The theory of moral sentiments: By Adam Smith, ...

Title

The theory of moral sentiments: By Adam Smith, ...

Author

Smith, Adam, 1723-1790.

Publication

London :: printed for A. Millar; and A. Kincaid and J. Bell, in Edinburgh,

1759.

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Link to this Item

https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eccodemo/k111361.0001.001 content_copy

Cite this Item

"The theory of moral sentiments: By Adam Smith, ..." In the digital collection Eighteenth Century Collection Online Demo. https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eccodemo/k111361.0001.001. University of Michigan Library Digital Collections. Accessed June 13, 2024. content_copy

Contents

• half title
• title page
• CONTENTS.
  • PART I. OF the Propriety of Action.
  • PART II. Of merit and demerit; or of the objects of reward and punishment.
  • PART III. Of the foundation of our judgments concerning our own sentiments and conduct, and of the sense of duty.
  • PART IV. Of the effect of utility upon the sen|timent of approbation.
  • PART V. Of the influence of custom and fashion upon the sentiments of moral approbation and disapproba|tion.
  • PART VI. Of Systems of Moral Philosophy.
• PART I. Of the PROPRIETY of ACTION.
  • SECTION I. Of SYMPATHY.
  • SECT. II. Of the sentiment by which we ap|prove or disapprove of the pas|sions and affections of other men, as suitable or unsuitable to their objects.
    • CHAP. I. Of the pleasure of mutual SYMPATHY.
    • CHAP. II. Of the manner in which we judge of the propriety or impropriety of the affections of other men, by their concord or disso|nance with our own.
    • CHAP. III. The same subject continued.
    • CHAP. IV. Of the amiable and respectable virtues.
  • SECTION III. Of the degrees of the different passions which are consistent with propriety.
    • INTRODUCTION.
    • CHAP. I. Of the passions which take their origin from the body.
    • CHAP. II. Of those passions which take their origin from a particular turn or habit of the imagination.
    • CHAP. III. Of the unsocial passions.
    • CHAP. IV. Of the social passions.
    • CHAP. V. Of the selfish passions.
  • SECTION IV. Of the effects of prosperity and adver|sity upon the judgment of mankind with regard to the propriety of action; and why it is more easy to obtain their approbation in the one state than in the other.
    • CHAP. I. That though our sympathy with sorrow is generally a more lively sensation than our sympathy with joy, it commonly falls much more short of the violence of what is felt by the person prin|cipally concerned.
    • CHAP. II. Of the origin of ambition, and of the distinction of ranks.
    • CHAP. III. Of the stoical philosophy.
• PART II. Of MERIT and DEMERIT; or, of the Objects of REWARD and PU|NISHMENT.
  • SECTION I. Of the sense of merit and demerit.
    • INTRODUCTION.
    • CHAP. I. That whatever appears to be the proper object of gratitude, appears to deserve reward; and that, in the same manner, whatever appears to be the proper ob|ject of resentment, appears to deserve punishment.
    • CHAP. II. Of the proper objects of gratitude and resentment.
    • CHAP. III. That where there is no approbation of the conduct of the person who confers the benefit, there is little sympathy with the gratitude of him who receives it: and that, on the contrary, where there is no disapprobation of the motives of the per|son who does the mischief, there is no sort of sympathy with the resentment of him who suffers it.
    • CHAP. IV. Recapitulation of the foregoing chapters.
    • CHAP. V. The analysis of the sense of merit and de|merit.
  • SECTION II. Of justice and beneficence.
    • CHAP. I. Comparison of those two virtues.
    • CHAP. II. Of the sense of justice, of remorse, and of the consciousness of merit.
    • CHAP. III. Of the utility of this constitution of na|ture.
  • SECT. III. Of the influence of fortune upon the sen|timents of mankind, with regard to the merit or demerit of actions.
    • INTRODUCTION.
    • CHAP. I. Of the causes of this influence of fortune.
    • CHAP. II. Of the extent of this influence of fortune.
    • CHAP. III. Of the final cause of this irregularity of sentiments.
• PART III. Of the foundation of our judgments concerning our own sentiments and conduct, and of the sense of duty.
  • SECT. I. Of the consciousness of merited praise or blame.
  • SECT. II. In what manner our own judgments re|fer to what ought to be the judgments of others: And of the origin of general rules.
  • SECT. III. Of the influence and authority of the ge|neral rules of morality, and that they are justly regarded as the laws of the Deity.
  • CHAP. IV. In what cases the sense of duty ought to be the sole principle of our conduct; and in what cases it ought to concur with other motives.
• PART IV. Of the EFFECT of UTILITY upon the sentiment of approbation.
  • SECT. I. Of the beauty which the appearance of UTI|LITY bestows upon all the productions of art, and of the extensive influence of this species of beauty.
  • SECT. II. Of the beauty which the appearance of uti|lity bestows upon the characters and acti|ons of men; and how far the perception of this beauty may be regarded as one of the original principles of approbation.
• PART V. Of the INFLUENCE of CUSTOM and FASHION upon the sentiments of moral approbation and disappro|bation.
  • SECT. I. Of the Influence of custom and fashion upon our notions of beauty and deformity.
• PART VI.
  • SECTION II. Of the influence of custom and fashion upo moral sentiments.
• PART VII. Of Systems of MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
  • SECT. I. Of the questions which ought to be exami|ned in a theory of moral sentiments.
  • SECT. II. Of the different accounts which have been given of the nature of virtue.
    • INTRODUCTION.
    • CHAP. I. Of those systems which make virtue in propriety.
    • CHAP. II. Of those systems which make virtue consist in prudence.
    • CHAP. III. Of those systems which make virtue con|sist in benevolence.
    • CHAP. IV. Of licentious systems.
  • SECTION III. Of the different systems which have been formed concerning the principle of appro|bation.
    • INTRODUCTION.
    • CHAP. I. Of those systems which deduce the principle of approbation from self-love.
    • CHAP. II. Of those systems which make reason the prin|ciple of approbation.
    • CHAP. III. Of those systems which make sentiment the principle of approbation.
  • SECTION IV. Of the manner in which different authors have treated of the practical rules of morality.
• ERRATA.