as in some measure morally evil. It must be allowed, therefore, that, at least in this one case, the coincidence or opposition of senti|ments between the observer and the person observed, constitutes moral approbation or disapprobation. And if it does so in this one case, I would ask, why not in every other? or to what purpose imagine a new power of perception in order to account for those senti|ments?
Against every account of the principle of approbation which makes it depend upon a peculiar sentiment distinct from every other, I would object; that it is strange that this sen|timent, which providence undoubtedly in|tended to be the governing principle of hu|man nature, should hitherto have been so little taken notice of, as not to have got a name in any language. The word moral sense is of very late formation, and cannot ••et be considered as making part of the En|glish tongue. The word approbation has but within these few years been appropriated to ••enote peculiarly any thing of this kind. In ••ropriety of language we approve of what|••ver is entirely to our satisfaction, of the form ••f a building, of the contrivance of a ma|••hine, of the flavour of a dish of meat. The
