is ultimately founded upon a sympathy or correspondence of this kind. I shall give an instance in things of a very frivolous na|ture, because in them the judgments of mankind are less apt to be perverted by wrong systems. We may often approve of a jest, and think the laughter of the com|pany quite just and proper, though we our|selves do not laugh, because, perhaps, we are in a grave humour, or happen to have our attention engaged with other objects. We have learned, however, from experience, what sort of pleasantry is upon most occasions capable of making us laugh, and we observe that this is one of that kind. We approve, therefore, of the laughter of the company, and feel that it is natural and suitable to its object; because, though in our present mood we cannot easily enter into it, we are sensible that upon most occasions we should very heartily join in it.
The same thing often happens with re|gard to all the other passions. A stranger passes by us in the street with all the marks of the deepest affliction; and we are imme|diately told that he has just received the news of the death of his father. It is impossible that, in this case, we should not
