of its proper object. The same thing holds true with regard to disapprobation. Our hor|ror for cruelty has no sort of resemblance to our contempt for mean-spiritedness. It is quite a different species of discord which we feel at the view of those two different vices, between our own minds and those of the person whose sentiments and behaviour we consider.
Secondly, I have already observed, that not only the different passions or affections of the human mind that are approved or disap|proved of, appear morally good or evil, but that proper and improper approbation appear to our natural sentiments to be stampt with the same characters. I would ask, therefore, how it is, that, according to this system, we approve or disapprove of proper or improper approbation. To this question, I imagine there is but one reasonable answer, which can possibly be given. It must be said th•••• when the approbation with which our neigh|bour regards the conduct of a third 〈◊〉〈◊〉 coincides with our own, we approve of his approbation and consider it as in some me••|sure morally good, and that on the contra•••• when it does not coincide with our own ••••••|timents, we disapprove of it, and consider
