnto Aethiopia, yet there his Kingdome en∣ded. So Alexander himselfe could neuer obtaine whole Asia, nor yet long retaine those Regions which he there had conquered. The Germans are not suf∣fered to goe beyond their limits. The Britains are shut vp within the compasse of the Sea. The Moores and Getulians are kept in by the Romanes, so that they cannot come without their bounds. Nay, the Romanes themselues are faine to guard their dominions with their Garrisons and Legions, and cannot extend their Empire ouer all nations, at their pleasure. And that which he affirmeth of those fore-named Nations, may likewise bee obseru••d in all others. There is no Kingdome in the world, but it is shut-vp and included within some li∣mits: yea and those oftentimes but very meane and weake ones: sometimes, a shallow Riuer; someties, a narrow Hill; sometimes, a field of sand. So weake meanes of inhibiting so strong desires, and so feeble, of resisting so vn∣bridled ambitions, that it is vtterly impossible for so weake and simple bounders, to be able to keepe in such men within their bounds, if God him∣selfe were not the Bounder of them. But hee, as hee hath by his power ap∣pointed, that a little weake sand should stoppe the rage of the swelling wa∣ters; so hath hee likewise appointed, that such weake termes and limits should keepe in the proudest and most ambitious Princes, as it were raging Lions, with their grates,* 1.820 and cages. As if God, that hath sayd vnto the Sea, Hitherto shalt thou come, and no further; and here shalt thou stay all thy proud and swel∣ling waues: should likewise haue sayd vnto Kings, and their Kingdomes, (as Seneca well expresseth it) Vltra Istrum, Dacus non exeat. Istmus Samothracas includat.* 1.821 Parthis obstet Euphrates. Danubius Sarmatica ac Romana disterminet. Rhenus Germaniae modum faciat. Pyrenaeus medium inter Gallias & Hispanias iugum extollat. Inter Aegyptum & Aethiopias arenarum in••ulta vastitas iaceat. Let the Dacians be contained within the riuer Ister. The Samothracians within their proper Istmus. The Parthians within Euphrates. Let Danubius distinguish betweene the Romanes and Sarmatians: and Rhenus restraine the daring Ger∣manes. Let the mountaine Pyrenaeus diuide the French, and Spaniards: and the wildernesse of Sand the Aethiopians, from Aegyptians. And in like manner also be all other Kingdomes: they are bound within their bounders, as it were in bands; aad shut-vp within their limits, as it were in prison. Now the Bounder of all these,* 1.822 is onely God himselfe: who (as I haue before shewed) is the Bounder of all things.

And this also appeareth by the liquid and cleere testimonies, both of Holy Scriptures,* 1.823 and of Heathen writings. The Prophet Moses affirmeth, that it is The most High God, that diuided vnto the Nations their inheritance, and sepa∣rated the sonnes of Adam, and appointed the borders of the people. And Ecclesiasticus affirmeth, That it is God, that appointed a ruler ouer euery people, when he diuided the Nations of the whole Earth.* 1.824 So that, both the erecting of Kings, and separation of Kingdomes, are the onely workes of God. And therefore Trismegistus calleth God, Terrarum distributorem; The distri∣buter of Countries.* 1.825 And Demosthenes citeth this sentence, out of the in∣scription of an Altar, that

—Iupiter ipse Rex superûm medius limite signat agros.* 1.826

God Iupiter himselfe, I weene, the King of Gods, is he, That causeth Countries, by their Lists, distinguished to be.

And this to preserue the people from contentions: as in the same place, hee af∣firmeth. For, where there be not such limits to distinguish them, there al wayes doe the people contend about them. As Salust exemplisieth by a notable instance,* 1.827 betweene the Cathaginians, and the Cyreneans. Who hawing long contended about their limits (and yet for a vaste feild of vnfruitfull bar••rea Sand) when they had euen wearied themselues with diuers mutuall slaugh∣ters, in the ende (for the ending of all contention) they fell vpon this Conclusion. That they should both of them send forth at a certaine praefixed time, certaine Messengers from their borders; and that the place, where they should meete, should be the Boundes of both Nations. The Carthaginians sent for them two Brothers called Phileni: by whose speed and diligence, they obtained great ad∣vantage. Which, when the Cyrenians chalenged, as being fraudulently gotten, by their setting forth before the appointed time; they offered them this condition; that, either the Phileni should be content to be buried quick, in the place where they mett, and which they chalenged for other limits; or else they should permit the setting of their limits vnto those Cyrenians, vnder the same condition which was propounded vnto them. Which condition (though vnaequall) yet the Phileni accepted: and so were both of them in the place buried quicke. Vnto whom, for their valour the Carthaginians there erected, and consecrated an Altar: as an aeternall monument, both of the limits of their Dominion, and of the honour of these two noble Brethren, by whom they had obtayned the same. Out of which memorable historie, we may draw these three obseruatious, to our present purpose. First, that where there be no knowne limits betweene Kingdome and Kingdome, there be alwayes contentions and quarells about them. Secondly▪ that the way to quench those quarells, is, there to set vp some artificiall limits, where there be no naturall. And thirdly, that euen those casuall and accidentall limits, yet are in those places fixed by the se∣cret decree and appointment of God: which, both this Altar of the Phileni insinuated, and the forenamed Altar of Demosthenes expressed:

—Iupiter ipse. Rex superûm, medius limite signat agros.

7 And,* 1.828 as God hath circumscribed the dominions of all King, within their bounds and limits: so hath hee also prescribed vnto all Kingdomes and Empires the times of their continuance. Both which points the Apostle Paul hath expressed in one sentence. God hath made, of one blood, al mankinde, to dwell vpon all the face of the Earth:* 1.829 and hath assigned the times, which were ordayned, and the bounds of their habitation. He both ap∣pointeth the bounds of their habitations; which was our former point: and assigneth the times of their contin••ance, which is our present point. The same God, which hath determined the dayes of al men, and kept the iust num∣ber of their months with him,* 1.830 appointing them their bounds which they cannot passe; he hath also appointed set periods of time, as well vnto Kingdomes, as vnto priuate persons: to some a time; to some, two times; to some,* 1.831 halfe a time; to some, all these together, at his owne will and pleasure. Which times and periods being fulfilled (as the dayes of a man when they are expired)

they are by and by dissolued. And this we may see verified as well in the great and mighty Monarchies; as in the smaller and inferior kingdomes.

—sublimes fregit Spartanus Athenas: At{que} idem Thebis cecidit:* 1.832 sic Medus ademit Assyrio: Medo{que} tulit moderamina Perses. Subiecit Persen, Macedo: cessurus & ipse Romanis.— The Spartane spoyl'd th' Athenian State; the like befell to Thebes: The Medes destroyd th' Assyrian Stock; the Persian slew the Medes. The Persian Monarch was subdued by that great Macedo: The Macedon must shortly yeeld vnto the Romane foe.

And the same may be seene in diuerse other Kingdomes, as Bartus ex∣emplifieth by many notable instances. So that, as in the same place hee obserueth:

As when the Wind the angry Ocean moues, Waue hunteth waue and billow billow shoues: So doe all Nations iustle each the other,* 1.833 And so one People doth pursue another. And scarce a second hath the first vnhoused, Before a third him thence againe hath rowsed.

Thus the greatest Kingdomes for force, yet haue beene of small continuance, being successiuely cut off by the sword of their enemies. But yet that, not by chance, but by Gods speciall ordinance: who, when the number of their dayes were expired (that is,* 1.834 when they had fullfilled the measure of their wickednesse) then sent vpon them, the sword of other Nations, for the punishment of their sinnes. For the swords of men are but the Rods of God, whereby hee scourgeth them that rebell against him: as hee himselfe affirmeth, both of the Assyrians, and of the Babilonians, calling the one of them, the rod of his wrath, and the other his Hammer and his weapon of warre, wherewith hee will breake downe nations and destroy Kingdomes. So* 1.835 So that though they whett the sword,* 1.836 yet it is God that strikes the stroke. It is he that breaketh in sunder those Kingdomes with his hammer. Which yet he doth not before their appointed time be fulfilled. For (as Ecclesiastes expresly affirmeth) Vnto all things there is an appointed time. A time to plant,* 1.837 and a time to pluck vp. And the appointer of those times is onely God himselfe as by this one Argument it euidently appeareth; that hee is so per∣emptorie and definite in foretelling the certaine times of the continuing and falling of diuers Kingdomes. Hee foretold of the great and mighty King∣dome of Babilon that it should continue but onely vnto the third generation,* 1.838 and that then it should vtterly be vndone. I haue giuen all these lands into the hand of Nebuchadnezzer the King of Babel my seruant—And all Na∣tions shall serue him and his Sonne and his Sonnes Sonne, vntill the very time of his Land also come, and then many Nations and great Kings shall serue them∣selues of him: what could be more definite? And that he neither deceiued nor was deceiued in it, the euent which followed, openly declared. For in the time of Belshazzer Nebuchadnezzers Sonnes Sonnes,* 1.839 the Babilonian Monarchy was dissolued, and that by the written decree of God, who there professeth that

the number of that Kingdome was fulfilled. And as definite as hee was in appointing the set time of the disso••ution of Babilon, so definite was he also in appointing the set time of the Iewish Captiuitie vnder them.* 1.840 This whole land shal be desolate and an astonishment, & shal serue the King of Babel seuen∣ty yeares. And when the seuenty yeares are accomplished, I will visit the King of Babel and that Nation &c. Which hee did accordingly performe. For first, for the deliuerance and manumission of the Iewes, it is expresly testified, that that was fulfilled, as soone as the time, fore-told by Ieremy, was finished.* 1.841 And, for the second part of the Prophecie, concerning the destruction of the Babilonian Kingdome; it followeth by consequent vpon the former.

For Cyrus, who, in the first yeare of his raigne, gaue order for the returne of the Iewes, was one of those Princes, who were the ouerthrowers of the Ba∣bilonians. As concerning which Prince, in giuing his name, almost an hun∣dred yeares,* 1.842 before hee was borne;* 1.843 there is so great an euidence of Gods fore-seeing prouidence, that a paralell to that prophecie, cannot bee giuen, in all the secular Historie. And as God hath bene definite, in foretelling the very time of the destruction of Babilon; so hath hee bene likewise, in fore∣shewing the destruction, both of the Ephraemites, and of the Aegyptians: pointing downe precisely, vpon the very number of the yeares: Within threescore and fiue yeares, Ephraem shall be destroyed, from being a Nation.* 1.844 And for Egypt, he sayth: I will make the land of Egypt desolate, for forty yeares &c. But, at the end of forty yeares, I will gather the Egyptians from the people,* 1.845 where they were scattered. Now, this so peremptorie assigning of a definite time, as well of their captiuitie, as of their libertie, doth euidently shew, not onely that those times are certainly appointed; but also that this appoint∣ment is onely made by God. Who (as our Sauiour Christ teacheth vs) hath in his owne power the seasons of all times:* 1.846 and who (as the Prophet Daniel teacheth vs) is hee,* 1.847 that changeth those times and seasons, and that both taketh away Kings, and setteth vp Kings. And this also was not vnknowne, euen to the very Heathen. For, Iason, in Xenophon, expresly affirmeth, that it is God onely, which doth, Et homines extollere, & potentes deprimere:* 1.848 That both lifteth vp the needy, and casteth downe the mighty. So likewise, He siodus:

—homines sunt pariter obscuri{que}, clari{que},* 1.849 Nobiles, ignobiles{que}, Iouis magni voluntate. Facilè enìm extollit, facilè etiam elatum deprimit. Facilè Praclarum minuit, & obscurum adauget. Men are obscure, or eminent, They noble are, or base: But all is Gods appointement; Who giu's the humble grace, Exalting them that are but low, And lofty ones depressing, Abating of the prouder show, And poorer sort increasing,

So Homer:

Facile est Dijs,* 1.850 qui coelum latum habitant, Et gloria illustrare mortalem hominem, Et malo afficere. The God of Heau'n, he easily can Immortalize a mortall man, with glory and with fame: The same God, euen as easily may Afflict a mortall man, I say, with sorrow and with shame.

And Simonides affirmeth, that God hath not only the power of the thing, but also the power of the Time. He both can do the thing, and appoint the Time.

O Filt, penes se habet Iupiter altitonans, finem Omnium quae fiunt,* 1.851 & pro arbitrio suo disponit. The Ends of all, in Gods sole power rest, Which hee disposeth, as him pleaseth best.

So that (to conclude this discourse with Tertullians sentence,) Ille vices do∣minationum, ipsis temporibus, in seculo ordinat, qui ante omne tempus fuit, & Seculum corpus temporum fecit.* 1.852 Hee it is, that ordained the interchange of do∣minions and Empires, in their times, who himselfe is more ancient then any time, and who hath made an eternity of the body of time. Now, if Cities grow great, and little, neither by Fate, nor Fortune; but by Gods praeordination; if hee limit their powers, circumscribe their dominions, and measure out their continuance; then must there needes bee a God, who performeth all these workes. But the Antecedent is true; as hath beene proued in this Chapter. And therefore, the Consequent must needes follow after.

CHAP. 8.

God is, both the Physicall, and Ethicall last end of all things. 2. Hee giueth vs all vertues, which are the way vnto perfect Blessednesse. 3. Hee implanteth in vs all good affections, which are the praeuious dispositions vnto vertues. 4. He giueth vnto vs the true and perfect Blessednesse. 5. Nay, hee him∣selfe is, our true and perfect Blessednesse.

LET vs now proceede forward, from the Politicks, vnto the Ethicks; which affoord vs many Arguments, to proue There is a God: and that by the confession, euen of the very Hea∣then. For, as the Physicks doe inferre, that there needes must be a God; because there is noe moe but one Primum Efficiens,* 1.853 but one first Efficient Cause, from which all things doe pro∣ceede: so the Ethicks doe inforce the same conclusion vnto vs; because there is no moe, but one vltimus finis, but one last finall cause, vnto which all things are referred. Which last End; as Aristotle himselfe teacheth, both in his Physicks,* 1.854 and in his Ethicks; must needes be Summum bonum, ipsum{que} adeo Optimum: that is, The chiefest and most soueraigne good of all things. For,

Quanto est posterior, tanto est praestantior omnis Finis.—* 1.855 Among all Ends, the Latter, is euermore the better.

And consequently, the last must needs be the best. And so must needs be God. Or else there should something be better then God. Which were vtterly ab∣surd. For, hee is the best of all. His title is, to be, Optimus. And therefore, as God is that Primum Efficiens,* 1.856 by whom all things were made: so is he al∣so, that Vltimus Finis, for whom all things were made. As the Scriptures themselues haue expresly testified. The Apostle Paul telleth vs, that All things were made, not only of God, but also for God too. Of him, and through him, and for him are all things.* 1.857 So that hee is not onely their Primum Effici∣ens, that is, Their first Author from whom they came; but he is also, their Vlti∣mus Finis too, that is, Their last Ende, for whom they came. Both which points, King Salomon confirmeth in his Prouerbs, in expresse and plaine words: The Lord hath made all things for himselfe;* 1.858 yea euen the wicked, for the day of euil. The Lord hath made all thing: therefore hee is their Efficient. He hath made them for himselfe: therefore he is their End.

Sic Deus est finis postremus & vltimus,* 1.859 in quem Omnia contendunt, propter quem mundus, & omnis Res mundi est: siquidem, propter seipsum, omnia fecit.

saith the Christian Poet.

God is the End, yea that last End, Vnto which One, all things contend: For which the world, and all therein. Was made: For he made all for Him.

And, as God is Finis rerum, condendarum, that is, The last Ende, for which all things were created: so is hee also, Finis rerum expetendarum: The last End for which all things are desired. Whom haue I in Heauen but thee? (saith the Prophet Dauid) and there is none vpon Earth that I desire in comparison of thee.* 1.860 So that, God is not onely the naturall ende of all his Creatures; but also the morall ende of all mens actions and affections. And this also may be conclud••d, by the reason afore-framed. For, Aristotle, affirmeth in the fore-alledged place,* 1.861 that, Si finis est quispiam rerum agendarum, quem, propter seipsum, caetera autem propter hunc volumus; constat hunc talem Finem sum∣mum esse Bonum, ipsum{que} optimum. If there be any such ende of all humane actions, which we onely desire in respect of it selfe, and other things but with reference vnto it; it is apparent, that such an ende must be that, which we call the supreme, and chiefest good. Now, that must needs be God: vnlesse something which is not God, should be better then God: vnlesse some other thing should be Summum Bonum, and God himselfe: be but Inferius Bonum. But that God himselfe, and nothing else, is both the last ende of all humane acti∣ons, and that chiefest good, which is aymed at in all of them, it is generally taught, in the Schooles of all the Heathen. Who deliuer vnto vs these foure speciall Doctrines, as the principalls of their Morals. Yea, and that, with as great and as vniforme a consent, as in any other of their doctrines can readi∣ly be found. First, that Vertue, which is the way vnto Felicitie, is giuen vs of God. Secondly, that good Affections, which are praeparatiues vnto Vertue, are also giuen by him. Thirdly, that Felicitie, which is the salarie and reward of Vertue, is giuen vs of God. And Fourthly, That God himselfe, is our onely true Felicitie.

2 For the first of which positions,* 1.862 and the first branch of it: it is a thing, which is agreed vpon, among the very Heathen, that the ende of the Ethicks, and Morall Philosophie, is to bring men, by vertue, vnto the true Felicitie. Felicitie is the ende of all mens actions and desires: but Vertue is the way, whereby men come vnto that ende. As Tullie exemplifieth in the person of Hercules.* 1.863 Abijt ad Deos Hercules: sed nunquàm abijsset, nisi, quùm inter Ho∣mines esset, eam sibiviam munivisset. Hercules is gone vnto the gods: but hee neuer had come there, if he had not made his way, whilest hee liued here. Hee had neuer come to Heauen, if hee had not by his vertue paued himselfe a Causey thither, whilest he liued among men. And therefore Seneca bringeth in Hercules, speaking thus of himselfe, and of his owne vertues:

—Virtus mihi In astra,* 1.864 & ipsos fecit ad superos iter. My Vertue 'tis, hath made a way for Me, Into the Heau••ns among the gods to be.

For, as he addeth, in another place:

Nunquàm Stygias fertur ad vmbras Inclyta Virtus.—* 1.865 Vertue ne're led to dwell Among the Ghosts in Hell

And that, which Seneca affirmeth of Hercules, doth Ennius of Romulus: Ro∣mulus in coelo cum Dijs agit aevum.* 1.866 Romulus now liueth in Heauen, among the gods. But how came he thither? That Tullie expresseth in another place. Quibus tandem gradibus Romulus ascendit in coelum? By what steps, did Ro∣mulus ascend,* 1.867 and climbe vp into heauen? He answereth his owne quaestion: Rebus gestis, at{que} virtutibus: By his nobles Acts, and by his vertues. And, that Vertue is the direct and compendious way vnto Felicitie, Aristotle himselfe defineth plainely, in his defining of it to be,* 1.868 Operatio per virtutem in vita perfecta: A working according vnto vertue in a life euery way perfect.

But now,* 1.869 all the Quaestion is, Whence this vertue is? Whether it be, by naturall inclination, from our Parents? or, of artificiall institution, from our Masters? or, of morall acquisition, from our selues? or, of supernaturall infusi∣on, from God? For, one of these foure wayes it must needes come vnto vs. For the first of which foure wayes, to wit, for Naturall inclination, Tullie stan∣deth;* 1.870 who setteth downe these positions: Omnia officia, a principijs Naturae proficisci: That all good offices and duties doe onely arise, out of the principles of Nature: And therefore, omnia officia eò referri, vt adipiscamur Princi∣pia Naturae:* 1.871 That all our duties doe ayme onely at this ende, to bring vs to the first principles of our Nature. For, as in another place he affirmeth, Est vir∣tus,* 1.872 quasi perfectio Naturae: And yet againe: Est virtus nihil aliud, quàm in se perfecta, & ad summum perducta, Natura. Vertue is nothing else, but Na∣ture brought vnto her perfection & hight. And therfore he setteth downe this for a Conclusion, that, Nature alone can leade vs vnto vertue, if we follow her direction:* 1.873 Naturam ducem nactus, non est quisquam hominum, qui ad virtutem pervenire non possit. Which sentences, in some sense, may be admitted, with good acceptance, if they be interpreted of our originall & vncorrupted. Na∣ture. But, consider of our Nature, as it is now depraued in vs, and by the cor∣rupt

Conduicts of our sinfull Parents traducted vnto vs; and there is nothing more contrarie vnto our nature, then vertue; nothing more consonant and agreeable, then vice.* 1.874 And therefore Aristotle affir∣meth, that, Natura etiam prauè omnia facit: that, Nature doth all things out of order. And, in another place, hee, disputing, which of the two extreame vices, is most contrarie vnto the middle vertue, hee sets downe this for a generall rule; that, That vice is alwayes most opposite vnto vertue,* 1.875 vnto which our owne nature doth leade vs most willingly. Ea nam{que}, medio contraria magis esse videntur, ad quae nos ipsi quodam∣modò sumus propensiores.* 1.876 Which manifestly proueth (as he also, in another place, expresly concludeth) Nullam fieri virtutem morum, in nobis, naturâ: That no morall vertue is bred in vs, by nature.

For the second Opinion, that it is framed in vs by Art, and by the in∣struction of our Teachers;* 1.877 Plutarch not onely approueth it, but also hath written a Booke to prooue it, and, Vertutem posse doceri, inscribed it. Which (as Aristotle well distinguisheth) is true indeede in intellectuall ver∣tues:* 1.878 as in Arts, and Sciences: they may be taught vs. But in Moralls, it is false. As out of the very name of morall vertues, in the same place, he col∣lecteth: That name importing, not institution, but custome; and that such vertues are gotten, not by learning, but by practising. And there∣fore Socrates professeth (yea and proueth too) quòd virtus nusquam discatur,* 1.879 nulló{que} praeceptore percipiatur: That vertue, can neither be learned, nor taught. So that, as Tullie is confuted by Aristotle; That vertue is not of Nature: so is Plutarch,* 1.880 by Plato; That it is not of Art. Which Maximus Tyrius also confirmeth. Non fit ab Arte, quòd euadunt boni, sed potiùs beneficio Iouis: It is not by Art, that men are made good; but rather by the grace and blessing of God. For, as Saint Ambrose very truely obserueth, Vera virtus nihil requirit, nisi Dei gratiam:* 1.881 True vertue requireth nothing else, but onely Gods grace. So that, it is neither of Nature, nor of Art, as Plato in another place expresly affirmeth, reiecting both those two fore-named causes, in one sentence: Apparet virtutem,* 1.882 nec disciplinâ, nec natura; sed diuinâ sorte suis posses∣soribus accidere. It neither comes by nature, nor by learning, but onely by Gods giuing.

And for the third opinion, That it is gotten of our selues, onely by in∣dustrie and practise; that apparently is Aristotles, in the fore-alledged place. Ne{que} naturâ, ne{que} praeter naturam,* 1.883 virtutes in nobis efficiuntur: sed idonei qui∣dem ad suscipiendas sumus, naturâ: Suscipimus autem ipsas, at{que} perficimus, per consuetudinem. Vertues are begotten in vs, neither by nature, nor beside nature: But Nature giueth vs a fitnesse and hability to receiue them. But it is onely practise and custome,* 1.884 that ripens and perfects them. But yet (as Pindarus truely noteth) All our practise and custome, will but a little profit vs, if God doe not giue his blessing vnto vs. Ad summitatem virtutis pervenerunt, qui labores experti sunt. Cum Dei autem fauore &c. There be many that haue at∣tained to the highest pitch of vertue, by their labour and indeauour. But yet by the assistance of Gods grace and fauour. And therefore Pythagoras giueth vs aduice, not to rely too confidently vpon our owne endeauours, but to ioyne our prayers vnto them, for Gods helpe and assistance.

—ad opus accede, Deos,* 1.885 vt id perficiant precatus. Lay hand vnto thy worke, with all thy wit, But pray, that God would speede and perfect it.

Otherwise, all thy paine shall be taken in vaine. For, as Saint Bernard truely teacheth:* 1.886 In cassum quis laborat, in acquisitione virtutum, si aliundé eas spe∣randas putet, quam a Domino virtutum. In vaine doe men labour to attaine vn∣to ve••tues, if they looke for them elsewhere, then from the Lord of vertues. It is he onely that giueth them, because he onely possesseth them: as Maximus Tyrius affirmeth:* 1.887 Virtutem, quam possidet, tribuit Deus. And therefore Theo∣critus aduiseth King Ptolome,* 1.888 that hee should, Virtutem a Deo petere; Pray for vertue, at the hand of God. So that, none of all the three forenamed are the causes of vertue: neither Nature, Arte, nor Industrie. It is true, that all these, in some degree, may be helps: but yet onely as Gods inferior and ministeriall instruments. Nature may plant it, Art may prune it, Industry may water it: but,* 1.889 as the Apostle Paul teacheth vs, Neither is he that planteth, any thing; nor yet hee that watereth, but onely God, that giueth the increase. And, hee that gi∣ueth the increase vnto plants, is hee, that giueth the increase vnto vertues, which are his heauenly plants: as euen Homer acknowledgeth:

Iupiter virtutem viris auget{que},* 1.890 minuít{que}, Prout quidem voluerit.* 1.891 God giueth vertue his increase, And lesseneth it, euen as He please.

And therefore,* 1.892 it is confessed with one mouth, by all the Heathen,* 1.893 that it is God,* 1.894 that is the giuer of vertue vnto men.* 1.895 Which is the second Branch of our first position. Simonides saith expresly, that, Nemo, sine Dijs, virtutem accepit, ne{que} vrbs, ne{que} Homo: That neither Man, nor Citie, without Gods spe∣ciall grace, could euer attaine to vertue. So likewise Pindarus, Boni & sapi∣entes, ex Deo solo proueniunt: Men are made both wise and good, only by the helpe of God. So likewise Theognis, Nemo hominum, ne{que} malus, sine nu∣mine, ne{que} bonus: There is no man made either good, or bad, but onely by God. According to that of Salomon, that, God hath made all things, for him∣selfe; yea, euen the wicked, for the day of euill. And yet is not God the cause of mens wickednesse. Because hee maketh them not euill, inserendo malitiam,* 1.896 but onely, subtrahendo gratiam, as Aquinas distinguisheth, Not by inserting into any man the motions of sin, but by withholding his grace, which is the bridle of sinne: which being withdrawne, men rush violently of them∣selues, like vntamed horses, into all kinde of wickednesse. But, though God giue not vice, inserendo malitiam; yet giueth he vertue, inserendo gratiam. And therefore the Romanes (as Saint Augustine obserueth) did consecrate vertue for one of their gods.* 1.897 Thereby plainely acknowledging, that Vertue is of God: yea The free gift of God, as Saint Augustine there affir∣meth. Virtutem quo{que} Deum fecerunt, quae, quia Dea non est, sed donum Dei, ipsa ab illo impetretur, a quo solo dari potest. They haue named Vertue, for one of their Gods. Which because it is no God, but the gift of God, it must onely of him bee sought, who hath onely power to giue it, that is to say, of God: who (by the consent of the chiefest Philosophers)

is the onely bestower of all vertues. Anax••goras saith, that, Mens (which is his word for God) is,* 1.898 Bonirecti{que} causa: The cause of all goodnes. And so like∣wise, Proclus: Quicquid bonum & salutare competit animabus, causam a Dijs de∣finitam habet. Whatsoeuer is good and healthfull to the soule, it hath his cause de∣fined and appointed of God, Yea, and hee addeth there also the opinion of Plato. Virtutum omnium, corporaliúm{que} bonorum, velut sanitatis, roboris, insti∣tiae, temperantiae exemplaria, Plato probat procedere penès Deum. Plato proueth the Patternes of all vertues and of all corporall endowments, as of Health, of Strength, of Iustice, of Temperance, to proceede from God.

Yea, and as Plutarch obserueth, God hath giuen vnto vertue a kind of natu∣rall sweetnesse, whereby it is no lesse delightfull vnto such as doe practise it then it is vnto those, among whom it is practised.* 1.899 Deo adiuuante, placidi, man∣sueti, & humani mores, nemini eorum, quibuscum viuitur, ita grati, iucundi{que} sunt, vt ei ipsi, qui ijs est praeditus. And this God doth, to allure vs vnto ver∣tue, by the sweetnesse of it.* 1.900 Yea, and as Iamblicus obserueth, God doth not only prouoke vs vnto vertue; but also reuoketh vs from vice. Ad iusta quidem ad∣iuuans, ab iniustis reuocans. And this we may euidently see in the Scriptures, by diuers notable examples.* 1.901 For when Abimelech intended to haue corrup∣ted Abrahams wife,* 1.902 God withheld him from it. And when Dauid intended to haue destroyed Nabal, God withheld him from it. And Opheus in his hymne vnto Venus (by whom hee vnderstandeth Diuine and heauenly Loue) hee maketh a prayer vnto her, to withhold his minde from all filthy and vicious loue.

O Dea, nam vbí{que} habes audiendi acumen,* 1.903 Exaudi; & laboriosam vitae meae viam Dirigas, tuis, ô veneranda, iustissimis telis, Profanarum extinguens horrendam libidinem cupiditatum. O Goddesse, heare; for thou canst, whate're, where I pray; Direct me, by thy righteous helpes, in my lifes tedious way, Quenching prophane and fearefull lusts, that leade my mind astray.

He prayeth to God, to withhold him; because hee could not withhold him∣selfe. And so,* 1.904 when Achilles intended to haue killed Agamemnon, Pallas with∣held him from it, as Homer also testifieth: by that fiction, implying this vn∣fayned truth, that it is God, which withholdeth vs from euill, as well as which helpeth vs in good. Both which points together, wee may euidently see, in the prayer of the Pharisee:* 1.905 O God, I thanke thee, that I am not as other men are, extortioners, vniust, adulterers. Here be the vices, from which God had withheld him, and for which hee thanketh him. Hee proceedeth on, vnto those vertues, wherewith God had adorned him. I faste twice in the Weeke, and I giue tithe of all that euer I possesse. So that, if a man be not infected with all kinde of vice, he may thanke God for it. And, if hee be indued with any kind of vertue, he may thanke God for that too. For it is onely by the grace of God,* 1.906 that he is, as he is. In which action of the Pharisee, we may eui∣dently see, a direct confutation of Tullies obseruation, that, Nemo quòd bo∣nus vir esset, gratias Dijs egit vnquàm. And againe in the same place,* 1.907 that Virtutem, nemo vnquàm acceptam Deo retulit: That no man had euer thanked God, that he had made him a good man. For we see the plaine contrarie, in the

prayer of the Pharisee: He expresly thanked God, that hee had made him so good. So that here is a confutation of his first position. His second is this, That no man euer acknowledged his vertue to haue descended vnto him from God. Which we see againe confuted, by all those seuerall testimonies, that before I haue recited. For they all haue professed, that Vertue is Gods gift. As for the reason, which in that place hee bringeth, to fortifie his position; That men are praysed for their vertues; which they could not iustly be, if it were the gift of God, and not gotten by themselues: That is a very false and insuffici∣ent reason. For, men are praised, both for their Beautie, and for their strength of bodie. And yet are both these the good gifts of God, and not purchased or gotten by our selues. And therefore, as error is alwayes vnconstant, and ne∣uer true vnto it selfe; so hee, in another place, both renounceth his owne posi∣tion, and confuteth his owne reason. His position hee renounceth by a con∣trarie position, directly affirming, that, Si inest, in hominum genere, Mens, Fides,* 1.908 Virtus, Concordia; Vnde haec in terram, nisi a superis, defluere potuerunt? If there be among men; either Wisdome, or Faith, or Vertue, or Peace; Whence could any of these come to men vpon earth, but only from the God of heauen? Naming Vertue, among the rest. And his Reason he confuteth by the instance of Metellus, Maximus, Marcellus, Africanus, Cato, Scipio, Laelius, who were the most vertuous, and the most prayse-worthy persons of the Romane Com∣monwealth.* 1.909 And yet he affirmeth of them all, that Horum neminem, nisi iu∣nante Deo, talem fuisse, credendum est. That none of all these, could euer haue beene such a man, as he was, if he had not beene helped and assisted by God. So that hee ascribeth their Vertues, and consequently their prayses, vnto God. Thereby plainly ouer-throwing, the ground of his position: and shewing, that vertue may be praysed, although it be of God. Thus you see the great agreement, which the Heathens Philosophers haue with the Scriptures, in ascribing vnto God, to be the Author of all Vertues.

3 Neither is God onely the Author and giuer of growne and perfect Vertue,* 1.910 when it is formed into an habit; but also of all those good motions, and affections, which are, as it were, the praeparatiues vnto it: or rather indeed the inchoations of it. Those good inclinations, and vertuous propensions, which (being adult and growne vp) doe proue the true substance and bodies of our vertues, are indeed not in vs any naturall dispositions; (as Tullie would haue them:)* 1.911 but supernaturall inspirations,* 1.912 and Gods owne celestiall semina∣tions;* 1.913 as the Prophet Moses expresly affirmeth:* 1.914 The Lord thy God wil circum∣cise thy heart, that thou mayst loue him, with all thy heart, & liue. So that the first motions of our loue towards God, are onely the motions of his loue towards vs. Hee moueth vs to loue him, that we may liue with him. Without whose grace thus mouing vs, we could haue no motion in vs, at the least not vnto good. For, the Apostle plainely teacheth vs, that, it is God, that giueth vs both the will, and the worke. Hee both giueth vs the vertues, and the feede of them too, which are good affections. For, as the same Apostle in another place tel∣leth vs: We are not able of our selues, so much as to thinke any thing, but all our sufficiencie is of God:* 1.915 So that, with the Prophet Isaiah, we may truely pro∣fesse: O Lord, thou it is, that hast wrought all our works for vs. And this euen the Heathen themselues doe acknowledge:* 1.916 running through all the

steppes of the Apostles former doctrine. One of them telleth vs, that,* 1.917

Nil agimus, nisi sponte Dei. By vs there can be nothing done, But by the will of God alone.

Another of them, that wee speake nothing, but by the will of God. Natu∣ra humana, nec rationem, nec orationem de Dijs suscipere potest, sine Dijs;* 1.918 nedum divina opera perficere, sine illis. The nature of man, can neither con∣ceiue, nor vtter any thing of the nature of God, without the helpe of God: much lesse can it doe any worke of God, without him. Another of them telleth vs, that wee cannot thinke any thing, without him: because all our cogitati∣ons and thoughts doe come from him.

Talis enìm mens est terrestrium hominum,* 1.919 Qualem quotidiè ducit pater, virorúm{que}, Deorúm{que}.

saith Homer.

Such thoughts Men haue, on earth that liue; As Men may craue, but God doth giue.

And so likewise Archilocus, vnto the same purpose:

Mortalium mens— —talem praebet identidem Sese,* 1.920 Tonantis summa qualem Quotidie exhibuit voluntas: Mans minde doth dayly such it selfe explay, As Gods great Will doth frame it euery day.

So that all the good motions and affections of the minde, the very Heathens doe professe, to proceede from God. And therefore Orpheus, in his hymme vnto Nemesis, prayeth to that Goddesse, to giue a vertuous and good minde vnto men, and to remooue all euill cogita∣tions from them.

Da verò mentem bonam vt habeant;* 1.921 Extinguens odiosas cogitationes, profanas, nimis suprebas, & scelestissimas. Giue, Nemesis, ô giue a vertuous minde to men, Repressing odious, base, and vile, proud thoughts in them.

Acknowledging all good motions, to bee Gods inspirations. And so likewise, on the contrarie, they againe professe, that all those wicked and depraued affections, whereby the minde of a man is corrupted, and so led headlong into all kinde of vice, are indeede nothing else, but the sug∣gestions, and temptations of Diuells, and wicked spirits. Daemon vltor (saith Trismegistus) ignis acumen incutiens, sensus affligit,* 1.922 & ad patranda scelera armat hominem; vt turpioris culpae reus, acriori supplicio sit obnoxius, eúmque, sine vlla intermissione, ad insatiabiles concupiscentias inflammat. The reuenging spirit, inflaming the minde with a quicke and sharpe fire, af∣flicteth our senses, and armeth a man vnto all kinde of wickednesse; that so he being guilty of a greater fault, may bee obnoxious to a greater pu∣nishment. And therefore hee ceaseth not to kindle in our mindes vnsatiable concupiscences. And againe, in another place: Nocentes Angeli,* 1.923 humanitati commisti, ad omnia audaciae mala miseros (manu iniecta) compellunt: in bella,

in rapinas, in fraudes, & in omnia, quae sunt animorum naturae contraria. The ••urtfull Angells, insinuating themselues into mens mindes, do hale-on poore wretches, as it were by the collars, into all kindes of euills; into wars, into rob∣beries, into frauds, and into all those vices, which are contrary vnto the true nature of our soules. So likewise Orpheus:

Daemones humani saeui hostes, at{que} maligni,* 1.924 Qui nostris animis vacuis infanda ministrant, Vt semper diram vitam cum crimine ducant. The Diuells, Mens fierce and cruell Enemies, Obiect vnto their mindes strange vilanies, To make their li••es curs'd with Impieties.

Which is largely and notably layd open by Porphyrius,* 1.925 out of whom it is transcribed, by Eusebius.

Thus, euen the very Heathen, doe both beleeue, that there bee Diuells; and, that they bee mans most hatefull and cruell enemies: and, that they pi••rce, and insinuate into the mindes of men: seeking there, with all kind of wicked lusts to corrupt them; that so they may bring them vnto vtter destruction. And so, on the contrarie, they doe likewise beleeue, not onely that there is a God; but also, that hee is the Author of all good: both giuing vnto vs all kindes of vertues, and giuing vnto vertues all their growth and increase; yea and their first seedes too, by inspiring into our mindes good thoughts and affections.* 1.926 Insomuch, that Hippodamus affirmeth, that Homines habent virtutem, propter diuinitatis commercium: That men attaine vnto vertues, onely by the commerce and conuersation of the Gods. Who not only helpe vs vnto vertue, by furthering and cherishing our good motions & affections:* 1.927 but further, by extinguishing those wicked lusts and concupiscen∣ces, wherewith the Diuell endeauoureth to extinguish vertue in vs. For, that also they adde: Adsum ego Mens, ijs (saith Pimander in Trismegistus, who professeth himselfe to bee the spirit of God,* 1.928 Mens diuinae potentiae) qui boni, pij, puri, religiosi, sancti{que} sunt: praesentia mea fert illis opem. I am present with those men, that are good, and godly, pure, religious, and holy: And that my presence giueth them great helpe and assistance. In what manner, hee sheweth after. Ipsa Mens, ianitoris munere fungens, incidentes in insidias corporis, haudquaquam permitto finem consequi suum. Aditus enim, per quos turpes blanditiae manare solent, iugiter intercludo, libidinùm{que} ••omites omnes extin∣guo. The Spirit (performing the part of a Porter) when as any of them fall into the snares of the flesh, will not permit and suffer them to finish their de∣signe, but shutteth vp the passages of all flattering inticements, and extingui∣sheth the incentiues of all filthy lusts: By faith thus quenching the fiery darts of the Diuell, as the Apostle speaketh. For, this Spirit is water: in quo, om∣nia ignita illius peruer si tela extinguuntur:* 1.929 as Nazianzene obserueth. He is a Water, that extinguisheth all the darts of the Diuell, because they bee of fire. And, as this good Spirit (like a Porter) repelleth euill spirits, that they can∣not enter: so hee also (like a Souldier) expelleth them againe, if they chance to enter. Hee taketh from those strong men, the armour, wherein they trusted, and casteth them out of the house,* 1.930 which they possessed. And this also, the Hea∣then

then haue expresly confessed.* 1.931 Dij vera bona dant bonis, quibuscum versan∣tur (saith Iamblicus,) suo{que} commercio prauitatem, passioném{que} longè ab ijs pro∣pulsant; suo{que} splendore, tenebrosos indè spiritus arcent. Mali enìm spiritus, in∣trante Deorum lumine, velut sole, tanquàm tenebrae subterfugiunt. The Gods doe giue to good men those things that are truly good, when they come vnto them; ex∣pelling by their presence, all passions, and vices; driuing from them, by their light, the Angels of darkenesse. For the light of the Gods, when it entreth mens mindes, driueth away the Diuels, as the light of the sunne driueth away darkenes. So that though the Diuell be neuer so malicious, in seeking to doe men hurt; yet is God no lesse gracious, in seeking to doe them good: the Diuell, by euill temptations, seeking to corrupt them, and so bring them to miserie: God, by good inspirations, seeking to correct them, and so bring them to fe∣licitie, Which is our next point.

4 For, as the Heathen doe confesse, that God is the Giuer of all Vertue,* 1.932 and Goodnes: so doe they likewise confesse, that God is the Giuer of all Felicitie, & Happinesse. He giueth vs Vertue, as the way of Felicity: & he giues vs Felicity as the reward of Vertue. And therefore, the Apostle Peter telleth vs,* 1.933 that God hath called vs both vnto vertue, and vnto Glory: to Vertue, as the way; to Glory, as the reward. For, so, Aristotle himselfe hath termed it expresly, Praemium, finis{que} Virtutis, optimum, diuinúm{que} quiddam, at{que} beatum esse constat.* 1.934 It is most cer∣taine, that the reward, and ende of vertue, is such a thing, as is both the best of all other things, and a diuine thing, and a blessed thing. He calleth the reward and ende of vertue, Beatum, that is to say, a blessed thing: because it is Blessed∣nesse it selfe. He calleth it, Optimum, that is to say, the best thing: because there is nothing that is beter then Blessednesse. And hee calleth it, Diuinum, that is, a diuine thing: because it is giuen by God himselfe vnto vs. And this is plainely confessed, both by Christians, and Heathens.* 1.935 The Apostle Iames telleth vs,* 1.936 that Euery good gift is giuen vs of God. And Plato confirmeth this testimonie to be true. Nihil nobis est bonum, quìn Dij praebeant: We haue no∣thing that is good, but it is giuen vs of God. And therefore Hesiodus calleth the gods, Bonorum Datores: The giuers of good things.* 1.937 And so likewise doth Homer,* 1.938 in the very same words 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Which Plutarch also obserueth in him. But Iamblicus goeth further. For he calleth the Gods not onely Datores, but also Largitores bonorum: Yea &, Omnium bonorum, The bountiful bestowers of all good things. God giueth all good things: and he giueth them not spa∣ringly: not digitulis duobus sumens primoribus; as the Comick speaketh; not ta∣king vp a little between his thumbe and his finger: but in a far larger manner. He giueth to the full, with an open hand. He openeth his hand,* 1.939 and filleth all things with his goodnesse: measuring out his blessings,* 1.940 not modio, nor tri∣modio; but ipso horreo; as the Comick speaketh, in another place: not by the bushell, nor by the sackfull, but by the whole Barnefull. For all the Barnes∣full in the world, are nothing else, but Gods bounty, and Gods gifts vnto their Possessors. So that, hee may be called truely Largitor bonorum, he giueth them so largly. And yet, as Turtullian truely noteth, God is not,* 1.941 Profusor bo∣nitatis; but Dispensator. He is not a rash powrer-out of his benefits; but a wise Disposer of them. Because, as in another place he addeth, Nec ratio, sine bo∣nitate, ratio; nec bonitas sine ratione, bonitas est. Neither is reason, without

goodnesse, reason; nor goodnes, without reason, goodnes. And therefore God,* 1.942 who is not irrationabiliter bonus, not good without reason, disperseth his good things, with a liberall hand: but he disperseth them, with an exact and vp∣right iudgement.

Now, if God be the giuer of all good things: then must hee needs be the giuer of Felicitie too, which is the principall good thing: If of the smal∣ler and lower goods, then much more of Felicitie, which is the greatest and highest.* 1.943 For Plato maketh that collection. Ipsum bonorum omnium authorem cur non maximi etiam boni causam arbitrabimur? He that is the Author of all good, why should hee not be the Author of the greatest good? Yea, and Aristo∣tle himselfe inferreth the same conclusion: Si aliquod aliud Deorum est mu∣nus hominibus, consentaneum est rationi, & felicitatem a Dijs ipsis dari, & eò magis, quò 〈◊〉〈◊〉 humanis bonis est praestabilius. If God hath giuen vnto men any other gift or bounty, then st••ndeth it with reason, that hee should also giue felicitie: yea, and that so much the more, by how much that gift is better. Whence he concludeth, that Felicitie is giuen to men by God: because it is the best of all other gifts. As Plato, from the same ground, concludeth the same, for wisedome, in the place before alledged. Which, in another place,* 1.944 he affirmeth directly, to be the true Felicitie. Sapientia, ipsa felicitas est: Quod puer quivis intelligat. Wisedome is the true felicitie: as euery Child may vn∣derstand very easily. And therefore, Homer doubteth not to affirme expresly that it is onely God himselfe, that is the giuer of Felicitie.

Iupiter ipse distribuit felicitatem Olympius hominibus.* 1.945 The highest God, is th'onely He, That giues to Men felicitie.

And Solon prayeth vnto the Muses, to obtaine felicitie for him, from the Gods:

—Musae? Felicitatem a Dijs immortalibus mihi praebete.* 1.946 O Muses, bring me happines, Which must come from Gods Holines.

For, as Eu••ipides truly noteth:

Nemo, Dijs invitis, vel felix est vel infelix.* 1.947 No man, against Gods will, Is either well, or ill.

And,* 1.948 as I obserued before of Vertue, so may I now againe obserue of felicitie that the Romans consecrated it, for one of their Gods: thereby plainely insi∣nuating, that as Vertue, so Felicity, is the onely gift of God. Both which points are affirmed, by Maximus Tyrius, in expresse and plaine words: Ex Iovis nutu,* 1.949 actiones virtutis, felicitatés{que} hominum pendent. Both the actions of ver∣tue, and all humane felicitie, doe absolutely depend vpon the beck of God. Thus the Heathens confesse, that not onely Vertue, which is the way vnto felicitie; but also that Felicitie, which is the reward of Vertue, are both of them, the gifts of Almighty God. And therefore they must needs confesse, There is a God,

3 Nay,* 1.950 they goe yet further. For, they not onely teach vs, that There is a God: and that hee is the Giuer of Felicitie vnto men: but also, that hee

himselfe is the true Felicity of them. Which the Romanes implyed, in con∣secrating Felicitie, for a God. For, thereby they insinuated, not only that Feli∣city is of God: (the point before noted:) but also that God is the onely true Felicity: the point now in hand. Which they demonstrate vnto vs, by a Gra∣dation, of three degrees. First, that Vertue and Godliness•• doe so strictly vnite a man vnto God, that, in some degree, that it maketh him partaker of the diuine and heauenly nature. Secondly, that this neere coniunction of man vnto God, doth bring him vnto heauen, which is the place of Gods dwelling. And thirdly, that there it maketh him partaker of Gods most blessed and beatificall vision; which is the highest summitie of all true felicity. And all these three points are so taught by the Heathens, as though they had bene catechized in the Schoole of Christians.

For the first of which three points, it is the constant doctrine of the wi∣sest of the Heathen, that mans felicitie, consisteth especially, in conforming himselfe vnto the nature of God, and in making himselfe to be like vnto him. So saith Iamblicus: Felix est, qui Deo, quatenus fieri potest, similis est.* 1.951 He is an happy man, that maketh himselfe as like vnto God, is hee possibly can. So Syri∣anus, the master of Simplicus: Boni causa est, vt cum Deo similemur: It is the cause of all good, to make a mans selfe to bee like vnto God. Now,* 1.952 that like∣nesse with God, cannot bee attained, by any thing else, but onely by Iustice, Vertue, and Goodnesse: as Seneca truely teacheth. Parem Deo pecunia non facit, sed animus; & hic rectus, bonus, magnus. It is not thy money,* 1.953 but it is thy minde, which maketh thee conformable and like vnto God; if it be a iust, and vpright mind, a vertuous, and good mind, a noble, and a great mind. This vertue makes a man, not similem Deo, but parem Deo, saith Seneca: not like vnto God, but, in some sort, euen equall with God. For Aristotle citeth it,* 1.954 as a common opinion, that, Ex hominibus Dij fiunt, ob virtutis excellentiam: That by the excellencie of vertue, euen men doe attaine to a kinde of Diuinity. A very excessiue and hyperbolicall speech: but yet diuers such there be vsed not onely by Heathens, but also by Christians, to expresse that great affi∣nitie, and neere coniunction, which vertue maketh betweene God and man. Saint Augustine saith, that it maketh a man partaker of God. Dei sunt parti∣cipatione foelices, quicun{que} sunt veritate, non vanitate, foelices.* 1.955 They that haue indeed the true possession of blessednesse, and not the false imagination of it, are blessed, by a kinde of participation of God. The Apostle Peter saith, that it maketh a man partaker of the diuine and godly nature.* 1.956 For, as Porphiry obserueth of wickednesse and vice; that it transformeth a man into the nature of a Diuell: so is it also true, of vertue and goodnesse; that it conformeth a man vnto the nature of God. Yea, and some haue gone so farre, as to say, it makes vs Gods. So saith Hierocles, that, Finis vitae, est,* 1.957 Deum facere, ex homine: The end of mans life, is, to make a man become a God. So Seneca,* 1.958 in the fore-alledged place. Animus rectus, bonus, magnus, nihil est aliud, quàm Deus in humano corpore hospes: A good, and vertuous minde, is indeed nothing else, but a very God, abiding for a time, in the body of a man. Neither haue Christians themselues abstayned from these exaggerated amplifications; the better to recommend vertue, and goodnesse vnto vs. The Apostle Paul tel∣leth vs, that, He which is ioyned to the Lord, is but one spirit with him.* 1.959 And

Boetius telleth vs, that God only is our blessednesse: and that therefore, who∣soeuer by God is made blessed,* 1.960 hee is made by him, A God. Deum esse ipsam Beatitudinem, necesse est. It is absolutely necessary, that God himselfe should bee mans Felicity. So likewise Palingenius:

—Deus ipse supremum est,* 1.961 Eximium{que} bonum, propriè, vere{que} vocandus. Quem qui habet, is debet foelix dici, at{que} beatus. God is the onely supreme good, so properly exprest, Whom whosoeuer hath, he may, be happy call'd and blest.

