for these purposes, nor can the spectator ever go along with it when it is exerted for any other. But the meer want of the be|neficent virtues, though it may disappoint us of the good which might reasonably be expected, neither does, nor attempts to do, any mischief from whch we can have oc|casion to defend ourselves.
There is, however, another virtue, of which the observance is not left to the freedom of our own wills, which may be extorted by force, and of which the viola|tion exposes to resentment, and consequent|ly to punishment. This virtue is justice: the violation of justice is injury: it does real and positive hurt to some particular persons, from motives which are naturally disapproved of. It is, therefore, the pro|per object of resentment, and of punish|ment, which is the natural consequence of resentment. As mankind go along with, and approve of, the violence employed to avenge the hurt which is done by injustice, so they much more go along with, and ap|prove of, that which is employed to pre|vent and beat off the injury, and to re|strain the offender from hurting his neigh|bours. The person himself who meditates
