De laudibus legum Angliæ writen by Sir Iohn Fortescue L. Ch. Iustice, and after L. Chancellor to K. Henry VI. Hereto are ioind the two Summes of Sir Ralph de Hengham L. Ch. Iustice to K. Edward I. commonly calld Hengham magna, and Hengham parua. Neuer before publisht. Notes both on Fortescue and Hengham are added

ARistotle in the first Booke of his natu∣rall Philosophie saith, that then wee suppose our selues to haue the know∣ledge of euery thing, when wee know the cau∣ses and beginnings there∣of euen to the princi∣ples, vppon the which text the Commentatour saith, that the Philoso∣pher by beginnings or principles did vnderstād the causes efficient, by the terme Causes hee vn∣derstood causes finall, and by Elements, mat∣ter and forme. But in the Lawe there are not matter and forme, as in things naturall and compound. How bee it there be in them certaine Elements, out of y^e which they proceede as out of

matter and forme, these are customes, statutes, and the Law of nature, of the which al the lawes of the realme haue their begin∣ning, euen as all naturall things haue of matter & forme, and as all things that are written and read do cōsist of letters, which also are called elements. But principles, or be∣ginnings, which are as the Commentarie saith, causes efficient, they are certaine vniuersal propo∣sitiōs, which they, that be learned in the Lawes of England, & likewise the Mathematicals do terme Maximes: the Rhethorici∣ans doe call the same Pa∣radoxes: & the Ciuilians terme them rules of the law. These in deede can∣not be proued by force of

arguments, or by demon∣strations Logicall: But as it is said in the second booke of Posterioum, they are knowne by induction by the way of sense and memorie. Wherefore in the first booke of his na∣turall Philosophy, Ari∣stotle saith, that prin∣ciples are not made of others, nor one of them of another, but all other bee made of them, And accor∣ding thereunto in the first booke of his Topikes he writeth, that euery prin∣ciple is a sufficient proofe of it selfe. And there∣fore the Phylosopher saith, that such as denie them, ought not to be dis∣puted or reasoned with∣all: because that as hee writeth in the sixth booke

of his Moral phylosophie, there is no reason to be gi∣uen for principles. Wher∣fore whatsoeuer they bee that couet to profit in the knowledge of any facul∣ties, they must néeds first be furnished with princi∣ples. For by thē are ope∣ned the causes final, vnto the which by y^• direction of reason, through the knowledge of the princi∣ples, we do attaine; wher∣fore these thrée, viz. Prin∣ciples, Causes, and Ele∣ments, being vnknowne, the science, whereof they are, is altogether vnkno∣wen. And the same thrée being known, the science also, whereof they are, is thought to bee knowne, not determinatly or pre∣cisely, but superficially

after a confuse & vniuer∣sall sort.

Thus wee thinke our selues to haue the know∣ledge of Gods Lawes, when wee vnderstand our selues to know saith, charitie, and hope, and also the Sacraments of the Church, and the Commaundementes of GOD, leauing to the Prelates of the Church the other misteries of Theologie. Wherefore the LORD saith vnto his Disciples: To you it is giuen to knowe the mysterie of the king∣dome of GOD, but to others in Parables, that seeing they may not see, &c. And the Apostle saith, Not to bee wi∣ser, then it behooueth. And in an other place,

Not being high in wise∣dome. In like manner, O most worthy Prince, it shall not bee needfull for you with long studie to search out the secret mysteries of the Law of England, It shall suf∣fice for you, as you haue profited in grammer, so also to profit in Law, Unto the perfection of Grammer, springing out of Etimologie, Ortho∣graphie, Prosodie, and Construction, as out of foure fountaines, you haue not exactly attay∣ned▪ and yet you are so sufficiently grounded in grammer, that you may well bee called a Gram∣marian. Likewise shall you bee well worthie to be called a Lawier, if you search out the principles

and causes of the Lawes, euen to the elements, af∣ter the manner of a scho∣lar or a learner. For it shall not be needful or ex∣pedient for you by the tra∣uell of your owne wit, to studie out the hid myste∣ries of the Law, But let that geare be left to your Iudges and men of law, which in the Realme of England are called Ser∣ieants at Law, and to other professors of y^e Law com∣monly called Apprenti∣ces: For you shall better execute iudgements by o∣ther, then by your selfe: Neither hath it been seen that any King of Eng∣land hath pronounced iudgement with his own mouth, And yet neuerthe∣lesse y^e iudgements of the Realme are his, though

by other they bee vttered and pronounced, Like as also King Iosaphat affir∣med the sentences of all the Iudges to be the iudge∣ments of God. Wherfore, most gracious Prince, you shall in short time with little labour bee sufficiently learned in the Lawes of England, so that you doe apply your minde to the optai∣ning thereof. For Se∣neca in an Epistle to Lu∣cillus, saith: There is nothing which earnest trauell and diligent care atchiueth not. And so well doe I know the prompt towardnesse of your nature, that I dare bee bolde to say, that in those Lawes (though the exact knowledge of them such as is required in iud∣ges

can skant bee gotten in the space of xx. yéeres) you shal sufficiētly in one yere attain to so much vn∣derstanding as is conue∣nient for a prince. Nei∣ther in the meane time shal you neglect and omit the study of martiall dis∣cipline, whereunto you are so feruently giuen, but during all the same yere in stead of recreatiō you shall vse the practise thereof at you pleasure.