And so it is indeed: because Felicity is Summum Bonum, that is, The supreme and the chiefest Good. And therefore, if God were not The true Felicity, he should not be The supreme good: but should haue a superior good aboue him, and himselfe bee but a second and inferior good. Whereupon hee ad∣deth but a little after, that if God himselfe be the supreme Good, that hee which obtaineth that same supreme good, hee therewith obtayneth to bee made a God: Quoniam beatitudinis adeptione fiunt homines beati; & beati∣tudo vera est ipsa diuinitas; diuinitatis adeptione fieri beatos, necesse est; sicut iustitiae adeptione iusti, sapientia, sapientes fiunt. Omnis igitur beatus Deus. Be∣cause, by the getting of blessednesse, men are made blessed; and true Blessednes is nothing else but God; therefore, by the getting of God, men get to bee blessed, as by the getting of Iustice to bee iust, and of Wisedome, to be wise. Therefore whosoeuer is blessed hee also is a God.* 1.962 So Nanzianzene proueth the Holy Ghost to be God, because otherwise he could not make him a God. Si eodem mecum est in ordine, quo pacto me Deum reddit? And his Expositor, Elias Cretensis, deliuereth his sense in the same hight of words. Nimirùm Spiritus Sanctus, quum natura sua & sanctus sit, & Deus; nos homines sanctificat, ac Deos reddit. The Holy Ghost being by nature both holy, & God, by sanctifying vs men, maketh vs become Gods.* 1.963 So likewise Dionysius: Salus non aliter existere potest, nisi ij, qui salutem consequuntur, Dij fiant: A man cannot otherwise attaine vnto saluation, then if he first be made a God. Which exaggerations of those fathers, and Scriptures, must not be expounded, according to the letter, as thogh men could be made to be Gods indeed: for that is a thing vnpossible: But the true meaning of them is, that by our imitation of Gods vertue and goodnesse, we are made so like vnto him, and so neerely ioyned with him, that we may bee sayd (in some sense) to be made partakers of his diuine nature: because all those vertues in him are nature.* 1.964 And therefore we may obserue, in al the forenamed places, that there is a mollification vsed, to reduce the fore-named Apotheosis and Deification, within the compasse of this sense. Dionysius Areopagita, where hee saith, that, All they which shall attaine the saluation of God, must first be made Gods: addeth (for explication:) Dei porrò effectio, est Dei, quoad fieri potest, imitatio, & cum eodem coniunctio, at{que} (vt ita dicam) vnio. The be∣ing made a God, is nothing else, but the imitation of God, and a coniunction with him, and (that I may so speake) a very vnion. Elias Cretensis, where hee saith, that the Holy Ghost doth make men Gods, addeth, that it is, per adopti∣onem, & gratiam: that this making of them Gods, is but onely Gods adopting them, by grace, to be his Sonne, So Nazianzen expoundeth, His being made a God, to be nothing, but onely, His coniunction with God. Quo pacto me Deum

reddit? vel quo pacto me coniungit Deo? Which coniunction with God (as Trismegistus teacheth) is onely effected by religion, and godlinesse.* 1.965 Propè Deos accedit, qui mente, qua Dijs iunctas est, diuina religione Dijs iunxerit. That man commeth neere vnto God indeed, that ioyneth his soule vnto him, by piety and religion. So likewise Boetius, where hee saith, that, Beatus omnis, Deus: Th••t euery one which is blessed is thereby made a God: hee addeth for the qua∣lification of that speech: Sed n••tura quidem vnus, participatione verò nihil prohibet esse quamplurimos: Yet there is but one God, by nature, but there may be many Gods, by participation. Not by the true participation of his naturall deitie, but of his vertue, and of his felicitie. Yea, and euen the Apostle Peter himselfe doth vse a further modification, euen of this participation. For, where hee telleth vs,* 1.966 that there be great and precious promises giuen vnto vs, That we should be partakers of the Godly nature: lest wee should misconstrue this participation, to be intended of Gods true nature or deitie, hee expoun∣deth himselfe plainely, that this participation of the diuine nature must bee gotten, by flying of corruption, by ioyning vertue with our faith; and with vertue, knowledge; and with knowledge, temperance; and with temperance, pati∣ence; and with patience goodlines; and with godlines, brotherly kindenes; and with brotherly kindnes, loue; Which is the bond of perfection,* 1.967 and tyeth a man strictly vnto God. And this is the first degree of our felicitie with God, which is affoorded vnto vs, in this present life.

There be two degrees more: which come not vnto men, before the life to come. The first, that vertue brings vs vp to Heauen, which is the place of Gods owne dwelling, and there maketh vs to liue aeternally with him. A thing plainely confessed, euen by the very Heathen. Pythagoras affirmeth, in his ver∣ses, that:

—Si, relicto corpore, ad purum aethera perveneris,* 1.968 Eris immortalis Deus, incorruptibilis, nec ampliùs mortalis. When as our Soules our Bodies shall forsake, And to the Heauens they shall themselues, betake; Then shall we be, as Gods immortall beene, All incorrupt; no longer mortall men.

For we shall then enioy God: who is our very life:* 1.969 as the Prophet Moses te∣stifieth: yea the life of our life, our vita vitalis, as the Orator speaketh where∣as this our present life,* 1.970 is but vita mortalis: a transitory and a mortall life. But this (saith the Apostle Paul) we know, that if our earthly Tabernacle be dissol∣ued, we haue a building giuen vs of God, which is an house, not made with hands, but aeternall in the heauens. And therefore saith Musonius, that Vir bonus, est civis vrbis Iovis; quae constat, ex hominibus, & Dijs. That he, which is a good;* 1.971 man, shall bee a Citizen of the Citie of God; which is a Citie, common vnto Gods with men. Which is a probable ayming at the Heauenly I••rus••lem: which in the Booke of the Apocalypse, is described vnto vs. I saw the Holy Citie,* 1.972 new Ierusalem, come downe from God, out of heauen, praepared as a Bryde, trimmed for her husband. And I heard a great voyce, out of Heauen, saying: Behold the Tabernacle of God is with men, and hee will dwell with them, and they shall be his people, and God himselfe will be their God with them. Vpon which our cohabitation with God,* 1.973 Tullie saith, that we are, Deorum quasi Gentiles; the

Countrymen of the Gods: Nay generis divini, the Kinsmen of the Gods, as he addeth in that place: of their owne generation: as Aratus speaketh.* 1.974 And therfore Tullie, in another place, speaking of the state of God, and vertuous men af∣ter this present life, he saith, that they shall liue among the Gods: Qui in corporibus humanis,* 1.975 vitam sunt imitati Deorum, his, ad eos, a quibus sunt pro∣fecti, facilis reditus patet: Such as haue liued the life of a God in the body of a man, shall finde an easie passage vnto God: because from him they haue descen∣ded. So that, God calleth those men to liue with him in heauen, with whom he himselfe hath liued vpon earth.

Now the way, whereby they ascend vp into Heauen, there to liue with God, is, by instructing themselues in the knowledge of God: As some, euen of the Heathens themselues,* 1.976 haue taught vs. Trismegistus saith expresly, that, Vnica salus homini, est cognitio Dei: & haec ad Olympum ascensio. The happines of man is the knowledg of God: and this is our way, of ascending into heauen. Agreeing well with that of our Sauiour Christ: This is life aeternal to know thee,* 1.977 to be the onely true God, and whom thou hast sent, Iesus Christ. For, as Bernard truly noteth, Summum bonum hominis, est plena & perfecta agnitio Creatoris:* 1.978 The happines of the Creature, is the knowledg of his Creator: Not a naked, or an idle knowledg; but a knowledg, which is ioyned with the practise of vertues.* 1.979 As the Apostle Peter teacheth vs. Ioynes with vertue knowledge. For, if they be not ioyned, they can neither of them profit. Ni∣hil enim prodest exercere virtutes,* 1.980 nisi noveris Creatorem: saith S. Hierom: Nec Dei veneratio proficit ad salutem, nisi praecepta Conditorts impleueris. It profiteth nothing, to exercise vertue, without the knowledg of God: and it pro∣fits as little, to haue the knowledg of God without the practise of vertue. Wee must therefore ioyne theorical and practicall vertues together,* 1.981 and by them, as by two legges, ascend into Heauen. Which is the true Paradice, where mans blessednes dwelleth. As Stobaeus alledgeth, out of Sophocles:

In Iovis tantùm hortis, beata felicitas.* 1.982 The Paradice of God, Heauen, onely is: The onely happy place of perfect blis.

And vnto this heauenly Paradice, it is vertue that bringeth vs. And that by the confession, euen of the very Heathen. For,

—Locum Virtus habet inter Astra,* 1.983

saith the Tragick Seneca:

Virtue enioyes her place among the Starres.

And she giueth to the vertuous, their place aboue the starres, seating them among the Gods. As they instance, in the Examples, both of Hercules, and Romulus: which before were touched by vs.* 1.984 As the same Tragick in the same Tragedie affirmeth expresly:

—cum summas Exiget horas consumpta dies,* 1.985 Iter ad superos gloria pandit. When the last howre is out, of the last wasted day, Then Vertues glory is that, which vnto Heauen mak's way.

And this is the second degree of our Felicitie with God; that, by vertue, men

are brought to liue eternally, in Heauen, which is the place of Gods owne dwelling.

The third of them, is this; That, by vertue, we are brought to enioy Gods blessed presence: whereby wee enioy that infinite happinesse, that cannot possibly be conceiued by vs. As the Apostle Paul teacheth vs: Those things,* 1.986 which the eye hath not scene, neither the eare heard, neither came into mans heart, hath God prepared for them that loue him. The particulars whereof, if they cannot bee conceiued, they cannot be expressed. Onely the Psalmist (in the generall) expresseth thus much, that, In his presence is the fulnesse of ioy,* 1.987 and, at his right hand, there are pleasures for euermore. And therefore, our Sauiour Christ placeth the highest pitch of the blessednesse of man, in the sight of God: Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God.* 1.988 And S. Chrysostome, he placeth the highest pitch of the miserie of man, in the depriuation of this beati••icall vision. Satius est enìm, mille fulmina sustinere,* 1.989 quam vultum illum, mansuetudinis pietatís{que} plenum, nos tamen aversantem, vi∣dere; & illos oculos placidissimos, nequaquam, nos aspicere, sustinentes. It were better, to suffer the fearefull flashes of a thousand lightnings, then to see that sweete countenance (so full of pietie, and mildnes) to be offended at vs, and those amiable eyes, not enduring to behold vs. This is worse, then to endure a thousand torments, and a thousand Hells: as hee writeth, in the same place. Therefore, as no tongue can expresse the torment and miserie of condemned soules, in being shut out from Gods blessed presence: so can no tongue ex∣presse the comfort and blessednesse of the soules of the righteous, by enioy∣ing the light of Gods most gracious countenance: which yeeldeth more ioy and comfort to the heart, then can bee conceiued by the heart. Whereupon the Prophet Dauid prayeth vnto God, that hee would but shew him the light of his countenance, and he should be saued. For,* 1.990 Deum videre, est vita animae: saith Gregory Nyssen. The very life,* 1.991 whereby the Soule is maintained, is only the beholding of the glorious face of God. And this is a Doctrine, which is not altogether hidden, euen from the very Heathen. Who teach, that, the enioy∣ing of God, and of his gracious presence, is the absolute perfection of all hu∣mane happines. So saith Ouid:

Felices illi, qui non simulacra, sed ipsos, Qui{que} Deûm coram corpora vera vident.* 1.992 Thrice happy such as see Their Gods, in person true, As in themselues they be, And not in painted hue.

Groping at that Diuinity Doctrine, that, Mans blessednesse consisteth in be∣holding of Gods countenance: not in a specular, and aenigmaticall vision;* 1.993 but in a cleere,* 1.994 and immediate one, as Aquinas, or rather indeede, S. Paul him∣selfe, speaketh.

And this was that, which Aristotle aimed at, if hee could haue hit it: when he so much preferred the Contemplatiue Felicity,* 1.995 before the Actiue: be∣cause the Obiect of it, is God. And therefore affirming of contemplatiue persons, that they be Dijs immortalibus amicissimi: The best beloued of God. Because,* 1.996 as S. Augustine affirmeth, By Contemplation, they looke God in the face:

which there hee calleth, Summitatem contemplationis: The highest ascending of our contemplation.* 1.997 Hence the Platonicks affirmed, that, Frui Deo, est sum∣mum hominis bonum, that, The Blessednesse of man, is, to enioy God. An anci∣ent Doctrine among the Heathens: as appeareth in Trismegistus: who deli∣uereth the same sentence,* 1.998 almost in the same words: Summum bonum animo∣rum, est Deo frui. Which fruition of God, S. Augustine, in another place, expresseth to be, Non sicut corpore fruitur, aut seipso animus, aut amico amicus; sed sicut luce oculus. That enioying, which good and godly men haue of God, is not like that enioying, which the soule hath of the body; nor like vnto that nei∣ther, which it hath of it selfe; nor like vnto that, which a friend hath of his friend: but like vnto that, which the eie hath of the light. Which is indeed so great, that, without it, the eye hath no vse of it selfe, but is as good as dead. And so is the soule too, without the sight of God. And therefore sayth Boteius,

Felix qui potuit, boni Fontem visere lucidum.* 1.999 That man is blest, that can behold, and euer come to see The blessed God, the Fountaine cleare of all good things that be.

For, With thee (saith the Psalmist) is the fountaine of life,* 1.1000 and in thy light shall we see light. Thus, both Christians, and Heathens doe confesse, that God himselfe is Mans true happines, and the rich reward of all true godlinesse: as S. Augustine truely teacheth:* 1.1001 Deus, est cultus sui, merces. God is the true recom∣pence of his owne seruice. And Beda* 1.1002 likewise, vnto the same purpose: Praemi∣um virtutis, est ipse▪ qui virtutem dedit. Our best reward of vertue, is, euen hee himselfe, who is the giuer of vertue. Yea, and this, euen God himselfe profes∣seth of himselfe. For hee telleth Abraham, that, He is his buckler, and his ex∣ceeding great reward. Now, if God bee both the giuer of vertue, and the rewarder of vertue with felicitie, yea and felicitie it selfe,* 1.1003 which is the reward of vertue; then must there needes bee a God. But, the former of these is pro∣ued, both by Holy Scriptures, and by Heathen Writers. And therefore the lat∣ter followeth.

CHAP. 9.

The Mathematicks shew, that there is a God. 2. And more particularly, Geometry. 3. Which, by a Geometricall pricke, doth leade men vnto some knowledge of God. 4. Of whom (in diuers powers) it hath a kind of resemblance.

WE haue now passed ouer,* 1.1004 both the Metaphysicks, Physicks, Phi∣sicke, Politicks, and Ethicks: in all which seuerall learnings wee haue learned, There is a God; both by Reasons, and Authorities. We are now come to the Mathematicks: Which, as they are something more abstracted from sense,* 1.1005 and from sensible Ob∣iects, then any of all those fore-named Sciences; so can they no•• yeeld vs such sensible Arguments, to proue this great Conclusion,* 1.1006 as the former can. For the proper subiect of the Mathematicks (especially of those two Arts, of Geometrie, and Arithmeticke; which I handle in this Chapter, and in the

next after) is onely to consider, of Quantum, secundùm se: Of Quantities by themselues,* 1.1007 abstracted from their subiects. And therefore we must not looke from them, for either discourses, or demonstrations, or positions, directly & categorically to this purpose. But yet wee may draw, per obliquum ductum, similitudes, and resemblances from both those two Sciences: whereby we may ascend in our contemplation, euen vnto diuine and celestiall know∣ledges: as by the shape of the shadow, we may gather assuredly, the shape of the body, For, as Ficinus hath truly obserued, to this purpose; Mathematica ita se habent ad diuina, vt vmbrae ad corpora:* 1.1008 Mathematicals are proportio∣oned vnto diuinitie, as the shadow to the Body. And therefore saith Alcinous that, Mathematicorum consideratio, est praeludium ad diuinorum contempla∣tionem. The consideration of the Mathematicks, is as it were, a praeludium;* 1.1009 vn∣to the contemplation of diuine and heauenly things. For, the very end of the Mathematicks (as Plato teacheth) is nothing else, but this; Vt ad diuinam naturam considerandam, nos conferamus: quatenùs hanc hominibus inspicien∣dam Deus largitus est.* 1.1010 Quam nunquam sine his artibus assequemur. The end of the Mathematicks, is, to leade vs men intentiuely to consider of the nature of God, and to contemplate of it, so farre, as it is lawfull to inquire into it. Which we can neuer compasse, without the knowledg of Mathematicall Arts. And therefore Aristotle calleth the Mathematicks, Divinam mathe sin, that is, a diuine learning:* 1.1011 because they leade men vnto the knowledg of diuine and heauenly thing.

Now, vnder the name of Mathematicks are comprehended foure Arts: Geome∣trie, Arithmetick,* 1.1012 Astronomie, and Musick, Which Mathematicall Arts and sciences (as some of the learned haue wittily obserued) were practised by God, in his creation of the world. He vsed Arithmetick, in knitting all the in∣numerable parts of the world,* 1.1013 in one body together: Geometry, in giuing vn∣to euery one, his proper forme and figure: And Musick, in ioyning them, in so concent-full an harmonie, each of them with another. Vnto which Mathematicall conceit,* 1.1014 doth Coelius Rhodiginus think that place in the Booke of Wisedome directly to allude: That God hath made all things, in Number, Weight,* 1.1015 and Measure: referring Number, to Arithmetick; Weight, vnto Musick; and Measure, to Geometrie. And Plutarch, interpreting that position of Plato: Deum semper Geometriam exercere, saith, in expresse words: That God made all things, Ratione, & Mensura, & Numero: in Wisedome, Measure and Number.

Out of certaine grounds in all which Arts, we may collect, That there is a God though not Mathematica certitudine (which,* 1.1016 as euen Aristotle him∣selfe yeeldeth, is not in all things to be required) yet more then Dialectica probabilitate,* 1.1017 I will giue you but a litle tast, in euery one of those forena∣med Arts: because these Mathematicall Subiects, being meere abstracts from sense, they cannot so familiarly, Influere in sensus, nor be so plausible to the vulgar vnderstanding, as other more popular Arguments can.

2 Let vs beginne with Geometry:* 1.1018 which (as Plato affirmeth) doth Ani∣mum attollere ad veritatem; at{que} ita ad Philosophandum praeparare, vt ad superi∣or a convertamus quae nunc (contrà quàm decet) ad inferiora deijcimus.* 1.1019 Geometry (saith he) erecteth a mans minde, vnto the searching of the truth; and so prae∣pareth

his thoughts vnto Philosophie, that it maketh him to direct them, vnto those things, which are aboue; which now hee directeth vnto the things which are below. Performing that office, whereunto the A∣postle Paul so earnestly exhorteth vs: to make vs seeke for those things, which are aboue.* 1.1020 Plutarch is more definitiue, and punctuall, in this point; expressing more particularly, what those Superiora be: namely, that, by them is intended the very nature of God. For he saith, that the very end of Geo∣metrie is nothing else, but onely to sublime mens mindes aboue their senses, ad naturae sempiternae contemplationem: to the contemplation of Gods aeternall Nature.* 1.1021 Whereupon Max. Tyrius calleth Geometry; Nobilissi∣mum Philosophiae membrum: The most noble part of Philosophie. And the Greek Philo calleth it, Principem & Metropolin reliquorum: The prime and Metropolitan of the Mathematicall Sciences: because it doth, Intellectum ve∣luti repurgare, & paulatìm a sensibus liberare. It purgeth mens vnderstandings and refineth them from the drosse of their senses. As we may see, in Pytha∣goras; who hauing found out the truth of a certaine Geometricall Conclusion for which he had a long time before beene studying,* 1.1022 he offered vp a Sacri∣fice vnto the Muses: thereby insinuating, that his illumination came from aboue: and so, by his Geometry, was ledde vnto the worship of the Deitie; though vnder the title of the Muses. And therefore, saith Aristotle, that Qui dicunt,* 1.1023 Mathematicas scientias, nihil de bono & pulchro dicere, falsum dicunt. Dicunt enim, & maximè ostendunt. Nam, etsi non nominant; cùm tamen opera & rationes ostendunt, nonnè dicunt de ijs? Those men that affirme, that Mathematicall sciences doe no way intreat of either Goodnesse, or Beauty, they affirme it very falsely For the Mathematicks doe dis∣course of them both. And, though they doe not expresly name them; yet, when they intreate both of their works, and of their reasons, doe they not then intreate of the things themselues? So that, though the Mathematicks doe not intreat directly of God, who is that Bonum, and Pulchrum; yet, in that they doe speake & intreate of his works, they doe obliquely speake of him. And though they conclude not so directly & perēptorily, in this subiect of diuinity, as they do in their owne proper subiect of Quantitie; wherein, as the Orator obserueth they doe not persuadere, sed cogere;* 1.1024 yet, euen here, they doe affoord vs such apt and fit resemblances, as, though they doe not cogere, yet may they well persuadere: Such as well may induce vs, though they doe not inforce vs.

3 And first for Geometry,* 1.1025 there is one maine position in it: which though it be proper and naturall vnto that Art; yet leadeth it vs, by consequence, vnto that aeternall and supernaturall power, which is called God. And that breefly is this:* 1.1026 that, Punctum est principium omnis lineae. So that, all magni∣tudes and continuities are deduced from one originall prick.

And therefore Proclus calleth Punctum, magnitudinis parentem, & autho∣rem: hee calleth a Pricke the parent of all magnitude. Which position, as it hath his Mathematicall truth,* 1.1027 in Geometry; so hath it his Physicall truth, in naturall Philosophy. From whence it must needes follow, that all those so largely extended lines, in the greatest bodies of the world, doe lineally des∣cend from one onely prick; which, in it selfe, is indiuisible. Now, what can bee this one indiuisible pricke or point, which is the Author of all those

huge magnitudes, which are euidently seene in those vast, and extended bo∣dies of the world, the heauens, and the elements, but onely God himselfe? Can all those huge dimensions of those immense bodies, such heights, such bredths, such depths, and such thicknesses, bee possibly deduced from any o∣ther pricke, then onely from God? who, though hee be both higher then hea∣uen, deeper then hell, broader then the sea, and thicker then the earth; yet is hee, like a pricke in euery line of all of them; and, as vtterly vncapable of any diuision, as is the very pricke of the Mathematician, which cannot be di∣uided, by the ege of very thought. Vnto which Mathematicall conceit, of deducing all magnitudes, and all their dimensions, from God, as from their true Originall point; the Apostle Saint Paul doth seeme to allude, when hee exciteth vs,* 1.1028 to comprehend, what is the bredth, and length, and depth, and height, &c.

4 And indeed,* 1.1029 if wee consider of the nature and power of a point or a pricke in a line, and in all other continuities whatsoeuer, whether solides or plaines; wee may easily perceiue, that there is in a pricke, a very great simili∣tude and resemblance of God. For first, as a point or pricke is the very first fountaine of euery line, which is indeede nothing else, but only fluxus Puncto∣tum: so this whole vniuersality of things, which wee call the World, is indeed nothings else, but a production, and elongation, and dilatation of the natu∣rall goodnesse of Almighty God. The goodnesse of God is the onely true point, from which all created things doe proceede.* 1.1030 For, as Dionysius Areo∣pagita very truely teacheth: Deus, bonitate ductus, omnes naturas in lucem pro∣tulit. God, being onely led by his owne naturall goodnesse, was thereby induced to create and make all things. This is the true Center of all good things, which are but as the radij, that bee drawne from it. And this is that, which the Pythagoreans aymed at,* 1.1031 in holding this position, that, Mathematicorum principia, sunt omnium rerum principia. That the Principles of the Mathe∣maticks, are the beginnings of all things.

Secondly, as in euery line, and in euery part of it, wheresoeuer you cut it, you shall surely finde a pricke; which was a communis Terminus vnto both the diuided parts, being the beginning of the one, and the end of the other, and which knitted, and vnited them both together: so, in euery part of the world, which soeuer you contemplate, you shall find the mighty power of the Spirit of God; which, like a common bond, knitteth all the seuerall parts of euery thing together, and vniteth them all, in one common nature. And this is manifestly acknowledged, euen by the Heathen Poet:

Principio, Coelum, ac Terras, campos{que}* 1.1032 liquentes, Lucentem{que} globum Lunae, Titania{que} astra, Spiritus intus alit: totam{que} infusa per artus Mens agitat molem, & magnose corpore miscet. From first beginning, there hath bene a certaine inward Spirit, Supporting Heauen, and Earth; and Seas, Moone, Stars, and all things by it. Which Spirit, like the Punctum is in Mathematicke body, And so transfus'd in all the World, through all the parts that may be: That, as the Soule (for such it is) by mouing can be proued,

So all the Worlds vast body is, by this Soule, euer moued.

Thirdly,* 1.1033 as a pricke is the end of euery line, Linearum terminus, as Aristotle speaketh, the extreame point, wherewith it is shut vp and determined: so is God the end of all his Creatures. Hee is both, that Terminus à quo, from which all things doe proceede; and that Terminus ad quem, vnto which they all are referred; and that medium per quod, by which they are all of them vni∣ted. And all this is confessed, euen by the very Heathen: who do all affirme of God, with one generall consent, that it is he onely, which doth, Et principi∣um, & media,* 1.1034 & finem rerum omnium tenere. That God holdeth in his hands, both the Beginning, and Middle, and End of all things. Yea, and this also, the Apostle Paul directly affirmeth, though in somewhat other termes, when hee telleth vs,* 1.1035 that, Of him, and through him, and to him, are all things, Of him as of their Beginning: Through him; as by their Middle, tye, and Bond; and, To him; as to their End. For so, Origen* 1.1036 expresly interpreteth those threetermes. Ostendit, Principium omnium, ex ipso; Conseruationem, Per ipsum; Et Finem, In ipsum. So that, God is that Punctum, in euery part of the world, from whom, euery Creature in the world doth proceede; by whom, they are preserued; and vnto whom, they bee destinated. And this is that resem∣blance, which Geometry affoordeth, to adumbrate the nature of God vnto vs.

CHAP. 10.

Vnity in Arithmeticke, doth leade men vnto God. 2. Which is affirmed by Philosophers, to bee the Originall of all things. 3. Yea directly affirmed to be Gód himselfe. 4. With whom, it hath, indeed, a very great resem∣blance.

THE second of those Mathematicall Arts, is, Arithmeticke: wherein wee doe find another paralel position vnto that,* 1.1037 which formerly wee found in Geometry. For, as Geometry teacheth vs, that Punctum, est Principium omnis lineoe: so Arithmeticke teacheth vs, that Vnitas, est principium omnis numeri. As all magnitude ariseth, from one only pricke: so all multitude ariseth, from one only vnity.* 1.1038 For Punctum, and Vnitas, differ no more but thus; that Punctum, est Vnitas sine numero; and Vnitas, est punctum sine loco. And therefore, Zaratas, the Pythagorean,* 1.1039 called Vnitatem, numeri patrem. Hee calleth an vnity, the father of all numbers. Because (as Boetius very truely teacheth) Omnis plu∣ralitas est ex vnitatibus: All numbers are nothing else, but a coniunction of vnities. Now,* 1.1040 if vnity be the parent of all multiplicitie, it must needs from thence follow, that all this multiplicity,* 1.1041 and variety of so infinite many things, as wee see in the world, doe draw their originall, from onely vnity. For, one vnity is the beginning of all plurality, as well in numero numerato, in that which is numbred, as in numero numerante, that which numbreth: as Trisme∣gistus expresly testifieth.* 1.1042 Omnes res ab vno fuerunt, iuredicatione vnius; & fuerunt nataeres omnes, ab hacrevna, aptatione. All things proceeded from One, by the Law of that One; and all things came of that One, by the adpatation of all vnto that One.

And this was that, which the Pythagoreans aimed at, in holding this one opinion so stisfly:* 1.1043 Ex numeris, & Mathematicorum initijs, omni proficisci: That all things proceede from numbers, and from the first principles of the Mathematicians, that is, from Punctum, and Vnitas. Which are prima, and (as it were) minima naturalia, in the two principalls of all Mathematicall Arts. Punctum, in all Geometricall continuities; and Vnitas, in all Arithme∣ticall numbers. These two, in the opinion of the Pythagoreans, are the very first beginnings, and originalls of all things. But especially this latter, espe∣cially this Vnity: which they make the onely cause of the whole vniuersity: maintaining this position (as Aristotle reporteth their opinion) Numerorum elementa,* 1.1044 entium quo{que} cunctorum esse elementa. That the Elements and first 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of Numb••rs, are also the prime principles and originalls of all thi••••g. Now this Numerorum Elementum, this beginning and principle of all Numbers,* 1.1045 is onely Vnity. And this Pythagoras made the originall cause of all thing••. Vnto which hee referred both the motions of the Heauens, and the generations of liuing Creatures,* 1.1046 and finally all things. Omnia numeris ac••epta ferebat, tam conversiones syderum, quam ortus animalium. Hee deriued all things from Numbers; as well the reuolution of the Starres, as the origi∣nall of all Creatures.

2 Yea, and as it is held by the consent of Philosophers, that Arithmeticall Vnity is the cause of all numbers:* 1.1047* 1.1048 so is it held by them likewise,* 1.1049 that Meta∣physicall Vnity is the generall cause of all things.* 1.1050 Iamblicus saith, that, Quae∣cun{que} sunt, per vnum sunt. What things soeuer are, are all by One. And Tris∣megistus saith, that, Monas, est omnium, principium, radix, & origo. Vnity is the beginning, roote, and originall of all things. And againe, that, Exvno prin∣••ipio, cuncta dependent: Principium, ex vno. That all things depend vpon one first principle: and it, vpon the vnity of it selfe. And that which hee saith, Anselmus plainely proueth in Monologio, as I haue partly touched before. Yea, and so doth Hugo de Victore too,* 1.1051 by this inuincible reason; that, Si di∣uersa intùs consilia praesidentium essent, ipsi se forìs rerum cursus ab inuicem aliquandò diuiderent:* 1.1052 nunc autem, omnia dum sic concorditer ad vnum finem currunt; profectò indicant, quòd vnus est fons, & origo, vnde procedunt.* 1.1053 If there were diuers Authors, there would be diuers counsells; if diuers counsells, diuers courses: whereas now all things running in an vniforme course, vnto one, and the same end, doe thereby euidently shew, that they all doe proceede from one and the same beginning.* 1.1054 Aristotle he sayth, that, Vnum, est Dualitate prius: That Vnitie, is before all Duality: which followeth by necessitie, vpon the order of very nature. For Principium, is, by nature, before his Compositum. Now Dualitie is nothing but a composition of two vnities. Yea, and in the same place,* 1.1055 it appeareth againe, that there were certaine Philo∣sophers, which held this opinion, that there is, Quoddam vnum, which is Primum omnium vnorum. That there is a certaine One thing, which is the first cause of All things. Which opinion, though hee there doe pretend to confute; yet doth hee indeede confirme it. For hee himselfe saith ex∣presly, that, vnitas, est, naturâ, Causa, vt multa sint Entia. So that, vnity is not onely before all Plurality, but it is also, the Cause of all Plurality. It is before it, as the cause is before his effect. Now, what can be that Vnitas, the

Cause of all vnities,* 1.1056 but onely that Vnus Deus; of whom, and through whom, and to whom, are all things? Who (as Boetius obserueth) because he is but one in himselfe, he hath therefore giuen vnto euery thing that hee hath made, to bee but one.* 1.1057 Qu••a Creator vnus est, ideo rebus, quas condidit, hoc in munere dedit, vt vnaquae{que} esset etiam vna. Insomuch that (as Dionysius Areopagita obser∣ueth) euen those numeralls themselues, which seeme to bee contrary vnto Vnity, yet haue their existence and being, by Vnity. As wee say, Vna duernio, & Dec••s vna, & vnum dimidium, & vna tertia pars, &c. As we say, in com∣mon speech, One Couple, and one Tenth, and one halfe, and one Third part. All which haue their particular being, by being but One. And so, there is no∣thing in the world, created by God, that is any more then One. God him∣selfe, by that created vnity, stamping vpon euery Creature, an image of the Vnity of his owne diuine nature. For (as Boetius addeth, in the former place) Prima Vnitas, quae est vnitas sibijp si, creauit aliam vnitatem, quae est infra eam. The first Vnity, which is one in it selfe (that is, God the Creator) hath created another vnity, which is beneath it selfe, which is, vnity in the Creature. Where∣by, both euery thing is at one within it selfe and euery part of the world hath vnity with another: they agreeing all most louingly, as fellow members to∣gether.* 1.1058 Hence Dionysius calleth God, Vnitatem, vnitatis omnis effectricem: An Vnity, which is the efficient of all vnities. Yea, and in the same place, hee alledgeth two substantiall reasons, why God may truely bee called One. The first is, Propter simplicitatem vacuitatis partium (which Boetius before calleth, Vnitatem sibijpsi:) Because God is so pure,* 1.1059 and so simple an essence, that he is not compounded, so much as of any parts: but is euery way one, without any mix∣ture or concretion. The second, Quia vi vntiatis, quae vnum facit, vnum effi∣cimur, diuiduis{que} nostris dissimilitud••nibus, ac diuersitatibus, singulari modo connexis, in monada; quae diuinam speciem refert, ac vnitatem, quae Deum imi∣tatur, colligimur & concrescimus: Because, by the force of vnity (whose worke it is to make things one) all those diuersities and differences, whereby wee are diuided, be, after a speciall manner, conioyned, repraesenting in that vnity, an image of the Deity, which is, Eorum, quae coniunguntur, coniunctio, & vnitas: The coniunction, and vnity of all those things that are ioyned and vnited toge∣ther. Which deity, is that vnity, not onely whereby all things are made one, but also whereby all things were made. There is no one thing in the world, but it is both made, and made one, by the vnity of the Deity. And therefore Pythagoras maintained this opinion: Sine vnitate, nihil esse factum: That it is Vnity, and nothing else, that is the maker of all things. Yea, and the preseruer of them too: as Boetius affirmeth. For, Tamdiû est vnumquod{que}, id quod est (sayth he) quamdiû in se vnitas est: cùm autem desinit esse vnum, desinit esse id quod est: Euery thing continueth so long in his being, as it continueth in his vnity:* 1.1060 and when it loseth his vnity, it ceaseth also to bee. Whereupon hee there concludeth, that, Sicut vnitate res ad esse ducitur: sic &, in illo esse, custoditur. As by vnity, all things are first brought vnto their being; so are they all, by vnity, preserued in the same. Nec quicquam inuenire possis (saith Diony∣sius) quod non vno (ex quo omnis diuinitas nominatur) & sit id, quod est, & absoluatur,* 1.1061 & custodiatur: Neither can any thing be found, which is not both made, and perfected, and preserued by vnity: which is the very title of the Deity.

Now, that, by this vnity, Pythagoras vnderstood nothing else but God; it euidentlie appeareth, in that hee both maketh his vnity the Maker of all things:

A quo sic rerum aeternus ducitur ordo:* 1.1062 Vt m••nade à prima innumeri numeri generantur:

as Palingenius expresseth it:

From whom all things proceede, by an eternall Law, As from the power of Vnity all numbers we may draw.

And againe, in that hee maketh it likewise, The fountaine of all goodnesse: Omnium bonorum principium.* 1.1063 For, both those two attributes, both to be the Maker of all things, and the Giuer of all good things, are ascribed vnto God, in the Holy Scriptures, by the two Brother-Apostles. The first of them, by S. Iohn: By him were all things made.* 1.1064 And the second, by S. Iames: Euery good gift commeth from the Father of light. So that, God onely is that vnity, which Homer also not obscurely insinuateth, when hee doth, Vnitatis naturam p••nere in bono: binarij in malo: When hee placeth the nature of vnity, in good:* 1.1065 and of Duality, in euill; making vnity, the Cause of all kind of goodnesse, both naturall, morall, and ciuill: as, in the same place, hee proueth, by diuers pregnant instances. Vnitatis natura (saith he) si aeri insit, bonam temperiem; ••i animo, virtutem; si corpori, sanitatem; si ciuibus & familijs, pacem, & concor∣diam praestat. Contra, Bin••rij natura, aeri tempestatem; animo, vítium; corpori, morbos; ciuitatibus & familijs, seditiones & odia insert. The nature of vnity is such, that, if it bee in the ayre, it maketh a good temper; if in the minde, it bringeth vertue; if in the body, health; if in the City, peace. But Duality, clean•• contrary in the ayre, procureth stormes; in the mind, vices; in the body, diseases; and in the City, dist••actions. So that Pythagoras his vnity, which is the foun∣taine of all goodnesse, cannot otherwise bee construed, but to bee God him∣selfe.

3 But wee neede vse no circuit, to prooue this vnity, to bee God,* 1.1066 in the opinion of Philosophers. For they themselues affirme it, in direct and expresse termes.* 1.1067 Trismegistus saith of God; that hee is, vnum illud principium, ex quo cuncta dependent, vel ex quo potiùs defluunt: That God is that one originall cause, on which all things doe depend; or ra∣ther,* 1.1068 from which all things doe proceede. And againe, in another place: That there is but Anima vna, & vit•• vna: & quisnam ille praeter vnum Deum? qui vnus singula facit in multis. There is but one soule, and one life: and what is that One, but onely one God, who being but One, yet doth all in all.* 1.1069 Agreeing exactly with the Doctrine of S. Paul: That there is but one God, and Father of all, which is aboue all, and through all, and in all. So like∣wise,* 1.1070 both Socrates and Plato, they both affirmed of God, that hee was: Vnum▪ singularis, & per se subsistentis naturae; solitarium, & revera bonum. God (say they) is but one thing; of a singular nature, and by it selfe subsisting; truely good, and without any companion. All which names, and titles, (as Plutarch there reporteth) they referred vnto Mentem, to a Spirit indued with vnder∣standing: which must needes bee God: because nothing else hath his being of it selfe.* 1.1071 And therefore ••ayth Simplicius, that, Vnitas, and Principium, and Bonum, and Deus, doe Vnam & idem sonare, doe signifie One, and the very

same thing. Plutarch, he proueth God to be Vnum, but One, out of those two letters, E. I. which were written vpon the Gates of Apollo's Temple: which sound as much as 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,* 1.1072 or, Vnum es. Non enìm multa sunt numina, sed vnum. For there are not many Gods, but one God. And Iamblicus saith of God, That,* 1.1073 Vnitas in Diis adeo superat, vt illorum esse sit vnitas quaedam. Vnitie in the Gods, is in so great an excellencie, that their very being, is only to be One.

So that, though by the error of his religion, he were led to affirme, that there were many Gods; yet, by the strength and power of very reason, hee was forced to yeeld, that there was nothing in God, but a most pure and simple vnitie: which is indeede Gods Esse, cui totum est, esse vnum: whose onely being is to be One: as Hugo de Victore noteth.* 1.1074 Which Vnitie, in another place, Iamblicus affirmeth, to be the cause of the whole Vniuersitie. Est Vnitas excel∣sa omnium causa. Now, what can this sublime Vnitie be, which is the cause of all things, but onely God? There is not any other thing, that is the cause of all things. And therefore Xenophanes (as Aristotle reporteth) looking vp into heauen,* 1.1075 vnto this sublime Vnitie, affirmed it to be nothing els, but God. Xenophanes àd totum coelum respiciens, ipsum vnum ait esse Deum. Yea, and diuers of the Philosophers haue gone so farre, as not to thinke it inough to say, Deum esse Vnum: but Deum esse Vnitatem: because Vnum is concretum; whereas there is nihil concreti in Deo. So that, (as Citadimus very wittily col∣lecteth in his obiections against Mirandula)* 1.1076 God may more properly be said to be Vnitas, then Vnus. Hence Pythagoras affirmed (as Epiphanius reporteth) Deum esse Vnitatem:* 1.1077 That God is that one thing, without which there is no∣thing. And Oenod••pes likewise (transposing onely the termes) Vnitatem esse Deum: as Athenagor••s reporteth.* 1.1078 He maketh Vnitie to be a Deitie.

The reason of which their curiositie of speaking, was; because though all of them found a true Vnitie in God,* 1.1079 yet found they it to be such, as could not be expressed by any word. But the neerest they could come vnto it, was the name of Abstract Vnitie. For though God be one (as is confessed by them all) yet is he not so one, as any other thing is one: but so, as nothing else is one: as S. Bernard in his fi••t Booke de Consideratione, hath expressed very excellently. Where hee giueth instance, of eight seuerall wayes, whereby things are sayd and made to be one. And yet none of them doth fully ex∣presse the Vnitie of the Deitie.* 1.1080 Est Vnitas, quae collectiua dici potest, vt cùm (verbi causa) multilapides faciunt acervum vnum. Est vnitas constitutiua, cùm multa membra vnum corpus constituunt. Est Vnitas coniugatiua, qua fit, vt duo iam non sint duo, sed caro vna. Est & natiua, qua anima & caro vnus na∣scttur Homo. Est vnitas potestatiua, qua, homo, virtutis non instabilis, non dis∣similis, sed vnus sibimet semper nititur inueniri. Est consentanea, cum per charitatem, multorum hominum est cor vnum, et anima vna. Est & votiua, cùm anima votis omnibus adhaerens Deo, vnus spiritus est. Est & dignatiua vnitas, qua limus noster, à Dei verbo, in vnam assumptus est personam. There is an Vnitie, which is made by collection; as when many Stones doe make but one heape. There is an Vnitie, which is made by composition; as when many mem∣bers doe make but one body. There is an Vnitie which is made by coniunction; as when man & wife are now no more two, but become one flesh. There is an Vnitie, which is made by stabilitie; as when a man is constant in his vertue, whereby he

is alwayes one, and like vnto himselfe. There is an vnity, which is made by consent; as when, through Christian charity, there is found but one heart and one minde in many. There is an vnity, that is made by deuotion; as when the soule adhaering vnto God by piety and religion, is thereby made but one Spirit with him. And there is an vnity, which is made by vouchsafing; as when God the word vouchsafed to assume the nature of man, into the indentity of his owne person. These bee the eight kindes of S. Bernards vnity: wherein I will not censure, either any impropriety, or any coincidency: because they all may well passe for seuerall kindes of Vnity, in the popular capacity. But yet hee affirmeth of them all, that all these vnities are but to little purpose if they bee compared to the Vnity of the Trinity; much more then being compared to the Vnity of the Deity. Haec omnia (saith hee) quid ad illud summum, atque (vt ita dicam) vnicè vnum, vbi vnitatem consubstantialitas facit? All these vnities are as good as nothing, in respect of that vnity, which is found in the Deity, by Consubstantiality. Huic vni, quiduis illorum si assimiles, erit quoquo modo vnum: si compares, nullo. To this vnity, if you doe but liken any of those forenamed vnities, they may, in some degree, be sayd to bee vnities: but, if you compare them, in no degree at all. Whereupon hee there concludeth: Igitur, inter omnia, quae rectè vnum dicuntur, arcem tenet vnitas Trinitatis: quâ, tres personae vna substantia sunt. Among all the vnities, that can be called vnities [of which Suidas nameth ten.) Boetius reckoneth vp,* 1.1081 foureteene seueral sorts) The vnity of the Trinity is the very chiefest: Wherby three distinct persons are vnited in one substance.* 1.1082 Which sentence of S. Bernards, Aquinas attri∣buteth to Boetius: being, a little perhaps, mistaken in the Author; but nothing at all, in the authority. Whereby it appeareth, that the Vnity in the Deity is so perfect and absolute, that the world cannot affoord a fit comparison to ex∣presse it.* 1.1083 Which Hugo de Victore acknowledgeth expresly, handling the very same point. God (sayth he) is not one, either by Collection; as a flocke is sayd to bee one, which consisteth of many Sheepe: Nor one, by Composition; as a body is sayd to be one, which consisteth of many members: nor one, by Similitude; as the same word is sayd to be one, when it is vttered by diuers mouthes. But God is one, essentia, & identitate; as the soule of a man, which is but one in one bo∣by. Nay, God is more purely one, then the soule of any man. For, though the soule of a man be verè vnum, yet it is not summè vnum, as hee noteth in that place: It is, vnum essentraliter; but it is not, vnum invariabiliter. And there∣fore, not summè vnum. For, that which is variabiliter vnum, that may bee quickly made Alterum: as a man in his sicknesse is from a man in his health. For,* 1.1084 as Seneca truely noteth, Nemo nostrûm, idem est in senectute, qui f••it i••∣uenis: nemo est manè, qui fuit pridiè. But God, is both essentialiter, and inuari∣abiliter vnus.* 1.1085 Hee neuer altereth from himselfe. In him there is no change, nay, no shadow of change.

Yea, and this, haue some, euen of the Heathen themselues, found: as wee may plainely see in Plutarch: who pleadeth very earnestly, for the Vnity of the Godhead,* 1.1086 against all supposed plurality. And yet denieth, that this vnity of the Godhead, is either such a kinde of vnity, as is among men; who though he be but one, yet is hee a congeries, ex infinitis diuersissimis{que} affecti∣onibus variè commixta: A masse of many vnlike and repugnant affections:

but God is one in the most pure simplicite of his essence and being: so as no∣thing els is. Whereby it appeareth, (as before I noted) that there is not any vnitie in the world, sufficient to expresse the Vnity of God. But that (as the Iewes beleeue in their Creede) There is,* 1.1087 talis vnites in Deo, qualis non repe∣ritur in vllo alio. There is such a speciall vnitie in God, as cannot in any other thing, be found. For (as Dionysius very truely obserueth) Deus est tale vnum, quod cogitationem superat omnem:* 1.1088 God is such an vnitie, as passeth all mans cogitation exceedingly. And therefore Dionysius, in another place, sayth of God, that he is not vnum; but he doth ipsum vnum superare: He surpasseth One it selfe: or (as Mirandula expresseth it) he is, Super-bonum, Super-ve∣rum, and Super-vnum: a Super-good, a Super-truth, a Super-one, a very Super-Superlatiue-one, as surpassing all other Bonitie, and Veritie, and Vnitie.

But how then can God be sayd to be One, if no created Vnitie be suffici∣ent to expresse him?* 1.1089 Vnto this poynt, I answere, that God may be sayd in a speciall manner, to be One, three seuerall wayes: as I find it obserued by lear∣ned writers. For his Simplicitie, for his Singularitie, and for his Vniuersalitie. The first way, whereby God is sayd to be One, is, for the purity and simplicity of his substance: which is not compounded with any thing els. For, that is most truely and properly one, which is nothing but it selfe, and hath none other thing mixed with it. Vnum enim quod est, syncerum est, & mixtionis pu∣rum, sayth Plutarch.* 1.1090 And such an one is God: who is so pure and simple an essence, that he is not compounded so much as of parts. But, as I noted be∣fore out of Dionysius, he is truely called Vnus, propter simplicitatem vacuitatis partium.* 1.1091 He is truely called One, because he hath no parts in him: but is solely and wholly of his owne selfe a••one, without any mixture, so much as of mat∣ter, as Plutarch affirmeth in his description of him. Deus est Mens, & species separata,* 1.1092 syncera ab omni materiae admixtione, perpessionibus obnoxiae. God is a separated mind, or forme, who is pure from the mixture of any matter, which may subiect him vnto any kind of passion. Yea, and Tully confirmes the same in his description: which though in words it differ, yet, doth it not in mat∣ter: For he defineth God to be, Mens soluta, & libera, segregata ab omni con∣cretione mortali,* 1.1093 &c. So likewsse Boetius: Diuina substantia, sine materia, for∣ma est: at{que} ideò vnum. So that, all of them run vpon this common notion: That God is a pure substance, without any mixtion. Which his vncompounded simplicitie, is the the true matter of his Vnitie: For, wheresoeuer is mixture, there must needs be number. Diuersitas enìm, cum differentia enti•• ponitur: sayth Plutarch:* 1.1094 Where there be diuersities, there must needs be differences: and consequently, numbers. And therefore Trismegistus sayth, that, Euery compound body, is a multitude of bodies. Eorum, quae in mundo insunt, corporum, vnum∣quod{que} est multitudo.* 1.1095 And, In corporibus, quae composita sunt, corporis cuius{que} numerus est. So that, there is a number in euery mixture. And so, if there were any mixture in God, he could not properly be one. Whereas now, his simplicitie is the true cause of his vnitie. Quia nulla in eo diuersitas, nulla ex diuersitate pluralitas,* 1.1096 nulla ex accidentibus multitudo; at{que} ideo nec numerus. As Boetius well collecteth. There is in God no diuersitie, and therefore no plu∣ralitie; no multitude by accidents, and consequently no number. And this

simplicitie of his substance, is the first of those three reasons, for which God is called One.

