INTRODUCTION.
AFTER the inquiry concerning the na|ture of virtue, the next question of importance in Moral Philosophy, is concern|ing the principle of approbation, concerning the power or faculty of the mind which ren|ders certain characters agreeable or disagree|able to us, makes us prefer one tenor of con|duct to another, denominate the one right and the other wrong, and consider the one as the object of approbation, honour and re|ward; the other as that of blame, censure and punishment.
Three different accounts have been give•• of this principle of approbation. Accord|ing to some, we approve and disapprove 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of our own actions and of those of others from self-love only, or from some view 〈◊〉〈◊〉 their tendency to our own happiness or d••••|advantage: according to others▪ reason, 〈◊〉〈◊〉
