the spectator, by the utmost effort of huma|••ity, could sympathize with it. The stoics, ••n the contrary, appear to have regarded every ••assion as improper, which made any demand ••pon the sympathy of the spectator, or re|••uired him to alter in any respect the natural ••nd ordinary state of his mind, in order to ••eep time with the vehemence of its emo|••••ons. A man of virtue, they seem to have ••ought, ought not to depend upon the ge|••erosity of those he lives with for pardon or ••pprobation.
According to the stoics every event ought, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 a wise man, to appear indifferent, and what 〈◊〉〈◊〉 its own sake could be the object neither 〈◊〉〈◊〉 desire, nor aversion, neither of joy, nor ••••rrow. If he preferred some events to 〈◊〉〈◊〉, if some situations were the objects of 〈◊〉〈◊〉 choice, and others of his rejection * 1.1, it 〈◊〉〈◊〉 not, because he regarded the one as in ••••emselves, in any respect better than the other, 〈◊〉〈◊〉 thought that his own happiness would be ••ore compleat in what is called the fortu|••••te, than in what is commonly regarded as 〈◊〉〈◊〉 distressful situation; but because the 〈◊〉〈◊〉 of action, the rule which the gods had