The second is, from his Singularity; as the first was from his Simplicity. Because there is no more Gods, but one; God is not onely one, but he is al∣so, The onely One. He is such an one, as hath no companion. Both which ti∣tles are expresly ascribed vnto God in the Scriptures: both that He is One, and that he is The onely One. The first of them, by the Prophet Moses: Audi Israël,* 1.1097 Dominus Deus noster, Deus vnus est. The Lord our God is One God. The second by the Prophet Isay:* 1.1098 Before me there was no God, neither shal there be any after me. So that God is so one, that he is The onely one. He is not on∣ly vnus, but also vnicus: or, to vse S. Bernards word,* 1.1099 Si dici potest, vnissi∣mus est. If that word may be vsed, he is of all things, the Onest. And in respect of this his Singularitie, because he is One, without any companion, is God called,* 1.1100 One, euen of the very Heathen. Socrates and Plato, as before I noted, in their definition of God, ascribe vnto him Vnitie, with particular respect vnto his Singularitie. For, they define God to be, Vnum, singularis, & per se subsistentis naturae: To be one, of a singular and incommunicable nature: To be by nature one,* 1.1101 and of himselfe subsisting. So likewise Antisthenes, who di∣rectly affirmed, Populares esse Deos, multos; naturalem, vnum. That, though there were many Gods, in popular opinion; yet that there is in nature, but onely one.* 1.1102 So likewise Plutarch:* 1.1103 Non multa sunt Numina,* 1.1104 sed vnum. There be not many Gods, but One. Which one God, he there thinketh to be the Sunne: as Macrobius likewise doth: who applyeth all the names of the other Gods, onely vnto him, as if he onely were all of them. Deus vnus, & omnes, as Varro speaketh: and they all, nothing else, but his seuerall names. Yea, and Plutarch, in that place, collecteth the very same, out of two seuerall names of the Sunne. The first, that he is called, Apollo: Quòd Vnicus sit, (of Apri∣uatiue, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉,) Voce multitudinis negationem arguente. The second, that he is called Ieius:* 1.1105 which soundeth as much as vnicus,* 1.1106 & solus. Though Macropedius interpret that name otherwise. So that there is but one God, as there is but one Sunne: which therefore the Romans called Solem, quasi so∣lum, that is to say, The sole One. And so may God be called; likewise, for the very same reason: as Boetius very wittily obserueth;

Quem, quia respicit omnia, Solus, Verum possis dicere Solem.* 1.1107 Whom, 'cause he lookes to all, Being solely one, Thou mayst him truely call, The very Sunne.

And this is the second reason, why God is called One: in respect of his Singularitie, because there is no other God, but He.

The third is,* 1.1108 in respect of his Vniuersalitie, because God is One, Non numero, sed Vniuersitate: Not so much by his Singularity, as by his Vniuersa∣lity: as Ruffine distinguisheth. For he is indeede, all things. He is All in all: as the Apostle speaketh. And as he is in all things: so all things are in him. In him they liue, moue, and haue their being. So that, as Picus Mirandula obser∣ueth out of Dionysius: Vnum dicitur Deus, quia vnicè est omnia. God may be

called one; because he onely is all things. An opinion maintained, by many of the Heathen.* 1.1109 Xenophanes affirmed directly: Deum esse omnia: That God was all things. And so likewise did Trismegistus; Omnia esse vnum, & vnum omnia: vt quae in Creatore fuerunt omnia, antequàm creasset omnia. He saith, That All things are One, and One is all: because they all were in their Maker, before the time that hee made any of them. And thereupon hee concludeth, that the name of God is, Omnia, that is, All things. Nec immeritò ipse dictus est omnia,* 1.1110 cuius membra sunt omnia. His name is iustly called, All things, whose parts and members are all things. And againe, in another place. Necesse est, aut omnia esse eius nomen; aut ipsum, omnium nominibus nuncupari. Either his name must bee All things; or else, he must be named, by the name of all things. So likewise,* 1.1111 both Zeno, and Melissus defined God to be, Et Vnum, & omne: To be One, that is All things.

Which speeches of the Heathen, in making God All things, and in calling him by all names; lest it should seeme to imply an vtter confusion of the Creator with the Creature; Dionysius expresseth them both, in a more quali∣fied manner, bringing a commodious exposition, to mollifie the hardnes of the position.* 1.1112 For he sayth, that God is, Omnia quae sunt, & nihil eorum quae sunt: He is, in some sense, all things that be; and yet, in another sense, none of all the things that be. Now, in what sense it is, that hee calleth God, All things; hee expoundeth himselfe, in the very same place: because, God is both in mundo, circa mundum, & supra mundum: He is, both in the World, about the World,* 1.1113 and aboue the World. And somewhat more fully, in another place: because, in divina vnitate, singillatìm collecta & coniuncta sunt omnia, prae∣stanti modo, & antè, eximiè insunt. Because all things had a being in God, after a speciall, and most excellent manner, before they had any being in them∣selues. And in this sense it must bee taken, when they say; God is, Omnia. And so likewise,* 1.1114 for his name: hee sayth, that God may bee praysed by vs; hoth vt nomine vacantem, & vt omni nomine: both as hauing no name, and yet as hauing euery name: Because euery thing that hath a name, is the worke of God.* 1.1115 So that, to conclude this point with the sentence of S. Augustine: Vnitas illa, à qua, omnis vniversitas & inchoatur, & perficitur, & continetur, est Vnus Deus. That Vnity, from whence the Vniuersality is both begunne, and prefected, and praeserued, is onely the vnity of the Godhead. Wherein, though there be a Trinity of persons; yet is there but an vnity of substance: yea and that an indiuisible Vnity too.* 1.1116 For the Vnity of the Trinity, is, not onely, Vnitas coniuncta; but also, plusquàm coniuncta: as Dionysius truely noteth. It is not an vnity conioyned, of things by nature differing: but more then con∣ioyned, of things in nature consenting.

4 Thus,* 1.1117 Arithmeticall vnity, being rightly vnderstood, and fitly appli∣ed, doth leade vs, by the hand, vnto the knowledge of God. Yea, and as I shewed before, of Punctum in Geometry; that it hath diuers lines, as mono∣grammall draughts of the image of God: so may the same be shewed in Arithmeticall vnity. First, it hath a resemblance of Gods omnipotent po∣wer: whereby hee both maketh and destroyeth all things, at his pleasure. For, as the Prophet Dauid affirmeth of God,* 1.1118 that, When hee sendeth forth his Spi∣rit, all things are created; and when hee but turnes his face, they are all a∣gaine

destroyed: so may it bee truely obserued of vnity; that it hath the like power, among his numbers, that God almighty hath, among his Creatures. For, all numbers haue, not onely their greatnesse and perfection, but also their essence and being, from One. But it, from none. As for example. If you de∣sire to make Two, or a Binary, which is the first number: adde, but One, vnto One, and you make Two. If Three, or a Ternary; adde but One, vnto Two; and you make Three. And so, in infini••um. Nay, the very name of all other numbers, implieth no more, but so many Ones. An Hundred, A Thousand, a Million, doth signifie no more, but an Hundred, a Thousand, and a Million of Ones.* 1.1119 For, Numerus is defined, by Moderatus Pythagoricus, to be nothing else, but Mon••dum congeries: All numbers are nothing, but a multitude of Ones. So that, the very essence and being of all other numbers whatsoeuer, whe∣ther odde, or euen, dependeth but on One. Yea, and so doth likewise their destruction, and dissolution. As we may euidently see, if wee will but walke rerograde, the same way backe againe. For, take but One, from Three; and you not onely vtterly destroy the odnesse, but also the essence of that num∣ber.* 1.1120 And so likewise, from any other. From what number soeuer, you shall take but one, you destroy his nature. And to what number soeuer, you shall adde but one, you make it another. Take one from the greatest number, and you make it lesse. Adde one to the least number, and you make it greater. Take one from an odde number, and you make it euen. Adde one to an euen number, and you make it odde. Vnitas, pari addita, imparem; impari, parem conficit numerum, saith Plutarch. And therefore, in another place hee calleth Vnity,* 1.1121 commune principium,* 1.1122 & parium, & imparium: the common principle, of euen, and odde. So that, both the creation, and destruction of all numbers, dependeth wholy, vpon One. One is the maker, and One is the marrer of euery number. Vnitates quippè gignunt, at{que} augent numerum: rursús{que} solutae inse numerum retrahunt: saith Trismegistus. Vnities added together, beget and increase numbers: and againe dissolued asunder, reduce euery number into themselues, and make of them vnities. Whereby it appeareth, that, as God doth all, among his Creatures: so likewise doth Vnity, among all numbers: which are, as it were, his Creatures, produced onely out of it selfe, by it's owne foecundity, without borrowing any thing thereto, out of any other: as God, in his Creation, produced all his workes, out of his owne omnipotent power, and did not borrow any thing, from any Creature. For, Mathemati∣cians affirme that, Numerus par est mas; impar, foemina: The euen number is the male;* 1.1123 and the odde the female: but, that, Monas est, & par, & impar: Vnity is, both euen, and odde; masculine and feminine: and so that all numbers are begotten of it, tanquàm a mare & a foemina: as of a male and a female. Now this fruitefull Monas, which begetteth all things, is nothing else, but God: as Trismegistus affirmeth; Deus vtrius{que} sexus foecunditate plenissimus, semper{que} voluntate sua praegnans,* 1.1124 parit, quicquid voluerit procreare. God who is filled with the fruitefulnesse of both sexes, and alwayes pregnant, according to his will produceth whatsoeuer his will is to haue produced.

So that,* 1.1125 as in another place he affirmeth, he is Vnus omnia: Such an One as is all things. Thus, in this point also, betweene Deitie, and Vnitie, there is a great affinitie.

Secondly, there is in Vnity a representation of Gods abolute perfection. For, as God hath his whole subsisting of himselfe, so that he cannot be made either greater, or lesser, by any of his creatures: so likewise hath Vnity. It hath his owne subsistence, absolutely in it selfe. For tho••g the essence of all o∣ther numbers dependeth vpon One; yet the essence of one dependeth vpon none. You cannot take any thing from one, to make it lesse: and you cannot adde any thing to one, to make that one greater. For, as Aristotle truly tea∣cheth:* 1.1126 Vnum, as it is nota 1.1127 Diuisibile: so is it notb 1.1128 Combinabile. Vnity can neither be diuided nor increased. For, when One is added vnto One, there is by their coniunction, produced another number; but yet neither of these two vnities, is in it selfe, made greater, but abideth firme and stedfast, in his owne stable nature; as God himselfe doth. And therefore, Iustin Martyr, euen in this respect,* 1.1129 compareth Vnitie vnto God. Quemadmodùm vnitati, id nihil confert ad perfectionem, quòd principium sit numeri: (Nam etiamsi principi∣um numeri non esset, perfecta tamen esset: & cum principium eius facta sit, non aucta tamen est) sic Deus quoque, ante creationem perfectus erat, & post crea∣tionem auctus non est. As it bringeth no perfection vnto an Vnity, that it is the fountaine and beginning of numbers: (For though it were not the beginning of any number, yet is an vnity perfect in its owne proper nature: and beeing the fountaine and beginning of some number, it is thereby perfected neuer the more) so God, who was perfect before the creation, yet is not made more perfect by the creation. And this is the second degree of their comparison.

Thirdly, there is in Vnitie, a draught and resemblance of Gods Immuta∣bilitie. For, as God is alwayes like vnto himselfe, and not subiect to so much as to a shadow of Change: no more is Vnitie neither. It is not variable, by pa∣rity;* 1.1130 or imparitie; by multiplicity, or paucity; as all other numbers be: but it still continueth, in its owne nature, immutably. An Vnity is alwayes at vnitie with it selfe,* 1.1131 and neuer varieth from it selfe. Est Vnitas (saith Mirandula) omninò semper, à se perfecta, non egreditur se, sed indiuidua simplicitate, & solitaria sibi cohaeret. Vnity is simple and perfect in it selfe, neuer going out of it selfe, but sticking vnto it selfe, vnchangeably, only by its owne sole and naturall simplicity. So absolute is the nature of One, in it selfe, that it cannot be chan∣ged; and so omnipotent toward others, that it changeth all numbers. So that Monas (as Trismegistus obserueth) tanquam principium,* 1.1132 radix, & ori∣go, omnem numerum continet, a nullo contenta; omnem gignit, a nullo genita. Vnity containeth all numbers, beeing contayned of none; and it begetteth all, being begotten of none.

Fourthly, there is in Vnity, a true resemblance of Gods Eternitie, or An∣tiquitie: who is named in the Scripture,* 1.1133 The Auncient of Dayes. For, as God is before all his creatures; so likwise is Vnitie before alll numbers. Sine vno, multitudo non erit,* 1.1134 sayth Dionysius: Vnum autem erit, sine multitudine: Vt Mo∣nas omnem numerum multiplicatum & auctum antecedit. There can be no mul∣titude without one, but one may be without a multitude: for, vnity is before any multiplied number. Which antecedencie of Vnity, in the same place, he appli∣eth vnto the Deitie.* 1.1135 Vnum illud, quod est causa omnium, est omni vno, & multitudine, omni toto, & parte, omni termino, & determinationis priuatione, omni fine & infinitate antiquius. That one thing, which is the beginning of all

things, is, in Nature before both all Ones, and all, Manyes, all wholes, all parts, all termes, and all indeterminations, all finites and all infinites. It is more anci∣ent, then all these. Yea so ancient, that (as Macrobius affirmeth) it is without all beginning.* 1.1136. And therefore he hath reduced it directly vnto God, Haec monas, initium, finis{que} omnium, ne{que}, ipsa principij finis{que} sciens, ad summum refertur Deum: That one thing, which is, both the beginning, and ende of all things; and yet hath neither beginning, nor ende, in it selfe; cannot otherwise be referred, but vnto the most High God. Who (as Mirandula obserueth out of Dionysius) ita rerum omnium principium est,* 1.1137 sicut omnium numerorum principium Vnitas est. God is so the first beginning of all things, as vnitie is the first beginning of all numbers. And thus, as Philo Iudaeus obserueth, Vnitas, est prime Causae & primi Authoris imago. There is in vnitie,* 1.1138 a true image of the Deitie who is the first Cause and first Author of all things. And who, in respect of his owne most inexplicable and incomprehensible Vnitie, may truly be called by vs, both 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, and 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: both One, and, The only One.

CHAP. 11.

That the motion of the Heauens, and Starres, is not naturall. 2. Which yet is so orderly, as if it were artificiall. That the order of their motion, hath the resemblance of a Dance. 4. That the Heauens themselues, doe make Musicke, to this Dance. That this orderly Motion of the Starres, hath led diuers men, to seeke for a God, aboue the Starres. 6. Because their orderly Motions, can neither be from Chance, nor from their owne Wills: But onely from Gods Wisdome, who is the Maker of them.

THe third of the Mathematicall Arts, is Astronomie: whose Obiect is, the Motion of the Heauenly Orbes, and Starres; where∣in there be many Arguments, which may leade men, by the hand, to vnderstand, There is a God. But because I haue instan∣ced,* 1.1139 but onely in Order: I will therefore keepe order and wil onely stand to it. And yet, in this place, I will but lightly touch it: because in the seauenth Booke, there falleth out a more apt, and more ample conside∣ration of it.

First therefore, as concerning the Motion of the Heauens, it hath troubled the Heads of the wisest Philosophers: of what Nature this Motion of the Hea∣uens should be? Tullie greatly approueth of Aristotles diuision, as concerning Motion;* 1.1140 That, Whatsoeuer things are moved, they must needs bee moved, either by their owne natures; or, by force from others; or by a will in themselues. Now, for the Heauens, he concludeth, that their motion cannot be natural, because the Motion of all naturall Bodies, whether Simple or, Compound, is either Vpward, or Downward. For, all Bodies are, either Light or, Heauy. If Light,* 1.1141 they moue directly vpward, If Heauy, they moue perpendicularly downward. And, there is not any naturall Bodie in the world, which is so aequally compounded of Light, and Heauie, that it can hang in the midst, and propend neither way. And therefore, the Heauens, if they were left vnto the motion of their owne proper natures, they would either moue vpward, or downward, as the Elements doe; or else they must stand still. For, other

Motion, from their matter, they can haue none, as they be naturall Bodies.

No, nor yet from their Forme neither, as they bee teret and round Bodies. For, though their Rotundity doth giue them an aptitude and disposition to bee carried about in their circular motion; yet giueth it not the motion it selfe vnto them. As we may see in a wheele: which (for all his roundnesse) stands as still as a stone, if it haue not some other means to helpe it vnto mo∣tion. It may bee obiected; that the weightines of the wheele doth settle it vpon his Axis, as in his proper place, where all things doe stand still. But it may also bee answered; that the Heauens are in their proper place: and there∣fore should stand still, yea though they had in them the principle of motion: much more, they hauing none. As indeed they haue not, if they bee of such a temper, as is neither Heauy, nor Light. For, if we could imagine, that nature had made any thing, so equally tempered, and indifferently poised, of Heauy, and Light, that neither were predominant; it must needes hang in the midst, and not mooue it selfe, either vpward, or downewards. Neither could it moue about, in a circular motion; vnlesse it were impelled, by some other thing. For, Nature hath made nothing, which hath, in it selfe, the proper principle of circular motion. I meane, not as it is a Body. The rotundity of their forme, that giueth onely, vnto them, an hability to that motion (as be∣fore I noted) but, the act, it giueth not. Neither can the vacuity of both Heauinesse and Lightnesse, giue vnto them that motion: because, that is ra∣ther the principle of station,* 1.1142 then of Motion. And (as Iustine Martyr very well collecteth:) If the absence, or priuation of both Heauinesse and Lightnes, were a formall cause of circular motion; then, Materia prima (which Aristotle maketh, to bee neither light, nor heauy) should, from all eternity, haue moued circularly: and so there should haue bene a motion, before there was any Heauen. Which hee derideth there, most iustly, as a grosse absurdity. But, if wee should grant: as Palingenius would haue vs:

—Coelestia corpora, per se,* 1.1143 At{que} suis formis; vt terra, ignis{que} moueri: That Heauenly bodies, of themselues, by their owne formes do moue, As doth the Earth, that is below; and Fire, that is aboue.

Yet he teacheth vs, in the same place, that, it is onely God, that giueth them their formes.

Nempe suis, res, a formis, tales generantur: Quales praecepit, qui formas condidit ipsas. Yet such are things, by their owne formes begotten, As He that made their formes,, doth please t'allot them.

And therefore, the Orator proceedeth on further, vnto the other two members, of his forenamed diuision of Motion. That this sphericall motion of the heauens, not proceeding, in them, from any naturall principle, inhae∣rent in their bodies, it must needes, either be a violent motion, put vpon them by an externall force, from some others; or else, a voluntary motion, occasi∣oned by an internall will in themselues. For, other principle, can be none, of this circular motion. But, that it cannot be a motion, inforced vpon them, hee assumeth from this ground: That there cannot bee any force, without them, that is strong enough to compell them: there being no force that is

greater then their owne.* 1.1144 Quae enim vis potest esse maior? What force can bee greater? And againe, Quid potest esse mundo valentius, quod impellat, atque moueat? What power can be greater, then the power of the world, that should bee able to mooue it? Hee supposeth (though falsely) that there can no such power bee. And therefore hee concludeth, That the motion of the Heauens, must be, of necessity, a motion meerly voluntary, proceeding from nothing else, but onely from their owne wills. Whereupon hee there in∣ferreth, that, Haec qui videt, non solùm indoctè, sed etiam impiè faciet, si Deos esse neget: That, this being admitted, he must not onely be vngodly, but also vn∣learned too, if hee deny them to be Gods: meaning, The Heauens and Starres. This is the summe of his reason, from the motions of the Starres. Wherein, though hee leade vs neuer so farre about; yet, at last, hee bringeth vs home vnto our Conclusion: That there needs must be a God: and, that the Heauens, by their motion, do plainely proue the same. An Argument largely handled by the Prophet Dauid in the 19. Psal.* 1.1145 And though Tully, in that place, doe bring the whole Argument vnto a false issue, building vpon a false ground; That the motion of the Heauens is voluntary, and of themselues; and that there∣fore, They be Gods: though, I say, it be false, in the particular, That the Heauens and Stars, be Gods; yet it is true in the generall, that it proueth most certainly, that There needes must be a God; and, that this motion of the Heauens, can∣not possibly be stirred by any other cause, but onely by God himselfe.

For, if the motion of the Heauens (being admitted to be voluntary) doe conclude them to bee Gods; then must needes the same motion (being ad∣mitted to be compulsory) much more conclude, that he, by whose force they be so violently compelled, must needes be God. As, euen Plato himselfe hath plainely confessed: from whom the former Argument of Tullies is borrow∣ed. Cogitemus (saith hee) quî fieri possit, vt tanta magnitudo, ab aliqua possit natura,* 1.1146 tanto tempore, circumferri? Ego igitur assero, Deum causam esse, nec ali∣ter posse fieri. Let vs consider (saith he) how it can possibly bee, that the Hea∣uens, being of so great and so vast a body, should, by any power of nature, ••e dri∣uen so impetuously. And therefore (saith he) I do confidently affirme, that onely God himselfe can bee the mouer of them. This is his determination, as con∣cerning the Heauens motion. And where is now that Soule of theirs; which, but a little before, he made the mouer of them?

2 But let vs now proceede further, and come from the nature of their motion to the Order.* 1.1147 Which is so great and excellent, that euen Aristotle himselfe (who subiecteth all other matters, with a kinde of Tyranny, vnto the power of his reasons) yet here (leauing reason) he sodainely breaketh out, into a passionate admiration:* 1.1148 Quid vnquàm poterit aequari coelesti ordini, & volubilitati? Cùm sydera conuertantur exactissima norma, de alio in aliud secu∣lum. What can euer be compared vnto the order of the Heauens, & to the motion of the Stars, in their seuerall reuolutions? Which mooue most exactly, as it were, by rule and square, from one generation to another. Which rule of their motion, Dauid affirmeth to be Gods law, that he hath set them.* 1.1149 God hath made them fast for euer; he hath giuen them a law, which they cannot passe. And so likewise doth Plato. For he saith, that God, when he had made the Starres, he did, Singulis leges fatales edicere: He gaue vnto them fatall & vnchangeable Lawes.

And indeed, the very name of this Art, whereof we now intreat [the ve∣ry name of Astronomie] in exact signification, importeth, that the Starres obserue a law in their motion. Which law is giuen vnto them, by none other, but onely by God himselfe, who is their true Law-giuer. He is both their Ma∣ker, and their Law-maker. Yea, and this law of his, they obserue so exactly, that (as the Orator obserueth) there is in all their motion,* 1.1150 Nihil temerarium, nihil varium, nihil fortuitum: They neither iustle rashly, one vpon another; nor yet decline casually, one from another; no, nor vary in the least poynt, from their prescribed order.* 1.1151 For (as Macrobius likewise noteth) In Coelo, constat, nihil fortuitum, nihil tumultuarium prouenire; sed vniuersa illìc di∣uinis legibus, & stata ratione procedere. There is nothing done casually, nothing disorderly, in the heauens: but all things prescribed by most exact reason; and determined by order of most diuine lawes. So that, hee ascribeth all the order of their motion, vnto that law, which God hath prescribed them. And so likewise doth Seneca:* 1.1152 he saith, that the Starres doe, aeternae legis imperio pro∣cedere: They moue by the appoyntment of an eternall Law, that is, by the law of an eternall God. Both of them agreeing with the Prophet Dauid, that the onely cause of their orderly motion, is that exact law, which God hath pre∣scribed them. In which poynt, Tullie also consenteth fully with them. For he, rendring a reason, why certaine of the Starres be called Planets: that is to say, Wanderers: yet affirmeth, that it is not, because they wander in their motion, but, because of that variety, which they haue aboue others. As for their owne motions, they keepe so strict an order, and so great a constancie, in obseruing of them, that they swerue not from that law, which God hath prescribed them.

Et,* 1.1153 si stellarum motus, cursus{que} vagantes Nosse velis, quae sint signorum in sede locatae. Quae verbo, & falsis Graecorum vocibus, errant; Reuera, certo lapsu, spacióque feruntur: Omnia iam cernes, diuina mente notata.

Marke, Omnia, diuina mente notata.

Wouldst thou the motions of the Starres, and various courses know; Which fixed are, and which are sayd to wander to and fro? How e're the Graecians name them such; in very truth, they runne In certaine tracts and distances, not wandring vp and downe: But all directed thou mayst see, by Gods prescription.

But, Manilius, in this point, goeth farre beyond them all; both expresly acknowledging, that the Starres, in their motion, obserue a law prescribed them: and that this Law-giuer, is none other, but onely God, their Crea∣tor.

Nec quicquam,* 1.1154 in tanta magis est mirabile mole, Quàm Ratio, & certis quòd legibus omnia parent. Nusquàm turba nocet, nihil vllis partibus errat. There is not ought (a wonder t'is) in such a wondrous masse, More wonderfull or strange then this, that Reason bring's to passe: That all obey their certaine lawes; which he doth still preferre; No tumult hurteth them, nor ought in any part doth erre:

From whence, by and by inferring,

Ac mihi tam praesens ratio non vlla videtur, Quâ pateat, mundum divino numine verti. To me, no reason stronger seem's to proue, The world, by power diuine, thus still to moue.

And a little after,* 1.1155 asking the quaestion,

At cur, dispositis vicibus, consurgere signa, Et, v••lut imperio, praescriptos reddere cursus, C••rnimus, ac nullis properantibus vlla relinqui? Whence is it, that wee see, the Starres in turnes to rise, And, at Command to stoope, and keepe their ordered guise? &c.

He giueth this for an Answer of their immutabilitie: that, it is the worke of the immutable God.

—Deus est, qui non mutatur in aevo.

And indeed, it is a wonder, that these Planets, still running sometime in di∣uers, and sometime in aduerse courses; yet should all of them obserue, so vnchangeably, their order, that they neuer should impeach, or hinder one another.* 1.1156 But though they doe, Transuersos agere cursus: as the Tragick noteth, in one place: yet doe they,* 1.1157 Inoffensos, as hee noteth in another. They runne in crosse courses; and yet doe not crosse one another, in their courses.* 1.1158 Nec errant (saith Plato) nec praeter antiqunm ordinem reuoluuntur. Neither doe they runne randon, nor are they rolled, beside their ancient order.

Which orderly motion of the Starres, both proueth, There is a God; yea, and that this is his worke; by so necessarie a consequence, that whoso∣euer seeth it not,* 1.1159 him, Tullie affirmeth to be, without all sense. Coelestem admirabilem ordinem, incredibilem{que} constantiam, qui vacare Mente putat, is ipse mentis expers habendus est. He which thinketh the admirable order and incredible constancie of the Heauens to be without a Spirit, hee may be thought himselfe to be without spirit or vnderstanding.

3 And indeed,* 1.1160 the motions of the Starres, are in so great Varietie; and yet obserued, with such order, and constancie; that they haue resemblance of a well measured dance: some running directly, and forth-right, in their courses; some dauncing round about, in their Epicycles. Yea, and that with great varietie, and change of their motions, in Directions, Stations, Retrograda∣tions, and such like: wherein they doe seeme, as it were, to treade the Maze and (in their kinde) to daunce their Measures.* 1.1161 Of which, Tullie giueth in∣stance, in the Planet Saturnus. Saturni Stella, in suo cursu, multa mirabiliter efficiens, tum antecedendo, tum retardando, tum vespertinis temporibus delite∣scendo, tum matutinis rursùm se aperiendo; nihil tamen immutat sempiternis seculorum aetatibus, quìn eadem ijsdem temporibus efficiat. The Planet Saturne, doth make many strange and great wonders, in his motion, some∣times going before, and sometimes comming after, sometimes withdrawing himselfe in the Euening, and sometimes againe shewing himselfe in the mor∣ning:* 1.1162 And yet changeth nothing, neither in the order of times, nor in the nature of things. And the like may be seene, in the rest of the Planets: as he himselfe sheweth, in that very place. So that, Aristophanes his ob∣seruation

of the Clowdes,* 1.1163 is much truer in the Starres: that they doe, Arte choream instituere. They make in their motions, an artificiall kind of Daun∣ces. Plato affirmeth, that God hath purposely prouided the Sunne to giue the Starres light, the better to performe their well ordered motions: which he calleth there, Their Daunces: where he also calleth their Courses, Deorum choreas, The daunces of the Gods. For so he indeed esteemed of the Starres: But Philo Iudaeus more truely,* 1.1164 Diuinas choreas, Diuine and heauenly daunces. For so, in a sort, they may truely be called: Diuinas reuera choreas agittantes, nec vnquam ordinem deserentes. They daune in Gods presence (as Dauid did before the Arke) and yet,* 1.1165 neither breake their orders, nor stray from their pla∣ce. So likewise Palingenius:

—Nec se collidunt,* 1.1166 concutiunt{que}, Occurrendo sibi, sed certa lege, modó{que}, Vna eadém{que} v••a, leni, vertigine pergunt; Et choreae in morem, placidè, tacite{que} feruntur. Nor doe they dash together, nor make shock, By meeting one another. But are lock't Vnto a constant law, and one set way; From which their smooth sweet windings neuer sway; But runne, as if they daunc't a Roundelay.

Whence,* 1.1167 Maximus Tyrius calleth God, Coeli compositorem harmonicum, and Astrorum circulationis, & chorea, supremum moderatorem: ascribing vnto him, the melody of the heauens, and the dauncing of the starres. And there∣fore Plato againe,* 1.1168 in another of his Dialogues, he sayth of the Starres, that they doe Chorea optima vti, omnium{que} chorearum magnificentissima: that they daunce a most stately and magnificall daunce: harping still vpon their dauncing. From whence, he there concludeth, That therefore they haue with∣in them, Mentem: a certaine spirit, or soule, that directeth them. And it is true, in very deed. But it is not their owne spirit, as he falsely supposed: it is onely Gods Spirit.* 1.1169 By the word of the Lord were the heauens made, and all the host of them, by the breath of his mouth: sayth the Prophet Dauid. And so likewise holy Iob:* 1.1170 His spirit hath garnished the Heauens, and his hand hath for∣med the crooked Serpent. So that, the Spirit, which giueth vnto the starres their motion, is onely the Spirit, which giueth them their being. It is onely that diuine Spirit,* 1.1171 in which all things both liue, and moue, and haue their be∣ing. Yea, and this is also confessed, euen by the very heathen. For, Tullie af∣firmeth,* 1.1172 that Soule of the world, to be nothing els, but god: and that by the Platonists owne doctrine. Animam mande dicunt esse Mentem, perfectam{que} sapientiam, quem Deum appellant.* 1.1173 So Plutarch Mens est Deus: That soule is God. And againe, Democritus ait, Deum in igne globoso, esse mundi animam. Democritus sayth, that God in the fiery globe, is the soule of the world.

Yea, and Virgil, speaking of that Mens, or Spirit, which giueth motion vnto the heauens, he giueth such a description of it, as an agree to no Spi∣rit, but to the Spirit of God.

Principio Coelum,* 1.1174 ae terras, Campo's{que} liquentes, Lucentém{que} globum Luna, Titania{que} astra, Spiritus intùs alit: totam{que} infusa per artus

Mens agitat molem— He saith, the Heauens, the Earth, the Waters, and the Stars, Receiue their Motions, and whate're they are, From an internall Spirit; which th' Eternall is, That vnto all of them their Motion giu's.

Now, what Spirit can this be, in all those great Creatures, but onely the Spi∣rit of God their Creator? Of whom, the prophet Ieremie affirmeth, that, hee filleth both Heauen and Earth.* 1.1175 And the Wiseman in the Booke of Wise∣dom: That he not onely filleth them, but also maintayneth them: answering to Virgils-alit. This Spirit, that made those Creatures, doth also guide their motions. And their mouing, in so exact both a number, measure, and or∣der, doth evidently show; That God himselfe is their Mouer.* 1.1176 That God himselfe is their Mouer. Whom euen the Heathen imagined, to be delighted which their dauncing, in such an order, before him. Yea, and that, something too much: as the Tragick seemes to chalenge him;

Cur tibi tanta est cura,* 1.1177 perenn••s Agitare vias aetheris alti? Why art thou so much taken vp, oh why, In those perpetuall motions of the sky?

Yea, and euen among vs Christians, that renowned Poet, Bartas, though hee goe not so farre, yet he affirmes that,

—sacred Harmonie,* 1.1178 And numbrie law did then accompanie Th' Almighty most: When first his ordinance Appointed Earth to rest, and Heauen to daunce.

4 And therefore,* 1.1179 diuers of them, as they ascribe a rythmicall motion, vnto the Starres; so doe they an harmonicall, vnto the Heauens; ymagining, that their mouing produceth the melodie of an excellent sweete tune. So that, they make the Starres, to be Dauncers; and the Heauens, to be Musitians. An opinion, which of old, hath hung in the heads, and troubled the braines of many learned men: yea, and that, not onely among the Hea∣then Philosophers; but also euen among our Christian Divines.

The first Author and inuenter of which conceited imagination,* 1.1180 was the Philosopher Pythagoras.* 1.1181 Who broched his opinion,* 1.1182 with such felicitie & happinesse,* 1.1183 that he wonne vnto his part,* 1.1184 diuers of the most ancient, and best leaned Philosophers: as Plutarch reporteth. Plato, whose learning Tullie so much admireth, that hee calleth him, The God of all Philosophers: Deum Philosophorum, he affirmeth of the Heauens, that Euery one of them, hath sitting vpon it, a Sweet-singing Syren, carolling-out a most pleasant and me∣lodious song, agreeing with the motion of her owne peculier heauen. Which Syren, though it sing of it selfe, but one single part; yet all of them to∣gether, being eight in number (for so many Heauens were onely held by the Ancients) doe make an excellent Song, consisting of eight parts: wherein, they still modulate their Songs, a greeable with the motions of the eight coelestiall Spheres.

Which opinion of Platoes,* 1.1185 is not only allowed by Macrobius; but he also af∣firmeth of this Syrens Song, that, it is a Psalme, composed in the praise of God

Yea, and he proueth his assertion out of the very name of a Syren: which sig∣nifieth (as he saith) as much as, Deo canens, A singer unto God. But Maxi∣mus Tyrius, he affirmeth of the Heauens, that (without any such helpe,* 1.1186 of those coelestiall Syrens) they make a most sweete harmonie, euen by their proper motions: wherein they doe, Omnes symmetriae numeros im∣plere; contrarió{que} nisu, diuinum sonum perficere: They, by their contrary mo∣uing, doe fill vp all the parts of a most Divine and heauenly Song. Which, hee affirmeth to be most pleasant vnto the eares of God; though it cannot be heard by the eares of men.* 1.1187 Yea, and the Sages of the Greekes, insi∣nuate also as much, by placing of Orpheus his harpe, in Heauen: implying, in the seauen strings of his well turned harpe, that sweete tune and harmonie, which is made in heauen, by the diuers motions of the seauen planets, as Lucian interprets it. Vnto which his opinion, there may seeme to be a kinde of allusion, in the Booke of Iob, as the Text, in the vulgar translation, is ren∣dered: Concentum Coeli quis dormire fac••et?* 1.1188 Who shall make the Harmony of the Heauens to sleepe? For so, likewise, the Diuines of Doway trans∣late it.

Pliny indeede, as concerning this Harmony, doth write somewhat doubt∣fully; whether there be,* 1.1189 in truth, any such thing, or no? suspending his owne opinion, with Non facilè dixerim. So that, as hee doth not defend it, for a veritie; so doth he not againe deny it, as a falsity; but leaueth it, as vncer∣taine. Whose doubting of it (he being of so acute, and inquiring a wit) is rather a credit, then a discredit vnto it. But, much more is Aristotles deri∣ding of it: because (in the end) hee was forced to retract in. For, though in his Booke, De Coelo, he confute it, and make, in a manner, but a scoffe, and scorne of it; yet,* 1.1190 in his booke,* 1.1191 De Mundo, he alloweth of it, and confesseth it to be the proper worke of God. For, there hee sayth expresly, that, God doth, In mundo, rerum omnium concentum continere: That hee keepeth that Harmony, which is to be found, in all the seuerall parts of the world. And so likewise, Tully; although, in one place, hee doe scoffe at this Harmony, that Mundus should ad harmoniam canere:* 1.1192 That the World should sing vnto a tune: yet, in another place, hee not onely subscribeth vnto it, but also, ascribeth vn∣to the working of it, all those benigne & gracious influences, which, from the Heauens, descend vpon these inferior bodies. Stellarum tantus est concentus, ex dissimilimis motibus, vt cùm summa Saturni refrigeret, media Martis incendat:* 1.1193 His interiecta Iouis, illustret & temperet. infra{que} Martem duae, Soli obediant: Sol ipse mundum omnem sua luce compleat, ab eo{que} Luna illuminata, grauidates & partus afferat, maturitatem{que} gignendi. There is so great an Harmony, and con∣cent of the Starres, arising from the diuersity of their motions; that, as Sa∣turne cooleth, so Mars heateth, and Iupiter (which is betweene them) hee tempe∣reth them both. The other two Planets, which are below Mars, are both of them obedient vnto the Sunne; which filleth the whole world with the cheerefull light of it: Wherewith it illumining the body of the Moone, by it giueth power of increase, and generation. Concluding, with these words, his former obser∣uation: Quae copulatio rerum, &, quasi consentiens ad mundi incolumitatem, coagmentatio naturae, quem non mo••et; hunc, horum nihil reputasse, certò scio: This consent and agreement of those naturall things, so greatly aduancing the

good of the whole world, if it doe not mooue any man, it is onely from this cause; That he neuer well considered them. Resoluing, that no man could euer ob∣serue them, but that th••y would make a great impression in him. But Macro∣bius (leauing all those Allegoricall allusions) asserteth this Harmony, vnto a true and reall melody indeede; occasioned by the various motions, and dif∣fering magnitudes of the Heauens. Which, he saith▪ must needes produce,* 1.1194. sonum dulcem, & musicum; non ineptum, & asperum: A sweete, and delight∣full; not a harsh, and distastfull sound: as, by inuincible reasons, he saith, may be collected. Which point, hee indeede hath laboured exactly,* 1.1195 with much fi••enesse and subtility. Vnto whom I referre them, that desire a more curious discourse vpon this Theame.

Neither is this an idle fancy, begotten onely in the heads of conceited P••ilosophers; but it is also entertained, for a certaine truth, by diuers learned Christians. Bed•• alledgeth this opinion, of the Harmony of Heauen,* 1.1196 for the credit of Musicke. Which hee would neuer haue done, if he had not allowed of it. Boetius doubteth not, directly to affirme it: yea, and to proue it too:* 1.1197 Non potest, ab hac coelesti vertigine, ratus ordo modulationis, absistere. But, a∣boue all, Anselmus, though otherwise a seuere and a very austere man; yet is so sweetened, and mollified with the conceite of this Musicke, that hee,* 1.1198 not onely asseuereth it; but also indeauoureth, with great paines and la∣bour, to set out the true musicall proportion of it: as Macrobius be∣fore did.

Now, it is no lesse vnprobable, that so many learned men, of so many dif∣fering bot••••ages and nations, should concurre, with such an harmony, in de∣fending of this Harmony, if it were merely fained; then it is, that there should bee such an Harmony, indeede. Neg, enìm hunc, tam certum syderum cursum,* 1.1199 at{que} discursum, forturti impetus esse dixerim: saith Seneca. These so certaine both courses, and recourses of the Starres, cannot possibly bee the workes of blinde Fortune, and Chance; but must needes bee Gods owne ordinance: be∣cause they doe not, sine aliquo Custode stare; but, aeternae legis imperio proce∣dere: as hee noteth in the same place: They neither keepe their stations, with∣out a Keeper; nor mooue their motions, without a Ruler: whose aeternall law they faithfully obey.

And, it was a thing no more hard vnto God, to make the Heauens to moue with a sweete melodious harmony, then to make them moue without it. For, if Queene Cleopatra, when she came vnto Antonius,* 1.1200 could instruct the Oare-men, and Rowers of her Barge, to strike all their strokes, in such or∣der and number, that they made a most sweete harmony and concent, vpon the water, as exactly agreeing with her musicall instruments, as the sound of a Taber agreeth with his Pipes (an Art also in practice sometimes, among the Greekes,* 1.1201 as may be collected,* 1.1202 out of Maximus Tyrius:) then much more can God doe so: who ordereth all his workes, both in Number, Weight, and Measure. It is not hard for him, in such sort to moderate, yea and to modu∣late, the Heauens, as to make them, to send fo••th a sweete harmony, in their motions.

Yea, and it is not incredible, that hee hath also done it. For, seeing it is vnpossible, that this so huge and vast a fabricke of the Heauens, being truely

materiall and sensible bodies, and whirled about with such incredible swift∣nes, should moue without some noyse:* 1.1203 as Pythagoras well collecteth: and that noyse (as Macrobius truely inferreth) must be of necessity, either sweete and melodious,* 1.1204 or harsh and absonous [aut musicum, aut asperum:] it is far more probable, that, that sound, which God hath chosen to sound continu∣ally in his diuine Eares,* 1.1205 should rather be tuned, like the sound of sweete Mu∣sicke, then harsh and confused, like the creaking of a Cart. For (as Macrobi∣us in the same place, obserueth) Fragor turbidus, & inconditus, offendit au∣ditum. An harsh and rude crashing of things, offendeth the eare. And there∣fore it is not likely to be found in the Heauen. In which, as there is Nihil for∣tuitum: so is there,* 1.1206 Nihil tumultuarium: As there is nothing done rashly; so there is nothing done disorderly. And, it cannot, in any probabilitie, be thought, that God, who hath appointed vs, in our singing vpon Earth, To make a pleasant melodie,* 1.1207 and to sing vnto him with a grace in our hearts;* 1.1208 would admit into the heauens themselues, any such vntuneable and incom∣posed noyse, as hath neither any grace nor melodie in it.

But this I doe not affirme, as a certainty; but onely propose as a probabi∣litie: leauing euery man vnto his owne liberty, to beleeue it, or not to be∣leeue it, as he findeth himselfe most inclined in his mind: Apologizing for my selfe, as Gregory Nyssen doth in a like case; That heerein I doe but, Inge∣nium, ad m••ntem nostram,* 1.1209 in propositis exercere, non doctrinam expositricem posteris relinquere: I doe but onely propound it, for the exercise of wit, as a probability; not commend it, for a sealed and infallible truth, vnto all poste∣ritie.

Therefore, be this opinion of the Harmony of the Heauens, as it may; be it, but Lepidè quidem,* 1.1210 & musicè dictum, factu autem impossibile, as Aristotle censureth it: that is: but a pleasant and musicall conceit: Yet this so excellent a concent and agreement in the heauens, to keepe so constantly, their seuerall rankes and orders (notwithstanding the diuersitie of their courses) is a work, which by themselues, cannot possibly be done, no more, then any musicall Instrument can put it selfe into tune. It is God the Musitian (as Plutarch be∣fore calleth him) that keepeth all in tune.* 1.1211 His power keepeth them all in o∣bedience: His wisedome guideth them all in their courses: and, his good∣nesse maketh them to produce those good effects, which they worke in the earth, and in these inferior Bodies. And therefore, euen Aristotle himselfe, who derideth so much the Harmony of the Heauens, in any real sounds; yet, in respect of this harmonicall concent in the creatures, he so much admireth it, that he compareth God, in his working of it, vnto a Praecentor in a Quire: who both appointeth and moderateth all the Songs,* 1.1212 that be sung there. All which things declare, that God, as he is delighted in order, so is hee likewise delighted in number: Yea and in musicall number too. In which opinion An∣selmus is carried so farre, that he, not onely affirmeth, that God hath giuen to the heauens an harmonicall number, in their motions; but also from thence collecteth, that God hath, in his kind, an harmonicall motion euen in himselfe.* 1.1213 Habes haec in te, tuo ineffabili modo, qui ea dedisti rebus, a te crea∣tis, suo sensibili modo: Thou hast this harmony, in thy selfe, after an vnspeak∣able manner, which thou hast giuen vnto thy creatures, after a sensible manner.

Yea, and euen the very Heathen were in the same opinion:* 1.1214 who beleeued, all their Gods, to consist of Numbers, and musical proportions.

•• But,* 1.1215 to leaue this harmonicall motion of Heauens, as a probleme, and not to determine it, as as position: yet, certaine it is, that the Heauens doe moue, in such an exquisite order, that the contemplation thereof, hath led ma∣ny to beleeue, that none other, but onely God, can be possibly their Mouer. Suidas affirmeth, that, euen Abraham himselfe, was first occasioned,* 1.1216 to seeke after God, by considering the motion of the Starres. For, hee being by nati∣on a Ch••ldean, (who, as Aristole obserueth,* 1.1217 are naturally giuen to that kinde of contemplation) and obseruing, in their motion, a wonderfull order, and va∣rietie, and yet no lesse a constancie, he presently collected, that these strange reuolutions could not possibly be performed, if they were not directed, and guided, by some God. So that, his first motiue, to seeke after God, was, that orderly motion, which he saw the Starres obserued. Yea and Orpheus him∣selfe insinuateth also as much.

Vnus praeterquam, cui derivatur origo Chaldaeûm ex genere, is noscebat sydera Coeli,* 1.1218 Illorúm{que} vias, & quî moueatur in orbem Sphaera, & tellurem circumvertatur in axem, Spiritus & regat hanc, & in aere, & in aequore fuso. One onely Man there was of old, and he from Chaldee sprang, Who knew the Natures of the Stars, and courses that they ranne, And how the Heauen doth wheele and ring all round about the Earth, The Spirit also that rules all these, and Ayre, and Sea beneath.

Which description of Orpheus, is referred vnto Abraham, by Clemens Alexandrinus. Yea,* 1.1219 and Philo Iudaeus collecteth,* 1.1220 that this his sublime and coelestiall disposition, was ominously foretold him, in his very name. For, A∣bram (as he interpreteth that name) doth signifie, as much, as, Pater subli∣mis, that is, A sublime and high-spirited man: because his spirit did not only mount-vp into heauen, but also vnto God, who is higher then the Heauen: and that cheifly, by the obseruation of the Starres, and their motion. By which hee was led, as it were by the hand, to vnderstand, There was a God. And so was likewise, Nigidius Figulus: of whom Lucane writeth thus.* 1.1221

At Figulus, cui cura, deos, secreta{que} Coeli Nosse, fuit, quem non Stellarum Aegyptia Memphis Aequarel visu, numeris{que} mouentibus astra. Wise Figulus, whose searching care, was perfectly to know Heauens secrets, & the Gods themselues: Whom no Aegyptian sage Surpassed in his skill, nor could more exquisitely show The motions of the Starres and Orbes, in numbred equipage.

He, being a great Astronomer, and obseruer of the Starres, was led, by his curiositie, in obseruing of their motion, to search after God, who was the Mouer of them. Yea, and Lucian interpreteth the fable of Bellerophon,* 1.1222 (wher∣in he is sayd, to haue mounted vp to Heauen, vpon a winged Horse) to haue beene nothing else, in truth, but onely the ascending of his minde, in diuine contemplations▪ occasioned by considering the motion of the Stars. Which carried him vp, in a sorte, into Heauen: but, not Equo, but Animo:

not by Horse, but by Heart; as hee mythologizeth vpon that fiction. And Tullie reporteth,* 1.1223 out of Aristotle, that, If there were a subterraneous gene∣ration of men, who had neuer once beheld the light of the Sunne; and had but onely heard, that there was a God; if these men, vpon the sodaine, should bee brought out of their denne, and but set to behold the wonderfull motions of the Heauens and Stars, they would praesently beleeue, both, that there were a God, as before they had heard; and, that these so regular and orderly motions, cannot be any others, but onely his works. Haec cùm viderent, profectò, & Deos esse, & haec tanta opera, Deorum ••sse, arbitrarentur.

To conclude this point. Seneca alledgeth the orderly motion of the Stars,* 1.1224 as a visible Argument, to demonstrate Gods providence. And Cleanthes was not only ledde,* 1.1225 by the very same Argument, to beleeue, There is a God: but he also alledgeth it, as a sensible demonstration, to induce all other men to beleeue the same. Where, though hee congest diuers other great reasons vnto the same purpose: yet ascribeth hee the greatest force vnto this: Quartam Causam esse (eam{que} vel maximam) aequabilitatem motus, conversionem coeli, Solis, Lunae, Syderum{que} &c. And, Plutarch affirmeth, generally of all men, that the very first motiue, which ledde them vnto God, was that orderly motion, whereby the Stars are carried.* 1.1226 Homines coeperunt Deum agnoscere, cùm viderent stellas, tantam concinnitatem efficere: ac dies, noctes{que}, aestate, & ••reme, suos seruare statos ortus, at{que} obitus. Men began first to acknowledge a God, when they considered the Stars to maintaine such a comelinesse, and both day and night, in Summer and Winter, to obserue their designed risings and settings.

By contemplation whereof, a man is not onely led, to know There is a God: but also is sublimed, in some sorte, aboue the nature of a man: as I haue noted formerly,* 1.1227 out of Tullie. Erigimur, & latiores fieri videmur, hu∣mana despicimus, contemplantés{que} supera, at{que} coelestia, haec nostra, vt exigua, & minima, contemnimus. Wee are lif••d vp and enlarged, we despise things below; in our contemplation of Heauen and things that are aboue, we trample vnder foote these our baser and inferiour fortunes, as being of very little of no esteeme.* 1.1228 So that, as Bradwardine obserueth out of Ptolomie: Scientia Astrorum; assimilat hominem suo Creatori. The knowledge and vnderstan∣ding of the Heauenly Creatures, doth make a Man like vnto his Creator.

