The sentiment or affection of the heart from which any action proceeds, and upon which its whole virtue or vice must ulti|mately depend, may be considered under two different aspects, or in two different relations; first, in relation to the cause that excites it, or the motive that gives oc|casion to it; and secondly, in relation to the end that it proposes, or the effect that it tends to produce.
In the suitableness or unsuitableness, in the proportion or disproportion which the affection seems to bear to the cause or ob|ject which excites it, consists the propriety or impropriety, the decency or ungrace|fulness of the consequent action.
In the beneficial or hurtful nature of the effects which the affection aims at, or tends to produce, consists the merit or demerit of the action, the qualities by which it is en|titled to reward, or is deserving of punish|ment.
Philosophers have, of late years, consider|ed chiefly the tendency of affections, and have given little attention to the relation which they stand in to the cause which ex|cites them. In common life, however, when we judge of any person's conduct, and of
