••rudent pursuit of our own real and solid happiness, as has been the opinion of others?
We examine the second question, when we consider, whether the virtuous character, whatever it consists in, be recommended to ••s by self-love, which makes us perceive that his character, both in ourselves and others, ••ends most to promote our own private inter|••st; or by reason, which points out to us the ••ifference between one character and another, ••n the same manner as it does that between ••ruth and falshood; or by a peculiar power ••f perception, called a moral sense, which his virtuous character gratifies and pleases, ••s the contrary disgusts and displeases it; or ••ast of all, by some other principle in human ••ature, such as a modification of sympathy, ••r the like.
I shall begin with considering the systems which have been formed concerning the ••••rst of these questions, and shall proceed af|••erwards to examine those concerning the ••econd.