6 And,* 1.1229 no meruaile.* 1.1230 For indeede this motion of the Heauens (if it duly be considered) cannot possibly proceed from any other Author, but onely from God. As it appeareth by this reason: That, this motion of the Starres, must needs be, a motion, either proceeding from their owne na∣ture; or beside their nature. It must needs be amotion, either secundùm Natu∣ram; or praeter Naturam. But, that their motion, is not of their owne proper nature, I haue already proued, in the first Section of this Chapter: because it hath no begining, neither from their Matter, nor yet from their Forme. And, other Nature haue they none. Now, if it be beside their Nature; th••n must 〈◊〉〈◊〉 be, either by Chance, or by Prudence. By Chance it cannot be: for then, they would neither moue so orderly, nor so constantly: because nothing is more contrar•••• 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Chance and Fortune is, to constancie, and reason. And therefore, th••••r motion, being so constant and orderly, must

needs be directed, not by Fortune, but by Wisdome. From whence, it must needs follow,* 1.1231 that the opinion of the Epicure, who ascribeth all the moti∣ons of the Heauens, vnto Chance; is an opinion, not onely impious and odious, but also foolish and ridiculous.

As the Orator maketh it plaine, by two notable Examples, of two Artificiall Spheres,* 1.1232 made to the imitation of the heauenly Orbs:* 1.1233 the one of them,* 1.1234 by Archimedes; the other of them, by Possidonius: and both of them, with such singular Art, and cunning, that they did, (as Varro speaketh) vias stelligeras aetheris explicare, aere cauo. They shewed, by their hollow brazen wheeles, all the seuerall motions, of the Starry Heauens. Now (saith the Orator, in that place) If either of these Spheres were shewed vnto the barbarous Britaines, yea▪ or vnto the very Scythians; they would, neither of them, doubt, but these workes were wrought by reason: then, much more, must the Heauens themselues (for they are much perfecter) Nisi Archimedem arbitramur plus valuisse, in imi∣tandis Sphaerae conuersionibus, quàm Naturam, in efficiendis. Vnlesse we should im••gine, that Archimedes could shew more Art, in imitating the motions of the Heauens, then nature could do, in making of them. Which were vtterly absurd: as Lactantius collecteth,* 1.1235 euen from this very instance. Deus, illa non potuit ve∣ra, machinari & effìcere, quae potuit solertia hominis imitatione simulare? Shall not God be able to doe that, in truth, which a Man is able to counterfeite, by art? Qûi igitur conuenit (saith Tully,* 1.1236 in the last alledged place) Signum, aut Tabu∣lam pictam, cûm aspexeris, scire adhibitam esse artem; cum{que} procul cursum na∣uìgij videris, non dubitare, quìn id ratione, & arte moueatur; aut cùm solarium vel descriptum, vel ex a qua contemplare, intelligere, declarari horas arte, non casu: Mundum autem, qui & has ipses artes, & earum artifices, & cuncta am∣plectitur, consilij & rationis expertem putare? What reason is there, that, when we looke vpon, either a Statue, or a Picture, we should know, that it must needes be ruled, by art; and when we looke vpon a Clocke, or a Diall, wee should know, that that must needes be made, by art: and yet to thinke, that the World, which containeth all those Artes, yea, and their Artificers too, should bee framed without art?* 1.1237 For, as he well inferreth, in another place, Neminem esse opportet, tam stultè arrog••ntem, vt in se rationem & mentem putet inesse, in Coelo Mun∣do▪ non putet. There ought no man to bee so foolishly arrogant, as to thinke, that, in himselfe, there is a spirit, and reason; and yet, that, in the heauens them∣selues, there is none. Which are so farre from being made without reason, that their making cannot be conceiued without great reason: as the Orator well obserueth. From whence hee truely concludeth, that hee needes must be a mad man, that ascribes them vnto Chance.* 1.1238 Haec omnis descriptio syde∣num, at▪ hic tantus Coeli ornatus, ex corporibus, hûc & ill••c casu & temere cur∣santibus, potuisse effici, cuiquam sano videri potest? This whole description of the Starres, and this so great beauty of the Heauens, can it possibly seeme to any man, that is well in his wits, to bee an effect of certaine Bodies, moouing vp and downe by chance, and at all aduentures? So that, with him, it is out of question; that the Heauens are mooued; ••••t by For∣tune, but by Wisdome.

But yet,* 1.1239 a greater Question remaines still behind: By whose wisdome it is, that the Heauens and Starres be mooued? For, if they be mooued by

Wisdome; then either by their owne, or by some others aboue them. As Ho∣race insinuateth, in the part of his diuision:

Stellae,* 1.1240 sponte sua, iussaenè vagentur, & errent? The Starres all in their courses, mooue they still, Or by their owne, or their Commanders will?

Yeelding, that, if it be not by the former, then, it must be, by the latter. But, by the former, it is not. It is not by motion, of their owne will, or reason. For they haue none in them. They are so farre from being, either the Authors, or Directors, of their owne proper motions; as that they vnderstand not, so much, as that they mooue at all: as euen Lucretius himselfe directly affirmeth:* 1.1241

Nam certè, ne{que} consilio primordia rerum Ordine se quaeque at{que} sagaci mente locârunt: Nec, quos quae{que} darent motus, pepigêre prosectò. Things, at the first, they did not certainly Themselues dispose, by counsell orderly: Nor did they, by a composition, Appoint themselues their propper motion.

It was, a much wiser, and intelligent Author, that disposed all these things, in so exquisite an order:* 1.1242 which were in his hand, but meerely passiue, as Clay is in the hand of the Potter; that neither vnderstandeth, of what forme, it is made; nor yet, for what vse, it is prouided. And, no more doe the Stars, in what manner they bee mooued. For, though they should make such an excellent Harmony, as before I haue described: yet doe not they themselues vnderstand that they make it,* 1.1243 no more then an harpe, or other musicall in∣strument vnderstandeth the tune that is playd vpon it. And, though they doe produce many notable effects, and benefits, in the earth, by that enter∣change of seasons, which they occasion by their motions; yet do not they themselues vnderstand that they doe it: no more then the wheeles in a mill doe vnderstand, what manner of Corne they grind. So that, the Heauens doe grind for vs; yea, and find for vs too▪ and yet they themselues doe not know what they doe: because they doe, volutatione haec, non voluntate facere:* 1.1244 as Iustin Martyr well obserueth: They doe this, by their mo∣tion; they doe it not, by their meaning. Dionysius exemplifieth, by instance of the Sunne: that, Sol, non cogitatione, aut voluntate, sed, eo ipso quod est, omnia illustrat, The Sunne imparteth his light vnto all things; but, not by any will or purpose, but by being a light-some substance; as a Candle likewise doth: Vnto which there is no man so simple as to ascribe a will. Neither can they to the Sunne. It is not, by his owne will, that it shineth vpon all things: but, it is onely, by the Goodwill of that God, which made it: who hath com∣manded and appointed it,* 1.1245 to shine vpon the bad, as well as on the good: as our Sauiour Christ testifieth. And this was not vnknowne, euen to the very Heathen.* 1.1246 Gratuitos habemus Deos (saith Seneca:)Nam & sceleratis Sol oritur, & piratis patent maria: The Gods are most gracious, and bestow their blessings freely: For the Sunne doth shine vpon the wickedest persons, and the Seas are open to the cruellest Pirats: Ascribing the shining of the Sun, not to his owne will, but to the gracious will of God, as our Sauiour before did.

And as it is in his shining; so is it likewise in his mouing. His motion is by Gods will;* 1.1247 and not by his owne. And though it be sayd, by the Prophet Da∣uid, that, The Sunne knoweth his going downe: yet, that must be taken, not to be a proper, but a figuratiue speaking: Implying, that the Sunne obserueth his prescribed motion, (which here, by Synecdoche, is expressed by his set∣ting) so precisely to the poynt, that in the least iot, hee neuer erreth from it. And therefore (by the figure, called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉) he is sayd,* 1.1248 to doe the same vpon knowledge and vnderstanding. Non quòd animatus sit, aut ratione vta∣tur (sayth S. Basil, vpon this place) sed quòd, iuxta terminum diuinitùs prae∣scriptum, ingrediens semper eundem cursum seruat, ac mensur as suas custodit. Not that the Sunne h••th any soule, or vse of vnderstanding, but that it keepeth his courses and measures exactly, according to Gods prescription. So that, the Sunnes knowing his going downe (as Baruch in his Epistle expresseth it) is no∣thing else (in true propriety of speech) but, his obedience to Gods ordinance,* 1.1249 in his going downe. Which he likewise affirmeth, of all the other Starres: who yet haue no more sense or knowledge of their seuerall motions, then an arrow in the ayre knoweth, whither it flyeth; or, a ship in the water, whither it say∣leth; or, a Chariot on the earth, whither it runneth. And yet, as when we see an arrow, to fly directly to any marke, whereunto it is aymed; though we see not the Archer, by whom it was shot; yet must we know, in reason, that it surely was directed by some skilfull person; because it goeth so direct∣ly, hauing yet no skill to direct it selfe: so, when we see the heauens to pro∣duce vpon the earth, so many good effects, by yeelding vnto it such fruitfull season.* 1.1250 and bringing out of it such plenty and variety of excellent fruites, whereby both men and beasts are nourished: and that they, ayming at this end, doe neuer faile to hit their marke: wee needes must vnderstand (if wee haue any vnderstanding) that this course is directed, by some heauenly Sa∣gittarius, indued with excellent skill, and reason. For, as Aquinas well ob∣serueth, insisting vpon this very comparison:* 1.1251 Sicut motus Sagittae ad determi∣natum ••inem, demonstrat apertè, quòd sagitta dirigitur ab aliquo cognoscent: a certus cursus natur alium rerum, cognitione carentium, manifestè declarat, mun∣dum ratione aliqua gubernari. As the flying of a shaft vnto his certaine marke, declareth, that it was shot by one, that well knew, whereunto he had aymed it: so the certaine mouing of all naturall things, which know not themselues any thing of their owne motion, declareth, that they are moued, by on•• that hath vnderstan∣d••ng. And so likewise, for the other two comparisons. When we behold a ship, to winde, and to turne, and to fetch about, so diuersly; and yet to come, at last, into that very hauen, which it intended, at the first: wee must needs know as certainly, that it is guided by the reason of some skilfull Pilot, as we certainly know, that it hath no proper reason of it owne, to guide it: as Theophilus Antiochenns obserueth, insisting vpon this second Comparison. Quemadmodùm enim,* 1.1252 si quis cernat navem, suis armamentis instructam, mare sulcare & in portum appellere; certè credet aliquem, a quo gubernetur, in ea esse gubernatorem: Sic certè; nemo adeò abiecti est animi, quìn credat, Deum esse gubernatorem omnium, quamuis oculis carnalibus eum non assequamur. As when a man shall see a Ship, rigged out, with all her tacklings, to saile through the Sea, and directly to arriue at her desired hauen; he must needs know, she

hath, within her, some cunning and skilfull gouernour: So, no man can be so abiectly minded, but he must needs know, God to be the Governour of all things, though he doe not behold him, with his bodily eyes.

And so likewise it is, in the mouing of a Chariot. It cannot goe whither it is purposely intended, if it haue not some skilfull driuer, to direct it. In like case, the Heauens themselues, they could neuer moue, so orderly, and directly, in their courses, if God himselfe were not the ruler, & director of their motions: quasi Auriga, habenas, & gubernator, clavum tenens (saith Philo Iu∣daeus, insisting vpon this third comparison) holding their raynes, like their Driuer, and their helme, like their Gouernour. So that, though we grant, that the motion of the Heauens;* 1.1253 is performed by excellent arte and wisdome; yet is it not, by their owne wisdome; but, by the arte and wisdome of that ruler,* 1.1254 that guideth them. As Lactantius plainely sheweth, by the Sphere of Archimedes. Wherein, though there were great arte and wisedome vsed, to make that Sphere moue so artificially, and orderly; yet was not that wisdome in the Sphere it selfe; but, in the Maker of it, that so cunningly contri∣ued it.

And so is it likewise, with the Heauens. Their turning, and returning, so swiftly, so orderly, so constantly, to so many good effects, as they bring forth in the earth, doth manifestly shew, that their motion must needs be ruled by prouidence and wisdome. But yet, that wisdome, is not in themselues, that haue those motions; but, in their maker, that gaue them. There is not in themselues, Sensus officij sui, sciens: any sense, or vnderstanding of those offices,* 1.1255 which they performe. But they compasse all their motions, Non suo consilio, sed Artificis ingenio: as hee addeth in the same place. From whence he truly concludeth, that, Inest syderibus ratio, ad peragendos motus suos: sed Dei est illa ratio, qui & fecit, & regitomnia; non ipsorum syderum, quee mouentur. The Stars doe shew great wisdome, in the performing of their motion: but it is none of their owne. It is the wisdome of God, who both made, and ruleth euery thing. So that, it may truely be sayd of the Heauens, as it was of a carued wooden head: that there is in them, Artis multum, sed sen∣sus nihil: There is a great deale of Arte and cunning, in their making; but yet no sense at all of their owne mouing.* 1.1256 And, though Seneca deride it, as a foolish opinion, to thinke, that so constant, and so orderly a motion, can ei∣ther be done, by Fortune, or by any such Nature, as is ignorant of his owne doing:* 1.1257 [vel temeritate quadam, vel natura n••sciente quid faciat] yet, to thinke the contrarie, is, indeed, a greater follie: vnlesse, by Nature, he meane, Natu∣ram Naturantem, The God of Nature: and not, Naturam naturatam, The Crea∣ture of God. For, Natura naturans, hee both knoweth, and ordereth all their motions, though they themselues know them not, no more then the wheeles doe in a Clock. And therefore Tullie himselfe (euen from this very compa∣rison) concludeth, that it needs must be from God, that they receiue all their motion. An cùm machinatione quadam moueri aliquid videmus, vt Sphaeram, vt Horas, vt alia permulta,* 1.1258 non dubitamus quìn illa opera sint rationis; cùm autem impetum Coeli, cum admirabili celeritale mou••ri, verti{que}, videamus, constantissimè conficientem vicissitudines anniversarias, cum summa salute, & conseruatione rerum omnium; dubitamus, quìn ea, non solùm ratione

fiant, sed etiam excellenti, diviná{que} ratione? Marke, Divina ratione. When we see anything moued by an artificiall engine, as a Sphere, or a Clocke, or any other such like thing, wee neuer make any doubt, but that those Workes were wrought by reason: And, can wee then doubt, when we see the heauens to mooue, with such incredible celerity, and yet to keepe their yearely courses, with such admirable constancy, procuring vnto all things, both their health, and safe∣ty, that this must be the worke, not onely of reason, but also of Diuine, and most excellent Reason? Ascribing the regularity of their motion, not vnto their owne, but vnto Diuine Wisdome. In which sentence, though it should bee thought, that Tully doth but Platonize, implying [by Diuine Wisdome] none other, but their owne, as reckoning the Starres themselues, to be Gods: yet, euen so, it proues the Cause: that the motions of the Heauens being so constant, and orderly, cannot otherwise bee stirred, but by the wisedome of God. And consequently, that it sheweth, that there needes must be a God. Yea, and in another place, hee goeth further, affirming of this so apt and or∣derly a motion, that it not onely cannot bee performed, in the naturall hea∣uen, without the power and wisedome of a God; but also, not to bee imita∣ted, by Archimedes, in his Artificiall heauen, without a diuine illumination from God.* 1.1259 Quod si in hoc mundo fieri, sine Deo, non potest; ne in Sphaera qui∣dem, eosdem motus, Archimedes, sine divino ingenio, potuisset imitari. Which sentence of his, cannot bee vnderstood, of the fore-named Star-Gods; but of that God, which ruleth both the Heauens, and the Starres: which is the true God, as Arrianus truely noteth.* 1.1260 He it is, Qui Solem & fecit, & circumducit. He it is, that made the Sun, and he it is that mooueth the Sun: Yea, and the Hea∣uens, wherein they mooue too.

As for the fore-named dotage of opinion, that The Stars should haue their soules, and by them bee mooued, in those orderly courses, vpon their owne voluntary wills; euen Plato himselfe, the strongest defender of that ground∣lesse fancie, yet speaketh of it, but weakely, and doubtfully. For hee, (not knowing, what well to determine) affirmeth of those motions of the Heauens: Impossibile esse,* 1.1261 Coelum stellas{que} omnes, adeó exquisita ratione, annis, mensibus, diebús{que} circumvolui, nobis{que}, omnibus bona omnia facere, nisi anima singulis aut adsit, aut in sit: That it is vnpossible, that the Heauens, and the Starres should mooue, in so excellent an order, distinguishing, by their motions, both yeares, and moneths, and dayes, and so ye••lding vnto vs all good and comfortable things, vnl••sse euery one of them, had either a spirit present with it, or a soule within it: Not determining this latter, but leauing it in suspence, whether it may not bee the former. But, Aristotle derideth it, as a meere fable, that the Heauen should haue a soule;* 1.1262 and that their motion, from that principle, should draw his beginning. Which hee proueth to bee false, by the force of two reasons, The first whereof, is this: That, if they had this perpetuall motion, from their soule; it would bee wearisome and yrkesome, to be occupied still, in doing one and the same thing: Ne{que} talis animae vita, sine dolore, beata{que} esse potest. And the life of such a soule, cannot be but full of griefe, and cleane destitute of blisse.* 1.1263 For, Natura varietate delectatur, The soule is delighted with variety. It is dulled with identity. Especially, if it haue no intermission, no alternation of rest.* 1.1264 It will then bee, Negotium, ab omni voluptate mentis

semotum; si requies non est. Yea, and, Eò magis laboriosum, quò magis perpe∣tuum: as hee addeth, in that place: That worke can haue but a little pleasure, that neuer giueth leasure: but is so much the more painefull, by how much the more perpetuall. Whereupon hee inferreth, That such a perpetuall doing of one and the same worke must needes bee as painfull vnto the soule, as Ixions turning vpon his wheele. For, if the Starres bee gods, and moued by their owne eternall soules; they can neither haue honour, nor profite, nor pleasure, in running still one course perpetually, without any varietie. For,

Qualis honor, vel quale lucrum, vel quanta voluptas,* 1.1265 Esse potest Divis, versantibus aethera semper? Nonne decet potiùs libertas maxima Divos? Vt quocun{que} velint, faciles accedere possint, Ne, tanquam dura devincti compede, nusquàm Ire queant, semper{que} loco teneantur eodem? Aut tanquàm figuli instantes operí▪ rotae{que}, Nunquam decedant scamno, nunquàm otia captent? Esine illis adeò dulcis labor ill•• rotandi? And labor ille potest Divis nunq••àm esse molestus? What good, what gaine, what honour, or what pleasures, Can any gods take in their turning Measures? Wherein th'are alwayes tyed to moue the Sphere? The greatest freedome them most fitting were. As that, where're they would, they might apply Themselues, with pleasure and facility. Lest they might s••eme, as chain'd to one set place, And not elsewhere haue l••aue to take their race: But euen as Potters, task't to tedious labour, From stall, and wheele, and worke do ne're giue ouer. What, is that toyle of whirling Spheres so sweete, Or, can that toyle be still for gods so meete?

This must needes be very yrkesome, to continue still in one and the same motion, without any alteration: especially, to any thing, that hath a soule, in∣dued with either sense,* 1.1266 or reason. And therefore, Plato affirmeth, that, Seipsum semper convertere, fermè nihil potest; praeter id, quod cursum, agitatis omnibus, praestat. That nothing can endure, to turne about it selfe euer; but onely that one thing, which giueth motion to all things. Whereupon, he there concludeth: Mundum seipsum non convertere semper: putting the doubt, out of doubt: That the motion of the Heauens is not voluntary of themselues.

His second Reason,* 1.1267 is this; that, Nature hath not giuen a voluntary or ani∣mal-motion vnto any thing, but shee hath also giuen it fit meanes and instru∣ments, to exercise the same: as feete, vnto Beasts; wings, vnto Birds: and sinnes, vnto Fishes; and such like. But, vnto the Starres shee hath giuen no such instruments, but made them round and teret, like a globe, as if shee had purposely depriued them of all the meanes of voluntarie motion. Vniversa videtur, tanquam de industria, abstulisse, quibus per se procedere ipsa possent.

From whence hee collecteth, that Nature neuer intended to bestow vpon them any voluntarie motion. Ne{que}o enim animalia ipsi curae ••uêre, adeò verò praestabiles res despexit. Vnlesse we should imagine, that Nature, which hath shewed such a care ouer these earthly Creatures, would carelesly praetermit, or despise those Heauenly. This is the whole summe of Aristotles reasons, to proue, that the Starres haue no voluntarie motions. Plato indeed rendereth a reason,* 1.1268 why the Heauens haue no neede of any instruments of motion; as Legges, or Feete. But they be such, as shew plainely, that their motion is not voluntarie.

Now, to recollect the summe of this long Chapter: If this regular, and or∣derly motion of the Starres, be, neither naturally giuen vnto them, either by their Matter, or by their Forme: nor accidentally fallen vpon them, either by Chance, or Fortune: nor voluntarily composed by them, out of their owne election: then must it needs be imposed vpon them, by diuine con∣stitution: as Plutarch truely collecteth:* 1.1269 accompting this for a sufficient enu∣meration. But, the three former branches are largely proued, in three Secti∣ons of this Chapter. And therefore, the Author of their motions, must needs be God himselfe. It can be none other. Whom Boetius truly calleth, —Terra∣rum, Coeli▪ satorem,

—qui perpetua mundum ratione gubernat.* 1.1270 Earths planter and Heauens placer, who, Worlds vast circumference Both made, and doth maintaine and rule, by lasting prouidence.

So that, for this point, I conclude with Lactantius; that, Tanta rerum mag∣nitudo, tanta dispositio, tanta in s••ruandis ordinibus temporibus{que} constantia, non potuit, autolìm, sine prouido Artifice, oriri, aut constare tot seculis, ••ine incola potenti, aut in perpetuum gubernari, sine perito & sciente Rectore. Quod ratio ipsa declarat. Such a greatnes, in the Creature; such a comelines, in their order, such, a constancie, in obseruing both their courses, and their seasons; could neuer, either, at first, haue beene framed, without a cunning hand; or, so long haue beene praeserued, without a powerfull inhabitant; or, so wisely haue beene gouerned, without a skilfull Regent. As, euen Reason it selfe maketh it plaine and euident.

CHAP. 12.

That God hath made all his creatures, in Harmonicall proportion, and in a kinde of Musicke. That all creatures are naturally deloghted with it. 3. That they prayse God in their kinds, with their naturall Musicks. 4. That Artificiall musicke is the gift of God to men. 5. That the chiefest end of it, is to prayse God with it.

WE are now, at the last, come vnto the last of the Mathematicall Sciences: which is the Arte of Musicke: of which I purpose not to discourse, as a curious Musitian, but as a Diuine. And therefore, I will not, Artem Musicam in trutina examinare, as Aristophanes speaketh.* 1.1271 I will not strictly examine euery croch••t and quauer, as it were, vpon the ballance: but (looking directly vpon mine owne marke, with a stedfast eye) I will onely vnfold those fiue poynts, vnto

you, which I haue summed vp before, in the contents of this Chapter. And that but very lightly; to auoyd all curiositie.

First therefore, for the first of them. It was Pythagoras his position: Vniversi, naturam Musicis fuisse rationibus fabricatam:* 1.1272 That the frame of this whole world, is made, in a kind of naturall Musick. And the most of the old Philosophers (as Plutarch reporteth) concurred with him,* 1.1273 in the very same opinion: A Deo omnia fuisse instituta, secundùm Harmoniam: That God hath made all his workes, exactly, vnto the due proportion of a Musicall Harmonie. And we may see it plainely verified, if we will take a Suruey, of all the Crea∣tures of God; beginning which the highest, and so, by degrees, descending the lowest.

And first, for the Heauens, the highest of Gods workes: I haue partly shewed before,* 1.1274 in the former Chapter, what an excellent Harmonie God hath bestowed into them, both actually, in their motions; and virtually, in their influences, I doe leaue the former of those Harmonies, to the libertie of the Readers, to beleeue, or not beleeue, as it pleaseth themselues. But, this latter of them, is a thing so euident, of their gracious influences vpon these inferior Bodies; that he must needs be destitute, both of sense, and reason, that denieth it. Neither, doe the Philosophers, only beleeue the body of the Heauens,* 1.1275 are made, in musicall proportion; but also, that their soules and Intelligences, from whence they haue their motion, are also made, by the same composition.* 1.1276 Plato, describing the Creation of the Soule of the world, he setteth downe exactly, all the seuerall substances, whereof it is compounded: and nameth there praecisely, both all the particular Ingredi∣ents, and all their seuerall doses.* 1.1277 In which Argument Macrobius likewise hath taken great pa••nes, to expresse more plainely, that which was deliuered by Plato more obscurely; as concerning both the Matters, and the Mea∣sures, of the Soules composition: which hee reduceth exactly, vnto Musi∣call proportion: Yea and further ascribeth, all the Musicall Harmonie of the Heauens themselues, onely vnto that musicall composition, which God gaue vnto the soule of the Heauens, in his first Creation. Ergò, Mundi a∣nima, qu ae, ad motum, hoc, quod videmus, Vniversitatis corpus impellit, con∣texta numeris, musicam dese creantibus concinnentiam, necesse est, vt sonos musicos, de motu, quem proprio impulsu praestat, efficiat. The soule of the World, which stirreth the bodie of the World vnto motion, being it selfe made of such numbers, as beget in it selfe, a musicall Harmonie; must needs, in all those motions, which it selfe procureth, produce a musicall Harmonie likewise. Yea, and a little after, hee attributeth vnto this musicall Composition of that soule, not onely the Harmonicall motion of the Heauens, but also, all that delight in Musicke, which all liuing Creatures does take, here vpon the earth. Iure igitur,* 1.1278 Musicá capitur omne quod viuit; quia coelestis anima, qua anima∣tur vniversitas, Originem sumpsit ex Musica. By right, must euery thing that hath life, be delighted with Musicke; because the soule of the world, which giueth them their life, is it selfe compounded of a kind of Musick. This is the con∣ceit, which the ancient Philosophers haue had, of the Musick and Harmonie of the Heauens, not onely in their Bodies, but also in their Soules. All of them proceeding onely, from that diuine and heauenly Harmonie, which

Anselmus affirmeth to bee in God himselfe;* 1.1279 as I haue before obserued. I censure not their opinion, but onely note it, to declare, how strongly they were possessed, that all things in the world are compounded, in a kinde of Harmony, by God; yea, euen the Soule of the world it selfe.

Let vs therefore now come downe from the Heauens, vnto the Elements. For,* 1.1280 in them also the Philosophers haue obserued diuers Harmonies. Plutarch, in his Booke, De prìmo Frigido, reporteth an old opinion, that God is called, by the name of a Musition. Which appellation hee interpre∣teth to bee giuen vnto him, for his skilfull proportioning of the Ele∣ments, and their qualities, in the mixture and temper of all compound bodies. Aeris mutationes, & effecta, quia temperat Deus, Musicus appellatur. God is called a Musition, for his skilfull tempering of the ayre, and his effects, in these mixed Bodies: Non, quòd gravia acutis, aut alba nigris accommodet, inter{que} ea consonantiam efficiat: sed, quód caloris, & frigoris, in mundo societatem, dissi∣dium{que} ita gubernet, vt, & coeant, & diseedant moderatè; & (nimia vtri{que}, vehementia adempta) in rectum modum componat. God is called a Musition; not, for his skilfull mingling of either flat, with sharpe; or white, with blacke; and so making vp his Musicke: but, because he so guideth the contrary qualities of Heate, and Cold, in the World; that be maketh them, both to come together, and to depart asunder, in a very wholsome and temperate manner. This calleth he, Gods Musicke: which is, indeede, most pleasant, yea, and no lesse profi∣table, then it is delightfull. Because God hath so graciously tempered the contrarie Qualities of the Elements together, that, as Manilius tru∣ly noteth:

Frigida nè calidis desint, aut humida siccis,* 1.1281 Spiritus aut solidis; sit{que}. haec discordia concors. That neither cold things want their hot, nor moyst things misse their dry, Nor sad things lacke the Spirits power, to quicken them thereby: So making Musicall concent of contrariety.

Which Comparison,* 1.1282 Ouid likewise vseth, vnto the same purpose, onely changing the termes; and, for his Discordia concors, concording discord, putting—Concordia discors, discording Concord. And so likewise doth Horace,* 1.1283 keeping the same termes. —Rerum concordia discors. Yea, and Seneca expresseth the very same thing, by the very same comparison: Tota huius mundi concordia, ex discordibus constat: The whole concordance of the world consists in discordances: maintaining still the same Musicall conceit, for the aptnesse and proprietie of it: Whereby they insinuate, that, howso∣euer the Elements haue a discord in their nature; yet haue they a concord in their mixture:

Quae nexus habiles, & opus generabile tingit,* 1.1284 At{que} omnis partus elementa capacia reddit: Which concord knits the Elements, in wholesome linckes together, And makes them able to produce, euen all this whatsoeuer:

as Manilius obserueth in the fore-alledged place.

And, as he ascribeth the Generation: so Aristotle ascribeth the Conseruation of all things vnto this Harmonicall mixture of the Elements. For hee saith,* 1.1285 that, That power which created the World, did, Naturas maximè con∣trarias,

ad mutuam cogere convenientiam, & per hac salutem parere vniverso. It ioyned things together that were contrary in nature: and yet thereby proui∣ded for the s••fety of the whole World.* 1.1286 For, as Hippodamus truely noteth, Nisi Harmonia & Prouidentia divina Mundus regeretur, non possent ampliùs in bono statu permanere quae mundo continentur. If the world were not gouerned by the Harmony of Gods prouidence, there could nothing in the world continue in good estate. Yea, and Aristotle, in the former place, hee goeth one steppe further; ascribing to this Harmonicall mixture, not onely the conseruation, but also the Creation,* 1.1287 and exornation of the world. Rerum omnium consti∣tutionem, Coeli, inquam, & Terrae, vniversi{que} mundi concretionem, vno exorna∣vit & instruxit concentu. It adorned the generall Creation of all things, both of Heauen, and Earth, and of the whole world, onely by this sweete mixture, and harmonicall consent.* 1.1288 And, Hugo de Victore obserueth the same thing: yet speaketh of it, more diuinely, as being a Christian. Si Vniversitatis huius ma∣chinam intuitus fueris; invenies, quam mirabili ratione, & sapientia, compo∣sitio rerum omnium perfecta sit, quàm apta, quàm congru••, quam d cora. In qua, non solùm concordiam servant similia; s••de tiam quae (cre••nte potentia) diversa, & repugnantia, ad esse prodierunt, dictante sapientia, ad vnam quo∣dammodo amicitiam, & foederationem conveniunt. If you well consider of the frame of this world, you shall finde, with how great wisdome, the same hath bene wrought, and how aptly, how fitly, and decently, composed. For therein, not only like things preserue peace and vnity; but also things contrary do ioyne league and amity. And then hee proceedeth to exemplifie his meaning, by our present instance of the Harmonicall mixture of the Elements. Quid repugnatius esse potest Aqua, & ••gne? quae tamen, in rerum natura, ita Dei contemperavit pru∣dentia, vt, non solùm ad invicem societatis vinculum non dissipent, verùm eti∣am, noscentibus cu••ctes, vt subsistere possint, vitale nutrimentum submini∣strent. What is more contrary in Nature, then Fire, and water? which yet are so farre from breaking the bond of their common coniunction, that, by a ioynt consent, they minister vnto all things, their vitall food, and nourishment? This is the Harmony of the Elements, consisting all of Concords.

Now, beside this, they haue another, which consisteth all of Discords. And that is, when any one of them doth either exceede their due proportion, which worketh a discord in all those bodies, that are compounded of them, and tendeth directly vnto their dissolution: or, when they digresse from their right and naturall vses, and turne their benefits into punishments. Which oftentimes is done,* 1.1289 for the sinne of man. As it was, to the Aegyptians: when the fire descended, and destroyed their fruite: the water putrified, and turned into blood: the aire was poisoned, with noysome flyes: and the earth corrupted, with the stinke of their froggs. Here was a great change, from that sweete and melodious tune, which God intended in their first Creation, into an harsh and vnpleasant one. But yet, euen in this change of their tune, they kept still a good harmony; and harmony concording with Gods seue∣rity, though somewhat discording with his mercy. As the Wiseman obser∣ueth, in the booke of Wisedome,* 1.1290 where be expresseth that perturbation, by this very comparison. The Elements (saith he) greed among themselues, in this change, as when one tune is changed vpon an instrument of Musicke, and yet

the melody still preserued. These be the two Harmonies of the Elements.

Let vs now descend, as yet one steppe lower, vnto those compounded Bo∣dies, which are made of their mixtures: and we shall see, that God hath gi∣uen the like Harmonies vnto them. First an Harmonie of Concords; which euidently appeareth in that amicable and louing agreement, that is seene be∣tweene all the parts of their bodies, in seruing, and cherishing, and comfor∣ting one another: which they doe, and performe, with that true sympathy & compassion,* 1.1291 that, if one member suffer, all the rest do suffer with it: &, if one be had in honour, al the rest reioyce with it. And diuers other notes there be of a singular symphonie and agreement betweene them.* 1.1292 Wherein, as Hugo de Victore noteth, Omnium membrorum iuncture tantam invicem seruant concordi∣am, vt nullum omninò possit inveniri membrum, cuius officum alteri non videa∣tur afferre adminiculum. Al the members of the body, are ioyned together, in so lo∣uing an vnitie, that there is not any of them, but that in discharging his own proper office, it bringeth also some helpe vnto his other fellow-members. Whereupon he there concludeth: Sic omnis natura se diligit, & miro quodam modo plurium dissimilium in vnum redactorum concordia, vnam in omnibus Harmoniam facit. Thus euerything, by nature, is louing to it selfe, and by ioyning things vnlike in true concord together, after an admirable manner, it maketh, in the whole body, a most sweete and pleasant Harmonie. This Harmonie of Concords hath God generally disposed, into the parts & members of al cōpounded bodies.

Now, he hath also placed among them, another kinde of Harmonie, con∣sisting all of Discords: in mixing of things of contrary natures, throughout all his works.* 1.1293 For, there is none of all his Creatures, but God hath created some∣thing contrary vnto it; which contendeth with it, by the contrariety of Nature, as one Enemie fighteth with another. And yet, all of them together, beget in the world, a most sweet & wholesome Concord. I meane, not only of those Sympathies, and Antipathies, which God hath planted in diuers of his Creatures;* 1.1294 wherby some of them amicably embrace one another, as most lo∣uing friends; others of them hatefully decline one another, as most mortal ene∣mies; (A secret in nature, whereof the learnedest men were neuer yet able to giue any reason (as Plutarch truly noteth, Aelianus confirmeth) but, euen in the other most common & ordinary workes of God, we shal finde none of them so free, but that it hath in nature, in some sort, his contrarie. So that, the frame of the whole world, doth seeme to benothing else, but only a mixture & compo∣sition of Contraries: striuing stil together, (though in more orderly manner) as they did in the masse of their confused Chaos: wherein, as the Poet describeth it,

Frigida pugnabant calidis, humentia siccis,* 1.1295 Mollia cum duris, sine pondere habentia pondus. Cold things with hot, moyst things with dry did fight, Soft things with hard, and sad things with the light.

And such is still the fight and conflict of contraries, euen in this well ordered and beautifull world, though the same hand, which then distinguished them into their seuerall orders, doth now so moderate and keepe them in order, that their contraries and repugnancies tende, both vnto the safetie, and beauty of the world; and not, either to the hurte, or to the blemish of it. In which respect, S. Augustine compareth that Naturall order, which God hath taken,

in mingling of Contraries, through all the rancks of his Creatures, to that artificiall order,* 1.1296 which Musitions ofttimes take, in the making of their Songs. Deus ordinem seculorum, tanquàm pulcherrimum carmen, ex quibusdam quasi Antithetis, honest avit. God hath framed and compounded the order of the vni∣uerse, in the manner of a curious & elegant verse; artificially adorned with mem∣bers, all of Contraries. Like that sentence of S. Paules: By Honour & dishonour by euill report,* 1.1297 & good report; as deceiuers, & yet true; as vnknown, & yet known as dying, & yet behold we liue; as chastened, & yet not killed; as sorrowing, & yet alwayes reioycing; as poore, & yet making many rich; as hauing nothing, and yet possessing all things.* 1.1298 Not vnlike that of Terence: Omnia habeo, ne{que} quicquam ha∣beo, nihil cùm est, nihil deest tamen. Whereupon S. Augustine, in the same place, concludeth, that, Sicut contraria contrarijs opposita sermonibus pluchritudinem reddunt; ita, quadam, non verborum, sed rerum, eloquentia, contrariorum appo∣sitione, seculi pulchritudo componitur. As contraries, opposed vnto contraries, do yeeld a kind of grace & beautie to the speech, so God, by placing contraries against their contraries, in a kinde, not of verbal, but of real eloquence, hath giuen a great grace and beautie to his worke. Which conceit of S. Augustine, deliuered by him,* 1.1299 but in generall termes, is illustrated by Tertullian; by the apposition. of many very notable particular instances, and those very fit and apposite. Tota operatio Dei, ex diversitatibus constat; ex Corporalibus, & incorporali∣bus; ex animalibus, & inanimalibus; ex vocalibus & mutis; ex mobilibus & stativis; ex genitalibus & sterilibus; ex aridis, & humidis: ex calidis & frigidis; &c. The whole workemanship of God is compounded all of Contra∣ries, of things corporeal, and incorporeall; of things liuing, and without life; of things loquent, and silent; of things moueable, and vnmoueable; of things fertile, and sterile; of things dry, and moyst; of things hot, and cold; &c. And the same that hee hath shewed, by those instances, in the great world, he proceedeth to declare, in Man also, the little world. Sic, & Hominem ipsum diversitas temperavit, tam in corpore, quàm insensu. Alia membra fortia, alia infirma; alia honesta, alia inhonesta; alia gemina, alia vnica; alia compa∣ria, alia disparia. Perindè, & in sensu: nunc laetitia, nunc anxietas; nunc a∣mor, nunc odium; nunc ira, nunc lenitas. In like case, Man himselfe is made by God of meerely Contraries: and that not only in his body, but also in his soule too. Some parts of Man be strong, & some againe be weake; some comely, some homely; some double, some single; some aequall, some vnaequall. And so likewise in his mind there is sometimes mirth, and sometimes greife; sometimes loue, and sometimes hate; sometimes feircenes, and sometimes mildnesse. So that, the whole world is,* 1.1300 in effect, nothing else but only a massie Coagmentation of Contraries. As Ecclesiasticus also directly obserueth. Euill is against good, & death against life; the Godly against the sinner,* 1.1301 & the vniust against the faithfull. And so, in all the workes of the most High, thou mayst see, that there be euer Two: and the one of them, is against the other.

Neither is this, the onely Obseruation of religious Christians; but also, of the irreligious Heathen. Wherein, many of the most learned haue ex∣actly concurred, affirming, that God (like a skilfull Painter to shew the grace of his worke the better, hath composed the whole world of opposite parts; as it were, of Lights and shadowes. Which as Trismegistus

noteth, is a matter, of so pure and absolute necessity, that, without it, the world could haue had no beautie. For, if Contraries had not bene thus ming∣led together, the curious workes of Nature could not haue beene distingui∣shed one of them from another.* 1.1302 And therefore he pronounceth, that, Ex op∣positione & contrarietate constare omnia, necesse est: ne{que} alitor se habere, possi∣bile est. For, as in a Picture, if all were blacke, or all white, there could be no grace or beauty in the worke: so in all the workes of Nature, if all were good, or all bad, there could be no grace or sweetnesse in any of them, because no distinction.

And therefore Pythagoras (as Varro obserueth) maintained this opinion: Omnium rerum initia esse bina:* 1.1303 vt, sinitum, & infinitum; bonum, & malum; vitam, & mortem; diem, & noctem. That the first Principles of all things in all kindes, are two contraries: as Finite, and Infinite; Good, and Euill; Life, and Death;* 1.1304 Day, and Night; and such like. Whose opinion, is by Aristotle expressed more fully: who setteth downe distinctly, ten seuerall combinati∣ons of Contraries, which the Pythagoreans defended, to be the first Principles and Originals of all things: As namely these following. Finitum, & infini∣tum; Par, & Impar; Vnum, & Plura; Dextrum, & Sinistrum; Masculinum, & Foemininum; Quiescens, & Motum; Rectum, & Curvum; Lumen, & Tene∣bras; Bonum, & Malum; Quadratum, & Longum; that is, Finite, and Infi∣nite Euen, and Odde; One, and Moe; Right hand, and Left; Male, and Female; Resting, and Mouing; Straight, and Crooked; Light, and Darkenesse; Good, and Euill; Square, and Long. These Contraries, they not onely held to be in the world; but also, to bee the working Principles of all things in the world. And therefore their Effects must needes be contrary,* 1.1305 as well as their Causes. In which opinion, Al••meon conspired so fully with them; that Aristotle doubteth, whether hee borrowed his opinion from them, or they theirs from him. Yea, and in another place hee confesseth, that it is the common opini∣on of all the Philosophers: That the first Principles of all thing must needes be meere Contraries.* 1.1306 Omnes, Contraria Principia faciunt. But hee himselfe handleth this point more exactly, then any, & brings it home more properly vnto our present purpose. That, in this mixing of Contraries, in all sorts of Creatures, Nature delighteth her selfe pleasantly, as with a most sweete Har∣mony: Natura,* 1.1307 ad contraria, miro fertur desiderio; at{que} concentum ex his facit. Nature is strangely carried with a strong desire, of ioyning contrary things to∣gether; and yet maketh of them a delightfull and most melodious tune. And this hee illustrates in that place, by very pregnant instances, both in Ciuill, and Artificiall, and Naturall things. For Ciuill things; he giueth these instan∣ces: That euery City, though neuer so well composed, and in neuer so great con∣cord; yet consisteth of persons of contrary conditions; some poore, some rich; some yong, some old; some weake, some strong, some good, some bad. All which, though they be many, yet make they but one City: and though, in nature, they bee vnlike;* 1.1308 yet make they a sweete concord, in the Ciuill State. In Artificiall things hee obserueth, that, Ars, adimitationem Naturae, se componens, idem praestat. That Art, as it imitateth Nature, in many other things; so doth it also in this, that it maketh all her workes of a mixture of contraries. Whereof hee gi∣ueth these instances: The Art of Painting mixeth contrary colours in her

Pictures: as blacke, with white; and red, with yellow. The Art of Musicke mixeth contrary sounds in her Songes: as Sharps, with flats; and briefes, with Longs. And the Art of Grammar mixeth contrary letters in her words: as vo∣wells with mutes: and such like. In Naturall things, hee giueth these instan∣ces, that,* 1.1309 Vis quaedam, per omnia dimanans, & transiens, siccitatem humori, ca∣lorem frigori, leue gravi commistum, & rotundo rectum; Terram omnem, Mare, Aethera, Solem, Lunam, & Vniversum exornavit Coelum cum Mun∣dum frabricata esset, ex diversis, & nullo modo immistilibus, aere, terra, igne, aqua, & imagine vna, quae globos comprehendit. There is a certaine power, which pierceth, and disperseth it selfe, through the whole world, ioyning dry things, with moyst, and hot things, with cold; light things, with heauy; and crooked, with straite: and yet, by this contrary composition, very excellently beautifying, both the earth, and sea, and skie, and Sun, and Moone, and general∣ly all the heauen: making the frame of this world, of things of far vnlike na∣ture, and such as refuse to be mingled together; ayre, and earth, and fire, and water; and Heauen, which comprehendeth all these Spheres, in his figure. Now all this commixtion of things, so contrary, do not tend to the defacing, but adorning of the world; as Concords, and Discords doe, vnto the better tem∣pering of the Harmony in Singing. For, by that very Comparison, doth Aristotle expresse them.* 1.1310 Natura & Coelt, & terrae, vniversi{que} mundi concreti∣onem, principiorum maximè contrariorum, vno exornavit, & instruxit concen∣tu. Nature hath compounded, both heauen, and earth, and all the whole World, of contrary Principles, to adorne it more beautifully, with a concent-full Har∣mony. Thus (as Seneca obserueth,* 1.1311 ioyning instances of all the fore-named heads together) Nu••ilo, serena succedunt; turbantur maria, cùm quieverunt; noctem, Dies sequitur; pars coeli consurgit, pars mergitur. Contrarijs, rerum aeternitas constat. After a storme, there comes a calme; the Seas bee troubled, after they haue rested; after the night, there appeareth day; One part of the Heauen riseth vp, another goeth downe: The whole frame of the Vniuerse, is compounded of Contraries.

And thus (as Trismegistus obserueth) Rerum singularum ordo,* 1.1312 concentum quendam, melo divino dulcisonum, conficit. The very naturall order of things, produceth a pleasant Harmony, composed in a kind of diuine and Heauenly me∣lody. Aud therefore hee affirmeth, that, Musicam nosse, nihil aliud est, quàm cunctarum rerum ordinem scire: To know Musicke, is nothing else, but to know the naturall order of things.* 1.1313 For, as Maximus Tyrius affirmeth, Natura, est perfectissima Harmonia. There is no Harmony better, then the order of Nature. Thus God hath made an Harmony, in all his Creatures: by the ioynt obseruation, both of Christians, and Heathens.

2 But, the testimonie of neither of them,* 1.1314 no, nor of them both toge∣ther, doth so euidence the matter, as the things themselues doe; by that incredible delight, which all of them doe naturally take, in the sweetnesse of Musick. For, there is nothing whatsoeuer, indued with a liuing and a sensible spirit, but it is rauished, in a sorte, and caried out of itself, with the bewitching sounds of Musicke. I omitt the fabulous narration of Am∣phion: as a Poëtical fiction: that the power of his Musick was so great, that he could,

Saxa movere sono testudinis;* 1.1315 &, prece blanda, Ducere quò vellet.— With Lutes alluring sound, and his sweet tunes, he could Moue the hard Stones, and make them stirre where 're he would.

Which, though it be but an Hyperbole, and Excesse of speech; yet the Poet made choise of it, of set purpose, thereby to expresse, with a greater Empha∣sis, the incredible power of Musick, vnto vs. Which, indeed, is very great yea, and not onely with vs men; but also with euery other liuing thing: both with Birds, and with Beasts, and with Fishes; yea, and euen with very Wormes. As wee may see, in all of them, if wee will but looke vpon them.

First, for Birds: there is no man, but may obserue, by his daily experi∣ence, with what a singular delight, they vse to solace, and entertaine them∣selues, with their naturall Musick; chaunting-out their sweete melodie, vp∣on the pleasant branches of euery greene tree. A thing expresly noted by the holy Prophet Dauid:* 1.1316 and by him there ascribed, to be the worke of God. Neither are they onely delighted with their owne naturall Musick; but also with Mans artificiall Musick. As we may euidently see, in Thrushes Linnets, and Blackbirds, and such like, with what attention they will listen, vnto the pleasant sounds of Musicall Instruments: yea, and how perfectly they will learne the tunes of those Songs, that be whistled vnto them. Which artificiall notes, they could neuer possibly either learne so quickly, or render so exactly, but that the seeds of true Harmonie, be sowne in their soules, as well as in mens. Yea, and their delight in Musick is so great, that they often-times forget their very safetie it selfe, in comparison of it. As it is noted, by the Poet:* 1.1317

Pistula dulce canit, volucrem dùm decipit auceps. The Sweetnesse of the Fowlers pipe, Deceives the Fowle, with his delight.

Yea, euen Bees, when they swarme, and are vpon the wing, ready to take their flight, whither either the winde driueth them, or their Captaine leadeth them: yet, by the sounds of tinckling brasse, are setled againe, and retar∣ded from their course: held onely, by that delight, which they naturally take in it;* 1.1318 as Plinie obserueth. Gaudent plausu, at{que} tinnitu aeris, eó{que} convocan∣tur: Because they are delighted with that tune and tinckling, they are therewith called together. Yea and Aelianus likewise saith, Crepitaculis sonoris, tan∣quàm Syrenibus, retrahuntur: They are recalled, and as it were charmed, with those shrill sounds.

Now likewise for Beasts: though their spirits be more dull, and their sen∣ses not so subtile,* 1.1319 as is the sense of Byrds; yet haue they no lesse a sense of Musick. For tame Beasts: Aelian giueth instance in the Arabian Sheepe; that they grow fat, much more by their Musick, then they doe by their Meat. And againe in Elephants;* 1.1320 that they are allayed from their greatest rage, by the allu∣ring sounds of Musick. And, of a contrarie effect, doth Iob giue instance, in the Horse;* 1.1321 who being enraged with the warlicke sounds of Musick, despiseth both wounds and death: and hearing the Trumpet, hee reioyceth at it, smel∣ling the battle afarre off, and saying in a iollitie, Ha, Ha: as in that place hee

expresseth it. And Aelianus in another description fitly paralleleth it. Yea, & yet againe,* 1.1322 of another contrarie passion, in the Libian Mares; that by the sounds of a certaine Hymenaean song, they are accended vnto Venerie: Which otherwise they decline. And, for Wilde-Beasts: Horace giueth an instance, in Orpheus; that, by the power of his inchanting Musick, hee did

—Lenire Tygrides, rapidos{que} Leones. Tame and make gentle Tygres feirce,* 1.1323 And soften Lyons furious.

