authors, therefore virtue consists in pru|dence.
Another set of authors make virtue consist in those affections only which aim at the happiness of others, not in those which aim at our own. According to them, therefore, disinterested benevolence is the only motive which can stamp upon any action the cha|racter of virtue.
The character of virtue, it is evident, must either be ascribed indifferently to all our af|fections when under proper government and direction, or it must be confined to some one class or division of them. The great divi|••ion of our affections is into the selfish and ••he benevolent. If the character of virtue ••herefore cannot be ascribed indifferently to ••ll our affections when under proper govern|••ent and direction, it must be confined either ••o those which aim directly at our own pri|••ate happiness, or to those which aim di|••ectly at that of others. If virtue, therefore, ••oes not consist in propriety, it must consist ••ither in prudence or in benevolence. Be|••••des these three, it is scarce possible to ima|••ine that any other account can be given of ••he nature of virtue. I shall endeavour to 〈◊〉〈◊〉 hereafter how all the other accounts,
