IT was observed in the third part of this discourse, that the rules of justice are ••he only rules of morality which are precise ••nd accurate; that those of all the other vir|••ues are loose, vague, and indeterminate; ••hat the first may be compared to the rules ••f grammar; the others to those which ••ritics lay down for the attainment of what 〈◊〉〈◊〉 sublime and elegant in composition, and which present us rather with a general idea ••f the perfection we ought to aim at than ••fford us any certain and infallible directions 〈◊〉〈◊〉 acquiring it.
As the different rules of morality admit ••uch different degrees of accuracy, those ••uthors who have endeavoured to collect and ••igest them into systems have done it in two ••ifferent manners, and one set has followed ••••rough the whole that loose method to which ••••ey were naturally directed by the considera|tion