Which, though the Poet there apply to an allegoricall interpretation: yet doth Aelian confirme it, by an Historicall narration. For he maketh report of diuers sorts of VVildBeasts,* 1.1324 that be so farre mollified, with the inticing sounds of Musick, that they be made by it, forgetfull, both of their young ones, and themselues. As he proueth, in that place, by the practise of the Tyr∣••heans: who vse to draw Wilde Boores, and Harts, into their Nets, by the one∣ly sweetnesse of certaine Musicall instruments. And Macrobius confirmes the same,* 1.1325 by the like obseruation: who reporteth, that, Nonnullae, vel aues, vel terrenae, & aquatiles belluae, invitatae cantu, inretia sponte decurrunt. He saith That there be many, not onely Byrds, and Beasts (which were our two former instances) but also Fishes too, (which is our third instance) that being inticed with the pleasing sounds of Musick, doe voluntarily rush into the very nets. As Aelian giueth instance,* 1.1326 in those kinde of Crab-fishes, which are called Paguri: which will follow the sound of Musick, euen out of the waters: and so are taken when they come to the land: And againe, in another kinde of Fishes,* 1.1327 called Pastinacae. And Plinie also proueth, by experience, in the Dol∣phins: of whom he writeth, that Et cantu mulcentur, & capiuntur, attoniti sono. That they are allured by Songs, and taken, whilst they be astonished with their sounds. Which delight of theirs in Musick, Plutarch affirmeth, to be a thing delightfull vnto God.* 1.1328 And he alledgeth to that purpose, certaine verses of ••••indarus: who compareth his owne desire of writing, vnto the vehement in∣citation of a Dolphin:

Quem, placido è Mari, Suauis excivit Tibiae sonus. Whom, out a peacefull Sea, the pleasant sound Of well-tuned Pipe, did force to come aground.

Yea, and how greatly those Fishes be delighted with Musick, we may see by Herodotus his narration of Arion,* 1.1329 whom a Dolphin (being allured, by the seewtenesse of his Musick) receiued vpon his backe, and permitted to bestride him, as it were his horse, bearing him safely to Land, out of the midst of the Seas. The credit of which report if any man suspect, hee confirmeth the truth of it, by the assertiue testimonie, both of the Corinthians, and the Lesbi∣ans; who searched the truth of it: beside the monument of Arion himselfe, which he offered vnto the Gods, for his wonderfull deliuerance: a monument of brasse, in the forme of a man, riding vpon a Dolphin.

Yea,* 1.1330 and Pliny, in his History, yeeldeth his assent to this narration of Arion; being thereunto induced by many other instances of Dolphins, more stupen∣dious. Which he receiued, by report of persons, of great & vnsuspected credit: as Maecenas, and Flavianus, and Flavius Alfius: men, as, of great nobility; so likewise of great grauity, and of vndoubted testimony. Whose wonderfull

narrations, of the great familiarity betweene men and Dolphins, and of the singular delight which they take in Musicke,* 1.1331 (affirmed also by Plutarch) would exceede all credibility; but that they bee reported, by men of such authoritie.* 1.1332

But to come vnto our fourth instance of Wormes, and creeping things: though they bee, but of an vnperfect generation, and of an heauy sense; yet wee see diuers of them, that practise a naturall kind of Musicke, with no lit∣tle delight. The Cricket, by the fire; the* 1.1333 Grashopper, in the field; and the Frog, in the water, doe all recreate themselues, with their naturall Songs: though they bee no better, then meere creakings, and croakings. And thus Musicall harmony (in all kindes of Creatures) doth,* 1.1334 Animum abstrahere, & quodam modo rapere, as Aristotle testifieth: It euen rapteth the soule, and ab∣stracteth it from it selfe.* 1.1335 So that (as Macrobius truely noteth) Nullum est tam immite, tam asperum pectus, quod non oblectamentorum talium teneatur affectu: There is not any so vntractable or vngentle a brest, but it receiueth some delight, by the alluring sounds of Musicke. Which, aboue all other Creatures, is most euident, in man: who is so naturally delighted with the Harmonies of Musicke, that it transporteth his soule, into any affection, whatsoeuer it will. It comforteth him, in paine. It tempereth him, in plea∣sure. It solaceth him, in trouble: and, it qualifieth him, in Anger. As Athe∣n••us obserueth,* 1.1336 in Clineas Pythagoricus: who euer, when hee was angry, would goe play vpon his Harpe: and being demanded, for what cause hee did it? hee sayd, that hee found, that it allayed the raging fiercenesse of his minde. And the like effect it had also, with King Saul: in whom, the raging of his furious spirit,* 1.1337 was calmed, and allayed, by the inticing sounds of Musick. And a contrary effect it had, with Elizeus; in whom, the drouping of the propheticall spirit was excited and stirred vp,* 1.1338 by the melodious tunes of Mu∣sicke. The contemplation of which strange effect, so rapt the Poet Bartas, into admiration of it, that it made him to breake out into this passionate ex∣clamation, of the might power of Musicke:

O what is it, that Musicke cannot do?* 1.1339 Sith th' all inspiring Spirit, it conquer's too: And mak's the same, downe from th' Imperiall pole, Descend to Earth, into a Prophets soule: With diuine accents, tuning rarely right, Vnto the rapting Spirit, the rapted spright.

So that, the sweetnesse of Musicke, as Ouid noteth of it, can

—trahere superis sedibus arte Iovem.* 1.1340

And so is it likewise, in all other affections. Musicke hath a dominion ouer euery one of them.* 1.1341 So that, as Macrobius truely obserueth, Omnis animi habitus cantibus gubernatur: All the seuerall habits and dispositions of the minde, are disposed and ouer-ruled by the Imperiall power of Musicke. For Musicke,* 1.1342 as Aristotle affirmeth of it, hath, Naturalem quandam voluptatem; per quam, illius vsus, cunctis aetatibus, cunctis{que} moribus est acceptus. It hath in it a naturall kind of pleasure; whereby the vse of it is made acceptable, vnto all sorts of persons, of whatsoeuer either ages, or manners. As wee may see by plaine experience; how Countrymen doe vse to lighten their toyling;

oldwiues, their spinning; Mariners, their labours; Soldiers, their dangers; by their seuerall musicall harmonies: and all other sorts of men, their griefes; as Ovid truely noteth:

Hoc est, cur cantet vinctus quo{que} compede fossor,* 1.1343 Indocili numero cùm grave mollit opus. Cantat & innitens limosae pronus arenae, Adverso tardam qui trahit amne ratem. Quíque ferens pariter lentos ad pectora remos, In numerum pulsa brachia versat aqua. Fessus vt incubuit baculo, saxo{que} resedit Pastor, arundineo carmine mulcet oves. Cantantis pariter, pariter data pensa trahentis, Fallitur ancillae, decipit••r{que} labor.

&c.

Hence 'tis, the Delver bound and clogd in clowted buskin, sings, By vntaught tunes his heavier taske to easier passe he brings. So he, that groveling streynes, and dragg's on muddy shore his boate, That comes aslugg against the streame, help't-on with singing note. And he, that bending slowly brings his tarrying Oare to breast, His winding Armes keepe stroke with songs, while he the water beates. The wearied Shepheard, as on staffe he leanes, or sitt's on Stone, Doth sweetely charme his flocke with pipe, which doth himselfe bemone. And thus the maid that sings and spinnes, and plies her distaffe fast, By songs deceiues the tediousnes of her praescribed taske.

Yea, euen sucking Infants, who haue not almost any sense of their life, yet haue a sense of Musicke. For, when they are in their strongest passion, and most fiercely crying; yet are they presently stilled with their Nurses singing, and so charmed with it, as if they were inchanted with some Circes cup. Whence Maximus Tyrius collecteth,* 1.1344 Animum esse Musicae alumnum: That the soule is, as it were, the very Nurse-Child of Musicke. So that, as Plato truely no∣teth: Rithmus & Harmonia, animi interiora, & penetrant, & pulsant: The Harmony of Musicke doth pierce, and affect, the very bowells of the minde. VVhereby it doth,* 1.1345 Animum plurimùm allicere, vt ea meritò gaudeant, qui au∣diunt: It delighteth the minde, with so strong an allurement, that all, which come to heare it, doe reioyce, and cheere at it. From whence, Aristotle col∣lecteth, that there is,* 1.1346 Quaedam cognatio nobis cum Harmonijs: There is a kinde of Affinity, betweene the Soule and Harmony. Insomuch that diuers of the ancient Philosophers,* 1.1347 held strongly this opinion: Animam, aut esse Harmoni∣am, aut habere Harmoniam: That, either the Soule is nothing else, but an Har∣mony it selfe;* 1.1348 or else, at the least, hath an Harmony in it. From whence, Fici∣nus collecteth, that, Harmonia qui non est delectatus, non est harmonicè com∣positus: That he, which is not delighted with Harmony, he surely, is not made ac∣cording to harmony.* 1.1349 Yea, and Balthasar, in his Courtier, passeth an harder Censure: For he saith, that, hee is either Insensatus; or, that hee hath Spiri∣tus discordes, & invicem repugnantes. Hee is either a senselesse, and a simple Foole; or, a man compounded of repugnant Spirits.

Yea, and Musicke hath not onely a kindred with the Soule; but also, a

kind of affinitie with the Body. For, there be diuers diseases in it, which are healed and cured,* 1.1350 by the pleasant sounds of Musick. As Macrobius obserueth in the fore-alledged place. Corporum quo{que} morbis medetur. Beda instanceth, in the paine of the Head,* 1.1351 and the Heart. Athenaeus, in the Sciatica and paine of the Hippes: and Aulus Gellius, in the biting of vipers. So that, Musicke hath in it,* 1.1352 a Sanatiue vertue, not only against the perturbations of the Soule; but also against the diseases of the Body.* 1.1353 And therefore, no meruaile, if euery liuing thing doe naturally take a delight, and pleasure, in it.

3 And,* 1.1354 as God hath created all things in a naturall Harmonie;* 1.1355 and giuen vnto all of them, a naturall propertie, to bee delighted with Harmonie: so haue all of them also, a naturall instinct, to praise the same God, with their naturall Musick; and to spend that his good gift, in the honour of him that gaue it. Proclus affirmeth of all Gods Creatures, that, Omnia precantur, Hy∣mnós{que} concinunt, ad ordinis sui ducem: alia, intellectuali modo; alia, rationali; alia, sensitivo; alia, naturali. All creatures make their prayers, and sings prayses, to their Ruler: some of them, in a manner, which is meerely intellectual; some of them, in a reasonable; some of them, in a sensible; and some, only in a natural. By Intellectuall Singers, he vnderstanding Angels; by Reasonable, Men; by Sensi∣ble, Birds, and Beasts; and by Naturall, Trees, and Plants, and such insensi∣ble Creatures. As it euidently appeareth, euen by his owne instances. Where, for Byrds, hee giueth an example of the Cock; whose crowing, hee interpreteth, to be his saluting of the rising Sun, and his hymne vnto Apollo. For plants, he giueth instance in the Heliotropium: whose turning continu∣ally towards the Sunne, hee interprets, to be his seruice vnto him: setting downe,* 1.1356 in the same place, a notable hymne, wherein he imagineth it to invo∣cate and praise him. As, our noble Poet Bartas, doth the like of the Larke, in a notable fiction: whose singing so constantly, in the morning, and eue∣ning, he construeth to be,* 1.1357 her Morning and Euening Song, and her dayly sa∣crifice in her Creators praise. And, for Beasts, Plinie giueth instance, in the Elephants; that they haue not onely a sense of Religion, but also vse a kinde of Ceremonie in their practise of the same. Yea, and Aelian affirmeth of them (as Proclus before did, of the Cock) that they doe,* 1.1358 Exorientem Solem vene∣rari; proboscidem, tanqu••m minum, adversùs Solis radios alleu••ntes: They worship the rising Sunne, aud they lift vp their Trunck, in honour vnto him. Concluding there his Chapter, with this notable increpation of Atheists, and such like vngodly men: Ergonè Deum Elephanti venerantur? Homines au∣tem, rationis participes, Sitne Deus, necne sit, dubitant? tum, si sit, Humanasnè res, curatione & administratione dign••tur? Shall an Elephant, a Beast, adore and worship God? and shall a Man, a Creature indued with reason, doubt, whether there be a God, or whether he regardeth the doings of Men? The like Religion,* 1.1359 he affirmeth, Elephants to practise towards the Moone. Thus, euen in the opinion of the very Heathen, all the Creatures of God, in their seue∣rall kindes, doe praise him. And, that in their opinion they be not mistaken, it may euidently be seene, in the 148. Psalme. Where, euen the Psalmist ex∣citeth all the fore-named sorts of Creatures, to offer vnto God, their prayers and invocations.* 1.1360 Praise him,* 1.1361 all ye Angels: his Intellectuall Creatures. Praise him, all ye People: his Reasonable Creatures. Praise him, Beasts and Cattle,

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Creeping things,* 1.1362 and flying fowles:* 1.1363 his Sensible Creatures:* 1.1364 Praise him,* 1.1365 Hea∣uens, and Starres, Mountaynes, and Hills, Fruitfull Trees, and Cedars: his Natural and insensible Creatures. All these he calleth vpon, to praise the name of the Lord. Which, he would not haue done, but that all these Crea∣tures, in their seuerall kindes, doe, in their seuerall manners, sing-out his due prayses.* 1.1366 Yea,* 1.1367 euen the very Wormes: as Dragons, and Creeping things; whom he also calleth-vpon, in the very same Psalme: as he there doth aso, vpon both Fire, Haile, and Snow, meere insensible things, Neither speaketh hee this,* 1.1368 only in a Rhetorical Prosopopoia,* 1.1369 as in the 98.* 1.1370 Psalme where he calleth vpon the Earth,* 1.1371 to make a noyse; the Sea, to roare; the Floods, to clap their hands: & the Mountaines to reioyce; and all these together, to sing a song, in Gods praise. He vseth not, in the former, any such Poetical Figure: but simply and plain∣ly, in the feruor of his spirit, hee calleth vpon all the Creatures fore-named, to sing vnto the Lord, with those seuerall Harmonies, which he hath giuen vnto their seuerall kinds.* 1.1372 And thus (as Tertullian truly obserueth) Deo, etiam ina∣nimalia, & incorporalia, laudes canunt. Not onely Angels, who haue no Bodies; but also other Creatures, which haue no soules; yet doe, in their kindes, sing-out Gods due praises.

4 Now, for Man: hee hath not onely a naturall delight in Musicke, as other Creatures haue; and a naturall abilitie, to expresse all the parts of it, more then other Creatures haue,* 1.1373 by the sweetenesse of his tuneable and melodious voice, farre excelling the sweetenesse of all musicall instruments: But he hath also inlarged his naturall Musick, with all the seuerall kindes of Artificiall Musick, both Vocal, and Organicall. In which worke, although he hath laboured,* 1.1374 and taken great paines, from the very beginning: yet could he neuer haue brought it vnto any perfection, if God himselfe had not been a Scholemaister vnto him. And this is acknowledged, euen of the very Hea∣then: who haue expresly affirmed, that Musick is not the Inuention of Man, but the very gift of God.* 1.1375 Plutarch affirmeth directly: Non Hominem aliquem repertorem fuisse Musicae, sed omnibus virtutibus ornatum Deum Apollinem: That no man was the first inventer of Musick, but Apollo their great and ho∣nourable God. Yea, and, in the same place, hee addeth, that Musick ought to be honoured; because it is the invention of a God. Veneranda prorsus est Musica; Deorum inventum cùm sit. In which his opinion, he was not alone, but had diuers others,* 1.1376 of the chiefest Philosophers concurring with him. Aristotle saith of Harmonie: that it is, Res Coelestis; eius{que} natura, & divina, & pulchra: That Musicke is an heauenly thing, and of a nature, not onely pleasing, but also diuine.

Theophrastus setteth downe, three originall Causes: whereby Musicke was first begotten in the mind of a Man;* 1.1377 Dolorem, voluptatem, & instinctum divinum: The allaying of his griefe, the procuring of his pleasure, and the in∣spiration of a divine and heauenly motion. But he acknowledgeth this instinct to be the chiefest of the rest. Yea and Plato affirmeth, without all circuition, Musicam esse Hominibus,* 1.1378 a Deo, datam: That musick was first giuen vnto men, by God.

But Macrobius handleth this point,* 1.1379 a great deale more prolixely, then any of the rest doe: prouing, by many Arguments, that Musicke, was not first in∣uented

vpon earth, but descended downe from Heauen. Yea, and that, in the opinion of the very Heathen, deliuered expresly in their mystical Theo∣logy. His Reasons bee these following.* 1.1380 First, that Hesiodus; who writeth the generation of their Gods, recording exactly, from whence they first sprang, calleth one of their Muses, Vrania; which signifieth, Heauenly. Insinuating thereby, that there is Musicke in Heauen: and, that from heauen it first was brought, by the Muses, vnto men. In whom also wee may obserue, that hee maketh Harmonia,* 1.1381 to haue bene the Daughter of Mars, and Venus, two of the Heathen Gods: thereby againe implying, that Harmony was first begot∣ten in Heauen. Another of his Reasons is, that Hesiodus calleth another of the Muses, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: her name being giuen, for the sweetensse of her voice; as Vrania's was, from the highnesse of the place. Thereby againe implying; that The sweetenesse of voice, hath the highest place in Heauen. Another: that the Heathen called Apollo, who was one of their greatest gods, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: quasi Ducem, & Principem Musarum: The Prince, and Ruler of the Muses. Ano∣ther: that, euen their very Rusticks, called the Muses, Camoenas, quasi Cane∣nas; Acanendo dictas, that is, Singing Damosels. Now, the Muses (as they all confesse) descended first from Heauen. Another: that, in all their fune∣rall pompes, and solemne exequies, they still carried-out their dead, with mu∣sicall instruments:* 1.1382 which was likewise in practice, euen among the Iewes. And this, he saith, they did, to signifie that their soules were now departed, vnto the originall house of Musicke: Ad originem dulcedinis Musicae, idest, ad Coelum: in their owne interpretation. And this, againe hee saith, is the true Cause, why euery mans soule is so much delighted with Musicke vpon earth: Quia in Corpus defert memoriam Musicae, ciuius in Coelo fuit conscia: Because it bringeth downe with it, into the Body, a remembrance of that Musicke, whereof, in Heauen, it had a full fruition. These, and diuers such like Argu∣ments hee congesteth, in that place, to proue, that Musicke descended first from Heauen. Of which, though some bee not greatly strong; yet they strongly shew, that, euen the Heathen held this, as a sacred opinion, that Mu∣sicke is Gods gift, and not mans inuention.

Yea, and that which the Heathen haue so ingenuously acknowledged, of the whole body of Musicke; they likewise acknowledge, of both the kindes of it; both of Vocal, and Organical. For Vocal Musicke. Homer expresly affirmeth of the Singer Demodocus, (the most excellent in those times) that the Sweetnesse of his voyce, whereby hee so greatly delighted all men, was a speciall gift, which God had giuen vnto him:

—divinum Cantorem Demodocum:* 1.1383 huic quidem Deus excellenter dedit cantilenam Ad oblectandum, quocun{que} animus ipsum impulerit canere. A most diuine, and heauenly Songster, Demodocus was: Who did, in most delightfull layes, all other men surpasse. What ere his mind did leade him to, he did excell in singing: And all this excellency of his, was giuen by God vnto him.

And, that, which hee affirmeth particularly of him, doth Seneca affirme, in generall,* 1.1384 of all men. Ille, Deus est, qui non calamo tantùm cantare, at{que} agreste & inconditum carmen, ad aliquam tantùm oblectationem, modulari docuit: sed

tot Artes, tot vocum varietates, tot sonos, alios, spiritu nostro; alios, externo, cantus edituros, commentus est. It is God that hath taught men, not onely to play, vpon rude and homely pipes, fit for rude and Country song's; but that first hath invented all those Arts, all those varieties of voices, and all those sounds, whereby, either with our owne breath, or with others, we expresse all those songs. And therefore the Psalmist concludeth the booke of Psalmes, with this Epiphonema:* 1.1385 Let euery thing that hath breath, praise the Lord. That so God, who gaue those instruments vnto men, might, with his owne gift, be praised by them.

For so is Organicall Musicke, as well as Vocal: it also is Gods gift. Yea, and that also by the Confession, euen of the very Heathen. For so, Homer affir∣meth in expresse and plaine words:

Alij,* 1.1386 tribuit Deus, bellicaopera; Alij, autem saltationem: alij cytharam, & cantum. God giu's to one, the feates of Armes; t' another, art of dansing; He giu's another, skill to harpe; another, voice for singing.

So that, both playing and Singing he acknowledgeth, to be the gifts of God, vnto men.* 1.1387 Yea, and Maeximus Tyrius reproueth the Musition Demodocus, whom before I named; because he ascribed not vnto God, his gift in play∣ng, as well as in singing: Ne{que} fide dignus Demodocus, cùm de seipso dicit:

Ipse mihi Doctor: tribuerunt Numina vocem.

Demodocus is not to be beleeued, when he vaunteth of himselfe; That the Gods indeede had giuen him his voice: but, as for all his cunning, hee learned that, onely of himselfe. This arrogancy he reproueth, as vnto God iniurious; from whom he receiued the gift of them both. He was, indeed, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; and therefore not 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as he boasted of himselfe.

Neither did the Heathen, onely ascribe vnto God, to bee the giuer of the skill of playing vpon all sorts of Musicall instruments; but also, to haue bene the first inuentor of making the very instruments themselues.* 1.1388 Heraclides affirmeth of Amp••ion (who was Iupiters sonne) that hee was the first in the world, that euer taught men the vse of the Harpe. But hee addeth there further, that he himselfe had learned that skill of his Father: Patre ni∣mirùm docente.* 1.1389 But Plutarch himselfe reduceth it higher; not allowing of any mortall man to bee the first inuentor, so much as of the Pipe; but ascribing, euen it (as well as the Harpe) to be the inuention of the learned god Apollo. But Bion more distinctly referreth those instruments, vnto those seuerall gods, that we•••• their seuerall inuenters; not heaping the glorie of all vpon one; but reseruing vnto euery god, the glorie of his owne inuention.

—••••stulam obliquam,* 1.1390 Pan invenit: Minerva, tibiam: Tes••ud••••em, Mercurius. Et Cytharam, dulcis Apollo. The crooked Pipe, was Pans deuice: Minerua's was the Flute. The Harpe Apollo did inuent: and Mercury the Lute.

Thus, not onely Musicke it selfe, of all kindes; but also all Musicall instru∣ments, of all sorts, are (euen in the iudgment of the very Heathen) confessed to bee the gifts of God vnto Men. Which, though they bee made by the hand of man; yet were they directed by the wisdome of God. And therefore the Heathen haue iustly ascribed them, not vnto him that

wrought them,* 1.1391 but vnto him that taught them.

5 Now, as God hath giuen vnto man, a natural kind of Musick, wherewith his soule is delighted; so hath hee also giuen him a naturall sense, and instinct to worship God with it, as a tribute, due to him, from whom it was first gi∣uen. As may be euidently seene, by the generall practice both of Christians, & Heathens. Who, as they doe agree by the light of Nature, in worshipping of God; so doe they likewise agree, by the same light of Nature, to vse Musicke in his worship. For the practice of Christians: the whole Booke of Psalmes is an euidence of it. Which, as it was dayly sung in the old Church of the Iewes; so is it still dayly sung in all the Churches of Christians, through the whole world of Christianitie. In which Booke (being penned by the Holy Ghost) we may obserue, three remarkeable things. First, that, as God hath appointed vnto man, a Sabbath day, wherein to praise and serue him: so hath hee also appointed them to serue him,* 1.1392 with hymnes, and psalmes, and spiritu∣all songs. Yea, and, among them, hath selected certaine speciall Psalmes, from among all the rest, as specially appropriated vnto those Sabbath Dayes: As may be euidently seene, by the title and inscription, of the 92. Psalme; A Psalme,* 1.1393 or Song, for the Sabbath Day. Secondly, that hee hath further had a speciall care, not onely of the Dittie, but also of the Tune too. As it like∣wise appeareth by the Titles and inscriptions of diuers other Psalmes. Ma∣gistro Symphoniae ad pneumatica instrumenta.* 1.1394 Magistro Symphoniae fidium ad grauem symphoniam. Magistro Symphoniae acutae ad medianam: and diuers others such like. Thirdly, that, not contented with the Musick of mens na∣turall voices, he hath further added to them (for the quickning of deuotion) the helpe of all sorts of Musicall instruments.* 1.1395 Praise him, in the sound of the Trumpet. Praise him, vpon the Lute, and Harpe. Praise him, with Timbrels, and Flute, with Virginals, and Organs, and with high sounding Cymbals. Thus, God himselfe hath required, to haue his Seruice furnished, with all the seue∣rall sorts of Musick,* 1.1396 both Harmonical, Rithmicall, and Organicall. And there∣fore Boetius ascribeth vnto the Art of Musick, a principa••l honor, aboue all the other. Inter septem Artes Liberales, principatum oblinet Musica. And Beda, who reporteth his opinion, alledgeth for it a good Reason:* 1.1397 Because it, of all other Arts, hath onely the honour to enter into the Church; and there to be vsed, in Gods owne immeditate seruice. For, this is an Arte so Heauenly and diuine, that it seemeth to haue beene giuen by God, vnto men, to this speciall ende; that by it Men might set out the glorie of God. And therefore Plutarch affirmeth,* 1.1398 that, Primum, & pulcherrimum Musicae officium, est, grata aduers••m Deos remuneratio: The first, and the fayrest office of Musick, is the returne of our thankfulnesse vnto God,* 1.1399 for his goodnesse. VVhich office the Prophet Dauid accordingly put in practice. What can I returne vnto the Lord for all his benefits? I will take vnto me, the Cup of saluation, and will call vp∣on the Name of the Lord. Here is the best returne, that by man can be made to sacrifice the true thankfulnesse of his soule vnto God; as for all his other inestimable Benefits, so for this among the rest, for giuing vs so Musicall and tuneable a voice, whereby wee haue a meane to praise him for all the rest. Pium est enim,* 1.1400 & praecipuum hominum hoc studium (saith Plutarch againe) Laudes canere Deorum, qui soli ipsis articulatam vocem sunt largiti. It is a

pious and a principall duty of man, to sing prayses vnto God; who onely hath gi∣uen him that articulate voyce, whereby he is able to sing vnto him. Thus this learned Philosopher, both deriueth the Arte of Musick from God, as from his originall beginning; and referreth it vnto God, as to his principall ende.

And this was not his opinion alone, but the very Religion, of all the rest of the Heathen. As may be euidently seene, not onely in Hesiodus, but also in Trismegistus:* 1.1401 two of their cheife Divines. For the first of them: Hesiodus, he maketh the Muses (who were the Authors of Musick) the Daughters of Iupiter: and therefore, to drawe their originall from God. And he maketh them againe, to sing alwayes before him: and therefore to referre all their Musick vnto God. And Trismegistus likewise, expresly deliuereth, both the very same points.* 1.1402 For the first of them: he saith that, Musarum chorus, est a summa Divinitate demissus, ne terrenus mundus videretur incultior, si modulo∣rum dulcedine caruisset: That the Quire of the Muses, was sent downe from heauen, from the highest of the Gods; lest this terrene and inferiour world should be barbarous and rude, if it lacked the delight and sweetenesse of Mu∣sick. And, for the second of them, he addeth: Sed potiùs, vt modulatis ho∣minum cantilenis concelebretur laudibus, qui solus dat omnia; vt Pater est omnium. But yet the higher ende of musick was, that, by mens delightfull mu∣sicke, hee might be onely praysed, who is the Giuer of all; as being indeed the very Father of all. So then Musick was first giuen by God to Men; that Men might, by it, giue due praises vnto God. For the true vse of Musicke (as Athenaeus obserueth) is principally this,* 1.1403 Deorum laudes Musicis Canticis personare: To chante out Gods prayses with musical Songs. And therefore the ancient Musick (as Plutarch recordeth) was only vsed in the Temples, for the worship of God;* 1.1404 and not in Theaters,* 1.1405 for the vaine delight of men.* 1.1406 For the Custome of the Heathens (as Macrobius reporteth, and Plutarch by ma∣ny speciall instances confirmeth) was, to vse Musick and Songs, in all their publicke prayers. Yea, and Plato well approueth it: Rectissimum erit, vt Hym∣ni laudés{que} Deorum, precibus mixtae, canantur. Hee would alwayes haue Hymnes, intermixed with prayers, and especially, with their solmne sacrifices. Whence, Maximus Tyrius, calleth Musicke, Optimum in Sacrificijs comitem: A sweete companion,* 1.1407 in all their sacrificing. Yea, and there addeth further, that it doth, Mysteria sanctificare: That it addeth a further Holinesse, vnto their holy mysteries.* 1.1408 Which opinion of his, Aristotle also confirmeth; who affirmeth of Musick, that it hath a power in it, both purgatiue, and sanatiue: whereby a mans minde is made both pure, and humble, and deuout. And therefore we may obserue, in the practice of Heathens, as well a••of Christians; that they haue not thought it sufficient, to worship God onely with prayers & invocations, but also with Hymnes, and Odes. Aelian recordeth an Hymne of thankesgiuing which Arion made to Neptune,* 1.1409 for his deliuerance by the Dolphin. Galen* 1.1410 vpon the contemplation of the admirable workmanship in the body of man, breaketh out into an Hymne, in the prayse of him that made him. Hìc compono Canticum, in Creatoris nostri laudem. And Trismegistus vpon the like contemplations,* 1.1411 setteth downe diuers Hymnes, which he made in Gods praise. Yea, and Homer hath made a set Booke of Hymnes, wherein he setteth out the prayses of all their Gods. Which kinde of Hymnes,

(as Macrobius recordeth) were vsually sung,* 1.1412 in the Temples of the Heathen, per Stroph••m, & Antistropham; for the stronger eleuation of their mindes toward Heauen. As our holy Hymnes are, in the Churches of Christians, by Verses, and Antiphonies, answering one another: And the like wee may obserue, to haue beene also in vse, in the Church of the Iewes. As appeareth in all the Psalmes; from the 146. vnto the end of the Psalme-Booke. Where, as euery Psalme beginneth with an Allelu-iah, or, Praise the Lord, by Stropha: so doth it likewise end, with an Allelu-iah, or, Praise the Lord, by Antistropha. And the same order of singing is obserued, euen in Heauen. Where Saints, and Angells, be the Choristers; and God himselfe, the 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉; who beareth also his part, in this Diuine and Heauenly Har∣monie. As euidently appeareth,* 1.1413 in the Booke of the Apocalyps. Where, a Multitude of Saints, singing vnto Gods praise, and beginning their Allelu-iah, by way of S••ropha, they were answered againe, by the Elders, and foure Beasts, with another Allelu-iah, by the way of Antistropha. And againe, they both were answered,* 1.1414 with a voic•• from the Throne, with another Allelu-iah, rebounding, and ecchoing from another place of Heauen. And, when they all had thus sung, their seuerall Allelu-iah, by themselues, asunder; then they ioyned in one, and sung it altogether. Here is an adumbration of the Quire of Heauen: and the forme of the singing of Saints, and Angells there∣in. Whereby it appeareth, that God hath not onely appointed, that Men should heere praise him, with holy Harmonies, in this present life; but also, with Heauenly Harmonies, in the life to come.

And this also was both knowne, and acknowledged, by the very Heathen: As it euidently appeareth, by the testimony of Pindarus.

Animae piorum Coelos colentes,* 1.1415 Cantu, beatum & magnum in Hymmis cannut. The Soules of godly blessed Saints inhabiting the Heau'ns, Do chaunt and sound their blessednes, in holy Songs and Hymn's.

Yea, and Porphiry reciteth a certaine Oracle of Apollo: wherein he affirmeth, that God hath created a certaine order of Angells, which do nothing but praise him, and sing continually before him.

Praetereà,* 1.1416 tertium quoddam genus Regum creâsti; Quite semper canunt, carminibús{que} laudant, Volentem Te ipsi cupidi, praedicant{que} & nunc, & semper. Thou God created hast a kinde of glorious Angel-Kings, Whose spirit, in celestiall Quire, thy prayses euer sings.

By all which fore-named Reasons, it euidently appeareth, that this Heauenly Art of Musicke is the gift of God, to men. And therefore, must necessarily inferre, that, There is One.

CHAP. 13.

The other Liberall Arts, doe, all of them, shew, That there is a God: they being, all of them, acknowledged, to be the gifts of God. 1. Grammer. 2. Logicke. 3. Rhetoricke. 4. Which three Arts haue apparently, an adumbration of the Trinity.

THIS second Booke prouing, That there is a God, from the grounds of Arts, hath now growne very great and prolixe, vn∣der mine hand: yea, and that, farre beyond both mine expecta∣tion, and intention. Wherein, I am not ignorant, that the vulgar Reader can take but small delight: the nature of this Argument is so farre out of his Element. Neither yet can any other, but only a professe•• Scholer, vnto whom these grounds of Arts are common, and familiar. And therefore, all the rest, which are as yet behind, I will but onely touch, and that with a light finger, to make the way shorter, vnto other more plausible and popular matter. Now the residue of the liberal Arts, be these three in number Grammer, Logicke, and Rhetorick. Which, all of them, are acknowledged, euen by the very Heathen, to bee Gods speciall Gifts and Blessings vnto men.

And first, as concerning Grammer. That is defined, to bee, Arts rectè Lo∣quendi,* 1.1417 at{que} scribendi; An Art of rightly Speaking, and Writing. So that, the naturall,* 1.1418 and, as it were, the homogeneall parts of Grammer, be two, Or∣thology, and Orthography. In both which parts of it, God hath had a speciall hand; as, euen by the Heathen themselues, is acknowledged: in the first of them, Orthology; in teaching men the right imposition of names: in the second of them, Orthography; in teaching them the rare inuention of letters. Two workes of so diuine and heauenly an inuention, that, without them, humane life were nothing but confusion.

For the better, and more cleere demonstration whereof, wee are to know thus much. That the facultie of speaking is not naturall vnto a man, no more then to a Beast. A man hath no more giuen speech vnto himselfe, then hee hath giuen himselfe the Tongue, wherewith hee speaketh. But God is the giuer of them both. And the tongue of a man, would be altogether as dumbe, as the tongue of a Beast; if God himselfe, at the first, had not taught it how to speake. Therefore, this gift of speaking, as it was at the first habi∣tually infused into Adam, so hath it euer since bene propagated from him, by onely imitation.

I know, it is an old receiued opinion, that (notwithstanding this great varietie of seuerall languages, which wee see entertained in diuers nations) yet that man hath a naturall speech of his owne, as hee is a man: which lan∣guage hee would speake by nature, if hee were not taught some other. But this is but a dreame: and hath beene twice refuted, by a double experiment. The first was,* 1.1419 by Psammeticus, a King of Egypt: who desiring to vnderstand, which was mans most ancient and naturall language, hee caused two Chil∣dren to bee sequestred from all society of men, and to bee nourished onely by sucking two shee-goates, forbidding all speech vnto them. VVhich Children, continuing for a long time dumbe, at last vttered, Bec, Bec. The King being informed, that, in the Phrygian Language, Bec, signified Bread, imagined that the Children called then for Bread: and from thence collected, that, because they spake that language which no man had taught them, that therefore the Phrygian language was the naturall speech of man. A silly proofe,* 1.1420 God knoweth. His conceit of Bec, Bec, well deseruing to be numbered with those Becceselenae, those doting old tales, which haue euer

beene contemned of those that are wise. For the Childrens Bec, Bec, (as is probably collected) was onely that language which they learned of their Goat-nurses, when they came to suck their teates. Who, receiuing of them some ease by their sucking, saluted them with Bec, the best language which they had. From whom the children learned it. And so much as they heard, iust so much againe they vttered, & no more. And if they had not heard it, they could neuer haue pronounced it. As we may euidently see, by an o∣ther experiment tried vpon other Infants,* 1.1421 (which is our second instance) by Melabdim Echebar, whom they call The great Mogor. He likewise (vpon the fore-named error) that Man hath a certaine proper language by Nature, caused thirty Children to be brought vp in dumbe silence, to finde out, by experience, whether all of them would speake one and the same language? ha∣uing inwardly a purpose, to frame his religion, conformable to that nation, whose language should be spoken: as being that Religion, which is purely naturall vnto man. But the Children proued all dumbe: though there were so many of them. And therefore they could not speake because they were not taught. Whereby it appeareth, that Speaking, which is the first part of Grammer, is not in man by Nature. But the first man had it, by onely diuine infusion; and all his posteritie, onely by imitation.

Now the first element and originall of all speech, is the Imposition of Names. Without which, there can be no distinction of things. I meane, not, quoad nos; though, quoad naturam, they be sufficiently distinguished, by those substantiall properties which are their essentiall and specificall differen∣ces. But yet, they could haue no distinction in speech, if they were not diui∣ded by their seuerall names. No, nor in vse neither. For, if things were not separated by their proper names,* 1.1422 then if a man should aske for Bread, they might giue him a Stone; if for a Fish, a Serpent; if for an Egg, a Scorpion. And so in all other things, there would follow like confusion. As we may see, in the building of the Tower of Babilon: how when the Labourers vnderstood not the names of those things, for which the Builders called, the worke was brought vnto a stand, and could not goe forward. So that, the right orde∣ring of all humane affaires dependeth chiefely vpon the distinction of names, without which,* 1.1423 there can be no knowledg of things. For, Nomen est a noscen∣do dictum: as S. Augustin giueth the notation of that name: and, Nomina be but Notaererum: as the Orator noteth of them: Names be the notes & marks, whereby wee doe know things; which cannot bee knowne, if they haue no 〈◊〉〈◊〉.* 1.1424 Whereupon, euen God himselfe, as soone as euer he had made a man he brought all things before him, that hee might put names vpon them. Full well foreseeing, in his diuine wisedome, that it was a thing most necessarie for the vse of man. Els would hee neuer haue appointed it so timely to be done. And therefore, euen the Heathen haue reckoned this nomenclature, and imposition of names,* 1.1425 for one of Gods owne works: holding it, for an invention, aboue humane vnderstanding. Euriphanus, though he ascribe the worke it selfe vn∣to Man, yet he holdeth it to be done,* 1.1426 by divine illumination: agreeing there∣in with the truth of the Scripture it selfe. And Tullie, reckoning vp certaine admirable inventions, farre transcending the highest pitch of the capacitie of man, he numbereth this for one, The imposing of names so aptly vpon things.

Which (as Plato acknowledgeth) Rerum istarum inuentio,* 1.1427 acutius ingenium quàm nostrum, exigit. The inuention of these things, exacteth a more peir∣cing wit, then is ours. VVhich, all the Heathen in generall, ascribed directly vnto their God Mercurie. So that, for Orthologie, the first part of Grammer, you see, that euen the Heathen haue two wayes auerred it, for a diuine in∣uention. VVhich doth necessarily conclude That therefore there is a God.

Now for Orthographie, the second part of Grammer, teaching the Arte of writing. That hath also in it another strange inuention: which, euen by the very Heathen, is reputed to be Diuine. And that is, the inuention and diui∣sing of Letters. A thing so essentiall and proper vnto Grammer, that the whole Arte hath his name and appellation from it. For, Grammatica (as S. Augustin obserueth out of Varro) doth signifie Literatio:* 1.1428 or, (as he refineth it) Litertura, that is, The cunning and skill of Letters. Ipso se nomine pro∣fiteri literas clamans: Proclayming, euen in his very name, that it professeth the knowledge of Letters. So Tullie. Studium Literarum profitentur ij, qui Gramm••tici vocantur. They which are called Grammarians, professe the Studie and knowledge of Letters. Now the first deuising and finding out of Letters, is one of the rarest and most heauenly inventions of all that are in vse in hu∣mane societie.* 1.1429 Yea, and that, whether we respect the notable subtilitie, or V∣tilitie of it. For the first of which two points. It is almost a miracle, that a meane could be invented, whereby words and sounds, which naturally bee the Obiects of the Eare, should be made the Obiects of the Eye. As we see the one is, by Letters, in writing; the other, by notes, in singing. This is in∣deed an admirable invention, that sounds and voices should, by the power of certaine Characters (as it were by Charmes) bee stolne away from their owne proper sense, and conueyed vnto another, by Leger••du Maìn, and so made an Obiect of the same. This (I say) is a very wonder: and, among all the senses, not to be found, in any other. No invention euer yet could make the Obiect of Seeing, the Obiect of Hearing; nor the Obiect of Hearing the Obiect of Smelling; nor the Obiect of Smelling, the Obiect of Feeling. Onely the Obiect of Hearing, by this inuention of Letters, is made (in some sort) the Obiect of Seeing. And this, by the goodnesse of God vn∣to man, for the increase of his knowledge and vnderstanding. Which is the second point, that I obserued in it.

For, by this rare invention of writing, it cannot be numbered, how many great Benefits be vnto men conueyed. By writing, we may giue direction for ourforaine Businesses, though we stay at home: and for our domestical, though we be abroad. By writing, we may conferre with our absent Friend, as freely, as with our present Neighbor; communicating all our counsells as secretly and closly, as if we should whisper one in anothers eare: yea though we be diuided many miles asunder. Ita vt absens vltra Maris aequora, Res, quae illìc ge∣rantur in aedibus,* 1.1430 omnes rectè intelligant: as Euripides noteth, euen in this very case. But writing, we may recorde those things that are past, as freshly, as when we remembred them present. By writing▪ we haue the monuments of an∣cient times communicated with vs, and all good Arts and Learning deriued vnto vs.

Yea (and that which farre surmounteth all that hitherto hath beene sayd)

by writing, wee haue the comfort of the holy word of God: which, from writing, receiueth his denomination, in being called Scripture: which is, nothing else but, Writing. Finally (to come home vnto this our owne purpose,* 1.1431 with Theodorets instance) by writing wee are furnished with inuin∣cible Arguments, to fight against the Atheist, who armeth himselfe to fight against God. These, and infinite like blessings, are conueied vnto men, by the benefit of writing.

Beside which, this inuention of writing, and the conueying of the voice vnto the eye from the eare, which I mentioned before, beguiling one sense of his Obiect, to furnish another with it, doth (by intermingling the Offices of those two diuers senses) minister no lesse delight in expressing their vses, by way of Questions and Riddles, then are vsually made vpon incestuous ma∣riages. As for example. If it should be demanded: How a voyce may bee seene? It may be answered: By writing. How a man may speake, after hee is dead? By writing.

Et moriens liberis aliquot literas Scribendo animum aperiet.* 1.1432

Saith Euripides:

Of dying man, his liuing minde, By Written deedes, his Children finde.

How two may talke together, without any word spoken? By writing. How two may speake together, that are many miles a sunder? By writing.

—peragunt Linguae Charta manus{que} vices. Where distance setteth on tongue a tie,* 1.1433 There hand and paper make supply.

How a man may teach his hand to speake? By writing. How a man may heare another speake, though he should stoppe his eares? By writing. How a man may remember that which he hath forgotten?* 1.1434 By writing.* 1.1435 Whence Euripides calleth it, Remedium oblivionis: The remedy of obliuion. And Aeschilus, An helpe of memory: Literarum autem compositio memoriam pro∣duxit. And many such like may the wit of man find out, many other wayes expressing the great vses of writing. All which haue their dependence, vpon the first inuention of letters.* 1.1436 And therefore the Romane Orator, as he ascribed before, the imposition of names: so againe he ascribeth the inuention of let∣ters, onely vnto God: as being an inuention aboue the reach of man. And so likewise doth Euriphanus,* 1.1437 whom I cited before, ioyning both inuentions together. Yea, and Plato expresseth of which of the gods: affirming of the Egyptians, that they challenge the inuention of letters, vnto one of their owne gods,* 1.1438 namely to their god, The••th: whom they held for the author of all good Arts among them: as letters are the beginning of all good learning. Others ascribed this inuention to the Muses. But Pacianus di∣rectly asserteth it to God:* 1.1439 to whom it is due, indeede. Dic, or••, Frater, Musae literas repererunt? Nonne per Dominm omnia, & a Deo omnia? Thus Grammer, not onely, by the imposition of names; but also, by the inuention of letters, doth leade vs, by the hand, to beleeue, There is a God.

2 Yea,* 1.1440 and so doth Logicke too. By the helpe and meanes whereof, both names were first imposed, and letters first inuented. For both these are done, according to reason. And Logicke (which is the Art of reasoning) is in∣deed nothing else, but the practice of reason: Disputare is nothing else, but Ratione vti.* 1.1441 It is nothing else, but Oratio ratione conclusa: as Tully speaketh: A speech concluded with Reason. Therefore not onely Grammer; and Rhe∣toricke (which is nothing else but a dilated kinde of Logicke,* 1.1442 Dialectica dila∣tata, as Tully calleth; it: and as Zeno exemplified it by his fist and his hand: Quòd latiùs loquerentur Rhetores,* 1.1443 Dialectiei autem compressiùs) but also all o∣ther Arts, were both at the first inuented, and after perfected, and euer practi∣sed; yea, and now, both taught, and learned, by the helpe of Logicke. As S. Augustine expresly affirmeth of it. Haec docet docere: Haec docet discere: Haec sola scientes potest facere:* 1.1444 This is the Art, which onely teacheth men how to teach: and which onely learneth men, how to learne: and which onely is able to make a man vnderstand. And therefore hee calleth Logicke, Disciplinam Disciplinarum: The Art of all Arts: The Art, whereby all Arts are both taught and learned. For, as Tully also noteth, Haec vna continet omnem, & perspi∣ciend quid in quavis re sit, scientiam; & iudicandi quale quid{que} sit, ac ratione & via disputandi.

Insomuch that,* 1.1445 as Iamblicus hath truely obserued: Nulla Philosophiae pars, abs{que} Dialectica ratione, comparatur: There can no part of Philosophy, bee per∣fectly attained; without the helpe and assistance of Logicke. As Aristotle sheweth in his Topickes:* 1.1446 where hee reckoneth vp the principall vses of it.

Yea, and it hath also as great an vse in Diuinity, as it hath in Philosophie. Logicke teacheth the Preacher to Analize and diuide his Text. It teacheth to collect true and proper Doctrines from it. And it teacheth him to discouer those false, or idle Doctrines, which are wrongly built vpon it.* 1.1447 Nam hanc de finiendo, distribuendo, ••olligendo, non solùm digerit, at{que} ordi∣nat, sed etiam ab omni falsitatis irreptione defendit: saith S. Augustine, com∣prehending in one sentence, all those three forenamed vses. The Art of Logick, by D••finitions, Divisions, and Collections, doth not onely digest things, and bring, them into Order, but also defendeth them from those captious falsities, which otherwise would oftentimes creepe into them. For, as the Orator also obserueth:* 1.1448 Habet Dialectica rationem, nè cui falso assentiamur, neuè vnquàm captios •• probabilitate falla••nur. For it is, Ars, vera & falsa iudicandi: as hee againe noteth, in another place: It is an Art of discerning truth from false∣hoold. Againe (another vse) it assisteth the Preacher, both in confuting of Haeresies, and in resoluing of all doubts and questions: as S. Augustine againe, in another place, obserueth.* 1.1449 Disput ati••nis disciplina, ad omnia genera quaesti∣onum, quae in liter•••• 〈…〉〈…〉 & dissoluenda plurimum valet. The Art of Disputing 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of a spe•••••••• 〈◊〉〈◊〉, for discerning and deciding of all manner of Qu••stion••, which any where wise, through the whole Scriptures. For, it doth 〈…〉〈…〉 intelligention: as the Orator noteth: It yeeldeth a certaine knowledge of things doubtfull. Yea, and the vse of it is so generall, in all the parts of Diuinity, that Iamblicus affirmeth of it very resolutely, that, Omnia, quae considerantur de D••••s,* 1.1450 Dialectica ratione astruuntur: That euery thing, which any way belongeth to God or Religion, is grounded vpon, and con∣firmed

by some Logical Reason.* 1.1451 Whence Plato himselfe (as Ficinus obserueth) vseth the word Dialectica, promiscuously, for Theologia, in many places of his writings; as being aequivalent, and all one, in sense. And therefore, Iamblicus affirmeth of Logick, that it is Deorum munus: A gift and token of God vnto Men. Yea, and so it is indeed: and that a very great one. Yea, and in the same place affirmeth expresly:* 1.1452 Reuerà, Deus quispiam fuit, qui Hominibus Dialecti∣cam monstravit, & coelitùs demisit. Certainly, it was some God, which shewed Logick vnto men, and sent it downe from Heauen. Which some ascribe, to Mercurie; some to Calliope; and some to Apollo: who (as there he reporteth) did purposely deliuer all his Oracles, in obscure and aenygmatical termes, to excite men thereby vnto the study of Logicke; which is the only Arte whereby they can be opened. Cuius opera quicquid ambiguum, & aequivocum est, dijudica∣tur: By the helpe of which Arte of Logick, whatsoeuer is ambiguous and doubt∣full, is cleared and distinguished.

