The theory of moral sentiments: By Adam Smith, ...

in the character, it can reflect no great ho|nour upon the performer. When we deno|minate a character generous, or charitable, or virtuous in any respect, we mean to signify that the disposition expressed by each of those appellations is the usual and customary dispo|sition of the person. But single actions of any kind, how proper and suitable soever, are of little consequence to show that this is the case. If a single action was sufficient to stamp the character of any virtue upon the person who performed it, the most worthless of mankind might lay claim to all the virtues; since there is no man who has not, upon some occasions, acted with prudence, justice, tem|perance and fortitude. But tho' single actions, how laudable soever, reflect very little praise upon the person who performs them, a single vitious action performed by one whose conduct is usually very regular, greatly dimi|nishes and sometimes destroys altogether our opinion of his virtue. A single action of this kind sufficiently shows that his habits are not perfect, and that he is less to be depended upon than from the usual train of his be|haviour we might have been apt to imagine.