As we cannot indeed enter thoroughly into the gratitude of the person who re|ceives the benefit, unless we beforehand approve of the motives of the benefactor, so, upon this account, the sense of merit seems to be a compounded sentiment, and to be made up of two distinct emotions; a direct sympathy with the sentiments of the agent, and an indirect sympathy with the gratitude of those who receive the bene|fit of his actions.
We may, upon many different occa|sions, plainly distinguish those two differ|ent emotions combining and uniting toge|ther in our sense of the good desert of a particular character or action. When we ••ead in history concerning actions of pro|per and beneficent greatness of mind, how ••agerly do we enter into such designs? How much are we animated by that high-spi|••ited generosity which directs them? How ••een are we for their success? How grieved at ••heir disappointment? In imagination we become the very person whose actions are ••epresented to us: we transport ourselves ••n fancy to the scenes of those distant and forgotten adventures, and imagine our|selves acting the part of a Scipio or a Ca|millus,