3 And that,* 1.1453 which the Heathen haue confessed both of Grammer and Logick, they confesse likewise of Rhetoricks: That it is also a speciall gift of God, For if Grammer, which is but the Arte of speaking, be so, then must Rhe∣torick, which is the Arte of Pleading, much more be so. It is a farre higher gift, to pleade then to speake. To speake, is euery mans gift; but to plead, the gift of few. And therefore; as Plato collecteth in another like Case; If God be the Giuer of the lesser blessings,* 1.1454 then much more of the greater. Ipsum bono∣rum omnium Authorem, cur non maximi etiam boni causam arbitramur? And therefore Dionysius Areopagita expresly affirmeth, That both these Arts of Speaking, are Gods speciall gifts. Deus, & dicendi, & benè dicendi munus,* 1.1455 concessit. It is God, that hath giuen, hoth the Arte of Speaking, and the Arte of Well speaking. Tullie, that great Orator; speaking of the Arte Oratorie, affir∣meth it, not to be a gift of Nature, but to descend from God, as from the first Author: Primus eius Artis Antistes esse, Deus putatur. The first Author of that Arte is beleeued to be God. And though, in the same place, hee be driuen to confesse,* 1.1456 that the benignitie of Nature hath no little sway in it; yet there he further addeth, that euen, Idipsum, quod est hominis proprium, non sit partum per nos; sed divinitùs ad nos delatum: That, euen that naturall habilitie, which any man hath vnto it, is not gotten by himselfe, but is giuen him by God. It is God that giueth the Tongue of the learned:* 1.1457 as the Prophet Isay testifieth. And therefore the same Orator, in another place, affirmeth; not following any other mans opinion, but deliuering his owne; That it is onely God, that is indeed the Maker of euery good Oration, by his diuine infusion. Mihi quidem nè haec notiora,* 1.1458 at{que} illustriora, carere vi divina videntur: vt Ego, aut Poetam, grave plenúm{que} carmen, sine coelesti aliquo mentis instinctu, putem fudere: aut eloquentiam, sinc maiori aliqua vi fluere, abundantem sonantibus verbis vbe∣ribús{que} sententijs. He professeth, that he is perswaded, that neither any Poet can make a good Poëm, nor yet any Orator a good Oration, if he be not infused with a divine inspiration.* 1.1459 For, as Pindarus also confesseth, vnto the same purpose: Et sapientes, & eloquentes, Dei benignitate, fiunt. It is onely Gods blessing, that giueth vnto men, both eloquence and wisedome. So Origen. Quòd verba quis fecerit,* 1.1460 quae persuadendi vim habeant, id Dei munere fit; quod verò suadeaetur, non semper ex Deo procedit. The power of perswading is alwayes the gift of

God; though the thing perswaded sometimes be not. Yea, and God himselfe ex∣presly chalengeth the same to be his gift. Yea the whole Trinitie chalengeth it, who haue all a true right in it. God the Father, he chalengeth it, vnto the Prophet Moses: who when hee detrected his returne into Egypt, vpon pre∣tence of his stammering,* 1.1461 God himselfe demanded of him: Who it was that had giuen the mouth vnto man? Is it not I the Lord? God the Sonne, hee chalen∣geth it, vnto his Disciples: forbidding them to be carefull, when they came before Magistrates what answer they should make them;* 1.1462 and assuredly promi∣sing, that, in that very howre, it should be giuen to them. And the Holy Ghost, he chalengeth it,* 1.1463 assuming vnto himselfe, that gift of strang speaking, wherwith the Apostles amazed all their hearers: They beganne to speake with other tongues, as the Spirit gaue them vtterance. By all which specialties, this Con∣clusion is proued,

4 Thus, all those three Arts, Grammer, Logick, and Rhetorick, are all of them giuen vnto men, by God. Yea, and that by God the Word: who is the wise∣dome of his Father:* 1.1464 and who is the true light, that lighteneth euery man that commeth into the world. And this also, by the Confession euen of the very Heathen.* 1.1465 For it is Epicharmus his Tenet: that, Divinum Verbum omnes Artes hominibus suggerit: It is onely God the Word, which giueth men the know∣ledge of all Arts and sciences. Which if it be generally true, in all Arts; then is it most specially true, in those Arts. For, all those three Arts, doe carie vp∣on them, the very name of that God, who is the Giuer of them. For, as God the son is called 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉: so likewise is euery one of those forenamed Arts. There is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Verbum: and that is Grammer. There is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Ratio, and that is Logick. And there is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Oratio: and that is Rhetorick. So that, as God the Son doth carrie vpon him,* 1.1466 the Character of his Father: so doe those threearts the Cha∣racter of their Author. Euery one of them is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, as God the Sonne is. So that, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, in generall, is like the nature of the Deitie, which is common vnto all the three persons of the Trinitie: and so is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, vnto all those three arts. So that as in the Trinitie it may truely be sayd; That the Father, is God; the Sonne is God; and the Holy Ghost, is God: So may it be sayd, in the Trinitie of those arts; That Grammer, is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Logick, is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, & Rhetorick, is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Here they are al conioyned together as in one common nature. And, as in the Trinity it may againe be sayd; That the Father, is not the Sonne; nor the Sonne, the Holy Ghost, nor the Holy Ghost, the Father: so may it be sayd likewise, in those three arts, and sciences: That Grammer, is not Logick; nor Logick, Rhetorick; nor Rheto∣rick, Grammer. Here againe disioyned. And yet, in another respect againe conioyned. For, as in the Trinitie, the Father doth beget the Sonne, and they two produce the Holy Ghost: so, in this other Trinitie, 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Ratio, doth beget 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, Verbum; and they two produce out of them, an other third 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, which is Ora∣tio. So that those three arts are not onely affirmed to be the gifts of God, by the testmonie of the Heathen, but they also declare it, by their very name.

CHAP. 14.

Philosophie leadeth a Man vnto God. 2. It hath in it a kinde of resemblance of God. 3. It is acknowledged to be the Gift of God. 4. And so likewise is Poetrie. 5. And so all other Arts in generall. 6. Yea euen the Mechanicall.

HAVING now dispatched the liberall Arts and Sciences; and shewed, how all of them doe lesson vs to God; it resteth, that we should ascend by them (as by certaine streames) vnto Phi∣losophie it selfe: which is the Fountaine, and Springhead, from whence they all do flow.* 1.1467 Tullie calleth Philosophy, The Mother of all good Arts: Omnium laudandarum Artium procreatricem quandam, & quasi parentem. And Damascene calleth it, The Inuenter of them. Per quam, Ars omnis & Scientia inventa est: By which all Arts and Sciences were first found and inuented. So that, what good soeuer we haue receiued, from all, or any of them, in teaching and instructing vs, to know, There is a God; all that we owe onely vnto Philosophy: which is the first Fountaine from whence it was deriued: though by them, as by Channells, it were brought and conueied. Nay, that which they taught vs but obscurely, and indirectly, as occupied properly in another subiect, that doth Philosophy teach plainly and directly, as hauing God himselfe for his naturall Obiect. As wee may euidently see, not onely by the notation of the Name, but also by the definition of the Thing. Both of them implying, that Philosophy, in truth, is a kind of Diuinity: whose Obiect is onely God. And therefore, Theaetetus, in Plato, calleth Philosophers,* 1.1468 by the name of Divines. Omnes Philosophos, Divinos appello. And Socrates well approueth his calling of them so.

Yea, and the very name of Philosophy, being rightly expounded, implyeth, that his principall Obiect is God. For, by interpretation, Philosophy signifieth, The loue of Wisedome: as the Orator giue th the accompt of that name. Now, The beginning of Wisdome,* 1.1469 is the feare of God: as, is plainly affirmed, by the Prophet Dauid. Nay, true wisedome it selfe is nothing else, but, Cognitio Numinis,* 1.1470 rerúm{que}. Divinarum: The knowledge of God, and of those things that belong to him: as Architas Tarentinus expresly defineth. Nay, God himselfe is indeed the truest and highest wisedome. So Aristotle: God is an Essentia de Sapientia perfectissima.* 1.1471 And this is further yet confessed, by the learned est of the Heathen: as Pansa reporteth and proueth. Aristotle againe, speaking of wisedome, saith, that it is not an humane possession, but an honour which is proper vnto God. And he citeth Simonides, for confirmation of it. So that, if Philosophie be truely the loue of Wisdome; then is it the loue of God, who is the truest wisedome. As diuers of the Fathers haue, from this ground, collected.* 1.1472 So Clemens Alexandrinus. Philosophi apud nos dicuntur, qui amant Sapientìam, quae est omnium opifex, & magistra, hoc est, Filij Dei cognitionem. They bee called Philosophers with vs, that are louers of that Wisdome, which is the Creator and Ruler of all things: that is, in very deede, that are louers of the knowledge of the Sonne of God.* 1.1473 So Damascen. Vera Philosophia, est Sapientiae amor: vera autem Sapientiae, Deus est: Ex quo conficitur, Amorem erga Deum, veram esse Philosophiam. True Philosophy is nothing else but onely God himselfe:* 1.1474 From whence it must needs follow, that True Philosophy, is nothing else but the true loue of God. In which point S. Augustine consenteth fully with Damascene: Id est Philosophari, amare Deum. And Theodoret,* 1.1475 he fully consents with them both. Quiestre vera Philosophus, iure vocari poterit pius, & Dei amans. Hee that indeed is a Philosopher, may

iustly be called by the name of Gods Louer. As the Patriarch Abraham, was called, Gods Friend. Yea, and some of the Heathen haue confessed also the same. Trismegistus* 1.1476 defineth True Philosophy, to be nothing but Religion, and diuine contemplation. And therefore Plato affirmeth of euill men, That they doe not philosophize: Mali non philosophantur: because, euen in their being euill men, they put on a contrary nature vpon them. For the Nature of Phi∣losophy is, by louing of God, to make men become good. And, in this nature, euery man ought to bee a Philosopher:* 1.1477 Deum scilicet amando: yea euen the simplest man that is, as Iustin Martyr teacheth. For this is the chiefest worke of man, euen as he is a man. This is that Opus Hominis, quatenus Homo: Where∣by he is made blessed: His truely louing God. And therefore, this, euery man ought to make his first and chiefest worke: and all the rest, but seconds, and thirds: as Iustine Martyr noteth, in the fore-alledged place. So that, Philo∣sophie teacheth a man to loue God, euen by his very name. And therefore it must needs assume, That there is one.

Againe, Aristotle* 1.1478 calleth true Philosophie, Scientiam veritatis: The know∣ledge of the Truth: and affirmeth, that The end of it, is onely Veritas, that is, to attaine vnto the truth. Now, God is, prima veritas, God is the first Truth, as Trismegistus affirmeth.* 1.1479 Primam veritatem, aio, Vnum, & solum illum, qui non est ex m••teria, corpore non continetur, sine colore, sine figura, mutationi & al∣terationi nulli obnoxium semper existentem. I call the first truth, that one and onely thing, which hath neither body, nor matter, colour, nor figure, neuer subiect to alteration, and yet euer in perfect being. All which attributes, can agree vnto nothing else, but onely vnto God himselfe. Whom the Scriptures like∣wise call,* 1.1480 by the name of the Truth: I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life. And this is that Truth, which we first ought to seeke for; as being the Way, which leadeth vs vnto Life. This is euerlasting life, to know thee to bee the onely true God,* 1.1481 and whom thou hast sent Iesus Christ. And the knowledge of Truth,* 1.1482 is the very end, for which man was created: as euen Aristotle himselfe hath expresly affirmed. Homines ad veritatem nati sunt. Men are borne for nothing else, but to seeke for the Truth. So that, whether Philosophy bee the loue of Wisdome; as Pythagoras intended: or, the knowledge of the Truth; as Aristotle intended: yet both wayes it leadeth a man vnto God, who is both the highest wisdome, and the chiefest Truth: Yea, and that, by vertue of the very name.

Now come wee from the notation of the name, vnto the definition of the Thing: and wee shall see it there againe. For Philosophy, is defined to bee, Omnium rerum, divinarum,* 1.1483 at{que} humanarum scientia: The knowledge of all things, both diuine, and humane. Whence Seneca affirmeth, that, Nomen Phi∣losophiae, est non solùm venerabile, sed etiam sacrum. The very name of Phi∣losophie, is both honourable, and holy: Honorable, in things humane; and Holy, in things Diuine. Now, if Philosophie teach vs the knowledge of the things of God; then must it needes leade vs, to the knowledge of God himselfe. And so indeede, true Philosophy doth. For, there is none other way to come vnto God,* 1.1484 but by eschewing of Euill, and doing of Good. And both these lessons doth Philosophy teach vs. For it is, both Expultrix vitiorum; and Indagatrix virtutum: The Expeller of vices; and Searcher-out of vertues.

First, it expelleth vices, as skilfull Phisitions doe peccant and vicious humors. And therefore,* 1.1485 in another place, he calleth Philosophie, Medicinam Animi•• The Phisick of the Soule: and in another, Culturam Animi: The Husbandrie and manuring of the Soule: which rooteth out all vices, as noysome and hurt∣full weeds. So that, for the first part of the way vnto God; which is Flying of euill; Philosophie, not onely pointes it out vnto vs, but also, in a sort, doth leade vs in it by the hand. Whereupon, in the fore-alledged place, hee cal∣leth Philosophie,* 1.1486 The Guide of our life: Ducem vitae. And, for the second part of the way; which is Doing of Good; he calleth Philosophie, Artem vitae: The Arte of mans life. Which Arte contayneth in it (as in another place he noteth) Et virtutis, & officij, & benè vivendi disciplinam: A full and perfect instruction both in all vertues, and in all manner of well liuing. Neither doth it onely teach the knowledge thereof vnto men; but it also exacteth the pra∣ctise of them. For, as it is obserued by the Romane Orator: Omnis optimarum rerum cognitio,* 1.1487 at{que} in ijs exercitatio, Philosophia nominatur: Not onely the knowledge of euery good thing, but also a working and exercise therein, is that, which can worthily be named Philosophie. Finally, whatsoeuer godly Lesson is taught vs, either in the Metaphysicks, or Physicks, or Phisick, or Ethicks, or Politicks, or Mathematicks, or Grammer, or Logick, or Rhetoricke, or any other Arte; all that is taught vs by Philosophie. For, all these are nothing else but the parts of Philosophie. And therefore, when the Apostle exhorteth vs, to take heed, that no Man deceiue vs through Philosophy; he speaketh not against true Philosophie: for that deceiueth no man: as is truely obserued by the Hea∣then Poet.

Nam ne{que} decipitur Ratio, ne{que} decipit vnquàm. For true Philosophie,* 1.1488 praeserueth men From all deceit, and not deceiueth them.

For,* 1.1489 in true Philosophie, there is, Nihil commentitijs fabellis loci: There is no place for Fables. And true Philosophers be not, fabularum, but, rerum autho∣res: as the Orator teacheth vs. Therefore, it is not true Philosophie, which the Apostle there reproueth: but certaine false, and sophisticall Doctrines, which many Impostors obtruded to their hearers, vnder the false name of Philosophy. He speaketh but of that Philosophie, which is falsely so called. For, true Philo∣sophie is the gracious gift of God.

2 Yea, and I finde it obserued, by some of the learned, that; as Philoso∣phie hath in it, an image of Gods goodnesse, in bringing so many, and so great good things vnto vs: so hath it in it also (in diuers other respects) an image and resemblance, not onely of the Deitie, but also of the Trinitie. As I see the lines drawne in Zeegedinus his common places.* 1.1490 Which though it be but, as it were, a monogrammal description, and a kind of rude draught, as it were with a Cole: yet, because a man so learned, hath thought it worthy to be published, I will not thinke it vnworthy to be here represented. His con∣ceite thereof, is this: That Whereas Philosophie hath three generall parts; Naturall, Rationall, and Morall; Naturall Philosophie, which handleth the causes of all things, representeth God the Father,* 1.1491 who is the Creator, and the generall Cause of all things. Rationall Philosophie, which teache••h of rea∣son and vnderstanding,* 1.1492 representeth God the Sonne, who is the wisdome of his Father, and the sweet disposer of all things. And Morall Philosophie,

which is the rule of well liuing,* 1.1493 representeth the Holy Ghost; who is the pre∣seruer, and the guide of all men into truth, and vertuous life.

Yea, and the same resemblances may also bee seene, in all the minor parts of the fore-named Philosophies, as well as in their totals. For first, as concer∣ning Naturall Philosophy: the parts thereof bee three, The Metaphysickes, the Mathematickes, and the Physickes. The Metaphysickes, considering the pure essence of things, doth therein resemble God the Father; who is nothing else but a pure and simple essence, and the very first principle of all other things. The Mathmetickes, considering of formes and figures, doe therein resemble God the Sonne;* 1.1494 who is the character and ingrauen image of God the Father The Physickes, considering the motions and operations of all natu∣rall bodies, doe therein resemble God the Holy Ghost; who is that diuine spirit, by which all things both liue,* 1.1495 and moue, and haue their being.

Now secondly, for Rationall Philosophy: that hath three parts too: Gram∣mer, Logicke, and Rhetoricke. Grammer, which teacheth the forming and expressing of words, resembleth God the Father; who formeth (like a minde) and expresseth, (like a mouth) the eternall Word, his Sonne. Logicke, which teacheth the power of reasoning, resembleth God the Sonne; who is 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉, The high Reason, and Wisedome of his Father. And Rhetoricke, which teacheth the faculty of perswading, resembleth the Holy Ghost; who both giueth vnto men the power of perswasion, and the motion also to be perswa∣ded by speaking.

And thirdly, for Morall Philosophie; that likewise hath three parts: Eccle∣siastickes, Oeconomickes, and Politickes. The Ecclesiastickes, treating of the knowledge of God the Creator, represent God the Father, in the authority of his Creation. The Oeconomickes, treating of priuate life, and of those prouisions which belong vnto it, represent God the Sonne, in the charity of his Sustentation. And the Politickes, treating of Regiment, and well gouer∣ning, represent God the Holy Ghost, in the goodnesse of his Preseruing. This is Zeegedin's comparison, as concerning that resemblance of the Holy Trinity, which shineth in euery part of Philosophy.

3 Now the Heathen, though they could not goe thus farre, as to see in Philosophie an image of the Trinity (because that is a Mysterie, farre aboue their Capacity) yet they could goe so farre, as to see, that Philosophy is the gift of God, and not the inuention of any mortall man.* 1.1496 Tully calleth it expresly, both Inventum Deorum, and, Donum Deorum, that is, both a sparke of Gods owne diuine Wisdome; and also his gracious gift vnto men. Which when hee sent vnto them, hee sent together with it, all other Arts and Sciences, to attend vpon it.* 1.1497 As Clemens Alexandrinus hath truely obserued. Apparet, ill as libe∣rales Graecorum disciplinas, vnà cum ipsa Philosophia, venire devinitùs ad Ho∣minem. It appeareth, that euen the liberall Arts of the Greekes, were sent downe out of Heauen, together wi••h Philosophie it selfe, vnto men. So that, as the Orator very truely affirmeth: Hoc bono, nullum optabilius, nullum praestan∣tius,* 1.1498 ne{que} datum est mortalium generi, Deorum concessu at{que}, munere ne{que} dabi∣tur. Then which the••e was neuer any greater good, nor more to bee desired, ei∣ther giuen,* 1.1499 or can be giuen by God vnto Men. Yea, and Seneca proueth it, by this excellent reason▪ That, if Philosophie were not giuen vnto men by God,

they should be more beholding vnto Philosophie then to God. For they receiue so many good things, by the meanes of Philosophy, as they doe from nothing else, but onely from God himselfe. This is that high opinion, which hath bene held of Philosophy, euen by the very Heathen.

4 And,* 1.1500 as they haue thought of Philosophy: so haue they likewise of Poetry: That it is also the gift of God, and not a skill by any man inuented. And this is,* 1.1501 not onely by the Romane Orator confirmed: but also, euen by the Poets themselues acknowledged. Democritus affirmeth directly: Nemi∣nem, sine furore, Poetam magnum esse posse. That no man can attaine, to bee a great Poet, vnlesse hee first bee rapt with some divine and heauenly spirit. And Plato, hee saith,* 1.1502 That Poets vse to make all their excellent Poems; non arte, sed divino affl••tu capti; not by their owne Art, but by the inspiration of some di∣vine spirit. And Maximus Tyrius, speaking of Homer, and of his excellent gift in Poetry, hee saith: That he was, surely, taught, by some of the Muses, if not by god Apollo himselfe,* 1.1503

Illum docuit vel Musa Iovis, vel pulcher Apollo.

And againe,* 1.1504 a little after: Et Homeri & Hesiodi carmina, vniversa{que} illa anti∣qua, Musa, divinitùs erat afflata. And that which these Philosophers affirme, the Romane Orator confirmeth.* 1.1505 Poeta, quasi divino quodam spiritu afflatur. Euery Poet is inspired, with a kind of heauenly spirt. Yea, and Apollo, the Poets speciall god, assumeth it vnto him: That Poesie is his gift.

—Per me concordant carmina nervis.* 1.1506 The Poets strings, And what he sings, That all agree, It is by mee.

Yea, and euen the very Poets themselues (stripping themselues of all the glory of that diuine inuention) doe industriously maintaine the very same opini∣on: partly, by indirect insinuation: and partly, by direct confession. By insi∣nuation, in their inuocations to Apollo, and the Muses in the beginning of their Poems. So Homer, in his Iliads.

Iram cane,* 1.1507 Dea, Pelidae Achillis. O Goddesse, doe thou streyne, Achilles angry veyne.

So againe in his Odysses.* 1.1508

Virum dic mihi, Musa, versutum. Helpe me, ô Muse, to sing of such a man, As was so wise a Poli••ian.

Insinuating, that he could not tell what to say, if the Muse should not teach him.

So Virgil, his Ape:

Dic mihi, Musa, virum. Prompt me the Man, my Muse.

So Nonius, in his Dionysiaca:

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉—Tell, Goddesse, tell.

So Ovid.

Ad mea perpetuum deducite tempora carmen. Yea gods draw on, perpetuate my rime, From Worlds first being, to my present time.

And, as in the beginning of their poems, they vse to insinuate, that they cannot goe forward, without the helpe of God: so, in the end of their poems, often∣times, they ascribe their felicity, in going so well forward, vnto his helpe. Euripides, in many of his Tragoedies, prayeth for victory: thereby insinuating, that victorie and excellency in Poetrie, is onely of God. Which, Agatho the Poet, in a very religious manner, expressed. For hee, hauing, in the Olym∣piacke,* 1.1509 obtained the victory, by his Tragoedie; he out of his thankfulnesse, the next day, sacrìficed vnto the Muses.

Neither doe the Poets, by these Insinuations onely, acknowledge, that their faculty is giuen to them by God: but also by their direct, and apert Confessions.

So Virgil:* 1.1510

—Ille Ludere quae vellem calamo permisit agresti. That God of mine is he, That granteth this to me, To sing, and pipe, and play, My pleasing country lay.

So Horace.

Deus,* 1.1511 Deus nam me vetat. God, God doth me forbid.

So Ovid.

Est Deus in nobis, agitante calescimus illo,* 1.1512 Imp••tus hic sacrae semina mentis habet. There is a God in vs, and by his power we liue, This power of his the seed•• of sacred minde doe giue.

So Ovid againe, in another place:

Est Deus in nobis,* 1.1513 sunt & commercia Coeli. Sedibus aethereis spiritus ille venit. A God there is in vs, and with vs Heauens commerce, And thence that Spirit comes, that helpeth out our verse.

Otherwise, as Theocritus* 1.1514 ingenuously confesseth:

Arduae sunt Poetarum viae, abs{que} Musis, Et lovis consilio. The paths that Poets trace, full vncouth proue, Without I••ues aide, and Muses, from aboue.

Thus,* 1.1515 euen the Heathen confessed, not onely Philosophy, but also Poetry, to be a Diuine gift; and to be sent vnto men out of Heauen, by God. But this point I now passe ouer; because I haue touched vpon it, before.

5 And the like they acknowledge of all other arts too. Yea, and that (as in the for••••er) both indirectly, by Implication; and directly, by Confes∣sion. The ••reekes insinuate, that all Arts come from God; in making 〈◊〉〈◊〉, Daughter of Iupiter: and to haue had her generation, in his Diu••eb••••••••. For, thereby they imply, that all Arts were first bred in Iupi∣ters owne head.* 1.1516 For Minerva was the Mistresse of all good Arts: as Salust, in his inuectiue against Tully, insinuateth: where, in derision, hee affirmeth him to bee a man, Quem Minerva omnes Artes edocuit: Whom Minerua had adorned with all her Arts and Sciences.

Yea,* 1.1517 and the Romanes doe also insinuate the same: in consecrating Mens, a∣mong their other Gods. Whereby againe they imply••, that all vnder∣standing

is giuen to men by God.

Neither doe they onely by Insinuation imply it; but also directly, in ex∣presse words confesse it.

So Orpheus

—Iovis omnia munus.* 1.1518 All goods are Gods: His gifts they are.

So likewise Pythagoras.

—sacrum genus est hominibus Quibus sacra natura p••ofere••do in lucem omnia monstra••.* 1.1519 He saith, the holy God doth bring to light, Whatsoeuer M••n doth vnderstand aright.

So likewise Aratus.

—nos, ille benignus Fausta docet— It's he alone,* 1.1520 euen he, the God beningne, That vs instructs, in euery blessed thing.

Yea, and as Philo Iudaeus obserueth; when he begins to teach men, he teacheth them to purpose.* 1.1521 Quandò Fons Sapientìae, Deus, Scientias tradit humano generi, sine mora hoc facit. Whenas God, who is the fountaine of all wisdome, deliuereth any Art or Science vnto men, he quickly doth dispatch them. H•• doth it, not, instillando; but, infundendo. He doth it, not by instillation, but by infusion. He droppeth it not in; but hee powreth it in. As wee may see in the Apostles, when hee gaue them the gift of toungs. And therefore it is a very false posi∣tion, which is maintained by Xenophon: That all Arts haue beene found out, rather by the wit of man (vsing the benefit of long time) then by Gods speciall blessing. Non Dij mortalibus principio oftendêre omnia: sed melius quaerentes tempore longo invenêre.* 1.1522 It is true indeede, that God doth not alwayes, vpon a sodaine, powre knowledge into men (as hee did into the Disciples) but teacheth them by degrees, in distance of times: but yet, men were not able, to get knowledge of themselues, though they should labour for it, with ne∣uer so great paine, and neuer so long time; if they were not assisted, with his speciall blessing. And therfore Orpheus, in the fore-alledged place, he ascribeth vnto God, not onely the beginning; but also the proceeding, in all kind of learning.

Iupiter est Caput,* 1.1523 & Medium: Iovis omnia munus.

God is the Beginning, and God is the proceeding: and All is of Gods giuing. For Euery good giuing commeth downe vnto vs from the Father of Lights.* 1.1524 And, It is onely in his Light, that we see Light. It is he (saith the Prophet Da∣uid) that teacheth a man knowledge.* 1.1525 It is he (saith the Prophet Daniel* 1.1526) that gi∣ueth wisdome, vnto all that be wise; and vnderstanding, vnto all that vnder∣stand. He gaue to Ananias, and his fellowes, their knowledge and vnderstand∣ing in all manner of learning.* 1.1527 He gaue vnto King Salomon, all his excellent wisedome, which reached vnto all the parts of Philosophy. And no man hath any thing, which hee hath not of his teaching: no nor can haue neither. For he giueth, not onely the possession of all Arts; but also all possibility of attay∣ning vnto them. He both teacheth men; and he giueth them the capacitie to learne. Hee giueth docilitie, together with his doctrine. It is hee (saith

the Prophet) that giueth an eare to heare,* 1.1528 as the learned.

Yea, and this also, euen by the Heathen themselues, is acknowledged. Strepsiades,* 1.1529 when hee entred into the Schoole of Socrates, to learne his ab∣struse Arts; hee prayed vnto the gods, to lend him their assistance. So that, though Docility may seeme to bee a gift of Nature; yet, euen that nature is, the gift of God. Nature may giue the gift of docility to vs: but God gi∣ueth the gift of docility to it. So that, all our capability of receiuing any Art, is taught, euen by the Heathen, to be giuen of God. And we must flye aboue nature, if wee will rightly reduce it, to his true Originall Author. God both giueth all knowledge, vnto them that haue it; and all capacity to re∣ceiue it, vnto them that haue it not. And thus (as Eusebius hath truely obser∣ued) it is,* 1.1530 Divinum verbum, quod omnes Artes hominibus suggerit; ••is onely the Diuine word, which giues vnto all men, all manner of Arts and knowledge. But this point hath also beene touched by me, heretofore. And therefore I will not presse it, in this place, any more.

6 Let vs therefore now come downe, to the lowest degree of Arts: that is, Manuary and Mechanicall:* 1.1531 and we shall see, that euen they, as well as the liberall, are, by the Heathen, confessed to bee the gifts of God. Trismegistus* 1.1532 saith of all kindes of knowledge in generall: that, Scientia est Dei donum: That all manner of knowledge, is the gift of God; And Seneca, of all humane Arts in particular:* 1.1533 Ne{que} enim nostra, haec, quae invenimus, dixeris; non magis quàm quòd crescimus. Insita sunt nobis omnium Artium semina. Sed Magi∣ster, ex occulto, Deus producit ingenia. Doe not call those things our workes, which we seeme to haue inuented: no more then it is our worke, that we grow vp. The seedes indeed of all good Arts, are sowne in our mindes. But yet there is a secret Master, within vs, which giueth vs our wits. And that is God himselfe. So Clemens Alexandrinus vnto the same purpose.* 1.1534 Artes omnes divina Ratio docet. Non enìm homo Artem aliquam invenit: sed Deus affert. Hominis enìm ratio, orta est a divina ratione. It is onely Gods wisdome, that teacheth all Arts and Sciences vnto men. For man cannot finde out any Art of himselfe: it is God that brings it to him. But be it that man inuented them; why yet all humane reason doth draw his Originall from Gods diuine wisdome. So that all is due to God. For, as Iob,* 1.1535 in his Booke, teacheth vs: Though there bee a Spirit in a man; yet it is the inspiration of the Almighty, that giueth vnder∣standing. Though a man haue, by nature, a spirit in him; yet hath not that spirit the light of vnderstanding, vnlesse the Father of Lights inspire the same into him. And this, euen Aristotle himselfe also teacheth: who expresly af∣firmeth; That, though God haue giuen docility into mens soules, by nature; yet hath he not giuen them doctrine it selfe, by nature: but giueth that of him∣selfe, out of his owne speciall grace.* 1.1536 A Natura non inest homini nisi docilitas; non autem doctrina: eius{que} animus creatus est, non eruditus, sed erudibilis. Man hath onely, by Nature, the power of docilitie, he hath not, by nature, the ha∣bit of doctrine. His soule is created to be capable of learning: it is not actually created learned. And therefore, as he noteth in another place: In all a mans learning,* 1.1537 Intellectus operatur, vt agens secundum; ac; per primum efficit, quic∣quid efficit: His vnderstanding worketh, but as a second Agent; and doth all it doth, by the vertue of an higher vnderstanding, which is aboue it. And this, euen

the Heathen acknowledge to be true, as well in all inferior and Mechanicall Arts, as in the liberall and ingenuous. And therefore they haue ascribed the inuention of all the seuerall manuarie Arts, vnto their seuerall gods: As namely,* 1.1538 to Hercules,* 1.1539 the first inuention of the purple dye:* 1.1540 Agriculture,* 1.1541 to Ceres:

Prima Ceres Ferro mortales vertere terram Instituit:—

Navigation to Neptune: as Diodorus Siculus writeth: whence his name is ety∣mologized by Tully:

Neptunus à nando: He is named Neptune from nauigation.

Whereby it appeareth, that, euen they themselues thought, the inuention of the meanest Mechanicall Art, to proceed from a more diuine vnderstan∣ding then dwelleth in the heart, or in the head, of any man. And thus farre they went right. But now, heere againe, they erre; that they ascribed those Arts, vnto their false gods, which of right do belong vnto the true God. For, all those Arts, are onely his gifts. He is their true Author, and Inuen∣tor. So that, without sacriledge, they cannot be ascribed, vnto any other. And therefore God himselfe, Who will not giue his honour vnto any other, calleth home all those Arts, and chalengeth them by name, to be his owne in∣uentions.

He taught the first Shipwright,* 1.1542 how to make his Ship. Hee teacheth the Carpenter, how to build his house. He teacheth the Husbandman, how to plow his land.

Ille colit terras:* 1.1543 He tilleth the Earth. The Earth Man tilleth, As God him teacheth.

Hee teacheth the Arte of Graving, in all kinde of mettals; and of Car∣ving, in either Wood,* 1.1544 or Stone. Hee teacheth the Arts, both of Weauing,* 1.1545 and Imbroydering; and of curious working, in all kinde of Needle worke: and of all such like other cunning inuentions; as hee ad∣deth in that place: shutting-vp his owne enumeration, with that generall Conclusion, that no other particular should bee left out of it. All these seuerall Artificers, hee professeth, that he filleth with the spirit of know∣ledge,* 1.1546 and vnderstanding; in all their seuerall Arts. Yea, and that which is very worthy the noting, hee assumeth to himselfe, to giue the Art to teach them, as well as to practise them. Yea,* 1.1547 and though hee bee, The most High: yet hee chalengeth the inuention, euen of that simple Art, which among the rest may seeme the most low: I haue created the Smith, that bloweth the Coales in the fire,* 1.1548 and him that bringeth forth an Instrument, for his worke.* 1.1549 But this point is largely handled, both by Theodoret, and by Zanchius. And therefore I will prosecute it no farther. Thus now we see, who is the true Author, of all those Arts and Sciences, which the Heathens haue ascribed vnto their false gods. And withall, that there is none of them so meane, which hee hath thought vnworthy to bee his owne inuention. So that now it appeareth, that there is not any Arte, neither Liberal, nor

illiberall, from the Metaphysickes, to the Mechanicks, from the high∣est, to the lowest, but that some way or other, it leadeth a man to God. Which is the maine scope, and intent of this second Booke. Heere wee should proceede to the third probation of our first generall head, argued, and vrged, from The Structure of Mans body, &c. But the Hand of Almighty GOD, at this present, on mine owne Body, heere stayeth my Hand.

〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉.

FINIS.

Notes

• * 1.1

  All Arts leade to God.
• * 1.2

  Arist. l. 4. Meta p••ys. ••. 2. To. 2. p. 1399.
• * 1.3

  The Metap••y∣sicks arguments for God.
• * 1.4

  The bounding of naturall bo∣dyes is the worke of God
• * 1.5

  Arist. l. 1 de Coe¦lo c. 7. To. 1. p. 559.
• * 1.6

  Ar••st. Ibid. p. 564.
• * 1.7

  Arist. l. 4. Phys••. c. 5. To. 1. p. 462.
• * 1.8

  Prosper. l. de Prouid. p. 181. ••.
• * 1.9

  Hilar. in Ps. 118. p. 516.
• * 1.10

  Scalig. Exercit. 9. p. 52.
• * 1.11

  Ps 104 9. 6.
• * 1.12

  Ps 104 9. 6.
• * 1.13

  2. Esdr. 4. 13. &c.
• * 1.14

  S••••l. Exercit. 6. Se••. 3. p. 27.
• * 1.15

  Claudian in 4. Con••alat. Hono∣••••. p. 186.
• a 1.16

  Psal. 24. 2.
• b 1.17

  Psal. 33. 7.
• c 1.18

  Psal. 104. 2. 9.
• * 1.19

  Isay 40. 12.
• * 1.20

  ••oet. l. 3. de con∣solat. M••tro. 9. p. 1042.
• * 1.21

  Ovid. l. 1. Me••am p. 4. 5.
• * 1.22

  Pausa▪ l. de. Os∣cul••. ••. 63. p. 364.
• * 1.23

  Idem. ibid. c. 20. p. 101.
• * 1.24

  Cic. l. 1. de Nat. Deor. p. 187.
• * 1.25

  Laërt in vit. Anaxagor•• p. 47.
• * 1.26

  Arist. l. 1. De Anima. c. 2. T••. 1. p. 786. & 787. Arist. l. 3. Phys. c. 4. To. 1. p. 447.
• * 1.27

  Ibid p. 446.
• * 1.28

  Ari••t ibid p. 447.
• * 1.29

  Arist. l. de Mun∣do. To. 2 p. 1569.
• * 1.30

  Suidas in••••oce Aristoteles. p. 138
• * 1.31

  Ex. 8. 19.
• * 1.32

  Arist. l. de Mun∣do. To. 2. p. 157••.
• * 1.33

  ••theuag. legat. pro Christ. B. b. ••at. 10. 8. p. 4.
• * 1.34

  Homer in Hym∣••is. p. 827. Gaecolat.
• * 1.35

  〈…〉〈…〉
• * 1.36

  The bounding 〈◊〉〈◊〉 natural fa∣culties, •• the worke of God.
• * 1.37

  Cic. l. 2. De Nat. De•••• p. 205.
• * 1.38

  Theodoret. l. De Prouident. To. 2. p. 530.
• * 1.39

  Aug. in Ps. 144. To. 8. p. 1673.
• * 1.40

  Gr••g Hom. 8. in ••zech. To. 2. p 71. b.
• * 1.41

  Raymundus de Sabunde in Theolog naturali Tit. 3.
• * 1.42

  Arist. l. 3. de generat. Ani••al. c. 11. To. 2. p. 354.
• * 1.43

  Arist. l. 5. de Hist. Animal••. 15. To. 2. p. 90.
• * 1.44

  Mar. 8. 24.
• * 1.45

  Tertul. Apol. c. ••1. p. 33.
• * 1.46

  Mat. 25. 14. 15.
• * 1.47

  Gen. 1. 1. 9. ••0 21. 2. 5.
• * 1.48

  Gen. 1. 27.
• * 1.49

  Act. 17. 28.
• * 1.50

  Act. 17. 25. Philo. Iud. l. de lingu. confus p. 479.
• * 1.51

  Arist. l. De Mun∣do. To. 2. p. 15••9.
• * 1.52

  Psal. 95. 4.
• * 1.53

  Arist. ibid. vbì supra.
• * 1.54

  〈…〉〈…〉. p. 267.
• * 1.55

  Pro••lus l. de d∣••••ua p 19••.
• * 1.56

  〈…〉〈…〉
• * 1.57

  The Sunne is not the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of naturall fa∣calties.
• * 1.58

  Arist. l. 2. d: Ge∣n••rat c. 9. l ••. 1. p. 674.
• * 1.59

  Diodor. Si••ul. l. 3 p 69.
• * 1.60

  〈◊〉〈◊〉 in Arc. p. 322.
• * 1.61

  〈◊〉〈◊〉 ibid.
• * 1.62

  Act. 3. 12. 13. 16.
• * 1.63

  La••t. l. 2. c. 5. p. 84.
• * 1.64

  Trismeg. in As••lep. c. 10. p. 523.
• * 1.65

  The Sunne is limited in his working.
• * 1.66

  Gen. 1. 1. 2.
• * 1.67

  Euseb. l. 4. De Praepar. c. 8. p. 155.
• * 1.68

  Gen. 29 24.
• * 1.69

  Ex. 14. 22.
• * 1.70

  Ioh 9. 6.
• * 1.71

  Num. 2 ••. 28.
• * 1.72

  Mat. 3. 9.
• * 1.73

  〈…〉〈…〉 Supartium. p. 339.
• * 1.74

  〈◊〉〈◊〉 l. 1 Me∣tam. p. 29.
• * 1.75

  〈…〉〈…〉
• * 1.76

  The Sunne is limited in his 〈…〉〈…〉.
• * 1.77

  Iob 38. 11.
• * 1.78

  Num. 24. 13.
• * 1.79

  Iohan. de sacro Bosco. c. 2. p. 23.
• * 1.80

  Act 17. 26.
• * 1.81

  Iosh. 10. 13.
• * 1.82

  2. Kin. 20. 11. Eccle. 48. 24.
• * 1.83

  Cic. l. 2. de Nat. Deor. p. 224.
• * 1.84

  Prudent. c. nt. Symmachum. p. 235. b.
• * 1.85

  Lact. l. 2. ••. 5. p. 83
• * 1.86

  Zach. Mitylen. l. De Mundi Cre∣at. Bib. Pat. To. 5. p. 739.
• * 1.87

  Ps. 19. 4. 5. Hugo de S. Vic∣tore l. 7. Erudit. Didasc. c. 8 To. 3. p. 19.
• * 1.88

  Zach. Mitylen. vbi supra.
• * 1.89

  Act. 17. 25.
• * 1.90

  Bo••l. l. 5. de Con∣sol. metro 2. p. 1100.
• * 1.91

  All Arts are limited.
• * 1.92

  Hom. l. 4. Iliad. p. 441.
• * 1.93

  No man hath the perfect knowledge of all Arts.
• * 1.94

  Propert. l. 2. Eleg 1. p. 193.
• * 1.95

  Plato. l. 2. De Repub. p. 550.
• * 1.96

  Max Tyr. Serm. 22. p. 270.
• * 1.97

  Cic. l. 3. De Orat. p. 195. Quintil. l. 1. c. 10. p. 59.
• * 1.98

  Homer. l. 8. Odys p. 53.
• * 1.99

  Diodor Sicul. l. 17. p. 572.
• * 1.100

  Max. Tyr. S••rm. l p. 83.
• * 1.101

  Faling. in Libra p. 199.
• * 1.102

  Cato l. 2. Distich. p. 22.
• * 1.103

  Palingen. vbi sup••a.
• * 1.104

  Senec. l 3. Con∣trouc••san pro∣••••m. p. 74.
• * 1.105

  Homer l. ••. Odyss. p. 53.
• * 1.106

  Homer. l. 1. Iliad. p. 6.
• * 1.107

  Psal. 28. 7.
• * 1.108

  Psal. 59. 17.
• * 1.109

  Senec. vbi sup••a.
• * 1.110

  Iob. 39. 22.
• * 1.111

  Senec Suasor. 2. p. 227.
• * 1.112

  Homer l. 13 Ibid p. 49•• in Grae••ola. God hath taugh the•••• hand to war•• and them sin∣gers to fight. Psalme 144. ••.
• * 1.113

  Tertul l. 1. cont 〈◊〉〈◊〉. c. 24. p. 862.
• * 1.114

  Cic l 3. de Orat. p. 208.
• * 1.115

  Cic. ibid.
• * 1.116

  Cic. l. 1 de •• •• 137.
• * 1.117

  Cic l. & de 〈◊〉〈◊〉 p. 2••.
• * 1.118

  〈…〉〈…〉
• * 1.119

  〈◊〉〈◊〉. in vit. Democriti. p. 316.
• * 1.120

  Cic. l. 3. de Orat. p. 204.
• * 1.121

  Terent. Andrea Act 1. Sce. 1. p. 4.
• * 1.122

  〈◊〉〈◊〉. l. De Orat. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. 208.
• * 1.123

  〈…〉〈…〉 H••st. c. 23. P. 377.
• * 1.124

  Aurel. Vict. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 vit. Hadr. p. 389 〈◊〉〈◊〉. ••part. vbi suprà.
• * 1.125

  1. Kin. 3. 12.
• * 1.126

  Eccles. 1. 13. 17. 18.
• * 1.127

  Eccles. 2. 12.
• * 1.128

  Arist l 2. de Coe∣lo. c. 5. Tom. 1. p. 583.
• * 1.129

  No man can haue the per∣fect knowledge of many Arts. X••noph. l. 8. De Paedia Cyri. p. 112.
• * 1.130

  〈…〉〈…〉
• * 1.131

  Cic. l. 2. De Orat. p. 1148.
• * 1.132

  Ci••. l. 1. De Orat. p. 133.
• * 1.133

  Cic. l. 3. de Orat. p. 197.
• * 1.134

  Catul. ad M. T. Cic. p. 33.
• * 1.135

  Iuuenal. Satyr. 10. p. 46.
• * 1.136

  Senec. l. 3. contro. in Proam▪ p. 74
• * 1.137

  No man can haue the p••••∣fect knowledge of any one Art
• * 1.138

  Hi••p••crat. A∣phorism. ••art. 1. ••. 9.
• * 1.139

  Cic. l. 3. De Orat. p. 20••.
• * 1.140

  Cic. l. 3. Tus••. p. 150.
• * 1.141

  Xenoph. l. 8. De Paedia Cyri. p. 112.
• * 1.142

  〈◊〉〈◊〉. l. 3. De Orat. p. 197.
• * 1.143

  Cic. ibid.
• * 1.144

  Cic. l 1. De Orat. p. 132.
• * 1.145

  Senec. l. 3. Contro in pro••••. p. 74.
• * 1.146

  〈…〉〈…〉
• * 1.147

  〈…〉〈…〉
• * 1.148

  God is the on∣ly 〈…〉〈…〉 3. 8 〈…〉〈…〉 50. 4. ••. x. 4. 10. &c.
• * 1.149

  Act. 2. 4.
• * 1.150

  1. Cor. 14. 18.
• * 1.151

  Coloss. 4. 3.
• * 1.152

  Homer l. 8. Odys. p. 53. B.
• * 1.153

  Pindar. in l••yth. Od. 1. p. 167.
• * 1.154

  〈…〉〈…〉
• * 1.155

  Lib. 1 Cap. 1. Sect. 3. H••siod Op•••• a & Dies p. 1. •• 〈…〉〈…〉 p 130.
• * 1.156

  〈…〉〈…〉 2. Bib Pa••. 10. 1. p. 308.
• * 1.157

  Io•• 32. 8.
• * 1.158

  1. Ioh. 2. 27.
• * 1.159

  Iohn 16. 13.
• * 1.160

  Plato. in Epi∣nom p 918.
• * 1.161

  V••tur 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Deus, ca••sis 〈◊〉〈◊〉. Quod autem bene s•• habet, ipse in si••gulis agit. Plato in Timao p 723.
• * 1.162

  Cic. l. 2. de Nat. Deor. p. 225.
• * 1.163

  Plato in Ione. p. 172.
• * 1.164

  Iust. Mar••. l. Cont Dog••ata Arill. To. 1. p. 280.
• * 1.165

  〈…〉〈…〉
• * 1.166

  1 Co••. 12. 8. 9. &c.
• * 1.167

  Wisd. 11. 20.
• * 1.168

  1. Co••. 12. 4. 5. 6.
• * 1.169

  Russ••••. in Psal. 73. To. 2. p. 175. ••.
• * 1.170

  Tertul. l. 5. c••nt. Marc. c. 8. P. 463
• * 1.171

  Isa••. 11. 2.
• * 1.172

  1. Kin▪ 9. 1••.
• * 1.173

  Ma••. 15. 28. 16. 8.
• * 1.174

  ••ct. 19. 12.
• * 1.175

  Act. 5. 15. 2. King 13. 21. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 48. 14. Num. 12. 6. 7. 8. Act. 2. 4. 1. Co••. 14. 18.
• * 1.176

  Viz. lib. 4.
• * 1.177

  Habak. 2. 5.
• * 1.178

  Pro 30. 15.
• * 1.179

  Aqui••. 1. Qu••••st. 78. Art. 1. 3. p. 168.
• * 1.180

  Arist. lib 1. Eth. c. 1. To. 2. p. 604.
• * 1.181

  Arist. Prob. Sect. 8. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. 9. To. 2. p. 461.
• * 1.182

  〈◊〉〈◊〉. l. 1. De Coe∣l•• ••. 4. 10. ••. p. 556.
• * 1.183

  Aquin▪ 1. Quest. ••. Art. 2. p. 14.
• * 1.184

  Natural Appe∣tites are vnsa∣tiable.
• * 1.185

  〈…〉〈…〉 p. 127. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Quaest. 60. Art••. ••. ••. 129.
• * 1.186

  Arist. l. 3. Eth. c. 11. To. 2. p. 640.
• * 1.187

  Eccles. 6. 7.
• * 1.188

  Deut. 29. 19. Isai. 5. 11. Plaut•• in Menech. act. 1. S••e. 2. p. 421.
• * 1.189

  Ouid. l. 7. M•••• tam. p. 28.
• * 1.190

  Arist. l. 3 Ethi••. c. 11. To. 2. p. 640 Arist. ibid. c. 10.
• * 1.191

  Haggai. 1. 6.
• * 1.192

  Pro. 13. 25.
• * 1.193

  P••o. 6. 9. 10. 11.
• * 1.194

  Sensible appe∣tites be ins••ti∣able.
• * 1.195

  Eccles. 1. 8.
• * 1.196

  Musaeus de Herone, p. 342.
• * 1.197

  Pro. 27. 20.
• * 1.198

  Xenophon, l. 1. de sact. Socrat. p. 166.
• * 1.199

  Cic. l. 5. Tusc. p 170.
• * 1.200

  All intellectu∣all appetites are insatiable.
• * 1.201

  Arist. l. 1. Mag. Moral. c. 13. To▪ 2. p. 931.
• * 1.202

  〈…〉〈…〉
• * 1.203

  The 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of a mans desire.
• * 1.204

  〈…〉〈…〉
• * 1.205

  〈…〉〈…〉
• * 1.206

  Aelian l 4. var. Hist. c. 2. 9. p. 429.
• * 1.207

  Senec. in Herc. Oe••••o. Act. 2. S••e. 2. p. 77.
• * 1.208

  Petron. Arbit. 〈…〉〈…〉. vet. Poet. p. 393.
• * 1.209

  H••bakuc 2. 5. Li••ie decad••. l. 1. p. 71.
• * 1.210

  Isocrates Orat. de Pace. p. 391.
• * 1.211

  〈…〉〈…〉 10. p. 45 b.
• * 1.212

  10. 19. 1••.
• * 1.213

  Gen. 31. 29.
• * 1.214

  Am••ition o•• Honour 1. vn∣satiable.
• * 1.215

  Cic. l. 1. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 p. 113. 〈…〉〈…〉
• * 1.216

  〈◊〉〈◊〉 l. 2. p. 124.
• * 1.217

  Plut in vita Mary To. 2. p. 94.
• * 1.218

  〈…〉〈…〉 387.
• * 1.219

  〈…〉〈…〉. 4. Sce. 4. P. 286.
• * 1.220

  Hom. l. 9. Iliad. p. 101. B.
• * 1.221

  Dion Nic••us, in Ncron••. p. 147.
• * 1.222

  Laert▪ in vi••d Empedoclis p. 295.
• * 1.223

  〈…〉〈…〉
• * 1.224

  〈…〉〈…〉 p 379.
• * 1.225

  The desire of 〈…〉〈…〉
• * 1.226

  Iuuen. Saratyr. 14. p. 67. b.
• * 1.227

  〈…〉〈…〉 p. 734.
• * 1.228

  1. Tim. 6. 17. Cic. 1. Parad. p. 421.
• * 1.229

  ••••rat. l. 2. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. Od. 2. p. 28. a.
• * 1.230

