of justice to the existence of society, how obvious soever that necessity may appear to be.
That it is not a regard to the preserva|tion of society, which originally interests us in the punishment of crimes committed against individuals, may be demonstrated by many obvious considerations. The con|cern which we take in the fortune and hap|piness of individuals does not, in common cases, arise from that which we take in the fortune and happiness of society. We are no more concerned for the destruction or loss of a single man, because this man is a member or part of society, and because we should be concerned for the destruction of society, than we are concerned for the loss of a single guinea, because this guinea is a part of a thousand guineas, and be|cause we should be concerned for the loss of the whole sum. In neither case does our regard for the individuals arise from our regard for the multitude; but in both cases our regard for the multitude is com|pounded and made up of the particular regards which we feel for the different in|dividuals of which it is composed. As when a small sum is unjustly taken from
