The theory of moral sentiments: By Adam Smith, ...

There is no appeal from the eye with re|gard to the beauty of colours, nor from the ear with regard to the harmony of sounds, nor from the taste with regard to the agreeableness of flavours. Each of those senses judges in the last resort of its own objects. Whatever gratifies the taste is sweet, whatever pleases the eye is beau|tiful, whatever sooths the ear is harmoni|ous. The very essence of each of those qualities consists in its being fitted to please the sense to which it is addressed. It be|longs to our moral faculties, in the same manner to determine when the ear ought to be soothed, when the eye ought to be indulged, when the taste ought to be gra|tified, when and how far every other prin|ciple of our nature ought either to be in|dulged or restrained. What is agreeable to our moral faculties, is fit and right, and proper to be done; the contrary, wrong, unfit and improper. The sentiments which they approve of, are graceful and becom|ing: the contrary, ungraceful and unbe|coming. The very words right, wrong, fit, improper, graceful, unbecoming, mean only what pleases or displeases those fa|culties.