is no more than discreet and prudent conduct with regard to our neighbours.
Such is the doctrine of Epicurus concern|ing the nature of virtue. It may seem ex|traordinary that this philosopher, who is de|scribed as a person of the most amiable man|ners, should never have observed, that, what|ever may be the tendency of those virtues, or of the contrary vices with regard to our bodily ease and security, the sentiments which they naturally excite in others are the objects of a much more passionate desire or aversion than all their other consequences; That to be amiable, to be respectable, to be the proper object of esteem, is by every well-disposed mind more valued than all the ease and secu|rity which love, respect and esteem can pro|cure us; That, on the contrary, to be odious, to be contemptible, to be the proper object of indignation, is more dreaded than all that we can suffer in our body from hatred, con|tempt or indignation; and that consequently our desire of the one character, and our aver|sion to the other, cannot arise from any regard ••o the effects which either of them is likely ••o produce upon the body.
