to which such exact rules can properly be given; it is this virtue, that has chiefly fallen under the consideration of those two different sets of writers. They treat of it, however, in a very different manner.
Those who write upon the principles of Jurisprudence consider only what the person to whom the obligation is due ought to think himself entitled to exact by force, what every impartial spectator would approve of him for exacting, or what a judge or arbiter to whom he had submitted his case, and who had un|dertaken to do him justice, ought to oblige the other person to suffer or to perform. The casuists on the other hand do not so much examine what it is that might properly be exacted by force, as what it is that the per|son who owes the obligation ought to think himself bound to perform from the most sa|cred and scrupulous regard to the general rules of justice, and from the most conscien|tious dread, either of wronging his neighbour, or of violating the integrity of his own cha|racter. It is the end of jurisprudence to pre|scribe rules for the decisions of judges and arbiters. It is the end of casuistry to prescribe rules for the conduct of a good man. By observing all the rules of jurisprudence, sup|posing
