they show a want of sufficient attention to the happiness of our neighbour.
Besides all this Dr. Hutcheson * 1.1 observed, that whenever in any action, supposed to proceed from benevolent affections, some other motive had been discovered, our sense of the merit of this action was just so far di|minished as this motive was believed to have influenced it. If an action supposed to pro|ceed from gratitude, should be discovered to have arisen from an expectation of some new favour, or if what was apprehended to pro|ceed from public spirit, should be found out to have taken its origin from the hope of a pecuniary reward, such a discovery would entirely destroy all notion of merit or praise-worthiness in either of these actions. Since, therefore, the mixture of any selfish motive, like that of a baser alloy, diminished or took away altogether the merit which would otherwise have belonged to any action, it was evident, he imagined, that virtue must consist in pure and disinterested benevo|lence alone.
When those actions, on the contrary, which are commonly supposed to proceed
