our approbation; and that the sentiment of approbation always involves in it a sense of propriety quite distinct from the perception of utility. We may observe this with regard to all the qualities which are approved of as virtuous, both those which, according to this system, are originally valued as useful to ourselves, as well as those which are esteem|ed on account of their usefulness to others.
The qualities most useful to ourselves are first of all superior reason and understand|ing, by which we are capable of discerning the remote consequences of all our actions, and of forseeing the advantage or detriment which is likely to result from them: and se|condly, self-command, by which we are en|abled to abstain from present pleasure or to endure present pain, in order to obtain a greater pleasure or to avoid a greater pain in some future time. In the union of those two qualities consists the virtue of prudence, of all the virtues that which is most useful to the individual.
With regard to the first of those qualities, it has been observed upon a former occasion that superior reason and understanding are originally approved of as just and right and accurate, and not meerly as useful or ad|vantageous.
