part of men are incapable; and though it fails of absolute perfection, it may be a much nearer approximation towards per|fection, than what, upon such trying oc|casions, is commonly either to be found or to be expected.
In all cases of this kind, when we are determining the degree of blame or ap|plause that seems due to any action, we very frequently make use of two different standards. The first is the idea of com|plete propriety and perfection, which, in those difficult situations, no human con|duct ever did, or ever can come up to; and in comparison with which the actions of all men must forever appear blameable and imperfect. The second is the idea of that degree of proximity or distance from this complete perfection, which the actions of the greater part of men commonly arrive at. Whatever goes beyond this degree, how far soever it may be removed from absolute perfection, seems to deserve ap|plause; and whatever falls short of it, to deserve blame.
It is in the same manner that we judge of the productions of all the arts which ad|dress themselves to the imagination. When