  Arist. l. 2. Po••t. c. 5. To. 2. p. 773.
• * 1.231

  Aristoph. in Plut. Act. 1. Sce. 2. p. 32.
• * 1.232

  Iuuenal. Satyr. 14. p. 63. b.
• * 1.233

  Senec. in He••c. Oetao. Act 2. Sce 2. p. 77.
• * 1.234

  Eccle. 5. 10.
• * 1.235

  1. Kin, 10. 21.
• * 1.236

  1. Kin, 10. 27.
• * 1.237

  1. Kin, 10. 22.
• * 1.238

  Iuuenal. Satyr. 14. p. 67. a.
• * 1.239

  Senec. l. 4. Nat. Quaest. c. 18. p. 84.
• * 1.240

  Virgil. l. 3. Aeneid. p. 166.
• * 1.241

  The desire of Pleasure 〈◊〉〈◊〉 vnsatiable.
• * 1.242

  〈…〉〈…〉 p. 51.
• * 1.243

  〈…〉〈…〉 c. 27. p. 134.
• * 1.244

  Horat. l. 1. carm. Od 19. p. 17. a.
• * 1.245

  Iuuenal. Satyr. 6. p. 22.
• * 1.246

  Cic. l. 5. Tusc. p. 170.
• * 1.247

  Plato in Philebo p. 90.
• * 1.248

  The desire of Reuenge, is in∣satiable.
• * 1.249

  Seneca in Pro∣uerbijs p. 278.
• * 1.250

  Iudith ••. 1, 2, 3.
• * 1.251

  〈…〉〈…〉 3. p. 17.
• * 1.252

  Seneca in Herc. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. Act. 2. S••c. 1. p. 65.
• * 1.253

  Ci••. Philip. 11. p. 605.
• * 1.254

  Herodotus in Thalia p, 190.
• * 1.255

  Platina in vita Sergy terij. p. 149.
• * 1.256

  The appetites of a mans will are vnsatiable.
• * 1.257

  Arist. l. 1. Mag. moral. c. 18. To. 2. p. 933.
• * 1.258

  Ouid. l. 10. Me∣tam. p. 399.
• * 1.259

  Arist. l. 7. Eth. c. 3. To. 2. p. 690.
• * 1.260

  1. Sam. 2. 29.
• * 1.261

  Arist. vbi suprà.
• * 1.262

  Ecclus. 24. 21.
• * 1.263

  Theognis. p. 7••0.
• * 1.264

  Philo Iudaeus l. De sacrificio Abel. p. 198.
• * 1.265

  Cic. l. 3. De Fin. p. 67.
• * 1.266

  Plutar. lib. Non posse suauiter viui secundum Epicurum. To. 2. p. 155.
• * 1.267

  Cic. l. 2. De Nat. Deor. p. 216.
• * 1.268

  Eccl. 2. 1 2 3 4 5 6
• * 1.269

  Eccles. 2▪ 7. 8. 12
• * 1.270

  Pro. 30. 15.
• * 1.271

  Gen. 41. 20. 21.
• * 1.272

  Bernard. lib. De diligendo Deo, p. 1096.
• * 1.273

  God is able to fill all our ap∣petites.
• * 1.274

  Iob. 40. 10. 15.
• * 1.275

  1. Io. 3. 20.
• * 1.276

  Psal. 23. 5.
• * 1.277

  Psal. 145. 16.
• * 1.278

  Psal. 127. 2.
• * 1.279

  Psal. 81. 10.
• * 1.280

  Psal. 17. 14.
• * 1.281

  1. Cor. 2. 9.
• * 1.282

  1. Pet. 5. 4.
• * 1.283

  1. Pet. 5. 4.
• * 1.284

  Ps. 16. 11.
• * 1.285

  Ps. 36. 7. 8.
• * 1.286

  Ps 10 2. 5.
• * 1.287

  Psal 73. 34. 71. 4.
• * 1.288

  Psal. 17 15.
• * 1.289

  Aug. in Manua•••• c 3 To. 9 p. 793.
• * 1.290

  Aug. in. Psal. 26. To. 8. p. 141.
• * 1.291

  Aug. l. 1. Confess. cap. 1. To. 1. p. 61.
• * 1.292

  Bernard. Serm. De bonis de se∣rendis. p. 1146.
• * 1.293

  B••llars. l. De 〈◊〉〈◊〉 grad 3. c. 1. p. 76.
• * 1.294

  Psal. 4. 8.
• * 1.295

  Psal. 17. 8. 57. 1. 61. 4. 63▪ 7.
• * 1.296

  Greg. Nyssen. in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Orat. 11. p 407.
• * 1.297

  P••il. 1. 23.
• * 1.298

  Nazian. Orat. 31. De Athana∣sio. p. 524.
• * 1.299

  Aug. l. de Spiri∣tu & Anima, cap. 55. To. 3. p. 895.
• * 1.300

  1. Cor. 15. 28. Bed. in 1. Cor. 15. To. 6. p. 571.
• * 1.301

  Hugo. de Victor. l. 7. Erudit D••∣das c. 8. To. 3. p. 19. X.
• * 1.302

  Gen. 17. 1. Irenaeus. l. 2. c. 1. p. 95.
• * 1.303

  Aug. l. De Spir. & Anima. cap. 59 To. 3. p. 898.
• * 1.304

  Laurentius Pi∣sanus in Enchi∣rid. Orthodoxo∣graph p. 915.
• * 1.305

  2. Cor. 3. 5.
• * 1.306

  Nothing is without a Cause. Plato in Timae••. p. 704.
• * 1.307

  Cic. 2. de Diui∣nat. P. 27••.
• * 1.308

  〈…〉〈…〉 c. 5. p. 1487. Item Trismegis. Pi∣mand. Dial. 2. p. 385.
• * 1.309

  Auselm. in Mo∣nologio. c. 3. To. 3. p. 3. 〈…〉〈…〉 To. 1. p. 685. Cic. de vniuer∣sitate p 427. Cic. l. 2 de Diui∣nat. p 271.
• * 1.310

  Cic. l. 1. de fini∣bus p. 39.
• * 1.311

  Ramus l. 1. Dia∣lecticae, c. 3. Plato. in Ciuil••. p. 210.
• * 1.312

  Nothing can be the Cause of it selfe.
• * 1.313

  Vallesius l. de sacra Philoso∣phia c. 1. p. 31.
• * 1.314

  Aquin. 1. Quaest. 2. Art. 3. p. 5.
• * 1.315

  Trisinegist. in Pimand. Dial. 14. p. 470.
• * 1.316

  Greg. Nyllen. De Infantib. praema∣turè abroptis p. 133.
• * 1.317

  P••ling▪ in Scorp. p. 206.
• * 1.318

  Arist. l. 2. mag. Moral. c. 8. To. 2. p 962.
• * 1.319

  Paling▪ vbi su∣pra p. 205.
• * 1.320

  Plato in Hippia maiore. p. 115.
• * 1.321

  Trismeg. in Pi∣mand. Dial. 14. p 470.
• * 1.322

  Zach. Mytilen l. de Mundi Creat. Rib. Pat. To. 5. p. 746.
• * 1.323

  Paling. in libra. 167.
• * 1.324

  Arist. l. De com∣muni Animali∣um motu. To. 1. p. 916.
• * 1.325

  Aqu••n. 1. Quaest. 2. Art. 3. p. 5.
• * 1.326

  Arist. l 10. De. Theo••eg. ••. 17.
• * 1.327

  Hilar. l. 6. De Trinit. p. 64.
• * 1.328

  Aquin. 1. Quaest. 2. Art. 4 p. 7. 2. Art. 4 p. 7.
• * 1.329

  Eusel. 7. De Praeparat. c. 8. p. 115.
• * 1.330

  Senec. La••. l. 1. c. 7. p. 19
• * 1.331

  Lact. ibid.
• * 1.332

  Iust. Martyr. in Confut. Graecar. Respons. To. 1. p. 336.
• * 1.333

  Anselm. Mono∣logo. 5. To. 3. p. 3
• * 1.334

  Id. ibid. c. 17. p. 9
• * 1.335

  〈…〉〈…〉
• * 1.336

  Lac••••. in vit•• Th••le•••• p. 12.
• * 1.337

  Philo. Iudaeus l. de Sacri••i. Abel. p. 199.
• * 1.338

  Iohn 5 26.
• * 1.339

  Anselm. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 monologio. c. 5. To. 3. p. 4.
• * 1.340

  There is a∣mong the Causes but one first cause.
• * 1.341

  Cic. Orat. Pro. Q. Ros••••o. 〈…〉〈…〉 p. 137. Anselm in Mono¦logio. c. 4. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. 3. •• 3.
• * 1.342

  〈◊〉〈◊〉. in Sco•• p. p. 206.
• * 1.343

  Arist. l 2. Meta∣phys. c 2. To 2. p 1385.
• * 1.344

  Aquin. 1. Quaest. 2. Art. 3. p. 5.
• * 1.345

  Arist. l. 2. Meta∣phys. ••. 2. To. 2. p. 1386
• * 1.346

  Paling. in Libr. p. 168.
• * 1.347

  Trismeg. in Pi∣mand. dial. 1. p. 437.
• * 1.348

  Cyprian in Prae∣fat. ad Corneli∣um. p. 482.
• * 1.349

  Anselm. in Monologio, c. 3. To. 3. p. 2.
• * 1.350

  V••••e drist. de l••eis ins••cabili∣bus. To. 2 p. 1595.
• * 1.351

  Paling. in Scor∣pio. p. 206.
• * 1.352

  Arist. l. 3. Meta∣phys. c. 4. To. 2. p. 1393.
• * 1.353

  Trismeg. Pi∣mand. dial. 20. p. 426.
• * 1.354

  Nyssen.
• * 1.355

  Arist. l 2. Phys. c. 3. To. 1. p. 433. Greg. l. 16. Mor. c. 18. To. 1. p. 95.
• * 1.356

  S••o••aeu•• l. 〈…〉〈…〉 Phys. c. 9 p. 13.
• * 1.357

  That first and supreme Cause, is no∣thing else, but God.
• * 1.358

  Damasc. l. 1. de Orthod fid. c. 12. p. 184.
• * 1.359

  Paling. in Scorp. p. 206.
• * 1.360

  Damasc. l. 1. Or∣thodox. fid. c. 12▪ p. 184.
• * 1.361

  Arist. l. 11. Me∣taphys. c. 6. To. 2. p. 1409.
• * 1.362

  Exo. 3. 14.
• * 1.363

  Dan. 7. 9.
• * 1.364

  Isay 41 4.
• * 1.365

  Arist. l. 7. Meta∣phys. c. 1. To. 2. p. 2433.
• * 1.366

  Arist. l. 4. Meta∣phys c. 1. To. 2. p. 1397.
• * 1.367

  Orig. Hom. in lib. Reg. To. 1. p. 362.
• * 1.368

  Trismeg. Asclep. c. 11. p. 525.
• * 1.369

  Plato. in So∣phis••a p. 188.
• * 1.370

  Ioh. 5 26.
• * 1.371

  Act. 17. 28
• * 1.372

  Act. 17. 25.
• * 1.373

  Paling. in. Libra, p. 169.
• * 1.374

  Trismeg. Pi∣mand. Dial. 10. p. 426.
• * 1.375

  Asclep. c. 8. p. 505.
• * 1.376

  Anselm. in Mo∣nologio. c. 4. To. 3. p. 3.
• * 1.377

  Arist. l. 7. Meta∣phys. ••. 1. To 2. p 1433.
• * 1.378

  O••••••. Hom. in l••b. Reg. To. 1. p. 362.
• * 1.379

  Dionys. Areop. l. De Diuin. Nom. c. 1. p. 194.
• * 1.380

  Senec l. 2. Nat. Quaest. c. 45. p. 36.
• * 1.381

  Trismeg. Pi∣mand. Dial. 10. p. 426.
• * 1.382

  Psal. 65. 11.
• * 1.383

  Psal. 68. 9.
• * 1.384

  Heb. 6. 7.
• * 1.385

  Psal. 127. 3.
• * 1.386

  Eurip. ••n lone. p. 814.
• * 1.387

  Bra••••a••d. l. 1. c. 3. p. 1••1.
• * 1.388

  Damasc. l. 1. Or∣thod. Fid. c.. 3. p. 166.
• * 1.389

  Trismeg. Pi∣mand. Dial. 14. p. 468.
• * 1.390

  Senec. Epist. 66. p. 106.
• * 1.391

  Senec. l 4. de Benefic. c. 7. p. 50.
• * 1.392

  Senec. Epist. 66 p. 1••7.
• * 1.393

  Trismeg. Pi∣mand. Dial. 14. p. 470.
• * 1.394

  Trismeg. Pi∣mand. Dial. 2. p. 386.
• * 1.395

  Iob, 32. 8.
• * 1.396

  Heb. 12. 9.
• * 1.397

  Iames 1. 17.
• * 1.398

  Trismeg Pi∣mand. Dial. 5. p. 403.
• * 1.399

  Arist. l. 1. Meta∣phys. c. 2. To. 2. p. 1372.
• * 1.400

  〈◊〉〈◊〉. l. de Mun∣••o. To. p. 1506.
• * 1.401

  〈◊〉〈◊〉. l. de Pla••••••. •• 3. To. 2 p. 7.
• * 1.402

  〈…〉〈…〉
• * 1.403

  Macrob. l. 1. in Som. c. 14. p. 47.
• * 1.404

  Pind. in Pyth. Od. 5. p. 263.
• * 1.405

  There is a first motion.
• * 1.406

  Plato l. 10. de Leg. p. 874.
• * 1.407

  Arist. l. 8. Physic. c. 5. To. 1. p. 528.
• * 1.408

  Cic. l. 1. Tusc. p. 116.
• * 1.409

  Hilar. l. 3. De Trin. p. 31.
• * 1.410

  Aquin. 1. Quaest. 2. Art. 3. p. 5.
• * 1.411

  Laërt. in vita Melissi, p. 312.
• * 1.412

  Ioseph. l. 2. Cont. Apion p. 902.
• * 1.413

  Arist. l. 2 Meta∣phys. c. 2. To. 2. p. 1386.
• * 1.414

  Arist. ibid.
• * 1.415

  Arist. l 3 Meta. c. 4. To. 2 p. 1393.
• * 1.416

  Manilius. l 4. Astron. p.
• * 1.417

  There is a first Mouer.
• * 1.418

  Iohan. Pic. Mi∣rand in Conclu∣si inibus su••s, To. To. 1. p. 58.
• * 1.419

  Arist. l. ••. Phys. c. 4. To. 1. p. 526.
• * 1.420

  Philo Iud. l. De O••i••ic. Mundi. p. 7.
• * 1.421

  Arist. l. de com∣m••ni An••mali∣um motu. To. 1. p 916.
• * 1.422

  Cic. l 2 de. Nat. Deor. p. 215.
• * 1.423

  Arist. l. 2. de Ge∣nerat. c. 10. To. 1. p. 676.
• * 1.424

  Nazian. Orat. 2. de T••eol. p. 28.
• * 1.425

  Arist. l. 8. Phys. c. 5. To. 1. p. 529.
• * 1.426

  Cic. l. 2. De. Nat. Deor. p. 215.
• * 1.427

  Arist. l. 8. Phys. c. 5. To. 1 p. 528.
• * 1.428

  The first Mo∣uer is the first Cause of all Motion.
• * 1.429

  Plato l. 10. de Legib p. 874.
• * 1.430

  Arist. l. 2. de Ani∣ma. c. 1. To. 1. p. 799.
• * 1.431

  Act. 17. 28.
• * 1.432

  Cic. l. 1. Tusc. p. 116.
• * 1.433

  Arist. l. d•• com∣muni Animal. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. To. 1. p. 912.
• * 1.434

  Arist. l. 8. Phys. c. 5. To. 1. p. 528.
• * 1.435

  Arist. l. Meta∣phys. c. 2. To. 2. p. 1386.
• * 1.436

  Arist. l. de Mun∣do. To. 2. p. 1567.
• * 1.437

  Plut. l. de Pythiae Or••••ulis. To. 3. Mo••. p. 493.
• * 1.438

  Arist 2. Meta∣phys c. 2. To. 2. p. 1386.
• * 1.439

  Arist. l. 7. Phys. c. 1. To. 1. p. 511.
• * 1.440

  Arist. l. 8. Phys. c. 1. To. 1. p. 530.
• * 1.441

  The first Mo∣uer is God.
• * 1.442

  Cic. l. 1. Tusc p. 116.
• * 1.443

  Arist. l. 12 Meta∣phys. c. 8. To. 2. p 15▪ 5.
• * 1.444

  Arist. l. 12. Me∣taphys. c. 10. To. 2. p. 1508.
• * 1.445

  Cic. l. de Vniuers. p. 431.
• * 1.446

  Arist. l. de Mundo. To. 2. p. 1567.
• * 1.447

  Arist. l. 8. Phys. c. 5. To. 1. p. 529.
• * 1.448

  Trismeg. pi∣mand. Dial. 1. p. 369.
• * 1.449

  Laert, in vita Zenonis p. 253.
• * 1.450

  Arist. l. 1. De Anima. c. 2. To. 1. p. 787.
• * 1.451

  Col. 2. 3.
• * 1.452

  Act. 17. 28.
• * 1.453

  Arist. l. 8. Phys. c. 1. p. 519.
• * 1.454

  Ouid, l. 1. Me∣tam. p. 1.
• * 1.455

  Plut. l. 1. de Pla∣citis c. 7. To. 2. Mor. p. 15.
• * 1.456

  Pro. 8. 27. &c.
• * 1.457

  Virgil. l. 6. Aen••••d. p. 267.
• * 1.458

  Virgil. l. 4. Georg. p. 94.
• * 1.459

  Plato, l. 10. de Leg. p. 875.
• * 1.460

  Laert, in vita Parmenidis, p. 311.
• * 1.461

  Theophra••••i, in Metaph. c. 1. Apud Aristot. To. 2. p. 1539.
• * 1.462

  Cic. l. 1. Tosc. p. 116.
• * 1.463

  Gen. 21. 33.
• * 1.464

  Paling. in. Libr. p. 169.
• * 1.465

  Plato. in Ph••dro p. 450.
• * 1.466

  Prosper. Epigr. 58. p. 169.
• * 1.467

  Bradwardin. l. 1. c. 4. p. 172. 174.
• * 1.468

  Chrysost. Serm. 10 in Rom. To. 4. p. 100.
• * 1.469

  Basil▪ Asceti∣cis. To. 2. p. 292.
• * 1.470

  Cic. l. 3. Tasc. p. 142.
• * 1.471

  Sinne is the first cause of Sicknesse.
• * 1.472

  Plut. l. 5. de Pla∣citis. c. 30. To. 2. Mor. p. 65.
• * 1.473

  Hi••ron. in c. 3. Naum. To. 6. p. 209.
• * 1.474

  Item Sto••aeus Serm. 98. p. 542.
• * 1.475

  Et Serm. 99. p. 545.
• * 1.476

  Psal. 39. 11.
• * 1.477

  Rom. 5. 12.
• * 1.478

  1. Co••. 11. 30.
• * 1.479

  Ioh. 5. 14.
• * 1.480

  Ex▪ 9. 10.
• * 1.481

  Num. 12. 8. 10.
• * 1.482

  Num. 25. 1. 2. 9.
• * 1.483

  1. Sam. 5. 6 9.
• * 1.484

  A. Gellius. l. 20. c. 1. p. 280. b.
• * 1.485

  Deut 28. 27.
• * 1.486

  Herod. l. 1. p. 51.
• * 1.487

  Pausan. in Achaicis, p. 279.
• * 1.488

  Idem, in Arcadi∣cij, p. 313.
• * 1.489

  Idem in Beot••cis p. 353.
• * 1.490

  Herod. l. 1. p. 66.
• * 1.491

  Plut. in vit. Romuli. p. 67. Liuie l. 6. p. 112.
• * 1.492

  Psal. 38. 3.
• * 1.493

  God threat∣neth sicknesse for mens sins. Leuit. 26. 16. 15. Deut. 7. 15.
• * 1.494

  Deut. 28. 15. &c.
• * 1.495

  Deu. 28. 21. 22. 27. 28. 35. 59.
• * 1.496

  Cic. l. 2. De ••in. p. 62.
• * 1.497

  2. Chro. ••1. 13. 14. &c.
• * 1.498

  Acts 12. 23. 2. Mac. 9. 9.
• * 1.499

  God sendeth all kinds of sicknesses vnto men.
• * 1.500

  Aug. in Psal. 94. To. 8. p. 1070.
• * 1.501

  Num. 16. 41, 46.
• * 1.502

  2. Chro. 21. 19. in Vulgata.
• * 1.503

  Psal. 39. 10.
• * 1.504

  Isay. 24 6.
• * 1.505

  Psalme 38. 7.
• * 1.506

  Exod. 9. 10.
• * 1.507

  Isay, 1. 6.
• * 1.508

  1. Sam. 5. 9. 12.
• * 1.509

  Iob. 2. 7. 8.
• * 1.510

  Isai. 19. 14.
• * 1.511

  Gen. 19. 11. 2.
• * 1.512

  Kin. 6. 18.
• * 1.513

  1. Mac. 6. 8 9. 1••
• * 1.514

  Homer, l. 1. Iliad p. 3.
• * 1.515

  Thucid. l. 2. p. 130.
• * 1.516

  Ouid, l. 7. Me∣tam. p. 278.
• * 1.517

  Max. Tyrius Scr••. ••9. p. 485.
• * 1.518

  〈…〉〈…〉 p. 390.
• * 1.519

  Quint. Curt. l. 10. p. 415.
• * 1.520

  Dan. 5. 2. 3. &c.
• * 1.521

  Sabel. Aeneid. 4. l. 6. p. 807.
• * 1.522

  Sueton. in vit. ••iti. c. 10. p. 115.
• * 1.523

  Ouid. l. 7. Me∣tam. p. 279.
• * 1.524

  Cic. l. 4. ••cad. p. 25.
• * 1.525

  Aurel. Vict. in vita Gallery p. 395.
• * 1.526

  Pompon. Laetus p. 445.
• * 1.527

  Euseb. l. 1. de vita Constan. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. c. 50. p. 139.
• * 1.528

  Cael. Rhodigin. l. 6. c. 1. p. 228.
• * 1.529

  Volateran. l. 23. p. 547.
• * 1.530

  Bap. Egnat. l. 2. Ror••. 〈…〉〈…〉. p. 703.
• * 1.531

  Pausan. in Ac••aicu p. 281.
• * 1.532

  Homer, l. 1. Iliad p. 3.
• * 1.533

  Cic l. 4. T••sc. p. 1••4.
• * 1.534

  Herod, l. 2. p. 1••6.
• * 1.535

  Aelian. l. 12. var. Hist. c. 23. p 481.
• * 1.536

  Plut. de ijs qui se••o puniun••ur, To. 2. p. 233.
• * 1.537

  1. Samuel, 6. 9. Iob, 5. 6.
• * 1.538

  Deut. 28. 22.
• * 1.539

  2. Kings, 19. 35.
• * 1.540

  Hieronym, in c. 3. Naum. To. 6. p. 209. c.
• * 1.541

  Stobaeus Serm. 98 p. 539.
• * 1.542

  Senec••. 〈…〉〈…〉 Act 5. See. 2. p. 257.
• * 1.543

  〈…〉〈…〉 in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 p. 17.
• * 1.544

  〈◊〉〈◊〉. in Psal. 118. Serm. 10. To. 4. p. 66••.
• * 1.545

  Sicknes is no∣thing else but the Sroke of God. Lib 1. Cap. 12 Sect. 5. Basil in As••••ti∣cis. To. 2. p. 292.
• * 1.546

  Solonin Elegijs, p. 134.
• * 1.547

  Ovid. l. 1. De Ponto Eleg. 4. p 160. b.
• * 1.548

  Ovid. l. 7. Me∣tam. p. 278.
• * 1.549

  Deut. 28. 27. 35.
• * 1.550

  Ecclus. 21. 3.
• * 1.551

  Hippocrates. l. 1. Praenotionum, c. 2. p. 366.
• * 1.552

  Cic. l. 16. ad Attic. epist. 339. p. 408.
• * 1.553

  Plutarch in A∣••••atorio. To. 3. p. 403.
• * 1.554

  Io. 11. 4.
• * 1.555

  Deut. 28, 22.
• * 1.556

  Deut. 28 27.
• * 1.557

  Deut. 28 28.
• * 1.558

  Ex. 4. 14.
• * 1.559

  Deut. 24. 8.
• * 1.560

  Psal. 39. 10.
• * 1.561

  Mar. 5. 29.
• * 1.562

  Mar. 3. 10.
• * 1.563

  Luke, 7 21.
• * 1.564

  Basil, in As••eti∣cis To. 2. p. 292.
• * 1.565

  Hieron. in Cap. 3. Naum. To. 6. p. 209.
• * 1.566

  Iob, 2. 7.
• * 1.567

  Luke, 13. 16.
• * 1.568

  1. Sam. 6. 9.
• * 1.569

  Psal. 39. 10.
• * 1.570

  Iuueual, Satyr. 13. p. 60. b.
• * 1.571

  Homer, l. 1. Iliad. p. 18. in Graecolat.
• * 1.572

  Psal. 91. 5. 6.
• * 1.573

  Psal. 38. 2, 3.
• * 1.574

  Plut. l. De Iside. To. 2. p. 190.
• * 1.575

  Plato, l. 2 De Re∣pub. p 554.
• * 1.576

  Deut. ••. 15.
• * 1.577

  Iob. 5. 18.
• * 1.578

  1. Sam. 2. 6.
• * 1.579

  Psal. 90. 3.
• * 1.580

  Hos. 6. 1.
• * 1.581

  Ouid. l. 1. De Re∣med. Amor. p. 292.
• * 1.582

  Tertul. l. 3. cont. Marcion. c. 24. p. 400.
• * 1.583

  God is the Gi∣uer of health.
• * 1.584

  Psalm. 28. 7.
• * 1.585

  Psalm. 27. 1.
• * 1.586

  Psalm. 94. 5.
• * 1.587

  Philo Iud. l. 2. de leg. allegor. p. 131
• * 1.588

  Greg. Nyssen, l. de Infantibus praematurè abreptis p. 138.
• * 1.589

  Aug. in Psal. 35. To. 8. p. 270.
• * 1.590

  Aug. l. 5. de Ciuit. Dei c. 11. To. 5. p. p. 303.
• * 1.591

  Athenae••, l. 10. p. 323.
• * 1.592

  ••iuie, l. 10. p. 170.
• * 1.593

  〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. Cicer. Orat. 4. in Ver. p. 105.
• * 1.594

  Pausan. in Co∣rinthiacis, p. 97.
• * 1.595

  Basil.
• * 1.596

  Isay, 43. 11. Aelian, l. 12. de var. Hist. c. 51. p. 489.
• * 1.597

  Cic. l. 2. de Nat. Deor. p. 210.
• * 1.598

  Cic. Orat. Pro Quinto Ligario, p 541.
• * 1.599

  Mat. 11. 5.
• * 1.600

  Mat. 10. 1. 8.
• * 1.601

  Luk 2. 11.
• * 1.602

  Ioh. 4. 42.
• * 1.603

  Act 3. 7. and 5. 15. &. 19. 12.
• * 1.604

  Act 3. 2. 6. 2. 7. 12. 16.
• * 1.605

  Mat. 1 21.
• * 1.606

  Act. 19. 13 &c.
• * 1.607

  Mat. 10. 1.
• * 1.608

  Hegesip. l. 2. de excidio vrbis. c. 12. p. 261.
• * 1.609

  Ps 3. 8. Wi••d. 16. 7.
• * 1.610

  God is the Pre∣seruer of health.
• * 1.611

  Cic. l. 2. Oss••c. p. 376.
• * 1.612

  Cic. l. 16. Epist. sam. Epist. 18. p. 180.
• * 1.613

  Iob. 30. 15.
• * 1.614

  Psa 4••
• * 1.615

  Psal. 91. 4. 7.
• * 1.616

  Iob. 7. 20.
• * 1.617

  Hier. in Cap. 26.
• * 1.618

  Isai. To. 5. p. 110
• * 1.619

  Pausa. in Arcadi cis, p. 300.
• * 1.620

  Athenaeus Lib. 14. p. 491.
• * 1.621

  Terent. Eunuch. Act. 5. See. 9. p. 96.
• * 1.622

  Cic. l. 3. de. Fin. p. 76.
• * 1.623

  ••useb. l. 9. Hist. c. 7. p. 112.
• * 1.624

  God is the Restorer of Health.
• * 1.625

  Deut. 7. 15.
• * 1.626

  Psal. 103. 3.
• * 1.627

  2. Kin. 5. 7.
• * 1.628

  2. Kin. 5. 15.
• * 1.629

  Ecclus. 38. 2.
• * 1.630

  Coel. Rhodigin. l. 19. c. 11. p. 1354. Plut. l. 4. Sympos. Quaest. 1. To. 3. Mor. p. 239.
• * 1.631

  Cic. l. 14. Epist. Fam. Ep. 7. 162.
• * 1.632

  Num. 11. 1, 2.
• * 1.633

  Num. 16. 47, 48
• * 1.634

  2. Sam, 24. 25.
• * 1.635

  Homer, l. 1. Iliad p. 5. B.
• * 1.636

  Ouid. l. 7. Me∣tam. p. 280.
• * 1.637

  La••r &. in vit. Epimen. p. 39.
• * 1.638

  Liuie, l. 1. p. 12.
• * 1.639

  Liuie, l. 5. p. 91.
• * 1.640

  2. Kin. 23.
• * 1.641

  Livi.
• * 1.642

  Psal. 41. 4.
• * 1.643

  Cic. Epist. Octa∣viano, p. 223.
• * 1.644

  Psal. 141. 2.
• * 1.645

  Iuuenal. Satyr. 13. p. 60. B.
• * 1.646

  This Chap. this Sect. prec••d.
• * 1.647

  Nonius in voce, preca••tur.
• * 1.648

  1. Kings, 8. 37. &c.
• * 1.649

  Cic. Orat, 5, in Ver. p. 137.
• * 1.650

  1, Kings, 20. 2. &c.
• * 1.651

  Ecclu. 3••. 9.
• * 1.652

  Ecclu. 3••. 14.
• * 1.653

  Iames, 5. 14. 15.
• * 1.654

  Mathew, 9. 2.
• * 1.655

  Cic. l. 2. Te Di∣uin. p. 263.
• * 1.656

  2. Kings, 20. 5. 7.
• * 1.657

  1. Kings, 18. 36. &c.
• * 1.658

  Suidas in voce 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉 p. 278.
• * 1.659

  Cic. l. 3. de Nat. Deor. p. 236.
• * 1.660

  God is the Giuer of all Medi••in•••• vn∣to Man.
• * 1.661

  Gen 2. 5.
• * 1.662

  Gen. 1. 12. 13. 14.
• * 1.663

  Plut. l. 1. de Placit. c. 1. To. 2. p. 4.
• * 1.664

  Bachiar. Epist. de lapsis, 〈◊〉〈◊〉. Pat. To. 1. p. 419 Ier. 9 22.
• * 1.665

  Plin. l. 24. c. 1. p. 350.
• * 1.666

  Gal. l. 3. de vsu partium.
• * 1.667

  Basil, in Asceti∣cis. To. 2. p. 291.
• * 1.668

  Theodoret. Serm 4. De Prouident. To. 2. p. 592.
• * 1.669

  Ecclus. 38. 4.
• * 1.670

  Cic. l. 2. De Nat. Deor. p. 221.
• * 1.671

  Plin l. 24. Cap. 1. p. 350.
• * 1.672

  Trismeg. As••lep. Cap. 13. p. 537.
• * 1.673

  God is the Gi∣uer of all skill in Physick.
• * 1.674

  Cic. lib. 1. Dedi∣u••••a. p. 242.
• * 1.675

  Plin. lib. 27. cap. 1. p. 387.
• * 1.676

  St••ba•• l. Eclog. Phys. c. 3. p. 3.
• * 1.677

  Coel. Rhodig. l. 29. c. 11. p. 1353.
• * 1.678

  Cic. l. 1. de Di∣uin. p. 142.
• * 1.679

  Plin. l 29. c. 1. p. 416.
• * 1.680

  Plut. l. de Homero. To. 11 p. 145.
• * 1.681

  Ou••d, l. 1. Me∣tam. p. 39.
• * 1.682

  Strab••, l. 14. p. 347.
• * 1.683

  Plut. l. contra St••icos, To. 3. p. 566.
• * 1.684

  Ecclus 38. 6.
• * 1.685

  Ecclus 38. 1.
• * 1.686

  Aug. l. 1. de Mo∣ribus Eccles. c. 28. To. 1. p. 738.
• * 1.687

  Basil. in As••••ti∣••••••, To. 2. p. 291. Theodoret. Ser. 4. de Prouiden. To. 2. p. 592.
• * 1.688

  Ephraem Syrus, Serm. de Fide, p. 81.
• * 1.689

  Gods blessing is it, that hea∣leth, more then the Me∣dicine.
• * 1.690

  2. Ch••on. 16. 12.
• * 1.691

  Mar. 5. 25, 26.
• * 1.692

  Dion Cassius in Hadriano. p. 135.
• * 1.693

  A. Gel. lib. 18. cap. 9. p. 263.
• * 1.694

  Ecclus 38. 8. 12. 13. 14.
• * 1.695

  Hier. in. cap. 26. Isai. To. 5. p. 110.
• * 1.696

  Hier. in cap. 7. Am••s To. 6. 124.
• * 1.697

  Hier. in vita Hi∣lar. To. 1. p. 144.
• * 1.698

  Basil. in Ascetici•• To. 2. p. 291.
• * 1.699

  p. 292.
• * 1.700

  Wis. 16. 12.
• * 1.701

  Wise. 16. 7.
• * 1.702

  Aug in. Psal. 34. To. 8. p. 250.
• * 1.703

  2. Kin 20 •• 5.
• * 1.704

  Ia. 5 14. 15.
• * 1.705

  Aug. l. 4. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 D•••••• 〈◊〉〈◊〉. 16 〈◊〉〈◊〉. 3. p. 79.
• * 1.706

  〈…〉〈…〉 p. 281. Psal 107 2••. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 16 12. 〈…〉〈…〉 291. Mat. 8. 3. Psal. 3. 8.
• * 1.707

  Psal. 113. 7 8.
• * 1.708

  Psal. 78. 70. &c
• * 1.709

  Cic. l. 1. Offic. p. 346.
• * 1.710

  Virgil. l. 1. Ae••••id. p. 123.
• * 1.711

  Plut. in Vit. Re∣muli. p. 49.
• * 1.712

  Sil. Ital. l. 15. p. 186.
• * 1.713

  Will. Thomas, p. 86.
• * 1.714

  Great Cities fall to be little.
• * 1.715

  Obadiah, v, 4.
• * 1.716

  Isay. 47. 1.
• * 1.717

  Isay. 47. 5.
• * 1.718

  Psal. 1378. A••ias Monta∣••us.
• * 1.719

  Isay, 15. 1.
• * 1.720

  Stob••ns Serm. 103. p. 564.
• * 1.721

  Pausan. in A••ca∣dicis, p. 325.
• * 1.722

  Ouid, l. 15. Me∣••amo••p. p. ••19.
• * 1.723

  Obadiah, v. 16.
• * 1.724

  Strabo, l. 16. p. 572.
• * 1.725

  Philo Iudaeus, l. Quod Deus sit immutabilis, in fine, p. 445.
• * 1.726

  Lucret. l, 2. p.
• * 1.727

  The rising and falling of Cit∣ties is neither by Fa••e nor Fortune.
• * 1.728

  Plut. in Vita Romuli. p. 52.
• * 1.729

  Psal. 75. 6.
• * 1.730

  Isai. 24. 1.
• * 1.731

  Plut. in Vita Romuli. p. 52.
• * 1.732

  Manil. l. 1. p. 16.
• * 1.733

  Senec. Oedip. Act. 1. p. 220. Pausanias in Arcadieis. p. 325
• * 1.734

  Dan. 2. 31. &c.
• * 1.735

  Dan. 73 &c.
• * 1.736

  Dan. 8. 3, &c.
• * 1.737

  Dan. 8 20. 21.
• * 1.738

  Deut. 18. 21. 22.
• * 1.739

  2. Tim. 1. 12.
• * 1.740

  Ionah. 3. 4.
• * 1.741

  Num. 24. 24.
• * 1.742

  Demost, Orat. de falsa legat. To. 24 p. 63.
• * 1.743

  Cic. in. Fragment p. 298.
• * 1.744

  Pausan. vbi suprà.
• * 1.745

  Luke, 4. 6.
• * 1.746

  The Rising and Falling of Cities is onely of God.
• * 1.747

  Pro. 8. 15, 16.
• * 1.748

  Tertul. Apolog. c. 30. p. 59.
• * 1.749

  Act••, 17. 25.
• * 1.750

  Daniel, 4. 32.
• * 1.751

  X••noph. l. 3. de Cyriminor. ex∣ped. l p. 301. Sabellicus Ae••eid 8. l. 1. To. 2. p. 425.
• * 1.752

  Daniel, 5. 18.
• * 1.753

  Ezr. 1. 2.
• * 1.754

  Plut. in vita Themistoclis p. 265.
• * 1.755

  Daniel, 7. 6.
• * 1.756

  Apotheg. Hebrae••o••um. l. 2. p. 39.
• * 1.757

  Plutarch. in 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Camilli. p. 282.
• * 1.758

  Plutarch l. de Fortuna Roma∣norum, To. 2. p. 409. 411.
• * 1.759

  Cic. Orat. de Arusp. Respons. p. 405.
• * 1.760

  Arnob. l. 8. cont. Gent. p. 746.
• * 1.761

  Liv. l. 5. p. 103.
• * 1.762

  Ecclus. 10. 22.
• * 1.763

  Atheneus. l. 12. p. 407.
• * 1.764

  Iob. 36. 17.
• * 1.765

  P••o. 16 12.
• * 1.766

  Ecclus. 10. 8.
• * 1.767

  Pro. 14. 34.
• * 1.768

  Ier. 25. 12.
• * 1.769

  Au. Gell. l. 20. c. 1 p. 281.
• * 1.770

  Cic. in Fragmen∣tis. To. 4. p. 298. 297.
• * 1.771

  Senec. in Thyes••e Act. 2. Sce. 1. p 296.
• * 1.772

  Plut. 〈…〉〈…〉. 4. p. 644.
• * 1.773

  Iosh 6. 20. Athenaeus. l. 2. p. 31.
• * 1.774

  Demost. Orat. de fal••a Legat. To. 2 p. 63.
• * 1.775

  Theognis. p. 8.
• * 1.776

  1. Kings, 12. 16, 17.
• * 1.777

  Isay. 47, 1.
• * 1.778

  Daniel, 4. 22.
• * 1.779

  Plutach, in vita Bruti. p. 863.
• * 1.780

  Iob, 12. 18.
• * 1.781

  Iob. 12. 2.
• * 1.782

  Daniel, 2. 21.
• * 1.783

  Tertul. A••ol••ge. c. 26. p. 57.
• * 1.784

  Plut. in vita 〈◊〉〈◊〉 p. 562.
• * 1.785

  Mathew, 10. 29.
• * 1.786

  Aug. l. 5. de Ciuit. Dei c. 11. T••. 5. p. 303.
• * 1.787

  God limiteth the power of all Kings and Kingdomes.
• * 1.788

  1. Samuel, 26. 20. 21.
• * 1.789

  Gen. 32. 6 7.
• * 1.790

  Gen. 33. 4.
• * 1.791

  Senec. •• Thy••st. Act. 3. Sce. 3. p. 3. p. 309.
• * 1.792

  Pro. 21. 1.
• * 1.793

  Psal. 105. 15.
• * 1.794

  Iudith 2. 1. 3, 7.
• * 1.795

  Iudith 3. 8.
• * 1.796

  Horat. l 1 Carm O••. 3. p. 7.
• * 1.797

  Iud. 14. 18.
• * 1.798

  Iud. 15. 2. &c.
• * 1.799

  Dan. 4. ••0.
• * 1.800

  Aeliand. 13. var. Hist. c. 30. p. 504.
• * 1.801

  Dan. 4. 31. &c.
• * 1.802

  2. King. 18. 17. 33. 34. 35. 29.
• * 1.803

  2. King 19. 28. 35. 36. 37.
• * 1.804

  1. Pet 55.
• * 1.805

  Mat. 6. 27.
• * 1.806

  Rom. 13. 1. Iust. M••rt l. de Monarchia Dei To. 1. p. 205.
• * 1.807

  Mat 6 13.
• * 1.808

  Wi••d. 6. 2. 3. 4.
• * 1.809

  God circum∣scribeth all Kingdome•• within Bounds
• * 1.810

  Psal. 95. 4.
• * 1.811

  Cicero. Orat. pro P. Seslio. p. 442.
• * 1.812

  Cicero. Orat. 4. in Catilin. p. 315 A••no••••ius. ••. ••. cont. Gentes. p. 746.
• * 1.813

  Ovid. l 1. ••astor. p. 3. b.
• * 1.814

  Egesip. l. 2. de Excid. o Hieros. p. 244.
• * 1.815

  Daniel, 3. 31. 2. 38.
• * 1.816

  Ezra. 1. 2.
• * 1.817

  Cic. l. 15. Epist. ad Attic. Epist. 326. p. 394.
• * 1.818

  Macrob. l. 2. de Som. Scip. c. 10. p. 111.
• * 1.819

  Macrob. ibid.
• * 1.820

  Iob, 38. 11.
• * 1.821

  Seneca, l. 1. Nat Quaest. ••a Prae∣sat, p. 2.
• * 1.822

  Cap. 1.
• * 1.823

  Deut. 32. 8.
• * 1.824

  Ecclus. 17. 15.
• * 1.825

  Trismeg. Pi∣mand. Dial, 13. p. 464.
• * 1.826

  Demost. Orat. de Halonesa, p. 26.
• * 1.827

  〈…〉〈…〉.
• * 1.828

  God giueth the times of conti∣nuance vnto Kingdomes
• * 1.829

  Act. 17. 26.
• * 1.830

  Iob. 14. 5.
• * 1.831

  Daniel, 7. 22. 12. 7.
• * 1.832

  Cloutian. l. 3. in laudes Stilicon. p. 273.
• * 1.833

  Bartus in his Colonies. p 442.
• * 1.834

  Gen. 15. 16.
• * 1.835

  Isa. 10. 5.
• * 1.836

  Jer. 51. 20.
• * 1.837

  Eccles. 3. 1. 2.
• * 1.838

  Ier. 27. 6. 7.
• * 1.839

  Dan. 5. 28 30. 26.
• * 1.840

  Ier. 25. 11, 12.
• * 1.841

  2. Chro. 36. 22. Ezra. 1. 1.
• * 1.842

  Isay. 44 28
• * 1.843

  Isay. 45. 1.
• * 1.844

  Isay, 7. 8.
• * 1.845

  Ezech. 29. 12. 13.
• * 1.846

  Acts, 1. 7.
• * 1.847

  Daniel. 2. 21.
• * 1.848

  Xenoph. l. 6. Rerum Graca∣rum p. 462.
• * 1.849

  Hesiod, Opera & Dies, p. 1.
• * 1.850

  Homer, Odyss. l. 16.
• * 1.851

  Smonides cum H••siodo, p. 164.
• * 1.852

  Tertul. Apologet. Cap. 26. p. 57.
• * 1.853

  Arist. l. 2. Phys. c. 3. To. 1. p. 433.
• * 1.854

  Arist. l. 1. Ethic. c. 1. To. 2. p. 604.
• * 1.855

  Paling. in l. conc. p. 103.
• * 1.856

  Lib. 2. Cap. 3 Sect. 4.
• * 1.857

  Rom. 11. 36.
• * 1.858

  Pro. 16. 4.
• * 1.859

  Palingenius▪ in Le••ne. p. 103.
• * 1.860

  Psal 73. 24.
• * 1.861

  Arist. l. 1. Eth. c. 1. To. 2. p. 604.
• * 1.862

  Vertue is the way vnto Feli∣citie.
• * 1.863

  〈…〉〈…〉. p. 113.
• * 1.864

  Senec. in Herc. 〈…〉〈…〉. 4. Sce. 4. p. 126.
• * 1.865

  Sen••••. in Herc. Oclaeo. Act. 5. Sce. 5 p. 128.
• * 1.866

  Cic. l. 1. Tusc. p 112.
• * 1.867

  Cic. 1. Parad. p. 421.
• * 1.868

  Arist. l. 1. Eth. c. 7. To. 7. p. 609.
• * 1.869

  Vertue is not of Nature, Art or Industrie
• * 1.870

  〈…〉〈…〉. p. 70.
• * 1.871

  Ibid. p. 69.
• * 1.872

  Cic. l. 1. Acad. p. 5 Cic. l. 1. de leg. p. 313.
• * 1.873

  Cic. l. 1. de. leg. p. 314. p. 326. in Lambini Edit.
• * 1.874

  Arist. Prob. Sect. 10. prob. 44. To. 2▪ p, 473.
• * 1.875

  Arist. l. 2. Eth. c. 8. To. 2. p. 625.
• * 1.876

  Arist, l▪ 2. Eth. c. 1. To. 2. p. 616.
• * 1.877

  Plut. To. 2. Mor. p. 252.
• * 1.878

  Arist. l. 3, Eth. c. 1. To. 2. p. 615.
• * 1.879

  Plato, in Prota∣gora, p. 231.
• * 1.880

  Max. Tyr. Serm. 22. p. 263.
• * 1.881

  Ambros. l. 2. de Iacob. c. 4. To. 4. p. 298.
• * 1.882

  Stob••us Serm. 1. p. 27.
• * 1.883

  Arist. l. 3. Eth. c. 1. To. 2. p. 616.
• * 1.884

  Pindarus in Nemeis Od. 6. p. 405.
• * 1.885

  P••thagor cum 〈◊〉〈◊〉, p 124.
• * 1.886

  Bern: Serm. 22. in Cant. ••. p, 55••.
• * 1.887

  〈…〉〈…〉. Serm. 22. p, 271.
• * 1.888

  〈◊〉〈◊〉, Fidyl. 17. p, 120.
• * 1.889

  1, Cor. 3. 7.
• * 1.890

  Homer, l. 20.
• * 1.891

  Iliad. p, 742.
• * 1.892

  God is the Giuer of ver∣tue vnto men. Theophil, Anti∣och. l, 2. ad A••to lic. Bib. Pa••. To. 5. p, 134.
• * 1.893

  Pindar. Olimp. Od 9 p, 109.
• * 1.894

  Theognis cum 〈◊〉〈◊〉. p, 14.
• * 1.895

  Prouerb, 16. 4.
• * 1.896

  Aquin, 1. 2. Quaest. 79. Art. 3. p, 160.
• * 1.897

  Aug. l, 4. de Ci∣uit. Dei, c. 20. To. 5. p. 252.
• * 1.898

  Arist. l. 1. de Ani¦m. ••. c. 2 To. 1. p. 786. Proclus l. de A∣nim ••. p. 193.
• * 1.899

  Plut. l. de ira cohibenda. To. 2. p. 292.
• * 1.900

  L. 2. c. 8. Sect. 3. Iamblic. c. 31. p, 100.
• * 1.901

  Gen. 20. 6.
• * 1.902

  1. Sam. 25. 26. 3••.
• * 1.903

  Stob. Serm. 61. p. 390.
• * 1.904

  Homer. l. 1. Ilid. p. 7.
• * 1.905

  Luk. 18. 11. 12.
• * 1.906

  1. Cor. 15. 10.
• * 1.907

  Cic. l. 3. de. Nat. Deor. p. 238.
• * 1.908

  Cic. l. 1. de Nat. Deor. p. 212.
• * 1.909

  Cic. l. 2. de Nat. Deor. p. 225.
• * 1.910

  God is the Gi∣uer of all good motions and affections.
• * 1.911

  Sunt ingenijs nostris semina 〈◊〉〈◊〉 virtutum quae si adolescere liceret, ipsa nos ad beatam vi∣tam Natura per∣duceret.
• * 1.912

  Cic. l. 3. Tusc.
• * 1.913

  Deut 30. 6.
• * 1.914

  Phil. 2. 13.
• * 1.915

  2. Cor. 3. 5.
• * 1.916

  Isai. 26. 12.
• * 1.917

  Lucan. l. 9. p. 127. b.
• * 1.918

  ••••mblic. c. 26. p. 1••.
• * 1.919

  Homer, lib. 18. Odys. p. 528.
• * 1.920

  Plut. lib. de Ho∣mero, To. 1. p. 129.
• * 1.921

  Stob. Serm. 9. p, 100.
• * 1.922

  Trismeg. in Pi∣mand. Dial. 1. p. 376.
• * 1.923

  Trismeg. in Asclep. c. 9. p. 515.
• * 1.924

  Aug. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 lib. 〈…〉〈…〉 Philoso▪ ••. c. 33. p, 474.
• * 1.925

