CHAP. 44.
Of the Sanctity of Doctrine; and the supposed absurdities of our profession.
THese notes are, Sanctity and efficacie of doctrine, our own confession, miracles, and predictions, the felicity and infelicity of such as defend or impugne the trueth; and lastly, the holy and religious conversation of the Professours of the truth. Let vs take a view of these in such sort and order, as they are proposed by them. They place in the front the Sanctity and efficacie of doctrine.
A lyer (they say) should haue a good memory; but surely our adversaries, of all the lyers that euer were, haue the worst memories: by reason whereof e∣uery second page of their writings, if not euery second line, is a refutation of the first. Bellarmine divideth his tract of the notes of the Church, into two parts. In the first he sheweth, what things are required in the notes of the Church, and there he saith, trueth and Sanctity of doctrine is no note of the Church. In the latter, he doth particularly assigne the notes, whereby he suppo∣seth the Church may be knowne, and reckoneth truth, sanctitie, and efficacie of doctrine, amongst the rest. But let vs pardon him this ouersight, and see how he proueth by this note, that we are not, and that their faction is, the true Church of God.
Our doctrine is false, absurd, and vnreasonable; and theirs, full of truth, rea∣son, and equitie: Therefore our Churches are not the true Churches of God, and theirs are. Both parts of the Antecedent of this argument we deny. For, he shall neuer bee able to proue the absurdities he imputeth vnto vs; but we are able to demonstrate against him, that the whole course of Popish doctrine is most absurd, false and impious.
But least hee should seeme to say nothing, hee produceth foure instances, wherein he supposeth there is apparant and very grosse absurditie. The first he proposeth in this sort: The Protestants teach, that a man is justified by speci∣all faith, whereby he perswadeth himselfe that he is just. Now then he reaso∣neth thus; When men beginne to beleeue, either they are just, and then their faith justifieth not, being in nature after their justification, and finding them already just, when it beginneth; or else they are not just, and then speciall faith making a man beleeue he is just, is false, and so a man is justified by a lye. To this horned argument wee answere, that speciall faith hath sundry actes, but to this purpose specially two: the one, by way of petition humbly intreating for acceptation and fauour; the other, in the nature of comfortable assurance, consisting in a perswasion that that is graunted, which was desired. Faith, by her first act, obtaineth and worketh our justification, and doeth not finde vs just when wee beginne to beleeue: by her second act, shee doeth not actiuely justifie, but finding the thing done, certifieth and assureth vs of it, and so is no lying perswasion, as this lying companion is pleased to pro∣nounce it to bee. So then, speciall faith in her first act, which is a kinde of petition, is before justification, and procureth or obtaineth it, but then shee hath not the perswasion of it; in her second act, shee presupposeth the