The theory of moral sentiments: By Adam Smith, ...

in the habitual mediocrity of the affec|tions according to right reason. Every par|ticular virtue, according to him, lies in a kind of middle between two opposite vices, of which the one offends from being too much, the other from being too little affected by a particular species of objects. Thus the virtue of fortitude or courage lies in a middle be|tween the opposite vices of cowardice and of presumptuous rashness, of which the one of|fends from being too much, and the other from being too little affected by the objects of fear. Thus too the virtue of frugality lies in a middle between avarice and profusion, of which the one consists in an excess, the other in a defect of the proper attention to the objects of self-interest. Magnanimity, in the same manner, lies in a middle between the ex|cess of arrogance and the defect of pusillani|mity, of which the one consists in too extrava|gant, the other in too weak a sentiment of our own worth and dignity. It is unnecessary to ob|serve that this account of virtue corresponds too pretty exactly with what has been said above concerning the propriety and impro|priety of conduct.