  ••usib. l. 4. de 〈…〉〈…〉. 11. l, 98.
• * 1.926

  Sto••••ns▪ Serm. 101. p, 554.
• * 1.927

  ••ib. 2. Cap. 8. Sect. 2.
• * 1.928

  Trismeg. Pi∣m••••d. Dial. 1. p. 375. 367.
• * 1.929

  Eph: 6. 16. Nazian. Orat. 40 〈◊〉〈◊〉 sanctum Baptisma. p, 621.
• * 1.930

  Luke, 11. 21, 22.
• * 1.931

  Iamblic. c. 30. p. 97.
• * 1.932

  God is the Gi∣uer of felicitie vnto men.
• * 1.933

  2. Pet. 1. 3.
• * 1.934

  Arist. l. 1. Eth. c. 9. To. 2. p. 611.
• * 1.935

  Iam. 1. 17. Plato. in Euthry∣p••one. p. 59.
• * 1.936

  Hesiod. in Theo∣gonia. p. 82.
• * 1.937

  Homer. l. 8. Odys. p. 218. Plut. l. de Ho∣mero To. 1. Mor. p. 119.
• * 1.938

  Lamblic. c. 47. p. 176. Plaut. Bacchid. Act. 4. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. 4. 343.
• * 1.939

  Psal. 104. 28.
• * 1.940

  Plaut. Prolog. in Menech. p. 416.
• * 1.941

  Tertul. l. 1. cont. Marc. c. 24 p. 362 Tertul. lib. 2. cont. Marcion. c. 5. p. 370.
• * 1.942

  Plat••. in 〈…〉〈…〉 p 913. Arist. l 1. 〈…〉〈…〉 9. To. 2. p. ••11.
• * 1.943

  〈…〉〈…〉
• * 1.944

  Plato in 〈◊〉〈◊〉. p. 256.
• * 1.945

  Homer. l. 6. Odys. p. 168.
• * 1.946

  Solon. in Eleg. p. 130. cum He••iodo.
• * 1.947

  Sio••. l. Eclog. Phys. cap 9. p. 11.
• * 1.948

  Aug l. u. de Ciuit De••. c. 18. To. 5. p. 249.
• * 1.949

  Max. Ty••. Serm. 23. p. 363.
• * 1.950

  God is the true Felicitie of Man.
• * 1.951

  S••ohaeus, Serm. 101. p. 453.
• * 1.952

  A••g. ••ugub. l 10. de pere••. Philos. c. 18 p. 590.
• * 1.953

  Senec. Epist. 31. p. 53.
• * 1.954

  Arist. l. 1. Eth. ••. ••. To. 2. p. 685.
• * 1.955

  Aug. ••ib. 4. de 〈◊〉〈◊〉. Dei c. 11. p. 303.
• * 1.956

  2. Peter, 1. 4, 5. Euseb. l. 4. de praepar. cap. 11. p 97.
• * 1.957

  Aug. Eugub. vbi supra.
• * 1.958

  Senec. vbi supra.
• * 1.959

  1. Cor. 6. 17.
• * 1.960

  Boet. l. 3. de Con∣solat. prosa 10. p. 10. 49.
• * 1.961

  Paling. in Le••. p. 107.
• * 1.962

  Nazian. Orat. 6. de Sp. Set. p. 174▪ 175.
• * 1.963

  Dionys. Areopag. lib. de Eccles. Hierar. c. 1. p. 90.
• * 1.964

  1. Peter, 1. 4, 5.
• * 1.965

  Trism••g. As••p. c. 2. p. 479.
• * 1.966

  1. Pet. 1. 4. 5. &c
• * 1.967

  Col. 3. 14.
• * 1.968

  Pythag. 〈◊〉〈◊〉 He∣siodo. p. 129.
• * 1.969

  Deut. 30. 20. Cic. l. de. Amicit. p. 396.
• * 1.970

  2. Cor. 5. 1.
• * 1.971

  Stobae. Serm. 38. p. 234.
• * 1.972

  Apoc. 21. 2. 3.
• * 1.973

  Cic. l. de Vniuer∣sitate. p. 432.
• * 1.974

  Act. 17. 28.
• * 1.975

  Cic. l. 1. Tusc. p. 119.
• * 1.976

  Trismeg in Pi∣mand. Dial. 10. p. 426.
• * 1.977

  Iohn, 1 ••. 3.
• * 1.978

  Ber. Ser. 2. super Salu•• Regina, p. 1355.
• * 1.979

  2 Pet. 1. 5.
• * 1.980

  Hieron. Epist. Fab••ol••e: To. 3. p. 42.
• * 1.981

  Apoc. 2. 7.
• * 1.982

  Stob. Se••m▪ 101. p. 552.
• * 1.983

  Senec. in Herc. Oetaeo. Act. 4. Sce. 4. p. 112.
• * 1.984

  Lib. ••, c. 8. Sect. 2
• * 1.985

  Senec. Herc. Oe∣taeo. Act. 5. Sce. vlt. p. 128.
• * 1.986

  1. Cor. 2. 9.
• * 1.987

  Psalme, 16. 11.
• * 1.988

  Mathew, 5. 8.
• * 1.989

  Chrys. Hom. 24. in Ma••. To. 2. p. 233.
• * 1.990

  Psalme, 8. 3. 7. 19.
• * 1.991

  Nyssen, lib de Infa••••ib•• pre∣mature abrep∣tis, p. 134.
• * 1.992

  Ouid, l. 2. de ••••onto. Eleg. 8. p, 182.
• * 1.993

  1 Cor. 13. 12.
• * 1.994

  Aquinas, •• Quaest. 12. Art. 2.
• * 1.995

  Arist. l. 10. Eth. c. 8. To. 2. 739, 740.
• * 1.996

  Aug. Epist. 222. To. 2. p, 860.
• * 1.997

  Aug. Epist 56. To. 2. p, 260.
• * 1.998

  Trismeg. Pi∣mand. Dial. 1. p, 377. Aug. l. 8. de Ciuit. 〈◊〉〈◊〉▪ 8. To. 5. p, 449.
• * 1.999

  Boeti••s, l. 3. de Consolat. metro. 12. p, 1••62.
• * 1.1000

  Psalme, 36. 9.
• * 1.1001

  Aug. in Senten∣tijs, To. 3. p, 1488.
• * 1.1002

  Beda, in 1. Cor. c. 15. To: 6. p, 571.
• * 1.1003

  Gensis, 15. 1.
• * 1.1004

  Mathematicus circa Abstracta speculatur, tol∣lendo omnia sensibil••a.
• * 1.1005

  Arist. l. 11. Me∣taphyl. c. 3. To. 2. p, 1485.
• * 1.1006

  Arist. l. 11. Meta. c. 4. p, 1486. & Seminar. Philos. p 797.
• * 1.1007

  Ficin. Argument in. l. 7. Platonis de repub. p. 616.
• * 1.1008

  Ficin. Argument. in Platonis The∣aete••. p. 134.
• * 1.1009

  Alcin. c. 2. Semi∣nar. philos. To. 2. p. 580.
• * 1.1010

  Plato in Epi∣nome. p. 918.
• * 1.1011

  Arist. l. 1. Mete••r c. 3. To. 1. p. 691.
• * 1.1012

  Arist. 1. 2. Metap. c. 3. To. 2 p. 1388
• * 1.1013

  Vide Coel. Rhodi¦gin. l. c. 2. p. 6.
• * 1.1014

  Wisd. 11. 17. Coel. Rhodigin. l. 1. Ant, lect. c. ••. p. 6.
• * 1.1015

  P••••t. l 8. Sympos. Quaest. 2. To. 3. p. 336. 337.
• * 1.1016

  Mathematica certitudo non est in omnibus quae••enda.
• * 1.1017

  Arist. l. 2. Meta∣phys. c. 3. To. 2. p. 1383.
• * 1.1018

  Geometrie leadeth a man to God.
• * 1.1019

  ••l••t. l. 7. de Re∣pub. p. 623.
• * 1.1020

  Col. 3. 1.
• * 1.1021

  Plut. l. 8. Simpo∣sia••. Quaest. 2. To. 3. p. 336. Ibid p 337. Ma•• T••r. Serm. 21. p. 260.
• * 1.1022

  Cic. l. 3. de Nat. Deor. p. 239.
• * 1.1023

  Arist. l. 13. Meta c. 3▪. 2. p. 1513.
• * 1.1024

  Cic. l. 4. Acad. p. 30.
• * 1.1025

  Punctum in Geometrie leadeth men to God.
• * 1.1026

  Arist. l. 1. Meta∣phys. c. 7. To. 2. p. 1383.
• * 1.1027

  Proclus in Eu∣clid. l. 2. c. 11. Serm. Philos. To. 2. p. 765.
• * 1.1028

  Eph. 3. 18.
• * 1.1029

  Punctum in Geometry re∣sembleth in some sort the nature of God.
• * 1.1030

  Dionys. l. de coe∣lesti Hierarch. c. 4. p. 29.
• * 1.1031

  Arist. l. Meta∣phys. c. 5. To. 2. p, 1375.
• * 1.1032

  Virgil. l. 6. Aeneid. p, 267.
• * 1.1033

  Arist. l. 11. Me∣taphys. c. 2. To. 2. p, 1484.
• * 1.1034

  Arist. l. de Mun∣do. To. 2. p, 1572.
• * 1.1035

  Rom. 11. 36.
• * 1.1036

  Orig. l. 6. Cont. Celsum p, 766.
• * 1.1037

  Vinity in A∣rithmeticke leadeth a man to God.
• * 1.1038

  Arist. l. 1. Metap. c. 7. To. 2 p, 1383.
• * 1.1039

  Arist▪ l. 13. Meta. c. 8. To. 2. p, 1522.
• * 1.1040

  Arist. ibid. Plut. lib. de Ani∣nac procreat, To. 3. Mor▪ p, 93.
• * 1.1041

  ••oet. lib. de Vni∣tate. p, 1276.
• * 1.1042

  Bradwardin. l. 1. de causa Dei c. 1. Correllar. 40. p, 135.
• * 1.1043

  Cic. l. 4. Acad. p, 30.
• * 1.1044

  Arist. l. 1. Meta. c. 5. p, 1375.
• * 1.1045

  Plut. l. 1. de ••la∣cit. c. 3. To. 2. p, 7.
• * 1.1046

  Plut. l. de Ho∣mero. To. 1. p, 123.
• * 1.1047

  Vnity is the Au••hor and originall of all things.
• * 1.1048

  Stobaeus, lib. Ecl••g. Phys c. 9. p, 13.
• * 1.1049

  Idem ibidem, c. 13. p, 27.
• * 1.1050

  Trismeg. Pi∣mand••Dial. 10. p, 426.
• * 1.1051

  Anselm. Mono∣log, c. 3. To. 3. p, 2.
• * 1.1052

  Lib. 2. Cap. 3. Sect. 3.
• * 1.1053

  Hugo de Sct. Victore, lib. 7. Erudit. didasc. c. 19. To. 3. p, 21. X.
• * 1.1054

  Arist. l. 13. Me∣taph. c. 8. To. 2. p, 1521. 1520.
• * 1.1055

  Arist-ibid.
• * 1.1056

  Romane••, 11. 36.
• * 1.1057

  Boet. l. de Vni∣tate, p, 1274. Dionys. 〈…〉〈…〉 lib. de Diuin. Nom, c. 13. p, 328.
• * 1.1058

  Dionys. Areopag. lib. de Diuin. nom▪ c. 1. p. 192.
• * 1.1059

  Ibid. p, 195▪
• * 1.1060

  Epip••. l. 3. Haeres. 80. To. 2. p. 519. Boet. l. de vni∣tate, p, 1274.
• * 1.1061

  Dionysius vbi suprà p, 330.
• * 1.1062

  Palingen. in Li∣bra. p, 168:
• * 1.1063

  Plut. l. de Homer To. 1. p. 123.
• * 1.1064

  Iohn, 1. 3. Iames, 1. 17.
• * 1.1065

  Plut. vbi suprà.
• * 1.1066

  The first vnity is nothing else but God.
• * 1.1067

  Trismeg. Asclep. c. 8. p. 505.
• * 1.1068

  Item Pimand. Dial. 11. p, 438.
• * 1.1069

  Eph. 4. 6.
• * 1.1070

  Plut. l. 1. de Placit. c. 7. To. 2, p, 16.
• * 1.1071

  Mornaeus, lib. de ve••i••. Relig. c. 3. p, 44.
• * 1.1072

  Plut lib. de E, I, To. 1. Mor. p, 695.
• * 1.1073

  Iamblic. lib. de Mysterijs p, 29.
• * 1.1074

  Hugo de Vict l. 7. Erud. didas. c. 19. To. 3. p, 21 X. Iamblic. vbi suprà p, 152.
• * 1.1075

  Arist. l. 1. Metap. c. 5. To. 2. p. 1376
• * 1.1076

  Pic. Mirand. Ob∣iect. 3. p, 181.
• * 1.1077

  Epiphan. l. 3. To. 2. p, 519.
• * 1.1078

  Athenag. Orat. pro Christ apud Iust. Martyr, To. 1. p. 223.
• * 1.1079

  How God is not one.
• * 1.1080

  Bernard. l. 5. De Considerat. p, 1408.
• * 1.1081

  Suidas in v••ce 〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉〈 in non-Latin alphabet 〉. p. 297 Boet. l. de vnita∣le p, 1276.
• * 1.1082

  Aquin. 1. Quaest. 11. Art. 4. ••. p, 21.
• * 1.1083

  Hugo, de Sct. Vict. l. 7. Erudit. Didascal. c. 19. To. 3. p, 21. X.
• * 1.1084

  Senec. Epist. 59. p, 95.
• * 1.1085

  Iames, 1. 17.
• * 1.1086

  Plut. l. de E, l. To. 1. p, 695.
• * 1.1087

  ••uxdorfius in Synagoga Iuda∣ica. c. 11. p, 3
• * 1.1088

  Dionysius Arco∣pag. lib. de diuin Nom. c. 1. p, 192 Dionys. ibid. c. 13 p. 330. Io. Pic. lib. de Ente & Vno, To. 1. p, 272
• * 1.1089

  How God is One.
• * 1.1090

  Plut. lib. de E, I. To. 2, p, 695.
• * 1.1091

  Dionys. Arcopag. lib de diuin. Nom. c. 1, p, 192
• * 1.1092

  Plut. lib. de Pla∣cit. c. 7. To. 2. p, 16.
• * 1.1093

  Cic. lib. 1. Tusc. p. 118. B••et. l. 1. de Trim. p. 1122.
• * 1.1094

  Plat. l. de E, l, p, 695,
• * 1.1095

  Trismeg. Piman. Dial. 12, p, 452.
• * 1.1096

  Boet. lib. 1. De Trinit. p. 1122.
• * 1.1097

  Deut. 6. 4.
• * 1.1098

  Isai. 43. 10.
• * 1.1099

  Bernard, l. 5. de Consid. p, 1047.
• * 1.1100

  Plut. l. 1. de plac. c. 7. To. 1. p, 16.
• * 1.1101

  Cic. l. 1. de Nat. Deor. p, 188
• * 1.1102

  Plut. l. de E. I. To. 1. mor. p. 695
• * 1.1103

  Macrob. l. 1. Saturnal. c. 23. p. 224.
• * 1.1104

  Luin. moral. poet. p, 1223.
• * 1.1105

  Macrob. l. 1. Satur. c. 7. p, 200 Varro. lib. 4 de Lingua Latina, p. 13.
• * 1.1106

  Item Cic. l. 3. de Nat. Deor. p, 233.
• * 1.1107

  Boet. l. 5. de Con. Metro. 2. p, 1100
• * 1.1108

  Ruf. Comment. in Symbol. To. 1. p, 172. 1. Cor. 15. 28 Act, 17. 28 Io. Pic. Mirand. l. de Ente & ••no, p, 172
• * 1.1109

  ••aert. in vita Xenoph. p, 310. Trismeg. Asclep. c. 1. p, 475.
• * 1.1110

  Trismeg. Asclep. c. 8. p, 506.
• * 1.1111

  Stob. l. Eclog. Phys c. 1. p, 2.
• * 1.1112

  Dionys. l. de Di∣uin. Nom. cap, 1. p, 201.
• * 1.1113

  Ibid. c. 13. p, 130.
• * 1.1114

  Ibid. c. 1. p, 200.
• * 1.1115

  Aug. lib. de vera Relig. c. 1. To. 1. p, 675.
• * 1.1116

  Dionys. l. de Di∣uin. Nom. cap. 2. p, 204.
• * 1.1117

  Vnity hath in it a resem∣blance of God.
• * 1.1118

  Psalme, 104. 198.
• * 1.1119

  Stob. l. Eclog. Phys. cap. 2 p, 3.
• * 1.1120

  Si quis a nume∣ro vnitatem ab∣stulerit, alius relinquetur nu∣me••us. Arist. l. 1. de Anima, c, 4. To. 1. p, 792. Plut. l. de E. I. To. 1. p. 686.
• * 1.1121

  Plut. l. de Ani∣mae, procreat, To. 3. p, 102.
• * 1.1122

  Trismeg. Pi∣mand. Dial. 12. p, 452.
• * 1.1123

  Macrob. l. 2. de Som: Scip. cap, 2. p, 88.
• * 1.1124

  Trismeg. Asclep. c, 8. p, 506.
• * 1.1125

  c, 1. p, 475.
• * 1.1126

  Arist. l. 13. Met. c. 8 To. 2.
• a 1.1127

  p, 1522.
• b 1.1128

  p, 1520.
• * 1.1129

  Iust. Mart. lib. Quaest. & R••sp. Quaest. 113. To. 3. p, 137,
• * 1.1130

  Ia. 1. 17.
• * 1.1131

  Io. Pic. Mirand. in Heptaplo. l. 3. c. 1. p, 17.
• * 1.1132

  Trismeg Piman. Dial. 41. p, 396
• * 1.1133

  Dan. 7. 9.
• * 1.1134

  Dionys. l. de Nom. Diuin. c. 13. p, ••. 9.
• * 1.1135

  330.
• * 1.1136

  Macrob. l. 1. in Som. Scip. c. 6. p. 16.
• * 1.1137

  Io. ••ic. Mir. l. de Ente & Vno. p. 172.
• * 1.1138

  Phil. Iud. l. De special. Leg. p. 1987.
• * 1.1139

  Lib. 2. Cap. 1. Sect. 1.
• * 1.1140

  Cic. l. 2, de Nat. Deor. p. ••07.
• * 1.1141

  Arist. l. 2. Phys. c. 9. To. 2. p. 440.
• * 1.1142

  Iust. Mart. in Con••utat. dog∣mat. Aristot. To. 1. p, 303.
• * 1.1143

  Palingen. in A∣quario. p, 329.
• * 1.1144

  Cic. vbi suprà.
• * 1.1145

  Psalme 19.
• * 1.1146

  Plato, in Epi∣nome p, 915.
• * 1.1147

  The motion of the Starres is very orderly.
• * 1.1148

  Arist. l. de Mun∣d. To. 2. p, 1565.
• * 1.1149

  Psalme 1486. Plato, in Timaeo. p. 710.
• * 1.1150

  Cic. l. 2. de Nat. Deor. p, 207.
• * 1.1151

  Macrob. l. 2, de Som. S••p. c. 1 p. 83.
• * 1.1152

  Senec. l. de prou. c. 1. p. 1▪ ••
• * 1.1153

  Cic. l. ••. de diu••••. p. 243.
• * 1.1154

  Manil. l. 1. p, 15.
• * 1.1155

  p, 16.
• * 1.1156

  Senec. Herc. Fur. Act. 5. p. 52.
• * 1.1157

  Act. 4. p. 37.
• * 1.1158

  Plato in Epino∣me. p. 915.
• * 1.1159

  Cic. l. 2. De Nat. Deor. p. 209.
• * 1.1160

  The motion of the Starres hath the resem¦blance of a Daunce.
• * 1.1161

  Cic. l. 2. De Nat. Deor. p. 208.
• * 1.1162

  Cic. l. 2. de Nat. Deor. p, 208. 215
• * 1.1163

  Aristop. in Nub. Act. 1. Sce. 3 p, 169. Plato in Timaeo, p, 709.
• * 1.1164

  Philo Iud. l. de Cherub. p, 157.
• * 1.1165

  1. Sam. 6. 14
• * 1.1166

  Palin. in Aquar. p, 323.
• * 1.1167

  Max. Tyr. S••r. 25. p, 303.
• * 1.1168

  Plat, in Epinome p. 915
• * 1.1169

  Psal. 33. 6
• * 1.1170

  Iob 26. 13.
• * 1.1171

  Act. 17. 28
• * 1.1172

  Cic. l. 1. Acad. p, 7.
• * 1.1173

  Plut. l. 1. de plac. c. 7. To. ••. p, 16
• * 1.1174

  Vir. l. 6 Aeneid▪ p, 267▪
• * 1.1175

  Ier. 23. 24. Wis. 1. 7.
• * 1.1176

  Max. Tyr. Serm. 21▪ p. 256.
• * 1.1177

  Senec. Hippolyt. Act. 3. Sce. 4. p. 206.
• * 1.1178

  Bartas in his Columnes. p. 493.
• * 1.1179

  The motion of the Heauens produceth an Harmonie. Cap. 12. Sect. 1.
• * 1.1180

  Arist. l. 2, de Coelo. c. 9. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. 1. p 588.
• * 1.1181

  Cic. l. 3. De Nat. Deor. p. 229.
• * 1.1182

  Plut. l. de Mu∣sica. To. 2. p. 707.
• * 1.1183

  Cic. l. 2. de Nat. Deor. p, 205.
• * 1.1184

  Plato. l 10 De. Rep. p. 670.
• * 1.1185

  Macr••. b. l. 2. de Som. Scip. c. 3. p. 90.
• * 1.1186

  Max. Tyr. Serm. 21. p, 256.
• * 1.1187

  Lucian., lib. de Astrologi••▪ p, 166. B.
• * 1.1188

  Iob. 38. 37.
• * 1.1189

  Pliny lib 2. cap, 3. p, 1.
• * 1.1190

  Arist. l. 2. de Coelo, c. 9. To. 1. p, 587.
• * 1.1191

  Arist. l. de Mun∣do, To. 2. p. 1569.
• * 1.1192

  Cic. l. 2. de Nat. Deor. p, 229.
• * 1.1193

  Cic. l. 2. de Nat. Deor. p, 218.
• * 1.1194

  Macrob. l. 2. de Som. Scip. c. 1. p. 83. &c.
• * 1.1195

  Ibid. c, 1. 2, 3, 4.
• * 1.1196

  Beda, lib. de Musica practi∣ca, To. 1. p, 417.
• * 1.1197

  Boetius, l de Musica. c. 2. p, 1374.
• * 1.1198

  Anselm l. de Imagine Mundi. cap. 24. To. 3. p, 300.
• * 1.1199

  Senec. l. de Pro∣uidentia, c, 1. p, 1.
• * 1.1200

  Plut. in vita Anton. To. 3. p, 148.
• * 1.1201

  Max. Tyr. Serm ••3. p. 280.
• * 1.1202

  Wis. 11. 17.
• * 1.1203

  Arist. l. 1. de Coe∣lo, c. 9. To. 1. p, 567.
• * 1.1204

  Arist. l. 2. de Coe∣lo, c. 9. To. 2. p, 587.
• * 1.1205

  Macr••b. l. 2. de Som. Scip. c. 1. p. 83.
• * 1.1206

  Ibid.
• * 1.1207

  Eph. 4. 19.
• * 1.1208

  Col. 3. 16.
• * 1.1209

  Greg. Nys••in ••••exam. p, 222.
• * 1.1210

  Arist. lib. 2. de 〈◊〉〈◊〉. c. 9. To. 1. p. 587.
• * 1.1211

  Plut. lib. de primo frigido. To. 2. p. 615.
• * 1.1212

  Arist. l. de mun∣do. To. 2. p, 1570.
• * 1.1213

  Anselm. in pros∣olog. cap. 17. To. 3. p, 32.
• * 1.1214

  Com. ••atal. l. 9. Mythol. c. 7. p. 982
• * 1.1215

  The motions of the Stars haue led many vnto God.
• * 1.1216

  Suidas in voce Abraham p. 6.
• * 1.1217

  Arist. l. 2. De Coelo. c. 12. To. 1. p. 590.
• * 1.1218

  Clem. Alex. l. 5. Strom. p. 282.
• * 1.1219

  Ibid.
• * 1.1220

  Philo Iudaeus. lib De Gigant. p. 408.
• * 1.1221

  Lucian. l. 1. p. 13.
• * 1.1222

  Lucian. l. De Astronom. p. 167
• * 1.1223

  Cic. l. 2. De Nat. Deor. p. 214.
• * 1.1224

  Seneca. lib. De Prouodent. c. 1. p. 1.
• * 1.1225

  Cic. l. l. de. Nat. Deor. p. 203.
• * 1.1226

  Plut. l. 1. de Pla∣citis. c. 6▪ T. 2. p 13.
• * 1.1227

  Cic. l. 4. Acad. p. 38.
• * 1.1228

  Bradward. l. 1. c. 1. p. 137.
• * 1.1229

  The motion of the Heauens, is not by Chance. Arist. ••. 2. Phys. c. 8. To. 1. p. 439. Natura duplex. Al••era quidetm, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 Ma••eria▪ altera, vt. F••rma•• Nihil est tam contrarium ra∣••••••▪ & con∣stantiae, quàm Fortuna.
• * 1.1230

  Cic. l. 2. De Di∣vinat. p. 265.
• * 1.1231

  Cic. l. 2. de Nat. Deor. p, 218.
• * 1.1232

  Cic. l. 1. Tusc. p, 117.
• * 1.1233

  Cic. l. 2. de Nat. Deor. p, 213.
• * 1.1234

  Non•••••• in voce Explica••e. p, 1654.
• * 1.1235

  Lactan. l. 2. c. 5. p, 84.
• * 1.1236

  Cic. vbi suprà.
• * 1.1237

  Cic. l. 2. de Leg. p, 322.
• * 1.1238

  Cic. l. 2. de Nat. Deor. p, 218.
• * 1.1239

  The motion of the Starres, is not by their owne will, but by Gods.
• * 1.1240

  Horat. l. 1. Epist. Ep. 12. ad Icci∣••m, p, 111.
• * 1.1241

  Lucret. l. 5. p, 199.
• * 1.1242

  Iay, 45. 9. Ieren••y, 18. 6. Romanes, 9. 21.
• * 1.1243

  Lyr•• egregiè resonantes non sentiunt. Dioge∣nes. Stob. Serm. 23. p, 190.
• * 1.1244

  Iust. Mart. lib. cont. D••gmata Aristot. T••. 1. p, 304. Dionys. Are∣pag. l. de Diuin. Nom. c. 4. p, 227.
• * 1.1245

  Mat. 5. 45.
• * 1.1246

  Senec. l. 4. de Benefic. c. 25. p, 60.
• * 1.1247

  Lib. 2. Cap. 1. Sect. 6. Psal. 104. 19.
• * 1.1248

  Genebrard. in locum Psalmi. Basil. in Psal. 103. To. 2. p. 253.
• * 1.1249

  Baruch, 6. 59.
• * 1.1250

  Gen. 8. 22.
• * 1.1251

  Aquin. 1. Quaest. 105. Arct. 1. p. 218.
• * 1.1252

  Theoph. Antioch. l. 1. ad Autolic. Bib. Pat. To. 5. p. 125.
• * 1.1253

  Philo Iud. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. de Mundi opific. p. 13.
• * 1.1254

  Lact. l. 2. c. 5. p. 8. 4.
• * 1.1255

  Ibid. p. 83. Ibid. p. 84.
• * 1.1256

  Aesop. fab.
• * 1.1257

  Senec. l. 1. Nat. Quaest▪ in prae∣sa•• p 3.
• * 1.1258

  Cic. l. 2. de Nat. Deor. p, 2 15.
• * 1.1259

  Cic. l. 1. Tusc. p, 117.
• * 1.1260

  Sto••eus, lib. Eclog. •• hys••e, 5. p, 7.
• * 1.1261

  Pla••••. in Epi∣n••me, p, 915.
• * 1.1262

  Arist. l. 2. de 〈◊〉〈◊〉, c. 1. To. 1. p, 578.
• * 1.1263

  Max. Tyr. Serm. 32. p. 392.
• * 1.1264

  Ibid. p. 577.
• * 1.1265

  Paling. in A∣quar. p, 328.
• * 1.1266

  Plato in Ciuili. p••duobus a principio folijs.
• * 1.1267

  Arist. l. de Coelo c. 8. To. 1. p. 587.
• * 1.1268

  Plato. in Timaeo.
• * 1.1269

  Plut. l. 1. de placit. Philosoph. c. 1. p. 4.
• * 1.1270

  Boet. l. 3. De Consolat. Metr. 3. p. 1042.
• * 1.1271

  Aristoph in Ra∣nis. Act. 3. Sce. 1. p. 271.
• * 1.1272

  Athenaeus. lib. 14. p, 471.
• * 1.1273

  Plut. lib. de Mu∣sita. To. 2. p, 708.
• * 1.1274

  The Harmony of the ••eauens lib. 2, c. 11. Sect. 4.
• * 1.1275

  Macrob. l. 2. de Som. Sc••p. c 3. p, 9•• 92.
• * 1.1276

  Plato in Timaeo, p, 707.
• * 1.1277

  Macrob. vbi suprà, c. 2. p, 87. 89.
• * 1.1278

  Ibid. c. 3. p. 91.
• * 1.1279

  A••selm. ••rosol. c. 17. To. 3. p, 32. Lib. 2. c. 11. Sect. 4.
• * 1.1280

  The Harmony of the Ele∣ments. Plut. l. de primo Frigido, To. 2. p, 615. Vt Artifex erga ar••em, sic D••us se habet erga Harmoni••m, Arist••us. Sto••. lib. Eclo••. Phys. cap, 24. p, 45.
• * 1.1281

  Manil▪ l. 1. Astro••••. p, 5.
• * 1.1282

  Ouid l. 1. Me∣••am. p, 35.
• * 1.1283

  Hora••. Li. Epist. ad I••cium, p, 111. a. Seneca l. 7. Nat. Quaest. c. 27. p, 117.
• * 1.1284

  Manil. vbi su∣prà.
• * 1.1285

  Arist. l. de Mun∣do, To. 2. p, 1565.
• * 1.1286

  Stobae••. Serm. 101. p.
• * 1.1287

  Arist. vbi suprá.
• * 1.1288

  Hugo de Victo∣re. l. 7. didasc. Erudit. c. 4. To. 3. p, 18. N.
• * 1.1289

  Exod. 9. 31. & 7. 19. 20. 21. & 8. 24. 13. 14.
• * 1.1290

  Wisd. 19. 17.
• * 1.1291

  1. Cor. 12. 26.
• * 1.1292

  Hugo. de vict. l. 7. Erudit. didasc c. 4. To. 3. p. 18. N
• * 1.1293

  The Harmony of compoun∣ded Bodyes.
• * 1.1294

  Phrygius. l. 8. Physic. p. 165. &c Plut. Symposiac. l. 2. Quaest. 7. To. 3 Mor. p. 200. Aelian. l. 8. De Animal. c. 27.
• * 1.1295

  Ovid. l. 1. Me∣tam. p. 2.
• * 1.1296

  Aug. l. 11. de Civit. Dei. c. 18. To. 5. p. 630.
• * 1.1297

  2. Cor. 6. 8. &c.
• * 1.1298

  Terent. E. unuch Act. 2. Sce. 2. p. 61. a.
• * 1.1299

  Tertul. l. 1. cont. Marcion. c. 16. p. 357.
• * 1.1300

  Ecclus. 33. 3.
• * 1.1301

  Ecclus. 33. 14
• * 1.1302

  Trismeg. Pi∣mand. Dial. 10. p, 424.
• * 1.1303

  Varro l. 4. de lingua. Lat. p, 5.
• * 1.1304

  Arist, l. 1. Meta∣phys. cap. 5. To. 2. p, 1376.
• * 1.1305

  Arist. ibid.
• * 1.1306

  Arist. l. 1. Phys. c. 5. To. 1. p, 419.
• * 1.1307

  Arist. l. 1. de Mundo. To. 2. p, 1564.
• * 1.1308

  Ibid. p, 1564.
• * 1.1309

  Ibid. p, 1565.
• * 1.1310

  Ibid. p, 1565.
• * 1.1311

  Senec. Epist. 108. p, 269.
• * 1.1312

  Trismeg. Asclep. c. 6. p, 495.
• * 1.1313

  Max. Tyr. Serm. 27. p, 319.
• * 1.1314

  All Creatures are naturally delighted with Musicke.
• * 1.1315

  Horat. l. de Ar••e Pocl. p. 174. B.
• * 1.1316

  Psal. 104. 12. 24.
• * 1.1317

  Cato. l. 1. p.
• * 1.1318

  Plin. l. 11. c. 20. Aelian. l. 5. de. Animalae. 13.
• * 1.1319

  Aelian l. 7. De Animal. c. 23.
• * 1.1320

  Idaem. l. 12. c. 41.
• * 1.1321

  Iob. 39. 28.
• * 1.1322

  〈◊〉〈◊〉. l. 6. De. An••••al. c. 10. 〈◊〉〈◊〉. l. 2. c. 41.
• * 1.1323

  〈…〉〈…〉.
• * 1.1324

  Aelian. l. 18. de Animal. c. 46. p, 269.
• * 1.1325

  Macrob. l. ••. de Som. 〈…〉〈…〉. p. 91.
• * 1.1326

  Aelian. l. 6. de. Animal. c. 30.
• * 1.1327

  Idem. l. 17. c. 16. Plin. l. 11. c. 37.
• * 1.1328

  Plut. l. de Sol••r∣tia Animal. To. 3 p. 90.
• * 1.1329

  Herodot. l. 1. Item Plut. In Conviv••o. To. 1 p. 373.
• * 1.1330

  Plini. l. 9. c. 8.
• * 1.1331

  Plut. in Conui∣uio, 7. Sap. To. 1. p, 377.
• * 1.1332

  Item lib: de Solert. Animal. To. 3. p, 90, &c.
• * 1.1333

  Stobaeus Serm. 29. p, 209.
• * 1.1334

  Arist. l. 8. Pol. c, 5. To. 2. p, 902.
• * 1.1335

  Macrob. l. 2. de Som. Scip. c. 3. p, 91.
• * 1.1336

  Athena{us}, l. 14. ••, 465.
• * 1.1337

  I. Samuel, 16. 23.
• * 1.1338

  2. Kings, 3. 15.
• * 1.1339

  Bartas in his Colum. p, 495.
• * 1.1340

  Ouid l. 3. Fast.
• * 1.1341

  Macrob. l. 2. de Som. Scip. c. 3. p, 91.
• * 1.1342

  Arist. l. 8. Pol. c. 5. To. 2. p, 902.
• * 1.1343

  Ouid. l. 4. Trist. ••leg. 1.
• * 1.1344

  Max. Tyr. Serm. 21. p, 252. Plato. l. 3. de Re∣pub, p, 564.
• * 1.1345

  Athenaeus l. 14. p, 471.
• * 1.1346

  Arist. vbi supra. p, 903.
• * 1.1347

  Cic. l. 1. Tusc.
• * 1.1348

  Seminar. Philo∣soph. To. 2. p, 415.
• * 1.1349

  Balthasar de Aulico. l. 1. p.
• * 1.1350

  Macrob. vblsu∣pr••.
• * 1.1351

  Beda. l. De Mu∣sica Practic. To. 1. p. 418.
• * 1.1352

  Athenaeus. l. 14. p. 465.
• * 1.1353

  A. Gel. l. 4. c. 13. p. 71.
• * 1.1354

  All Creatures praise God with their Na∣turall Musicks. Lib. 1. Cap. 16. Sect. 3.
• * 1.1355

  Proclus l. de. Sa∣crific. p. 275.
• * 1.1356

  Bartas. Day. 5. p. 175.
• * 1.1357

  Plin. l. 8. c. 1.
• * 1.1358

  Aelian. l. 7. de Animal. c. 39.
• * 1.1359

  Aelian. l. 4. De Animal. c. 9.
• * 1.1360

  Psal. 148. 2.
• * 1.1361

  Psal. 148. 11.
• * 1.1362

  Psal. 148. 10.
• * 1.1363

  Psal. 148. 4.
• * 1.1364

  Psal. 148. 3.
• * 1.1365

  Psal. 148. 9.
• * 1.1366

  Psal. 174. 7.
• * 1.1367

  Psal. 174. 8.
• * 1.1368

  Psal. 98 4.
• * 1.1369

  Psal. 98 7.
• * 1.1370

  Psal. 98 8.
• * 1.1371

  Psal. 98 1.
• * 1.1372

  Te••tul. l. co••t. Hermo••. c. 44. p. 243.
• * 1.1373

  Ecclus. 40. 21.
• * 1.1374

  Gen. 4. 21.
• * 1.1375

  Plut. l. de. Mu∣sica. To. p. 688.
• * 1.1376

  Plut. ibid. p. 694.
• * 1.1377

  Plut. in Sympos. l. 1 Quaest. 5. To. 3. p. 168.
• * 1.1378

  Plut. l. de Super∣sl••t. To. 1. p. 384.
• * 1.1379

  Macrob. l. 2. de Som. Scip. c. 3. p. 90.
• * 1.1380

  Hesiod. in Theo∣gon. p, 80.
• * 1.1381

  Ibid, p, 128.
• * 1.1382

  Mat. 9. 23.
• * 1.1383

  Homer, l. 8 Odys. p, 202.
• * 1.1384

  Senec. l. 4. de Benefic. c. 6. p, 50.
• * 1.1385

  Psal. 1506.
• * 1.1386

  Homer, l 13. Iliad. p: 494. In Graecolat.
• * 1.1387

  Max. Tyr. Serm. 22. p. 264.
• * 1.1388

  Plut. l. de. Musi∣c••. To. 2. p. 682.
• * 1.1389

  p. 689.
• * 1.1390

  Bion Eidyl. 3. p. 318.
• * 1.1391

  The chiefest▪ end of Musick is to praise God with it.
• * 1.1392

  Eph. 5. 19. Col. 3. 16.
• * 1.1393

  Psal 92.
• * 1.1394

  Psal. 4. 5. 6. 9.
• * 1.1395

  Psal. 150. 3. 4. 5.
• * 1.1396

  Aug. l. 2. de Doct. Christ. To. 3. c. 17 Isidor. l. 2. Orig. c. 18.
• * 1.1397

  Beda, lib. de Musica Practia. Tom 1. p. 417.
• * 1.1398

  Plut. lib. de Mu∣sica To. 2. p. 707.
• * 1.1399

  Psal. 116, 12, 13
• * 1.1400

  Plut. vbì suprà. p. 681.
• * 1.1401

  Hesiod in Theo∣gon. p 78.
• * 1.1402

  Trismeg. in Asclap. c. 5. p. 490.
• * 1.1403

  Athenaeus. l. 14. p. 471.
• * 1.1404

  Plut. vbi. sup. p. 697.
• * 1.1405

  Macrob. l. 2. de Som. Scip. c. 3. p. 90.
• * 1.1406

  Plut. vbi. sup. p. 689.
• * 1.1407

  Max. Tyr. Serm. 21. p. 257.
• * 1.1408

  Arist. l. 8. Pol. c. 7 To. 2. p. 905.
• * 1.1409

  Aelian. l. 12. De Animal. c. 42. p. 268.
• * 1.1410

  Galen. l. de vsu part.
• * 1.1411

  Trismeg.
• * 1.1412

  Macrob. vbi suprà.
• * 1.1413

  Apoc. 19. 1.
• * 1.1414

  4. 5. 6: 7.
• * 1.1415

  Theod••r••t lib. de Martyr. To. 2. p. 541.
• * 1.1416

  Porp••yr. lib. 10. Respons. apud Pausam. lib. de Osculo. cap. 40. p. 202.
• * 1.1417

  Lilly Gramma∣tica.
• * 1.1418

  Grammer sheweth There is a God.
• * 1.1419

  Herod. l. 2. p.
• * 1.1420

  Plut. l. 1. de Placitis, c. 17. To. 2. p. 15.
• * 1.1421

  Purchas, Pilgrim▪ lib. 1. c. 8. p, 40.
• * 1.1422

  Luke, 11. 11. 12.
• * 1.1423

  Aug. l. de Ma∣gistro. c. 5. To. 1. Cicero de Fini∣••us p. 142. b••
• * 1.1424

  Gen. 2. 19.
• * 1.1425

  Stobaus Serm. 101. p. 556.
• * 1.1426

  Cic. lib. 1. Tusc.
• * 1.1427

  Plato, in Cratylo. Aug. l. 2. de Do•••• Christ. c. 18. To. 3.
• * 1.1428

  Aug. l. 2. De Or∣dine c. 12. To. 1. Haec Literarum ••lementa•• inve∣nit. Theod. Serm. 4. de prouid. pro pesinem.
• * 1.1429

  Cic. l. de. Orat. 85. B. Nizol.
• * 1.1430

  Stob. Serm. 79. p. 469.
• * 1.1431

  Theod. Serm. 4. de Provident.
• * 1.1432

  Stobaeu•• Serm. 79. p, 469.
• * 1.1433

  Ovid, l. 5. de Trist.
• * 1.1434

  Stob. Serm. 79. p, 496.
• * 1.1435

  Ibid. p, 468.
• * 1.1436

  Cic. l. 1. Tusc.
• * 1.1437

  Stobaens Serm. 101. p, 556.
• * 1.1438

  Plato. in Phile∣bo. p, 85. Item in Phaedro. p, 463.
• * 1.1439

  Pacian. Epist. 2. ••ib. Pat. To. 1. p, 30••.
• * 1.1440

  Logicke pro∣ueth, There is a God.
• * 1.1441

  Roding•••• in Dialecticam Ra••i.
• * 1.1442

  Cic. Aca. p. 45. a. Cic. de Clar O∣rat. 194. a. Ni∣zol.
• * 1.1443

  Cic. l. de Fin. p. 68. a. Nizol. Aug. l. 2. de Or∣dine c. 13. To. 1. p. 489.
• * 1.1444

  Cic. l. de Fin. p. 68▪ a.
• * 1.1445

  Stobae{us}. Serm. 81. prope finem.
• * 1.1446

  Arist. l. 1. Topic. cap. 2.
• * 1.1447

  Ang. lib. 2. de Ordi••••. c. 13. To. 1.
• * 1.1448

  Cic. lib. de Fin. p. 105. ••. Nizol. Cic. lib. de Orat. p. 123▪ a.
• * 1.1449

  Aug. l. 2. de Doct. Christ. c. 32. To. 3.
• * 1.1450

  Stobae. Serm. 79. p. 47••.
• * 1.1451

  Ficin. Argum. in Euthyd••mo.
• * 1.1452

  Stobaeus Serm. 7a. p, 471.
• * 1.1453

  Rhetorick is the Gift of God. Lib. 2. c. 1. Sect. 8. fin.
• * 1.1454

  Plato in Epinom 913. p.
• * 1.1455

  Dionys. l. de. Di∣uin. Nom. c. 13. p. 332.
• * 1.1456

  Cic. l. 1. de. Orat. p. 146.
• * 1.1457

  Isai. 50. 4.
• * 1.1458

  Cic. l. 1. Tusc. p. 117.
• * 1.1459

  Pindar. Pythi••∣rum Od. 1. p. 187.
• * 1.1460

  Orig. contra Celsum. l. 6. 4. fol. aet. finem.
• * 1.1461

  Ex. 4. 10. 11.
• * 1.1462

  Mat. 10. 19. 20.
• * 1.1463

  Act. 2. 4.
• * 1.1464

  1. Cor. 1. 24. lo. 1. 9.
• * 1.1465

  Euseb. l. 13. de Praeparat. c. 7. p. 278.
• * 1.1466

  Heb. 1. 3.
• * 1.1467

  Cic. l. 1. de Orat. p. 127. Damasc. l. de Logica, c. 3. p. 419.
• * 1.1468

  Plato, in So∣phist. princip.
• * 1.1469

  Psal. 111.
• * 1.1470

  Stobae{us}. Serm 1. p. 15.
• * 1.1471

  Arist. l. 3. de Theolog. c. 4. Pansa. c. 45. Arist. l. 1. Me∣taph. c. 1.
• * 1.1472

  Clem. Alex. l. 6. Strom. p. 298.
• * 1.1473

  Damascen. l. de Logica, c. 3. p. 419. I.
• * 1.1474

  Aug. l. 8. de Ci∣vil. Dei, c. 9. To. 5. p. 450.
• * 1.1475

  Theodoret in Hist. Sanctorum Patrum To. 2. fin.
• * 1.1476

  Trismeg. Asclep. c. 6. p. 494. Plato in Lyside. sin.
• * 1.1477

  Iust. Mart. Dial. cum Tryphon. To. 2 p. 30. Arist. l. 1. Ethic. c. 7.
• * 1.1478

  Arist. l 2. Me∣taph. c: 2.
• * 1.1479

  Stobae{us}, Serm. 11. p. 134.
• * 1.1480

  Iohn 14.
• * 1.1481

  Iohn 17.
• * 1.1482

  Arist. l. 1. Rhetor. ad Theodect. c. 1. m.
• * 1.1483

  Cic. de Orat. p. 103. a. Item in lib. de Vniuerso. Senec. Epist. 14.
• * 1.1484

  Psalme 37. 27.
• * 1.1485

  Cic. Tusc. 228. b. 191. a. 177 a.
• * 1.1486

  Cic. Tusc. 228. b. Cic. de Fin. 90. b. Cic. in Pison. 95. a.
• * 1.1487

  Cic. de Orat. 148 a.
• * 1.1488

  Manil. l. 2.
• * 1.1489

  Cic. l. de Divin. p. 125. a. Cic. de Nat. Deor. p. 75. b.
• * 1.1490

  Zeeged. loc. com. p. 10.
• * 1.1491

  Acts 17. 25.
• * 1.1492

  1. Cor. 1. 24.
• * 1.1493

  Iohn 16. 13.
• * 1.1494

  Hebrewes 1. 3.
• * 1.1495

  Acts 17. 28.
• * 1.1496

  Cic. l. 1. Tusc. p. 117.
• * 1.1497

  Clem. Alex. l. 1. Strom. p. 136.
• * 1.1498

  Cic. l. de Vnivers. p. 204. a.
• * 1.1499

  Senec. Epist. 14.
• * 1.1500

  Poetry is the Gift of God.
• * 1.1501

  Cic. de Divin p. 97. b.
• * 1.1502

  Plato in Io••e. pr.
• * 1.1503

  Max. Tyr. Serm. 16. p. 194.
• * 1.1504

  p. 195.
• * 1.1505

  Cic. Orat. pro Archia Poeta. p. 189. a.
• * 1.1506

  Ovid l. 1. Me∣tam. p. 39.
• * 1.1507

  Hom. l. 1. Iliad.
• * 1.1508

  Odys. l. 1.
• * 1.1509

  Plato, in Convi∣vio. p. 417.
• * 1.1510

  Virg. Eclog. 1. p. 1.
• * 1.1511

  Horat. p. 18.
• * 1.1512

  Ovid l. 6. Fast.
• * 1.1513

  Ovid. l. 3. de Arte Amandi.
• * 1.1514

  Theocrit cidyl. 10. p. 110.
• * 1.1515

  All A••t•• ac∣knowledged to be the gifts of God.
• * 1.1516

  Salust, in Cice∣ron.
• * 1.1517

  Cic. l. 2. de Nat. Deor. p. 212.
• * 1.1518

  L. Apuleus, l. de Munde. Pansa, p. 97.
• * 1.1519

  Pansa. c. 3. p. 10.
• * 1.1520

  Stobaus Eclog. Phys. c. 3. p. 3.
• * 1.1521

  Phil•• Iud. p. 198.
• * 1.1522

  Stob Eclog. Phys. c. 11. p. 17.
• * 1.1523

  Orpheus in Pansa c. 19. p. 79.
• * 1.1524

  Iames 1. 17.
• * 1.1525

  Psalme 36. 9. 94. 10.
• * 1.1526

  Daniel 2. 21.
• * 1.1527

  Daniel 1. 17. 1. Kings 3. 12. 4 30. 31. 32. 33.
• * 1.1528

  Isay 50. 4.
• * 1.1529

  Aristoph in Nub. Act. 1. Sce. 2. p. 163. Aelian p. 423.
• * 1.1530

  Euseb l. 13. de Prapar. c. 7. p. 278. Lib. 2. c. 1. Sect. 8.
• * 1.1531

  Mechanicall Arts are the gifts of God.
• * 1.1532

  Trisineg. Pi∣mand. Dial. 10. p. 424.
• * 1.1533

  Senec. l. 4. de Be∣nesic. c. 6. p. 50.
• * 1.1534

  Cl••m. Alex. l. 5. Strom. p, 281.
• * 1.1535

  Iob 32. 8.
• * 1.1536

  Arist. l. 12. de Theol. cap 15.
• * 1.1537

  Arist. l. 8. de Theol. cap. 8.
• * 1.1538

  Plato. in Convi∣vio. p. 428.
• * 1.1539

  Pol. Virg de. In∣vent. l. 3. c. 6. p. 227.
• * 1.1540

  Virg. l. 1. Georg. p. 36.
• * 1.1541

  Diod. Sic. l. 6.
• * 1.1542

  Gen. 6. 14. Psal. 127. 1.
• * 1.1543

  Virg. Eclog. 3. p. 8.
• * 1.1544

  Ex. 35. 32, 33.
• * 1.1545

  35.
• * 1.1546

  Ex. 35. 31.
• * 1.1547

  34.
• * 1.1548

  Isay 54. 16.
• * 1.1549

  Theodoret. Ser. 4. de Provident. To. 2. p. 591. Zanch, l, de Ope∣ribus Dei p. 61••••