too that even the weaknesses of bene|volence are not very disagreeable to us, whereas those of every other passion are al|ways extremely disgusting. Who does not abhor, excessive malice, excessive selfishness, or excessive resentment? But the most ex|cessive indulgence even of partial friendship is not so offensive. It is the benevolent pas|sions only which can exert themselves with|out any regard or attention to propriety, and yet retain something about them which is en|gaging. There is something pleasing even in mere instinctive good-will which goes on to do good offices without once reflecting whether by this conduct it is the proper ob|ject either of blame or approbation. It is not so with the other passions. The moment they are deserted, the moment they are unaccom|panied by the sense of propriety, they cease to be agreeable.
As benevolence bestows upon those ac|tions which proceed from it a beauty superior to all others, so the want of it, and much more the contrary inclination communicates a peculiar deformity to whatever evidences such a disposition. Pernicious actions are of|ten punishable for no other reason than be|cause
