a regard to general rules; and in what cases some other sentiment or affection ought to concur, and have a principal in|fluence.
The decision of this question, which cannot, perhaps, be given with any very great accuracy, will depend upon two dif|ferent circumstances; first, upon the na|tural agreeableness or deformity of the sen|timent or affection which would prompt us to any action independent of all regard to general rules; and secondly, upon the precision and exactness, or the looseness and inaccuracy of the general rules them|selves.
I. First, I say, it will depend upon the natural agreeableness or deformity of the affection itself, how far our actions should arise from it, or entirely proceed from a regard to the general rule.
All those graceful and admired actions, ••o which the benevolent affections would prompt us, ought to proceed as much from the passions themselves, as from any regard to the general rules of conduct. A benefactor thinks himself but ill requit|ed, if the person upon whom he has be|••towed his good offices, repays them merely
